Defense Acquisitions
DOD Could Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among Its Unmanned Aircraft Systems Gao ID: GAO-10-508T March 23, 2010For the last several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has planned to invest billions of dollars in development and procurement of unmanned aircraft systems. In its fiscal year 2011 budget request the department indicated a significant increase in these investments, expecting to need more than $24 billion from 2010 through 2015. DOD recognizes that to leverage its resources more effectively, it must achieve greater commonality among the military services' unmanned aircraft system acquisition programs. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's July 2009 report (GAO-09-520) which examined 10 unmanned aircraft acquisition programs: eight unmanned aircraft systems--Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow, Predator, Sky Warrior, Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance, and Unmanned Combat Aircraft System-Demonstration; and two payload development programs--Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program, and Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload. The testimony focuses on: 1) the cost, schedule, and performance progress of the 10 programs as of July 2009; 2) the extent to which the military services collaborated and identified commonality among the programs; 3) factors influencing the effectiveness of the collaboration; and, 4) recent DOD investment decisions related to these acquisitions.
Most of the 10 programs reviewed had experienced cost increases, schedule delays, performance shortfalls, or some combination of these problems. The programs' development cost estimates increased by more than $3 billion collectively, or 37 percent, from initial estimates. Procurement funding requirements for most programs also increased, primarily because of increases in numbers of aircraft being procured, changes in system requirements, and upgrades and retrofits to fielded systems. Procurement unit costs increased by an average of 12 percent, with three aircraft programs experiencing unit cost increases of 25 percent or more. Four programs reported delays of 1 year or more in delivering capability to the warfighter. Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, and Shadow had been used in combat operations with success and lessons learned, but had been rushed into service in some cases, leading to performance issues and delays in development and operational testing and verification. Programs collaborated and identified areas of commonality to varying degrees. The Marine Corps was able to avoid the cost of initial system development and quickly deliver useful capability to the warfighter by choosing to procure existing Army Shadow systems. The Navy expected to save time and money on Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) by using Air Force's Global Hawk airframe, and payloads and subsystems from other programs. However, Army and Air Force had not collaborated on their Sky Warrior and Predator programs, and might have achieved greater savings if they had, given that Sky Warrior is a variant of Predator and being developed by the same contractor. DOD encouraged more commonality between these programs. Although several programs achieved airframe commonality, service-driven acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration were key factors that inhibited commonality among subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations, raising concerns about potential inefficiencies and duplication. Despite DOD's efforts to emphasize a joint approach to identifying needs and commonality among systems, most of the programs assessed continued to pursue service-unique requirements. The services also made independent resource allocation decisions to support their unique requirements. DOD had not quantified the costs and benefits associated with pursuing commonality among these programs, and efforts to collaborate had produced mixed results. However, in order to maximize acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD have continued to push for more commonality. Since July 2009, DOD has made several investment decisions regarding unmanned aircraft systems, which in general, reflect increased emphasis on developing advanced capabilities and acquiring larger numbers of specific systems. However, the decisions do not appear to focus on increasing collaboration or commonality among the programs.
GAO-10-508T, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Could Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among Its Unmanned Aircraft Systems
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-508T
entitled 'Defense Acquisitions: DOD Could Achieve Greater Commonality
and Efficiencies among Its Unmanned Aircraft Systems' which was
released on March 23, 2010.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST:
Tuesday, March 23, 2010:
Defense Acquisitions:
DOD Could Achieve Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among Its
Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-10-508T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-508T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
For the last several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
planned to invest billions of dollars in development and procurement
of unmanned aircraft systems. In its fiscal year 2011 budget request
the department indicated a significant increase in these investments,
expecting to need more than $24 billion from 2010 through 2015. DOD
recognizes that to leverage its resources more effectively, it must
achieve greater commonality among the military services‘ unmanned
aircraft system acquisition programs.
This testimony is based primarily on GAO‘s July 2009 report (GAO-09-
520) which examined 10 unmanned aircraft acquisition programs: eight
unmanned aircraft systems”Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow, Predator, Sky
Warrior, Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance, and Unmanned
Combat Aircraft System-Demonstration; and two payload development
programs”Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program, and
Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload. The testimony focuses on: 1)
the cost, schedule, and performance progress of the 10 programs as of
July 2009; 2) the extent to which the military services collaborated
and identified commonality among the programs; 3) factors influencing
the effectiveness of the collaboration; and, 4) recent DOD investment
decisions related to these acquisitions.
What GAO Found:
Most of the 10 programs reviewed had experienced cost increases,
schedule delays, performance shortfalls, or some combination of these
problems. The programs‘ development cost estimates increased by more
than $3 billion collectively, or 37 percent, from initial estimates.
Procurement funding requirements for most programs also increased,
primarily because of increases in numbers of aircraft being procured,
changes in system requirements, and upgrades and retrofits to fielded
systems. Procurement unit costs increased by an average of 12 percent,
with three aircraft programs experiencing unit cost increases of 25
percent or more. Four programs reported delays of 1 year or more in
delivering capability to the warfighter. Global Hawk, Predator,
Reaper, and Shadow had been used in combat operations with success and
lessons learned, but had been rushed into service in some cases,
leading to performance issues and delays in development and
operational testing and verification.
