Iraq and Afghanistan
DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel Gao ID: GAO-11-1 October 1, 2010The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements for a wide range of services in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, as GAO previously reported, the agencies have faced challenges in obtaining sufficient information to manage these contracts and assistance instruments. As part of our third review under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, as amended, GAO assessed the implementation of the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) and data reported by the three agencies for Afghanistan and Iraq for FY 2009 and the first half of FY 2010 on the (1) number of contractor and assistance personnel, including those providing security; (2) number of personnel killed or wounded; and (3) number and value of contracts and assistance instruments and extent of competition for new awards. GAO compared agency data to other available sources to assess reliability.
While the three agencies designated SPOT as their system for tracking statutorily required information in July 2008, SPOT still cannot reliably track information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan. As a result, the agencies relied on sources of data other than SPOT to respond to our requests for information. The agencies' implementation of SPOT has been affected by some practical and technical issues, but their efforts also were undermined by a lack of agreement on how to proceed, particularly on how to track local nationals working under contracts or assistance instruments. The lack of agreement was due in part to agencies not having assessed their respective information needs and how SPOT can be designed to address those needs and statutory requirements. In 2009, GAO reported on many of these issues and recommended that the agencies jointly develop a plan to improve SPOT's implementation. The three agencies reported to GAO that as of March 2010 there were 262,681 contractor and assistance personnel working in Iraq and Afghanistan, 18 percent of whom performed security functions. Due to limitations with agency-reported data, caution should be used in identifying trends or drawing conclusions about the number of personnel in either country. Data limitations are attributable to agency difficulty in determining the number of local nationals, low response rates to agency requests for data, and limited ability to verify the accuracy of reported data. For example, a State office noted that none of its Afghan grant recipients provided requested personnel data. While agency officials acknowledged not all personnel were being counted, they still considered the reported data to be more accurate than SPOT data. Only State and USAID tracked information on the number of contractor and assistance personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during the review period. State reported 9 contractor and assistance personnel were killed and 68 wounded, while USAID reported 116 killed and 121 wounded. Both agencies noted that some casualties resulted from nonhostile actions. DOD still lacked a system to track similar information and referred GAO to Department of Labor data on cases filed under the Defense Base Act for killed or injured contractors. As GAO previously reported, Labor's data provide insights but are not a good proxy for the number of contractor casualties. DOD, State, and USAID obligated $37.5 billion on 133,951 contracts and assistance instruments with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during FY2009 and the first half of FY2010. DOD had the vast majority of contract obligations. Most of the contracts were awarded during the review period and used competitive procedures. State and USAID relied heavily on grants and cooperative agreements and reported that most were competitively awarded. While DOD and State did not comment on the draft report, USAID commented on the challenges of implementing SPOT and provided revised personnel data that GAO reviewed and included in the report. In response to GAO's 2009 report, DOD, State, and USAID did not agree with the recommendation to develop a plan for implementing SPOT because they felt ongoing coordination efforts were sufficient. GAO continues to believe a plan is needed to correct SPOT's shortcomings and is not making any new recommendations.
GAO-11-1, Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2010:
Iraq And Afghanistan:
DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges in Tracking Contracts,
Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel:
GAO-11-1:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-1, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on
contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements for a wide range of
services in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, as GAO previously reported,
the agencies have faced challenges in obtaining sufficient information
to manage these contracts and assistance instruments.
As part of our third review under the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, as amended, GAO assessed the
implementation of the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational
Tracker (SPOT) and data reported by the three agencies for Afghanistan
and Iraq for FY 2009 and the first half of FY 2010 on the (1) number
of contractor and assistance personnel, including those providing
security; (2) number of personnel killed or wounded; and (3) number
and value of contracts and assistance instruments and extent of
competition for new awards. GAO compared agency data to other
available sources to assess reliability.
What GAO Found:
While the three agencies designated SPOT as their system for tracking
statutorily required information in July 2008, SPOT still cannot
reliably track information on contracts, assistance instruments, and
associated personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan. As a result, the agencies
relied on sources of data other than SPOT to respond to our requests
for information. The agencies‘ implementation of SPOT has been
affected by some practical and technical issues, but their efforts
also were undermined by a lack of agreement on how to proceed,
particularly on how to track local nationals working under contracts
or assistance instruments. The lack of agreement was due in part to
agencies not having assessed their respective information needs and
how SPOT can be designed to address those needs and statutory
requirements. In 2009, GAO reported on many of these issues and
recommended that the agencies jointly develop a plan to improve SPOT‘s
implementation.
The three agencies reported to GAO that as of March 2010 there were
262,681 contractor and assistance personnel working in Iraq and
Afghanistan, 18 percent of whom performed security functions. Due to
limitations with agency-reported data, caution should be used in
identifying trends or drawing conclusions about the number of
personnel in either country. Data limitations are attributable to
agency difficulty in determining the number of local nationals, low
response rates to agency requests for data, and limited ability to
verify the accuracy of reported data. For example, a State office
noted that none of its Afghan grant recipients provided requested
personnel data. While agency officials acknowledged not all personnel
were being counted, they still considered the reported data to be more
accurate than SPOT data.
Only State and USAID tracked information on the number of contractor
and assistance personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan
during the review period. State reported 9 contractor and assistance
personnel were killed and 68 wounded, while USAID reported 116 killed
and 121 wounded. Both agencies noted that some casualties resulted
from nonhostile actions. DOD still lacked a system to track similar
information and referred GAO to Department of Labor data on cases
filed under the Defense Base Act for killed or injured contractors. As
GAO previously reported, Labor‘s data provide insights but are not a
good proxy for the number of contractor casualties.
DOD, State, and USAID obligated $37.5 billion on 133,951 contracts and
assistance instruments with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during
FY2009 and the first half of FY2010. DOD had the vast majority of
contract obligations. Most of the contracts were awarded during the
review period and used competitive procedures. State and USAID relied
heavily on grants and cooperative agreements and reported that most
were competitively awarded.
While DOD and State did not comment on the draft report, USAID
commented on the challenges of implementing SPOT and provided revised
personnel data that GAO reviewed and included in the report.
What GAO Recommends:
In response to GAO‘s 2009 report, DOD, State, and USAID did not agree
with the recommendation to develop a plan for implementing SPOT
because they felt ongoing coordination efforts were sufficient. GAO
continues to believe a plan is needed to correct SPOT‘s shortcomings
and is not making any new recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-1] or key
components. For more information, contact John P. Hutton at (202) 512-
4841 or huttonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
SPOT Still Cannot Be Relied on to Track Statutorily Required Data:
DOD, State, and USAID Data on Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan Are
Incomplete:
Only State and USAID Reported Data on Killed and Wounded Contractors
and Assistance Personnel:
Agencies Obligated Tens of Billions of Dollars on Contracts and
Assistance Instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope And Methodology:
Implementation of SPOT:
Contractor and Assistance Personnel:
Killed or Wounded Contractor and Assistance Personnel:
Contracts and Assistance Instruments:
Appendix II: DOD, State, And USAID Contractor And Assistance Personnel
In Iraq and Afghanistan:
Appendix III: Contractors Killed In Iraq And Afghanistan]
Appendix IV: DOD, State, And USAID Contracts And Assistance
Instruments In Iraq and Afghanistan:
Appendix V: Comments From The U.S. Agency For International Development
Appendix VI: GAO Contact And Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Comparison of Results Using Different Methods to Identify DOD
Contractors Performing Security Functions, as of March 31, 2010:
Table 2: DOD-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan, End of Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 3: Difference Between DOD-Reported Census and SPOT Data on the
Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan for the First
Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 4: State-and USAID-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor and
Assistance Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2009 and
the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 5: State-and USAID-Reported Data on the Number of Security
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half
of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 6: USAID-and State-Reported Data on Contractor and Assistance
Personnel Killed and Wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009
and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 7: Defense Base Act Cases for Contractor Deaths and Injuries in
Iraq and Afghanistan during Fiscal Year 2007 through the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 8: DOD Quarterly Census Data on the Number of Contractor
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half
of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 9: Nationalities of DOD Contractor Personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 10: Nationalities of State Contractor and Assistance Personnel
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2010:
Table 11: Nationalities of USAID Contractor and Assistance Personnel
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2010:
Table 12: Number of DBA Cases Classified by Occupation of Contractor
Killed in Iraq and Afghanistan during Fiscal Year 2009 and the First
Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 13: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 14: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 15: DOD's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 16: DOD's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 17: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 18: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 19: State's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 20: State's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 21: State Active Assistance Instruments and Obligations for Iraq
and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2010:
Table 22: State New Assistance Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 23: State Active Assistance Instruments and Obligations for Iraq
and Afghanistan, by Type, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 24: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 25: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 26: USAID's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 27: USAID's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 28: USAID Active Assistance Instruments and Obligations for Iraq
and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2010:
Table 29: USAID New Assistance Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 30: USAID Active Assistance Instruments and Obligations for Iraq
and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2010:
Figures:
Figure 1: Nature of Incidents Resulting in Defense Base Act Cases for
Fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan during Fiscal Year 2009 and the
First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Figure 2: DOD, State, and USAID Obligations on Active Contracts (in
millions of dollars) for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and
the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Figure 3: DOD, State, and USAID Percent of Contracts and Obligations
on Awards for Iraq and Afghanistan:
Figure 4: Competition for DOD, State, and USAID Iraq and Afghanistan
Contracts Awarded in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2010:
Figure 5: State and USAID Obligations on Grants and Cooperative
Agreements for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First
Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Figure 6: Total Number of DBA Fatality Cases Classified by Nationality
of Contractor Killed in Iraq and Afghanistan during Fiscal Year 2009
and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Abbreviations:
AAPD: Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
DBA: Defense Base Act:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation:
FPDS-NG: Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation:
LOA: Letter of Authorization:
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding:
NAICS: North American Industry Classification System:
NDAA for FY2008: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008:
NDAA for FY2010: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010:
SPOT: Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 1, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
The Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (State), and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied
extensively on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to provide a wide
range of services, such as security, transportation, and base
operations. Additionally, State and USAID have depended on recipients
of grants and cooperative agreements--two types of assistance
instruments--to implement infrastructure, governance, and economic
development projects in the two countries. Given this reliance, it is
critical that agency officials have reliable information as a starting
point to inform decision making and properly oversee the work being
performed under contracts and assistance instruments in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As our prior work has shown, the agencies' lack of
complete and accurate information may inhibit planning, increase cost,
and introduce unnecessary risk.[Footnote 1]
Congress has taken a number of actions to increase oversight of
contracts and assistance instruments with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Among these, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA for FY2008) directed DOD, State, and USAID to
sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding contracting in Iraq
and Afghanistan, including maintaining common databases of information
on contracts and contractor personnel.[Footnote 2] The three agencies
signed an initial MOU in July 2008 that designated the Synchronized
Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) as their system of record
for the statutorily required information. With the passage of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA for
FY2010), Congress expanded the requirement to cover grants,
cooperative agreements, and their associated personnel.[Footnote 3] In
response, the three agencies revised their MOU in April 2010 to
specify that SPOT was also the system of record for tracking
statutorily required information on grants and cooperative agreements
with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan and their associated
personnel.
The NDAA for FY2008, as amended, directed us to review and report
annually on DOD, State, and USAID contracts and assistance instruments
with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 4] In our two prior
reports, we provided analyses of agency-reported data on contracts and
contractor personnel, identified limitations associated with those
data, and noted shortcomings in SPOT's implementation.[Footnote 5]
For our third annual report, we are assessing the status of the three
agencies' efforts to implement SPOT and providing the results of our
analysis of agency-reported data for fiscal year 2009 and the first
half of fiscal year 2010 on (1) the number of personnel, including
those performing security functions,[Footnote 6] working under DOD,
State, and USAID contracts and assistance instruments with performance
in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) the number of such personnel who were
killed or wounded; and (3) the number and value of contracts and
assistance instruments[Footnote 7] that were active or awarded
[Footnote 8] during our 18-month review period and the extent of
competition for new awards.
We used the following methodologies to develop our findings.
* To assess SPOT's implementation, we reviewed DOD, State, and USAID's
MOUs and the agencies' guidance and policies regarding SPOT. We also
interviewed officials responsible for implementing SPOT, including
those in Iraq and Afghanistan, to determine the agencies' criteria and
practices for entering information into SPOT and the system's current
and planned capabilities.
* For the number of contractor and assistance personnel, DOD, State,
and USAID provided us with data on U.S., third country, and local
nationals working under contracts and assistance instruments in Iraq
or Afghanistan, including those performing security functions, during
our review period. The agencies primarily obtained these data from
surveys of or reports from their contractors and assistance instrument
recipients. We assessed the reported data by comparing them to other
available sources. Based on these comparisons, we concluded that
caution should be exercised when using the agency-provided data on
contractor and assistance personnel to draw conclusions about either
the actual number in Iraq or Afghanistan for any given time period or
trends over time. However, we are presenting the reported data along
with their limitations as they establish a rough order of magnitude
for the number of personnel working under contracts and assistance
instruments in the two countries during our 18-month review period.
* For the number of contractor and assistance personnel killed or
wounded during our review period, we analyzed State and USAID data
that were based on reports submitted by contractors and assistance
instrument recipients. We could not independently verify the
completeness of the numbers State and USAID reported to us, but we are
reporting them as they provide insight into the numbers killed or
wounded during our review period. DOD did not collect and could not
provide these data. In addition, we analyzed Department of Labor data
on Defense Base Act (DBA) cases for incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan
during fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal year 2010.
Specifically, we reviewed all 213 DBA case files pertaining to
contractor deaths to determine, for example, whether the case was the
result of a hostile incident. We determined the DBA data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, when presented
with the appropriate caveats, based on our prior reliability
assessments.
