Defense Management
DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective Actions Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Gao ID: GAO-11-171R December 16, 2010This report responds to House Report 111-166 to accompany the House bill (H.R. 2647) that later became the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The House Report noted the House Armed Services Committee's concerns that the lessons learned regarding the prevention and management of corrosion in the F-22 Raptor had not been fully applied to the development and acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The House Report directed that the Director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight evaluate the F-35 program and submit a report to the defense committees within 180 days after the act was enacted. The Department of Defense (DOD) report was also to include implications for existing and future weapon systems based on the findings of the F-35 evaluation. DOD submitted its report to Congress in September 2010. House Report 111-166 also directed the Comptroller General to provide an assessment of the completeness of DOD's evaluation and submit a report to the defense committees within 60 days after the date on which DOD submits its evaluation. In assessing the completeness of DOD's corrosion study, our objectives were to determine the extent to which the study (1) assessed the incorporation of lessons learned from the F-22's corrosion problems into the F-35's corrosion prevention and control (CPC) program, (2) identified implications for other current and future weapon systems' CPC programs, and (3) was consistent with generally accepted research standards that define a sound and complete study with regard to design, execution, and presentation.
DOD's study identifies several areas where the F-35 program has incorporated lessons learned from the F-22's corrosion problems, compares and contrasts the two aircraft programs, and discusses potential future corrosion issues for the F-35. The corrosion study also addresses various implications for other weapon systems' CPC programs. For example, it identifies key practices on which effective corrosion prevention and control for any weapon system depend, names five specific weapon system programs that could benefit from F-22 and F-35 lessons learned, and cites commonly noted corrosion prevention and control issues. The corrosion study was generally consistent with research standards that define a sound and complete study with regard to design, execution, and presentation. Further, we found that the study team made recommendations in exit briefings to the F-35 and F-22 program offices and that the report contains numerous statements suggesting corrective actions may be needed at other weapon system program offices, the services, and DOD to improve their CPC programs. However, no formal recommendations were made in the report. In the absence of formal recommendations, it may be difficult for DOD and Congress to monitor and assess corrective actions resulting from the corrosion study. Following up on corrective actions would help DOD to minimize the impacts of corrosion on military equipment. Therefore, we are making recommendations that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to document, and establish a process for monitoring and assessing, corrective actions taken by the F-35 and F-22 program offices, other weapon system program offices, the Air Force, the Navy, and DOD in response to the corrosion study. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with one.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Jack E. Edwards Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-8246GAO-11-171R, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective Actions Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
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GAO-11-171R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 16, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess
Corrective Actions Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter:
This report responds to House Report 111-166 to accompany the House
bill (H.R. 2647) that later became the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010.[Footnote 1] The House Report noted the House
Armed Services Committee's concerns that the lessons learned regarding
the prevention and management of corrosion in the F-22 Raptor had not
been fully applied to the development and acquisition of the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter. The House Report directed that the Director of
Corrosion Policy and Oversight evaluate the F-35 program and submit a
report to the defense committees within 180 days after the act was
enacted. The Department of Defense (DOD) report was also to include
implications for existing and future weapon systems based on the
findings of the F-35 evaluation. DOD submitted its report to Congress
in September 2010.
House Report 111-166 also directed the Comptroller General to provide
an assessment of the completeness of DOD's evaluation and submit a
report to the defense committees within 60 days after the date on
which DOD submits its evaluation. In assessing the completeness of
DOD's corrosion study, our objectives were to determine the extent to
which the study (1) assessed the incorporation of lessons learned from
the F-22's corrosion problems into the F-35's corrosion prevention and
control (CPC) program, (2) identified implications for other current
and future weapon systems' CPC programs, and (3) was consistent with
generally accepted research standards that define a sound and complete
study with regard to design, execution, and presentation.
