DOD Personnel Clearances
Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues Gao ID: GAO-11-185T November 16, 2010In light of longstanding problems with delays and backlogs, Congress mandated personnel security clearance reforms through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which requires, among other things, that executive agencies meet objectives for the timeliness of the investigative and adjudicative phases of the security clearance process. Since 2005, the Department of Defense's (DOD) clearance program has been on GAO's high-risk list due to timeliness delays and GAO continued that designation in 2007 and 2009 also due to concerns about quality. Based on prior and ongoing work, this statement addresses DOD's progress in (1) reducing the timeliness of initial personnel security clearances at DOD and (2) building quality into the processes used to investigate and adjudicate security clearances. GAO reviewed Performance Accountability Council timeliness data and has begun a preliminary analysis of available DOD data, examined key clearance reform documents, and conducted interviews with DOD and the Performance Accountability Council officials about timeliness and efforts to improve the quality of investigations and adjudications. GAO plans to continue examining the timeliness and quality of personnel security clearances in DOD. This work will help inform the Comptroller General's high risk update decision in January 2011.
DOD, which comprises the vast majority of clearances, has made significant progress in reducing delays in making personnel security clearance decisions and meeting statutory timeliness objectives since GAO first designated DOD's personnel security clearance program as a high risk area in 2005. In 2007, GAO found that initial clearances for DOD industry personnel took an average of 325 days to complete. With the passage of IRTPA in 2004, timeliness requirements were established in law and executive branch agencies were required to make decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances within an average of 120 days. In 2008, GAO found that DOD had made significant improvements in reducing delays, with the fastest 80 percent of clearances taking an average of 87 days to complete. As of December 2009, IRTPA's timeliness objective is for each federal agency to process the fastest 90 percent of initial security clearances within an average of 60 days, including a period of not longer than 40 days to complete the investigative phase and 20 days to complete the adjudicative phase. DOD met the 60 day IRTPA timeliness objective for initial personnel security clearances, as well as the 20 day objective for the timeliness of adjudications, for each of the first, second, and third quarters of fiscal year 2010, according to data provided by the Performance Accountability Council. GAO's ongoing work continues to examine the timeliness of personnel security clearances in DOD. DOD has taken a number of positive steps to integrate quality into its investigative and adjudicative processes, including issuing guidance and developing tools to measure quality. For example, in November 2009, the Under Secretary for Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) issued guidance to outline the requirements that adjudicators must adhere to when documenting personnel security clearance adjudication rationales. Similarly, in March 2010, the USD(I) issued guidance to clarify when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances. In addition, DOD created two electronic quality assessment tools--the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations (RAISE) and the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR)--to track the quality of investigative and adjudicative documentation. These tools are embedded in DOD's Clearance Adjudication Tracking System (CATS), a system used by all non-intelligence DOD Central Adjudication Facilities. Although these are positive developments that can contribute to greater visibility over the clearance process, these tools have not been fully implemented. GAO's ongoing work continues to examine the implementation of these tools and other efforts to ensure that momentum is sustained.
GAO-11-185T, DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:30 a.m. EST:
Tuesday, November 16, 2010:
DOD Personnel Clearances:
Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress on Addressing Timeliness
and Quality Issues:
Statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-11-185T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-185T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In light of longstanding problems with delays and backlogs, Congress
mandated personnel security clearance reforms through the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which requires,
among other things, that executive agencies meet objectives for the
timeliness of the investigative and adjudicative phases of the
security clearance process. Since 2005, the Department of Defense‘s
(DOD) clearance program has been on GAO‘s high-risk list due to
timeliness delays and GAO continued that designation in 2007 and 2009
also due to concerns about quality.
Based on prior and ongoing work, this statement addresses DOD‘s
progress in (1) reducing the timeliness of initial personnel security
clearances at DOD and (2) building quality into the processes used to
investigate and adjudicate security clearances. GAO reviewed
Performance Accountability Council timeliness data and has begun a
preliminary analysis of available DOD data, examined key clearance
reform documents, and conducted interviews with DOD and the
Performance Accountability Council officials about timeliness and
efforts to improve the quality of investigations and adjudications.