* For the contracts and assistance instruments, we obtained data from
DOD, State, and USAID on the number of active or awarded contracts,
grants, and cooperative agreements with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan during our review period; the amount of funds obligated on
those contracts and assistance instruments; and the extent of
competition for new contract and assistance awards. Data were provided
from the government's system for tracking information on contracting
actions as well as agency-specific databases and manually compiled
lists of contract and assistance actions. Although we found a small
number of errors in some of the datasets, we determined that the data
were sufficiently reliable to identify the minimum number of active or
awarded contracts and assistance instruments and the associated
obligation amounts, as well as the extent of competition, based on our
reliability assessments, interviews with agency officials, and
verification of some reported data.
A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is included
in appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from November 2009
through September 2010 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan
and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Background:
Section 861 of the NDAA for FY2008 directed the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator to sign an MOU
related to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The law specified a
number of issues to be covered in the MOU, including identifying
common databases to serve as repositories of information on contract
and contractor personnel. The NDAA for FY2008 required the databases
to track the following, at a minimum:
* for each contract that involves work performed in Iraq or
Afghanistan,
- a brief description of the contract,
- its total value, and:
- whether it was awarded competitively; and:
* for contractor personnel working under contracts in Iraq or
Afghanistan,
- total number employed,
- total number performing security functions, and:
- total number killed or wounded.
In July 2008, DOD, State, and USAID signed an MOU in which they agreed
SPOT would be the system of record for the statutorily required
contract and personnel information. SPOT is a Web-based system
initially developed by the U.S. Army to track detailed information on
a limited number of contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces.
The MOU specified that SPOT would include information on DOD, State,
and USAID contracts with more than 14 days of performance in Iraq or
Afghanistan or valued at more than $100,000, as well as information on
the personnel working under those contracts. Each agency further
agreed to ensure that data elements related to contractor personnel,
such as the number of personnel employed on each contract in Iraq or
Afghanistan, are entered into SPOT accurately. Although the law only
directs the agencies to track aggregate data, SPOT is currently
configured in a manner that tracks individuals by name and records
information such as the contracts they are working under, deployment
dates, blood type, and next of kin. The agencies agreed that contract-
related information, such as value and extent of competition, are to
be imported into SPOT from the Federal Procurement Data System - Next
Generation (FPDS-NG), the federal government's system for tracking
information on contracting actions. Also, per the MOU, DOD is
responsible for all maintenance and upgrades to the system, but the
agencies agreed to negotiate funding arrangements for any agency-
unique requirements.
Since the signing of the July 2008 MOU, the requirements of section
861 have been amended. The Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 specified additional matters to
be covered in the agencies' MOU to address criminal offenses committed
by or against contractor personnel.[Footnote 9] Additionally, the NDAA
for FY2010 amended the original requirements by redefining "contract
in Iraq and Afghanistan" to include grants and cooperative agreements
and redefining "contractor" for these purposes to include grantees and
cooperative agreement recipients.[Footnote 10] The NDAA for FY2010
also revised the minimum threshold for tracking contracts, task and
delivery orders, grants, and cooperative agreements from 14 days of
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan to 30 days. In April 2010, the
three agencies signed a new MOU to incorporate these statutory changes.
DOD, State, and USAID have phased in their implementation of SPOT,
with each developing its own policies and procedures governing the use
of SPOT.
* DOD designated SPOT in January 2007 as its primary system for
collecting data on contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces. At
that time, it directed contractor firms to enter by name all U.S.,
third country, and local nationals working under its contracts in Iraq
or Afghanistan into SPOT.[Footnote 11] DOD officials informed us that
they have not issued a policy directing that personnel working under
assistance instruments be entered into SPOT because the department has
made very limited use of these instruments in Iraq or Afghanistan.
* State issued a policy in March 2008 requiring contractors to enter
data on their personnel working in Iraq and Afghanistan into SPOT.
[Footnote 12] An additional directive was issued in January 2009 to
expand this requirement to personnel working under assistance
instruments in the two countries.[Footnote 13]
* USAID issued a directive in April 2009 requiring contractors and
assistance recipients in Iraq to begin entering personnel data into
SPOT.[Footnote 14] In July 2010, USAID issued a directive that
expanded that requirement to contractors and assistance recipients in
Afghanistan.[Footnote 15]
Spot Still Cannot Be Relied On To Track Statutorily Required Data:
DOD, State, and USAID have encountered several practical and technical
challenges that undermined SPOT's ability to accurately and reliably
track personnel, as well as contracts and assistance instruments, as
agreed in the MOUs. Although DOD, State, and USAID revised their MOU
in April 2010 to incorporate changes pertaining to the use of SPOT,
they lacked agreement on how to proceed with its implementation. This
lack of agreement existed partly because the agencies have not
assessed their respective agency information needs for managing
contracts and assistance instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan and how
SPOT should be designed to meet these needs.
SPOT Falls Short of Tracking All Required Information:
SPOT's implementation to date falls short of tracking information as
agreed to in the MOUs. Specifically, agency policies and other
challenges have limited which personnel have been entered into the
system and tracked, including those performing security functions.
Furthermore, while SPOT has the capability to record when personnel
have been killed or wounded, such information has not been regularly
updated. Finally, SPOT does not have the capability to track the
contract and assistance instrument data elements as agreed to in the
MOUs.
Contractor and Assistance Personnel:
For personnel working under contracts and assistance instruments, we
identified at least three challenges the agencies faced in ensuring
that SPOT contained complete and accurate information. Specifically:
* USAID and State policies limited the extent that local national
personnel were entered into SPOT. Following the passage of the NDAA
for FY2008, USAID and State developed agency-specific policies
regarding SPOT's implementation. However, in some instances these
policies limited the extent to which local nationals were required to
be entered into the system. USAID's April 2009 contract and assistance
policy specified only that contractor and assistance personnel
deployed to Iraq must be registered in SPOT.[Footnote 16] The policy
explicitly excluded Iraqi entities and nationals from being entered
into SPOT, until a classified system is established. It was not until
July 2010 that USAID directed that its contractor and assistance
personnel working in Afghanistan be accounted for in SPOT.[Footnote
17] The policy notes that procedures will be provided separately for
entering information on Afghan nationals into SPOT, but as of
September 2010, such procedures have not been developed. As a result
of these policies, information on local nationals working under USAID
contracts and assistance instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan is still
not being tracked in SPOT. State's assistance policy directs that U.S.
and third country nationals working under grants must be entered into
SPOT.[Footnote 18] While the policy specifies that local nationals
should be entered into the system, State officials told us that agency
staff can use their discretion to determine whether local national
personnel working under grants are entered into SPOT. In contrast,
State requires all U.S. citizens, third country, and local nationals
working under its contracts to be entered into SPOT.[Footnote 19] In
explaining why their policies make exceptions for local nationals,
officials from USAID and State cited security concerns. USAID
officials told us that they held off entering Iraqi or Afghan
nationals into SPOT because identifying local nationals who work with
the U.S. government by name could place those individuals in danger
should the system be compromised. Similarly, State officials cited
concern for the safety of these individuals should SPOT, with its
detailed personnel information, be compromised.
* Practical limitations hindered the agencies' ability to track local
national personnel. Even when local national personnel are required to
be entered into SPOT, agency officials have explained that such
personnel are particularly difficult to track, especially in
Afghanistan, and as a result, their numbers in SPOT are not a close
representation of their actual numbers. This is primarily due to
practical limitations the agencies encountered, including:
- Many local nationals working under contracts and assistance
instruments are at remote locations and their numbers can fluctuate
daily. DOD officials in Iraq and Afghanistan explained that this is
especially true for construction projects, where the stage of
construction and season can affect the total number of personnel
working on a project. For example, DOD officials in Afghanistan told
us that at one project site the number of local national personnel
working fluctuated anywhere from 600 to 2,100. Further, DOD
contracting officials told us in some instances it could be weeks
before they are notified that local national personnel are no longer
working on a particular project. This has limited the ability to
track, in real time, the status of these personnel in SPOT. Also, for
personnel working at remote locations, the ability of U.S. government
officials to verify the completeness of information in SPOT is
hindered by security conditions that make it difficult for them to
visit regularly, and they cannot use their limited time on site to
verify personnel information.
- Local nationals working under DOD, State, or USAID contracts and
assistance instruments rarely need SPOT-generated letters of
authorization (LOAs) because they are not accessing U.S. facilities or
using U.S. government services.[Footnote 20] In contrast, U.S. and
third country nationals typically need a SPOT-generated LOA, for
example to even enter Iraq or Afghanistan, and, therefore, are more
likely to be entered into SPOT. As we have previously reported, the
need for a SPOT-generated LOA has served as the primary factor and
incentive for ensuring that personnel have been entered into the
system.[Footnote 21]
- Information necessary for entering personnel into SPOT may not be
available. DOD, State, and USAID officials told us some local national
contractors are hesitant or simply refuse to submit information on
their personnel because of safety concerns. Additionally, some
information required for SPOT data fields, such as first and last
names and date of birth, may not exist or be known. This is
particularly true in Afghanistan, where it is common for local
nationals to have only one name and know only their approximate year
of birth.
- Limited access to reliable internet connections in Iraq and
Afghanistan inhibit local firms' ability to enter personnel
information into SPOT. Since SPOT is a Web-based system that requires
internet access for extended periods of time to input detailed
personnel information, agency officials noted that this is a major
impediment to the widespread use of SPOT in both countries.
* Contractors and assistance recipients have not kept SPOT updated.
Although the agencies have increasingly required their contractors and
assistance recipients to enter personnel information into the system,
there has been little emphasis placed on ensuring that the information
entered into SPOT is up to date. Specifically, contractors and
assistance recipients have not consistently closed the accounts of
their personnel once they have left Iraq or Afghanistan. As a result,
SPOT does not accurately reflect the number of contract and assistance
personnel in either country, and in some cases the numbers may be
overstated. SPOT program officials told us that in March 2010 they
began periodically reviewing SPOT to close out the accounts of any
personnel who either did not actually travel to Iraq or Afghanistan or
whose estimated deployment ending date was 14 days overdue. Based on
this review, in April 2010 alone, they identified and closed the
accounts of over 56,000 such personnel who had been listed in SPOT as
still being deployed.
Personnel Performing Security Functions:
Although SPOT was designated as a system for tracking the number of
personnel performing security functions, it cannot be used to reliably
distinguish personnel performing security functions from other
contractors. SPOT program officials explained that the number of
security personnel working under contracts and assistance instruments
for the three agencies can be identified using multiple methods, all
of which have limitations and yield different results, as shown in
table 1. However, in acknowledging the limitations of these methods,
the officials noted that they are developing guidance that better
explains the different methods and the results they yield. The three
methods used to count security contractors include:
* The common industry classification system identifies the types of
goods and services the firm provided under the contract.[Footnote 22]
However, by using this contract classification system to calculate the
number of security contractors, other personnel working on the
security contract but not performing security functions, such as
administrative and support staff, would be included in the count.
* Job titles are to be entered into SPOT by employers for each
individual. SPOT program officials identified five job titles that
they include in counts of security personnel.[Footnote 23] These
officials acknowledged there is a risk that an employee providing
security services may have a job title other than one of those five
and, therefore, would not be included in the count.
* The weapon authorization data field in SPOT identifies personnel who
have been authorized to carry a firearm. Employers of armed security
contractors are required to enter this information into SPOT as part
of DOD's process to register and account for such personnel in each
country.[Footnote 24] However, USAID officials in Iraq explained that
security personnel working under the agency's contracts and assistance
instruments receive authorization to carry firearms from the Iraqi
government, not DOD, and are not identified in SPOT as having a
weapons authorization. Further, some contractors performing security
functions are not authorized to carry weapons and would, therefore,
not be included in a count using this method. Conversely, some
personnel who are not performing security functions have been
authorized to carry weapons for personal protection and would be
included in the count.
Table 1: Comparison of Results Using Different Methods to Identify DOD
Contractors Performing Security Functions, as of March 31, 2010:
Number of security contractors: Afghanistan;
Method: Industry classification: 4,309;
Method: Job title: 3,140;
Method: Weapon authorization: 1,910.
Number of security contractors: Iraq;
Method: Industry classification: 23,127;
Method: Job title: 22,673;
Method: Weapon authorization: 11,500.
Source: GAO analysis of SPOT data.
[End of table]
Regardless of the method employed to identify personnel in SPOT, it
appears that not all personnel performing security functions are being
captured in the system. For example, based on an analysis of SPOT
data, no more than 4,309 contractor personnel were performing security
functions for DOD in Afghanistan during the second quarter of fiscal
year 2010. In contrast, DOD officials overseeing armed contractors in
Afghanistan estimated the total number of DOD security contractors in
Afghanistan for the same time period was closer to 17,500.[Footnote 25]
Personnel Killed or Wounded:
With regard to tracking personnel who were killed or wounded while
working on contracts and assistance instruments in Iraq and
Afghanistan, SPOT was upgraded in January 2009 so that contractors
could update the status of their personnel in the system, including
whether they were killed or wounded. However, officials from the three
agencies informed us they do not rely on SPOT for such information
because contractors and assistance recipients generally have not
recorded in SPOT whether personnel have been killed or wounded. This
is evidenced by the fact that when we compared information in SPOT to
DBA insurance case data provided by Labor[Footnote 26] on 213
contractors who had been killed in Iraq or Afghanistan during our
review period, only 78 of the contractors were in SPOT and, of these,
only 9 were listed as having been killed. SPOT program officials
explained that SPOT users may not be aware of the requirement to
update the system with such information and they are working to
develop new guidance that clarifies the requirement.
