Reserve Forces
Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force Gao ID: GAO-09-898 September 17, 2009Since September 11, 2001, the Army has heavily used its reserve components--the Army National Guard and Army Reserve--for ongoing operations even though they were envisioned and resourced to be strategic reserves. A congressional commission, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Army have concluded the Army will need to continue to use its reserve components as an operational force. The transition will require changes to force structure as well as manning and equipping strategies that could cost billions of dollars. The 2009 Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to study this transition. This report provides additional information on (1) progress and challenges the Army faces, (2) to what extent the Army has estimated costs for the transition and included them in its projected spending plans, and (3) the effect of the operational role on the Guard's availability to state governors for domestic missions. GAO examined planning, policy, and budget documents, and relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code; and met with DOD, Army, reserve component, and state officials.
The Army is changing the organization and missions of some of its reserve units to provide more operational forces, and is increasing their personnel and equipment, but faces challenges in achieving the predictable and sustainable mobilization cycle envisioned for an operational force, primarily due to the high pace of operations. The Army is reorganizing its reserve units to match their active counterparts, is changing the missions of some units, has made plans to add over 9,000 personnel by 2013, and has requested almost $23 billion for reserve equipment since 2003. To guide the transition, DOD has established principles and policies, such as a 1-year limit on reserve mobilizations, and set a goal of providing reservists 5 years between mobilizations. However, heavy operational demands have meant that many reservists have had significantly less than 5 years between mobilizations. To make the most of the limited mobilization time available, DOD directed the services to provide sufficient resources to support reserve forces to be nearly ready to deploy before mobilization. In the past, reserve component forces often required significant time after mobilization to prepare individuals and units for deployment. However, the Army is continuing to need to improve readiness after mobilization by addressing medical and dental issues, or transferring personnel and equipment from nondeployed units to fill shortfalls. Until demand eases, it seems unlikely that the Army will be able to achieve the mobilization cycle it initially envisioned for the reserves. The Army developed initial cost estimates for transitioning its reserve components to an operational role, but has not budgeted for most of the costs it identified. A 2008 estimate identified costs of about $24 billion over a 6-year period from 2010 to 2015 to increase full-time support personnel, training days, recruiting and retention incentives, and installation support, among others. However, because the Army has not yet established the specific equipping, manning, and training levels required of an operational reserve, it is difficult to assess the estimate's validity. The Army established a task force to develop an implementation plan for the transition, and Army leadership is currently reviewing a draft plan and awaiting the results of other studies, such as a review of full-time support needs. However, pending the results of these studies and agreement on an implementation plan, the Army does not expect to budget for such costs until 2012. Best practices have shown that effective and efficient operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks, metrics and timelines to measure success, and a comprehensive and realistic funding strategy. Until the Army finalizes an implementation plan and fully estimates the transition costs, and includes these costs in its projected spending plans, it will be difficult to assess the Army's progress in transitioning its reserve component to a sustainable operational force. The operational role has reduced the Guard's availability for domestic missions, but the effect on the states remains unclear because states mitigate shortfalls with mutual support agreements and requirements for some domestic missions remain undefined.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-898, Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2009:
Reserve Forces:
Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for
Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force:
Reserve Forces:
GAO-09-898:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-898, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since September 11, 2001, the Army has heavily used its reserve
components”the Army National Guard and Army Reserve”for ongoing
operations even though they were envisioned and resourced to be
strategic reserves. A congressional commission, the Department of
Defense (DOD), and the Army have concluded the Army will need to
continue to use its reserve components as an operational force. The
transition will require changes to force structure as well as manning
and equipping strategies that could cost billions of dollars. The 2009
Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to study this transition. This
report provides additional information on (1) progress and challenges
the Army faces, (2) to what extent the Army has estimated costs for the
transition and included them in its projected spending plans, and (3)
the effect of the operational role on the Guard‘s availability to state
governors for domestic missions.
GAO examined planning, policy, and budget documents, and relevant
sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code; and met with DOD, Army,
reserve component, and state officials.
What GAO Found:
The Army is changing the organization and missions of some of its
reserve units to provide more operational forces, and is increasing
their personnel and equipment, but faces challenges in achieving the
predictable and sustainable mobilization cycle envisioned for an
operational force, primarily due to the high pace of operations. The
Army is reorganizing its reserve units to match their active
counterparts, is changing the missions of some units, has made plans to
add over 9,000 personnel by 2013, and has requested almost $23 billion
for reserve equipment since 2003. To guide the transition, DOD has
established principles and policies, such as a 1-year limit on reserve
mobilizations, and set a goal of providing reservists 5 years between
mobilizations. However, heavy operational demands have meant that many
reservists have had significantly less than 5 years between
mobilizations. To make the most of the limited mobilization time
available, DOD directed the services to provide sufficient resources to
support reserve forces to be nearly ready to deploy before
mobilization. In the past, reserve component forces often required
significant time after mobilization to prepare individuals and units
for deployment. However, the Army is continuing to need to improve
readiness after mobilization by addressing medical and dental issues,
or transferring personnel and equipment from nondeployed units to fill
shortfalls. Until demand eases, it seems unlikely that the Army will be
able to achieve the mobilization cycle it initially envisioned for the
reserves.
The Army developed initial cost estimates for transitioning its reserve
components to an operational role, but has not budgeted for most of the
costs it identified. A 2008 estimate identified costs of about $24
billion over a 6-year period from 2010 to 2015 to increase full-time
support personnel, training days, recruiting and retention incentives,
and installation support, among others. However, because the Army has
not yet established the specific equipping, manning, and training
levels required of an operational reserve, it is difficult to assess
the estimate‘s validity. The Army established a task force to develop
an implementation plan for the transition, and Army leadership is
currently reviewing a draft plan and awaiting the results of other
studies, such as a review of full-time support needs. However, pending
the results of these studies and agreement on an implementation plan,
the Army does not expect to budget for such costs until 2012. Best
practices have shown that effective and efficient operations require
detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks, metrics and
timelines to measure success, and a comprehensive and realistic funding
strategy. Until the Army finalizes an implementation plan and fully
estimates the transition costs, and includes these costs in its
projected spending plans, it will be difficult to assess the Army‘s
progress in transitioning its reserve component to a sustainable
operational force.
The operational role has reduced the Guard‘s availability for domestic
missions, but the effect on the states remains unclear because states
mitigate shortfalls with mutual support agreements and requirements for
some domestic missions remain undefined.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Army finalize an implementation plan and cost
estimates for the transition to an operational force, and include
transition costs in its funding plans. In comments on a draft of this
report, DOD agreed with GAO‘s recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-898] or key
components. For more information, contact John Pendleton, (202) 512-
3489 or PendletonJ@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Army Has Taken Steps to Adapt the Reserve Components, but It Faces
Challenges in Achieving a Sustainable Mobilization Cycle and Meeting
Premobilization Readiness Standards:
The Army Has Estimated and Budgeted for Some Costs to Transition Its
Reserve Components to an Operational Force, but Has Not yet Finalized
an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy:
States Use Mutual Support Agreements to Mitigate Effects of National
Guard Deployments, although Some Domestic Requirements Remain
Undefined:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces:
Table 2: Cost Estimates to Transition the Reserve Components to an
Operational Force:
Figures:
Figure 1: Army Force-Generation (ARFORGEN) Model:
Figure 2:Army Reserve Component Members on Active Duty from September
2001 to June 2009 in Support of Operations Noble Eagle, Iraqi Freedom,
and Enduring Freedom:
Figure 3: Number of Army Reserve Component Soldiers Available for
Deployment in Fiscal Year 2011 under Currently Planned Force Structure
at Varying Average Amounts of Time between Mobilizations:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 17, 2009:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the demand for Army
forces has been high, and the Army has relied heavily upon its reserve
components--the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve--to meet
operational requirements. As of May 2009, about 475,000 members of the
Army's reserve components had been activated for ongoing operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other missions worldwide, representing
the largest activation of reservists since the Korean War. The high
pace of operations has meant that the reserve components' Cold War role
has evolved from a strategic reserve that would be used to supplement
active duty forces in the event of extended conflict to an operational
force characterized by ongoing rotational deployments.[Footnote 1]
As a strategic reserve, the reserve components were not maintained to
be immediately ready for deployment, and it was expected that they
would receive additional equipment, personnel, and training after they
were mobilized.[Footnote 2] However, as an operational force, reserve
units need to build and maintain readiness prior to mobilization to
support recurring deployments. Some capabilities that have been in
especially high demand for stability and counterinsurgency operations,
such as civil affairs and psychological operations, reside heavily in
the reserve component, creating an especially high pace of operations
for reservists with these skills. In 2006, the Department of Defense's
(DOD) Quadrennial Defense Review established that to use the reserve
components as a viable operational force, reservists and units must be
more accessible and readily deployable.[Footnote 3] In 2008, the
congressionally chartered Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
found there was no reasonable alternative to increased reliance on the
reserve components given the current threats, fiscal challenges,
projected demand for forces, and the unique capabilities resident in
the reserves.[Footnote 4] In that same year, U.S. Army Forces Command
similarly concluded that using the reserve components as an operational
force was the Army's best option for meeting its needs. According to
the Army, other options available including full mobilization,
significantly enlarging the active component, and maintaining or
adapting the strategic reserve were infeasible, impractical, or
unsustainable.[Footnote 5] DOD has acknowledged that the reserve
component is now an integral part of the operating force, in addition
to its strategic reserve role, and the Army is undertaking initiatives
designed to enhance the capability of both active and reserve forces
and to provide a more predictable deployment schedule.
Over the last few years, we have examined the effects of expanded
mission requirements on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve,
including their new operational roles in supporting both large-scale,
long-duration overseas operations and emerging domestic requirements.
In July 2005, we reported that, while the Army Reserve has provided
ready forces to support military operations since September 11, 2001,
it was becoming increasingly difficult to continue to provide these
forces due to personnel and equipment shortages.[Footnote 6] In October
2005, we reported that the high pace of operations has also caused a
strain on the Army National Guard's equipment inventories that could be
used for domestic missions.[Footnote 7] In September 2006, we testified
before the congressionally chartered Commission on National Guard and
Reserves[Footnote 8] that equipment shortages and personnel challenges
have increased in the National Guard and Army Reserve, which if left
unattended may hamper the reserve components' preparedness for future
overseas and domestic missions.[Footnote 9] In January 2007, we further
reported that planning for the National Guard's response to large-
scale, catastrophic events is not complete and that the National Guard
may not be prepared to respond as efficiently and effectively as
possible to domestic events.[Footnote 10] We have also previously
reported that the operational readiness of reserve forces has been
hampered by long-standing problems with reservists' medical and
physical condition and that DOD is unable to determine the extent to
which the reserve force has complied with routine examinations due to a
lack of complete or reliable data.[Footnote 11] A list of related GAO
products is included at the end of this report.
The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009[Footnote 12] directed GAO to report on the use of the Army's
reserve components as an operational reserve. Specifically, we were
asked to include in our report a description of current and programmed
resources, force structure, and any organizational challenges that the
Army's reserve components may face serving as an operational reserve
including challenges related to force structure; manning; equipment
availability, maintenance, and logistics issues; and any conflicts with
requirements under Title 32 of the United States Code.[Footnote 13] We
satisfied that mandate by providing a briefing on our preliminary
observations addressing these issues to the congressional defense
committees in June 2009.[Footnote 14] This report provides additional
information related to the questions addressed in response to the
mandate. Specifically, this report examines: (1) steps the Army has
taken and the challenges it faces in transitioning its reserve force
structure, manning, and equipping, and logistics strategies,[Footnote
15] (2) the extent to which the Army has estimated costs required for
the reserve components' transition to the operational role and included
these in its budget and Future Years Defense Program,[Footnote 16] and
(3) the effect of the National Guard's federal operational role on its
availability to state governors for domestic missions.
