Military Personnel
DOD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Need to Be Further Strengthened
Gao ID: GAO-10-405T February 24, 2010
This report discusses our efforts to evaluate the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the U.S. Coast Guard's oversight and implementation of their respective sexual assault prevention and response programs. Our findings build upon our previous work related to sexual assault in the military services. DOD and the Coast Guard have taken a number of positive steps to increase program awareness and to improve their prevention and response to occurrences of sexual assault, but additional actions are needed to strengthen their respective programs. As we have previously reported, sexual assault is a crime with a far-reaching negative impact on the military services in that it undermines core values, degrades mission readiness and esprit de corps, subverts strategic goodwill, and raises financial costs. Since we reported on these implications in 2008, incidents of sexual assault have continued to occur; in fiscal year 2008, DOD reported nearly 3,000 alleged sexual assault cases, and the Coast Guard reported about 80. However, it remains impossible to accurately analyze trends or draw conclusions from these data because DOD and the Coast Guard have not yet standardized their respective reporting requirements.
DOD has taken steps to implement our August 2008 recommendations to improve its sexual assault prevention and response program; however, its efforts reflect various levels of progress, and opportunities exist for further program improvements. To its credit, DOD has implemented four of the nine recommendations in our August 2008 report. Further, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has introduced some changes in DOD's annual report to Congress, it has not completed the process of developing a standardized set of sexual assault data elements and definitions. We also found that OSD cannot assess training programs as we recommended, because OSD's strategic plans and draft oversight framework do not contain measures against which to benchmark performance, and DOD has not implemented our recommendation to evaluate processes for staffing key installation-level positions because, according to OSD officials, they were advised that the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services would be making related recommendations. Finally, OSD officials stated that they will not address our recommendation to collect installation-level data--despite its availability and the military services' willingness to provide them--until they have implemented the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database to maintain these data. While the Coast Guard has partially implemented one of our recommendations to further develop its sexual assault prevention and response program, it has not implemented the other. In August 2008, we reported that the Coast Guard's sexual assault prevention and response program was hindered by several issues, and we made two recommendations to strengthen its program's implementation. Further, the Coast Guard lacks a systematic process to collect, document, and maintain its sexual assault data and related program information, and it lacks quality control procedures to ensure that program data being collected are reliable. Additionally, while the Coast Guard's instruction requires that all Coast Guard Sexual Assault Response Coordinators be trained to perform relevant duties, officials stated that they have not developed a curriculum or implemented training for the Coast Guard's 16 Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, as they had elected alternatively to develop a training curriculum for other program personnel. Thus, to ensure that the Coast Guard can provide proper advice to its personnel, in our February 2010 report we recommend that it establish and administer a curriculum for all key program personnel.
GAO-10-405T, Military Personnel: DOD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs Need to Be Further Strengthened
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST:
Thursday, February 24, 2010:
Military Personnel:
DOD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Programs Need to Be Further Strengthened:
Statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
and:
Randolph C. Hite, Director:
Information Technology Architecture and Systems:
GAO-10-405T:
[End of section]
Chairman Tierney and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our efforts
to evaluate the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the U.S. Coast
Guard's oversight and implementation of their respective sexual
assault prevention and response programs. Our statement today
summarizes the findings of a report that we are issuing concurrently
with today's hearing, and it builds upon our previous work related to
sexual assault in the military services.[Footnote 1] Our main message
today is that DOD and the Coast Guard have taken a number of positive
steps to increase program awareness and to improve their prevention
and response to occurrences of sexual assault, but additional actions
are needed to strengthen their respective programs. As we have
previously reported, sexual assault is a crime with a far-reaching
negative impact on the military services in that it undermines core
values, degrades mission readiness and esprit de corps, subverts
strategic goodwill, and raises financial costs.[Footnote 2] Since we
reported on these implications in 2008, incidents of sexual assault
have continued to occur; in fiscal year 2008, DOD reported nearly
3,000 alleged sexual assault cases, and the Coast Guard reported about
80.[Footnote 3] However, it remains impossible to accurately analyze
trends or draw conclusions from these data because DOD and the Coast
Guard have not yet standardized their respective reporting
requirements.[Footnote 4]
Mr. Chairman, your ongoing attention to this important issue has led
to a number of improvements to both DOD's and the Coast Guard's sexual
assault prevention and response programs, and has significantly
contributed to the broader congressional effort to raise the awareness
of and accountability for sexual assault in the military services. Our
August 2008 report examined sexual assault in the military and Coast
Guard services,[Footnote 5] and highlighted that DOD's and the Coast
Guard's program implementation was hindered by several issues,
including the lack of an oversight framework, limited support from
commanders, and training that was not consistently effective.
