Missile Defense
DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-09-856 September 16, 2009In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) began developing and rapidly fielding a global Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) composed of elements that include radars, interceptors, and command and control systems. These elements are envisioned to be linked together to defend against a broad range of ballistic missile threats. In 2009, DOD began a broadly scoped review of missile defense policy and strategy intended to reassess the BMDS and set direction for the future. In response to congressional interest in missile defense requirements and operations, GAO reviewed the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the types and quantities of elements and interceptors it needs and (2) established the units to operate elements that have been put into use. GAO reviewed key analyses, studies, plans, and other documents from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the services, combatant commands, and Joint Staff; and interviewed officials from across DOD.
DOD lacks the comprehensive analytic basis needed to make fully informed decisions about the types and quantities of elements and interceptors it needs. Such an analytic basis would include a comprehensive examination of the optimal mix of elements and interceptors needed to meet all of DOD's ballistic missile defense requirements. DOD studies prepared to date were completed for specific purposes, such as addressing regional threats. However, none of the studies have taken a comprehensive approach that addressed the full range of requirements. The Joint Staff conducted studies, for example, to identify the minimum interceptor quantities needed for certain ballistic missile defense elements designed to defend against short-to-intermediate-range threats. Additionally, the combatant commands have analyzed their ballistic missile defense requirements for their specific regions, and the services have studied requirements for specific elements. Without a full assessment of its overall requirements, DOD lacks the information it needs to make the best possible policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions for ballistic missile defense. DOD has faced challenges in fully establishing units to operate five of eight ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into operational use. DOD typically requires that major weapon systems be fielded with a full complement of organized and trained personnel. To rapidly field missile defenses, however, DOD has in some cases put ballistic missile defense elements into operational use before first ensuring that the military services had created units and trained servicemembers to operate them. Three of the eight elements were modifications to existing systems, like the Navy's Aegis ships, so units already existed to operate these modified elements. The five remaining elements--the midcourse defense system designed to defend the United States from long-range threats; the high-altitude, theater missile defense system; a powerful radar placed on a sea-based, movable platform; ground-based radars currently fielded in Japan and Israel; and the command and control system designed to link the BMDS together--were put into use before operational units were fully established. As a result, DOD has faced a number of challenges. For example, the Army faced personnel shortfalls to operate the midcourse defense system. These shortages affected the Army units' ability to support ongoing research and development activities and ultimately resulted in operational readiness concerns. MDA and the military services are taking steps to establish the needed forces, but this may take years for some elements. DOD recognizes the challenges created by putting elements into early use, but has not set criteria requiring that operational units be in place before new elements are made available for use. Looking ahead, several new elements are in development, like the radars and interceptors currently being considered for deployment in Europe, and emerging threats could again cause DOD to press those capabilities into use. Unless fully trained units are in place to support missile defense elements when they are made operational, DOD will continue to face uncertainties and operational risks associated with the elements.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-856, Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities
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Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2009:
Missile Defense:
DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and Establish Operational
Units before Fielding New Capabilities:
GAO-09-856:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-856, a report to the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) began developing and rapidly
fielding a global Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) composed of
elements that include radars, interceptors, and command and control
systems. These elements are envisioned to be linked together to defend
against a broad range of ballistic missile threats. In 2009, DOD began
a broadly scoped review of missile defense policy and strategy intended
to reassess the BMDS and set direction for the future. In response to
congressional interest in missile defense requirements and operations,
GAO reviewed the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the types and
quantities of elements and interceptors it needs and (2) established
the units to operate elements that have been put into use. GAO reviewed
key analyses, studies, plans, and other documents from the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA), the services, combatant commands, and Joint
Staff; and interviewed officials from across DOD.
What GAO Found:
DOD lacks the comprehensive analytic basis needed to make fully
informed decisions about the types and quantities of elements and
interceptors it needs. Such an analytic basis would include a
comprehensive examination of the optimal mix of elements and
interceptors needed to meet all of DOD‘s ballistic missile defense
requirements. DOD studies prepared to date were completed for specific
purposes, such as addressing regional threats. However, none of the
studies have taken a comprehensive approach that addressed the full
range of requirements. The Joint Staff conducted studies, for example,
to identify the minimum interceptor quantities needed for certain
ballistic missile defense elements designed to defend against short-to-
intermediate-range threats. Additionally, the combatant commands have
analyzed their ballistic missile defense requirements for their
specific regions, and the services have studied requirements for
specific elements. Without a full assessment of its overall
requirements, DOD lacks the information it needs to make the best
possible policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions for ballistic
missile defense.
DOD has faced challenges in fully establishing units to operate five of
eight ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into
operational use. DOD typically requires that major weapon systems be
fielded with a full complement of organized and trained personnel. To
rapidly field missile defenses, however, DOD has in some cases put
ballistic missile defense elements into operational use before first
ensuring that the military services had created units and trained
servicemembers to operate them. Three of the eight elements were
modifications to existing systems, like the Navy‘s Aegis ships, so
units already existed to operate these modified elements. The five
remaining elements”the midcourse defense system designed to defend the
United States from long-range threats; the high-altitude, theater
missile defense system; a powerful radar placed on a sea-based, movable
platform; ground-based radars currently fielded in Japan and Israel;
and the command and control system designed to link the BMDS together”
were put into use before operational units were fully established. As a
result, DOD has faced a number of challenges. For example, the Army
faced personnel shortfalls to operate the midcourse defense system.
These shortages affected the Army units‘ ability to support ongoing
research and development activities and ultimately resulted in
operational readiness concerns. MDA and the military services are
taking steps to establish the needed forces, but this may take years
for some elements. DOD recognizes the challenges created by putting
elements into early use, but has not set criteria requiring that
operational units be in place before new elements are made available
for use. Looking ahead, several new elements are in development, like
the radars and interceptors currently being considered for deployment
in Europe, and emerging threats could again cause DOD to press those
capabilities into use. Unless fully trained units are in place to
support missile defense elements when they are made operational, DOD
will continue to face uncertainties and operational risks associated
with the elements.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOD perform a comprehensive analysis
identifying its requirements for BMDS elements and interceptors and
require, in the absence of an immediate threat, the establishment of
operational units before making elements available for use. In comments
on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with GAO‘s
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856] or key
components. For more information, contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-
3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
DOD Identified Its Initial Ballistic Missile Defense Needs but Has Not
Determined Its Overall Ballistic Missile Defense Requirements:
Force Structure Not Fully in Place for Some Units Operating Ballistic
Missile Defense Elements:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements That MDA Has Delivered to
the Combatant Commands for Operational Use as of July 2009:
Figure:
Figure 1: Benefits of Integration:
Abbreviations:
Aegis BMD: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense:
BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System:
C2BMC: Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications:
DOD: Department of Defense:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
THAAD: Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 16, 2009:
The Honorable Jim Langevin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Michael Turner:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Since 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) has emphasized the
development and fielding of a globally integrated, interconnected, and
layered Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) composed of "elements"
that include radars, interceptors, and command and control systems,
[Footnote 1] which together are to be capable of addressing all ranges
of threatening ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.[Footnote 2]
With the submission of the fiscal year 2010 defense budget to Congress,
DOD announced its intention to strike a new balance between developing
new ballistic missile defense capabilities and fielding what it
believes to be proven and effective weapon systems. The Missile Defense
Agency's (MDA) $7.8 billion budget request for fiscal year 2010
emphasized the fielding of specific BMDS elements to defend against
near-term threats from rogue states and threats to U.S. forces and
population centers abroad. For example, the Secretary of Defense
announced that DOD's budget request added $900 million to more rapidly
acquire and field the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) elements and their
associated interceptors, while reducing investments in some
developmental programs designed to address longer-term threats. As the
military services increasingly take responsibility from MDA for these
and other elements as they transition from research and development to
operations, the cost to the services for operating and maintaining
ballistic missile defense elements is likely to grow; typically, such
costs account for 70 percent of a weapon system's life-cycle costs.
To assist the subcommittee in its review of DOD's approach to
acquiring, fielding, and operating ballistic missile defenses, you
asked us to review DOD's overall requirements to perform worldwide
ballistic missile defense missions. We focused on the types and
quantities of ballistic missile defense elements (including inventories
of interceptors) and the organizations, personnel, and training needed
to operate these elements. Specifically, in addressing its overall
force structure requirements, we reviewed the extent to which DOD has
(1) identified the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense
elements and interceptors that it needs for performing ballistic
missile defense missions and (2) established the units to operate
elements that have been put into use. To determine the extent to which
DOD has identified the types and quantities of ballistic missile
defense elements and interceptors that it requires, we identified,
obtained, and reviewed key MDA and Joint Staff studies identifying
ballistic missile defense requirements. We performed our analysis by
comparing DOD's analytical and funding approaches for ballistic missile
defense against criteria for establishing a knowledge-based approach to
acquiring major weapon systems, which provides evidence that
warfighting requirements are valid and can be met with chosen concepts
that are developed and produced within existing resources.[Footnote 3]
The documentation we reviewed also included direction and guidance from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and MDA; MDA
plans for developing ballistic missile defenses; and direction from the
Deputy Secretary of Defense outlining the BMDS Life Cycle Management
Process. To determine the extent to which DOD has established the units
needed to operate ballistic missile defense elements that have been put
into use, we identified, reviewed, and assessed MDA development plans
and fielding schedules, Joint Staff orders, and U.S. Strategic Command
processes and plans for evaluating the operational performance of
ballistic missile defense capabilities. The scope of our analysis
included those ballistic missile defense elements that have been
delivered to the combatant commands for operational use as of July
2009.[Footnote 4] For both objectives, we interviewed officials from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, MDA, Army, Navy,
and Air Force. We also obtained documentation from key geographic
combatant commands to understand their operational requirements for
ballistic missile defense elements and service forces, the processes
for establishing these requirements, and any challenges they have had
or expect to encounter in obtaining the capabilities and forces that
they need for operations. The combatant commands we visited were U.S.
Strategic Command and the four geographic combatant commands--U.S.
Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S.
