B-2 Bomber
Review of the Air Force's Decision to Change Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications Antennas Gao ID: GAO-11-180R December 16, 2010The B-2 bomber is a low-observable, long-range strike aircraft capable of entering heavily defended areas to deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons. The B-2 currently uses an ultra high frequency (UHF) satellite communications system, but because of aging military satellites, the Air Force determined a new communications system was needed. As a result, the Air Force began an incremental acquisition approach for replacing the B-2's existing UHF satellite communications system with an extremely high frequency (EHF) communications capability. The first increment, which is expected to begin production in late fiscal year 2011, is designed to upgrade computer system speed and storage capacity. The second increment is expected to provide secure, survivable strategic communications connectivity, thus allowing B-2 pilots to receive emergency action messages during strategic operations--an EHF capability that U.S. Strategic Command has stated it needs by fiscal year 2016. The third increment is intended to enable the EHF system to connect with the Global Information Grid. The focus of our review was the second increment, which is scheduled to enter the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase in early fiscal year 20131 and has an estimated total acquisition cost of $1.9 billion. In March 2008, the Air Force started a technology development and concept refinement phase for the second increment of the EHF system. In summer 2008, Air Force officials raised concerns during systems engineering activities about integration plans for a new EHF antenna subsystem, particularly as they related to the planned antenna location. As a result of these concerns, the Air Force decided to change the location of the antenna for the EHF system, and also changed the type of antenna it planned to use from a mechanically steered array to an active electronically scanned array (AESA). Because of concern over the change in antenna, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed us to review the decision process used by the Air Force to make a change in the antenna approach.4 This Senate direction was in addition to a request from the House of Representative's Armed Services Committee, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee for us to (1) review the decision-making process used to support the antenna changes, and (2) determine the extent to which the program is employing a knowledge-based acquisition approach to identify and resolve technical gaps prior to the start of EMD. On August 17, 2010, we briefed our findings to congressional staff.
The Air Force's decision to change the antenna location to lower risks appears reasonable. However, the Air Force's decision process used to change antenna type was not supported by comprehensive, detailed analyses of cost, schedule, and technical risks for alternative antenna options. Without such analyses, it is difficult to determine whether the program is pursuing the most cost-effective and lowest risk antenna solution. An Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) Acquisition Center of Excellence expert panel that examined the antenna selection process found the decision to exclusively pursue an AESA antenna may have precluded lower risk, more mature, and more affordable options. Finally, while the program's acquisition strategy incorporates several knowledge-based practices, there are additional options, particularly the pursuit of more robust competitive prototyping and maturing technologies to higher readiness levels, that could help reduce risk and improve the program's chances of a successful outcome.
GAO-11-180R, B-2 Bomber: Review of the Air Force's Decision to Change Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications Antennas
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GAO-11-180R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 16, 2010:
Congressional committees:
Subject: B-2 Bomber: Review of the Air Force's Decision to Change
Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications Antennas:
The B-2 bomber is a low-observable, long-range strike aircraft capable
of entering heavily defended areas to deliver both conventional and
nuclear weapons. The B-2 currently uses an ultra high frequency (UHF)
satellite communications system, but because of aging military
satellites, the Air Force determined a new communications system was
needed. As a result, the Air Force began an incremental acquisition
approach for replacing the B-2's existing UHF satellite communications
system with an extremely high frequency (EHF) communications
capability. The first increment, which is expected to begin production
in late fiscal year 2011, is designed to upgrade computer system speed
and storage capacity. The second increment is expected to provide
secure, survivable strategic communications connectivity, thus
allowing B-2 pilots to receive emergency action messages during
strategic operations--an EHF capability that U.S. Strategic Command
has stated it needs by fiscal year 2016. The third increment is
intended to enable the EHF system to connect with the Global
Information Grid. The focus of our review was the second increment,
which is scheduled to enter the engineering and manufacturing
development (EMD) phase in early fiscal year 2013[Footnote 1] and has
an estimated total acquisition cost of $1.9 billion.
In March 2008, the Air Force started a technology development and
concept refinement phase for the second increment of the EHF system.
[Footnote 2] In summer 2008, Air Force officials raised concerns
during systems engineering activities about integration plans for a
new EHF antenna subsystem, particularly as they related to the planned
antenna location. As a result of these concerns, the Air Force decided
to change the location of the antenna for the EHF system, and also
changed the type of antenna it planned to use from a mechanically
steered array to an active electronically scanned array (AESA).