GAO plans to continue examining the timeliness and quality of
personnel security clearances in DOD. This work will help inform the
Comptroller General‘s high risk update decision in January 2011.
What GAO Found:
DOD, which comprises the vast majority of clearances, has made
significant progress in reducing delays in making personnel security
clearance decisions and meeting statutory timeliness objectives since
GAO first designated DOD‘s personnel security clearance program as a
high risk area in 2005. In 2007, GAO found that initial clearances for
DOD industry personnel took an average of 325 days to complete. With
the passage of IRTPA in 2004, timeliness requirements were established
in law and executive branch agencies were required to make decisions
on at least 80 percent of initial clearances within an average of 120
days. In 2008, GAO found that DOD had made significant improvements in
reducing delays, with the fastest 80 percent of clearances taking an
average of 87 days to complete. As of December 2009, IRTPA‘s
timeliness objective is for each federal agency to process the fastest
90 percent of initial security clearances within an average of 60
days, including a period of not longer than 40 days to complete the
investigative phase and 20 days to complete the adjudicative phase.
DOD met the 60 day IRTPA timeliness objective for initial personnel
security clearances, as well as the 20 day objective for the
timeliness of adjudications, for each of the first, second, and third
quarters of fiscal year 2010, according to data provided by the
Performance Accountability Council. GAO‘s ongoing work continues to
examine the timeliness of personnel security clearances in DOD.
DOD has taken a number of positive steps to integrate quality into its
investigative and adjudicative processes, including issuing guidance
and developing tools to measure quality. For example, in November
2009, the Under Secretary for Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) issued
guidance to outline the requirements that adjudicators must adhere to
when documenting personnel security clearance adjudication rationales.
Similarly, in March 2010, the USD(I) issued guidance to clarify when
adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for
granting clearances. In addition, DOD created two electronic quality
assessment tools”-the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security
Evaluations (RAISE) and the Review of Adjudication Documentation
Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR)-”to track the quality of investigative
and adjudicative documentation. These tools are embedded in DOD‘s
Clearance Adjudication Tracking System (CATS), a system used by all
non-intelligence DOD Central Adjudication Facilities. Although these
are positive developments that can contribute to greater visibility
over the clearance process, these tools have not been fully
implemented. GAO‘s ongoing work continues to examine the
implementation of these tools and other efforts to ensure that
momentum is sustained.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-185T] or key
components. For more information, contact Brenda S. Farrell, 202-512-
3604, farrellb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Akaka, Ranking Member Voinovich, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss DOD's
efforts to improve timeliness and quality of its security clearance
process. Personnel security clearances allow government and industry
personnel to gain access to classified information that, through
unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave
damage to U.S. national security. The recent unauthorized leak this
past year of about 500,000 pages of classified documents posted to the
internet related to the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is an
example of the inherent risks involved when granting an individual a
security clearance. As you know, there continues to be a high demand
for security clearances. For example, prior to September 11, 2001, we
reported that DOD processed about 200,000 security clearances
annually.[Footnote 1] For fiscal year 2008, we reported that DOD
approved personnel security clearances for approximately 630,000
military, civilian, and industrial personnel.[Footnote 2] Government-
wide, the federal government processed nearly 900,000 clearance cases
annually for the period covering fiscal years 2006 through 2009. DOD
accounts for the vast majority of all initial security clearances
making it a formidable challenge to those responsible for deciding who
should be granted a clearance.