To conduct this work, we reviewed DOD's September 2010 report and
documentation that the DOD study team collected. We interviewed
members of the DOD study team to obtain their views on key aspects of
the evaluation, and obtained the perspectives of the Air Force and the
Navy corrosion executives and F-35 and F-22 program offices on DOD's
study. We also identified generally accepted research standards, based
on prior GAO work, which define a sound and complete study, determined
which of these standards were relevant to DOD's corrosion study, and
compared characteristics of DOD's study against those standards.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 to December 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
On November 15, 2010, we provided a draft of this product to the
defense committees. Our evaluation of DOD's corrosion study is
discussed in the attached briefing slides (see enclosure I). In
summary, DOD's study identifies several areas where the F-35 program
has incorporated lessons learned from the F-22's corrosion problems,
compares and contrasts the two aircraft programs, and discusses
potential future corrosion issues for the F-35. The corrosion study
also addresses various implications for other weapon systems' CPC
programs. For example, it identifies key practices on which effective
corrosion prevention and control for any weapon system depend, names
five specific weapon system programs that could benefit from F-22 and
F-35 lessons learned, and cites commonly noted corrosion prevention
and control issues. The corrosion study was generally consistent with
research standards that define a sound and complete study with regard
to design, execution, and presentation.
Further, we found that the study team made recommendations in exit
briefings to the F-35 and F-22 program offices and that the report
contains numerous statements suggesting corrective actions may be
needed at other weapon system program offices, the services, and DOD
to improve their CPC programs. However, no formal recommendations were
made in the report. In the absence of formal recommendations, it may
be difficult for DOD and Congress to monitor and assess corrective
actions resulting from the corrosion study. Following up on corrective
actions would help DOD to minimize the impacts of corrosion on
military equipment. Therefore, we are making recommendations that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to document, and establish a
process for monitoring and assessing, corrective actions taken by the
F-35 and F-22 program offices, other weapon system program offices,
the Air Force, the Navy, and DOD in response to the corrosion study.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three
recommendations and partially concurred with one. DOD's written
comments are reprinted (see enclosure II). DOD also provided technical
comments that we have incorporated into this report where applicable.
DOD concurred with our recommendations to document F-22 and F-35
program-specific, service-specific, and DOD-wide recommendations
flowing from the corrosion study and to establish a process for
monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of corrective actions. DOD
stated that it had begun to take corrective actions on the program-and
service-specific recommendations, and that it was seeking to improve
CPC policies across the department, using the information from its
study to help guide future actions. Although these appear to be
positive steps, DOD in its response did not provide specific
information on its corrective actions or how it was documenting
recommendations or monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of
corrective actions. Therefore, we could not assess to what extent
DOD's actions will meet the intent of our recommendations.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation pertaining to five
other weapon systems identified in the study. DOD stated that its
study team did not conduct a review of these weapon systems or have
any insight into them in order to determine program-specific corrosion
issues. Further, DOD stated that any recommendations flowing from the
report with regard to these systems would be more appropriately
labeled "best practices." Although DOD did not focus on these five
systems, the study indicated that they were in a preproduction
acquisition status where there was potential opportunity to
incorporate CPC lessons learned from the F-35 and F-22. Therefore, we
continue to believe that DOD should take steps to ensure that
applicable lessons learned are identified and incorporated into the
acquisition programs of these five systems in order to avoid future
costs due to corrosion.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense;
the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This
report will also be available at no charge on our Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-8246 or edwardsj@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report were Tom Gosling, Assistant Director; Susannah Hawthorne; and
Janine Prybyla.
Signed by:
Jack E. Edwards:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Norm Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I:
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective Actions
Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter:
Briefing for Congressional Committees:
December 16, 2010:
Contents:
* Introduction:
* Objectives:
* Scope and Methodology:
* Summary of Findings:
* Objective 1: F-22 Lessons Learned for Corrosion Prevention and
Control:
* Objective 2: Implications for Other Weapon System Corrosion
Prevention and Control Programs:
* Objective 3: Design, Execution, and Presentation of the Corrosion
Study:
* Conclusions:
* Recommendations for Executive Action:
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
* Related GAO Products:
Introduction: Corrosion is costly and affects readiness and safety;
DOD and services have taken steps to prevent and control corrosion:
Corrosion can have negative effects on military equipment in terms of
cost, readiness, and safety.
* The Department of Defense (DOD) estimated in July 2010 that
corrosion of military equipment costs the military services over $21
billion a year.
* Corrosion affects military readiness by taking critical systems out
of action, and has also affected safety, resulting in fatal accidents
due to the degradation of equipment.
Corrosion is defined as the unintended destruction or deterioration of
a material due to interaction with the environment. It includes such
varied forms as rusting; pitting; galvanic reaction; calcium or other
mineral buildup; degradation due to ultraviolet light exposure; and
mold, mildew, or other organic decay.
Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)), the Office of Corrosion Policy
and Oversight is responsible for the prevention and mitigation of
corrosion of military equipment. Each military department has
designated a corrosion executive who serves as the principal point of
contact to the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight and
coordinates corrosion prevention and control (CPC) efforts.
DOD seeks to minimize the impact of corrosion on weapon systems and
has established key elements of CPC planning for this purpose. For
instance, weapon system program offices are encouraged to develop a
CPC plan and establish a corrosion prevention advisory team to help
mitigate potential corrosion problems.
F-22 and F-35 will be the backbone of DOD's tactical fleet; efforts to
address corrosion problems with the F-22 are under way:
The F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will be the backbone
of DOD's tactical fighter fleet for decades to come. These two systems
are referred to as fifth-generation fighters and possess capabilities,
such as low observable characteristics (stealth), data fusion from
multiple sources, and advanced electronics and communications systems.
* The F-22 is nearing the end of production at 187 aircraft and is
being procured by the U.S. Air Force.
* The F-35 is the largest acquisition program in the history of DOD
and is a joint and international program that includes three U.S.
military services and eight international partners. The F-35 is in
development and has begun low-rate production. Production is expected
to continue for 20 or more years and produce 3,000 or more aircraft.
Efforts are under way to address corrosion problems with the F-22.
Corrosion of the aluminum skin panels on the F-22 was first observed
in spring 2005, less than 6 months after the Air Force first
introduced the aircraft to a severe environment. By October 2007, a
total of 534 instances of corrosion were documented, and corrosion in
the substructure was becoming prevalent. For corrosion damage
identified to date, the government is paying $228 million to make F-22
corrosion-related repairs and retrofits through 2016.
House Report 111-166 directed DOD to evaluate the F-35 program:
In House Report 111-166 to accompany the House bill (H.R. 2647) that
later became the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, the House Armed Services Committee:
* expressed concerns that the lessons learned regarding the prevention
and management of corrosion in the F-22 had not been fully applied to
the development and acquisition of the F-35;
* directed the Director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to evaluate
the F-35 program and to submit a report to the defense committees
within 180 days after the act was enacted; and;
* stated that the report should include, but not be limited to,
information obtained from floor inspections and examination of program
documentation, implications for existing and future weapons systems
based on the findings of the F-35, and any and all manufacturing and
engineering processes.
The House Report also directed GAO to provide an assessment of the
completeness of DOD's evaluation and submit a report to the defense
committees within 60 days after the date on which DOD submits its
evaluation.
DOD submitted its final report, entitled Corrosion Evaluation of the F-
22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, on September 30,
2010.[Footnote 2]
[End of section]
Objectives:
In assessing the completeness of DOD's corrosion study, our objectives
were to determine the extent to which the study:
* assessed the incorporation of lessons learned from the F-22's
corrosion problems into the F-35's CPC program,
* identified implications for other current and future weapon systems'
CPC programs, and,
* was consistent with generally accepted research standards that
define a sound and complete study with regard to design, execution,
and presentation.
[End of section]
Scope and Methodology:
To conduct our work, we took the following steps:
* Reviewed DOD's September 2010 report and documentation that the DOD
study team collected to support its evaluation of the F-35 program,
and identified F-22 lessons learned and implications for other weapon
systems.
* Interviewed members of the DOD study team to obtain their views on
key aspects of the evaluation, including its objectives, scope, and
methodology; findings; conclusions; and any limitations that may have
impeded their ability to conduct a comprehensive review.
* Identified generally accepted research standards, based on prior GAO
work, that define a sound and complete study,[Footnote 3] determined
which of these standards were relevant to DOD's corrosion study, and
compared characteristics of DOD's study against those standards.
* Obtained the perspectives of the Air Force and the Navy corrosion
executives and F-35 and F-22 program offices on DOD's study, including
its approach, methodology, and findings.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 through December
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Summary of Findings:
* Objective 1: DOD's corrosion study identifies several areas where
the F-35 program has incorporated lessons learned from the F-22's
corrosion problems, compares and contrasts the two aircraft programs,
and discusses potential future corrosion issues for the F-35.