[Footnote 3] Because of concern over the change in antenna, the Senate
Armed Services Committee directed us to review the decision process
used by the Air Force to make a change in the antenna approach.
[Footnote 4] This Senate direction was in addition to a request from
the House of Representative's Armed Services Committee, Air and Land
Forces Subcommittee for us to (1) review the decision-making process
used to support the antenna changes, and (2) determine the extent to
which the program is employing a knowledge-based acquisition approach
to identify and resolve technical gaps prior to the start of EMD. On
August 17, 2010, we briefed our findings to congressional staff. The
August briefing--with non-substantive revisions made for clarification
purposes--is enclosed with this report.
In conducting our review, we obtained data from the Air Force that it
used to support its decision to change antennas. We reviewed a 2009
Air Force trade study assessment of antenna subsystem options, B-2
program office antenna risk assessments and cost-benefit analysis
data, an Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) Structures Branch
assessment of B-2 structural risks, contractors' antenna data and
aircraft stress analysis, an ASC Acquisition Center of Excellence
panel antenna assessment, and other relevant B-2 program management
documents. We also interviewed B-2 program officials and ASC
Structures Branch officials about the decision-making process,
technical assessments, and basis for the decision. Additionally, in
preparing our August 2010 briefing we provided a copy to the Air Force
for review and their comments were incorporated where appropriate. We
performed our review from May 2010 to December 2010 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained
provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit
objectives.
Summary:
The Air Force's decision to change the antenna location to lower risks
appears reasonable. However, the Air Force's decision process used to
change antenna type was not supported by comprehensive, detailed
analyses of cost, schedule, and technical risks for alternative
antenna options. Without such analyses, it is difficult to determine
whether the program is pursuing the most cost-effective and lowest
risk antenna solution. An ASC Acquisition Center of Excellence expert
panel that examined the antenna selection process found the decision
to exclusively pursue an AESA antenna may have precluded lower risk,
more mature, and more affordable options. Finally, while the program's
acquisition strategy incorporates several knowledge-based practices,
there are additional options, particularly the pursuit of more robust
competitive prototyping and maturing technologies to higher readiness
levels, that could help reduce risk and improve the program's chances
of a successful outcome.
The Air Force's Decision to Change Antenna Locations Appears
Reasonable:
In 2009, the Air Force completed a trade study that served as the
catalyst and primary support for the decision to pursue an alternative
antenna location. Because of concerns raised about aircraft
modifications that would be required to install the antenna in the
originally planned antenna location, the B-2 program office examined
the feasibility of alternative locations and antennas. Structural
analysis supporting the trade study found that installation risk to
the aircraft could be substantially lowered by changing the antenna
location on B-2 aircraft. The trade study also found that antenna
concepts are available that could support a location change. The study
focused on two locations for aircraft integration--the originally
planned saddlebag (near aircraft center) and the elevon cove (aft part
of aircraft)--and three technology options--mechanically steered
array, AESA, and hybrid technology that would utilize a combination of
the two technologies. Because of size constraints, the mechanically
steered array was not considered a viable option for the elevon cove
location on the aircraft. The locations and antenna technology options
assessed by the trade study are shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Antenna Options Assessed in Air Force Trade Study:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The following are depicted on the illustration:
Saddlebag Location:
Mechanically steered array, AESA, and Hybrid assessed.
Elevon Cove Location:
AESA and Hybrid assessed.
Source: B-2 Program Office.
Note: According to B-2 program officials, two antennas were expected
to be needed for the saddlebag location; the elevon cove location
requires only one antenna.
[End of figure]
Air Force assessments by the ASC Structures Branch and an ASC
Acquisition Center of Excellence panel also supported changing the
antenna location on the aircraft. The Structures Branch assessment,
led by a former B-2 structural engineer, found that integrating an
antenna system into the saddlebag location would be more complex and
higher risk primarily because of the engineering required and aircraft
modification challenges. The ASC Acquisition Center of Excellence
panel, comprised of subject matter experts from the Air Force
acquisition, manufacturing, and technology development communities,
concurred with changing antenna locations from the saddlebag to the
elevon cove and noted the rigor of the process used by the program to
make this decision.