Contracts and Assistance Instruments:
SPOT currently cannot be used to track information on contracts and
assistance instruments as agreed to in the MOUs. For example, SPOT
still cannot import contract dollar values directly from FPDS-NG. SPOT
program officials told us that the system has been reconfigured to
import data from FPDS-NG, but the direct link between the two systems
will not occur in 2010 as previously estimated. The officials
explained that they are coordinating with FPDS-NG officials to
determine when the link can be established. Further, while the MOU was
updated in April 2010 to cover assistance instruments, the revised MOU
did not address how assistance instrument information, such as value
and competition, would be entered into SPOT as such information is not
available through FPDS-NG. USAID and State officials informed us they
do not plan to directly link SPOT and the systems that currently track
their respective assistance instruments. They explained that this is
due in part to the fact that both agencies are implementing new
tracking systems. Without such links the agencies will have to
manually enter assistance information into SPOT. In addition, although
SPOT was upgraded in 2009 to allow users to include information on
whether the contract or assistance instrument was awarded using
competitive procedures, the system is not a reliable source for this
information as it is generally not being entered. For example, we
found that competition information had only been entered for 45
percent of the contracts in SPOT with performance during our review
period.[Footnote 27]
Lack of Interagency Agreement Has Hindered SPOT's Implementation:
There has been a lack of agreement among, and in some instances
within, DOD, State, and USAID about how to proceed with SPOT's
implementation. At a March 2010 congressional hearing, officials from
the three agencies testified that they would modify how SPOT tracked
personnel.[Footnote 28] Specifically, they explained the system would
be modified to allow users to enter the aggregate number of personnel
working on a particular contract or assistance instrument, as opposed
to requiring each individual to be entered by name. The proposed
modification was primarily in response to USAID's concerns that the
cost and resources needed to enter all of the currently required data
outweigh the benefits of having detailed information as well as to
alleviate security concerns over entering personal information on
local nationals into SPOT. However, as of September 2010, SPOT still
does not allow users to enter aggregate personnel data, as the
agencies have disagreed on who will pay for the modification and what
approach to take. DOD estimated that it would cost as much as $1.1
million to reconfigure the system to allow aggregate data to be
entered and stored. Since the modification would be made to address
USAID's concerns, DOD officials noted that in accordance with the MOU,
USAID should cover the cost. However, USAID officials informed us that
the modification would not solely benefit USAID as State and even DOD
components have expressed interest in having SPOT track aggregate
personnel information. State began conducting preliminary tests on an
approach that would upload into SPOT groups of unique records assigned
to each local national instead of individual names and associated
personal data. In August 2010, DOD and State officials indicated that
they had successfully uploaded the first batch of records into SPOT
using this method. Although USAID's preferred approach would have
users directly enter the total number of U.S., third country, and
local nationals working under each contract or assistance instrument,
USAID officials recently indicated the agency would begin testing
State's approach as a low-cost solution.
The lack of agreement on how to proceed with SPOT's development and
implementation can be partly attributed to the fact that the agencies
designated it as their system of record for meeting statutory
requirements without first identifying their information needs. SPOT
program officials acknowledged that they were unaware of the
informational needs of the contracting commands--required users of
SPOT--or whether the commands had any uses for the detailed data
contained in the system. Further, the agencies do not have a shared
understanding of the value of tracking detailed data, particularly
since the level of detail required for all contractor and assistance
personnel in SPOT is greater than what is statutorily required. For
example, senior USAID contracting and assistance officials told us the
agency had no plans to use the detailed information tracked in SPOT as
a tool for managing and overseeing its contracts and assistance
instruments. They further noted SPOT is being implemented only because
the agency is statutorily required to have a system for tracking such
information. Even within agencies there is not consensus on the need
for detailed information on all contractor and assistance personnel.
For example, while DOD policy requires all contractor personnel to be
individually entered into SPOT, several senior DOD officials we met
with in Iraq and Afghanistan stated that they do not see the benefit
of collecting detailed information on all individuals, especially
local nationals working at remote locations, given the challenges
associated with collecting such information and the likelihood of it
being incomplete or inaccurate. However, SPOT program officials we met
with explained that while they recognize that the benefits of the
information collected through SPOT will vary throughout organizations,
they are working to identify other potential users of SPOT data. For
example, they noted that some users find detailed personnel
information valuable, such as base commanders who could use the system
to obtain insight as to who is on their installations. Senior
officials from DOD, State, and USAID agreed that the agencies should
obtain an understanding of their respective informational needs and
ensure that a system is in place to collect that information at the
appropriate level of detail. Without such an understanding, they noted
that the agencies risk expending resources unnecessarily in difficult
environments trying to collect and verify detailed data that may be of
limited utility.
Previous GAO Recommendation Regarding SPOT Not Implemented:
Last year, we reported on the challenges associated with the agencies'
implementation of SPOT. To address the shortcomings identified in our
2009 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and State
and the USAID Administrator jointly develop and execute a plan with
associated time frames for the continued implementation of the NDAA
for FY2008 requirements, including:
* ensuring the agencies' criteria for entering contracts and
contractor personnel into SPOT are consistent with the NDAA for FY2008
and with the agencies' respective information needs for overseeing
contracts and contractor personnel,
* revising SPOT's reporting capabilities to ensure they fulfill
statutory requirements and agency information needs, and:
* establishing uniform requirements on how contract numbers are to be
entered into SPOT so that contract information can be pulled from FPDS-
NG.
* DOD and State disagreed with the need for the agencies to develop
and execute a plan to address the issues we identified. They cited
ongoing coordination efforts and planned upgrades to SPOT as
sufficient. While USAID did not address our recommendation, it noted
plans to continue meeting with DOD and State regarding SPOT. At that
time, we cautioned that continued coordination without additional
actions would not be sufficient and that a plan would help the
agencies identify the concrete steps needed to help ensure that the
data in SPOT are sufficiently reliable to fulfill statutory
requirements and their respective agencies needs. As our current work
demonstrates, many of the issues with the agencies' implementation of
SPOT that our recommendation was intended to address have not been
resolved. In particular, the agencies have not assessed their
respective informational needs or determined how SPOT could be best
implemented to meet those needs. Further, the system still cannot be
relied on to reliably track statutorily required data.
DOD, State, and USAID Data On Personnel In Iraq And Afghanistan Are
Incomplete:
DOD, State, and USAID reported to us that as of March 2010 there were
262,681 contractor and assistance personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan,
18 percent of whom were performing security functions. DOD reported
207,553 contractor personnel, while State and USAID reported 19,360
and 35,768 contractor and assistance personnel, respectively. Of the
personnel reported by the three agencies, 88 percent were contractors
and the remaining 12 percent worked under assistance instruments. Due
to limitations with SPOT, the reported data were obtained primarily
through periodic agency surveys and reports from contractors and
assistance recipients. We determined that caution should be exercised
when identifying trends or drawing conclusions about the number of
contractor and assistance personnel in either country based on the
data the agencies reported to us. Several factors, many of which are
similar to the challenges with SPOT, hindered the agencies' ability to
collect accurate and reliable personnel data, including difficulty
obtaining information on the number of local nationals, low response
rates to agency surveys, and limited ability to verify the accuracy or
completeness of the personnel data reported. Despite such limitations,
the officials characterized the data reported to them and provided to
us as the best data available on the number of contractor and
assistance personnel in the two countries.
DOD Contractor Personnel:
As of the second quarter of fiscal year 2010, DOD reported to us that
there were 95,461 contractor personnel in Iraq and 112,092 contractor
personnel in Afghanistan (see table 2 and also appendix II for
additional DOD contractor personnel data). Of that total,
approximately 14 percent were reported to be performing security
functions. DOD reported that it had no personnel working under grants
or cooperative agreements in either country during our review period.
The contractor personnel numbers were obtained through the U.S.
Central Command's (CENTCOM) quarterly census.[Footnote 29] CENTCOM
initiated its quarterly census of contractor personnel in June 2007 as
an interim measure until SPOT was fully implemented, and for our
reporting period, DOD continued to use the census to count the number
of DOD contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. The census is
dependent on contractor firms reporting their personnel data to DOD
components, which then compile the data and report them to CENTCOM at
the end of each quarter.
Table @; DOD-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan, End of Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Iraq:
All contractors;
Fiscal year 2009 fourth quarter: 113,731;
Fiscal year 2010 second quarter: 95,461.
Contractors providing security;
Fiscal year 2009 fourth quarter: 12,684;
Fiscal year 2010 second quarter: 11,610.
Afghanistan:
All contractors;
Fiscal year 2009 fourth quarter: 104,101;
Fiscal year 2010 second quarter: 112,092.
Contractors providing security;
Fiscal year 2009 fourth quarter: 11,423;
Fiscal year 2010 second quarter: 16,733.
Total:
All contractors;
Fiscal year 2009 fourth quarter: 217,832;
Fiscal year 2010 second quarter: 207,553.
Contractors providing security;
Fiscal year 2009 fourth quarter: 24,107;
Fiscal year 2010 second quarter: 28,343.
Source: CENTCOM census data.
[End of table]
According to DOD officials, the quarterly census remains the most
reliable source of contractor personnel data. However, DOD officials
overseeing the census acknowledged that the census numbers represent a
rough approximation of the actual number of contractor personnel who
worked in either country. These officials told us that because of how
the data were collected and reported by the various DOD components, it
was difficult to compile and obtain a more precise count of contractor
personnel. Specifically, there are several factors that hindered DOD's
ability to collect accurate and reliable data, including difficulty in
counting local nationals and an inability to validate the data. As
military operations increase in Afghanistan, efforts to obtain an
accurate count of the contractor workforce may be more complicated
than in Iraq, because DOD's contractor workforce in Afghanistan
consists of more local nationals than in Iraq, and data on local
nationals are more difficult to obtain than data on U.S. citizens and
third country nationals. The reasons cited--fluctuating numbers and
work at remote locations--are similar to those cited for why it is
challenging to ensure that local nationals are entered into SPOT. DOD
officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan explained that security
conditions limit their ability to conduct site visits to remote
locations and added that while at sites their focus is primarily on
assessing the status of a project, as opposed to checking on the
number of personnel working.
Moreover, the challenges associated with CENTCOM's quarterly census
were heightened by the transition to an automated census. In the
second quarter of fiscal year 2010, DOD began to transition from the
manually compiled CENTCOM census to eventual reliance on SPOT. In
doing so, DOD used a SPOT-populated census template--called SPOT-Plus--
as an interim step. Although the DOD official responsible for the SPOT
program has stated that CENTCOM's manual census was cumbersome,
resource intensive, and provided only a snapshot in time, DOD
officials implementing SPOT-Plus stated that it was even more
cumbersome and resource intensive. In particular, the SPOT-Plus
process required reporting units to manually provide data on contracts
and contractor personnel--as was the case with the manual census--but
the number of census data fields increased from 18 to over 50.
Although DOD issued instructions to facilitate the initial transition
from the quarterly census to SPOT-Plus, the process did not go as well
as anticipated. CENTCOM officials told us that in some cases reporting
units responded to the second quarter census by using an older census
spreadsheet that was not populated with SPOT data or did not respond
at all. DOD officials stated that in some instances there was
confusion as to who should compile and verify the contract and
contractor personnel data and the task was mistakenly delegated to DOD
organizations that were not privy to or responsible for that
information. Furthermore, since the second quarter SPOT-Plus template
did not provide a way to differentiate the numbers of private security
contractors from the total, CENTCOM had to subsequently request that
reporting units provide this information in a separate section of the
SPOT-Plus template. CENTCOM and SPOT program officials stated that
many of the challenges experienced with the second quarter SPOT-Plus
census have since been addressed. SPOT program officials now estimate
that the transition from the census to SPOT will be completed no later
than the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011.
There continue to be considerable discrepancies between the contractor
counts obtained through the census and SPOT (see table 3). In some
instances, DOD contractor personnel numbers in SPOT may be
overreported, and in others, underreported. For example, in comparing
SPOT-reported data to census data at the end of the second quarter of
fiscal year 2010, we found that SPOT included almost 18,000 more
personnel working in Iraq than the census. Conversely, SPOT did not
include more than 70,000 personnel working in Afghanistan who were
included in the census. Further, DOD officials from one service
component in Afghanistan told us SPOT contained data on 4,200
contractor personnel who worked on their contracts, but their census
submission to CENTCOM showed there were over 40,000 personnel working
on their contracts for the same period.
Table 3: Difference Between DOD-Reported Census and SPOT Data on the
Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan for the First
Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Contractors in Iraq:
Census: 95,461;
SPOT: 113,439;
Difference: 17,978.
Contractors in Afghanistan:
Census: 112,092;
SPOT: 39,983;
Difference: 72,109.
Total:
Census: 207,553;
SPOT: 153,432;
Difference: 54,121.
Source: CENTCOM census data and GAO analysis of DOD SPOT data.
[End of table]
State and USAID Contractor and Assistance Personnel:
As of the end of the fiscal year 2010 second quarter, State reported
11,236 personnel working under contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan and
an additional 8,074 working under assistance instruments, while USAID
reported 12,229 contractor personnel and 23,539 assistance personnel
in the two countries. Table 4 depicts the total number of State-and
USAID-reported contractor and assistance personnel in the two
countries, while appendix II provides additional State and USAID
contractor and assistance personnel data.
Table 4: State-and USAID-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor and
Assistance Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2009 and
the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Iraq:
Contractors:
State: Fiscal year 2009: 7,116;
State: First half fiscal year 2010: 7,258;
USAID: Fiscal year 2009: 1,962;
USAID: First half fiscal year 2010: 1,782.