To determine the extent to which the Army has modified the force
structure as well as the manning and equipping strategies of its
reserve components to meet the requirements of the operational role,
and to identify the challenges, if any, the Army faces in completing
the transition, we reviewed Army plans and policy documents, reports of
the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, and DOD reports to
Congress on related initiatives and issues. We also reviewed program
and policy documents and interviewed officials with DOD, Army, National
Guard Bureau, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, U.S. Army Forces
Command, and First Army. Further, we incorporated information from
surveys of a nonprobability sample of 24 Army National Guard or Army
Reserve units, as well as follow-up interviews with officials from 15
of these units.[Footnote 17] The surveys and interviews addressed a
range of training, equipment, and personnel issues. To evaluate the
current and projected resources for transitioning the reserve
components to the operational role, we reviewed current Army plans,
policy and budget documents, DOD's fiscal year 2009 supplemental
appropriations request, and DOD's fiscal year 2009 and 2010 budget
requests. To determine the effect of the National Guard's federal
operational role on its availability to state governors for domestic
missions, we reviewed relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the
United States Code and conducted interviews with the National Guard
Bureau and offices of the Adjutants General of four states (Virginia,
Missouri, Washington, and Florida). We selected states that had a
history of major disaster declarations and that also contained units
that are in demand for both overseas and domestic missions. We
conducted this performance audit from July 2008 through July 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. The scope and methodology
used in our review are described in further detail in appendix I.
Background:
In fiscal year 2008, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard had about
197,000 and 360,400 soldiers, respectively, comprising 51 percent of
the total Army, which also includes the active component. The Army
organizes, trains, and equips its reserve components to perform
assigned missions. The Army Reserve is a federal force that is
organized and trained primarily to supply specialized combat support
and combat service support skills to combat forces.[Footnote 18] The
Army National Guard is composed of both combat forces and units that
supply support skills, but in contrast to the Army Reserve, the Army
National Guard has dual federal and state missions. When not called to
active duty for a federal mission, Army National Guard units remain
under the command and control of the governors, typically training for
their federal mission or conducting state missions. In addition,
National Guard forces can be mobilized under Title 32 of the United
States Code for certain federally funded, domestic missions conducted
under the command of the governors such as providing security at the
nation's airports in the immediate aftermath of the September 11
terrorist attacks and assisting the Gulf Coast in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. Both reserve components are composed primarily of
citizen soldiers who balance the demands of civilian careers with part-
time military service.
Reserve forces may be involuntarily called to active duty under three
mobilization authorities. As shown in table 1, the President may
involuntarily mobilize forces under two authorities with size and time
limitations. Full mobilization, which would authorize the mobilization
of forces for as long as they are needed, requires a declaration by
Congress.
Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces:
Statute: 10 U.S.C. 12301(a); "Full Mobilization";
Provisions: Declared by Congress: In time of war or national emergency;
No limit on numbers of soldiers called to active duty; For duration of
war or emergency plus 6 months.
Statute: 10 U.S.C. 12302; "Partial Mobilization";
Provisions: Declared by the President: In time of national emergency;
No more than 1,000,000 reservists can be on involuntary active duty; No
more than 24 consecutive months.
Statute: 10 U.S.C. 12304; "Presidential Reserve Call-up";
Provisions: Determined by the President: To augment the active duty
force for operational missions or to provide support to certain
emergencies; No more than 200,000 members of the Selected and
Individual Ready Reserves can be on active duty; No more than 365 days.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code provisions.
[End of table]
In September 2001, following President Bush's declaration of a national
emergency resulting from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
DOD issued mobilization guidance that, among other things, allowed the
services to mobilize reservists for up to 24 cumulative months under
the President's partial mobilization authority. In January 2007, the
Secretary of Defense issued updated guidance on the utilization of the
force that, among other things, limits involuntary reserve component
mobilizations to no more than 1 year at a time.[Footnote 19]
During the Cold War, the Army's reserve components principally operated
as a force in reserve, or strategic reserve, that would supplement
active forces in the event of extended conflict. Members of the
reserves generally served 39 days a year--1 weekend a month and an
additional 2 weeks of duty. In addition, the reserve components have a
small number of full-time personnel, Active Guard and Reserve personnel
and military technicians, that perform the necessary day-to-day tasks
such as maintaining unit equipment and planning training events that
reserve units need to accomplish in order to maintain readiness for
their mission and be able to deploy.[Footnote 20] The Army's resourcing
strategy for a strategic reserve provided reserve units with varying
levels of resources according to the priority assigned to their federal
warfighting missions. Most reserve component units were provided with
between 65 and 74 percent of their required personnel and 65 to 79
percent of their required equipment. This approach assumed that most
reserve component forces would have a lengthy mobilization period with
enough time to fully man, equip, and train their units after they were
mobilized to attain the high level of operational readiness necessary
for deployment.
Since September 11, 2001, however, the demand for Army forces and
capabilities has been high, especially to support ongoing operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Recognizing that its forces were being stressed
by the demands of lengthy and repeated deployments, the Army has
adopted a new force-generation model intended to improve units'
readiness over time as they move through phased training to prepare to
be ready for a potential deployment. This contrasts with the previous
approach in which, as a strategic reserve, units' personnel and
equipment levels were maintained below warfighting readiness levels
until they were mobilized. Under the Army's new model, the early phases
of the cycle will entail formation and staffing of the unit and
beginning individual and collective training, while later phases will
concentrate on larger unit training. Figure 1 illustrates the planned
movement of units through the reset, train/ready, and available phases
of the Army force-generation model.
Figure 1: Army Force-Generation (ARFORGEN) Model:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
This figure depicts a wheel with interdependent 'spokes,' with one
leading to the next on a continual basis.
ARFORGEN is a structured progression of increased unit readiness over
time resulting in periods of availability of trained, ready, and
cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil
authorities and combatant commander requirements.
RESET Year:
The RESET force pool begins when 51 percent of a unit‘s personnel
return to home station. Reserve component units are in the RESET force
pool for at least 365 days. During this time there is soldier-family
reintegration, block leave, unit reconstruction, training, and receipt
of new personnel and equipment. Units retain homeland defense and
homeland security capabilities.
Train/Ready 1 Phase:
Activities in this phase are initially centered on acquiring personnel
skills, such as professional military training, equipment upgrades and
improvements, and changing leadership at the unit. Once these small-
team and section tasks are complete, the unit will focus on low-level
collective tasks or mission-specific tasks, if known.
Train/Ready 2 Phase:
This phase takes the individually trained soldiers and the unit
leadership and integrates their technical skills into a full-spectrum,
culturally aware, tactically proficient unit. The unit will conduct
battle staff exercises and collective training from the platoon through
the battalion level. The units will participate in a high-intensity
exercise intended to allow the units to test their collective skills,
and, through an external evaluation, determine areas to focus training
efforts during their Train/Ready 3 phase.
Train/Ready 3 Phase:
The focus of the Train/Ready 3 phase is to gain full tactical
proficiency in the unit‘s geographically oriented, mission-specific
tasks. The unit will continue to train collectively with a focus on
their directed mission-essential tasks and may receive an opportunity
to receive validation of their tactical proficiency at one of the
Army's training centers. In addition, these units provide depth and
strategic capability that can be surged to meet unexpected operational
demands.
Available Year:
Units in the Available phase typically are mobilized to meet specific
mission requirements or are on short notice for potential contingency
missions. Soldiers not activated support homeland defense missions,
mobilization centers, and medical centers in the continental United
States.
Continue on by returning to RESET Year.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of figure]
Under the Army's force-generation model as designed, reserve component
units would be available for deployment for 1 year with 5 years between
deployments. After returning home from a deployment, units remain in
the reset phase for a fixed 1-year period and focus on restoring
personnel and equipment readiness so that they can resume training for
future missions. Following the reset phase, units enter the train/ready
phases in which they progressively increase their training proficiency
by completing individual and collective training tasks. As designed in
the force-generation model, reserve component units remain in the
train/ready phases for 4 years, although the amount of time is not
fixed and may be reduced to meet operational demands. Upon completion
of the train/ready phases, units enter the available year in which they
can be mobilized to meet specific mission requirements. Under current
DOD policy, involuntary reserve component mobilizations are limited to
no more than 1 year in length. The force-generation process requires
increasing resources for units to use in training to gain higher levels
of proficiency prior to mobilization.
In 2008, DOD published a new directive on managing the reserve
components as an operational force. The directive provides the
following definition of the reserve components as an operational force:
"The reserve components provide operational capabilities and strategic
depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of
conflict. In their operational roles, reserve components participate in
a full range of missions according to their Services' force-generation
plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established
cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the
combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families and
employers. In their strategic roles, reserve component units and
individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the
national defense strategy. As such, the reserve components provide
strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as
needed."[Footnote 21]
The Army Has Taken Steps to Adapt the Reserve Components, but It Faces
Challenges in Achieving a Sustainable Mobilization Cycle and Meeting
Premobilization Readiness Standards:
The Army has made a number of changes to its force structure, as well
as to its manning and equipping strategies to better position its
reserve components for the operational role. However, given the current
high pace of operations, the Army has faced challenges in achieving
sustainable mobilization rates for its citizen soldiers and in readying
personnel and units before they are mobilized in order to maximize
their availability to operational commanders after deployment.
The Army Has Taken Steps to Modify the Reserve Components' Force
Structure for the Operational Role:
The Army has made four force-structure changes to better position its
reserve components for the operational role.
* First, the Army is undertaking a major reorganization--called the
modular force initiative--designed to make Army forces more flexible
and responsive by reorganizing combat and combat support forces from a
division-based force to smaller, more numerous, modular brigade
formations with significant support elements. In contrast to the Army's
previous division-based force with many different types of unique
forces, the modular forces were designed to be standardized and
interoperable so forces could be more easily tailored to meet
operational needs. Under the modular reorganization, National Guard and
Army Reserve units are to have the same designs, organizational
structures, and equipment as their active component counterparts so
that they can be operationally employed in the same manner as active
component units. The Army reported in its 2009 Campaign Plan that it
has converted or begun converting 256 (84 percent) of the 303 planned
brigade formations.[Footnote 22] However, the Army has been focused on
equipping and staffing units to support ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the equipment and personnel levels in nondeployed units
have been declining. Further, as previously reported, the Army does not
have a plan with clear milestones in place to guide efforts to equip
and staff units that have been converted to the modular design,
[Footnote 23] and the Army now anticipates that the converted modular
units will not be fully staffed and equipped until 2019--more than a
decade away. Furthermore, without adequate planning, the Army risks
cost growth and further timeline slippage in its efforts to transform
to a more modular and capable force.
* The Army is changing the missions of some Army organizations and
retraining soldiers to produce more soldiers and units with high-demand
skills. For example, the Army is decreasing its supply of air defense,
armor, and field artillery capabilities in order to increase its supply
of special operations, civil affairs, and military police capabilities.
The Army began these rebalancing efforts in fiscal year 2003 after
military operations in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks generated high demand for certain forces. Among those forces in
high demand were certain combat support and combat service support
forces such as military police and transportation units. These support
forces, which are also called enablers, reside heavily in the reserve
components. The goals of rebalancing included helping to ease stress on
units and individuals with high-demand skills and meeting the Army's
goal of executing the first 30 days of an operation without
augmentation from the reserve component. As part of the rebalancing
plan, the Army National Guard is converting six brigade combat teams
into four maneuver enhancement brigades[Footnote 24] and two
battlefield surveillance brigades[Footnote 25] that will perform combat
support roles. As of February 2009, the Army reported that it had
completed rebalancing 70,400 positions, about 50 percent of the
approximately 142,300 positions scheduled to be rebalanced by 2015
across the active and reserve components.