The Decision Process Used to Change Antenna Type Was Not Supported by
Comprehensive Cost, Schedule, and Technical Risks Analyses:
The Air Force's decision to pursue an AESA antenna was not supported
by a process that provided comprehensive analyses of cost, schedule,
and technical risks for alternative antenna options. The Air Force
trade study evaluated technical feasibility of different antenna
options, but did not assess cost and schedule effects or fully
evaluate technical risks.
However, in light of the trade study results, the Air Force requested
that the prime contractor reevaluate antenna options and submit its
best concept to meet EHF requirements. The Air Force informed the
prime contractor that an AESA antenna installed in the elevon cove
location was its preferred antenna concept based on trade study
findings, but provided the prime contractor with an opportunity to
make its own decision on what antenna location and type to pursue. The
prime contractor ultimately chose to pursue an AESA antenna for the
elevon cove location and submitted a request for information to eight
potential suppliers asking for AESA system options. The prime
contractor did not request information for any alternative antenna
solutions, such as a hybrid antenna. The prime contractor selected one
of its other business divisions as the supplier for the AESA antenna
subsystem, and the Air Force approved the selection.
Without more comprehensive analyses of cost, schedule, and technical
risks for different antenna options, it is difficult to determine
whether the program is pursuing the most cost-effective and lowest
risk antenna solution. For example, the selected AESA antenna approach
relies on development of technologies that are not mature and are thus
considered high risk at this point[Footnote 5], which makes it
difficult to estimate the resources that will be needed to develop and
produce the system. While the ASC Acquisition Center of Excellence
panel concurred with the prime contractor's decision to change the
antenna location and found selection of an AESA antenna defensible,
the panel also found that the decision to exclusively pursue an AESA
antenna may have precluded use of other lower risk, more affordable
antenna options. Specifically, the panel stated that while AESA
technology is needed to meet at least part of the antenna subsystem
requirements, meeting all EHF requirements with an AESA antenna
subsystem will be a significant technical challenge. In particular,
the panel noted that several different types of antenna elements or
hybrid arrays with lower risk or lower cost, or both, may be available
as an alternative to using AESA technology to meet EHF transmit
requirements.
Acquisition Approach Employs Several Knowledge-Based Practices, but
Additional Options Could Be Considered:
Consistent with DOD policy and knowledge-based acquisitions, the Air
Force is pursuing several practices that should help position the
program for success prior to entering:
EMD. First, the B-2 EHF system has been broken into three separate
increments, each expected to be its own major defense acquisition
program. This approach allows for a better matching of requirements
and resources, which provides an opportunity to defer challenging
requirements until technologies are ready. Second, the B-2 EHF
Increment 2 program plans to conduct early systems engineering and
design activities, including a preliminary design review, before
starting EMD. Finally, the program's preliminary plans indicate
efforts to minimize concurrency among development, flight testing, and
production.
However, there are additional knowledge-based practices that could be
worth considering for the B-2 EHF Increment 2 program. While the Air
Force plans to competitively prototype a few selected AESA components
that have lower technology maturity levels and higher risk,[Footnote
6] a more comprehensive effort that includes competitive prototyping
of full antenna subsystems using different technologies and different
contractors could reduce risk, validate designs, and lead to better
cost estimates, as well as provide a fallback option if the AESA
antenna does not mature as planned. A fallback antenna option may be
particularly worthwhile given that initial operational capability for
the second EHF increment is currently expected about 3-½ years later
than U.S. Strategic Command's stated fiscal year 2016 need date, and
additional schedule slips would further delay its availability to the
warfighter. Also, while the program plans to demonstrate critical
technologies in a relevant environment prior to the start of EMD,
[Footnote 7] demonstrating critical technologies in a realistic
environment before EMD could further reduce risks and provide greater
assurances that the technologies will work as intended before
finalizing the design.[Footnote 8] This is especially true given that
the B-2 EHF system must meet very stringent nuclear-hardening
requirements and any later design changes could require significant
additional time and money.
Agency Comments:
The Office of the Secretary of Defense was presented with a copy of a
draft version of this report and given an opportunity to provide
comments. However, the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not
provide comments on the draft report to GAO. For the August 2010
briefing that is enclosed with this report, the Air Force was provided
a copy for review and their comments were incorporated where
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Air
Force. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters covered in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other major
contributors to this letter were Marie P. Ahearn, Bruce Fairbairn,
Matt Lea, and Sean Merrill.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Enclosure:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I:
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
Increment 2 Program Acquisition Approach:
Briefing for the Committees on Armed Services:
U.S. Senate and House of Representatives:
Contents:
* Slide 3: Objectives and Scope;
* Slide 4: Summary of Findings;
* Slides 5-7: Program Description and Status;
* Slides 8-14: Decision-Making Process and Actions Taken on B-2 EHF
Increment 2 Antenna;
* Slides 15-16: GAO Observations;
* Slide 17: Knowledge-Based Practices Being Used and Additional
Opportunities.