Programs collaborated and identified areas of commonality to varying
degrees. The Marine Corps was able to avoid the cost of initial system
development and quickly deliver useful capability to the warfighter by
choosing to procure existing Army Shadow systems. The Navy expected to
save time and money on Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) by
using Air Force‘s Global Hawk airframe, and payloads and subsystems
from other programs. However, Army and Air Force had not collaborated
on their Sky Warrior and Predator programs, and might have achieved
greater savings if they had, given that Sky Warrior is a variant of
Predator and being developed by the same contractor. DOD encouraged
more commonality between these programs.
Although several programs achieved airframe commonality, service-
driven acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration were key
factors that inhibited commonality among subsystems, payloads, and
ground control stations, raising concerns about potential
inefficiencies and duplication. Despite DOD‘s efforts to emphasize a
joint approach to identifying needs and commonality among systems,
most of the programs assessed continued to pursue service-unique
requirements. The services also made independent resource allocation
decisions to support their unique requirements. DOD had not quantified
the costs and benefits associated with pursuing commonality among
these programs, and efforts to collaborate had produced mixed results.
However, in order to maximize acquisition resources and meet increased
demand, Congress and DOD have continued to push for more commonality.
Since July 2009, DOD has made several investment decisions regarding
unmanned aircraft systems, which in general, reflect increased
emphasis on developing advanced capabilities and acquiring larger
numbers of specific systems. However, the decisions do not appear to
focus on increasing collaboration or commonality among the programs.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-508T] or key
components. For more information, contact Michael Sullivan at (202)512-
4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss GAO's recently issued report
on the Department of Defense's (DOD) unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)
acquisition efforts.[Footnote 1] From 2002 through 2008, the number of
unmanned aircraft in the DOD's inventory increased from 167 to more
than 6,000 as a result of the department's efforts to meet the growing
demand from the warfighters for these capabilities. DOD has noted that
meeting this demand has been difficult because of the dynamic nature
of supporting ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while
at the same time developing new and emerging capabilities. At the time
of our report in July 2009, the department was planning to invest more
than $16 billion from 2008 through 2013 to develop and procure
additional unmanned aircraft systems. More recently, the fiscal year
2011 defense budget request indicates a significant increase in DOD's
unmanned aircraft investment plans. However, the growing number of
national priorities competing for federal dollars will continue to
challenge DOD's efforts to meet escalating demands for unmanned
systems.
DOD recognizes that to more effectively leverage its acquisition
resources, it must achieve greater commonality and efficiency among
the military services' various unmanned system acquisition programs.
In fact, DOD states in its Unmanned Systems Roadmap, that there is the
potential for an unprecedented level of collaboration to meet
capability needs and reduce acquisition costs by requiring greater
commonality among the military services' unmanned systems. Although
achieving commonality can be difficult, we have reported in the past
that taking an open systems[Footnote 2] approach and designing systems
with common subsystems and components can reduce both production and
life cycle costs as well as improve interoperability among systems.
For maximum benefit, commonality should be incorporated into the
design of a system when requirements are being established. Unmanned
aircraft systems can potentially achieve commonality in design and
development, ranging from a complete system, including the ground
control segment, to a subsystem or component, as well as commonality
in production facilities, tooling, and personnel.
My statement today focuses on (1) the cost, schedule, and performance
progress of selected unmanned aircraft acquisition programs as of July
2009; (2) the extent to which the military services had collaborated
and identified commonality among those programs; (3) the key factors
influencing the effectiveness of their collaboration; and (4) recent
DOD investment decisions related to unmanned aircraft acquisitions. It
is primarily drawn from our July 2009 report that examined 10
acquisition programs: eight unmanned aircraft programs and two payload
programs. We conducted this performance audit from August 2008 to July
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
Once fielded, unmanned aircraft have proven quite valuable to the
warfighter. On the other hand, most of the unmanned aircraft programs
we reviewed had experienced cost increases, schedule delays,
performance shortfalls, or some combination of these problems.
Development cost estimates for the 10 programs we assessed had
collectively increased more than $3 billion (37 percent in 2009
dollars) from initial estimates. Procurement funding requirements had
also increased for most programs, primarily because of increases in
the number of aircraft being procured, changes in system requirements,
and upgrades and retrofits to equip fielded systems with capabilities
that had been deferred. Overall, procurement unit costs increased by
12 percent, with three aircraft programs experiencing unit cost
increases of 25 percent or more. Four programs had reported delays of
1 year or more in delivering capability to the warfighter. While the
Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, and Shadow systems had been used in
combat operations with notable success and key lessons learned, they
had been rushed into service in some cases, leading to performance
issues and delays in development and operational testing and
verification.