Accordingly, we made a number of recommendations--nine to DOD, and two
to the Coast Guard--for improving program implementation. We
recommended that DOD:
* review and evaluate the department's policies for the prevention of
and response to sexual assault to ensure that adequate guidance is
provided to effectively implement the program in deployed environments
and joint environments,
* evaluate the military services' processes for staffing and
designating key installation-level program positions, such as
coordinators, at installations in the United States and overseas, to
ensure that these individuals have the ability and resources to fully
carry out their responsibilities,
* review and evaluate sexual assault prevention and response training
to ensure that the military services are meeting training requirements
and to enhance the effectiveness of the training,
* systematically evaluate and develop an action plan to address any
factors that may prevent or discourage servicemembers from accessing
health services following a sexual assault,
* direct the military service secretaries to emphasize to all levels
of command their responsibility for supporting the program, and review
the extent to which commanders support the program and resources are
available to raise servicemembers' awareness of sexual assault matters,
* require the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to develop
an oversight framework to guide continued program implementation and
evaluate program effectiveness,
* improve the usefulness of the department's annual report as an
oversight tool both internally and for congressional decision makers
by establishing baseline data to permit analysis of data over time and
to distinguish cases in which (1) evidence was insufficient to
substantiate an alleged assault, (2) a victim recanted, or (3) the
allegations of sexual assault were unfounded,
* direct the military service secretaries to provide installation-
level incident data to the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Office annually or as requested, to facilitate analysis of sexual
assault-related data and better target resources over time, and:
* direct the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military
Services to begin its examination immediately, now that all members of
the task force have been appointed, and to develop a detailed plan
with milestones to guide its work.
We recommended that the Coast Guard:
* evaluate its processes for staffing key installation-level program
positions, such as the coordinators, to ensure that these individuals
have the ability and resources to fully carry out their
responsibilities, and:
* develop an oversight framework to guide continued program
implementation and evaluate program effectiveness. At a minimum, such
a framework should contain long-term goals, objectives, and
milestones; performance goals; strategies to be used to accomplish
goals; and criteria for measuring progress.
We also testified twice before your Subcommittee in 2008 on matters
related to sexual assault in the military services; first, in July
2008,[Footnote 6] to present our preliminary observations on DOD's and
the Coast Guard's sexual assault prevention and response programs, and
second, in September 2008, to present the findings and recommendations
of our August 2008 report.[Footnote 7] In November 2008, you asked us
to continue to monitor DOD's and the Coast Guard's progress in
addressing those recommendations. Our statement today specifically
addresses the extent to which:
* DOD has taken steps to implement our recommendations from 2008 and
has further developed its programs to prevent and respond to sexual
assault;
* DOD has taken steps to address a congressional requirement to
establish a centralized, case-level sexual assault incident database;
and:
* the Coast Guard has taken steps to implement our recommendations
from 2008 and has further developed its programs to prevent and
respond to sexual assault.
To conduct our work, we reviewed current DOD and Coast Guard policies
and programs and compared them with our findings and recommendations
from 2008. We also interviewed DOD and Coast Guard officials to
supplement our analyses of program modifications. In addition, we
assessed the extent to which DOD has addressed a congressional
requirement to establish a centralized, case-level sexual assault
database by reviewing applicable legislation and DOD documentation,
and compared it with DOD, federal, and industry guidance on key system
acquisition best practices. We also interviewed DOD officials to
obtain information on the status of the department's efforts to
establish the database.