GAO Objectives and Scope:
The House Armed Services Committee asked us to review the decision-
making process used by the B-2 program office to change antenna
subsystem solutions, and determine the extent to which the program is
employing a knowledge-based acquisition approach and systems
engineering practices to identify and resolve technical gaps prior to
the start of system development. Subsequent Senate direction[Footnote
9] asked us to review the decision-making process used by the Air
Force to select a new antenna solution.
We interviewed B-2 program and other Air Force officials and reviewed
a 2009 trade study assessment of antenna subsystem options, program
office risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis data, contractors'
aircraft stress analysis and make-buy decision materials, and other
related programmatic documents.
Summary of Findings:
The decision to change antenna locations appears reasonable from an
integration standpoint, but concerns remain over technology risk and
the strategy for acquiring the active electronically scanned array
(AESA) antenna.
A 2009 Air Force trade study found the B-2 EHF Increment 2 program's
key performance parameters (KPP) were not achievable and there was
substantial risk with integrating an antenna subsystem in the
saddlebag region.
The subsequent decision to change antenna location to the elevon cove
effectively eliminated the mechanically steered array (MSA) antenna
option due to its size.
An Air Force panel agreed with antenna location change, but said there
may be lower risk/more affordable technologies options than the AESA
technologies being pursued.
Although technical characteristics were assessed and a new antenna
location in the elevon cove was selected, the program office did not
analyze cost and schedule factors to support selection of AESA over
MSA and hybrid options.
AESA antenna critical technologies are assessed at low readiness
levels (TRLs 3-4) and thus high risk; the programs development
approach does not provide a fallback antenna technology option should
the AESA technology not mature as expected.
The program's acquisition strategy incorporates several knowledge-
based practices, but we identified additional opportunities to reduce
future risks, such as pursuing more comprehensive competitive
prototyping.
B-2 EHF Program Description:
The B-2 EHF system is expected to provide secure, survivable
communications and will replace the existing ultra high frequency
system that uses aging MILSTAR satellites. The new system will use an
Advanced EHF satellite system with first satellite launch expected in
2010.
The Air Force is developing and procuring the B-2 EHF system in three
separate increments, each expected to be its own major defense
acquisition program:
* Increment 1 upgrades computer system speed and storage capacity,
provides new integrated processing units and disk drives, and enables
a growth path for future B-2 upgrades.
* Increment 2 provides secure, survivable strategic communications
connectivity by adding low observable antennas and radomes, and
includes the family of advanced beyond line-of-sight terminals (FAB-T)
and related hardware.
* Increment 3 improves tactical/conventional communications that
migrates to current/future EHF communication architecture and enables
net-ready capability for improved situational awareness.
Our review was limited to the B-2 EHF Increment 2 program.
B-2 EHF Increment 2 Top-Level Schedule and Cost:
B-2 EHF's three-increment approach was established in January 2006,
with Increment 2 beginning pre”Milestone B activities in March 2008.
Ongoing component advanced development work includes systems
engineering, software preliminary design, technology maturation,
antenna prototyping, and structural analysis for antenna integration
prior to Milestone B program start, which is now expected in fiscal
year 2013.
Increment 2, which is expected to be the most expensive of the three
EHF increments ($1.9 billion), is largely an antenna development and
FAB-T integration effort.
Figure 1: 2010 Program Schedule:
[Refer to PDF for image: program schedule]
FY 08 through FY 13:
Component Advanced Development (Technology Development and System
Design).
FY 12:
Preliminary design review.
FY 12 through FY 17:
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) (Milestone B).
FY 14:
Critical design review.
FY 16:
USSTRATCOM need date.
FY 17: Initial operational test and evaluation complete.
FY 17 through FY 21:
Production (Milestone C).
Source: B-2 Program Office.
Note: Data are from April 2010 brief to Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition), and June 2009 Program Management Review brief.
USSTRATCOM = United States Strategic Command.
[End of figure]
B-2 EHF Increment 2 Status:
Milestone B has been delayed over 3 years from the original
acquisition strategy schedule.