* The Army is also increasing personnel within the reserve components.
In January 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced an initiative to
expand the total Army by approximately 74,200 soldiers to better meet
long-term operational requirements, sustain the all-volunteer force,
and build towards a goal of 5 years between mobilizations for the
reserve components. This initiative is expected to add 8,200 soldiers
to the Army National Guard by 2010; 65,000 soldiers to the active
component by fiscal year 2010; and 1,000 soldiers to the Army Reserve
by 2013. The Secretary of Defense expects that with a larger force,
individuals and units will, over time, deploy less frequently and have
longer times at home between deployments. However, we have previously
reported that the Army has not developed a comprehensive funding plan
for the expansion initiative and that, lacking a complete and accurate
plan, Congress and other decision makers may not have the information
they need to consider the long-term costs and benefits associated with
increasing Army personnel levels or gauge the amount of funding that
should be appropriated to implement the initiative.[Footnote 26]
* The Army eliminated some reserve force-structure positions that
previously had been intentionally unfilled, largely for budgetary
reasons. Specifically, the Army's force-structure rebalancing, which
began in fiscal year 2003, and the modular transformation efforts that
began in 2004 reduced the force structure allowances for the Army
National Guard by 7 percent from 376,105 to 349,157 and Army Reserve by
about 4 percent from 213,324 to 205,028 between 2005 and 2009.[Footnote
27] Concurrently, the Army's Grow the Force plan increased the Army
National Guard's size by almost 2 percent from 352,700 soldiers in
fiscal year 2007 to 358,200 by fiscal year 2010 and the Army Reserve's
size by 3 percent from 200,000 soldiers in fiscal year 2007 to 206,000
by 2013. When the reserve components were solely a strategic reserve,
the Army routinely authorized units to be assigned fewer personnel than
would be required for their wartime mission under the assumption that
units could receive additional personnel when mobilized. By reducing
the number of units, the Army was able to authorize the remaining units
to be more fully manned.
DOD established a policy in 2008 to promote and support the management
of the reserve components as an operational force.[Footnote 28] The
policy directed the services to align reserve component force
structures, to the extent practicable, with established DOD goals for
frequency and duration of utilization for units and individuals. In
addition, the policy instructs the service Secretaries to manage their
reserve components such that they provide operational capabilities
while also maintaining strategic depth to meet U.S. military
requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Further, the policy
directs the Secretaries to ensure sufficient depth of reserve component
unit and individual capabilities to meet DOD's established force-
utilization goals. Those goals include planning for involuntary
mobilizations of guard and reserve units such that they receive 5 years
at home for every 1 year they are mobilized.
The Army Has Adapted Personnel Strategies for the Reserve Components'
Operational Role, but It Has Not Modified Requirements for Full-Time
Support Staffing:
The Army has adapted the strategies that it uses to staff its reserve
components for the operational role, which requires Army reserve
component units to achieve higher levels of personnel readiness and
maintain a more stable cadre of personnel than they did as part of a
strategic reserve. The Army has increased the number of personnel in
reserve component units, given units higher priority for personnel as
they near availability for deployment in the rotational cycle,
established some personnel readiness goals, and modified its recruiting
and retention strategies.
The operational role has several implications for how the Army staffs
its reserve component units. First, as an operational force, Army
reserve component units are now expected to be available to deploy for
1 year with 5 years between deployments and more frequently when the
Army faces increased demand for forces by the combatant commanders. To
prepare for regular deployments, the Army now expects its reserve
component units to progressively increase their personnel readiness on
a cyclical basis as they near availability for deployment. The Army
determines a unit's personnel readiness level by comparing the unit's
level of available strength to the number of personnel required by the
unit. Available strength is the portion of the unit's assigned strength
that is available for deployment to accomplish the unit's assigned
wartime mission. To be available, these personnel must meet a number of
administrative, medical, and dental requirements and must meet their
individual qualifications.[Footnote 29] As an operational force,
reserve component units need to make efficient use of training time
before deployment and build a cohesive force needed to achieve
collective training proficiency. DOD's policy that the service
Secretaries program and execute resources as required to support a
"train-mobilize-deploy" model means that units need to achieve high
levels of personnel readiness and complete most of their training
requirements prior to mobilization. This approach to training and
mobilization contrasts with the strategic reserve's "mobilize-train-
deploy" approach in which units would be brought up to full personnel
strength and soldiers' medical and dental issues would be addressed
after mobilization. To implement the train-mobilize-deploy model, the
Army has found that it needs to stabilize unit personnel by the time
the unit is alerted for deployment or as early as possible in the force-
generation cycle so that the unit can attain as much collective
training proficiency as possible prior to mobilization. This approach
allows the unit to minimize postmobilization training time and provide
as much availability as possible to theater commanders.
The Army Has Increased the Number of Personnel in Reserve Component
Units:
To staff reserve component units more fully, the Army has increased the
percentage of required personnel that are assigned to reserve component
units above strategic reserve levels and has established a long-range
goal of achieving full personnel strength throughout the force-
generation cycle for reserve components.[Footnote 30] As discussed
previously, the Army decreased the size of its reserve components'
force structures while also increasing their end strength,[Footnote 31]
which allowed remaining units to be more fully manned. Also, the Army
has modified its approach to assigning personnel to reserve component
units by giving units nearing deployment priority over other units in
the assignment of soldiers and establishing some personnel readiness
requirements for deploying units.[Footnote 32]
Despite these changes, the Army has not adopted any overarching,
uniform personnel readiness levels that units must achieve as they
progress through each phase of the force-generation cycle. The Army has
established some interim personnel readiness goals for units
participating in a "RESET pilot" program.[Footnote 33] However, the
Army reported in its 2009 Campaign Plan that current high global
demands for Army forces are preventing units from achieving specific
readiness levels as they progress through the phases of the force-
generation cycle.[Footnote 34] The Army plans to evaluate units in the
pilot program through 2010 and use this information to identify lessons
learned and determine what levels of personnel readiness will be
required of reserve component units as they progress through the force-
generation cycle.
The Reserve Components Have Established New Recruiting and Retention
Initiatives:
The reserve components have established several new initiatives to meet
the recruiting and retention goals of an operational force. Both
components have established incentives for current soldiers to recruit
others. The Army National Guard established the Guard Recruiting
Assistance Program in which every Army National Guard member can
function as a recruiter. The program provides a $2,000 monetary
incentive to Guard soldiers for every new person they recruit who
begins basic combat training. The Army Reserve's Recruiting Assistance
Program also provides a $2,000 monetary incentive to soldiers for every
new person they recruit. Both components are also implementing targeted
bonus programs to increase retention for soldiers with high-demand
occupational specialties and for certain officer grades.
Other Army National Guard recruitment and retention efforts include:
* the Recruit Sustainment Program, which is designed to keep recruits
interested in the Army National Guard as well as increase their
preparedness while awaiting training, and:
* the Active First Program, which is a pilot initiative in which
soldiers are recruited to serve for an 8-year period which includes
serving 3 years in the active component and 5 years in the Army
National Guard.
Additional Army Reserve recruitment and retention initiatives include:
* a conditional release policy designed to control the number of
reservists who leave the Army Reserve to enter the active Army, Army
National Guard, or other service components;
* an education stabilization program which synchronizes new soldiers
with a unit in the appropriate phase of the force-generation cycle so
that the soldier can complete his/her college degree without the
interruption of mobilization; and:
* an employer partnership initiative in which soldiers are recruited to
train and serve in the Army Reserve for a particular occupational
specialty and work in a related occupation for one of the civilian
employers that participate in this initiative.
The Army Has Established Initiatives to Improve Reserve Component
Personnel Readiness and Unit Stability:
Further, the Army and its reserve components have begun several other
initiatives to improve personnel readiness and unit stability prior to
mobilization and improve the execution of the "train-mobilize-deploy"
model required by DOD for an operational force. Although these
initiatives are in various stages of implementation, and it is too
early to assess their effectiveness, some of the steps that the Army
and its reserve components have taken include the following:
* The Army has established a goal of issuing alert orders to reserve
component units at least 12 months prior to their mobilization in order
to provide them enough time to attain required levels of ready
personnel for deployment. Army data show that the Army has increased
the amount of notice it provides to mobilizing Army National Guard
units from an average of 113 days in 2005 to 236 in 2008.
* The Army Reserve began implementing the Army Selected Reserves Dental
Readiness System in 2008 to reduce the number of nondeployable soldiers
across the force by providing annual dental examinations and dental
treatment for all soldiers regardless of their alert or mobilization
status.
* To reduce personnel attrition and increase unit stability prior to
unit mobilizations without the use of stop-loss, [Footnote 35] the Army
National Guard's Deployment Extension Stabilization Pay program, when
implemented, will make some soldiers eligible to receive up to $6,000
if they remain with their unit through mobilization and 90 days
following demobilization. The initiative is scheduled to begin in
September 2009. The Army Reserve is considering a similar program.
To improve medical readiness across the reserve components, the Army
National Guard is pilot testing an initiative--the Select Medical Pre-
Deployment Treatment Program--that will provide limited medical
treatment at no cost to eligible[Footnote 36] medically nondeployable
soldiers in Army National Guard and Army Reserve units alerted for
deployment. If the Army determines that the pilot is successful, it
will consider expanding the program across the reserve components.
The Army Has Not Established Full-Time Support Staffing Needs for the
Operational Role:
Although the shift to the "train-mobilize-deploy" model increases the
importance of the premobilization readiness tasks performed by full-
time support staff, the Army has not modified its full-time support
staffing requirements to reflect the needs of the operational role, and
the reserve component units face difficulties in performing key
readiness tasks at current staff levels. As of May 2009, the Army had
not reevaluated the reserve components' requirement for the full-time
staff that are needed to perform key readiness tasks on a day-to-day
basis in light of their new operational role. With most members of the
Army National Guard and Army Reserve serving 2 days a month and 2 weeks
out of the year, the reserve components rely on a small number of full-
time personnel to perform the day-to-day tasks such as maintaining unit
equipment and planning training events that reserve units need to
accomplish in order to maintain readiness for their mission and be able
to deploy. The Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee,[Footnote 37] U.S.
Army Forces Command,[Footnote 38] and the Commission on National Guard
and Reserves have reported that insufficient full-time support levels
place the operational force at risk.[Footnote 39]
The Army's reserve components are not authorized the number of full-
time personnel needed to meet the requirements established for their
strategic role, and requirements for the operational role have not been
determined. For fiscal year 2010, the Army National Guard and Army
Reserve required about 119,000 full-time support positions but were
only authorized 87,000 positions, or about 73 percent of the
requirement. The current full-time support requirement is based on a
manpower study conducted in 1999 when the reserve components were still
primarily a strategic reserve. In subsequent years, the Army reviewed
and adjusted the manpower analysis but it did not conduct an analysis
that incorporated the needs of an operational reserve. The last review
performed was completed in 2006, prior to the issuance of the Secretary
of Defense policy that limited involuntary mobilizations to 1 year and
before an increased emphasis was placed on premobilization readiness.
In 2007, the Army directed a study designed, in part, to measure the
readiness benefit to the Army of increasing its reserve components'
full-time support. However, because of data limitations, the Army could
not quantify the effect of full-time support on unit readiness. As a
result, the Army initiated an additional study to determine the link
between full-time support levels and unit readiness before including
additional funding for full-time support in future budget requests.
Specifically, the Army has commissioned a study to assist it with
identifying the existing requirements for full-time support,
determining how the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have met these
requirements in the past, and developing analytical links between full-
time support and unit readiness. The Army does not plan to make any
decision on full-time support resource levels until after this study is
completed in September 2009.