Pacific Command--that have participated in U.S. Strategic Command's
advocacy efforts to identify desirable characteristics and capabilities
for the BMDS. We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to
September 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
In 2002, the President reinforced ballistic missile defense as a
national priority and directed DOD to proceed with plans to develop and
put in place an initial capability beginning in 2004.[Footnote 5] To
expedite the delivery of an operationally capable BMDS, in 2002 the
Secretary of Defense established MDA, granted the agency expanded
responsibility and authority to develop globally integrated
capabilities, directed it to manage all ballistic missile defense
systems then under development, and transferred those systems
controlled by the military services to the agency. The systems
transferred from the services and the new systems whose development MDA
initiates are all considered to be ballistic missile defense elements.
Since its creation in 2002, MDA has developed, fielded, and declared
ready for operations an increasingly complex set of ballistic missile
defenses designed to defend the United States, deployed forces, allies,
and friends from limited ballistic missile attacks. By leveraging
existing service weapon systems and developmental concepts, MDA fielded
an initial defensive capability beginning in 2004 to defend the United
States from a limited, long-range ballistic missile attack. This
initial defensive capability included the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense system of interceptors and fire control systems, Upgraded Early
Warning Radars, sea-based radars installed aboard Aegis cruisers and
destroyers, and an early version of the Command, Control, Battle
Management, and Communications (C2BMC) element. MDA first made these
elements available for operations in April 2005 by establishing the
initial BMDS operational baseline.[Footnote 6] DOD first put these
elements to operational use by activating them in 2006 in response to
North Korean ballistic missile activity. Since that time, DOD has added
some elements to the operational baseline while declaring others ready
for contingencies. Table 1 identifies the fielding locations and dates
that MDA first delivered operational elements to the combatant commands
as of July 2009.
Table 1: Ballistic Missile Defense Elements That MDA Has Delivered to
the Combatant Commands for Operational Use as of July 2009:
BMDS element/lead service: Ground-based Midcourse Defense/Army;
Element description: A ground-based system based on a developmental
program transferred to MDA in 2002 that is designed to protect the U.S.
homeland from intermediate-and intercontinental-range ballistic missile
attacks from North Korea and the Middle East. The element employs
ground-based interceptors to strike at threatening warheads as they
travel through space toward their target(s);
Fielding location(s): Ground-based interceptors located in Alaska and
California; fire control operations centers located in Alaska and
Colorado;
Delivery date: Included in the first operational baseline, published in
April 2005.
BMDS element/lead service: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense/Navy;
Element description: A system that (1) provides a forward-deployed
capability to search, detect, and track ballistic missiles of all
ranges and transmit track data to the BMDS and (2) employs sensors and
interceptors to protect deployed forces and population centers. The
element is based on a modification to existing Navy Aegis ships to
provide these capabilities. The interceptors include the Standard
Missile-3, designed to defend against short-to medium-range missile
threats in the midcourse phase, and a modified Standard Missile-2
interceptor designed to defend against short-range threats in the
terminal phase;
Fielding location(s): Aegis-class Navy destroyers and cruisers
homeported in Japan, Hawaii, California, and Virginia;
Delivery date: Sensor capabilities to support the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense element were included in the first operational
baseline, published in April 2005. Midcourse intercept capabilities
were added to the baseline in November 2006. In September 2008 terminal
defense capabilities were first made available for contingency
operations.
BMDS element/lead service: Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade/Air Force;
Element description: Radar element that provides missile tracking data
to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, in addition to legacy
missions;
Fielding location(s): Alaska;
Delivery date: Included in the first operational baseline, published in
April 2005.
BMDS element/lead service: Upgraded Early Warning Radar/Air Force;
Element description: Radar element that provides missile tracking data
to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, in addition to legacy
Air Force missions;
Fielding location(s): California and United Kingdom;
Delivery date: First radar included in the first operational baseline,
published in April 2005; second radar added to the operational baseline
in December 2007.
BMDS element/lead service: Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications/none designated;
Element description: A networked computer and communications element
developed by MDA to integrate the BMDS by providing deliberate
planning, situational awareness, sensor management, and battle
management capabilities;
Fielding location(s): Multiple combatant commands, the National
Military Command Center, and other regional locations;
Delivery date: Included in the first operational baseline, published in
April 2005.
BMDS element/lead service: AN/TPY-2 Forward-based Radar[A]/Army;
Element description: A transportable, land-based radar, similar in
design to the THAAD radar, which provides advance warning of ballistic
missile launches to the BMDS from forward-based locations;
Fielding location(s): Japan and Israel;
Delivery date: First radar, fielded in Japan, added to the operational
baseline in September 2006; second radar, fielded in Israel, first made
available for contingency operations in November 2008.
BMDS element/lead service: Sea-based X-Band Radar/Navy;
Element description: An MDA-designed element, consisting of a radar
built on a movable sea platform, which is to provide an improved
ability to acquire, track, and discriminate threatening warheads from
decoys, thereby improving the chances of a successful intercept by the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense element;
Fielding location(s): Pacific Ocean (based in Hawaii);
Delivery date: First made available for contingency operations in July
2008.
BMDS element/lead service: Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense/Army;
Element description: A ground-based system based on a developmental
program transferred to MDA in 2002 that is designed to protect deployed
U.S. forces and population centers from short-and medium-range
ballistic missile attacks. The system employs interceptors designed to
strike at threatening missiles both inside and just outside of the
earth's atmosphere;
Fielding location(s): Texas;
Delivery date: First made available for contingency operations in
September 2008.
Source: GAO summary of DOD information.
Note: Does not include the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 element, which
the Secretary of Defense assigned to the Army in 2003 as an operational
system. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 element is designed to
protect deployed U.S. forces from short-range and medium-range
ballistic missile threats.
[A] AN/TPY stands for "Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance."
[End of table]
As table 1 indicates, DOD has designated lead services for seven of the
eight elements that have been delivered to the combatant commands for
operational use; MDA currently plans to retain control of the eighth
element delivered to date--C2BMC--and not transition it to a single
lead service.[Footnote 7] Lead military services are expected to
provide the rest of the military force structure--the organizations,
personnel, and training--required for operations as the elements become
more technically mature.[Footnote 8] Lead military services are also
expected to begin funding operational and support costs as elements
transition from MDA to the services.[Footnote 9]
To develop ballistic missile defense capabilities, MDA both modified
existing service weapon systems to perform ballistic missile defense
missions and developed new elements, many based on previously existing
concepts, expressly for ballistic missile defense purposes. For
example, MDA developed the Upgraded Early Warning Radar and Aegis BMD
elements as modifications to existing service weapon systems, whereas
MDA developed the Ground-based Midcourse Defense and THAAD elements
based on developmental programs transferred to MDA in 2002. MDA has
spent about $56 billion since 2002 to develop these assets.
Additionally, MDA's fiscal year 2010 budget request proposes to develop
more advanced Aegis BMD interceptors capable of addressing intermediate-
range ballistic missile threats, enhance the C2BMC element's
capabilities, and undertake other developmental initiatives, including
research into ascent phase technologies.[Footnote 10] These
developments are likely to affect both element quantities and service
force structure requirements as MDA begins to field these capabilities.
MDA, under the direction and oversight of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, is responsible for
evaluating ballistic missile defense capabilities to determine which
elements are ready to perform military operations, giving the Secretary
of Defense the option of activating elements for operational use.
[Footnote 11] Under MDA's approach, an element is first available for
crisis and contingency operations when it has achieved Early Capability
Delivery, based upon MDA's assessment of element-level tests and its
determination that the element's employment will not degrade other
operational ballistic missile defenses. According to MDA's current
approach, an Early Capability Delivery declaration is the first point
at which an element is made available for operational employment in
defense of the United States and U.S. allies. Subsequently, MDA
declares when an element is added to the operational baseline by
declaring that it has achieved Partial Capability Delivery, and is
capable of day-to-day operations, or Full Capability Delivery meaning
that the element is able to sustain operations over longer periods.
[Footnote 12] In May 2009, MDA updated its approach to making
capability declarations so that it considers not only the agency's own
developmental assessments, but also a U.S. Strategic Command-led
assessment of the element's capabilities and limitations under
operational conditions. MDA's first capability review under this new
approach is expected to occur later in 2009.
Oversight of MDA is executed by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Because MDA is not subject to
DOD's traditional joint requirements determination processes and
because it utilizes flexible acquisition practices, DOD developed
alternative oversight mechanisms. For example, in 2007 the Deputy
Secretary of Defense established the Missile Defense Executive Board,
[Footnote 13] which is to provide the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics or Deputy Secretary of Defense,
as necessary, with a recommended ballistic missile defense strategic
program plan and feasible funding strategy for approval. In September
2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense also established the BMDS Life
Cycle Management Process, and directed the board to use the process to
oversee the annual preparation of a required capabilities portfolio and
develop a program plan to meet the requirements with Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation; procurement; operations and
maintenance; and military construction in defensewide accounts.
DOD is currently undertaking a review of its approach and requirements
for ballistic missile defenses. In the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,[Footnote 14] Congress required
DOD to prepare a review of the ballistic missile defense policy and
strategy of the United States. Among other matters, the congressionally
mandated review is to address the full range of ballistic missile
threats to the United States, deployed forces, friends, and allies; the
organization, discharge, and oversight of acquisition for ballistic
missile defense programs; roles and responsibilities of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies, combatant commands, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and military departments in such programs; DOD's
process for determining the force structure and inventory objectives
for ballistic missile defense programs; the near-term and long-term
affordability and cost-effectiveness of such programs; and the role of
international cooperation on missile defense in the ballistic missile
defense policy and strategy of the United States. Congress required DOD
to provide a report on its review by January 31, 2010.
This report is one in a series of reports we have issued on ballistic
missile defense that have identified key acquisition, management, and
operational challenges associated with the development of the BMDS. In
August 2009 we published a report identifying actions that DOD needs to
take to improve planning and to increase the transparency of total
costs for the proposed European Interceptor Site and European Midcourse
Radar elements.[Footnote 15] In March 2009, we issued our sixth annual
assessment of DOD's progress in developing the BMDS; this report
concluded that although MDA had shown the benefits of its flexible
acquisition practices by fielding and improving upon an initial
ballistic missile defense capability since 2005, this approach also has
limited the ability of DOD and congressional decision makers to measure
MDA's progress on cost, schedule, testing, and performance.[Footnote
16] In September 2008, we found that although DOD had begun preparing
for BMDS operations and support, difficulties in transitioning these
responsibilities from MDA to lead services had complicated long-term
planning to operate and support the elements over their life cycle.