Assistance personnel:
State: Fiscal year 2009: 3,490;
State: First half fiscal year 2010: 2,333;
USAID: Fiscal year 2009: 1,385;
USAID: First half fiscal year 2010: 1,627.
Afghanistan:
Contractors:
State: Fiscal year 2009: 4,961;
State: First half fiscal year 2010: 3,978;
USAID: Fiscal year 2009: 15,691;
USAID: First half fiscal year 2010: 10,447.
Assistance personnel:
State: Fiscal year 2009: 3,885;
State: First half fiscal year 2010: 5,741;
USAID: Fiscal year 2009: 18,546;
USAID: First half fiscal year 2010: 21,912.
Total contractors and assistance personnel:
State: Fiscal year 2009: 19,503[A];
State: First half fiscal year 2010: 19,360[B];
USAID: Fiscal year 2009: 37,584;
USAID: First half fiscal year 2010: 35,768.
Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data.
[A] State reported 51 contractors working in both Iraq and Afghanistan
in 2009. These individuals are included in the State fiscal year 2009
total.
[B] State reported 50 contractors working in both Iraq and Afghanistan
in 2010. These individuals are included in the State fiscal year 2010
total.
[End of table]
Of the total number of contractor and assistance personnel working in
Iraq and Afghanistan at the end of the second quarter in fiscal year
2010, State reported that about 35 percent were performing security
functions. USAID reported that about 32 percent of the total number of
contractors and assistance personnel working in Iraq and Afghanistan
were performing security functions. Table 5 depicts the numbers State
and USAID reported to us regarding personnel performing security
functions under contracts and assistance instruments. In some
instances, State has contracted directly for personnel to perform
security services, for example, to guard the embassies in Baghdad and
Kabul. Additionally, State and USAID contractors and assistance
recipients have subcontracted for security services to protect their
personnel and facilities.
Table 5: State-and USAID-Reported Data on the Number of Security
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half
of Fiscal Year 2010:
Iraq:
Security personnel working under contracts:
State: Fiscal year 2009: 4,261;
State: First half fiscal year 2010: 4,250;
USAID: Fiscal year 2009: 1,145;
USAID: First half fiscal year 2010: 963.
Security personnel working under assistance instruments:
State: Fiscal year 2009: 428;
State: First half fiscal year 2010: 367;
USAID: Fiscal year 2009: 262;
USAID: First half fiscal year 2010: 325.
Afghanistan:
Security personnel working under contracts:
State: Fiscal year 2009: 2,025;
State: First half fiscal year 2010: 1,691;
USAID: Fiscal year 2009: 3,888;
USAID: First half fiscal year 2010: 4,538.
Security personnel working under assistance instruments:
State: Fiscal year 2009: 263;
State: First half fiscal year 2010: 404;
USAID: Fiscal year 2009: 4,033;
USAID: First half fiscal year 2010: 5,729.
Total security personnel:
State: Fiscal year 2009: 6,978[A];
State: First half fiscal year 2010: 6,713[A];
USAID: Fiscal year 2009: 9,328;
USAID: First half fiscal year 2010: 11,555.
Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data.
[A] State reported one security contractor working in both Iraq and
Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010. This individual is included in the State
totals for both years.
[End of table]
State and USAID took similar approaches to provide us with the numbers
of contractor and assistance personnel for fiscal year 2009 and the
first half of 2010. Although State now requires contract personnel and
some grant personnel to be entered into SPOT, to respond to our
request, State's bureaus generally relied on manually compiled
surveys--with at least one bureau supplementing its response with SPOT
data. Similarly, USAID relied on a combination of periodic surveys and
data obtained through quarterly reports submitted by the agency's
contractors and assistance recipients.[Footnote 30] However, State
officials informed us that their contractors and assistance recipients
are not required to provide such reports and, therefore, response
rates to requests for personnel numbers are low. For example,
officials with one State office noted that none of its Afghan grant
recipients provided personnel numbers. In contrast, USAID officials in
Iraq indicated that they regularly receive personnel numbers from all
of their contractors and assistance recipients, while USAID officials
in Afghanistan we spoke with stated they generally receive responses
from about 70 percent of their contractors and assistance recipients.
We identified several contracts and assistance instruments for which
personnel information was not provided. For example, we identified a
State contract to design and build offices and housing in Afghanistan
with obligations totaling $234 million for which personnel numbers
were not reported. In another example, we identified four USAID
cooperative agreements for a program promoting food security in
Afghanistan with total obligations of $144 million for which
information on the number of personnel working on the agreement was
not provided.
Agency officials acknowledged several additional challenges in
providing us with complete data on their contract and assistance
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. First, not all local nationals
working on State and USAID contracts and assistance instruments were
included in the numbers they provided to us. As with SPOT, local
nationals were not always captured in personnel counts because it was
either not feasible or too difficult to obtain accurate information.
In addition, State and USAID officials stated that they have limited
ability to verify the accuracy or completeness of the personnel data
provided. State officials in Iraq and Afghanistan informed us that
they have no visibility into the extent to which contractors use
subcontracted employees and generally are not able to track the
numbers of subcontract personnel. However, USAID officials in Iraq
explained that they have instituted measures to review the reported
data to improve accuracy.
Although agency officials acknowledged that not all contractor and
assistance personnel were being tracked over the course of our review
period, they still considered the data provided to our requests for
personnel information to be more accurate than SPOT. Reflective of
their policies regarding SPOT's use and challenges associated with
collecting data through SPOT, there are significant discrepancies--
both in terms of under-and overreporting--between the numbers in SPOT
and what was reported to us by State and USAID. For example, as of the
end of the second quarter of fiscal year 2010, there were 7,077 fewer
State contractor and assistance personnel in SPOT than were reported
to us. In fact, SPOT did not include any of the 5,741 personnel
working under assistance instruments in Afghanistan that State
reported to us. The discrepancies for USAID were also notable, given
that during our review period USAID did not require the use of SPOT in
Afghanistan or for Iraqi nationals. For USAID, there were only 579
personnel in SPOT as of end of the second quarter of fiscal year 2010-
35,189 fewer than what the agency reported to us.
Only State and USAID Reported Data on Killed and Wounded Contractors
and Assistance Personnel:
Although DOD, State, and USAID are required to track the number of
personnel killed or wounded while working on contracts and assistance
instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan, only State and USAID tracked this
information during our review period. State reported to us that 9 of
its contractor and assistance personnel were killed and 68 were
wounded during fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal year
2010. For the same period, USAID reported to us that 116 contractor
and assistance personnel were killed and 121 were wounded[Footnote 31]
(see table 6). Both agencies noted that some of the reported
casualties resulted from nonhostile actions. For example, USAID
reported that 3 contractors sustained injuries in a traffic accident.
These data were based on reports submitted to State and USAID by
contractors and assistance recipients. Without alternative sources of
data, we could not verify whether State's and USAID's data were
complete. However, a recent report from the USAID Inspector General
suggested that not all security contractors in Afghanistan are
reporting incidents that result in personnel being injured or killed.
[Footnote 32]
Table 6: USAID-and State-Reported Data on Contractor and Assistance
Personnel Killed and Wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009
and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
State:
Killed:
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 5;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 0;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 3;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 1;
Total: 9.
Wounded:
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 22;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 23;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 23;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 0;
Total: 68.
USAID:
Killed:
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 8;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 0;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 73;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 35;
Total: 116.
Wounded:
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 2;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 0;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 67;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 52;
Total: 121.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data.
[End of table]
DOD officials informed us they eventually intend to track the number
of killed and wounded contractor personnel through SPOT. DOD reported
that it has other systems that collect information on contractor
casualties, but they have limitations. For example, the Defense
Casualty Information Processing System contains information on
American citizens who were killed or wounded while working as
contractors or civilian employees. However, the system does not
differentiate between direct-hire government civilians and contractors
and does not include data on local or third country nationals.
Additionally, some individual components within the department receive
reports on killed or wounded contractor personnel, but such reports
are not consistently tracked in a readily accessible or comprehensive
manner. For example, contracting officials in Afghanistan explained
that they receive serious incident reports, which include information
on incidents in which personnel were killed or wounded, submitted by
their private security contractors. A DOD official in Afghanistan
knowledgeable on the matter cautioned though that the reports most
likely understate the actual number of contractor casualties, as not
all contractors submit reports as required.
Absent a reliable system for tracking killed or wounded contractor
personnel, DOD officials referred us to Labor for data on cases filed
under DBA for killed or injured contractors--as they have for our
prior reports. However, as we previously reported, Labor's DBA case
data do not provide an appropriate basis for determining the number of
contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. Under
the NDAA for FY2008, as amended, Labor--unlike DOD, State, and USAID--
has no responsibility for tracking killed or wounded contractor
personnel, and as such its data were not designed to do so. Labor
officials also explained that not all deaths and injuries reported
under DBA would be regarded as contractors killed or wounded within
the context of the NDAA for FY2008. They further explained that
injuries to local and third country contractors, in particular, may be
underreported.
Labor DBA Data Provide Insight on Contractor Casualties:
While Labor's DBA data do not serve as a proxy for fulfilling the NDAA
for FY2008 requirements, Labor's DBA case data provide insights into
contractor deaths and injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to
data provided by Labor, there were 10,597 DBA cases, including 213
cases reporting contractor deaths, that resulted from incidents in
Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2009 and the first half of
fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 33] As shown in table 7, the number of
deaths and injuries in Iraq has declined since 2007. In Afghanistan,
the number of contractor deaths has increased since 2007, while the
number of injury cases has fluctuated from over 1,100 to almost 2,000.
However, Labor's DBA data cannot provide insight into the number of
personnel working under assistance instruments who have been killed or
injured in Iraq or Afghanistan as such instruments are not subject to
DBA. See appendix III for additional data regarding DBA cases for
contractor deaths occurring during our review period.
Table 7: Defense Base Act Cases for Contractor Deaths and Injuries in
Iraq and Afghanistan during Fiscal Year 2007 through the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Deaths:
Iraq: Fiscal year 2007: 337;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 122;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 66;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 14;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2007: 40;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 47;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 97;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 36.
Injuries:
Iraq: Fiscal year 2007: 9,148;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 7,735;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 4,838;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 3,331;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2007: 1,962;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 1,100;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 1,199;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 1,016.
Total cases:
Iraq: Fiscal year 2007: 9,485;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 7,857;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 4,904;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 3,345;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2007: 2,002;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 1,147;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 1,296;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 1,052.
Source: GAO analysis of Labor data.
Note: Cases may be filed for contractor personnel working on contracts
with U.S. government agencies other than DOD, State, and USAID.
[End of table]
Based on our analysis of all 213 DBA cases for contractor personnel
killed in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period, we determined
that 49 percent of deaths resulted from hostile incidents. When
comparing deaths in Afghanistan to those in Iraq, we found that 62
percent of the reported fatalities in Afghanistan were caused by
hostile incidents, whereas in Iraq, 26 percent were the result of
hostile actions, as shown in figure 1. In both countries, improvised
explosive devices were a primary cause of death for incidents
involving hostile actions. In one incident, a vehicle carrying a group
of engineers to a project site hit such a device, resulting in eight
fatalities. For both countries, nonhostile deaths resulted from
various types of accidents or health issues. For example, we found
that at least 31 percent of the nonhostile fatalities were the result
of health conditions or illnesses, such as cardiac arrest.
Figure 1: Nature of Incidents Resulting in Defense Base Act Cases for
Fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan during Fiscal Year 2009 and the
First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 pie-charts]
Afghanistan: hostile vs. nonhostile:
Hostile: 62.4%;
Nonhostile: 316%;
Unknown: 6%.
Iraq: hostile vs. nonhostile:
Hostile: 26.3%;
Nonhostile: 72.5%;
Unknown: 1.2%.
Source: GAO analysis of Labor DBA data.
[End of figure]
Agencies Obligated Tens of Billions of Dollars on Contracts and
Assistance Instruments in Iraq And Afghanistan:
DOD, State, and USAID collectively obligated $35.7 billion on 133,283
contracts, and $1.8 billion on 668 assistance instruments with
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2009 and the
first half of fiscal year 2010. DOD accounted for the vast majority of
all contract obligations, while State and USAID accounted for all of
the reported obligations on grants and cooperative agreements. The
fundamental reason as to why agencies choose a contract instead of an
assistance instrument is dependant upon whom the agency determines to
be the primary beneficiary. With contracts, the goods or services
obtained are for the direct benefit or use by the U.S. government,
whereas the primary purpose of assistance instruments is to further a
public purpose.[Footnote 34] Most contracts and associated obligations
reported to us by the agencies were awarded during fiscal year 2009
and the first half of fiscal year 2010, with the agencies generally
using competitive procedures to award their contracts. State and USAID
relied heavily on assistance instruments to achieve their missions in
Iraq and Afghanistan and used different types of assistance
instruments depending on the purpose for the funding. Additionally,
State and USAID officials indicated that consistent with their
policies, they used competitive procedures whenever practical in
awarding assistance instruments. The agencies were unable to provide
information on subcontracts and subgrantees, which we were required to
report. See appendix IV for detailed information on each agency's Iraq
and Afghanistan contracts, assistance instruments, and associated
obligations during our review period.