In light of long-standing concerns regarding delays in processing
clearances and other issues, Congress has taken a number of actions to
help ensure the continued focus on improving the personnel security
clearance processes governmentwide. For example, with the passage of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004,
Congress set objectives and established requirements for improving the
clearance processes, including requirements related to timeliness,
reciprocity,[Footnote 3] and an integrated, secure database to house
clearance information.[Footnote 4] Further, IRTPA required annual
reports to Congress about personnel security clearance reform,
including timeliness. In addition, the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 stipulates that by February 1 of each year, the
president will report on, among other things, the number of
contractors and employees of the U.S. government who hold a security
clearance, the amount of time it takes the intelligence community to
make a security clearance determination, and metrics for investigative
and adjudicative quality.[Footnote 5] Through these annual reports and
numerous oversight hearings, Congress has provided valuable oversight
over reform efforts. Specifically, this committee alone has held six
prior hearings on this issue over the past five years.[Footnote 6]
In 2005, we designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel
security clearance program as a high-risk area due to delays in
processing security clearances.[Footnote 7] We maintained the high-
risk designation in 2007 because of continued delays and additional
concerns about incomplete clearance documentation in the investigation
and adjudication phases of the security clearance process.[Footnote 8]
In 2009, despite significant improvement in reducing delays, we
continued to designate this program as a high-risk area due to more
stringent timeliness requirements established by IRTPA that were to
take effect in December 2009, as well as continuing problems with
incomplete clearance documentation.[Footnote 9] More specifically, in
December 2009, IRTPA set new timeliness goals for executive branch
agencies, requiring decisions on at least 90 percent of initial
clearance decisions within an average of 60 days and permits the
executive branch to exclude the slowest 10 percent from the reported
average.[Footnote 10] With regard to incomplete documentation, we
noted that building quality throughout DOD's processes was important.
For example, the lack of quality could increase the risk of
adjudicators missing patterns of behavior in subsequent clearance
renewals, undermine reciprocity, increase the risk of unauthorized
disclosure of classified information, and reduce the assurance that
appropriate safeguards are in place.
Executive agencies have also demonstrated a commitment to personnel
security clearance reform. For example, in 2007, the Director of
National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) established the Joint Reform Team to coordinate
governmentwide efforts to achieve timeliness goals established in
IRTPA and improve the processes related to granting security
clearances. In 2008, the Joint Reform Team--comprised of entities
within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), and USD(I)--developed a plan to transform the clearance process
and in the following year, developed an Enterprise Information
Technology Strategy to support the reformed process. In June 2008, the
president issued Executive Order 13467, establishing a Suitability and
Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council--commonly known
as the Performance Accountability Council--as the head of the
governmentwide governance structure for driving implementation and
overseeing clearance reform efforts and appointing OMB's Deputy
Director for Management as the chair. This governance structure was
put in place, in part, to sustain the momentum of clearance reforms.
(See Figure 1 for key events related to security clearance reform.)
Figure 1: Key Events Related to the Security Clearance Reform Effort:
[Refer to PDF for image: timeline]
December 17, 2004:
Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act passed.
January 2005:
Government Accountability Office places Department of Defense‘s
clearance program on its high-risk list.
June 27, 2005:
Executive Order 13881 designates the Office of Management and Budget
the single entity to ensure centralization, uniformity, and
reciprocity of security clearance policies.
November 2005:
Office of Management and Budget issues a plan for improving the
security clearance process.
June 25, 2007:
The Joint Reform Team is formed to develop a plan for clearance
reform, including research priorities and an information technology
strategy, to achieve IRTPA goals.
April 30, 2008:
The Joint Reform Team issues a report on reforming the security
clearance and suitability process.
June 30, 2008:
Executive Order 13467 establishes the Performance Accountability
Council to drive implementation of the reform effort and designated
the Office of Management and Budget‘s Deputy Director for Management
as Chair.
December 18, 2008:
The Joint Reform Team issues a report outlining reform progress and
further plans.
March 17, 2009:
The Joint Reform Team issues an Enterprise Information Technology
Strategy to support the reformed security and suitability process.
February 16, 2010:
The Performance Accountability Council issues a strategic framework to
articulate the goals of the security and suitability process reform.
May 31, 2010:
The Performance Accountability Council develops quality measures a
that it believes will identify specific quantifiable targets linked to
goals that are intended to be measured objectively and ultimately
gauge progress and assess the quality of the personnel security
clearance process.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] The Quality Measures are proposed measures.