For our report based on this performance audit, we conducted our work
from February 2009 to February 2010 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
DOD's Efforts to Address Our Recommendations from 2008 Reflect Varying
Levels of Progress:
DOD has taken steps to implement our August 2008 recommendations to
improve its sexual assault prevention and response program; however,
its efforts reflect various levels of progress, and opportunities
exist for further program improvements. To its credit, DOD has
implemented four of the nine recommendations in our August 2008
report. First, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
established a working group to address our recommendation to evaluate
the adequacy of DOD policies for implementing its sexual assault
prevention and response program in joint and deployed environments.
Based on the working group's findings, OSD suggested revisions to
joint policy, which a Joint Staff official told us they are using to
modify related publications. Second, the military service secretaries
have each taken a variety of steps to address our recommendation to
emphasize responsibility for program support at all levels of command.
The most notable examples of this support include the U.S. Navy's
recent establishment of a sexual assault prevention and response
office that will report directly to the Secretary of the Navy, and the
Army's incorporation of a sexual assault program awareness assessment
into promotional boards for its noncommissioned officers. Third, OSD
chartered the Health Affairs Sexual Assault Task Force to address our
recommendation to evaluate and address factors that may prevent or
discourage servicemembers from seeking health services. Specifically,
the task force evaluated and subsequently issued a number of
recommendations that are intended to improve access to health care
following a sexual assault, including chartering a Sexual Assault
Health Care Integrated Policy Team to review department-level policies
regarding clinical practice guidelines, standards of care, personnel
and staffing, training requirements and responsibilities, continuity
of care, and in-theater equipment and supplies. Fourth, in August
2008, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military
Services began its examination of matters related to sexual assault,
as we recommended, and on December 1, 2009 the task force released a
report with its findings and recommendations.
However, DOD's actions toward implementing the other five
recommendations from 2008 reflect less progress. For example, although
OSD has drafted an oversight framework, that framework does not
contain all the elements necessary for effective strategic planning
and program implementation, such as criteria for measuring progress to
facilitate program evaluation and to identify areas needing
improvement. However, according to OSD officials, they plan to develop
these within the next 2 years. Further, the draft oversight framework
does not include information on how OSD plans to use or report the
results of its performance assessments, does not identify how program
resources correlate to its achievement of program objectives, and does
not correlate with the program's two strategic plans. Therefore, to
improve oversight of the department's sexual assault prevention and
response programs, in our February 2010 report we recommend that OSD
strengthen its oversight framework by identifying how the results of
performance assessments will be used to guide the development of
future program initiatives, identifying how program resources
correlate to its achievement of strategic program objectives, and
correlating the oversight framework with the program's two strategic
plans. In written comments on our draft report, DOD concurred and
noted that it has already taken steps toward implementing these
recommendations. For example, DOD stated that it currently has efforts
underway to establish criteria for measuring its progress and expects
to have a plan in early 2010 for tracking the department's progress
toward performance objectives. DOD also noted that it plans to align
its budget categories with specific performance objectives, starting
with the 2012 budget cycle. Further, DOD noted that the process it
plans to use to track its progress toward performance objectives will
also allow the department to synchronize the objectives, timelines,
and strategies of its two strategic plans. We commend DOD for taking
immediate steps in response to our recommendations, and encourage the
department to continue taking positive actions toward fully
implementing them.