DOD Had Significantly More Contract Obligations than State or USAID:
DOD accounted for the vast majority of all contracts and obligations
made by the three agencies during our review period. Of the reported
$35.7 billion obligated by the three agencies on contracts with
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, 88 percent of obligations were
for DOD contracts, as shown in figure 2. Task orders made up the
largest number of contracts and the majority of obligations for DOD,
State, and USAID. For example, DOD had over 98,000 active task orders
with obligations totaling $24.7 billion--of which almost $6.3 billion
was for one task order that provides food, housing, and other services
for U.S. military personnel. Similarly, State reported that 68 percent
of its contracts were purchase orders, which accounted for only 1
percent of its total obligations. In contrast, task orders accounted
for over 76 percent of State's total contract obligations but only 17
percent of its contracts. While USAID task orders accounted for only 8
percent of its total number of contracts, obligations on these task
orders amounted to 51 percent of the agency's total contract
obligations. Approximately half of DOD and State's contracts and
obligations were for performance in Iraq during our 18-month review
period. In contrast, almost 85 percent of USAID's contract obligations
were for contracts with performance in Afghanistan.
Figure 2: DOD, State, and USAID Obligations on Active Contracts (in
millions of dollars) for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and
the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Agency: DOD;
Afghanistan: $13.31 billion;
Iraq: $17.66 billion;
Other: $624 million.
Agency: State;
Afghanistan: $1.83 billion;
Iraq: $1.46 billion;
Other: $69 million.
Agency: USAID;
Afghanistan: $11.50 billion;
Iraq: $264 million;
Other: $0.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
Note: "Other" represents contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan or contracts that the agencies reported as having
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country.
[End of figure]
Some contracts also included work in both countries. For example, DOD
provided us with data on seven active task orders under a construction
contract with total obligations of approximately $152 million and
indicated that there was performance in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, in such cases, it was not possible based on the data reported
to us to isolate which portion of the total obligations was specific
to Iraq or Afghanistan. As a result, we counted contracts, and their
associated obligations, with performance in both Iraq and Afghanistan
as well as contracts where the agency indicated that performance was
in Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country, as "other."
Further, we counted contracts with performance in multiple countries
and their associated obligations with the Iraq contracts if the agency
identified the place of performance as including Iraq, but not
Afghanistan. Similarly, we counted contracts and their associated
obligations with the Afghanistan contracts if the place of performance
included Afghanistan but not Iraq.
Agencies Competed Majority of New Contract Awards:
Of the over 133,000 contracts, including task and delivery orders
active during our review period, 98 percent were new contracts and
orders awarded by the three agencies during fiscal 2009 and the first
half of fiscal year 2010. Similarly, 83 percent of the total funds
obligated were on contracts awarded during this same period. There
were some variations between agencies, as shown in figure 3. For
example, for both State and USAID, about 84 percent of their
obligations were on contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2009,
whereas the vast majority of obligations for DOD were on contracts
awarded during our review period.
Figure 3: DOD, State, and USAID Percent of Contracts and Obligations
on Awards for Iraq and Afghanistan:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
DOD: Contracts;
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2009 or the first half of fiscal year
2010: 98%;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2009: 2%.
DOD: Obligations;
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2009 or the first half of fiscal year
2010: 92%;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2009: 8%.
State: Contracts;
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2009 or the first half of fiscal year
2010: 91%;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2009: 9%.
State: Obligations;
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2009 or the first half of fiscal year
2010: 16%;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2009: 84%.
USAID: Contracts;
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2009 or the first half of fiscal year
2010: 65%;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2009: 35%.
USAID: Obligations;
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2009 or the first half of fiscal year
2010: 16%;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2009: 84%.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of figure]
The three agencies reported that they generally used competitive
procedures when awarding their contracts. Out of a total of 32,876
contracts, excluding task and delivery orders, awarded in the period
of our review, 92 percent were reported as awarded using competitive
procedures. These competitively awarded contracts also accounted for
about 92 percent of the obligations made on contracts awarded during
our review period, as depicted in figure 4. Generally, contracts
should be awarded on the basis of full and open competition.[Footnote
35] The agencies reported that most of their new contracts were
awarded using full and open competition, but in some instances the
agencies reported a contract as being competed but did not indicate
whether full and open or other than full and open competition was
used.[Footnote 36] For about 5 percent of the contracts awarded during
our review period, the agencies did not report competition information.
Figure 4: Competition for DOD, State, and USAID Iraq and Afghanistan
Contracts Awarded in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Extent of competition: Contracts;
Competed: 93%;
Not competed: 2%;
Not reported: 5.1%.
Extent of competition: Obligations;
Competed: 92%;
Not competed: 2%;
Not reported: 6%.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of figure]
Most of the 801 contracts reported to us by the three agencies as not
competed had relatively small obligations during our review period.
[Footnote 37] Approximately 78 percent of these contracts had
obligations less than $25,000. In contrast, only 13 of the 801
contracts had over $1 million in obligations, accounting for 63
percent of obligations for the noncompeted contracts.
Competition requirements generally do not apply to the issuance of
task orders.[Footnote 38] However, where there are multiple awardees
under the underlying contract, the FAR requires the contracting
officer in most instances to provide each awardee a fair opportunity
to be considered for each order exceeding $3,000. The agencies
reported that 99 percent of the task and delivery orders issued during
our review period were competed--either the underlying contract was
awarded competitively or multiple awardees were given a fair
opportunity to be considered for each order.
State and USAID Relied Heavily on Grants and Cooperative Agreements in
Iraq and Afghanistan:
State and USAID reported obligations of $1.8 billion on 668 grants and
cooperative agreements with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal year 2010. Conversely,
DOD reported that it did not have any grants or cooperative agreements
with obligations during our review period. Of the total number of
active State and USAID assistance instruments in the two countries, 88
percent were grants. However, grants accounted for only 42 percent of
the total assistant instrument obligations. Cooperative agreements,
although smaller in number, accounted for the majority of the total
amounts obligated on assistance instruments during our review period.
According to State and USAID policy, the type of assistance instrument
used is determined based on a variety of factors. Among the factors to
be considered is the level of involvement the agency anticipates will
be needed to effectively administer the agreement.[Footnote 39]
State and USAID generally relied on different types of assistance
instruments during our review period depending on the purpose for the
funding. Of State's active assistance instruments, 84 percent of its
assistance obligations were for grants, whereas 63 percent of USAID's
assistance obligations were for cooperative agreements as shown in
figure 5. The principal purpose of State's grants in Iraq and
Afghanistan varied by bureau and covered a wide range of activities
such as teaching computer skills to women and adolescents, covering
the travel costs for subject matter experts to attend conferences, and
funding explosive ordnance and mine clearance efforts. In contrast,
USAID used cooperative agreements generally to implement development
programs in sectors such as banking, education, health, and road
construction in the two countries. Each agency has implemented
programs designed to provide grants to local national organizations
and individuals to develop the Iraqi and Afghan economies. During our
review period, State reported that its local grants program provided
$15.3 million in funding to over 280 Iraqi grant recipients, with 84
percent of the awards being $25,000 or less.[Footnote 40] USAID has
similar programs, but as we recently reported, in some instances the
agency also relied on contractors to award and administer such grants.
[Footnote 41] In these instances, the contract data we received
contained the cumulative value of the obligations made under both the
base contracts and the grants being managed under those contracts.
Figure 5: State and USAID Obligations on Grants and Cooperative
Agreements for Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First
Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Agency: State;
Grants: 88%;
Cooperative agreements: 12%.
Agency: USAID; %;
Cooperative agreements: 63%.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of figure]
State and USAID policies require the use of competitive procedures
when awarding assistance instruments unless an authorized exception to
the use of competition applies.[Footnote 42] State and USAID officials
informed us that they used competitive procedures for assistance
awards in Iraq and Afghanistan whenever practical. Based on our review
of 52 randomly sampled State assistance instruments active during
fiscal year 2009, we found that 79 percent were awarded competitively.
Similarly, in our review of 36 randomly sampled USAID assistance
agreements in Iraq and Afghanistan that were active in fiscal year
2009, we found that 50 percent were competed.[Footnote 43]
Information on Subcontracts and Subgrants Not Readily Available:
The NDAA for FY2008, as amended, mandated that we identify the total
number and value of all contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements,
which include prime contracts, task or delivery orders, as well as
subawards at any tier. While we were able to obtain data on the number
of and amount obligated on prime contracts and orders as well as
grants and cooperative agreements, the agencies were unable to provide
comparable data on subcontracts and subgrants. As we have reported in
the past, contract and assistance instrument files may contain
information on subcontracts and subgrants but none of the agencies
systematically tracked this information in a readily retrievable
manner.[Footnote 44] The value of subawards would be included in the
total value of the prime contract or assistance instrument, but the
agencies could not readily distinguish the amount that went to the
prime contractor, grantee, or cooperative agreement recipients from
the amount that went to subcontracts or subgrants for all contracts
and assistance instruments.
Concluding Observations:
Over the past 2 years, DOD, State, and USAID have made some progress
in implementing SPOT. While that progress has been hindered by
practical and technical limitations, a continued lack of interagency
agreement on how to address issues, particularly those related to
tracking local nationals, has been an impediment toward moving
forward. Tracking Iraqi and Afghan nationals who work under contracts
and assistance instruments presents unique challenges, not only in
terms of obtaining aggregate numbers, but especially in terms of
obtaining the detailed information currently required by SPOT. The
still unresolved issue of how local nationals will be tracked reliably
in SPOT reflects a lack of consensus among and even within the
agencies about the value and use of such data beyond fulfilling a
statutory requirement.
With SPOT not yet fully implemented, the agencies have relied on other
methods of collecting data that have their own shortcomings to respond
to our requests for required information, and in some cases, data were
not provided. Last year, we recommended that the agencies develop a
joint plan with associated time frames to address SPOT's limitations,
but agency officials believed that a plan was not needed and their
ongoing coordination efforts were sufficient. However, our work since
then demonstrates that their ongoing efforts alone were not sufficient
to ensure that statutory requirements are met. Over the past year,
SPOT's implementation has continued to be undermined by a lack of
agreement among the agencies on how to proceed and how best to meet
their respective data needs to fulfill statutory requirements and
improve oversight and management of contracts and assistance
instruments. Until the agencies individually assess their own data
needs given the relative challenges and benefits of tracking detailed
information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated
personnel and collectively agree on how to best address those needs
while meeting statutory requirements, as we have previously
recommended, they are not in a position to determine how best to move
forward. By working with potential users of the data to better
understand their information needs, each agency can help ensure the
information tracked in SPOT is sufficient to meet statutory
requirements as well as help facilitate agency oversight of contracts,
grants, and cooperative agreements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Once the
agencies have agreed on how to proceed, having a plan with defined
roles and responsibilities and associated time frames can help hold
the agencies accountable and ensure timely implementation. Otherwise,
implementation of SPOT will continue to languish, with the agencies
not collecting reliable information required by Congress and risking
collection of other information they will not use. Therefore, we
believe the recommendation in our 2009 report still applies, and we
are not making any new recommendations.
Agency Comments:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOD, State, and
USAID. DOD and State informed us they had no comments on the draft's
findings or concluding observations. In its written comments, USAID
described the extent to which it intends to use SPOT in Iraq and
Afghanistan in a manner that would satisfy statutory requirements
while meeting the agency's needs (see appendix V for USAID's written
comments). Additionally, after receiving the draft report USAID
provided us with revised data on contractor and assistance personnel
working in Afghanistan during the first half of fiscal year 2010.
After reviewing and analyzing these data, we incorporated the results
of our analysis into the final report as appropriate.
We also provided a draft of this report to Labor for its review, but
the department did not have any comments.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the Secretary of Labor, and interested
congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at
no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
John Hutton:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
Chair:
The Honorable Christopher S. Bond:
Vice Chairman:
Select Committee on Intelligence:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chairman:
The Honorable Darrell Issa:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter Hoekstra:
Ranking Member:
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, as amended, directs GAO to review and report on matters relating
to Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In response to this mandate, we are assessing the status
of the three agencies' efforts to implement the Synchronized
Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) and providing the results
of our analysis of agency-reported data for fiscal year 2009 and the
first half of fiscal year 2010 on (1) the number of personnel,
including those performing security functions, working under DOD,
State, and USAID contracts and assistance instruments with performance
in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) the number of such personnel who were
killed or wounded; and (3) the number and value of contracts and
assistance instruments that were active or awarded during our 18-month
review period and the extent of competition for new awards.
Implementation of SPOT:
To address our first objective, we reviewed DOD, State, and USAID's
July 2008 and April 2010 Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) that
addressed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
requirements. We compared SPOT's capabilities to the MOU requirements
to determine the extent to which SPOT fulfilled the terms of the MOUs.
In addition, we reviewed each agency's policies and guidance governing
the use and implementation of SPOT. We interviewed officials from the
three agencies responsible for implementing SPOT to determine the
criteria and practices for entering information into SPOT and the
system's current and planned capabilities. We also met with DOD,
State, and USAID officials, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan,
to obtain insight into the extent to which SPOT was being used by each
agency and the obstacles they were encountering. In addition, we met
with the contractor responsible for SPOT's development to discuss the
continued development of the system.
We reviewed DOD's internal controls governing SPOT and interviewed
SPOT program and contractor officials to assess the processes used to
ensure the data elements contained in the system are complete and
accurate. We also obtained SPOT data from DOD on behalf of each agency
for contractor and assistance personnel with deployments during our
period of review and compared them to other sources such as the
personnel and contract data we received for our other objectives.
Because the data from other sources had limitations, we did not have a
means to determine the full extent to which SPOT was incomplete or
inaccurate for our review period. However, based on the data we
obtained from other sources and our review of the internal controls,
we determined that there were significant discrepancies associated
with the SPOT data that undermined their reliability.