[End of figure]
During the past five years, we have conducted numerous reviews that
have enabled us to gain a historical view of the progress that has
been made in clearance reform efforts. Specifically, since we first
placed DOD's personnel security clearance program on our list of high-
risk government programs and operations, we have testified on
clearance-related issues in 12 prior hearings and issued four reports
[Footnote 11] with 14 recommendations, including recommendations that
DOD has implemented to issue guidance that clarifies when adjudicators
may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting
clearances and recommendations that OMB has implemented to report on
the time required to complete all initial clearance applications--not
just the average of the fastest 90 percent of initial clearances--in
the executive branch's IRTPA-required annual reports. In response, DOD
and the Performance Accountability Council have already taken steps to
implement several of our recommendations aimed at further improving
DOD's security clearance program. Through our ongoing work, we plan to
continue to examine the timeliness and quality of personnel security
clearances in DOD and the extent to which DOD has met our criteria for
removal of an issue from our high-risk list. This work will help
determine whether DOD's personnel security clearance program should
remain on or be removed from our 2011 high-risk list that the
Comptroller General will announce in January 2011. A list of our
related GAO products is provided at the end of this statement.
As requested, my statement today will address DOD's progress in 1)
reducing the timeliness of initial personnel security clearances and
2) building quality into personnel security clearance investigation
and adjudication processes. My statement draws on both our ongoing and
prior work on the personnel security clearance process. To assess the
extent to which DOD has made progress in reducing the timeliness of
initial personnel security clearances, we analyzed IRTPA timeliness
objectives and reviewed quarterly data provided by the Performance
Accountability Council's Subcommittee on Performance Measurements and
Management, chaired by the DNI, which covered the first, second, and
third quarters of fiscal year 2010. We also interviewed knowledgeable
DNI officials about the accuracy and completeness of the data they
provided and determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for
our purposes. At the time of this testimony, we had not completed our
independent assessment of the DOD timeliness for fiscal year 2010
because not all data were available. However, we have begun a
preliminary analysis of first, second, and third quarter data for
fiscal year 2010 provided by the Defense Personnel Security Research
Center. We anticipate completing this analysis after obtaining and
analyzing DOD's fourth quarter fiscal year 2010 data. To assess the
extent to which DOD has made progress in building quality into
personnel security clearance investigation and adjudication processes,
we interviewed DOD officials who are knowledgeable about quality tools
and their implementation plans. We also reviewed DOD guidance that
addresses quality and the implementation of quality tools. Our review
was performed from October 2010 through November 2010 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our objectives.
DOD Has Made Significant Progress in Reducing the Time for Processing
Initial Personnel Security Clearances for DOD Personnel:
DOD has made significant progress in reducing delays in personnel
security clearance decisions and in meeting statutory timeliness
objectives since we first designated DOD's personnel security
clearance program as a high-risk area in 2005. In 2007, we found that
initial clearances for DOD industry personnel took an average of 325
days to complete.[Footnote 12] With the passage of IRTPA in 2004,
timeliness requirements were established in law under which executive
branch agencies were initially required to make decisions on at least
80 percent of initial clearances within an average of 120 days. We
found that by 2008, DOD had made significant improvements in reducing
delays. For example, in examining fiscal year 2008 data, we reported
that the average of the fastest 80 percent of initial DOD clearances,
including military, civilians, and industry personnel, took an average
of 87 days to complete, well below what was required by law[Footnote
13]. However, despite these improvements, we continued to designate
this program as a high-risk area due to more stringent timeliness
objectives that were to take effect in December 2009. IRTPA required
the Performance Accountability Council to develop a plan under which,
to the extent practical, each authorized adjudicative agency would be
required to make a determination on at least 90 percent of all
applications for a personnel security clearance within an average of
60 days from the date of receipt of the completed application by an
authorized investigative agency.[Footnote 14] Although the government
is required to only report on the average of the fastest 90 percent of
cases, we previously identified that the absence of comprehensive
reporting limits full visibility over the timeliness of initial
clearance decisions. Consistent with GAO's recommendation, the
government now reports on the remaining 10 percent.