[Footnote 17] In July 2008, we reported that DOD had taken some steps
to address the combatant commands' ballistic missile defense needs, but
had yet to establish an effective process for identifying and
addressing the overall priorities of the combatant commands when
developing ballistic missile defense capabilities.[Footnote 18] We
reported in May 2006 that DOD had begun preparations to operate
ballistic missile defenses, such as identifying lead services, but had
not established the criteria that must be met before the BMDS can be
declared operational.[Footnote 19]
DOD Identified Its Initial Ballistic Missile Defense Needs but Has Not
Determined Its Overall Ballistic Missile Defense Requirements:
DOD has identified its needs for establishing an initial and evolving
ballistic missile defense capability, but lacks the comprehensive
analytic basis needed to make fully informed decisions about the
overall mix of elements and interceptors that it requires. A knowledge-
based decision-making approach can help to provide the comprehensive
analytic basis needed to establish missile defense policies and
strategies and determine funding priorities. For ballistic missile
defense, such an approach would require full examination of the optimal
type and quantity of various ballistic missile defense elements and
interceptors needed to meet all of DOD's requirements--a complex task
due to the many factors that should be considered, including the
evolving nature of the threat and emerging technologies. For example,
the same mix of Aegis BMD ships and THAAD batteries provides different
defensive coverage depending on whether the elements are acting
autonomously or are integrated with another X-band radar. However,
DOD's assessments of missile defense requirements prepared to date were
limited in scope primarily because they were prepared for specific
purposes. The Joint Staff, for example, conducted studies to identify
the minimum interceptor quantities needed for certain ballistic missile
defense elements designed to defend against short-to-intermediate-
range threats. Additionally, the combatant commands have analyzed their
ballistic missile defense requirements for their specific regions, and
the services have studied requirements for specific elements. Without a
comprehensive analytic basis that identifies the full range of
operational type and quantity requirements for ballistic missile
defense elements, DOD may not be acquiring the optimized mix of
elements and interceptors that would provide the most effective missile
defense.
DOD Has Identified the Types and Quantities of Ballistic Missile
Defense Elements Needed for an Initial and Evolving Defensive
Capability:
MDA identified how many and what type of ballistic missile defense
elements were needed to begin fielding an initial set of capabilities
in 2004 and to evolve the BMDS over time. Directed by the President in
2002 to begin fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities
in 2004, MDA undertook the major early assessments that established
DOD's initial and evolving ballistic missile defensive capability,
which formed the foundation of the current BMDS. According to a
February 2004 MDA briefing, the initial defensive capability prepared
in response to the President's policy direction included the Cobra Dane
Radar Upgrade, the Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar, up to 20 ground-
based interceptors located in Alaska and California, command and
control in Colorado, and sea-based radars deployed aboard Aegis ships.
Additionally, based on the President's policy direction and direction
from the Secretary of Defense, also issued in 2002, MDA planned to
expand the initial capability over time. To do so, MDA conducted
internal studies and developed plans in 2002, 2003, and 2004 that
identified the quantities of elements and interceptors it needed for
research and development purposes and to defeat long-range ballistic
missiles from rogue states. As of February 2005, these studies resulted
in plans for fielding 48 ground-based interceptors to address the long-
range ballistic missile threat, with 36 of the interceptors planned for
fielding in Alaska, 2 in California, and 10 in Europe.[Footnote 20] The
studies also resulted in plans to establish a network of sensors--
including radars aboard Aegis ships and land-based radars in North
America, Asia, and Europe. Additionally, MDA planned to build up to 48
THAAD interceptors and 101 Aegis BMD interceptors by the end of
calendar year 2011 as part of its efforts to develop and field
capabilities to defeat short-, medium-, and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles. However, these initial plans did not define DOD's
overall requirements for ballistic missile defense elements and
interceptors. In particular, MDA's analyses were primarily focused on
addressing the requirements of an initial and evolving ballistic
missile defense capability and were not intended to address all of
DOD's operational requirements for performing ballistic missile defense
missions worldwide.
Determining the Quantity of Ballistic Missile Defense Elements and
Interceptors Required for All Missions Involves Many Factors:
Establishing requirements for ballistic missile defense involves
balancing several interrelated factors. A comprehensive analytic basis
would include determining the optimum types and numbers of ballistic
missile defense elements and interceptors for performing missile
defense missions worldwide. However, optimizing the quantities of each
element and interceptor involves many factors, including the
integration of various types of ballistic missile defense elements,
various risk assessments, the potential contributions of friends and
allies, optimizing elements that can address multiple threats, and the
evolving nature of the threat and emerging technologies. Our prior work
shows that a knowledge-based decision-making process can help to
provide the comprehensive analytic basis needed for establishing
funding priorities, including determining the affordability of DOD's
missile defense policies and strategies.[Footnote 21] A knowledge-based
decision-making process includes providing decision makers with
evidence that warfighting requirements are valid, that they can be met
with the chosen weapon system designs, and that the chosen designs can
be developed and produced within existing resources.
Integrated Elements Are More Effective Than Elements Operating
Independently:
Optimizing the numbers and types of each element and interceptor needed
involves looking across the BMDS to see how the different elements can
best work together as an integrated system. According to the Director
of MDA, the integration of the many ballistic missile defense elements
into a system makes the BMDS more effective than would the individual
elements operating independently. Integration may include improving
systems integration among elements, adding a different type of
interceptor, adding a sensor, or a combination of these and other
options in order to increase a defended area. For example, figure 1
illustrates how the same mix of Aegis BMD ships and THAAD batteries
provides vastly different defensive coverage depending on whether the
elements are acting autonomously (smaller coverage) or are integrated
with a radar (larger coverage).[Footnote 22] Increased integration
could therefore affect requirements, perhaps lessening the quantity of
elements needed to defend an area. However, Air Force officials told us
that the cost of integrating elements could be high enough in some
circumstances that it may be more efficient to purchase additional
elements and interceptors.
Figure 1: Benefits of Integration:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Defended area with elements operating individually:
Depicted on the illustration:
THAAD defended area;
Aegis BMD defended area;
THAAD element;
Aegis BMD element.
Defended area with elements integrated together with a radar:
Depicted on the illustration:
THAAD defended area;
Aegis BMD defended area (much larger than area previously covered);
THAAD element;
Aegis BMD element;
X-Band radar.
Source: GAO analysis of Missile Defense Agency data.
Note: The same number of elements acting individually provides a
smaller defended area than when those elements are integrated together
with a radar.
[End of figure]
Risk Assessments Factor into Overall Requirements:
Assessments of the threat and other risk assessments are also factors
affecting overall requirements for the types and quantities of missile
defense elements and interceptors. According to the Director of MDA,
optimizing the size and type of the ballistic missile defense force
requires an operational risk assessment of the adversary's ballistic
missile arsenal that would have to be engaged. It also requires
understanding the capabilities and limitations of BMDS elements needed
to counter these threats, an understanding that continues to improve
with additional testing. For example, the required number of ground-
based interceptors needed to defend the United States from long-range
threats would be affected if additional testing were to reveal an
increase or decrease in the expected capability of that type of
interceptor. Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Strategic
Command officials told us that risk assessments should also consider
the extent to which different kinds of elements and interceptors
provide redundant coverage. Air Force officials added that redundant
capabilities should be considered when optimizing force structure,
stating that even if there were a single element that could provide
defensive coverage for an entire region, an optimized force structure
may include additional elements so that the area would still be
defended if the original element were incapacitated.
Allied Contributions Can Affect Quantity Requirements:
The extent to which the United States can depend upon contributions
from friends and allies also can affect the determination of DOD's
optimized ballistic missile defense force structure. For example, U.S.
Central Command officials told us that coordination with friends and
allies on ballistic missile defenses and their purchase of ballistic
missile defense elements and interceptors may allow the command to
reorient its forces to fill other gaps. Similarly, U.S. Pacific Command
told us that close ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan has
improved overall ballistic missile defense protection in the command's
area of responsibility, allowing the command to expand protection of
critical assets. The Director of MDA testified before Congress in June
2009 that if cooperative efforts with Russia were successful in
integrating some radar facilities, it could enhance the ability of
ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. Finally, in regard
to the proposed ballistic missile defense sites in Europe, DOD and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been exploring ways to
link U.S. missile defense assets with NATO's missile defense efforts.
In April 2008, NATO declared its intention to develop options for a
comprehensive missile defense architecture to extend coverage to all
allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the proposed
U.S. system.
Some Elements Are Designed to Defend against Multiple Threats or
Perform Different Missions:
A key factor affecting the requirements for some elements is that they
are designed to address multiple types of ballistic missile threats.
For example, potential choices about whether to use the interceptors
based in Europe as a reserve to defend the United States or to use them
to intercept all incoming long-range threats regardless of the intended
target could significantly affect how many ground-based interceptors
would be needed overall. Similarly, the Aegis BMD element was designed
to provide search and track capabilities to help the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense element defend the United States, and as a stand-
alone element capable of defending deployed U.S. forces and population
centers abroad from shorter-range threats. In addition, Navy and U.S.
Pacific Command officials told us that Aegis ships are also in high
demand to perform other maritime missions, such as antisubmarine
warfare. As a result, the use of Aegis ships as ballistic missile
defense weapon systems may constrain the ability of combatant
commanders to use those ships for other purposes without increasing the
size of the available force structure. In coming years, as the Aegis
BMD element takes on new roles to intercept longer-range missiles that
are targeting the United States,[Footnote 23] regional combatant
commanders who rely on the Aegis ships for multiple missions may be
further constrained in how they deploy those assets. Consequently, even
as the Aegis BMD element becomes more capable, requirements for Aegis
force structure may increase in order to satisfy the multiple missions.
Changes in Threat and Evolving Missile Defense Technology Will Likely
Affect Future Requirements:
The evolving nature of the threat and emerging technologies also have
implications for the quantity requirements for ballistic missile
defense elements and interceptors. For example, MDA reported to
Congress in July 2009 that the requirement for emplaced ground-based
interceptors was reduced, in part, because the original intelligence
estimate of the number of missiles that the ground-based interceptors
were intended to counter was later assessed to be off by 10 to 20
missiles. Similarly, improvements in BMDS capabilities affect
requirements. For example, the Director of MDA testified before
Congress in May 2009 that new ascent phase capabilities will eliminate
the need for the Multiple Kill Vehicle program and would reduce overall
the number of ballistic missile defense interceptors needed to defeat
an attack.