Contractor And Assistance Personnel:
To address our second objective, we requested that the three agencies
provide us with contractor and assistance personnel data covering
fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal year 2010. DOD, State,
and USAID provided the number of U.S., third country, and local
nationals working under contracts and assistance instruments with
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan in fiscal year 2009 and the first
half of fiscal year 2010. The data provided were generally obtained by
the agencies through surveys and periodic reports submitted by
contractors and assistance recipients. These data included individuals
reported to be performing security functions.
To assess the completeness of the reported personnel data, we compared
the data to the list of contracts and assistance instruments we
compiled to address our objective on the number and value of contracts
and assistance instruments. Furthermore, we interviewed agency
officials regarding their methods for collecting data on the number of
contractor and assistance personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on
our analyses and discussions with agency officials, we determined that
caution should be exercised when using the agency-provided data on
contractor and assistance personnel to draw conclusions about either
the actual number in Iraq or Afghanistan for any given time period or
trends over time. However, we are presenting the reported data along
with their limitations as they establish a rough order of magnitude
for the number of contractor and assistance personnel during our
period of review.
Killed or Wounded Contractor and Assistance Personnel:
To address our third objective, we analyzed USAID and State data on
the number of contract and assistance personnel killed or wounded in
Iraq and Afghanistan during the period of our review. Due to the lack
of other available and reliable data sources, we could not
independently verify whether USAID's and State's data were accurate.
Nevertheless, we are providing them as they provide insight into the
number of contractor and assistance personnel who were killed or
wounded during our period of review. DOD did not collect and could not
provide such data. After informing us that they did not have a
reliable system for tracking killed or wounded personnel, DOD
officials referred us to use the Department of Labor's (Labor) Defense
Base Act (DBA) case data.
We analyzed data from Labor on DBA cases arising from incidents that
occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal year 2009 and the first
half of fiscal year 2010. We obtained similar DBA data from Labor for
our previous reports, for which we determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes, when presented with
appropriate caveats. We reported in 2009 that DBA data are not a good
proxy for determining the number of contractor and assistance
instruments personnel who were killed or wounded in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but they do provide insights into the number killed or
wounded, common causes of death, and whether claimants died from
hostile or nonhostile actions.[Footnote 45] We reviewed the entire
population of fatality case data reported by Labor that occurred
during our review period, which totaled 213, to determine information
such as the circumstances of the incident resulting in death and the
nationality of the individual killed.
Contracts and Assistance Instruments:
To address our fourth objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and
USAID on the number of active or awarded contracts, grants, and
cooperative agreements with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal year 2010, the amount of
funds obligated on those contracts and assistance instruments during
our review period, and the extent to which new contracts, grants, and
cooperative agreements were competitively awarded. We also interviewed
agency officials to discuss the reported data. The agencies provided
data from FPDS-NG, agency-specific databases, and manually compiled
lists of obligations and deobligations. We determined that the data
each agency reported were sufficiently reliable to determine the
minimum number of active or awarded contracts and obligation amounts,
as well as the extent of competition, based on prior reliability
assessments, interviews with agency officials, and verification of
some reported data to information in contract files.
We took steps to standardize the agency-reported data. This included
removing duplicates and contracts and assistance instruments that did
not have obligations or deobligations during our review period. DOD
provided us with 36 separate data sets, State provided 11, and USAID
provided 12. The reported data included multiple contract numbering
conventions for each agency. We reformatted each data set and combined
them to create a single, uniform list of contracts, orders, assistance
instruments, and modifications for each agency. We excluded the base
contracts under which orders were issued. This was done, in part,
because such contracts do not have obligations associated with them as
the obligations are incurred with the issuance of each order. We also
excluded other contract vehicles such as leases, sales contracts, and
notices of intent to purchase, as these instruments do not include
performance by contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan. In
addition, we also excluded voluntary contributions, property grants,
and participating agency service agreements from our assistance data,
as these types of instruments do not include performance by assistance
personnel in either country. For all contracts and assistance
instruments within our scope, we summed the reported obligations for
each contract, order, and assistance instrument for fiscal year 2009
and the first half of fiscal year 2010. Some contracts and assistance
instruments had obligations in both fiscal year 2009 and the first
half of fiscal year 2010, so the number of active contracts, grants,
and cooperative agreements for the entire 18-month period was lower
than the combined number of contracts, grants, and cooperative
agreements that were active in each fiscal year.
We reviewed 52 State and 36 USAID assistance files as part of our data
reliability assessment of agency-specific databases. From State's
Grant Database and Management System, we randomly selected 68
assistance files that were active during fiscal year 2009 and reviewed
52 of these files to ensure the accuracy of basic information--such as
the assistance agreement number, the amount obligated, and date of
action, among others--that the agency provided in response to our
requests for information. From USAID's Electronic Procurement and
Information Collection System, we randomly selected 39 assistance
files that were active during fiscal year 2009 and reviewed 36 of
these files in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Although we found a small
number of errors when comparing the data contained in State and
USAID's databases to the assistance agreement documents, we determined
that the errors were inconsequential and that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 through
September 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID Contractor and Assistance Personnel
in Iraq and Afghanistan:
DOD Contractor Personnel:
Table 8 shows the total number of Department of Defense (DOD)
contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan, as reported by the U.S.
Central Command's (CENTCOM) census, for each quarter in fiscal year
2009 and the first half of fiscal year 2010. The data depict an
overall decrease in personnel in Iraq and an overall increase in
personnel in Afghanistan during our review period. DOD did not report
having any personnel working under assistance instruments in either
country during our review period.
Table 8: DOD Quarterly Census Data on the Number of Contractor
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half
of Fiscal Year 2010:
Contractor personnel: Iraq;
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 148,050;
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 132,610;
Fiscal year 2009: Third quarter: 119,706;
Fiscal year 2009: Forth quarter: 113,731;
Fiscal year 2010: First quarter: 100,035;
Fiscal year 2010: Second quarter: 95,461.
Contractor personnel: Afghanistan;
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 71,755;
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 68,197;
Fiscal year 2009: Third quarter: 73,968;
Fiscal year 2009: Forth quarter: 104,101;
Fiscal year 2010: First quarter: 107,292;
Fiscal year 2010: Second quarter: 112,092.
Contractor personnel: Total;
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 219,805;
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 200,807;
Fiscal year 2009: Third quarter: 193,674;
Fiscal year 2009: Forth quarter: 217,832;
Fiscal year 2010: First quarter: 207,327;
Fiscal year 2010: Second quarter: 207,553.
Source: DOD CENTCOM census data.
[End of table]
Table 9 provides a breakdown of the total number of DOD contractor
personnel by nationality working in the two countries at the end of
fiscal year 2009 and the end of the second quarter of fiscal year
2010. The number of Afghan personnel working on DOD contracts was
significantly larger than the number of U.S. or third country national
personnel working on DOD contracts in Afghanistan, while in Iraq a
smaller percentage of DOD's contractor workforce consisted of Iraqi
nationals.
Table 9: Nationalities of DOD Contractor Personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Nationality: U.S.
End of fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 29,944;
End of fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 9,322;
End of second quarter fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 24,719;
End of second quarter fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 16,081.
Nationality: Local national;
End of fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 30,007;
End of fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 78,430;
End of second quarter fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 17,193;
End of second quarter fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 78,499.
Nationality: Third country national;
End of fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 53,780;
End of fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 16,349;
End of second quarter fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 53,549;
End of second quarter fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 17,512.
Nationality: Total;
End of fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 113,731;
End of fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 104,101;
End of second quarter fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 95,461;
End of second quarter fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 112,092.
Source: DOD CENTCOM census data.
[End of table]
State Contractor and Assistance Personnel:
Table 10 shows the number of Department of State (State) contractor
and assistance instrument personnel, by nationality, as reported to us
based on State surveys of contractors and assistance instrument
recipients.
Table 10: Nationalities of State Contractor and Assistance Personnel
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2010:
Nationality: U.S.
Fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 2,943;
Fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 1,399;
First half fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 3,082;
First half fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 1,240.
Nationality: Local national;
Fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 4,262;
Fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 5,946;
First half fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 3,139;
First half fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 7,055.
Nationality: Third country national;
Fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 3,400;
Fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 1,490;
First half fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 3,345;
First half fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 1,389.
Nationality: Unknown;
Fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 1;
Fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 11;
First half fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 25;
First half fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 35.
Nationality: Total;
Fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 10,606;
Fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 8,846;
First half fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 9,591;
First half fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 9,719.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: In addition to the number of personnel presented in the table,
there were 43 personnel working in both Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal
year 2009 and 44 personnel working in both countries as of the second
quarter of 2010 for which nationality is unknown. These personnel are
not included in the table.
[End of table]
USAID Contractor and Assistance Personnel:
Table 11 shows the number of U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) contractor and assistance instrument personnel, by
nationality, as reported to us based on USAID surveys and reports from
its contractors and assistance instrument recipients. During our
review period, the number of local national personnel in both Iraq and
Afghanistan working under USAID contracts or assistance instruments
was significantly larger than the number of U.S. or third country
national personnel.
Table 11: Nationalities of USAID Contractor and Assistance Personnel
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2010:
Nationality: U.S.
Fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 204;
Fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 434;
First half fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 180;
First half fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 625.
Nationality: Local national;
Fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 1,636;
Fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 32,238;
First half fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 1,887;
First half fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 30,734.
Nationality: Third country national;
Fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 177;
Fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 1,565;
First half fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 193;
First half fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 1,000.
Nationality: Unknown;
Fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 1,330;
Fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 0;
First half fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 1,149;
First half fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 0.
Nationality: Total;
Fiscal year 2009: Iraq: 3,347;
Fiscal year 2009: Afghanistan: 34,237;
First half fiscal year 2010: Iraq: 3,409;
First half fiscal year 2010: Afghanistan: 32,359.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Contractors Killed in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Figure 6 provides information on the number Defense Base Act (DBA)
cases by nationality for contractors killed in Iraq or Afghanistan
during fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal year 2010. In
Iraq, the total number of fatality cases resulting from incidents
during our review period was 80. By comparison, the total number of
fatality cases during the same period in Afghanistan was 133. In Iraq,
death cases were fairly evenly distributed among U.S., local, and
third country nationals, but in Afghanistan the majority of death
cases involved local nationals.
Figure 6: Total Number of DBA Fatality Cases Classified by Nationality
of Contractor Killed in Iraq and Afghanistan during Fiscal Year 2009
and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Iraq: US;
Contractors killed in fiscal year 2009: 22;
Contractors killed in first half of fiscal year 2010: 3.
Iraq: Local National:
Contractors killed in fiscal year 2009: 20;
Contractors killed in first half of fiscal year 2010: 2.
Iraq: Third Country National;
Contractors killed in fiscal year 2009: 23;
Contractors killed in first half of fiscal year 2010: 8.
Iraq: Unknown;
Contractors killed in fiscal year 2009: 1;
Contractors killed in first half of fiscal year 2010: 1.
Afghanistan: US;
Contractors killed in fiscal year 2009: 15;
Contractors killed in first half of fiscal year 2010: 3.
Afghanistan: Local National:
Contractors killed in fiscal year 2009: 63;
Contractors killed in first half of fiscal year 2010: 26.
Afghanistan: Third Country National;
Contractors killed in fiscal year 2009: 19;
Contractors killed in first half of fiscal year 2010: 5.
Afghanistan: Unknown;
Contractors killed in fiscal year 2009: 0;
Contractors killed in first half of fiscal year 2010: 2.
Source: GAO analysis of Labor DBA data.
[End of figure]
Table 12 shows, by occupation, the number of DBA fatality cases for
incidents that occurred during our review period. The security
contractor occupation category had the highest number of fatalities
with 68 cases for fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal year
2010.
Table 12: Number of DBA Cases Classified by Occupation of Contractor
Killed in Iraq and Afghanistan during Fiscal Year 2009 and the First
Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Occupation: Security Contractor;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 15;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 5;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 31;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 17.
Occupation: Translator/Interpreter;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 12;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 0;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 13;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 5.
Occupation: Construction/Laborer;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 5;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 1;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 22;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 4.
Occupation: Facility Support/Maintenance;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 8;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 2;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 7;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 1.
Occupation: Transportation/Driver;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 9;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 3;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 7;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 5.
Occupation: Administrative/Office Staff;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 4;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 1;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 4;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 1.
Occupation: Other/Unknown;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 13;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 2;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 13;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 3.
Occupation: Total;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2009: 66;
Iraq: First half fiscal year 2010: 14;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2009: 97;
Afghanistan: First half fiscal year 2010: 36.
Source: GAO analysis of Labor DBA data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Assistance
Instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan:
DOD Contracts:
Table 13 shows all Department of Defense (DOD) contracts, along with
the associated obligations, reported to us as active in Iraq,
Afghanistan, or both during fiscal year 2009 and the first half of
fiscal year 2010. For last year's review, DOD reported obligating
$26,981.6 million on 46,645 contracts for fiscal year 2008. DOD did
not report any obligations for assistance instruments with performance
in either country during fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal
year 2010.
Table 13: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 39,479;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $8,820.7;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active contracts: 22,972;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $4,489.1;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
contracts[A]: 60,723;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$13,309.8.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 47,474;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $13,197.3;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active contracts: 21,655;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $4,464.1;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
contracts[A]: 67,611;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$17,661.5.
Other[B]:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 1800;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $482.5;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active contracts: 1,430;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $140.9;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
contracts[A]: 3,210;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$623.5.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 88,753[C];
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $22,500.6;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active contracts: 46,057;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $9,094.1;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
contracts[A]: 131,544;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$31,594.8.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2009 and the first
half of fiscal year 2010. As a result, the total number of active
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the
number that were active each year added together. Obligation amounts
are unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire
period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
[B] "Other" represents contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan or contracts that DOD reported as having performance in
Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country.