* Development delays in the FAB-T program, key to Increment 2, have
significantly affected the EHF schedule.
* Acquisition strategy changes (i.e., moving preliminary design review
(PDR) before Milestone B) also resulted in schedule revisions.
Changing the antenna subsystem approach and location has further
affected the program schedule and acquisition strategy.
Under the current schedule, the program will not begin production by
the current U.S. Strategic Command need date in fiscal year 2016.
Accelerating the schedule in an effort to meet the need date would
likely involve accepting more risk.
Program Office Raised Concerns with Requirements and Antenna Subsystem:
In 2005, the Air Force directed the prime contractor to conduct an
antenna trade study. The study found an MSA antenna subsystem
installed in the B-2's saddlebag area was the preferred approach for
Increment 2. While installation risk was reviewed in the trade study,
an in-depth analysis of structural integration risk was not completed.
During summer 2008, B-2 program officials began raising concerns about
the planned antenna subsystem location, and these concerns were
considered at the System Requirements Review in December 2008.
In February 2009, the Assistant Secretary for the Air Force
(Acquisition)”-responding to requirements issues and the inability of
the program to meet U.S. Strategic Command's need date-”directed a
trade study be performed to investigate alternative technical and
material solutions for B-2 EHF SATCOM development and integration as
well as opportunities to support future growth capability.
2009 Air Force Trade Study Focused on Technical Viability:
The 2009 trade study was limited to a review of the technical
viability of program requirements (KPP objectives) and antenna
subsystem options.
KPPs were evaluated to determine whether objectives as defined in the
capabilities development document (identifies the system's expected
capabilities) could be accomplished with available technologies.
Study assessed technical feasibility and structural risk of two
installation locations”the saddlebag and elevon cove”and three
technology options (MSA, AESA, and a hybrid combination of both).
According to program officials, the antenna study was not intended to,
nor did it prioritize key subsystem characteristics or assess cost and
schedule factors for each option.
Trade Study Assessed Antenna Options:
The 2009 study focused on two locations, with different technology
options assessed at each location as appropriate.
Figure 2: Trade Study Antenna Options:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Saddlebag (SB):
- Mechanically steered array (MSA);
- Active electronically scanned array (AESA);
- Hybrid (MSA/AESA mixed technology).
Elevon cove[A] (EC):
” AESA;
” Hybrid.
Saddlebag location requires two antennas”-one on each side”-to provide
sufficient coverage.
MSA”SB;
AESA”S;
Hybrid”S.
Elevon cove location requires one antenna to provide sufficient
coverage.
AESA”EC;
Hybrid”EC.
Source: B-2 Program Office.
[A] MSA antenna technology was not assessed in the elevon cove
location because it was determined by the program office to be too
large for the location.
[End of figure]
What the 2009 Trade Study Found:
The trade study determined that requirements needed revision because
no antenna subsystem concept could meet all four KPPs as drafted in
the capabilities development document.
Its assessment of B-2 EH F antenna locations and technologies
determined:
* All antenna location and technology options assessed were viable but
carry different risks and technology maturity timelines.
* Antenna location for integration much more of a determinant than
expected. Elevon cove location reduced integration risk compared to
the saddlebag.
* Radar cross section did not dictate a specific antenna location or
technology change, but a move to the elevon cove could reduce the
effect on aircraft low observable qualities. Low-probability of
intercept/detection options of AESA matched or exceeded MSA results.
Although the study assessed all options as viable, from the program's
perspective it provided evidence that an alternate location and
technology exists that has lower integration risk than the MSA in the
saddlebag option.
Actions Taken since the 2009 Trade Study:
KPPs were revised to reflect achievable objectives based on what is
technically feasible.
Program office requested the prime contractor reevaluate antenna
solution options and submit its best concept to meet Increment 2
requirements. Specific antenna location or technology were not
prescribed, but the contractor was aware that an AESA antenna in the
elevon cove was the preferred system concept based on trade study
findings.
The prime contractor chose to pursue an AESA antenna subsystem in the
elevon cove and submitted a request for information to eight
subcontractors asking for potential AESA system options as part of its
"make-buy" decision. The prime contractor selected one of its sister
divisions to develop the AESA antenna subsystem.