DOD's Analyses to Date Have Been Limited in Scope:
Our review of DOD's analyses of its type and quantity requirements for
ballistic missile defenses show that the studies prepared to date have
been limited in scope and did not create the comprehensive analytic
basis for making programwide decisions about policies, strategies, and
investments. MDA's initial analyses were completed for the purpose of
establishing an initial and evolving set of ballistic missile defense
capabilities, not to determine DOD's overall operational requirements.
Similarly, we found that the assessments of ballistic missile defense
quantity requirements conducted by other DOD organizations were
prepared for specific purposes:
* The Joint Staff conducted two analyses beginning in 2006 that
identified a minimum baseline need to double the number of THAAD and
Aegis BMD interceptors planned in the fiscal year 2008 budget as well
as a need for an additional THAAD battery and an upgraded AN/TPY-2
forward-based radar with self-defense capability. The Joint Staff
focused on THAAD and Aegis BMD interceptor inventory requirements
because production decisions for additional interceptors needed to be
made in DOD's fiscal year 2010 future years' funding plan in order to
avoid the possibility of closing down production. Combatant commands
were also voicing a demand for these capabilities in order to protect
deployed U.S. forces and population centers abroad. The Joint Staff
characterized the studies as an "initial mark on the wall" because the
studies made assumptions that tended to drive down the identified
quantities in the baseline. For example, the studies did not factor in
quantities needed for spares, training, testing, or in transit; assumed
the lack of enemy countermeasures; and assumed that ballistic missile
defense command and control systems would work perfectly under
operational conditions. Acknowledging these limitations, Members of
Congress and DOD officials nevertheless have cited the Joint Staff
studies as identifying the requirement for boosting THAAD and Aegis BMD
quantities and affecting DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget request.
* The geographic combatant commands regularly assess their individual
requirements for ballistic missile defense forces, but these analyses
are limited in scope to each command's unique area of responsibility,
as assigned by the President. For example, U.S. Central Command
officials told us that their requirements for ballistic missile
defenses are driven by the need to protect against short-to medium-
range threats from within the command's own theater. U.S. Northern
Command officials told us that their requirements for ballistic missile
defense forces are driven primarily by the command's need to protect
against long-range strikes from states outside of their area of
responsibility. U.S. Northern Command conducted an independent three-
phase study on where to field ground-based interceptors that included
looking at the operational benefits of an interceptor site located in
the eastern United States in order to augment the planned European
Interceptor Site. However, this study did not address whether MDA's
budgeted requirement of ground-based interceptors--which at the time of
the study included 44 interceptors in the United States and 10 in
Europe--was sufficient to meet the command's requirement.
* The military services have also started to perform assessments on
ballistic missile defense quantity requirements, but these assessments
have been limited in scope and do not attempt to optimize the number of
ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors worldwide. For
example, in 2007, the Navy completed a study assessing its requirement
for making Aegis ships capable of performing the ballistic missile
defense mission. Based on the study's findings, the Navy concluded that
the entire Aegis fleet should have this capability and that ballistic
missile defense was a core Navy mission. However, the Navy neither
attempted to assess the requirements for the number and type of
interceptors to be used aboard these ships, nor scoped the assessment
to try to vary the mix of other elements and interceptors in order to
optimize the number of Aegis BMD ships. For example, the Navy did not
vary the number of THAAD, Patriot Advanced Capability-3, AN/TPY-2
forward-based radar, or other elements in order to see if that affected
the requirement for Aegis BMD ships. The Army also recently undertook a
short-turnaround study to identify whether it is a better option to
maintain the THAAD battery procurement plan outlined in the fiscal year
2010 budget or to buy fewer batteries and instead develop and field a
more capable THAAD interceptor. The Army study intends to explore
different options for gaining the same capability that a new
interceptor could provide, including placing THAAD interceptors forward
of the battery and operating them remotely, as well as the use of sea-
and land-based Aegis BMD interceptors. However, Army officials told us
that while the study is looking at several combat scenarios, it is not
intended to establish the global quantity requirements for THAAD or
establish a global optimum mix of joint BMDS elements and interceptors.
DOD Has Opportunities to Establish What Type and How Many Elements and
Interceptors Are Needed for All Missions and to Refine Ballistic
Missile Defense Policy:
Having prepared various but limited assessments of ballistic missile
defense quantity requirements to support an initial and evolving
ballistic missile defense capability, DOD now has the opportunity to
build upon these studies to better define its overall requirements for
ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors. The newly
established BMDS Life Cycle Management Process, which DOD has started
using to prepare an annual capabilities portfolio and program plan to
meet requirements, has broadened the participation of stakeholders from
across DOD in developing the annual budget proposal for ballistic
missile defense capabilities development, operations, and support.
[Footnote 24] The Life Cycle Management Process is designed to allow
DOD to balance long-term and near-term needs by reviewing ballistic
missile defense capability developments as a portfolio. However, to
date the Missile Defense Executive Board, which oversees the process,
has not commissioned a broad-based analysis of DOD's overall
requirements, and instead has depended on more limited analyses of
quantity requirements to inform its deliberations over the missile
defense budget. For example, in preparing DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget
proposal, and again in beginning to prepare for the fiscal year 2011
proposal, the board relied on the Joint Staff's limited analysis of
THAAD and Aegis BMD requirements. The Joint Staff is completing
additional studies focused on the impact of countermeasures on
ballistic missile defenses and plans on studying how ballistic missile
defense and air defense can be integrated. However, according to Joint
Staff officials, these studies do not assess ballistic missile defense
requirements in their entirety. As part of the congressionally mandated
review of ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, DOD expects to
examine, among other things, the appropriate balance among elements to
defend against ballistic missiles of all ranges; the role of allied
contributions; and options for defending Europe from Iranian ballistic
missile defense attack. The review is required to be completed by
January 2010 and is expected to inform future budget requests. Given
its broad charter and short time frame, the review is not expected to
include an underpinning, comprehensive analysis of all requirements.
However, the policy and strategy review could potentially lead to
revised ballistic missile defense requirements.
Force Structure Not Fully in Place for Some Units Operating Ballistic
Missile Defense Elements:
DOD has faced challenges in fully establishing units to operate five of
the eight ballistic missile defense elements that have been put into
operational use. DOD typically requires that major weapon systems be
fielded with a full complement of organized and trained personnel. To
defend against potentially catastrophic threats posed by rogue states
armed with ballistic missiles, however, DOD has in some cases put
ballistic missile defense elements into operational use before first
ensuring that the military services had created units and trained
servicemembers to operate them. DOD had in place operational units to
operate the three elements that were based on existing service weapon
systems, such as Aegis ships and Air Force early warning radars that
were upgraded to take on ballistic missile defense capabilities.
However, the five remaining elements that have been put into
operational use represent new capabilities designed expressly for
ballistic missile defense purposes and for which new operational units
had to be created. As a result, early fielding meant that units were
not fully in place and required, in some cases, that personnel be
temporarily assigned or borrowed from other organizations when the
elements are put into operational use to address these potential
threats. For example, the Army has faced personnel shortfalls to
operate the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, which necessitated
augmentation with personnel from the Army National Guard to overcome
operational readiness concerns. These personnel shortages primarily
resulted from the need for Army units to participate in MDA research
and development activities, which are important to improving the
element's capabilities. MDA and the military services are taking steps
to establish the forces needed for operations, but this may take years
for some elements. DOD recognizes the challenges created by putting
elements into early use, but has not set criteria requiring that
operational units be in place before new elements are made available
for use. In the future, emerging threats or crises could again require
DOD to press developmental capabilities into use. However, until DOD
reconsiders its approach to making elements available for operational
use before the units are fully organized, manned, and trained to
perform all of the missions they will be expected to execute, the
combatant commanders will lack certainty that the forces can operate
the elements as expected.
DOD's Approach to Ballistic Missile Defense Has Focused on Early
Fielding of Capabilities:
DOD's approach to ballistic missile defense development differs from
its standard weapons development process in order to stress the early
fielding of new capabilities. DOD practices for developing military
capabilities typically require that major weapon systems complete
developmental activities and then be fielded with a full complement of
organized and trained personnel so that servicemembers are capable of
operating the systems on behalf of the combatant commands.[Footnote 25]
DOD customarily prepares planning documents that identify
organizational, personnel, and training requirements that must be
established before a new weapon system can be declared operational for
the first time. These requirements typically include an assessment of
the military specialties needed; identification of personnel
requirements; and the development of individual, unit, and joint
training programs. The individual services also typically require the
establishment of an operational unit that is manned with trained
servicemembers before new weapon systems are used operationally.
According to Army officials, the Army declares new weapon systems to be
initially operational only after units have been activated and soldiers
have completed collective training requirements for operating the
systems. Navy and Air Force practices also emphasize establishing the
organizations, personnel, and training needed to operate a weapon
system before it is declared operational.
DOD adopted a unique acquisition approach for ballistic missile defense
capabilities in order to meet the President's direction to begin
fielding in 2004 an initial capability to defend against ballistic
missiles that may carry weapons of mass destruction. In establishing
MDA, the Secretary of Defense directed it to use prototype and test
assets to provide early capability, if necessary, and improve the
effectiveness of deployed capabilities by continuing research and
development activities and inserting new technologies as they become
available. Further, the Secretary gave MDA the flexibility to field
ballistic missile defense systems in limited numbers when available,
and to base production decisions on test performance. Although the
Secretary directed that the services provide forces to support
ballistic missile defense operations, he also canceled the services'
requirements documentation prepared for then-developmental programs--
such as THAAD and Ground-based Midcourse Defense--because the service-
generated requirements were not consistent with the BMDS developmental
objectives. Additionally, the Secretary directed that BMDS development
would not be subject to DOD's traditional joint requirements
determination processes and would utilize certain flexible acquisition
practices until a mature ballistic missile defense capability had been
developed and was ready to be handed over to a military service for
production and operation. Consequently, the services initially had
little basis on which to determine force structure requirements for
some ballistic missile defense elements, even as MDA began to develop
elements and add them to the BMDS operational baseline.