[C] One DOD component changed the way it reported its contracts in
fiscal year 2009. Orders that had been previously combined were
reported separately. A DOD official said that what appeared to be an
increase in the number of contracts from fiscal year 2008 and fiscal
year 2009 was due to the reporting change rather than an actual
increase in the number of orders.
[End of table]
Table 14 provides information on the number of contracts awarded by
DOD and associated obligations made during our review period. The
majority of DOD's active contracts were awarded during our review
period, while 92 percent of the DOD's obligations were made on the new
contract awards.
Table 14: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 38,612;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $9,498.8;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 21,169;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $3,176.6.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 46,577;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $13,126.3;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 20,015;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $2,798.8.
Other[B]:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 1,720;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $331.2;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 1,412;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $203.4.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 86,909;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $22,956.3;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 42,596;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $6,178.8.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred, so some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2009 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2010.
[B] "Other" represents contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan or contracts that DOD reported as having performance in
Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country.
[End of table]
Table 15 shows competition information for the DOD contracts
(excluding task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our
review period. DOD reported that 29,440 (93 percent) contracts were
competed, including 26,544 contracts that were awarded using full and
open competition. For 1,528 contracts, DOD either provided no
competition information or provided insufficient information for us to
determine whether the contract was competed.
Table 56: DOD's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Competed:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 21,364;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $4,488.5;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 8,076;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $1,144.7;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 29,440;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$5,633.2.
Not competed:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 473;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $25.6;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 110;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $37.9;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 583;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$63.5.
Not reported:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 695;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $233.1;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 833;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $165.5;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 1,528;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$398.7.
Total;:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 22,532;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $4,747.3;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 9,019;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $1,348.1;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 31,551;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$6,095.4.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which orders were issued. This was
done, in part, because such contracts do not have obligations
associated with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance
of each order.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred, so some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2009 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2010.
[End of table]
As shown in table 16, most of the DOD contracts reported as awarded
without competition had relatively small obligations during our review
period.
Table 16: DOD's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Contract value by obligated amount: Less than or equal to $25,000;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 493;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $2.7.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $25,000 and less than
or equal to $100,000;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 54;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $3.1.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $100,000 and less
than or equal to $1 million;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 30;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $25.4.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $1 million;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 6;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $32.3.
Contract value by obligated amount: All;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 583;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $63.5.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which orders were issued. This was
done, in part, because such contracts do not have obligations
associated with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance
of each order.
[End of table]
State Contracts and Assistance Instruments:
Table 17 shows all Department of State (State) contracts, along with
the associated obligations, reported to us as active in Iraq,
Afghanistan, or both during fiscal year 2009 and the first half of
fiscal year 2010. For last year's review, State reported obligating
$1,475.7 million on 846 contracts for fiscal year 2008.
Table 17: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 431;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $742.1;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active contracts: 103;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $84.7;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
contracts[A]: 523;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$826.8.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 664;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $1,387.1;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active contracts: 170;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $72.6;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
contracts[A]: 818;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$1,459.7.
Other[B:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 30;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $49.1;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active contracts: 12;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $19.8;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
contracts[A]: 40;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$68.9.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 1,125;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $2,178.2;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active contracts: 285;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $177.1;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
contracts[A]: 1,381;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$2,355.3.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2009 and the first
half of fiscal year 2010. As a result, the total number of active
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the
number that were active each year added together. Obligation amounts
are unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire
period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
[B] "Other" represents contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan or contracts that State reported as having performance in
Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country.
[End of table]
Table 18 provides information on the number of contracts awarded and
associated obligations made during our review period. The majority of
State's active contracts were awarded during our review period but
only 16 percent of State's obligations were made on the new contract
awards.
Table 18: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 405;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $283.5;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 87;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $23.5.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 604;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $42.0;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 141;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $8.7.
Other[B]:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 13;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $14.7;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 7;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $0.4.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 1,022;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $340.2;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 235;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $32.5.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred, so some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2009 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2010.
[B] "Other" represents contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan or contracts that State reported as having performance in
Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country.
[End of table]
Table 19 shows competition information for the State contracts
(excluding task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our
review period. State reported that 76 percent of its contracts were
competed, including 489 (40 percent) that were awarded using full and
open competition. For 72 contracts, State either provided no
competition information or provided insufficient information for us to
determine whether the contract was competed.
Table 19: State's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Competed:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 667;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $286.0;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 168;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $25.7;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 835;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$311.7.
Not competed:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 165;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $21.6;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 32;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $0.9;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 197;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$22.4.
Not reported:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 70;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $6.0;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 2;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $0.5;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 72;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$6.5.
All:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 902;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $313.6;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 202;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $27.0;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 1,104;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$340.6.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which orders were issued. This was
done, in part, because such contracts do not have obligations
associated with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance
of each order.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred, so some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2009 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2010.
[End of table]
As shown in table 20, most of the State contracts reported as awarded
without competition had relatively small obligations during our review
period.
Table 20: State's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Contract value by obligated amount: Less than or equal to $25,000;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 121;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $1.1.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $25,000 and less than
or equal to $100,000;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 45;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $2.7.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $100,000 and less
than or equal to $1 million;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 28;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $5.3.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $1 million;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 3;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $13.2.
Contract value by obligated amount: All;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 197;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $22.4.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which orders were issued. This was
done, in part, because such contracts do not have obligations
associated with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance
of each order.
[End of table]
Table 21 shows all active State assistance instruments along with the
associated obligations reported to us as active in Iraq, Afghanistan,
or both during fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal year 2010.
Table 21: State Active Assistance Instruments and Obligations for Iraq
and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2010:
Dollars in millions.
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 131;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $39.4;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance instruments:
89;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $27.1;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 218;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$66.5.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 303;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $50.3;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance instruments:
63;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $92.8;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 365;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$143.0.
Other[B]:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 6;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $0.4;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance instruments:
3;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $0.1;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 9;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$0.5.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 440;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $90.1;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance instruments:
155;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $120.0;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 592;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$210.1.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] Some assistance instruments were active in both fiscal year 2009
and the first half of fiscal year 2010. As a result, the total number
of active assistance instruments during the 18-month period of our
review is less than the number that were active each year added
together. Obligation amounts are unique to each fiscal year so total
obligations for the entire period are the sum of obligations in each
fiscal year.
[B] "Other" represents assistance instruments with performance in Iraq
and Afghanistan or assistance instruments that State reported as
having performance in Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which
country.
[End of table]
Table 22 provides information on the number of assistance instruments
awarded and associated obligations made during our review period.
Nearly all of State's active assistance instruments were awarded
during our review period.
Table 22: State New Assistance Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded assistance instruments: 131;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $41.2;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded assistance
instruments: 87;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $25.3.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded assistance instruments: 286;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $50.3;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded assistance
instruments: 59;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $92.1.
Other[B]:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded assistance instruments: 6;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $0.4;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded assistance
instruments: 3;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $0.1.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded assistance instruments: 423;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $92.0;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded assistance
instruments: 149;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $117.5.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each assistance instrument
was awarded, not when the obligations occurred, so some obligations
for instruments awarded in fiscal year 2009 occurred in the first half
of fiscal year 2010.
[B] "Other" represents assistance instruments with performance in Iraq
and Afghanistan or assistance instruments that State reported as
having performance in Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which
country.
[End of table]
Table 23 shows State's assistance instruments active in Iraq and
Afghanistan and associated obligations by type--grants, including
those made using Quick Response Funds, and cooperative agreements.
During our review period, grants accounted for 97 percent of State's
active assistance instruments and 84 percent of assistance obligations.
Table 23: State Active Assistance Instruments and Obligations for Iraq
and Afghanistan, by Type, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Grants:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 189;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $55.5;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance instruments:
103;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $113.7;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 289;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$169.3.
Quick Response Funds grants:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 234;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $13.7;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance instruments:
50;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $1.7;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 284;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$15.3.
Cooperative agreements:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 17;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $20.9;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance instruments:
2;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $4.6;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 19;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$25.5.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 440;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $90.1;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance instruments:
155;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $120.0;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 592;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$210.1.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] Some assistance instruments were active in both fiscal year 2009
and the first half of fiscal year 2010. As a result, the total number
of active assistance instruments during the 18-month period of our
review is less than the number that were active each year added
together. Obligation amounts are unique to each fiscal year so total
obligations for the entire period are the sum of obligations in each
fiscal year.
[End of table]
USAID Contracts and Assistance Instruments:
Table 24 shows all U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
contracts, along with the associated obligations, reported to us as
active in Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year 2009 and the first
half of fiscal year 2010. For last year's review, USAID reported
obligating $1,656.7 million on 277 contracts for fiscal year 2008.
Table 24: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 160;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $836.7;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active contracts: 106;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $665.2;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of active
contracts: 229;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation
amount: $1,501.8.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 111;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $259.5;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active contracts: 25;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $4.3;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of active
contracts: 128;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation
amount: $263.8.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 271;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $1,096.2;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active contracts: 131;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $669.4;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of active
contracts: 357;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation
amount: $1,765.6.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2009 and the first
half of fiscal year 2010. As a result, the total number of active
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the
number that were active each year added together. Obligation amounts
are unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire
period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
[End of table]
Table 25 provides information on the number of contracts awarded and
associated obligations made during our review period. Fifty-two
percent of USAID's active contracts were awarded prior to our review
period and these contracts accounted for nearly 84 percent of USAID's
obligations.
Table 25: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 72;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $147.5;
First half of fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 58;
First half of fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $96.0.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 86;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $28.9;
First half of fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 16;
First half of fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $3.0.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 158;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $176.3;
First half of fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 74;
First half of fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $98.9.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred, so some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2009 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2010.
[End of table]
Table 26 shows competition information for the USAID contracts
(excluding task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our
review period. USAID reported to us that 107 contracts (48 percent)
were competed, including 98 contracts that were awarded using full and
open competition. For 93 contracts, USAID either provided no
competition information or what was provided was not sufficient to
determine whether the contract was competed.
Table 26: USAID's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Competed:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 86;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $52.0;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 21;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $53.3;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 107;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$105.3.
Not competed:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 17;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $22.1;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 4;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $6.3;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 21;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$28.3.
Not reported:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 47;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $9.4;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 46;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $8.0;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 93;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$17.4.
All:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 150;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $83.5;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 71;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $67.5;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 221;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$151.1.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which task and delivery orders were
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with
the issuance of each order.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred, so some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2009 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2010.
[End of table]
As shown in table 27, there were only 21 contracts that USAID reported
as awarded without competition, 4 of which had obligations greater
than $1 million during our review period.
Table 27: USAID's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2010:
Contract value by obligated amount: Less than or equal to $25,000;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 9;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $0.1.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $25,000 and less than
or equal to $100,000;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 3;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $0.1.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $100,000 and less
than or equal to $1 million;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 5;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $1.9.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $1 million;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 4;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $26.1.
Contract value by obligated amount: All;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of awarded
contracts: 21;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount
(in millions): $28.3.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which orders were issued. This was
done, in part, because such contracts do not have obligations
associated with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance
of each order.
[End of table]
Table 28 shows all USAID assistance instruments along with the
associated obligations, reported to us as active in Iraq, Afghanistan,
or both during fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal year
2010. During the first half of fiscal year 2010, USAID deobligated
funds from one cooperative agreement with performance in Iraq, which
resulted in its total assistance obligations showing negative $15.8
million for that time period.
Table 28: USAID Active Assistance Instruments and Obligations for Iraq
and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2010:
Dollars in millions.
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 48;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $882.9;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance instruments:
27;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $634.4;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 53;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$1,517.3.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 19;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $129.0;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance instruments:
5;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: ($15.8)[ B];
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 23;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$113.2.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 67;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $1,011.9;
First half fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance instruments:
32;
First half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $618.6;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 76;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount:
$1,630.5.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] Some assistance instruments were active in both fiscal year 2009
and the first half of fiscal year 2010. As a result, the total number
of active assistance instruments during the 18-month period of our
review is less than the number that were active each year added
together. Obligation amounts are unique to each fiscal year so total
obligations for the entire period are the sum of obligations in each
fiscal year.
[B] In its fiscal year 2010 data submission, USAID reported to us that
one cooperative agreement in Iraq had a deobligation of $27 million.
After taking into consideration all other obligations occurring on
assistance instruments in Iraq for the same period, total obligations
were negative $15.8 million.
[End of table]
Table 29 provides information on the number of assistance instruments
awarded and associated obligations made during our review period. The
majority of USAID's active assistance instruments were awarded before
our review period and 84 percent of USAID's obligations were made on
the existing assistance awards.
Table 29: USAID New Assistance Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2010:
Dollars in millions.
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded assistance instruments: 17;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $223.9;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded assistance
instruments: 2;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $16.7.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded assistance instruments: 5;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $19.3;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded assistance
instruments: 1;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $5.5.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded assistance instruments: 22;
Fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $243.2;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Number of awarded assistance
instruments: 3;
First half fiscal year 2010[A]: Obligation amount: $22.2.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each assistance instrument
was awarded, not when the obligations occurred, so some obligations
for instruments awarded in fiscal year 2009 occurred in the first half
of fiscal year 2010.
[End of table]
Table 30 shows USAID's assistance instruments active in Iraq and
Afghanistan and associated obligations by type--grants and cooperative
agreements. During our review period, cooperative agreements accounted
for 76 percent of USAID's active assistance instruments and 63 percent
of assistance obligations.
Table 30: USAID Active Assistance Instruments and Obligations for Iraq
and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2010:
Dollars in millions.