* Objective 2: The corrosion study addresses implications for other
weapon systems' CPC programs. For example, it identifies key practices
on which effective corrosion prevention and control for any weapon
system depend, names specific weapon system programs that could
benefit from F-22 and F-35 lessons learned, and cites commonly noted
corrosion prevention and control issues.
* Objective 3: The corrosion study was generally consistent with
research standards that define a sound and complete study with regard
to design, execution, and presentation. The study team made
recommendations in exit briefings to the program offices and the
report contains numerous statements suggesting corrective actions may
be needed at the service and DOD levels, but no formal recommendations
were made in the report. Thus, it may be difficult for DOD and
Congress to monitor and assess corrective actions taken in response to
the study's findings.
* Recommendation for Executive Action: We are making recommendations
aimed at ensuring that the program offices, services, and DOD take
sufficient corrective actions in response to the findings in the
corrosion study. DOD concurred with three recommendations and
partially concurred with one.
[End of section]
Objective 1: F-22 Lessons Learned:
Study documents several steps taken by F-35 program to control and
prevent corrosion based on F-22's problems:
The DOD corrosion study identifies several areas where the F-35
program has incorporated lessons learned from the F-22's corrosion
problems; examples follow.
* The F-35 program is mitigating corrosion risk associated with
conductive gap filler[Footnote 4] and paint by using a gap filler that
is less galvanically dissimilar from aluminum, an alternative to the
conductive paint, a design with fewer seams that require gap filler,
and more representative verification and qualification testing. Many
of the F-22's corrosion problems were linked to problems with gap
filler materials and paint.
* The F-35 program made organizational changes that integrated the
personnel working within the corrosion materials and processes
functional area and the low-observable (i.e., stealth) functional
area. In contrast, personnel working within these areas for the F-22
program were "stove-piped."
* The F-35 drainage design is significantly improved with more,
adequately sized drain holes. Drain holes in the F-22 were found to be
too small to enable good water drainage.
Study compares and contrasts the two programs:
The DOD corrosion study also compares and contrasts the two programs
with respect to corrosion prevention and control.
According to the study, the F-22 and F-35 programs were similar in
that they both followed a performance-based acquisition approach. This
approach gives the contractor the flexibility to design the aircraft
to meet high-level requirements set by the government. However,
neither aircraft had a corrosion prevention user requirement[Footnote
5] that would drive CPC as a design requirement. Further, the program
offices for both aircraft only required "corrosion resistance" within
the system specifications, a poorly defined and nonspecific term that
is difficult to ensure incorporation into aircraft components and to
verify.
While not necessarily due to lessons learned from the F-22 program,
the study identifies several important differences between the
programs. For example, the F-35 program:
* has several technical performance metrics, such as sortie generation
rate, that are indirectly driving actions to improve supportability,
while the F-22 program did not;
* has a more robust corrosion design largely due to inclusion of more
stringent Navy corrosion qualification tests;
* has a longer service life requirement (30 years vs. 20 years for the
F-22); and;
* has a Corrosion Prevention Advisory Board where corrosion issues are
discussed in detail and both the contractor and the government display
a willingness to address these issues.
Study discusses potential future corrosion issues for the F-35:
While the corrosion study states that the F-35 program incorporated
several lessons learned from the F-22's corrosion problems, the study
also discusses potential future corrosion issues for the F-35 based on
F-22 lessons learned and how these issues could be mitigated by making
changes to the current plans for the F-35; examples follow.
* Environmental and occupational health concerns drove the initial use
of a nonchromated primer[Footnote 6] on the F-22 that did not provide
corrosion protection, and the program later switched to a chromated
primer. The F-35 has also chosen to use a nonchromated primer that has
never been tested on an aircraft in a corrosive operating environment.
* No operational-level test for corrosion was conducted on the F-22
prior to initial operating capability, and none are currently planned
for the F-35.
* The length of the F-22 full-scale climatic test was cut in half, and
the program office for the F-35 is currently considering reducing its
full-scale climatic test.
The corrosion study concluded that, if the F-22 program had
accomplished testing earlier in the program, many of the corrosion
problems could have been addressed at greatly reduced cost and the
associated readiness issues avoided. If the F-35 conducts tests that
are planned and conducted properly and in full, these tests could
reveal many corrosion-susceptible areas on the aircraft.