Units Are in Place to Operate Existing Systems That Were Modified for
Ballistic Missile Defense:
Our analysis determined that the units operating the existing service
systems that were modified for ballistic missile defense have been
organized, manned, and trained to execute their ballistic missile
defense capabilities. Such systems make up three of the ballistic
missile defense elements that DOD first put into operational use by
activating them in 2006 in response to North Korea's ballistic missile
threat:
* Upgraded Early Warning Radars. Air Force early warning radars, such
as those at Beale Air Force Base and Royal Air Force Base Fylingdales,
United Kingdom, were first developed and operated in the Cold War. As
these radars have been modified for ballistic missile defense missions,
the Air Force assigned responsibility to the 21st Space Wing for
operating the Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar, while the United
Kingdom has agreed to provide forces to operate and maintain the
Fylingdales radar. The Air Force has provided stand-alone training
equipment to train and qualify site personnel at the two Upgraded Early
Warning Radars that DOD has already declared operational, and has
certified that operational crews are fully trained at these radar
sites. The Air Force has made similar preparations to begin operating a
third Upgraded Early Warning Radar, located at Thule, Greenland, later
in 2009.
* Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade. In accepting the transfer of the Cobra Dane
Radar Upgrade from MDA, which was approved by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in February 2009, the
Air Force agreed to continue to manage the radar on behalf of its
multiple missions and stakeholders, while MDA agreed to fund missile
defense mission-specific operations and maintenance training and to
assist the Air Force in identifying mission-specific operations costs.
MDA also is providing maintenance support through fiscal year 2013,
when maintenance support becomes an Air Force-funded responsibility.
* Aegis BMD. Aegis BMD-capable ships are operated by the Navy, and the
Navy supports those ships through existing service-based infrastructure
and processes. Servicemembers have been initially qualified on the
ballistic missile defense mission through existing Navy commands and
according to Navy practices. The Navy updated its training and
personnel requirements and relied on established procedures to certify
the performance of Aegis crews to perform the full range of Aegis BMD
missions.
Units Operating Newly Developed Ballistic Missile Defense Elements Have
Not Been Fully Organized, Manned, and Trained for All Tasks:
Our analysis determined that DOD has not yet put into place operational
units that are fully organized, manned, and trained to execute all of
their ballistic missile defense responsibilities for the remaining five
ballistic missile defense elements, which were designed expressly for
ballistic missile defense and thus required DOD to create new units. In
order to address existing and emerging threats, DOD used flexible
acquisition practices to make these elements available for operational
use before the services were fully ready to operate them. However,
without fully established organizations, personnel, and training, these
units faced challenges in dealing with the rapid fielding of elements,
the ongoing research and development activities involving fielded
elements, and the lack of an established force structure for operating
the BMDS command and control system.
Rapid Fielding of Elements Has Challenged Operational Units:
Operational units have faced challenges resulting from the rapid
fielding of elements before the units have had all of the necessary
organizations, personnel, and training in place. For example, the Army
had only a few months after being named lead service to organize and
train a detachment for managing the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, which
MDA fielded in Japan and added to the BMDS operational baseline in
September 2006.[Footnote 26] In contrast, the Army generally requires
years to organize an operational unit, establish personnel
requirements, and train servicemembers for operating a new weapon
system. The rapid fielding required the Army to deploy soldiers without
a complete and approved force structure for sensor management
operations when MDA added the radar to the baseline. For example, the
Army did not yet have a program to train Army soldiers; to mitigate
this shortfall, MDA provided the first group of Army sensor managers
with an orientation of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar and of the
radar management software then in use. A U.S. Army Space and Missile
Defense Command official told us that the initial servicemembers'
orientation lacked the requirements, curriculum, training devices,
standards, and evaluations that are generally expected to be in place
as part of an initial qualification training course when the Army
fields a new weapon system. As a result of the Army's initiative, the
initial sensor managers developed their own tactics, techniques, and
procedures for managing the radar before the Army had in place a
training course to qualify servicemembers in sensor management. Since
that time, the Army has established a training course, which has
graduated a sufficient number of servicemembers projected to meet
combatant command needs.
Despite the Army's successes in training servicemembers, DOD still
faces interrelated organizational and personnel challenges for the
sensor management of the second AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, which MDA
fielded in Israel and made available for contingency operations in
November 2008. At the time DOD fielded the radar, the Europe-based Army
unit responsible for sensor management operations lacked both the
organizational structure and sufficient personnel to perform these
functions on a continual basis.[Footnote 27] Rather, the unit was
organized and manned to perform air and missile defense operations on
behalf of U.S. European Command, including command and control
operations of Patriot air and missile defense forces, and air and
missile defense operational and exercise planning. To minimize the
potential risk to the unit's primary missions as it performed the newly
assigned sensor management operations, the Air Force has deployed
servicemembers, at U.S. European Command's request, and will deploy
them throughout 2009 to augment the unit. However, these deployments
have not fully addressed the stress to the unit. In March 2009, the
Commander, U.S. European Command, testified that the unit's increasing
requirements were "a moving target" and would demand considerable
flexibility to identify and resource them in the near-to mid-term. U.S.
Army Space and Missile Defense Command officials told us that the Army
has established an operational unit in its force structure planning
system to provide sensor management for the second AN/TPY-2 forward-
based radar; however, the officials added that the Army has not
activated the unit because DOD has not determined whether the radar
will be permanently fielded in Israel.
The Sea-based X-Band Radar was first declared available for
contingencies in 2008, and has been made operational for brief periods,
without the full Navy force structure in place. Unlike Aegis BMD, which
is based on existing Navy ships and support systems, the Sea-based X-
Band Radar is a new system. In March 2007 the Navy agreed in principle
to become the lead service for the Sea-based X-Band Radar, which could
transfer to the Navy as early as 2011. However, to transfer to the
Navy, the Sea-based X-Band radar element must pass a Navy inspection;
and the combatant commands must determine not only that the element can
perform all of its assigned missions, but also that the operator crew
understands its current capabilities and limitations. Additionally, the
Navy has agreed to the transfer of the element as long as funds for
operating it are also transferred to the Navy; however, as we testified
in March 2009,[Footnote 28] the transfer agreement does not specify how
these funds will be transferred to the Navy in the long term. Further,
the Navy had yet to determine personnel requirements for the radar. To
mitigate the potential risk of an incomplete force structure before the
radar transfers, MDA has provided contractor personnel to support day-
to-day operations, as needed.
MDA also declared the THAAD element to be available for contingencies
in September 2008, and the Secretary of Defense activated the element
in the Pacific region twice during 2009, before the Army had the
opportunity to fully establish the unit that will operate the first
THAAD battery.[Footnote 29] The Army activated a unit of 99 soldiers in
2008 to operate the first THAAD battery, but does not expect to
complete the training and organizational activities needed to fully
establish the unit and declare an initial operational capability until
late in fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 30] As a result, U.S. Pacific
Command and other combatant commands are operating the element during
contingencies with a unit composed of a mix of MDA personnel,
contractors, and Army soldiers. According to MDA's August 2008
assessment of the element's capabilities and limitations at the time it
was declared available for contingencies, the nonstandard unit lacks
experience in tactical operations, has not completed collective
training, and requires significant external support. Despite these
force structure limitations, a U.S. Pacific Command official told us
that the command requires THAAD in the event of a crisis. Further, Army
and MDA officials told us that Army's approach to prepare forces to
operate THAAD has been closely coordinated with MDA's schedule to
acquire the element. Army officials added that the Army modified its
approach from standard Army practices to more rapidly achieve an
initial operational capability. However, Army officials told us that
until the Army fully establishes the force structure to operate THAAD,
the combatant commands may overestimate the Army's preparedness to
deploy an operational unit to defend U.S. forces and population centers
during a drawn out contingency. As a result, the benefit of rapidly
fielding THAAD could be offset by the risks associated with depending
on a unit that does not have the full complement of organized and
trained personnel.
Operational Units Have Faced Challenges Caused by Ongoing Research and
Development Activities:
Operational units have also faced challenges resulting from ongoing
research and development activities for which the units have not been
organized, manned, and trained. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command officials told us that involving operational units in BMDS
research and development activities can be beneficial because it allows
the lead service and operational personnel to directly affect an
element's development. Like other BMDS elements, the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense element was put into operational use to address
existing threats, but is also simultaneously being tested and refined
by MDA. Consequently, the Army units responsible for operating the
element are also responsible for sending operational crews to
participate in MDA-sponsored tests of new capabilities,[Footnote 31]
such as upgraded versions of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
element's fire control software. However, like most other Army units,
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense units are not organized, manned, and
trained for tasks such as the testing associated with research and
development activities. As a result, the Commanding General, U.S. Army
Space and Missile Defense Command, concluded in May 2009 that the
units' mismatch between the available crews and mission responsibility
was creating an adverse impact on their operational readiness and
performance of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense mission. Lacking
additional crews and funding, the Commanding General determined that
the units' operational requirements would preclude them from fully
contributing to MDA's developmental efforts, which in turn would have a
negative impact on both the operational crews' readiness and the
efforts to rapidly develop the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element.
To address this mismatch, the Army has agreed to temporarily activate
Army National Guard soldiers to augment the units' personnel. However,
the Army has not solved the long-term mismatch between operational
requirements and available personnel, and has requested that U.S. Army
Space and Missile Defense Command evaluate and present alternatives for
meeting the long-term requirements that the mission entails.
Ongoing research and development, as well as upgrades to elements, also
create uncertainty about the preparedness of some operational units to
operate elements under realistic conditions. For example, as new
versions of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element's fire control
software are installed, Army soldiers operating the software typically
complete their initial qualification training, and crews are certified,
according to standard Army practices. However, in August 2008,
following the Army's participation in an MDA test using high-fidelity
modeling and simulation capabilities, U.S. Northern Command determined
that the existing training equipment provided by MDA did not adequately
simulate how other ballistic missile defense elements interact with the
fire control system.[Footnote 32] As a result, the Deputy Commander,
U.S. Northern Command, stated that the Army's operational crews would
no longer be certified on the fire control software until the crews had
access to training systems that better reflected the operational
behavior of BMDS elements. Since that time, MDA has installed an
upgraded training system for Army operators to use. U.S. Northern
Command officials stated to us that the upgraded training system is an
improvement over the prior capability, and the Army units were using
the upgraded system to train servicemembers on the next version of the
fire control software. Officials from the 100th Brigade, U.S. Strategic
Command, and MDA told us that MDA delayed declaring the upgraded fire
control capability to be operational until the units had an opportunity
to train on the upgraded operational system. However, as of July 2009
the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, had not determined whether the
upgraded training capabilities were sufficient to certify the crews for
operations.