In December 2009, an Air Force panel of Aeronautical Systems Center
(ASC) engineers assessed and concurred with the prime contractor's
make-buy decision for an AESA antenna in the elevon cove location. The
panel agreed that AESA technology was needed to provide downlink
capability, but found insufficient data to support the need for an
AESA-specific uplink capability.
Program office completed a cost-benefit analysis in February 2010,
concluding that estimated cost for competitively prototyping two full
AESA antenna subsystems exceeded potential estimated benefits.
Air Force decided to competitively prototype key AESA subcomponents
that had low TRLs and higher risk.[Footnote 10]
EHF Increment 2 System Planned Competitive Prototyping Approach:
Figure 3: B-2 EHF Increment 2 Planned Competitive Prototyping:
[Refer to PDF for image: chart]
Top level:
B-2 EHF Increment 2 system:
Second level, connected to B-2 EHF Increment 2 system:
FAB-T subsystem.
AESA antenna subsystem.
Third level, connected to FAB-T subsystem:
Operator Panel, Op Station S/W;
Modem Processor Group A & B.
Third level, connected to AESA antenna subsystem:
* Power supply;
* Receive AESA/Radome:
- Radomes and array components supporting LPI performance competed;
prototype competition will be limited to the component level two
subsystems of the antenna subsystem;
* Transmit AESA/Radome;
* Array control unit/IMU;
* System interconnect;
* Cooling system loop.
Source: GAO analysis of data.
Note: Data are from December 2009 B-2 EHF Increment 2 brief and May
2010 B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 2 Competitive Prototyping Acquisition
Strategy Update. Op = operator; S/W = software; IMU = inertial
measurement unit.
[End of figure]
* Program's stated competitive prototyping strategy is to compete AESA
components that contribute to optimal radio frequency, radar cross
section, and low probability of intercept (LPI) design performance and
risk reduction.
GAO Observations about Decision Process Leading to Antenna Subsystem
Change:
Program office has attempted to make decisions that balance
requirements with technology solutions prior to Milestone B,
consistent with DOD acquisition policy and GAO best practices.
Trade study technical assessment was the catalyst and primary support
for the program's decision to pursue an alternate antenna location.
The location change decision appears reasonable from a technical
standpoint based on trade study results and other supporting internal
Air Force assessments.
Change to the elevon cove location may lower antenna integration risk,
but it does not necessarily reduce technology risk. AESA technologies
have low technology readiness levels (primarily TRL 3-4 based on
program office self-assessment).
Characteristics of the different antenna options assessed were not
prioritized, and life-cycle cost and schedule analyses for the
different antenna options were not completed to support selection of
the antenna technology approach.
Air Force ASC panel found the decision to exclusively pursue AESA
solutions may have precluded use of lower risk, more affordable
technologies, particularly as they relate to several different
transmit uplink antenna elements or hybrid arrays that may be viable
options.
Given the stated time-critical nature (2016 need date) for the
availability of this EHF capability, a technology development approach
that pursues more than one antenna technology solution (e.g. AESA and
hybrid) could provide flexibility if one of the antenna technologies
cannot be matured as expected.
Competitive prototyping of different antenna technologies by different
contractors has the potential to increase contractor performance and
could provide a fallback technology option.
Some Knowledge-Based Acquisition Practices Being Used, but Additional
Opportunities Remain:
The B-2 EHF Increment 2 program's overall acquisition strategy
includes several sound knowledge-based practices:
* Developing system in three defined increments, each its own program.
* Early systems engineering and design efforts, including a PDR before
EMD.
* Minimized concurrency among development, flight testing, and
production.
Additional opportunities to further reduce overall risk of future
problems include:
* Completing Milestone A review to support a sound business case.
* Demonstrating technologies to TRL 7 before Milestone B.[Footnote 11]
* Ensuring that PDR includes fully functional and capable FAB-T.
* Pursuing additional competitive prototyping opportunities.
[End of section]
Additional Materials:
Timeline of Key B-2 EHF Increment 2 Events:
Figure 4: B-2 EHF Increment 2 Timeline:
[Refer to PDF for image: timeline]
Summer 2008:
Program office informally voices concerns over KPPs and antenna
subsystem.
December 2008:
System Requirements Review highlights emerging KPP, antenna, and
integration risks.
February 2009:
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) directs KPP &
antenna trade study.
Mid-2009:
Trade study identities KPP shortfalls and that alternative antenna
solution is viable.
July 2009:
Program office issues draft request for proposal to prime contractor
for antenna”-no antenna type specified by program office.