[End of section]
Objective 2: Implications for Other Systems:
Study addresses various implications:
DOD's corrosion study addresses various implications for other
existing and future weapon systems. For example, it addresses key
practices on which effective CPC for any weapon system depend, names
specific weapon system programs that could benefit from F-22 and F-35
lessons learned, and cites commonly noted CPC issues.
The study also includes more generic factors that could potentially
contribute to corrosion in other weapon systems. These factors are
related to current acquisition practices, the application of lessons
learned from legacy systems, lack of Air Force expertise with
corrosion, and lack of Navy expertise with low-observable technology.
The study team based these implications for other weapon systems on
its review of the F-22 and F-35, briefings on other weapon system
programs at the Naval Air Systems Command, and assistance the DOD
Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office has given programs during
acquisition system reviews.
The Air Force and Navy corrosion executives stated that they agreed
with study findings pertaining to their services and were planning to
take corrective actions.
Study identifies key CPC practices and names specific systems that
could benefit from lessons learned:
DOD's corrosion study identifies key practices on which effective CPC
for any weapon system depend. These practices include:
* independent expert evaluation and advice;
* clear and traceable "flow down" of CPC requirements to aircraft
components;
* design guidelines and trade-offs that balance competing requirements;
* adequate verification and validation through testing that is
operationally representative; and;
* early operational evaluation in corrosive environments.
The study also names a number of new weapon systems that could benefit
from CPC lessons learned from both the F-22 and the F-35. These
systems include the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, CH-53K helicopter,
Joint High Speed Vessel, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned
Aircraft System, and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. The study
identifies these systems as candidates for incorporating lessons
learned due to their preproduction acquisition status.
Study cites common CPC issues:
DOD's study also cites several corrosion CPC issues that are common to
weapon system programs.
* CPC is not listed within user requirements documents.
* CPC is not integrated into system engineering processes.
* The program office lacks an effective corrosion prevention advisory
team.
* The program office lacks a strong CPC focus.
* Life-cycle costs accounting for the impact of corrosion are not
considered during program decision making.
Air Force and Navy corrosion executives stated they were taking
corrective actions:
Air Force and Navy corrosion executives stated they agreed with the
findings identified in DOD's study that pertain to their services and
briefed the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) on
corrective actions being taken to address these issues; examples
follow.
* The Air Force is:
” strengthening the charter of the Air Force Corrosion Prevention
Advisory Board[Footnote 7] to, among other things, include other
stakeholders and;
- forming integrated product teams within the Advisory Board to
address corrosion-related weaknesses in the areas identified by DOD's
study.
* The Navy is:
” developing a corrosion strategic plan (scheduled completion in
fiscal year 2011) and;
” drafting a Navy instruction with corrosion policy, protocols, and
timelines (scheduled completion in fiscal year 2011).
As these actions have not yet been completed, it is not clear the
extent to which they will address and correct the corrosion issues
identified in DOD's study.
[End of section]
Objective 3: Design, Execution, and Presentation:
Study was generally consistent with research standards:
The corrosion study was generally consistent with research standards
that define a sound and complete study with regard to design,
execution, and presentation.
Generally accepted research standards include the following elements:
[Footnote 8]
* Design standard: The study is well designed. The study's plan,
scope, and objectives follow guidance, and constraints are explicitly
identified.
* Execution standard: The study is well executed. The methodology is
successfully executed, and data are collected to support the analyses.
* Presentation standard: Presentation of results is timely, accurate,
concise, and relevant to the client and stakeholders. The presentation
of the results supports the study's findings, recommendations are
supported by analyses, and the participants and stakeholders are
informed of the study results and recommendations.
Study was well designed and consistent with guidance:
The corrosion study generally met the design standard. The plan,
scope, and objectives were consistent with congressional direction and
departmental guidance implementing that direction.
* The Director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight established a team of
government personnel and contractors to conduct the study. Team
members collectively had expertise and experience with weapon system
program management and corrosion.
* The study team used the language in the House Report as its starting
point to develop its evaluation design. An October 19, 2009,
memorandum signed by the USD (AT&L) provided further guidance.
* The evaluation design was multifaceted and included site visits,
collection and analysis of program documentation, interviews with
program officials, reviews of engineering and manufacturing processes,
and consultation with technical experts. The study team identified
relevant criteria for its study, including lessons learned from the F-
22 program and systems engineering best practices.