DOD Plans for Establishing the Force Structure for the BMDS Command and
Control Element Are Unclear:
MDA retains lead responsibility for the command and control element, or
C2BMC, unlike the other ballistic missile defense elements, which are
being made part of the military services' force structure. According to
MDA, retaining responsibility of C2BMC helps the agency control the
configuration of the element as it is upgraded to more capable
versions. Therefore, none of the services have been required to create
units, train personnel, or provide servicemembers to the combatant
commands to operate the C2BMC element. However, unlike the services,
MDA lacks the responsibility for providing forces to support military
operations. As a result, the combatant commands have had to identify
and organize C2BMC operators from within their existing resources by
drawing upon servicemembers who are already deployed to the commands
for other warfighting responsibilities.
MDA has provided personnel and training to support the combatant
commands' C2BMC operational requirements, but additional steps are
needed to ensure that the combatant commands' needs are met. The C2BMC
element is the integrating element that makes the BMDS a global system
by providing combatant commanders with communications links, real-time
battle information to make decisions, and a planning capability to
optimize the fielding of ballistic missile defense forces on a global
scale. It is also used to perform sensor management of the AN/TPY-2
forward-based radar, and future C2BMC versions are expected to have the
capability to control additional sensors. To help meet the combatant
commands' operational needs, MDA has trained hundreds of servicemembers
who were already assigned to the combatant commands;[Footnote 33]
through the end of 2008, MDA trained more than 200 personnel at U.S.
Pacific Command and the Navy Pacific Fleet, 250 personnel at U.S.
Northern Command, and more than 175 personnel at U.S. Strategic
Command. MDA also deploys its own personnel to 26 locations around the
world to help the combatant commands and other users operate the
element. However, according to U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command officials, the inability to identify and request additional
personnel from the services to operate the C2BMC element creates a
potential personnel shortfall in combatant commanders' operations
centers, which may become acute during a crisis when there are not
enough personnel to effectively perform all required activities.
Officials from U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and the U.S.
Pacific Command-based Army unit using the C2BMC element also told us
that the detachment responsible for managing the AN/TPY-2 forward-based
radar can become overtaxed by the responsibility to operate the C2BMC
element for other functions and purposes.
Though none has been designated the lead service for the C2BMC element,
the Army, Navy, and Air Force have started preparing to support the
organizational, training, and personnel requirements to operate
ballistic missile defense command and control and battle management
systems. Such requirements could grow as MDA continues to add functions
to the C2BMC element. Although the services have not established
personnel requirements for operating the C2BMC system, DOD officials
told us that future versions of the software may require crews of up to
five personnel per shift. Moreover, at present MDA trains only
individual servicemembers, not crews, to operate the C2BMC system.
Furthermore, as of July 2009, the services' effort to establish
requirements for the C2BMC element is in its very early stages. Until
the services determine their respective requirements for manning and
training for the C2BMC element, operational risks and impacts will
persist.
DOD Has Taken Steps to Evaluate Operational Capabilities and
Limitations, but Potential Risks Remain When Elements Are First
Declared Operational:
DOD has taken steps to evaluate the operational capabilities and
limitations of ballistic missile defenses when they are first made
available for operations. DOD recognized the potential operational risk
of using developmental ballistic missile defense elements for military
operations following the fielding of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar
to Japan in 2006. In 2006, we also recommended that DOD develop
operational criteria for evaluating ballistic missile defense elements
before the Secretary of Defense declares the elements operational.
[Footnote 34] We found that without such criteria, the Secretary of
Defense lacked a baseline against which to objectively assess the
combatant commands' and services' preparations to conduct ballistic
missile defense operations. Moreover, we found that lacking clear
criteria, DOD may have difficulty determining whether the return on its
significant development investment in the BMDS can be realized. Since
our report was issued, U.S. Strategic Command's functional component
for integrated missile defense has developed and begun evaluating
ballistic missile defense elements against operational criteria to help
the combatant commands and element operators understand the
capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense elements as
they are added to the BMDS operational baseline. However, these
criteria were not designed to evaluate the extent to which the services
had fully established the organizations, training, and personnel needed
to operate ballistic missile defense elements.
In May 2009, MDA updated its BMDS Master Plan to more fully consider
the extent to which the services are developing the organizations,
personnel, and training needed for operations when declaring that an
element has achieved Early Capability Delivery,[Footnote 35] which is
the first point where the element is made available for operational
employment in defense of the United States or U.S. allies. MDA's plan
incorporates reviews of the elements' performance under the commands'
operational criteria before the MDA Director makes capability delivery
declarations. The updated plan also states that MDA will support
service and combatant command requirements for new equipment training,
unit training, and certification, and that MDA will provide appropriate
training facilities and support. These steps could help coordinate the
services' force structure development with MDA's capability delivery
schedule in the future. However, MDA's updated plan does not require
that organizations, personnel, and training of the operational unit be
in place before MDA makes an Early Capability Delivery declaration, or
before the Secretary of Defense subsequently activates the element.
The tension between the early fielding of ballistic missile defense
capabilities and the desirability of preparing units to operate these
capabilities was reflected in the views expressed by officials from
across DOD during our review. Officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense told us that MDA's flexibility to shift resources
when developing and fielding ballistic missile defenses has allowed DOD
to employ ballistic missile defense capabilities more quickly than if
the services had been responsible for their development. Such
flexibilities continue to reflect the urgency and national priority of
the ballistic missile defense mission. However, they stated that it was
appropriate to consider a ballistic missile defense element to be part
of the respective service's force structure when MDA declared that the
element had achieved Early Capability Delivery. Office of the Secretary
of Defense, U.S. Strategic Command, and Army officials emphasized the
need to establish a lead service early in development and to provide
adequate lead time to establish an operational force structure before
operating elements. For example, Army officials told us that the Army
has established the operational units needed to perform ballistic
missile defense missions, but agreed that the previous lack of
coordination with MDA on the timing of fielding missile defense
elements and declaring them operational has been problematic. Navy
officials told us that the Navy does not recognize distinctions among
MDA's capability delivery declarations; the Navy does not consider a
ballistic missile defense element to be operational until the element
has been fully incorporated into the Navy force structure. A U.S.
Pacific Command official told us that some crises could require DOD to
put developmental capabilities to operational use, adding that shifting
emphasis to the establishment of the services' force structure could
delay the availability of ballistic missile defense capabilities to the
combatant commanders. However, the official agreed that it was
reasonable for DOD to ensure that the services had fully established
the units' organizations, personnel, and training needed to operate
ballistic missile defenses before the elements were declared available
for operations, provided that such assurances reflected a broader shift
in DOD's policy goals from fielding systems quickly to the more
deliberate development of capabilities that can be readily operated
over sustained periods.
Better linkage between force structure development and element fielding
plans is important because the currently configured BMDS is the
starting point for additional capabilities and elements that await
future deployment. For example, MDA plans to field and declare
operational additional AN/TPY-2 forward-based radars; although the Army
now has in place the units to operate these radars in its force
structure plans, the Army requires time to activate these units and
prepare them for operations. Similarly, although both the Army and the
Air Force have started planning to operate the proposed European
Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar elements, which would be
fielded in Europe to defend against ballistic missiles launched from
the Middle East, both services will require time to prepare the
operational units in order to be ready when MDA completes the
development and fielding of these systems. Additionally, DOD's fiscal
year 2010 missile defense budget proposal shifts emphasis toward
developing new ascent phase capabilities, which are expected to
intercept ballistic missiles before they can release countermeasures to
defeat U.S. defenses. As DOD makes this shift, MDA and the services
will need to closely coordinate their efforts in order to avoid the
challenges that affected the operations of elements that have been
previously fielded.
Conclusions:
Ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors of various types
are in demand from the geographic combatant commands, but DOD faces a
high price tag to develop, acquire, operate, and support ballistic
missile defense capabilities over the long term. Thus far, decisions
regarding the shape and structure of the BMDS have been made based on
policy first established in 2002 and on limited analyses of force
structure options. DOD's analyses to date have helped the department
understand some of its requirements and inform its policies, but these
analyses are incomplete and have not covered the full range of
ballistic missile defense missions. DOD's ongoing review of its
ballistic missile defense policy and strategy provides a good
opportunity for DOD to reassess its ballistic missile defense
priorities and needs. However, the review is moving forward without the
benefits that a comprehensive assessment of DOD's quantity requirements
would provide. Lacking the solid foundation of a knowledge-based,
comprehensive analytic basis for making decisions, which includes
careful assessments of DOD's overall ballistic missile defense quantity
requirements, DOD will continue to lack crucial data it needs to make
the best possible policy, strategy, and budgetary decisions for
ballistic missile defense.
Making BMDS elements available for operational use before units were
fully established reflected DOD's sense of urgency to rapidly field
defenses against potentially catastrophic threats. However, now that
some ballistic missile defenses are in place, the risk of putting
additional elements in use before operational units are fully
established must be weighed against the marginal benefits, absent an
imminent threat. Looking forward, reassessing this approach is
important because DOD has several elements in development that may be
fielded in coming years, including additional forward-based radars, the
interceptors and radars that are planned for fielding in Europe, and
new elements associated with ascent phase intercept.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To establish the foundation needed to make effective policy, strategy,
budgetary, and acquisition decisions, we recommend that the Secretary
of Defense take the following two actions:
* Direct the preparation and periodic updating of a comprehensive
analysis of the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense
elements and interceptors that are required for performing ballistic
missile defense missions worldwide. The analysis should consider the
integration of elements; risk assessments of the threat, capabilities
and limitations of the BMDS, and redundancy requirements; allied
contributions; the employment of elements that can perform multiple
types of ballistic missile defense missions and other missions; and any
other relevant factors identified by the department.
* Use this analysis as a foundation for evaluating DOD's ballistic
missile defense developmental and acquisition priorities in future
budget requests as well as its overall ballistic missile defense policy
and strategy direction.