Further, while OSD has introduced some changes in DOD's annual report
to Congress, it has not completed the process of developing a
standardized set of sexual assault data elements and definitions. OSD
officials noted that the standardization of data definitions is
something they expect to accomplish in the near term, while
standardizing data elements will take longer as it is a task that will
be completed in conjunction with their development of a centralized
sexual assault database. However, we note that in the meantime,
information in DOD's annual report still cannot be compared across the
military services, and it may not be effectively characterizing
incidents of sexual assault in the military services. Thus, to enhance
visibility over the incidence of sexual assaults involving DOD
servicemembers, and to improve the department's sexual assault
prevention and response programs and the pending implementation of the
Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database, in our February 2010 report
we recommend that DOD standardize the type, amount, and format of the
data in the military services' report submissions. In written comments
on our draft report, DOD stated that it is working to achieve complete
data uniformity among the military services, but that this will
ultimately be accomplished once the Defense Sexual Assault Incident
Database--which I will discuss next--has been established. While we
recognize the complexity of this task, we continue to assert that the
full establishment and implementation of standardized data elements
and definitions will facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of
DOD's sexual assault prevention and response programs.
We also found that OSD cannot assess training programs as we
recommended, because OSD's strategic plans and draft oversight
framework do not contain measures against which to benchmark
performance, and DOD has not implemented our recommendation to
evaluate processes for staffing key installation-level positions
because, according to OSD officials, they were advised that the
Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services would be
making related recommendations. Finally, OSD officials stated that
they will not address our recommendation to collect installation-level
data--despite its availability and the military services' willingness
to provide them--until they have implemented the Defense Sexual
Assault Incident Database to maintain these data. We did not make any
new recommendations to DOD in our February 2010 report regarding these
findings however, we continue to assert that until these
recommendations are fully implemented, OSD cannot be sure that the
programs are improving the department's prevention of and response to
sexual assault incidents.
DOD Has Yet to Establish A Centralized Sexual Assault Incident
Database:
DOD has taken preliminary steps to establish the centralized, case-
level Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database that Congress directed
it to implement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009, but it did not meet the statutorily mandated January 2010
deadline for implementing the database. Instead, only general
milestones for acquiring the database have been set, and DOD cannot
currently commit to when the system will be implemented because it
does not have a reliable acquisition and implementation schedule.
Further, a range of key information technology management practices
that are essential to successfully acquiring and implementing a system
remain to be accomplished. Our research and evaluations of information
technology programs across the federal government have shown that
adherence to such practices--including assessing a program's overlap
with related programs and using reliable estimates of life cycle costs
and benefits to justify investment in the system--is essential to
delivering promised system capabilities and benefits on time and
within budget. However, more remains to be accomplished before these
disciplines will be effectively implemented. For example, while DOD
developed a business case for the database in June 2009 that includes
a cost estimate of $12.6 million, the cost estimate does not include
all costs over the system's life cycle, has not been adjusted to
account for program risks, and does not include a comparison of
alternatives on the basis of net present value. To increase the
chances of the database being successfully acquired and implemented,
in our February 2010 report we recommend that DOD adhere to key system
acquisition management processes and controls, including, but not
limited to developing a reliable integrated master schedule, assessing
the program's overlap with related programs, and justifying the
investment based on reliable estimates of life cycle costs and
benefits. In written comments on our draft report, DOD agreed with
these recommendations but noted that doing so depends in part on
hiring a system development contractor. In this regard, DOD expects to
release the Request for Proposals for a system developer soon, and
award a contract sometime between April and June 2010.
Coast Guard Has Partially Implemented One of Our Two Recommendations
from 2008:
While the Coast Guard has partially implemented one of our
recommendations to further develop its sexual assault prevention and
response program, it has not implemented the other. In August 2008, we
reported that the Coast Guard's sexual assault prevention and response
program was hindered by several issues, and we made two
recommendations to strengthen its program's implementation.[Footnote
8] In response to these recommendations, the Coast Guard has
established a headquarters-level program manager position to oversee
its sexual assault prevention and response program, and it has
initiated an assessment of the current workload requirements and
resource allocations for its Sexual Assault Response Coordinators. In
written comments on our draft report, the Coast Guard stated that it
had recently completed its assessment of the workload requirements and
resource allocations for its Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, and
upon release of the final report the Coast Guard plans to review and
analyze the recommendations and as appropriate, incorporate additional
resource requirements into its annual budget process.