* A comprehensive study plan documenting all steps in the evaluation
design was not developed. However, elements of the design were
captured in various planning documents, and the study team briefed the
affected parties on the evaluation design, including the weapon system
program offices.
Constraints to the design of the study were identified:
The study team identified constraints to the design of the study.
* Due to time and geographic constraints, the study team did not
assess the manufacturing processes of the numerous suppliers. A major
portion of F-22 and F-35 parts and subassembly manufacturing had been
outsourced by the prime contractor to sub-tier suppliers.
* The breadth and depth of data pertaining to F-22 and F-35 corrosion
was extensive, and the team was limited by the amount of information
they could review in the study's time frame. To mitigate this
limitation, the team selected a few subsystems from each program to
conduct a full requirements and verification flow-down analysis, while
the remainder of the review looked at overall processes within the
programs. Subsystems reviewed were selected based on relevance to
corrosion issues (i.e., corrosion-related problems had already been
observed in these subsystems), program-level visibility, and level of
difficulty in collecting relevant information.
* Neither program office had maintained all records from the early
years of the programs and thus were missing a considerable amount of
documentation. In addition, meeting minutes from the F-22 program
office were lacking in detail, which made it difficult for the study
team to determine decisions made and dissenting opinions that occurred
at key meetings.
Study was well executed; deviations from the planned approach were
explained:
The corrosion study generally met the execution standard. The study
was executed in accordance with the evaluation design. There were some
deviations from the planned approach which were explained.
* The study team gathered and reviewed program documents; conducted
site visits to program offices, service laboratories, manufacturing
facilities, and major depots; and analyzed the information it obtained
for contributing causes, lessons learned, and applications of best or
accepted practices.
* The review examined subject areas that affected the corrosion
resistance of the aircraft design and how the effects of corrosion
were accounted for. The subject areas included (1) systems
engineering/program management; (2) materials and processes; (3)
structures; (4) manufacturing and quality assurance; and (5) knowledge
base/science and technology.
* Deviations from the planned approach were explained:
” Initially, the program offices were to have identified appropriate
subsystems for the study team to review; however, since this did not
occur, the study team selected the subsystems drawing from information
it had already collected.
” As noted previously, the study team was not able to visit as many
sub-tier suppliers as originally anticipated and focused its work
mainly on the original equipment manufacturers.
” The study team also made some changes to its initial schedule as the
study progressed.
Study presents results that support its findings:
The corrosion study generally met the presentation standard.
* Our review of documents collected by the study team and our
discussions with team members showed that the presentation of results
in the report supports findings developed in the evaluation.
* In addition, we found the report was consistent with this standard
in that it addressed the study's objectives, cited documentary support
for key points, and contained conclusions that are supported by
analyses.
* While the study team identified constraints to the design of the
study and was able to explain deviations from its planned approach,
not all constraints and deviations were explicitly discussed in the
report.
* The F-22 and F-35 program offices, as well as the Air Force and the
Navy, were given an opportunity to comment on a draft of the report.
The comments were addressed by the study team, and any changes they
deemed necessary were incorporated into the final report. Further, all
of the comments and the team's responses were incorporated into an
appendix in the final report.
* While the program offices disagreed with some of the specific
findings regarding their programs, both program offices and the Air
Force and Navy corrosion executives agreed with the overall approach
and findings of the study.
Recommendations are not documented in DOD's study:
The findings and conclusions of DOD's corrosion study imply that
corrective actions are needed, but the report does not include formal
recommendations.
* The study team provided recommendations to both program offices
during their exit briefings. In addition, throughout the report,
recommended courses of action for the program offices are implied;
examples follow.
” "The [F-22] program should heed the lessons they could have learned
from their early corrosion experience as the fixes are implemented and
tested."
” "With appropriate mitigation planning and activities, the F-35 can
address the remaining corrosion risks before they are realized. This
will likely involve additional full scale and component-level testing,
changes in design, and trade studies to address the long term cost and
readiness implications of design choices."
* Likewise, the report contains numerous statements implying that
corrective actions are needed at the service and DOD levels. As noted
previously, the Air Force and Navy corrosion executives have briefed
DOD on actions they are taking in response to the corrosion study.
Officials said they considered but did not make formal recommendations
in the report because doing so likely would have increased the time
for internal report coordination and concurrence.