To reduce the potential risks associated with operating ballistic
missile defense elements with insufficient force structure, we further
recommend that the Secretary of Defense require, in the absence of an
immediate threat or crisis, that operational units be established with
the organizations, personnel, and training needed to perform all of
their ballistic missile defense responsibilities before first making
elements available for operational use.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with one and concurred with two of our recommendations. DOD's comments
are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments that
we incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation to prepare and
periodically update a comprehensive analysis of the types and
quantities of ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors that
are required for performing ballistic missile defense missions
worldwide. In its comments, DOD validated the need for a comprehensive
and recurring analysis. DOD indicated that the ongoing ballistic
missile defense review will develop the strategic themes and analytic
bases to be used in future analyses. DOD also noted the
interrelationships between ballistic missile defense and air defense,
and that a comprehensive assessment must include these defenses.
Moreover, DOD stated that decisions related to ballistic missile
defenses must factor in the priorities of other government agencies,
like the State Department. In our recommendation, we stated that DOD
should consider any other relevant factors it identifies, and the
inclusion of air defense and priorities of other government agencies
can reasonably be seen as such relevant factors. DOD intends to perform
a detailed assessment for ballistic missile defense requirements during
each Quadrennial Defense Review cycle and once in the intervening
years.[Footnote 36] Overall, we generally agree with DOD's suggested
approach to implement our first recommendation; such steps, if taken,
would meet its intent.
In its response to our second recommendation that DOD use the
comprehensive analysis as a foundation for future ballistic missile
defense budget requests as well as setting policy and strategy
direction, DOD concurred and indicated that this analysis would be used
to shape ballistic missile defense developmental and acquisition
priorities in future budget requests, and to shape overall ballistic
missile defense policy, strategy, and future deployment options.
However, until DOD conducts this detailed assessment of its overall
ballistic missile defense quantity requirements, it will continue to
lack crucial data needed to make policy, strategy, and budgetary
decisions.
DOD concurred without comment with our third recommendation to require,
in the absence of an immediate threat or crisis, that operational units
be established with the organizations, personnel, and training needed
to perform all of their ballistic missile defense responsibilities
before first making elements available for operational use. Our
recommendation recognizes that facing an immediate threat or crisis,
DOD may need to field elements without first fully establishing
operational units. However, now that some ballistic missile defenses
are in place, we continue to believe that DOD must carefully weigh the
risk of putting additional elements in use before operational units are
fully established against the marginal benefits of rapid fielding.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Director, Missile Defense Agency; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Chiefs of Staff and
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, this report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
During this review, we evaluated the Department of Defense's (DOD)
assessments, prepared since 2002, of the types and quantities of
ballistic missile defense elements required for ballistic missile
defense missions, and DOD's efforts to establish the units to operate
elements that have been put into use through July 2009.[Footnote 37] To
determine the extent to which DOD has identified the types and
quantities of ballistic missile defense elements that it requires, we
identified, obtained, and reviewed key guidance, studies, and analyses
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Missile Defense Agency
(MDA), the Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, other combatant
commands, and the military services. These documents included
memorandums from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and DOD
Directive 5134.9, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), dated October 9, 2004,
which established MDA and directed the development of the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS); Office of the Secretary of Defense
budget guidance establishing the goals and objectives of the BMDS; and
direction from the Deputy Secretary of Defense establishing the Missile
Defense Executive Board and BMDS Life Cycle Management Process. We
obtained and reviewed classified briefings summarizing MDA studies,
including the September 26, 2002, Missile Defense Agency Response to
Defense Planning Guidance Tasking; the October 26, 2004, briefing
titled Missile Defense Capability; and the March 23, 2007, European
Site Technical Rationale. We confirmed with MDA officials that these
studies constituted the key initial MDA analyses outlining the types
and quantities of elements and interceptors constituting the BMDS. We
also obtained and reviewed unclassified briefings summarizing MDA's
2002-2004 plans to establish an initial and evolving defensive
capability against ballistic missile threats. To understand the Joint
Staff's roles and contributions to determining DOD's quantity
requirements for ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors,
we obtained and reviewed briefings summarizing the Joint Staff's
studies of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) and Terminal
High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) quantity requirements, including the
2006 Joint Ballistic Missile Defense Capability Mix Study and the
subsequent Ballistic Missile Defense Joint Capability Mix II and
Ballistic Missile Defense Joint Capability Mix Sensitivity Analysis
studies. To understand how these studies were used to develop MDA's
fiscal year 2010 budget request, we obtained and reviewed key
memorandums from the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. We also obtained and reviewed guidance approved by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense establishing the Joint Staff's and U.S. Strategic
Command's roles to develop analytical studies that are to be used as
the basis for developing annual BMDS budget proposals. From U.S.
Strategic Command, we obtained and reviewed Strategic Command
Instruction 538.3, Warfighter Involvement Process, dated June 2008, and
the 2007 Prioritized Capabilities List to help us to understand the
command's role in identifying and advocating for BMDS quantity
requirements. We also used the U.S. Strategic Command documentation to
identify key geographic combatant commands with ballistic missile
defense requirements. These commands are U.S. Central Command, U.S.
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command. We
then obtained and reviewed briefings and other documents to understand
the extent to which these commands had identified quantity requirements
for ballistic missile defense elements and interceptors. We also
identified and reviewed Army and Navy analyses to identify the
quantities of key elements. We analyzed DOD's various studies by
comparing them with criteria for establishing a knowledge-based
approach to acquiring major weapon systems, which we established based
on our prior work on knowledge-based acquisition[Footnote 38] and on
DOD documentation. We also met with officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, MDA headquarters and element program
offices, key geographic combatant commands, U.S. Strategic Command, and
each of the military services to discuss DOD's efforts to establish
type and quantity requirements for ballistic missile defense force
structure, their respective roles and responsibilities in preparing
such analyses, and the challenges of doing so.
To determine the extent to which the military services have established
the units needed to operate ballistic missile defense elements, we
performed our work at each of the military services, MDA, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, and key combatant commands. During our work
at each of the services, we adopted an element-by-element approach to
review the progress made by each service:
* To review the extent to which the Air Force has established units for
operating the Upgraded Early Warning Radars and the Cobra Dane Radar
Upgrade, we obtained and reviewed Air Force plans for declaring the
Beale and Fylingdales radars operational. We obtained Air Force
memorandums declaring whether the radars had met Air Force operational
criteria for being considered initially operational. We also met with
officials from the Air Force Air Staff and Air Force Space Command, and
submitted questions to Air Force Space Command, which provided us with
written responses. We also reviewed an agreement between the Air Force
and MDA describing each organization's roles and responsibilities upon
the transfer of the Cobra Dane Radar Upgrade from MDA to the Air Force.
* To review the extent to which the Navy has established the force
structure for Aegis BMD and Sea-based X-Band Radar elements, we
obtained and reviewed Navy certifications of the Aegis BMD capability
and the Pacific Fleet's December 2008 draft Sea-based X-Band Radar
Concept of Operations. We also reviewed an agreement between MDA and
the Navy describing each organization's roles and responsibilities for
providing operational forces for the Sea-based X-Band Radar until the
radar transfers to the Navy. We also met with Navy officials from the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and from the Office of the
Commander, Pacific Fleet.
* To review the extent to which the Army has established units with the
required organizations, training, and personnel for the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense, THAAD, and AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar elements, we
reviewed documentation establishing each of the Army units covered by
our review. We obtained and reviewed Army doctrine for THAAD and Ground-
based Midcourse Defense operations and the Army's 2009-2013 and 2010-
2015 force structure plans. We obtained and reviewed key U.S. Army
Space and Missile Defense Command documentation regarding a command
initiative to review and update the force structure for Ground-based
Midcourse Defense. We met with officials from the Army staff, U.S. Army
Space and Missile Defense Command, 100th Missile Defense Brigade, 49th
Missile Defense Battalion, Forward-based X-Band Radar Detachment, 94th
Army Air and Missile Defense Command, and 357th Air Defense Artillery
Detachment.
In addition to our work at the services, we also met with officials
from MDA to discuss the agency's perspectives and contributions to the
ballistic missile defense force structure, particularly for the
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications element. We
submitted questions to each element program office and received written
responses. We also obtained and reviewed key documents from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, including the BMDS 2007 Transition and
Transfer Plan, which was published in February 2008. We established
criteria for assessing the services' efforts to establish units with
the required organizations, personnel, and training by reviewing our
prior work on planning for ballistic missile defense operations,
[Footnote 39] and by obtaining and reviewing key DOD and service
documents. These included Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction
3170.01G, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System; Army
Regulation 71-11, Total Army Analysis; Army Regulation 71-32, Force
Development and Documentation--Consolidated Policies; and Air Force
Instruction 10-601, Capabilities-Based Requirements Development. We
obtained and reviewed documents outlining MDA's process and criteria
for declaring elements to be available for operational use; these
included MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMDS) Master Plan, version
9.1, which was signed in May 2009, and prior versions of this plan;
integrated master schedules; and other MDA guidance. We determined when
MDA had first delivered capabilities to the combatant commands for
operational use by reviewing MDA's initial operational baseline, dated
April 2005, and subsequent memorandums issued by the MDA Director to
update this baseline or declare elements to be available for
contingency operations. We met with officials from U.S. Strategic
Command and from the four geographic combatant commands that have
identified ballistic missile defense priorities: U.S. Central Command,
U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command.
We also met with officials from U.S. Strategic Command's Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, who
provided us with the component's most recently completed Force
Preparation Campaign Plan that outlines the command's approach and
operational criteria for assessing ballistic missile defense element
performance.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to September 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
September 9, 2009:
Mr. John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-09-856, "Missile Defense: DoD Needs to More Fully Assess
Requirements and Establish Operational Units before Fielding New
Capabilities," dated August 14, 2009 (GAO Code 351260).
The DoD concurs with two of the draft report's recommendations and
partially concurs with one. The rationale for our position is included
in the enclosure. I submitted separately a list of technical and
factual errors for your consideration.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point
of contact for this effort is Mr. David Crim, 703-697-5385,
david.crim@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report - Dated August 14, 2009:
GAO Code 351260/GAO-09-856:
"Missile Defense: DoD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and
Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the preparation and periodic updating of a comprehensive
analysis of the types and quantities of ballistic missile defense
elements and interceptors that are required for performing ballistic
missile defense missions worldwide. The analysis should consider the
integration of elements; risk assessments of the threat, capabilities
and limitations of the BMDS, and redundancy requirements; allied
contributions; the employment of elements that can perform multiple
types of ballistic missile defense missions and other missions; and any
other relevant factors identified by the Department.