Grants:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 14;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $318.6;
First half of fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance
instruments: 7;
First half of fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $288.6;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half of fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 18;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half of fiscal year 2010: Obligation
amount: $607.1.
Cooperative agreements:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 53;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $693.3;
First half of fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance
instruments: 25;
First half of fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $330.0;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half of fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 58;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half of fiscal year 2010: Obligation
amount: $1,023.3.
Total:
Fiscal year 2009: Number of active assistance instruments: 67;
Fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $1,011.9;
First half of fiscal year 2010: Number of active assistance
instruments: 32;
First half of fiscal year 2010: Obligation amount: $618.6;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half of fiscal year 2010: Number of active
assistance instruments[A]: 76;
Fiscal year 2009 and first half of fiscal year 2010: Obligation
amount: $1,630.5.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] Some assistance instruments were active in both fiscal year 2009
and the first half of fiscal year 2010. As a result, the total number
of active assistance instruments during the 18-month period of our
review is less than the number that were active each year added
together. Obligation amounts are unique to each fiscal year so total
obligations for the entire period are the sum of obligations in each
fiscal year.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
From The American People:
September 22, 2010:
John Hutton:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. General Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Hutton:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International
Development's (USAID) formal response to the draft GAO report entitled
"Iraq and Afghanistan: DoD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges
in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated
Personnel (GA0-11-1)".
The enclosed USAID comments are provided for incorporation with this
letter as an appendix to the final report.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit
review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Drew W. Luten:
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Management:
Enclosure: a/s:
[End of letter]
USAID Comments on Draft GAO Report Entitled "Iraq and Afghanistan:
DoD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges in Tracking Contracts,
Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel (GA0-11-1)"
We are very appreciative of the fact that this year's draft report
more clearly highlights the practical challenges associated with using
Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT). As a
reporting tool, its utility has not yet been fully demonstrated. In
this context and as the report also highlights, USAID is not the only
SPOT user to question the amount of time and effort required should it
be necessary to enter, individually, all contractor and grantee
personnel by name with associated personal and deployment information.
For this reason we would like to comment on the topic of agreement
among the three Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signatories. We
believe the mutual agreement of the parties is that each party to the
MOU is able to implement SPOT in a manner that most appropriately
suits its own purposes. In doing so, it should still be possible to
fulfill requisite National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) reporting
requirements ” subject to completion of the SPOT related, on-going
work to further develop and implement the promised Total Operational
Picture Support System (TOPPS) program. With the objective of further
developing SPOT's aggregate reporting functionality, USAID is pleased
to be cooperating on this effort.
We believe it is correct to say that with the awareness of DOD and
State, USAID has defined the extent of SPOT application in Iraq and
Afghanistan as follows:
* Partner personnel with military interface or roles that require SPOT
Letters of Authorization (LOAs) will be entered, by name, into SPOT.
* Private armed security guard personnel contracted for by both
contractors and grantees will be, to the extent possible, entered by
name into SPOT. (Please allow us to observe on this point that
contemporary uncertainties in Afghanistan might impact our
implementation of SPOT for this specific purpose.)
* All other contractor and grantee staff will be accounted for in SPOT
reporting using the aggregate number methodology, the utility of which
is recognized by all of the MOU signatories.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John P. Hutton (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, Johana R. Ayers, Assistant Director;
Noah B. Bleicher; John C. Bumgarner; Burns D. Chamberlain; Morgan
Delaney-Ramaker; Timothy J. DiNapoli; Justin Fisher; Cynthia Grant;
David Greyer; Justin M. Jaynes; Christopher Kunitz; Jean McSween;
Heather B. Miller; Jamilah Moon; Roxanna T. Sun; and Jeff Tessin made
key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Face Challenges in
Tracking Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Agreements, and Associated
Personnel, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-509T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2010).
[2] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 861, as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-417, §
854 (2008).
[3] Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 813 (2009).
[4] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 863.
[5] GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to
Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq
and Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2009). GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD,
State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2008).
[6] The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 854(d) amended section 864 of the
NDAA for FY2008 to add a definition of "contractor personnel" as "any
person performing work under contract for the Department of Defense,
the Department of State, or the United States Agency for International
Development, in Iraq or Afghanistan, including individuals and
subcontractors at any tier." Section 813 of the NDAA for FY2010
expanded the NDAA for FY2008 definition of "contract" to include
grants and cooperative agreements and, therefore, personnel working
under grants or cooperative agreements in Iraq and Afghanistan are
included in our scope. Section 864 of the NDAA for FY2008 defines
private security functions as the "guarding of personnel, facilities
or property of a Federal agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a
third party" and "any other activity for which personnel are required
to carry weapons in the performance of their duties."
[7] Section 864(a)(2) of the NDAA for FY2008, as amended by section
813(a) of the NDAA for FY2010, defines a "contract in Iraq or
Afghanistan" as "a contract with the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, or the United States Agency for International
Development, a subcontract at any tier issued under such a contract, a
task order or delivery order at any tier issued under such a contract,
a grant, or a cooperative agreement (including a contract,
subcontract, task order, delivery order, grant, or cooperative
agreement issued by another Government agency for the Department of
Defense, the Department of State, or the United States Agency for
International Development) if the contract, subcontract, task order,
delivery order, grant, or cooperative agreement involves worked [sic]
performed in Iraq or Afghanistan for a period longer than 30 days."
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a "subcontract" as a
contract entered into by a subcontractor to furnish supplies or
services for performance of a prime contract or other subcontracts.
The FAR defines a "task order" as an order for services placed against
an established contract or government sources. For purposes of this
report, when we use the term contract, we intend it to refer to a
contract, task order, or delivery order with performance in Iraq or
Afghanistan, while the term assistance instrument refers to a grant or
cooperative agreement with performance in Iraq or Afghanistan, within
the parameters established by the NDAA for FY2008 and the NDAA for
FY2010.
[8] Since the NDAA for FY2008 and subsequent amendments did not define
what constitutes an "active" contract, grant, or cooperative
agreement, we considered a contract or assistance instrument active if
funds were obligated or deobligated on that contract or assistance
instrument in fiscal year 2009 and/or the first half of fiscal year
2010. There were other contracts and assistance instruments that had
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan during that time period but had no
obligations or deobligations; such contracts and assistance
instruments were not included in our analyses. Contracts and
assistance instruments awarded in fiscal year 2009 and the first half
of fiscal year 2010 are a subset of the active contracts. Throughout
the report, the term "award" refers to the issuance of a task or
delivery order, the award of a new contract, or the award of a new
assistance instrument.
[9] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 854.
[10] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 813.
[11] This guidance was implemented in Department of Defense FAR
Supplement section 252.225-7040(g), which specified that contractors
are to enter information into SPOT for all personnel authorized to
accompany the U.S. Armed Forces. However, Class Deviation 2007-O0010
excluded contracts with performance in the U.S. Central Command's area
of responsibility, which includes Iraq and Afghanistan, that did not
exceed $25,000 and had less than 30 days of performance.
[12] Office of the Procurement Executive, Procurement Information
Bulletin No. 2008-15, Use of Synchronized Predeployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT) for Contractors Supporting and Diplomatic
or Consular Mission Outside the United States (Mar. 25, 2008).
[13] State Grants Policy Directive Number 33, Recipient Performance in
a Designated Area of Combat Operations (Jan. 6, 2009, as amended on
Aug. 13, 2009).
[14] USAID Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive 09-01 (AAPD 09-
01), Contract Clause and Assistance Provision for Awards in Iraq (Apr.
1, 2009).
[15] USAID Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive 10-04 (AAPD 10-
04), Contract Clause and Assistance Provision for Awards in
Afghanistan (July 20, 2010).
[16] USAID AAPD 09-01.
[17] USAID AAPD 10-04.
[18] Grants Policy Directive Number 33.
[19] State Department Procurement Information Bulletin No. 2008-15.
[20] A letter of authorization is a document issued by a government
contracting officer or designee that authorizes contractor personnel
to travel to, from, and within a designated area and to identify any
additional authorizations, privileges, or government support the
contractor is entitled to under the contract.
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1].
[22] The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is a
standardized system used by federal statistical agencies in
classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting,
analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S.
business economy. The three NAICS codes the SPOT program office used
to determine security contractors are: 561612 - Security Guards and
Patrol Services; 561621 - Security Systems Services (except
Locksmiths); and 922120 - Police Protection.
[23] The following job titles have been identified by the SPOT program
office to determine the number of security contractors under this
method: Security Advisor; Private Security Contractor; Security
Specialist; Site Security Advisor; and Security Supervisor.
[24] Section 862 of the NDAA for FY2008, as amended, required the
agencies to develop a process for registering, authorizing, and
accounting for contractors performing security functions.
[25] Compiled by U.S. Forces - Afghanistan, Armed Contractor Oversight
Directorate, April 2010. The Armed Contractor Oversight Directorate is
a staff organization under U.S. Forces - Afghanistan that is
responsible for tracking and managing DOD armed contractors, including
the management and reporting of serious incidents such as weapons
discharge and fatalities resulting from attacks.
[26] Congress enacted the Defense Base Act (DBA) in 1941. The
insurance required under the DBA provides employees with uniform
levels of disability and medical benefits or, in the event of death,
provides benefits to eligible dependents. Contractors, including
subcontractors, are required to provide DBA insurance coverage for all
of their employees, regardless of their nationality, working outside
the United States on U.S. military bases or under a contract with the
U.S. government for public works or national defense.
[27] The 4,370 contracts we identified in SPOT with performance
beginning during our review period consist of those contracts having a
unique alphanumeric contract number and do not include task or
delivery orders awarded in the same period. It is not possible to
obtain an accurate count of the number of newly awarded task and
delivery orders as contractors and assistance recipients are
instructed by the agencies to enter information on their
subcontractors into the task order data column because SPOT does not
have a specific data field to enter subcontractor information.
[28] Hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations, Interagency Coordination of Grants
and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: Progress, Obstacles, and Plans
(Mar. 23, 2010).
[29] CENTCOM is one of DOD's unified combatant commands. It is
responsible for overseeing U.S. security interests in 20 countries,
including Iraq and Afghanistan.
[30] During part of our review period, USAID's Iraq and Afghanistan
missions relied solely on periodic surveys of contract and assistance
recipients for personnel data. However, in March 2009, the Iraq
mission began requiring quarterly personnel data submissions from its
contractors and assistance recipients. In October 2009, a similar
effort was instituted in Afghanistan.
[31] USAID also reported that an additional 19 personnel working on
contracts or assistance instruments were kidnapped in Iraq and
Afghanistan during fiscal year 2009.
[32] USAID, Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Oversight of Private Security
Contractors in Afghanistan, Audit Report Number 5-306-10-009-P (May
21, 2010).
[33] Labor's Web site provides data on DBA cases by the date that each
case was created, which is not always the date that the incident
occurred. In contrast, for our reporting purposes Labor provided us
with data from October 1, 2009, until March 31, 2010, based on when
the incident resulting in the case occurred.
[34] Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, 31 U.S.C. §§
6301 et seq. sets forth criteria agencies are to use in determining
whether a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement is the appropriate
instrument.
[35] See 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (applicable to DOD) and 41 U.S.C. § 253
(applicable to other executive agencies discussed in this report).
Section 403(6) of title 41, U.S. Code, defines "full and open
competition" as when all responsible sources are permitted to submit
sealed bids or competitive proposals on a procurement. The competition
requirements are implemented in FAR Part 6 and corresponding agency
acquisition regulation supplements.
[36] The law authorizes agencies to use other than full and open
competition in certain situations. There may be circumstances in which
full and open competition would be impracticable, such as when
contracts need to be awarded quickly to respond to urgent and
compelling needs or when there is only one source for the required
product or service.
[37] We obtained obligation data for each contract with performance in
Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal year 2009 and the first half of fiscal
year 2010. Obligations, however, may not be equivalent to the full
contract value as contracts may be incrementally funded over a period
of multiple years.
[38] FAR § 6.001(f)
[39] Grants are generally used when the principal purpose of the
relationship is the transfer of money, property, services, or anything
of value to the recipient in order to accomplish a public purpose of
support or stimulation authorized by federal statute, where the
recipient is to have substantial freedom to pursue its stated program.
Although similar, a cooperative agreement requires increased
coordination and substantial involvement is anticipated between the
agency and the recipient during the performance of the proposed
activity.
[40] Established in September 2007, State's Quick Response Funds
program in Iraq provides assistance and funding for local activities
to fulfill needs not currently being met through existing economic and
governance programs. During the period of our review, the Quick
Response Funds program in Afghanistan did not make any awards as it
was not established until the third quarter of fiscal year 2010.
[41] GAO, Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management
of Contractors Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in Iraq
and Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-357]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2010).
[42] State's Grants Policy Directive Number 5, Competition
Requirements; USAID's ADS Chapter 303, Grants and Cooperative
Agreements to Non-Governmental Organizations, Section 303.3.6.1. In
some instances the agencies establish exceptions to competition. For
example, USAID has a policy authorizing less than fully competitive
procedures for the award of assistance instruments in Afghanistan to
facilitate and expedite implementation of programs and activities.
[43] Because we followed a probability procedure based on random
selections, each sample is only one of a large number of samples that
we might have drawn. As each sample could have provided different
estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our
particular sample's results as a 95 percent confidence interval (e.g.,
plus or minus 5 percentage points). This is the interval that would
contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we
could have drawn. The confidence interval is plus or minus 6 percent
for the sample of State assistance instruments and plus or minus 10
percent for the sample of USAID assistance agreements.
[44] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1], [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19].
[45] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19].
[End of section]
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