August 2009:
Trade study complete ” outbrief USSTRATCOM/Air Combat Command.
August 2009:
Prime contractor request for information specific to AESA antenna
solutions.
October 2009:
Air Force Configuration Steering Board briefing ” AESA preferred
system concept approved.
December 2009:
Air Force ASC completes assessment of prime contractor make-buy
decision on AESA antenna.
February 2010:
Program office completes cost-benefit analysis on competitive
prototyping AESA antennas only.
March 2010:
Program office issues final request for proposal to prime contractor
for AESA antenna solution.
May 2010:
Prime contractor submits AESA antenna proposal.
May 2010:
Air Force approves competitive prototyping of AESA antenna components.
December 2010:
Program office planned AESA antenna contract award.
Source: GAO analysis of B-2 Program Office data.
[End of figure]
Evolving Acquisition Plans and Costs:
Figure 5: B-2 EHF Increment 2 Schedule and Total Cost Estimates over
Time:
[Refer to PDF for image: timeline]
FY 16: USSTRATCOM need data.
2007 ($1.2 billion):
FY 08-FY 10: Concept Advanced Development (Milestone B in FY 09);
FY 09-FY 12: Engineering & Manufacturing Development (Milestone C in
FY 12);
FY 12-FY 16: Production.
2008 ($1.5 billion):
FY 08-FY 11: Concept Advanced Development (Milestone B in FY 10);
FY 11-FY 14: Engineering & Manufacturing Development (Milestone C in
FY 13);
FY 13-FY 17: Production.
2009 ($1.5 billion)[A]:
FY 08-FY 12: Concept Advanced Development (Milestone B in FY 12);
FY 12-FY 16: Engineering & Manufacturing Development (Milestone C in
FY 15);
FY 15-FY 19: Production.
2010 ($1.9 billion):
FY 08-FY 14: Concept Advanced Development (Milestone B in FY 13);
FY 13-FY 17: Engineering & Manufacturing Development (Milestone C in
FY 15);
FY 17-FY 21: Production.
Source: GAO analysis of B-2 Program Office data.
[A] The B-2 EHF Increment 2 program cost estimate was not revised by
the program office to reflect changes that occurred in fiscal year
(FY) 2009 until FY2010.
[End of figure]
B-2 EHF Increment 2 Development Cost Estimate Evolution:
Figure 6: Development Funding and Estimated Costs for Different
Plans[A]:
Annual development funding by different plan:
Fiscal year: 2007;
2007 plan: $0;
2008 plan: $0.5 million;
2009 plan: $0.5 million;
2010 plan: $0.5 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
2007 plan: $66.4 million;
2008 plan: $55.7 million;
2009 plan: $55.7 million;
2010 plan: $52.8 million.
Fiscal year: 2009;
2007 plan: $165.5 million;
2008 plan: $173 million;
2009 plan: $173 million;
2010 plan: $154.2 million.
Fiscal year: 2010;
2007 plan: $408.6 million;
2008 plan: $349.4 million;
2009 plan: $349.4 million;
2010 plan: $277.3 million.
Fiscal year: 2011;
2007 plan: $650.9 million;
2008 plan: $557.3 million;
2009 plan: $557.3 million;
2010 plan: $518.6 million.
Fiscal year: 2012;
2007 plan: $762.8 million;
2008 plan: $765 million;
2009 plan: $765 million;
2010 plan: $691.5 million.
Fiscal year: 2013;
2007 plan: $764 million;
2008 plan: $897.8 million;
2009 plan: $897.8 million;
2010 plan: $939.3 million.
Fiscal year: 2014;
2008 plan: $985.9 million;
2009 plan: $985.9 million;
2010 plan: $1.202 billion.
Fiscal year: 2015;
2010 plan: $1.33 billion.
Fiscal year: 2016
2010 plan: $1.37 billion.
Estimated development costs under different plans:
Fiscal year 2007:
Component advanced development: $165.5 million;
Engineering and manufacturing development: $598.5 million;
Total: $764 million.
Fiscal year 2008:
Component advanced development: $173 million;
Engineering and manufacturing development: $812.9 million;
Total: $986 million.
Fiscal year 2009:
Component advanced development: $173 million;
Engineering and manufacturing development: $812.9 million;
Total: $986 million.
Fiscal year 2010:
Component advanced development: $682.1
Engineering and manufacturing development: $691.5
Total: $1.37 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of B-2 Program Office data.