Our ongoing work has shown that DOD has continued to improve its
timeliness and DOD reports that it is meeting the new statutory
timeliness requirements. According to data provided by the Performance
Accountability Council, DOD initial personnel security clearances met
the 60 day IRTPA overall timeliness objective and the 20 day objective
for the timeliness of adjudications for each of the first, second, and
third quarters of fiscal year 2010, as shown in Table 1.[Footnote 15]
Over this same period, average timeliness for the fastest 90 percent
of DOD industry personnel security clearances ranged from 64 days to
69 days. In addition, DOD reported meeting the IRTPA 40 day timeliness
objective for investigations in the third quarter of fiscal year 2010.
However, timeliness data for investigations is a reflection of OPM as
the investigative service provider for DOD.
Table 1: Fastest 90 Percent of All DOD Initial Security Clearances for
First, Second, and Third Quarters of Fiscal Year 2010:
Department of Defense:
Investigations (40 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 42;
Second quarter: 45;
Third quarter: 39;
Adjudications (20 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 15;
Second quarter: 11;
Third quarter: 9;
Combined (60 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 57;
Second quarter: 56;
Third quarter: 48.
Department of Defense: Army:
Investigations (40 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 42;
Second quarter: 45;
Third quarter: 40;
Adjudications (20 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 10;
Second quarter: 4;
Third quarter: 3;
Combined (60 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 52;
Second quarter: 49;
Third quarter: 43.
Department of Defense: Navy:
Investigations (40 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 43;
Second quarter: 42;
Third quarter: 38;
Adjudications (20 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 12;
Second quarter: 18;
Third quarter: 7;
Combined (60 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 55;
Second quarter: 60;
Third quarter: 45.
Department of Defense: Air Force:
Investigations (40 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 40;
Second quarter: 41;
Third quarter: 39;
Adjudications (20 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 28;
Second quarter: 12;
Third quarter: 9;
Combined (60 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 68;
Second quarter: 53;
Third quarter: 48.
Department of Defense: Industry[A]:
Investigations (40 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 44;
Second quarter: 49;
Third quarter: 41;
Adjudications (20 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 20;
Second quarter: 20;
Third quarter: 26;
Combined (60 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 64;
Second quarter: 69;
Third quarter: 67.
Department of Defense: DOD other[B]:
Investigations (40 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 89;
Second quarter: 51;
Third quarter: 48;
Adjudications (20 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 42;
Second quarter: 29;
Third quarter: 21;
Combined (60 days: average days to complete):
First quarter: 131;
Second quarter: 80;
Third quarter: 69.
Source: Performance Accountability Council data.
[A] DOD's Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office adjudicates
clearances for industrial personnel. When the Defense Industrial
Security Clearance Office identifies issues with these cases that may
potentially affect the adjudicative decision, they submit the cases to
the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals. The time it takes the
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office to arrive at the initial
decision is included in DOD timeliness. However, timeliness
information is not reported for cases sent to the Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals.
[B"] DOD other" includes 1) all secret and confidential clearances and
initial top secret clearances adjudicated by the DOD Central
Adjudication Facilities for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Washington Headquarters Services and 2) the initial Sensitive
Compartmented Information clearance cases adjudicated on their behalf
by elements of the intelligence community, such as the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
[End of table]
Although DOD has made significant progress in reducing delays in
making personnel security clearance decisions, it is important that
DOD sustain this progress. Reducing delays in the security clearance
process will enable DOD to reduce risks to national security, expedite
the start of classified work, hire the best-qualified workers, and
decrease the government's cost of national security-related contracts.
Positive Steps Have Been Taken to Address Quality and Enhance
Visibility Over the Security Clearance Process:
We are also encouraged by a number of recent developments that are
intended to enhance visibility over the quality of the security
clearance process. In our prior work, we have stated that timeliness
alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process and
we emphasized the need for attention to quality. However, we found an
uneven attention to quality within DOD's process; specifically, we
found missing documentation in reports prepared by OPM that DOD
adjudicators had used to make clearance decisions. In May 2009, for
example, we estimated that 87 percent of OPM investigative reports
provided to DOD at three Central Adjudication Facilities in July 2008
were missing required documentation.[Footnote 16] Because neither OPM
nor DOD measured the completeness of their investigative reports or
adjudicative files, we reported that both agencies were limited in
their ability to explain the extent to which, or the reasons why, some
documents were incomplete. Incomplete documentation may increase the
time needed to complete the clearance process, increase the overall
costs of the process, and reduce the assurance that appropriate
safeguards are in place to prevent DOD from granting clearances to
untrustworthy individuals. We emphasized that building quality
throughout DOD's process could promote positive outcomes, such as
facilitating reciprocity with other agencies.