Mobilization of certain full-time support staff with dual roles as full-
time support staff and deployable members of reserve units who perform
key logistics and maintenance tasks has also created maintenance and
readiness challenges for the Army's reserve components. In the National
Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for 2009, DOD reported that the
average staffing of Army Reserve maintenance activities[Footnote 40] is
at approximately 60 percent of requirements, and currently about 25
percent of the assigned staff is deployed. According to the report,
mobilization of Army National Guard full-time support staff has
resulted in an overall reduction of 71 percent of maintenance
technician staffing during mobilization. The Army National Guard often
hires temporary technicians to replace maintenance technicians who are
mobilized. However, state National Guards, on average, hire only one
temporary technician for every five maintenance technicians mobilized,
due to the cost involved. To mitigate the maintenance backlog, the Army
Reserve continues to use contractors, contracted maintenance support,
and commercially available services.
The Army Has Adapted Its Strategy for Equipping Deploying Reserve
Units:
The Army has adapted its strategy for equipping its reserve components
for the operational role by establishing a long-term equipping goal
and, until it reaches this goal, giving units priority for equipment as
they near their availability for deployment. Over the long term, the
Army has established a goal of equipping all reserve units with 100
percent of their requirements by the end of fiscal year 2019. However,
because the Army's need for equipment currently exceeds the available
supply, and equipment shortages are expected to continue for a number
of years, the Army prioritizes the distribution of equipment to units
that are deployed and preparing to deploy consistent with its force-
generation model.[Footnote 41] In addition, under the new "train-
mobilize-deploy" model, reserve component units are also expected to
complete most of their training requirements prior to mobilization so
that they can provide as much time as possible to theater commanders
within the 12-month limit on involuntary mobilizations. To accomplish
these goals, the Army has established interim policies and guidance for
equipping reserve component units. First, the Army intends for a unit
to have 80 percent of its required equipment 365 days after the unit
returns from deployment. Second, the Army has directed commanders to
ensure that units report to the mobilization station with 90 to 100
percent of their required equipment.[Footnote 42]
Given Current Operational Demands and Army Force-Sizing Decisions,
Reserve Component Forces Face Challenges in Achieving the Secretary of
Defense's Goals for a Sustainable Mobilization Schedule and
Premobilization Readiness:
The Army faces challenges in limiting the frequency of mobilizations
and increasing both personnel and unit readiness given the high pace of
current operations.
The Army Faces Challenges in Achieving a Sustainable Mobilization
Schedule:
Despite changes to its force structure, manning, and equipping
strategies, at the current pace of operations, the Army's reserve
component force structure does not allow the Army to reach the
Secretary of Defense's goal of providing reservists 5 years demobilized
for each year mobilized. As figure 2 shows, the Army's reserve
components have experienced a continued high level of mobilizations
since 2001 in support of Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and
Iraqi Freedom.[Footnote 43]
Figure 2: Army Reserve Component Members on Active Duty from September
2001 to June 2009 in Support of Operations Noble Eagle, Iraqi Freedom,
and Enduring Freedom:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
The following time periods are depicted on the graph (approximate):
Major combat operations in Afghanistan: September 2001 to May 2001;
Major combat operations in Iraq: March 2003 to July 2003;
Transfer of government to Iraq: July 2004;
Iraqi National Assembly elections: February 2005;
Iraqi vote on constitution: October 2005;
Surge in Iraq and Afghanistan: August 2007 to June 2009.
Date: September 2001;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 132;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 789;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 921.
Date: October 2001;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 6,016;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 5,555;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 11,571.
Date: November 2001;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 7,010;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 7,296;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 14,306.
Date: December 2001;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 7,711;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 7,990;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 15,701.
Date: January 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 10,209;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 10,067;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 20,276.
Date: February 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 11,180;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 10,452;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 21,632.
Date: March 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 13,486;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 10,535;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 24,021.
Date: April 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 13,589;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 10,565;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 24,154.
Date: May 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 16,344;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 11,015;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 27,359.
Date: June 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 17,389;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 11,084;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 28,473.
Date: July 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 18,515;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 11,264;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 29,779.
Date: August 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 18,456;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 10,886;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 29,342.
Date: September 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 20,197;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 9,932;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 30,129.
Date: October 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 17,737;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 8,603;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 26,340.
Date: November 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 18,820;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 8,729;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 27,549.
Date: December 2002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 19,073;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 9,477;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 28,550.
Date: January 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 38,182;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 29,511;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 67,693.
Date: February 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 60,626;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 53,244;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 113,870.
Date: March 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 72,052;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 63,827;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 135,879.
Date: April 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 70,953;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 64,896;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 135,849.
Date: May 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 72,082;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 62,582;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 134,664.
Date: June 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 70,728;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 59,225;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 129,953.
Date: July 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 68,057;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 57,492;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 125,549.
Date: August 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 64,083;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 53,780;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 117,863.
Date: September 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 61,626;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 50,231;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 111,857.
Date: October 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 67,450;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 46,444;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 113,894.
Date: November 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 68,759;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 45,223;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 113,982.
Date: December 2003;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 78,261;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 54,408;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 132,669.
Date: January 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 81,994;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 56,104;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 138,098.
Date: February 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 80,285;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 54,254;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 134,539.
Date: March 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 78,821;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 50,957;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 129,778.
Date: April 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 72,618;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 45,236;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 117,854.
Date: May 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 68,641;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 39,001;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 107,642.
Date: June 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 73,378;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 36,607;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 109,985.
Date: July 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 73,605;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 34,730;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 108,335.
Date: August 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 81,251;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 36,794;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 118,045.
Date: September 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 81,891;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 38,243;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 120,134.
Date: October 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 89,545;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 42,164;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 131,709.
Date: November 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 93,829;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 44,077;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 137,906.
Date: December 2004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 94,042;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 43,827;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 137,869.
Date: January 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 95,677;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 41,292;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 136,969.
Date: February 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 91,004;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 39,227;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 130,231.
Date: March 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 80,399;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 34,411;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 114,810.
Date: April 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 72,030;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 32,320;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 104,350.
Date: May 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 69,124;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 31,461;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 100,585.
Date: June 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 69,239;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 31,342;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 100,581.
Date: July 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 69,673;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 31,504;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 101,177.
Date: August 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 73,615;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 32,323;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 105,938.
Date: September 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 76,562;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 33,227;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 109,789.
Date: October 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 77,383;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 33,648;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 111,031.
Date: November 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 66,350;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 33,126;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 99,476.
Date: December 2005;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 60,307;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 31,638;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 91,945.
Date: January 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 52,010;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 31,718;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 83,728.
Date: February 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 47,758;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 31,147;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 78,905.
Date: March 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 47,035;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 28,594;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 75,629.
Date: April 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 47,278;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 25,214;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 72,492.
Date: May 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 46,769;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,338;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 70,107.
Date: June 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 46,900;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,714;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 70,614.
Date: July 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 48,057;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 24,731;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 72,788.
Date: August 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 48,812;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 24,460;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 73,272.
Date: September 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 48,397;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 24,853;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 73,250.
Date: October 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 48,597;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 24,566;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 73,163.
Date: November 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 46,800;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 24,047;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 70,847.
Date: December 2006;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 43,065;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,419;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 66,484.
Date: January 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 44,397;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,395;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 67,792.
Date: February 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 44,334;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,510;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 67,844.
Date: March 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 43,863;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,880;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 67,743.
Date: April 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 44,044;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,517;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 67,561.
Date: May 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 47,230;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 24,771;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 72,001.
Date: June 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 53,996;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 25,936;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 79,932.
Date: July 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 56,114;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 25,655;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 81,769.
Date: August 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 53,102;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 25,467;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 78,569.
Date: September 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 50,897;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 24,460;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 75,357.
Date: October 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 50,477;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 73,484.
Date: November 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 48,581;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,222;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 71,803.
Date: December 2007;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 50,982;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 22,571;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 73,553.
Date: January 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 58,569;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 24,112;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 82,681.
Date: February 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 59,372;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 24,361;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 83,733.
Date: March 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 59,904;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 25,673;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 85,577.
Date: April 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 59,763;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 26,555;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 86,318.
Date: May 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 56,036;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 26,245;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 82,281.
Date: June 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 56,042;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 25,245;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 81,287.
Date: July 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 53,764;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,793;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 77,557.
Date: August 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 61,110;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,517;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 84,627.
Date: September 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 66,104;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 23,294;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 89,398.
Date: October 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 67,803;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 27,524;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 95,327.
Date: November 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 68,193;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 28,152;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 96,345.
Date: December 2008;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 69,023;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 27,780;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 96,803.
Date: January 2009;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 65,387;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 28,683;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 94,070.
Date: February 2009;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 66,105;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 28,591;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 94,696.
Date: March 2009;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 68,651;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 29,840;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 98,491.
Date: April 2009;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 73,002;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 30,707;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 103,709.
Date: May 2009;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 79,470;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 29,606;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 109,076.
Date: June 2009;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army National Guard: 80,043;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army Reserve: 30,485;
Number of soldiers mobilized, Army reserve component total: 110,528.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of figure]
As of June 2009, more than 110,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve
soldiers were mobilized in support of these operations. Due to this
high demand for forces, the Army has only been able to provide its
reserve component soldiers with less than 4 years at home between
mobilizations on average. For example, many capabilities such as civil
affairs, psychological operations, military police, transportation, and
adjutant general companies and detachments are in high demand, so units
with these skills are being mobilized much more frequently, sometimes
with less than 3 years between deployments. Although unit mobilization
frequency differs on a case-by-case basis, nearly all types of units
are being mobilized more frequently than the Secretary's goal of no
more than 1 year mobilized every 5 years. For reserve component forces
to be provided 5 years at home between mobilizations given the current
force structure, the total number of Army reserve component soldiers
mobilized would have to decline by about 54 percent of the soldiers
mobilized as of June 2009 to approximately 51,000 soldiers. As figure 3
below shows, the number of reserve component soldiers that could be
available for deployment decreases as the required average amount of
time between mobilizations increases.
Figure 3: Number of Army Reserve Component Soldiers Available for
Deployment in Fiscal Year 2011 under Currently Planned Force Structure
at Varying Average Amounts of Time between Mobilizations:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Less than 4 years between mobilizations: 74,500 (5 brigade combat
teams, 57,000 enablers);
4 years between mobilizations: 60,600 (4 brigade combat teams, 45,500
enablers);
5 years between mobilizations: 51, 000 (3 brigade combat teams, 38,700
enablers).
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
Note: Data are from the Department of the Army Force File (July 1,
2008).
[End of figure]
The Army's current plans for its reserve component force structure
would provide soldiers about 4 years at home between mobilizations,
which is more than the current pace allows but less than the 5 year
goal. According to Army officials, the current high pace is not
expected to be permanent and the Army must balance mobilization
frequency goals with the need to meet current operational demands,
maintain capabilities to perform the full range of missions expected
under the National Military Strategy, and remain within the constraints
of mobilization policies and force-size limitations, as well as
expected future budgets. The Army currently projects that the high pace
of operations will continue through fiscal year 2013, but it does not
project when the Army will be able to achieve the Secretary's goal of 5
years between deployments. As a result, the Army has accepted the risk
more frequent reserve mobilizations may pose to its personnel
recruitment and retention in order to be better positioned to achieve
its other goals.
Challenges Remain in Achieving Desired Levels of Personnel Readiness
and Unit Stability:
Although officials report that the Army reserve component units are
meeting the Army's required levels of ready personnel by the time that
they deploy, the reserve component units continue to have difficulty in
achieving goals for personnel readiness and unit stability prior to
mobilization. As a result, the Army has had to continue to take steps
to build readiness after mobilization. However, the Army has found that
addressing issues such as medical and dental problems after
mobilization may disrupt predeployment training and reduce the amount
of time units are able to be provided to theater commanders under
current limits on involuntary mobilizations. The Army has begun to
implement additional initiatives to improve personnel readiness and
unit stability but it is too early to evaluate their effectiveness.