* Total estimated development cost has increased $610 million since
2007. Delay to FAB-T delivery and increased understanding of the
complexity and cost of integration contributed to the cost increase
and additional development time reflected in the 2010 plan.
* Additional resources were required before Milestone B to resolve
requirements and technology gaps that were identified during systems
engineering activities.
* About half of the program's development cost is now expected for pre”
Milestone B activities.
[A] The B-2 EHF Increment 2 program cost estimate was not revised by
the program office to reflect changes that occurred in FY2009 until
FY2010.
[End of figure]
Attributes of the Program Office's Assessment of Antenna Subsystem
Options:
Table 1: Attributes of Antenna Options Assessed:
Attribute: Technical characteristics;
Attribute consideration in decision process? Yes;
Description of process and activities: For each antenna
location/technology option, the 2009 trade study evaluated capacity,
coverage, radar signature, power management, integration risk, and
probability of detection/intercept. A structural analysis was
completed by ASC Structures Branch on integration risks for the
saddlebag and elevon cove locations.
Attribute: Cost;
Attribute consideration in decision process? No;
Description of process and activities: We found no evidence of a cost-
benefit analysis for each different antenna technology solution option
from the 2009 trade study. According to program officials, the only
related cost analysis performed was the February 2010 cost-benefit
analysis of competitively prototyping two AESA antenna subsystems.
This analysis was performed after the decision to change antennas.
Attribute: Schedule;
Attribute consideration in decision process? Limited;
Description of process and activities: Program office self-assessed
achievability of TRL 6 for antenna technology by Milestone B to
identify risk of each option based on the expected schedule. Program
officials stated no full schedule assessment was completed for the
different antenna technology options and their ability to meet the
USSTRATCOM need date.
Source: GAO analysis of B-2 Program Office data.
[End of table]
[End of briefing slides]
Footnotes:
[1] EMD begins at Milestone B, which is normally formal program
initiation for Department of Defense (DOD) weapon system acquisition
programs. This phase is intended for completion of the development of
a system or increment of capability.
[2] The technology development and concept refinement phase for
Increment 2 includes systems engineering, software preliminary design,
technology maturation, antenna prototyping and structural analysis for
antenna integration.
[3] A mechanically steered array has a circular or elliptical antenna
plate that requires moving parts to steer a beam across an airspace or
ground area; an active electronically scanned array can steer its
beams electronically--without moving parts--and redirect them from one
location to another.
[4] S. Rep. No. 111-201, at 81 (2010).
[5] Because AESA critical technologies for the B-2 EHF system have not
yet been demonstrated as a system prototype in a realistic
environment, such as in a test-bed aircraft, we consider them high
risk based on GAO's best practices work on technology development.
[6] DOD Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027, Implementation of the
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) (Dec. 4, 2009),
implements WSARA, including competitive prototyping requirements.
WSARA requires that DOD policy ensure acquisition strategies for major
defense acquisition programs provide for competitive prototypes before
Milestone B approval unless a waiver is properly granted. Pub. L. No.
111-23 § 203.
[7] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
included a provision requiring all major defense acquisition programs
seeking Milestone B approval--entry into EMD--to obtain certification
that program technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant
environment, which is technology readiness level (TRL) 6. Pub. L. No.
109-163 § 801, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2366b. TRL 6 is achieved by
testing a representative model or prototype system that is very close
to form, fit, and function in a relevant environment, like in a high-
fidelity lab or simulated operational environment.
[8] GAO best practice work supports technology demonstration in a
realistic environment--TRL 7--before the start of EMD. TRL 7
represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in a
test-bed aircraft.
[9] S. Rep. No. 11-201, at 81 (2010).
[10] D0D Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027, Implementation of the
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) (Dec. 4, 2009),
implements WSARA, including competitive prototyping requirements.
WSARA requires that DOD policy ensure acquisition strategies for major
defense acquisition programs provide for competitive prototypes before
Milestone B approval unless a waiver is properly granted. Pub. L. No.
111-23 § 203.
[11] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
included a provision requiring all major defense acquisition programs
seeking Milestone B approval-”entry into EMD-”to obtain certification
that program technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant
environment, which is TRL 6. Pub. L. No. 109-163 § 801, codified at 10
U.S.C. § 2366b. GAO best practices support technology demonstration in
a realistic environment”-TRL 7”-before EMD.
[End of section]
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