DOD has taken a number of positive steps to integrate quality into its
investigative and adjudicative processes and demonstrated the
commitment of senior leadership to reforming the personnel security
process within DOD. For example, according to DOD officials, DOD
recently initiated the creation of a Performance Accountability
Directorate within USD(I)'s Directorate of Security to provide
oversight and accountability for the DOD Central Adjudication
Facilities that process DOD adjudicative decisions. Most importantly,
DOD has also issued guidance and developed tools to measure quality.
For example:
Guidance. DOD has taken steps to issue guidance on adjudication
standards. On November 8, 2009, the USD(I) issued guidance on
adjudication standards that outline the minimum documentation
requirements adjudicators must adhere to when documenting personnel
security clearance adjudication rationales in the Joint Adjudication
Management System.[Footnote 17] These standards are for cases with
significant derogatory information and for Single Scope Background
Investigations[Footnote 18] that are missing standard investigative
scope items but were still adjudicated. In response to our
recommendation, the USD(I) issued additional guidance on March 10,
2010 that clarifies when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative
reports as the basis for granting clearances. This guidance provides
standards that can be used for the sufficient explanation of missing
or incomplete scope items.
Tools. DOD has taken steps to measure the frequency with which
documentation for investigations and adjudications meets federal
standards. DOD developed two tracking tools--the Rapid Assessment of
Incomplete Security Evaluations (RAISE) and the Review of Adjudication
Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR)--to assess the quality
of investigative and adjudication documentation. These tracking tools
are embedded capabilities in DOD's Clearance Adjudication Tracking
System (CATS), which is used by all non-intelligence DOD Central
Adjudication Facilities. Although these are positive steps, it is too
early to assess the effectiveness of these tools as they have not yet
been fully deployed.
* The RAISE tracking tool will document the instances of missing case
information or unresolved case issues for records of investigation
provided by OPM.[Footnote 19] In July 2010, DOD issued guidance
requiring that each DOD Central Adjudication Facility that utilizes
the Clearance Adjudication Tracking System use the RAISE tracking tool
on all incomplete national security investigations and on random
samples of other clearance cases accounting for 7 percent of their
respective Single Scope Background Investigations and 14 percent of
both their Periodic Reinvestigations and National Agency Check with
Local Agency Check and Credit Check investigations. The results are to
be reported to the DNI who, as Security Executive Agent of the
Performance Accountability Council, will arbitrate disagreements
between OPM and DOD and clarify policy questions. DOD deployed the
RAISE tracking tool to four Central Adjudication Facilities between
July and October 2010 and plans to complete deployment to the
remaining Central Adjudication Facilities by the beginning of calendar
year 2011.
* The RADAR tracking tool will enable DOD to independently evaluate
the quality of adjudicative decisions against the adjudicative
standards. The USD(I) has directed DOD Central Adjudication Facilities
to provide adjudication case records to the Defense Personnel Research
Center for analysis. The USD(I) plans to use results of the RADAR
tracking tool assessments to monitor Central Adjudication Facilities'
compliance with documentation policies, communicate performance to the
Central Adjudication Facilities, identify potential weaknesses and
training needs, increase compliance, and establish trend data. DOD has
completed a pilot program for the use of the RADAR tracking tool and
has begun its implementation for the Army, Defense Industrial Security
Clearance Office, and Navy Central Adjudication Facilities in
September 2010. Further, implementation is scheduled for the Air Force
and Washington Headquarters Services by November 2010.