Reserve component units continue to have difficulty in achieving
personnel readiness and unit stability goals before they are mobilized
because of the number of soldiers who do not meet medical, dental, and
individual training qualification requirements as well as personnel
attrition. A 2008 Army study of the pre-and postmobilization
preparation of five Army National Guard brigade combat teams that
mobilized between October 2007 and January 2008[Footnote 44] found that
none of the five units met deployment standards for the levels of
personnel with individual training qualifications and medical readiness
when they arrived at their mobilization stations. The study also found
that these units had experienced significant attrition, with an average
of 59 soldiers leaving their units per month between the time they were
alerted for mobilization and 90 days before mobilization when the
Army's stop-loss policy prevented them from leaving the Army.
As a result of the challenges faced in achieving desired personnel
readiness levels, the Army and its reserve components have had to
continue taking steps to improve individual and unit readiness late in
the force-generation cycle and after mobilization. Such steps include
addressing medical and dental issues and transferring personnel from
nondeployed to deploying units to fill shortages. For example,
according to Army mobilization officials, one unit that mobilized in
September 2008 required the transfer of more than 900 soldiers, or 22
percent of the 4,122 required personnel, from other units within 2
weeks of its mobilization date in order to fill shortages and man the
unit to a deployable level. Further, our surveys of and interviews with
24 recently deployed reserve component units found that nearly all of
those units had to receive personnel transfers from outside their units
to achieve the required personnel levels for deployment. According to
Army officials, such transfers disrupt unit stability and cause
personnel turbulence at a time when the units are working to attain
collective training proficiency in preparation for deployment.
Additionally, Army officials stated that personnel transfers disrupt
premobilization training plans when they occur within the last 6 months
prior to a unit's mobilization date because more training has to be
done after mobilization, which reduces operational availability to
theater commanders. For these reasons, one of the chief lessons learned
reported in a 2008 Army study of pre-and postmobilization is that early
assignment of personnel and stabilization of deploying units is
necessary to make efficient use of training time and build a cohesive
force so that the units can efficiently achieve required levels of
collective training proficiency and provide as much operational
availability as possible to theater commanders.
The Army Faces Challenges Providing the Equipment Needed to Train
Reserve Units for Ongoing Operations and Meeting Longer-Term Equipping
Goals:
Although the Army has taken steps in recent years to improve reserve
component equipment inventories, it faces challenges in equipping units
for training while supporting current high operational demands and,
over the long term, may face challenges in meeting its equipment goals
amid competing demands for resources. From 2003 to 2010, the Army
requested $22.7 billion in its annual appropriations to equip the Army
National Guard and Army Reserve.[Footnote 45] Despite this effort, the
Army National Guard reported in October 2008 that it had 76 percent of
its required equipment with only 63 percent of the required items
located within the United States and available for training use.
Similarly, the Army Reserve reported that it had 74 percent of its
required equipment with only 67 percent of the required items located
within the United States.
The Army is finding it difficult to provide units access to the same
equipment for training that they will use overseas so they can attain
training proficiency before they deploy. The demand for some items,
such as mine resistant ambush protected vehicles and night vision
equipment, has increased across the Army as operations have continued,
and equipment requirements to support ongoing operations continue to
evolve. As previously reported, these evolving requirements have made
it difficult for the Army to communicate to deploying units what
equipment will be needed in-theater and has challenged the reserve
components to identify and transfer the right items.[Footnote 46]
Moreover, the Army has directed reserve component units returning from
overseas deployments to leave in-theater certain essential equipment
items that are in short supply for use by follow-on forces. While this
equipping approach has helped meet operational needs, it continues the
cycle of reducing the pool of equipment available to nondeployed forces
for unplanned contingencies and for training. We have previously
reported that the continuing strategy of transferring equipment to
deploying forces hampers the ability of nondeployed forces to train for
future missions.[Footnote 47]
Furthermore, the transformation to the modular structure has also
placed demands on the Army's equipment inventories because it requires
modular units to have modern equipment as well as increased quantities
of some items. Similarly, the initiative to expand the Army, which
added six brigade combat teams and additional modular support
units[Footnote 48] to the overall Army force structure, required
equipment and placed additional demands on the Army's inventories.
A 2008 Army study of lessons learned from the deployment of five Army
National Guard Brigade Combat teams found that equipment shortages
adversely affected the deployment training of these units and increased
the amount of time required to obtain collective training proficiency.
[Footnote 49] This study noted that training on the equipment a unit
will use in-theater is essential to ensure tasks, conditions, and
standards are met during premobilization training. However, the Army
has not been able to provide some equipment to units to accomplish
their training either prior to mobilization or deployment.
During our interviews with reserve component units that had returned
from deployment within the past year, we found several instances where
units did not train with the same equipment before they deployed that
they used in theater. As a result, they had to accomplish this training
in-theater, effectively reducing their operational availability to
theater commanders. For example:
* A National Guard transportation company did not have the opportunity
to train before mobilization with the armored trucks they drove in-
theater. According to unit officials, these models maneuver differently
and drivers need to practice driving the armored version. To accomplish
this training, soldiers trained with armored versions upon arrival in-
theater.
* A National Guard engineering battalion told us they did not have
access to the heavy equipment transporter or cranes used in-theater
when it was training at the mobilization station. Instead, soldiers
trained with similar equipment before they deployed and then trained on
some of the equipment upon arrival in-theater.
* National Guard officials from an aviation battalion told us that they
did not have an opportunity to train on some equipment they used in-
theater, including global positioning systems, communications systems,
and intelligence systems. Instead, they trained on the equipment with
the unit they were relieving after they arrived in-theater.
* An Army Reserve transportation company had to wait until it was in-
theater to train on a pallet loading system.
Over the long term, the Army faces challenges in meeting its equipping
goals amid competing demands for resources. The National Guard and
Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2009 included estimates of the
resources required for the Army National Guard to achieve the 100
percent equipping goal by 2019. The report estimated that the Army
National Guard will require an additional $6 billion each year from
2014 to 2019 to achieve the 100 percent goal, not including the $36.8
billion included in the Future Years Defense Program from 2005 to 2013
to purchase equipment. In addition, this report estimated that the Army
Reserve will need $1.6 billion each year over its 2009 to 2015
projected spending plan to reach its equipping and modernization goals.
Despite the magnitude of the Army's projected investment in its reserve
components, until operational demand eases, it seems unlikely that the
Army will be able to achieve DOD's goal of a sustainable mobilization
cycle for its reserve forces or fully implement the train-mobilize-
deploy model. It is also not clear how long reserve component forces
can sustain the current high pace of operations without difficulties in
recruiting and retaining reserve component soldiers or compromising the
viability of the all-volunteer citizen soldier reserve components,
which are an important national resource critical for both domestic and
overseas missions.
The Army Has Estimated and Budgeted for Some Costs to Transition Its
Reserve Components to an Operational Force, but Has Not yet Finalized
an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy:
The Army has estimated and budgeted for some costs that relate to the
transition of its reserve components to an operational force, but the
full cost of the transition remains uncertain and could vary widely
from the initial estimates depending on Army decisions. The Army has
decided to include the majority of funding needed for this effort in
its fiscal year 2012 to 2017 projected spending plans[Footnote 50]
after costs are clarified by ongoing studies. However, the Army has not
yet completed an implementation plan and funding strategy that fully
describe the key tasks necessary for the transition, establish
timelines for implementation, and identify metrics to measure progress.
Army Has Prepared Some Preliminary Cost Estimates for the Transition to
an Operational Role, but Actual Costs Could Vary Widely Depending on
Army Decisions:
The Army has developed and updated a preliminary estimate of the costs
that are not already included in its budget and Future Years Defense
Program for the operational transition, but actual costs could vary
widely from the estimates depending on Army decisions, such as which
cost categories are essential for an operational reserve and the level
of resources that will be required. In response to initiatives
established by the Chief of Staff of the Army in April 2007, the Army
formed a working group to develop a concept plan to complete six
critical transition tasks. These tasks include (1) adapting pre-and
postmobilization training; (2) adapting forces that perform key
functions such as training, equipping, construction, and maintenance;
(3) providing Army incentives to retain citizen soldiers and support
their families; (4) modifying reserve component premobilization
equipping strategies; (5) updating human resource management processes;
and (6) revising statutes, policies, and processes.
As a part of this effort, the Army developed a preliminary cost
estimate for those transition tasks that were not already included in
the Army's budget or program. The intent of the preliminary cost
estimate was to determine the magnitude of the additional costs
required to complete the transition in order to assess the feasibility
of the effort and provide estimates that Army leadership could use in
developing its projected spending plans for fiscal years 2010-2015. The
working group estimated an incremental cost of about $28 billion for
fiscal years 2010-2015 for the transition. However, the Army continued
to examine the estimates for pre-and postmobilization validation,
training support, and installation support. As a result of ongoing
studies, the Army decided to report a cost range of between $24.4
billion and $28.1 billion depending on implementation decisions. Of
that total, the primary cost driver was for increasing full-time
support, estimated at $12.8 billion over the period.
In 2009, the Army revised its estimates to incorporate updated
assumptions for some cost categories. Specifically, the estimates:
* increased costs for medical readiness to reflect expanding medical
treatment to reservists throughout the phases of the force-generation
cycle;
* decreased costs for full-time support, which, according to Army
officials, will provide 80 percent of the strategic reserve requirement
rather than 100 percent of the strategic reserve requirement;
* increased costs for the Army Reserve homeland defense pilot program
to include the cost of incentives for high-priority units; and:
* increased premobilization training costs to incorporate updated cost
factors for items such as participation rates, pay and allowances, and
inflation.
At the time of this report, the Army had not completed updates for
other cost categories such as recruiting and retention, information
technology, predeployment training equipment, new equipment training,
second-destination transportation, premobilization training, and
community services. The most recent Army estimates show a cost range
from $12.7 billion to $27 billion over a 6-year period. Table 2 shows
the cost categories and the amounts the Army estimated in 2008,
categories updated in 2009, and a summary incorporating the most recent
Army estimates.
Table 2: Cost Estimates to Transition the Reserve Components to an
Operational Force (Dollars in millions):
Cost category; Pre-and postmobilization validation and training
support;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 0 to 481[B];
2009 updates to the estimate: Under study[C];
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 0 to 481[C].
Cost category; Installation support;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 0 to 144[B];
2009 updates to the estimate: Under study[C];
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 0 to 144[C].
Cost category; Predeployment training equipment, new equipment
training, second-destination transportation;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 4;
2009 updates to the estimate: Not updated;
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 4.
Cost category; Recruiting and retention;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 563;
2009 updates to the estimate: Not updated[D];
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 563.
Cost category; Medical readiness[E];
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 147;
2009 updates to the estimate: 170 to 930;
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 170 to 930.
Cost category; Unit validation tracking system;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 5;
2009 updates to the estimate: Not updated;
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 5.
Cost category; Additional days for generating force;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 6;
2009 updates to the estimate: Not updated;
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 6.
Cost category; Defense health program for full-time support;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 142;
2009 updates to the estimate: Under study[C];
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 142[C].
Cost category; Full-time support[F];
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 1,996;
2009 updates to the estimate: 0 to 1,000[C];
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 0 to 1,000[C].
Cost category; Army Reserve homeland defense pilot program (i.e., ready
response reserve unit pilot program);
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 9;
2009 updates to the estimate: 16;
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 16.
Cost category; Information technology/secure internet/bandwidth;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 89;
2009 updates to the estimate: Not updated[G];
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 89.
Cost category; Premobilization training;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 349;
2009 updates to the estimate: 370;
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 370.