DoD Response: Partially Concur. While as the GAO notes, the DoD
currently conducts a number of analyses to determine the appropriate
set of ballistic missile defense capabilities, the recommendation for
DoD to prepare and update a comprehensive analysis of types and
quantities of ballistic missile defense elements (to include
interceptors) required for performing worldwide ballistic missile
defense missions is valid. In addition, given the interrelationships
between ballistic missile defense and air defense both operationally
and technically, analyzing ballistic missile defenses must include a
comprehensive assessment of global capabilities. In addition, decisions
related to ballistic missile defenses must factor in the priorities not
only of the broader DoD enterprise, but of other government agencies
(e.g. the Department of State).
The ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense Review will develop the strategic
themes and analytic bases to be used in this periodic review. This
analysis can then be incorporated into the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR), which includes all principal stakeholders and meets the
criterion for periodic update. The DoD will conduct a more detailed
assessment of needs and capabilities during each QDR cycle and once in
the intervening four years between QDRs the DoD will update the
assessment. Because of the large number of factors GAO recommends for
inclusion in the review (degree of integration, threat risk
assessments, Ballistic Missile Defense System capabilities and
limitations, redundancy requirements, allied contributions, employment
of multi-mission assets, and other relevant factors) and the biennial
budget planning process, it would be impractical to conduct such a
comprehensive review on a more frequent basis.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense use
this analysis as a foundation for evaluating DoD's ballistic missile
defense developmental and acquisition priorities in future budget
requests as well as its overall ballistic missile defense policy and
strategy direction.
DoD Response: Concur. If undertaken as part of the Quadrennial Defense
Review, this analysis would serve the GAO-recommended purposes of
shaping ballistic missile defense developmental and acquisition
priorities in future budget requests, and shaping overall ballistic
missile defense policy, strategy, and future deployment options.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
require, in the absence of an immediate threat or crisis, that
operational units be established with the organizations, personnel, and
training needed to perform of their ballistic missile defense
responsibilities before first making elements available for operational
use.
DoD Response: Concur.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director;
David Best; Colin Chambers; Tara Copp Connolly; Nicolaas C. Cornelisse;
Susan Ditto; and Kevin L. O'Neill, Analyst-in-Charge, made significant
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Ballistic missile defense elements include Airborne Laser; Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense; AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar; Cobra Dane
Radar Upgrade; Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications;
European Interceptor Site; European Midcourse Radar; Ground-based
Midcourse Defense; Patriot Advanced Capability-3; Sea-based X-Band
Radar; Space Tracking and Surveillance System; Terminal High-Altitude
Area Defense; and Upgraded Early Warning Radar. An interceptor is a
component of some ballistic missile defense elements that is used to
destroy an adversary's ballistic missile. For example, the Missile
Defense Agency is building the Standard Missile-3 to be used as a
ballistic missile defense interceptor as part of the Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense element.
[2] A missile attack involves four phases from launch to impact: (1)
the boost phase is the period immediately after launch when the
missile's booster stages are still thrusting and typically lasts 3 to 5
minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles; (2) the ascent phase
is when the booster stages have stopped thrusting and dropped away,
leaving a warhead and possible decoys; (3) the midcourse phase, lasting
for about 20 minutes for intercontinental ballistic missiles, begins
after the missile has stopped accelerating and the warhead travels
through space; and (4) the terminal phase begins when the warhead
reenters the atmosphere and lasts approximately a minute or less.
[3] For example, see GAO, Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based
Funding Approach Could Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619] (Washington, D.C.:
July 2, 2008), and Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-467SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2008).
[4] Our scope did not include an evaluation of the Army's efforts to
establish the units needed to operate the Patriot Advanced Capability-
3 element, which is the most mature ballistic missile defense element.
Although MDA and the Army continue to work together to integrate the
system's capabilities into the overall BMDS, Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 transferred to the Army in 2003 and has been fully
integrated into the Army's existing force structure for the Patriot air
and missile defense system.
[5] The White House, National Security Presidential Directive-23
National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense (Dec. 16, 2002).
[6] Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense System
Operational Baseline, version 1.0 (April 2005). The BMDS operational
baseline is a management tool that MDA uses to determine the
composition of the operational BMDS at any given point in time.
[7] Three other elements--Airborne Laser, European Midcourse Radar, and
Space Surveillance and Tracking System--have been assigned to the Air
Force as lead service, and the Army is taking responsibility for
operating the European Interceptor Site. MDA has not made these
elements available for operational use.
[8] In contrast, under standard DOD practices the services are
generally responsible for declaring weapon systems to be operational
and for developing both the weapon systems and the force structure
needed for operations.
[9] In developing an integrated BMDS, DOD's intention was for MDA to
develop BMDS elements and then "transition" the elements to the
services that would operate and support them. The transition process
may, for some elements, end at a point that DOD calls transfer--with
MDA and the lead service sharing development, operations, and
sustainment responsibilities as defined by agreement.
[10] Since the release of the fiscal year 2010 budget request, MDA has
changed the name of the ascent phase concept to "early intercept."
However, we continue to refer to the concept as ascent phase throughout
this report.
[11] According to DOD Directive 5134.9, Missile Defense Agency (MDA),
October 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics is responsible for recommending to the
Secretary of Defense when Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
assets are available for emergency or contingency use. According to
MDA's May 2009 Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Master Plan, MDA
supports such decisions by determining which assets are suitable for
emergency activation.
[12] We have previously reported that MDA's effort to conform to a
schedule of Early, Partial, and Full Capability Deliveries has resulted
in making such declarations based on a more limited understanding of
system effectiveness than planned. See GAO, Defense Management: Key
Challenges Should be Addressed When Considering Changes to Missile
Defense Agency's Roles and Missions, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 26,
2009), and Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile
Defense Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than
Planned, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2009).
[13] The Missile Defense Executive Board is chaired by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The
board's members are the Director, Defense Research and Engineering;
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Director, Program Analysis and
Evaluation; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics,
and Technology; Deputy Under Secretary of Air Force Space Programs;
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command; Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and
Nonproliferation; Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; Vice Chief
for Naval Operations; Director, Missile Defense Agency; and Vice
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[14] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 234 (2008).
[15] GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning
and Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European
Sites, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771] (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 6, 2009).
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338].
[17] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost
Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 25, 2008).
[18] GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Process
for Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-740] (Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2008).
[19] GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational
Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-473] (Washington, D.C.:
May 31, 2006).
[20] The total number of planned deployed ground-based interceptors
remained 48 until the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request when
the total number increased to 54--40 in Alaska, 4 in California, and 10
in Europe. The President's fiscal year 2010 budget request did not
alter the total number of ground-based interceptors but changed the
number of emplaced interceptors in Alaska and California from 44 to 30.
In explaining this change, MDA reported to Congress in July 2009 that
the 2002 projection of threat missiles was reassessed to be off by 10
to 20 missiles. Additionally, the report explains that the number of
long-range missiles the interceptors would have to engage at any one
time was limited because of the low number of launch complexes for
these missiles. The report concludes that 30 emplaced interceptors is
sufficient to defend the United States and that the number could be
expanded if the threat grows.
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-467SP].
[22] Areas on the figure do not signal current or intended deployment
locations of the assets.
[23] MDA is developing the Standard Missile-3 Block II interceptor,
which is expected to be able to intercept intermediate-range missiles
during the midcourse phase of flight. These interceptors are expected
to be deployable on Aegis ships by 2015.
[24] For a discussion of GAO's perspective on DOD's progress and
challenges to improving oversight of the BMDS through the Life Cycle
Management Process, see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T].
[25] DOD's traditional requirements process is described in Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01G, Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System (Mar. 1, 2009). DOD's acquisition
process is described in DOD Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition
System (May 12, 2003), and DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the
Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008).
[26] Sensor management operations include integration and management of
the sensor with the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element and are
executed from a remote location. Sensor management of the radar fielded
to Japan in 2006 is executed by an Army unit located in Hawaii, and
sensor management of the radar fielded to Israel in 2008 is executed by
an Army unit located in Germany.
[27] Israel is located within the U.S. European Command area of
responsibility and sensor management operations are performed remotely
from Germany by the 357th Air Defense Artillery Detachment.
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T].
[29] This unit is the A Battery (THAAD), 4th Air Defense Artillery
Regiment, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 32nd Area Air and Missile
Defense Command. The Army also plans to activate the A Battery, 2nd
Regiment, in fiscal year 2010; the D Battery, 2nd Regiment, in fiscal
year 2012; and the B Battery, 2nd Regiment, in fiscal year 2013.
[30] DOD defines an Initial Operational Capability as the first
attainment of the capability to employ effectively a weapon, item of
equipment, or system of approved specific characteristics that is
manned or operated by an adequately trained, equipped, and supported
military unit or force.
[31] The Army established the 100th Ground-based Midcourse Defense
Brigade, based in Colorado, and the 49th Ground-based Midcourse Defense
Battalion, based in Alaska, to operate the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense element.
[32] The operational crews of the 100th Ground-based Midcourse Defense
Brigade are certified by U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command in
support of U.S. Northern Command.
[33] The MDA-provided training does not include training for sensor
management of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar, which the Army has
provided to servicemembers since 2008.
[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-473].
[35] Missile Defense Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
Master Plan, version 9.1 (April 2009). The plan was signed by the MDA
Director on May 18, 2009.
[36] Section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 (1999), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 118,
directed DOD to conduct comprehensive Quadrennial Defense Reviews every
4 years to examine elements of the defense program and policies of the
United States, including the national defense strategy, force
structure, modernization, infrastructure, and budget plan.
[37] Because Patriot Advanced Capability-3 is not among the Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements that the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) has declared ready for operations, we did not evaluate the Army's
efforts to establish the units needed to operate the element. Although
MDA and the Army continue to work together to integrate the system's
capabilities into the overall BMDS, Patriot Advanced Capability-3
transferred to the Army in 2003 and has been fully integrated into the
Army's existing force structure for the Patriot air and missile defense
system.
[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-467SP].
[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-473].
[End of section]
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