Beyond these steps, DOD has participated in the development and
tracking of quality metrics through the Performance Accountability
Council. On March 17, 2010, the leaders of the reform effort--the OMB,
OPM, DNI, and DOD--along with GAO, briefed this Subcommittee's
chairman and ranking member on the status of security clearance reform
efforts. Subsequent to this briefing, this Subcommittee requested that
the Joint Reform Team and GAO engage in an effort to develop metrics
to measure the quality of security clearance investigations and
adjudications in order to address GAO's concerns about quality. In May
2010, the leaders of the reform effort provided this Subcommittee with
15 metrics assessing the timeliness and quality of investigations,
adjudications, reciprocity, and automation. According to Joint Reform
Team officials, these metrics were communicated to executive agencies
in June 2010. Given the role of the executive branch and the need for
GAO to remain independent in carrying out its auditing
responsibilities, decisions related to performance measures and their
effective implementation are fundamentally an executive branch
management responsibility. However, we are encouraged by the Joint
Reform Team's collaborative efforts to develop these quality measures.
We have previously reported that successful performance measures
should meet nine criteria.[Footnote 20] For example, successful
measures should clearly link to agency goals, have measurable targets,
and be reasonably free from bias. GAO has been examining the
Performance Accountability Council metrics and our preliminary
observations show that many of the quality metrics appear to address
attributes of a successful performance measure, such as being
objective, quantifiable, and are linked to reform effort goals. We
view the quality metrics as a positive step towards identifying
specific quantifiable targets linked to goals that can be measured
objectively and used by leaders and others to gauge progress and
assess the quality of the personnel security clearance process.
Although these are positive developments that can contribute to
greater visibility over the clearance process, these measures have not
yet been fully implemented and we are continuing to examine these
efforts as part of our ongoing work.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we are strongly encouraged by the
progress that the Performance Accountability Council, and in
particular, DOD, has made over the last few years to implement
recommendations, reduce overall timeliness, and take steps to
integrate quality into its processes. As I have already noted, based
on Performance Accountability Council data, DOD has reported that it
is meeting IRTPA timeliness requirements for the first three quarters
of fiscal year 2010, which represents significant and noteworthy
progress. Moreover, the progress that has been made with respect to
the overall governmentwide reform efforts would not be possible
without committed and sustained leadership of Congress and by the
senior leaders involved in the Performance Accountability Council.
Their continued oversight and stewardship of the reform efforts is the
cornerstone to sustaining momentum and making future progress.
Although DOD has taken steps to develop and implement quality
assessment tools, these tools have not yet been fully implemented.
Therefore, it is important that management focus is sustained to
ensure that these efforts are implemented and continuously evaluated.
We are continuing to track timeliness and monitor the implementation
and results of DOD's quality assessment tools. This work will help
inform the Comptroller General's high-risk update decision in January
2011.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond at this time to any questions that you or members of the
Subcommittee may have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this
testimony are Liz McNally, Assistant Director; James Ashley; Joseph M.
Capuano; Sara Cradic; Cindy Gilbert; Linda Keefer; James Krustapentus;
Greg Marchand; Richard Powelson; and Jillena Roberts.
[End of section]
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-849]. Washington, D.C.: September
7, 2010.
Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and
Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide
Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-117T]. Washington, D.C.: October 1,
2009.
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But Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain Reform
Efforts. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-684T].
Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009.
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-488]. Washington, D.C.: May 19,
2009.
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2009.
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January 22,
2009.
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and Quality. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-261R].
Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2008.
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Process. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1050T].
Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008.
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Clearance Reform. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-965R]. Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2008.
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Process. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-776T].
Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-551T]. Washington, D.C.: April 9,
2008.
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Quality and Timeliness of Clearances. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-580R]. Washington D.C.: March 25,
2008.
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-470T]. Washington, D.C.: February
12, 2008.
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-352T]. Washington, D.C.: February
27, 2008.
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Informed Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-350]. Washington, D.C.: February
13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found
For Industry Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-842T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2007.
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310]. Washington, D.C.: January
2007.
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1070]. Washington, D.C.: September
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2006.
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2006.
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Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-747T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2006.
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Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-323R]. Washington,
D.C.: January 17, 2006.
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http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-233T]. Washington, D.C.: November
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Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
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High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-207]. Washington, D.C.: January
2005.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining
Eligibility for Top Secret Security Clearances, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-465] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18,
2001).
[2] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about
Timeliness and Quality, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-261R], (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19,
2008)
[3] For the purposes of this testimony, we define reciprocity as an
agency's acceptance of a background investigation or clearance
determination completed by any authorized investigative or
adjudicative agency.