Cost category; Duty military occupational specialty qualification and
schoolhouse support;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 42;
2009 updates to the estimate: Not updated;
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 42.
Cost category; Temporary full-time support;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 122;
2009 updates to the estimate: Under study[C];
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 122[C].
Cost category; Increase annual training and inactive duty for training;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 560;
2009 updates to the estimate: Under study[C];
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 560[C].
Cost category; Increase surge capacity in training pipeline;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: Not included;
2009 updates to the estimate: Under study[C];
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: No estimate yet
available[C].
Cost category; Providing Army community services to reserve components
(includes Yellow Ribbon);
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: 31;
2009 updates to the estimate: Not updated[H];
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: 31.
Cost category; Annual total;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: $4,065 to $4,689;
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: $2,120 to $4,505, plus
costs not yet estimated.
Cost category; Total over 6 years;
2008 Army cost estimate[A]: $24,388 to $28,136;
GAO summary using the most recent Army estimate: $12,720 to $27,030i,
plus costs not yet estimated.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[A] The costs in this column were obtained by dividing the total costs
the Army identified over the fiscal years 2010-2015 time period by 6 to
obtain a per year cost. The cost categories, assumptions, and
methodology for the 2008 estimate were based on the Army's 2007 reserve
component utilization technical guidance memorandum. This memorandum
outlines program intent with respect to resourcing the Army's vision
and provides instructions for building the budget.
[B] These costs were still being studied by the Army at the time of the
analysis.
[C] Ongoing studies are examining these potential costs.
[D] According to Army officials, the Fiscal Year 2010 President's
Budget Request includes $1.9 billion for reserve component recruiting
and retention.
[E] The 2008 estimate included man-days for medical and dental
screening only. The 2009 estimate includes medical treatment for
soldiers; the cost range depends on whether soldiers in all phases of
the force-generation cycle are provided treatment or just those in the
later phases.
[F] Amount varies depending on the number and rate of increase.
[G] According to Army officials, the Fiscal Year 2010 President's
Budget Request includes $176 million for this category. In addition,
$43.6 million was included in the Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental Request
for Overseas Contingency Operations.
[H] According to Army officials, the Fiscal Year 2010 President's
Budget Request includes $123 million for this category.
[I] The 6-year totals were obtained by multiplying the per-year cost by
6 to obtain a rough order of magnitude for comparison purposes only.
These costs have not been adjusted for inflation, and some fixed costs,
such as secure internet, may decrease over the period.
[End of table]
According to Army officials involved in cost estimating, the transition
costs could vary widely from the initial estimates for four key
reasons. First, the Army has not yet defined which cost categories are
essential for an operational reserve component, so costs could be added
or removed from the estimate. For example, the Army has not decided
whether activities recommended by the Commission on National Guard and
Reserves, such as providing housing allowance for activated reservists
and reimbursing certain reservists for travel, are essential for an
operational reserve and should be included as transition costs.
Estimated costs for implementing these recommendations were not
included in the preliminary estimate or the 2009 updates and, if
included, could significantly increase costs. The Army has estimated
that providing housing allowance for activated reservists could add
from $170 million to $400 million annually and reimbursing travel
expenses for certain reservists participating in individual training
would add about $580 million annually. The Army has not estimated costs
to implement other commission recommendations, such as the costs to
increase the capacity of training institutions and increase staff
support to the Employer Support of Guard and Reserves program.[Footnote
51] Second, the Army has not decided on the level of resources that
will be required in other cost categories. For example, the Army has
not established the specific personnel, training, and equipment levels
its reserve components will require in each phase of the force-
generation cycle. Third, several studies are underway to examine the
level of resources required for full-time support, medical and dental
benefits, and incentives changes for the operational role. If readiness
requirements, full-time support, medical and dental benefits, or
incentives are increased above current levels, costs for the transition
to the operational role could increase. Finally, neither estimate
includes any recurring or sustainment costs beyond 6 years; costs for
incentives, policy, or legislative changes required for the operational
role; or costs for implementing the human resource initiatives designed
to increase flexibility for reservists transitioning to and from active
duty--referred to as the "continuum of service initiatives"--that the
Army has identified as critical to the transition.[Footnote 52]
Moreover, costs that the Army considered part of other Army
initiatives, such as increasing reserve component equipping levels or
expanding the Army, were not included.
The Army Plans to Include the Majority of Estimated Transition Costs in
Its Fiscal Year 2012 to 2017 Projected Spending Plans, but It Has Not
Finalized an Implementation Plan and a Funding Strategy for Achieving
Its Goals:
According to Army officials, The Fiscal Year 2010 President's Budget
Request includes some funding that supports the reserves' operational
role, but the Army plans to include the majority of funding for
transition costs in its fiscal year 2012-2017 projected spending plans
after it obtains more information on the resources needed to support
the operational role. Army officials identified $2.2 billion in The
Fiscal Year 2010 President's Budget Request that the Army considers as
supporting the transition to the reserves' operational role.
Specifically, the fiscal year 2010 budget includes $123 million for
community services (family support); $34 million for dental care to
facilitate timely mobilization; $176 million for information
technology, secure internet, and bandwidth; and $1.9 billion for
reserve component recruiting and retention.[Footnote 53]
In addition, Army officials stated that $779 million of the funds
requested in DOD's fiscal year 2009 supplemental request for overseas
contingency operations will also contribute to the transition to an
operational force. For example, Army officials identified funding
requested for items such as installing secure internet capability to
reserve component units, temporary full-time support staff, additional
training days, and other costs as contributing to the transition.
However, it is not clear from Army documents how much of the transition
costs identified in the preliminary cost estimates are included in the
fiscal year 2009 supplemental or 2010 budget request.
Although, in an information paper provided to Congress in February
2008, the Army stated that its fiscal years 2010 to 2015 projected
spending plans would capture the required capabilities to begin the
formal transformation of the reserve components to an operational
force, the Army has decided to defer including the majority of those
resources until the fiscal years 2012 to 2017 projected spending plans.
According to Army officials involved in estimating transition costs,
the Army needed more information on the resources required for the
reserve components to meet operational readiness requirements, such as
levels of medical support and full-time support. Army officials noted
that accurately estimating costs for the transition is challenging
because specific information about the levels of personnel, equipment,
training, and full-time support required of an operational reserve
component in each phase of the Army's force-generation cycle has not
been developed. Army officials have stated that more specific metrics,
such as the level of training proficiency required in each phase of the
cycle, would help them to develop a more refined cost estimate for the
transition.
In February 2008, the Army formed a temporary task force to develop a
comprehensive, coordinated implementation plan to transition the Army's
reserve components from a strategic reserve to an operational force. At
the time of this report, the task force had developed a draft
implementation plan that identifies some of the key tasks, an
approximate 10-year timeline to complete transition tasks and
incorporate associated costs into the base budget, and some measures of
success. According to Army officials, the Army is awaiting agreement on
this plan, as well as the results of several ongoing studies, before it
incorporates any additional transition costs into the fiscal year 2012
budget and program.
In the meantime, the Army continues to utilize its reserve components
as an operational force without a complete and approved implementation
plan that clearly defines what tasks and costs are essential to the
transition or a comprehensive funding strategy that identifies a
timeline and funding sources for key transition tasks. According to
DOD's directive that governs managing the reserve components as an
operational force, it is DOD policy that the reserve components shall
be resourced to meet readiness requirements of federal missions and
that resourcing plans shall ensure visibility to track resources from
budget formulation, appropriation, and allocation through execution.
Additionally, best practices for strategic planning have shown that
effective and efficient operations require detailed plans outlining
major implementation tasks, defined metrics and timelines to measure
progress, a comprehensive and realistic funding strategy, and
communication of key information to decision makers. However, at the
time of this report, the task force had not yet identified specifics
for key tasks such as adapting the training base and institutional
support functions, identifying measures of success for all transition
tasks--such as synchronizing training cycles, sustaining volunteerism,
and implementing human resource initiatives--and developing a
resourcing strategy. In addition, the draft implementation plan does
not explain how other Army initiatives, such as increasing the Army's
end strength or transforming to the modular force contributes to the
overall goal of transitioning the reserve components to an operational
force.
According to Army officials, the task force is scheduled to disband in
September 2009, and it is not clear who will have responsibility for
managing the implementation of the transition to the operational role
and tracking progress over the long term. Without an approved
implementation plan that fully describes the key tasks necessary for
the transition, establishes timelines for implementation, and
identifies metrics to measure progress, it will be difficult for the
Army to gauge whether it is moving toward its goal of fully supporting
the transition of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to
operational roles. Furthermore, Congress will continue to have only a
partial view of the potentially substantial cost and time required to
complete the transition.
States Use Mutual Support Agreements to Mitigate Effects of National
Guard Deployments, although Some Domestic Requirements Remain
Undefined:
The deployment of National Guard units as a federal operational force
has reduced their availability for domestic missions, but the effect on
the states remains unclear because states have mitigated shortfalls
through mutual support agreements and requirements for some domestic
missions, such as responding to large multistate events, remain
undefined. In general, National Guard members may only serve in one
duty status at a time.[Footnote 54] Unless they are activated under
Title 10, Guard members remain under command and control of the state
governors in either state active duty or Title 32 status. When National
Guard members are activated for federally controlled Title 10 duty,
their Title 32 status generally stops and then begins again when they
are released from Title 10 active duty.
Under the Army's force-generation model as designed, there is the
potential for units to be unavailable to state governors for 1 year
with 5 years between federal mobilizations. However, according to Army
and state National Guard officials, the reality of the current
operational environment is that National Guard units deploy more
frequently and are unavailable to state governors for about 1 year
every 3 years. For example, Washington's brigade combat team deployed
in 2008 after 3-1/2 years at home.
The effect of the operational role on the National Guard's domestic
readiness remains unclear because states have taken steps to mitigate
any known shortfalls and, as we have previously reported, DOD, the
Department of Homeland Security, and the states have not defined
requirements, readiness standards, and measures for the National
Guard's domestic missions that are likely to be conducted in Title 32
status.[Footnote 55] Since National Guard units have begun deploying
for their federal missions, states have made plans to compensate for
any shortfalls in availability of their Guard forces either by relying
on other capabilities and resources within the state or by relying on
assistance from other states obtained through mutual support
arrangements. National Guard officials from all of the four states that
we visited reported that they routinely coordinate with other states
and utilize mutual assistance agreements to ensure they can respond
effectively to domestic requirements when state forces are deployed.
For example, officials in Florida voiced a particular concern because a
brigade combat team of more than 3,400 people would be deployed during
the 2010 hurricane season. However, they noted that they routinely
coordinate with other southeastern states to ensure that forces and
capabilities that could be needed to respond to hurricanes are
available within the region, and they anticipated being able to respond
effectively. In addition, according to Washington National Guard
officials, while they have typically been able to assign domestic
response missions to units that are outside their deployment window,
this becomes increasingly difficult when a large percentage of the
state's forces are mobilized. At the time of our visit, the state had
almost 50 percent of its forces mobilized. Similarly, Guard officials
in Virginia told us that its brigade combat team, comprising about 54
percent of the state's National Guard forces, will be deployed at the
same time as the state's aviation battalion resulting in a large loss
of forces and essential capabilities for domestic response missions. To
mitigate for this loss, Virginia National Guard officials stated they
rely on mutual support arrangements with other states and cross
training of the state's soldiers. In addition, state National Guard
officials told us that they would have to rely on other states to
provide support in the event of a catastrophic disaster regardless of
the number of soldiers the state had mobilized for federal missions.