Further, the Coast Guard lacks a systematic process to collect,
document, and maintain its sexual assault data and related program
information, and it lacks quality control procedures to ensure that
program data being collected are reliable. For example, Coast Guard
officials noted that in fiscal year 2008, the Coast Guard
Investigative Service documented 78 reports of alleged sexual assault,
while Coast Guard Headquarters, using its hard copy log of reports
from its coordinators, had documented only 30. Therefore, in our
February 2010 report we recommend that the Coast Guard improve the
oversight and accountability of its sexual assault prevention and
response program by establishing a systematic process for collecting,
documenting, and maintaining sexual assault incidence data, and by
establishing quality control processes to ensure that program
information collected is reliable. In written comments on our draft
report, the Coast Guard noted that it is currently developing a
prototype of an electronic database to track sexual assault reports
and that it expects to complete the database in 2010.
Additionally, while the Coast Guard's instruction requires that all
Coast Guard Sexual Assault Response Coordinators be trained to perform
relevant duties, officials stated that they have not developed a
curriculum or implemented training for the Coast Guard's 16 Sexual
Assault Response Coordinators, as they had elected alternatively to
develop a training curriculum for other program personnel. Thus, to
ensure that the Coast Guard can provide proper advice to its
personnel, in our February 2010 report we recommend that it establish
and administer a curriculum for all key program personnel. In written
comments on our draft report, the Coast Guard noted that it has
scheduled training in May 2010 for all of its personnel performing
Sexual Assault Response Coordinator duties. We commend the Coast Guard
for the steps it has taken and its plans for further developing its
sexual assault prevention and response program, and we encourage the
service to continue taking positive actions toward fully implementing
our recommendations.
In summary, we want to reiterate our recognition that both DOD and the
Coast Guard have taken a number of positive steps toward addressing
our recommendations from 2008 to further strengthen their respective
sexual assault prevention and response programs. Additionally, each
service has proactively developed and implemented a variety of
initiatives--beyond what we recommended--to increase program awareness
and to improve prevention of and response to occurrences of sexual
assault. While such progress is noteworthy, DOD's and the Coast
Guard's efforts have not fully established sound management frameworks
that include a long-term perspective and clear lines of
accountability--all of which are needed to withstand the
administrative, fiscal, and political pressures that confront federal
programs on a daily basis. Further, successful program implementation
will require the personal involvement of top DOD and Coast Guard
leadership in order to maintain the long-term focus on and
accountability for program objectives. Without such support, DOD's and
the Coast Guard's programs will not be able to maximize the benefits
of their respective prevention and response initiatives, and they may
not be able to effect the change in military culture that is needed to
ensure that their programs are institutionalized.
Chairman Tierney and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our
prepared statement. We would be pleased to answer any questions you
may have at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
If you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this
statement, please contact Brenda Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or
farrellb@gao.gov or Randolph Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Key
contributors to this statement include Marilyn K. Wasleski, Assistant
Director; Neelaxi Lakhmani, Assistant Director; Divya Bali; Stacy
Bennett; K. Nicole Harms; Jim Houtz; Ron La Due Lake; Kim Mayo; Adam
Vodraska; and Cheryl A. Weissman.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Military Personnel: Additional Actions Are Needed to
Strengthen DOD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual Assault Prevention and
Response Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-
215], (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2010).
[2] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Programs Face Implementation and
Oversight Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-924] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 29,
2008).
[3] In fiscal year 2008, DOD reported 2,908 alleged incidents of
sexual assault involving military servicemembers, and the Coast Guard
reported 84.
[4] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-924].
[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-924].
[6] GAO, Military Personnel: Preliminary Observations on DOD's and the
Coast Guard's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1013T] (Washington,
D.C.: July 31, 2008).
[7] GAO, Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Strengthen
Implementation and Oversight of DOD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Programs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1146T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10,
2008).
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-924].
[End of section]
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