[4] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 3001 (2004) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 435b).
While IRTPA was a far-reaching act with many broad implications, our
references to it throughout this report pertain solely to section
3001, unless otherwise specified.
[5] Pub. L. No. 111-259, § 367 (2010).
[6] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but
Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-842T]
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005); GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances:
Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing Problems with DOD's
Program, But Concerns Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-233T] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9,
2005); GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other
Impediments Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-747T] (Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2006); GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate
Documentation Found For Industry Personnel, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-842T] (Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2007); GAO, Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the
Security Clearance Process, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-776T] (Washington, D.C.: May 22,
2008); and GAO, Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made
to Reduce Delays But Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and
Sustain Reform Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-684T] (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 15,
2009). The Subcommittee on Intelligence Community Management, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Subcommittee on
Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services; and the Subcommittee on
Government Management, Organization and Procurement, House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform have also held hearings on this
issue.
[7] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-207] (Washington, D.C.: January
2005).
[8] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.: January
2007).
[9] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C. January
2009).
[10] This 60 day period is to include periods of not more than 40 days
to complete the investigative phase and 20 days to complete the
adjudicative phase from the date of receipt of the completed
application by an authorized investigative agency.
[11] GAO, Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy
Is Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-488] (Washington, D.C.:
May 19, 2009); GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness
Reporting, Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are
Needed to Further Improve the Clearance Process, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400] (Washington, D.C.: May 19,
2009); GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would
Enable More Informed Congressional Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-350] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13,
2008); and GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are
Needed To Improve The Security Clearance Process, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1070] (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 28,
2006).
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271].
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400].
[14] Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 3001 (2004) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
435b). According to IRTPA, this period shall include a period of not
longer than 40 days to complete the investigative phase of the
clearance review and a period of not longer than 20 days to complete
the adjudicative phase of the clearance review. These measures apply
to initial personnel security clearances.
[15] The annual report to Congress contained self reported agency data
that was provided to the PAC Subcommittee on Performance Measurements
and Management. This data excludes the elements of the intelligence
community under DOD, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, National
Reconnaissance Office, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and
National Security Agency, but does include the intelligence components
of the military departments. According to DOD officials, DOD's system
for tracking and reporting security clearance case information does
not differentiate between initial secret/confidential clearances and
renewal secret/confidential clearances. Therefore, the Performance
Accountability Council timeliness reports on initial clearances
include DOD secret/confidential renewal cases, as well as initial
secret, confidential, top secret, and sensitive compartmented
information clearances. A prior GAO review and OPM officials'
estimates of DOD clearance timeliness in fiscal year 2009 indicated
that confidential and secret level clearances, whether initial or
renewal, generally took the same amount of time to investigate.
Furthermore, the Defense Personnel Security Research Center--a DOD
entity dedicated to improving the effectiveness, efficiency, and
fairness of the DOD personnel security system--issued a working paper
that showed that average adjudication timeliness did not substantially
differ between initial and renewal secret clearance cases for DOD
using first, second, and third quarter data for fiscal year 2008.
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-400].
[17] The Joint Adjudication Management System is a subsystem of the
Joint Personnel Adjudication System and provides the capability for
DOD adjudicators to record eligibility decisions and potentially
disqualifying information.
[18] Single Scope Background Investigations are used to support
initial top secret with Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance
adjudicative decisions.
[19] In addition to DOD's tools to assess the quality of
investigations and adjudications, the broader reform effort also has
two quality tools sponsored by OPM. First, the Quality Assessment
Tool, deployed by OPM in March 2010, is designed to track OPM
investigations provided to adjudicators that were deemed quality
deficient by the adjudicators. Second, the Quality Hotline is designed
for adjudicators in agencies for which OPM is the investigative
service provider to report deficient investigations. However,
according to DOD officials we spoke with, DOD asked the DOD Central
Adjudication Facilities to not use the OPM quality assessment tools
because of the lack of oversight. According to these officials, these
tools are primarily for suitability, not national security.
[20] GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax
Filing Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22,
2002).
[End of section]
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