Conclusions:
The Army's reserve components are likely to be used as an operational
force supporting regular overseas rotations for the foreseeable future,
and several studies and commissions have determined there is no viable
alternative to the Army's continued reliance on reservists. Although
the Army has taken steps to modify its force structure and adapted its
personnel and equipping strategies for the operational role, heavy
operational demands have hampered the Army's efforts to implement the
force-generation model as intended. For example, the Army has not
established firm readiness requirements for an operational reserve
component or fully incorporated the resources needed to support the
operational role into its budget and projected spending plan. Although
the Army continues to study key costs, incorporating the necessary
resources into its budget and projected spending plan is needed to
effectively implement the force-generation model and support the
reserve components in their new role. Adapting the Army's institutions
and incorporating the resources needed to support the cyclical
readiness of an operational reserve component into its base budget will
be a long-term effort estimated to take more than 10 years to complete.
The implementation of these changes will span multiple administrations
and Congresses and require many billions of dollars and, therefore,
needs sound management controls to guide the effort and ensure success.
The Army currently plans to request the majority of funding to complete
the transition to an operational force in its fiscal year 2012-2017
budget; however, it has not finalized a cost estimate or detailed
implementation plan that identifies what specific requirements have
been and remain to be filled. The lack of outcome-related metrics also
hampers the Army's ability to measure its progress towards fully
operationalizing its reserve components and justifying the large
expenditure of funds required to implement the transition. Until the
Army adopts an implementation plan outlining its requirements for
transitioning its reserve components to an operational force,
identifying progress made to date, and detailing additional personnel
and other resources required, DOD decision makers and Congress will not
be in a sound position to determine the total costs to complete the
transition and decide how to best allocate future funding. Moreover,
without effective management controls over these initiatives to help
measure progress and to accomplish effective and efficient operations,
the Army risks continued challenges in preparing ready units and
providing reservists a sustainable balance between military and
civilian careers, which, over time, could threaten the viability of the
all-volunteer citizen soldier force.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to take the following three actions:
* Finalize an implementation plan for transitioning its reserve
components to the operational role that describes the key tasks
necessary for the transition, assigns responsibility for these tasks,
defines metrics for measuring success, and establishes timelines for
full implementation.
* Complete a cost estimate for the transition that, at a minimum,
should include:
* a clear definition of what costs the Army does and does not consider
to be related to the transition to an operational force;
* estimates for key cost drivers; and:
* identification of any uncertainties in the estimates due to pending
changes to the reserve components' force structure, personnel,
training, and equipping strategies or other decisions that may affect
costs, and updates to the plan as these decisions are made.
* Include the costs of the transition in the Army's budget and Future
Years Defense Program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written
comments on a draft of this report. The department agreed with each of
our recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in
appendix II.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Secretary of the Army to finalize an implementation plan for
transitioning its reserve components to the operational role. In its
comments, it cited DOD Directive 1200.17 that directs the Secretaries
of the military departments to manage their respective reserve
components as an operational force such that they provide operational
capabilities while maintaining strategic depth. However, this directive
does not provide detailed direction on how the services should
transition the reserve forces, and we believe that a detailed plan is
necessary to ensure key tasks in managing the reserves as an
operational force are completed. DOD also drew a distinction between
managing the reserve components as an operational force and
transitioning reserves to an operational force. In this report, we
defined transitioning reserves to an operational force as implementing
those steps necessary to adapt the Army's institutions and resources to
support the cyclical readiness requirements and implement the "train-
mobilize-deploy" model. We believe that completing a detailed
implementation plan that describes key tasks necessary for the
transition, assigns responsibility for these tasks, defines metrics for
measuring success, and establishes time lines for full implementation
is an essential part of transitioning the reserve components to an
operational force.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Secretary of the Army to complete a cost estimate for the
transition that includes a definition of costs, estimates for key cost
drivers, and areas of uncertainties, such as pending policy decisions,
that may affect costs. However, the department did not describe the
steps it will take to complete the estimate. We therefore believe the
Secretary of Defense should provide specific direction and guidance as
outlined in our recommendation.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Secretary of the Army to include the costs of the transition in the
Army's budget and Future Years Defense Program. In its comments, DOD
noted its published guidance, Directive 1200.17, that resourcing plans
should ensure visibility to track resources from formulation,
appropriation, and allocation through execution. However, as discussed
in the report, the Army does not plan to include the majority of the
estimated costs for transitioning its reserve components to an
operational role until fiscal year 2012. Until the Army includes the
resources required in its future spending plans it will be hampered in
its ability to transition its reserve components to the operational
role.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov]. Should you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3489 or
pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To conduct our work for this engagement, we analyzed data, reviewed
documentation, and interviewed officials from the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters
Department of the Army, U.S. Army Forces Command, First Army, the
National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, the Office of the Chief
of the Army Reserve, the U.S. Army Reserve Command, RAND Corporation,
and the Institute for Defense Analysis. We also reviewed documentation
and interviewed officials from offices of National Guard Adjutants
General in four case-study states: Florida, Missouri, Virginia, and
Washington. These states were selected because they had a history of
major disaster declarations; are geographically dispersed across the
United States; have a brigade combat team presence or a Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive (CBRNE)
Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) team (which are units that are
dual-tasked with domestic responsibilities) or both; face a range of
homeland security risks; and present a range of population sizes.
To identify the extent to which the Army has made progress but faces
challenges in modifying the force structure, manning, and equipping
strategies of its reserve components to meet the requirements of the
operational role, we reviewed prior GAO work, reports of the Commission
on the National Guard and Reserves, reports to Congress on related
initiatives and issues, current Army plans and policy documents,
including the Army Campaign Plan, Army Structure Memorandums, Army
Forces Command's concept plan for Army Initiative 4 (transition the
reserve components to an operational force), Army Forces Command's 4 +
1 Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team Comprehensive Review, the
National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, DOD Directive 1200.17,
Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force, and
Headquarters Department of the Army Execution Order 150-18 Reserve
Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre-and Post-Mobilization
Training Strategy. We also reviewed Army data on actual and planned
modular unit restructuring, total force structure changes, and the
expected number of reserve component soldiers available each year at
varying mobilization rates under the currently planned rotational force
structures in order to assess changes made to the reserve components'
force structure for the operational role. In addition, we reviewed Army
National Guard and Army Reserve force-structure allowances, personnel
end strength, and equipment on hand to assess the extent to which the
Army and reserve components have made changes to more fully man and
equip units for the operational role. Further, we incorporated
information from surveys of a nonprobability sample of 24 Army National
Guard or Army Reserve units, as well as follow-up interviews with
officials from 15 of these units. We selected units of different types
and sizes that had returned from deployments in the last 12 months. In
addition, we chose the proportion of Army National Guard and Reserve
units for our sample based on the proportion of mobilized forces from
each of the components. The surveys and interviews addressed a range of
training, equipment, and personnel issues. We supplemented this
information by reviewing documents and interviewing officials from DOD,
Army, National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, U.S.
Army Forces Command, and First Army to discuss planned and ongoing
policy and strategy changes for transitioning the reserve components to
an operational force. Further, we incorporated information from
interviews with officials from offices of National Guard Adjutants
General in case-study states.
To determine the extent to which the Army has estimated costs for the
transition of the reserve components to an operational force and
included them in its current budget and Future Years Defense Program,
we reviewed DOD's fiscal year 2009 supplemental appropriations request
and DOD's fiscal year 2009 and 2010 budget requests. We also examined
the Army's cost estimates for operationalizing the reserve components,
including Army Forces Command's concept plan for Army Initiative 4
(AI4)--transitioning the reserve components to an operational force--
and a Center for Army Analysis cost-benefit analysis of the AI4 concept
plan. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOD, the Army, Army
Forces Command, the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, and
the Army Reserve in order to understand assumptions made in estimating
the cost for transforming the reserve components to an operational
force, to assess the extent to which those costs have been included in
DOD's budget and Future Years Defense Program, and to identify whether
the Army has an implementation plan that includes the full cost of the
transition.
To determine the effect of the National Guard's federal operational
role on its availability to state governors for domestic missions, we
reviewed relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code, and
DOD directives regarding management of the reserve components as an
operational force and National Guard homeland defense activities. We
also conducted interviews with the National Guard Bureau and offices of
National Guard Adjutants General in the four states chosen for our case
study concerning the possibility of conflicts between the states'
National Guard requirements and Title 32 requirements related to the
operational role of the National Guard. Further, our review of prior
GAO work, along with the interviews with officials from the National
Guard Bureau and case-study states, allowed us to assess whether the
requirements of the National Guard's operational role may affect the
availability or readiness of National Guard forces for domestic
missions.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 through July 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Reserve Affairs:
1500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-1500:
September 8, 2009:
Mr. John Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-09-898, "Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Finalize an
Implementation Plan and funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational
Reserve Force, dated July, 2009." The Department has comments on the
draft report, and concurs with the recommendations. The Department's
comments are attached.
The primary action officer within DOD for this report is COL Bernard J.
Hyland. He can be reached at (703) 693-8611.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
[Illegible, Principal Deputy], for:
Dennis M. McCarthy:
Attachment: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report - Dated July 24, 2009:
GAO Code 351378/GAO-09-898:
"Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and
Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to finalize an implementation plan for
transitioning its reserve components to the operational role that
describes the key tasks necessary for the transition, assigns
responsibility for these tasks, defines metrics for measuring success,
and establishes timelines for full implementation:
DOD Response: Concur
DoDD 1200.17 directs the Secretaries of the Military departments to
manage their respective Reserve Components as an operational force such
that the RCs provide operational capabilities while maintaining
strategic depth to meet U.S. military requirements across the full
spectrum of conflict--A clear distinction must be maintained between
managing the reserve components as an operational force vice
"transitioning to an operational force", which implies that the entire
RC force will be utilized in an operational mode at all times. Managing
the RC as an operational force recognizes the need to ensure that,
while providing strategic depth, RC units and individuals train and are
available for missions in accordance with the National Defense
Strategy.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to complete a cost estimate for the
transition that, at a minimum, should include:
* A clear definition of what costs the Army does and does not consider
to be related to the transition to an operational force;
* Estimates for key cost drivers; and;
* Identification of any uncertainties in the estimates due to pending
changes to the reserve components' force structure, personnel,
training, and equipping strategies or other decisions that may affect
costs, and updates to the plan as these decisions are made.
DOD Response: Concur.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to include the costs of the transition
in the Army's budget and Future Years Defense Program.
DOD Response: Concur.
DoDD 1200.17 directs the Services to ensure the RCs are resourced to
meet readiness requirements pet sections 3013, 5013, and 8013 of Title
10, United States Code and that RC resourcing plans shad ensure
visibility to track resources from formulation, appropriation, and
allocation through execution.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director;
Melissa Blanco; Susan Ditto; Nicole Harms; Kevin Keith; Susan Mason,
Charles Perdue; John Smale, Jr.; Suzanne Wren; and Matthew Young made
key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach to Training and
Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-720]. Washington, D.C.: July 17,
2009.
Military Personnel: Reserve Compensation Has Increased Significantly
and Is Likely to Rise Further as DOD and VA Prepare for the
Implementation of Enhanced Educational Benefits. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-726R]. Washington D.C.: July 6,
2009.
Military Personnel: Army Needs to Focus on Cost-Effective Use of
Financial Incentives and Quality Standards in Managing Force Growth.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-256]. Washington, D.C.:
May 4, 2009.
Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of
Defense. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-449R].
Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2009.
Military Training: Improvement Continues in DOD's Reporting on
Sustainable Ranges, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Its Range
Assessments and Comprehensive Plan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-128R]. Washington, D.C.: December
15, 2008.
Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and
Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their Capabilities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-131]. Washington, D.C.:
November 14, 2008.
Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support
Missions May Depend on DOD's Implementation of the 2008 National
Defense Authorization Act. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-311]. Washington, D.C.: April 16,
2008.
Force Structure: Restructuring and Rebuilding the Army Will Cost
Billions of Dollars for Equipment but the Total Cost Is Uncertain.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-669T]. Washington, D.C.:
April 10, 2008.