Lack of formal recommendations could hamper follow-up and
accountability:
In the absence of documented formal recommendations, it may be
difficult for DOD and Congress to monitor and assess corrective
actions taken in response to the study's findings.
One element of the presentation standard states that recommendations
arising from a research study should be supported by analyses. While
this standard does not require researchers to make recommendations, a
high-quality study thoroughly explores the implications of its
findings. Further, recommending a course of action is a highly
accountable step for researchers.[Footnote 9]
In addition, policymakers and program managers should implement sound
internal controls to improve accountability and minimize operational
problems. More specifically, internal control monitoring should assess
the quality of performance over time and ensure the findings and
recommendations of audits and other reviews are promptly
resolved.[Footnote 10]
[End of section]
Conclusions:
Based on our review, we believe DOD's evaluation of the F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter corrosion prevention and control program is reasonably
complete given the time limitations and other constraints.
The study highlights important lessons learned from the F-22's
corrosion problems and identifies ongoing corrosion concerns for both
the F-22 and F-35, as well as implications for other current and
future weapon systems, but the lack of formal recommendations flowing
from the study may hinder the implementation of corrective actions
needed to address these ongoing concerns and implications.
The study names five other weapon systems that could potentially
benefit from F-35 and F-22 corrosion lessons learned, but it is not
clear from the study to what extent the lessons have actually been
incorporated into these systems' CPC programs. Given the preproduction
status of the five systems, actions taken in a timely manner to
incorporate the lessons learned could have a positive impact on
preventing future corrosion.
Documenting, monitoring, and assessing corrective actions at the
program offices, the services, and DOD-wide would help DOD to minimize
the effects of corrosion on military equipment.
[End of section]
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure sufficient follow-up to DOD's corrosion study, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the USD (AT&L) to
take the following four actions:
* Document program-specific recommendations flowing from the corrosion
study with regard to the F-35 and F-22 and establish a process for
monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of these programs'
corrective actions.
* Document program-specific recommendations flowing from the corrosion
study with regard to the other weapon systems identified”specifically,
the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, CH-53K helicopter, Joint High
Speed Vessel, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft
System, and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle”and establish a process
for monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of the CPC programs for
these systems.
* Document Air Force- and Navy-specific recommendations flowing from
the corrosion study and establish a process for monitoring and
assessing the effectiveness of these services' corrective actions.
* Document DOD-wide recommendations flowing from the corrosion study,
implement any needed changes in policies and practices to improve CPC
in new systems, and establish a process for monitoring and assessing
the effectiveness of the department's corrective actions.
[End of section]
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In its written comments, DOD concurred with three recommendations and
partially concurred with one.
DOD concurred that it should document F-22 and F-35 program-specific,
service-specific, and DOD-wide recommendations flowing from the
corrosion study and that it should monitor and assess the
effectiveness of corrective actions. DOD stated that it had begun to
take corrective actions. Because DOD did not provide specific
information on these corrective actions or how it would implement our
recommendations, we could not assess to what extent DOD's actions will
meet the intent of our recommendations.
DOD partially concurred that it should document recommendations
pertaining to the five other identified systems and that it should
monitor and assess the effectiveness of corrective actions. DOD stated
that the study team did not review these systems or have insight into
them in order to determine program-specific corrosion issues. However,
as noted earlier, the study identifies these systems as candidates for
incorporating lessons learned due to their preproduction acquisition
status. Therefore, we continue to believe DOD should take steps to
ensure that applicable lessons learned from the F-35 and F-22 are
identified and incorporated into the acquisition programs of these
five systems in order to avoid future costs due to corrosion.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Management: DOD Has a Rigorous Process to Select Corrosion
Prevention Projects, but Would Benefit from Clearer Guidance and
Validation of Returns on Investments. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-1184]. Washington, D.C.: December 8,
2010.
Defense Management: Observations on Department of Defense and Military
Service Fiscal Year 2011 Requirements for Corrosion Prevention and
Control. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-608R].
Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Defense Management: Observations on the Department of Defense's Fiscal
Year 2011 Budget Request for Corrosion Prevention and Control.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-607R]. Washington,
D.C.: April 15, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting
Warfighter Requirements on Time. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-382]. Washington, D.C.: March 19,
2010.
Defense Management: Observations on DOD's Analysis of Options for
Improving Corrosion Prevention and Control through Earlier Planning in
the Requirements and Acquisition Processes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-694R]. Washington, D.C.: May 29,
2009.
Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing
Development Increases the Government's Financial Risk. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-303]. Washington, D.C.: March 12,
2009.
Defense Management: High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions Are
Needed to Address Corrosion Issues. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-07-618]. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2007.
[End of section]
[End of Enclosure I]
Enclosure II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
December 9, 2010:
Mr. Jack E. Edwards:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Edwards:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-11-171R, "Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and
Assess Corrective Actions Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter," dated November, 2010 (GAO Code 351517).
Attached is DoD's proposed response to subject report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Daniel J. Dunmire:
Director:
DoD Corrosion Policy and Oversight:
Enclosures: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated November 15, 2010:
GAO-11-171R (GAO Code 351517):
"Defense Management: Dod Needs To Monitor And Assess Corrective
Actions Resulting From Its Corrosion Study Of The F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter"
Department Of Defense Comments To GAO Recommendation:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to document program-specific recommendations flowing from
the corrosion study with regard to the F-35 and F-22 and establish a
process for monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of these
programs' corrective actions (See page 25/GAO Draft Report).
DoD Response: Concur. The DoD has already begun taking action on the F-
35 and F-22 program-specific findings of the study.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to document program-specific recommendations flowing from
the corrosion study with regard to the other weapon systems
identified ” specifically, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, CH-53K
helicopter, Joint High Speed Vessel, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
Unmanned Aircraft System, and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle ” and
establish a process for monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of
the CPC programs for these systems (See page 25/GAO Draft Report).
DoD Response: Partially concur. Recommendations flowing from the
corrosion study for other weapon systems identified in the report are
general in nature and not specific to a program. These weapon systems
were identified due to the phase of acquisition they are in and a
general understanding of the materials used. Recommendations flowing
from the report on these systems would be more appropriately labeled
top level "best practices" that apply to any system and are already
stated at the end of the Executive Summary of the report. The
evaluation team did not conduct a review of the other weapon systems
or have any insight into those programs to determine any program
specific corrosion issues.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to document Air Force- and Navy-specific recommendations
flowing from the corrosion study and establish a process for
monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of these services'
corrective actions (See page 25/GAO Draft Report).
DoD Response: Concur. The DoD has already begun taking action on the
Air Force- and Navy-specific findings of the study.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to document DoD-wide recommendations flowing from the
corrosion study, implement any needed changes in policies and
practices to improve CPC in new systems, and establish a process for
monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of the department's
corrective actions (See page 25/GAO Draft Report).
DoD Response: Concur. The DoD corrosion program is seeking to improve
the policies and practices for CPC across the department and will use
the information from the report to help guide future actions.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009).
[2] The report is dated September 20, 2010.
[3] GAO identified frequently occurring, generally accepted research
standards that are relevant for defense studies and define a quality
or sound and complete study as part of its 2006 review of the adequacy
and completeness of a DOD study. The standards drew from several
sources, including prior GAO work and external organizations such as
the RAND Corporation. See GAO, Defense Transportation: Study
Limitations Raise Questions about the Adequacy and Completeness of the
Mobility Capabilities Study and Report, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-938] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20,
2006).
[4] Gap filler is the sealant between exterior panels that is required
by low-observable aircraft.
[5] User requirements are top-level elements that are required to be
included in an aircraft's design and are specified in the F-35's
Capabilities Development Document and the F-22's Operational
Requirements Document.
[6] A nonchromated primer does not contain hexavalent chromium (Cr+6).
[7] This Advisory Board oversees and coordinates efforts throughout
the Air Force to prevent and mitigate corrosion of military equipment.
[8] Each of the three standards has a number of supporting elements.
However, not all of these are applicable to every study. For example,
some elements apply to scenarios, threats, modeling, and assumptions
and may be relevant to studies that make future projections or
estimates. Similarly, some elements apply to the verification and
validation of data and may be relevant to studies that rely on
quantitative analyses as a basis for findings.
[9] RAND Corporation, RAND Standards for High-Quality Research and
Analysis (Santa Monica, Calif.: January 2010). These standards were
part of GAO's 2006 review of research literature and DOD guidance that
identified frequently occurring, generally accepted research standards
that are relevant for defense studies and define a quality or sound
and complete study. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-938].
[10] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.:
November 1999).
[End of section]
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