Military Readiness: Impact of Current Operations and Actions Needed to
Rebuild Readiness of U.S. Ground Forces. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-497T]. Washington, D.C.: February
14, 2008.
Force Structure: Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow the
Force Initiative Funding Plan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-354R]. Washington, D.C.: January 18,
2008.
Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the
Army's Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve
Accountability for Results. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-145]. Washington, D.C.: December
2007.
Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That
Equipment Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While
Meeting Ongoing Operational Requirements. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-814]. Washington, D.C.: September
19, 2007.
Guard and Reserve Personnel: Fiscal, Security, and Human Capital
Challenges Should be Considered in Developing a Revised Business Model
for the Reserve Component. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-984]. Washington, D.C.: June 20,
2007.
Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the Army's
Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address Implementation
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-936].
Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2007.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Establish a Strategy and Improve
Transparency over Reserve and National Guard Compensation to Manage
Significant Growth in Cost. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-828]. Washington, D.C.: June 20,
2007.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic
Equipment Requirements and Readiness. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-60]. Washington, D.C.: January 26,
2007.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st
Century Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1109T]. Washington D.C.: September
21, 2006.
Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel
Recruitment and Retention Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-134]. Washington, D.C.: November 17,
2005.
Military Personnel: Top Management Attention Is Needed to Address Long-
standing Problems with Determining Medical and Physical Fitness of the
Reserve Force. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-105].
Washington, D.C.: October 27, 2005.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment
Need to be Reexamined. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-170T]. Washington, D.C.: October 20,
2005.
Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment
Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation
Initiatives. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-111].
Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2005.
Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve
Personnel and Equipment Shortages. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-660]. Washington, D.C.: July 12,
2005.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for
Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-21]. Washington, D.C.: November 10,
2004.
Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas
and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-670T]. Washington, D.C.: April 29,
2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Deployment is the movement of forces and materiel to desired
operational areas.
[2] Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing personnel
and equipment, activating units and members of the reserves for active
duty, and bringing the armed forces to a state of readiness for war or
other national emergency.
[3] Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, D.C., Jan. 6, 2006).
[4] Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Final Report to Congress
and the Secretary of Defense, Transforming the National Guard and
Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force (Jan. 31, 2008).
[5] Commanding Officer, United States Army Forces Command, Memorandum,
Concept Plan for Army Initiative 4 (AI4); Transition the Reserve
Components (RC) to an Operational Force (Feb. 25, 2008).
[6] GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army
Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-660] (Washington, D.C.: July 12,
2005).
[7] GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard
Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force
Transformation Initiatives, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-111] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4,
2005).
[8] Congress chartered this commission to assess the reserve component
of the U.S. military and to recommend changes to ensure the National
Guard and other reserve components are organized, trained, equipped,
compensated, and supported to best meet the needs of U.S. national
security.
[9] GAO, Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness
for 21st Century Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1109T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21,
2006).
[10] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-60] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26,
2007).
[11] GAO, Military Personnel: Top Management Attention Is Needed to
Address Long-standing Problems with Determining Medical and Physical
Fitness of the Reserve Force, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-105] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27,
2005).
[12] Pub. L. No. 110-417, §343 (2008).
[13] We were also directed to evaluate the extent to which the Army's
training facilities and ranges--including the combat training centers,
military schools, and skill training courses--support the transition of
the reserve components to an operational force. Training issues are
addressed in GAO, Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach
to Training and Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-720] (Washington, D.C.: July 17,
2009).
[14] GAO, Preliminary Observations on Army's Transition of Its Reserve
Components to an Operational Role, Briefing for the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees' Subcommittees on Defense, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-780R] (Washington, D.C.: June 1,
2009).
[15] For purposes of this report, we define the transition of the
Army's reserve components to an operational force as including those
steps necessary to adapt the Army's institutions and resources to
support cyclical readiness requirements and implement the "train-
mobilize--deploy" model consistent with Annex I (Transition the RC into
an Operational Force) to Army Campaign Plan 2009 (Coordinating Draft)
(May 1, 2009).
[16] The Future Years Defense Program is DOD's centralized report on
current and planned resource allocations.
[17] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[18] Combat support units provide fire support and operational
assistance to combat forces, whose primary missions are to participate
in combat. Combat service support refers to the essential capabilities,
functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of
operating forces on the battlefield (e.g., supply, maintenance, health,
transportation, and other services required by aviation and ground
combat troops to assist those units in accomplishing their combat
missions).
[19] Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Utilization of the Total Force
(Jan. 19, 2007).
[20] Full-time Active Guard and Reserve personnel are Army National
Guard and Army Reserve soldiers who are on voluntary active duty or
full-time National Guard duty providing full-time support for the
purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or
training the reserve components. Military Technicians are federal
civilian employees providing full-time support for administration,
training, and maintenance in reserve component organizations/units.
Dual-status military technicians are required to maintain membership in
a reserve component as a condition of employment, while certain non-
dual-status technicians are not subject to that requirement.
[21] Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve
Components as an Operational Force (Oct. 29, 2008).
[22] Department of the Army, The Army Campaign Plan 2009 (FOUO) (Feb.
19, 2009).
[23] GAO, Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to
Equip and Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their
Capabilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-131]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2008).
[24] Maneuver enhancement brigades are designed as a unique
multifunctional command and control headquarters to perform maneuver
support, consequence management, stability operations, and support area
operations for the supported force.
[25] Battlefield surveillance brigades are designed to conduct
reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and intelligence
operations to build the common operational picture in order to focus
joint combat power and effects.
[26] GAO, Force Structure: Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's
Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-354R] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18,
2008).
[27] Force-structure allowances are the number of unit spaces that can
be manned with personnel.
[28] Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve
Components as an Operational Force, (Oct. 29, 2008).
[29] For example, Army guidance currently requires combat arms units to
deploy with at least 90 percent of their assigned personnel, and combat
support and combat service support units to deploy with at least 80
percent of assigned personnel. In addition, 100 percent of the soldiers
who mobilize and deploy with a unit must meet Army soldier readiness
requirements, including medical and dental standards, administrative
criteria, and occupational specialty qualification.
[30] Department of the Army, The Army Campaign Plan 2009 (FOUO) (Feb.
19, 2009).
[31] End strength is the maximum number of personnel each of the
military services is authorized to have on the last day of a fiscal
year.
[32] Deploying combat units must have 90 to 100 percent of their
required personnel available for deployment, and 85 to 100 percent of
their required senior-grade personnel and 85 to 100 percent of their
personnel qualified in their military occupational specialty upon
arrival to their mobilization station. Deploying support units must
have 80 to 89 percent of their required personnel available for
deployment, and 75 to 84 percent of their required senior-grade
personnel and 75 to 84 percent of their personnel qualified in their
military occupational specialty upon arrival to their mobilization
station.
[33] Interim goals for all units in the pilot program are to have 80
percent of their aggregate assigned personnel and 75 percent of senior
grade personnel by the time they exit the RESET phase and to attain the
highest level of personnel readiness as they enter the last phase of
the cycle when they are available for mobilization and deployment.
[34] Department of the Army, The Army Campaign Plan 2009 (FOUO) (Feb.
19, 2009).
[35] Stop-loss refers to a policy the Army initiated in June 2004 and
applies to personnel in units identified for deployment in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom. The policy
prevents soldiers from separating or retiring from the Army from 90
days prior to mobilization for reserve component soldiers until 90 days
after they return from deployment. The Secretary of Defense has
announced that stop loss will be phased out in August 2009 for Army
Reserve soldiers and September 2009 for Army National Guard soldiers.
[36] TRICARE is the health care program serving active duty service
members, National Guard and Reserve members, retirees, their families,
survivors, and certain former spouses. To be eligible for treatment
under the pilot, soldiers must have correctable medical conditions and
must not otherwise be eligible for care provided under TRICARE.
[37] Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, ARFPC White Paper on Full-
time Support (Washington, D.C., 2007). Governed by Section 10302 of
Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee is
a committee within the Office of the Secretary of the Army. The
committee is responsible for reviewing and commenting on any major
policy matters directly affecting the reserve components and
mobilization preparedness of the Army. The committee's comments on such
matters are forwarded to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of
Staff.
[38] Commanding Officer, United States Army Forces Command, Memorandum,
Concept Plan for Army Initiative 4 (AI4); Transition the Reserve
Components (RC) to an Operational Force (Feb. 25, 2008).
[39] Commission on National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the
National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force (Jan.
31, 2008).
[40] The Area Maintenance Support Activities perform unit-level
maintenance beyond the unit's capability to perform due to time
restraints and required training.
[41] The Army determines a unit's equipment readiness based on the
extent to which a unit has been assigned its required warfighting
equipment and those items are in working order.
[42] According to The 2009 Army Campaign Plan, current operational
demands are preventing the Army from reaching specific readiness goals
established through the force-generation cycle at this time.
[43] Operations to defend the United States from terrorist attacks are
known as Operation Noble Eagle. Overseas operations to combat terrorism
are known as Operation Enduring Freedom, which takes place principally
in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, which takes place in and
around Iraq.
[44] Army Forces Command, Pre-and Post-Mobilization Comprehensive
Review: 4+1 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), 2008. Forces Command conducted
this review at the request of the Secretary of Defense and the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army between March and May of 2008. The review
focused on the four most recent Army National Guard BCTs to mobilize,
as well as the 39th BCT from Arkansas, which was specifically requested
by the Secretary of Defense. The other four BCTs studied included the
27th BCT from New York, the 37th BCT from Ohio and Michigan, the 45th
BCT from Oklahoma, and the 76th BCT from Indiana.
[45] The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material and
Facilities) reports that from 2003 to 2009 Congress added $7.3 billion
in funding for Army National Guard and Army Reserve equipment in either
DOD's appropriations or in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment
Appropriations. We did not evaluate the accuracy or reliability of
these amounts.
[46] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-111].
[47] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-111].
[48] The modular support units include two combat support brigades, one
fires brigade, one air defense brigade, one engineer brigade, and two
sustainment brigades.
[49] Army Forces Command, Pre-and Post-Mobilization Comprehensive
Review.
[50] The Army's projected spending plans are contained it its Program
Objective Memorandum, which defines what the Army intends to do over a
6-year program period and presents the Army's proposal for a balanced
allocation of its resources within specified constraints.
[51] The Department of Defense carries out its responsibilities for
educating servicemembers and employers about their rights and
responsibilities under the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (38 U.S.C. Sec. 4301-4334) and
assisting reservists in resolving problems with their civilian
employers related to reserve component service, largely through its
National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves.
[52] Facilitating a "continuum of service" refers to a variety of human
resource initiatives that are intended to increase the efficiency of
Army human resource management processes that affect a reservist over
the course of a career.
[53] At the time of this report, Army officials stated that DOD had not
developed and provided to Congress its future budget and program plans.
[54] Section 325 of Title 32 of the U.S. Code provides members of the
National Guard with relief from Guard duty when ordered to active duty.
It also provides an exception that allows a National Guard officer to
continue to serve in Title 32 status after activation under Title 10 if
the dual status is authorized by the President and consented to by the
officer's state governor.
[55] Prior GAO work found that, although states plan for the National
Guard's use in missions within their borders, they have only planned to
a limited extent for the Guard's use in large-scale, multistate events
such as those described in the Homeland Security Council's national
planning scenarios. We also reported that, while DOD is taking steps to
better assess the National Guard's preparedness for its domestic
missions, these efforts are not yet complete and are limited by the
lack of fully identified requirements for the Guard's domestic
missions. We further concluded that until the National Guard's required
capabilities are better defined and tracked, decision makers will lack
information on whether the Guard has the equipment it needs to respond
effectively to large-scale, multistate events.
[End of section]
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