We found varying degrees of collaboration and commonality among DOD's
unmanned aircraft acquisition programs. The Marine Corps was able to
avoid the cost of initial system development and quickly deliver
useful capability to the warfighter by choosing to procure existing
Army Shadow systems. The Army and Navy had settled on many common
requirements between their Fire Scout systems, which had the potential
to gain them efficiencies. However, in January 2010 the Army notified
the Congress that it had terminated its Fire Scout program because the
aircraft was no longer required. In another case, the Navy expected to
save time and money on its Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS)
system by using the existing Air Force Global Hawk airframe, with
payloads and subsystems from various other programs. In contrast, the
Army and Air Force had not effectively collaborated on their Sky
Warrior and Predator programs, and greater commonality could have been
achieved given that the Sky Warrior is a variant of the Predator and
is being developed by the same contractor. At the time of our review,
DOD officials continued to press for more commonality between these
two programs.
Service-centric requirements and funding, and ineffective
collaboration were key factors that resulted in the limited
achievement of commonality. While several unmanned aircraft programs
had achieved airframe commonality, most were pursuing service unique
subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. Despite DOD's
efforts to emphasize a joint approach to identifying and prioritizing
warfighting needs and to encourage commonality among programs, the
services continued to establish service-unique requirements--some of
which have raised concerns about possible inefficiencies caused by
unnecessary duplication. Likewise, DOD's funding process gives the
individual services the responsibility and authority to independently
make resource allocation decisions to support their respective
requirements. At the time of our review, DOD officials had not
quantified the associated costs or benefits of pursuing increased
commonality among unmanned aircraft programs, and service efforts to
collaborate had produced mixed results. However, Congress and DOD
continued to push for more commonality, which could maximize
acquisition resources and help meet increased demand.
Since July 2009, when our report was issued, DOD has made several key
investment decisions regarding unmanned aircraft systems that are
contained in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD's fiscal year
2011 budget request, and DOD's Aircraft Investment Plan (2011-2040).
In general, these decisions reflect increased emphasis on developing
more advanced unmanned aircraft capabilities and acquiring larger
numbers of specific systems. However, they do not appear to focus on
increasing collaboration or commonality among unmanned aircraft
programs.
Background:
Unmanned aircraft systems generally consist of (1) multiple aircraft,
which can be expendable or recoverable and can carry lethal or non-
lethal payloads; (2) a flight control station; (3) information and
retrieval or processing stations; and (4) in some cases, wheeled land
vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms. DOD categorizes
these systems based on key characteristics including weight and
operating altitude. While there were many small, less expensive
unmanned aircraft in DOD's portfolio, our review focused on the
larger, more costly programs. At that time, these programs accounted
for more than 80 percent of DOD's total investment in unmanned
aircraft from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013.[Footnote 3]
DOD's 2011 budget request indicates that the department plans to
invest nearly $25 billion from 2010 through 2015 in development and
procurement of the unmanned aircraft systems we reviewed. Table 1
details many of the key characteristics and funding requirements of
those systems. See appendix I for additional program data.
Table 1: Characteristics and Funding Requirements of Selected Unmanned
Aircraft Systems:
(Then year dollars in millions):
Aircraft: Reaper;
Gross Weight (pounds): 10,500;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 50,000;
Imagery Intelligence: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: [Check];
Weapons: [Check];
Total Investment Funding (FY10-FY15): $8,354.7.
Aircraft: Global Hawk[A];
Gross Weight (pounds): 32,250;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 60,000;
Imagery Intelligence: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: [Check];
Weapons: [Empty];
Total Investment Funding (FY10-FY15): $5,130.1.
Aircraft: BAMS;
Gross Weight (pounds): 32,250;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 60,000;
Imagery Intelligence: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: [Empty];
Weapons: [Empty];
Total Investment Funding (FY10-FY15): $3,783.9.
Aircraft: Sky Warrior;
Gross Weight (pounds): 3,200;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 25,000;
Imagery Intelligence: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: [Empty];
Weapons: [Check];
Total Investment Funding (FY10-FY15): $3,306.1.
Aircraft: Shadow;
Gross Weight (pounds): 375;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 15,000;
Imagery Intelligence: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: [Empty];
Weapons: [Empty];
Total Investment Funding (FY10-FY15): $1,781.4.
Aircraft: UCAS-D;
Gross Weight (pounds): 46,000;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 40,000;
Imagery Intelligence: n/a;
Signals Intelligence: n/a;
Weapons: n/a;
Total Investment Funding (FY10-FY15): $1,056.4.
Aircraft: Predator;
Gross Weight (pounds): 2,250;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 25,000;
Imagery Intelligence: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: [Check];
Weapons: [Check];
Total Investment Funding (FY10-FY15): $829.5.
Aircraft: Fire Scout[B];
Gross Weight (pounds): 3,150;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 20,000;
Imagery Intelligence: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: [Check];
Weapons: [Empty];
Total Investment Funding (FY10-FY15): $472.4.
Sources: DOD, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032 and BAMS Program
Office:
[A] Global Hawk characteristics presented in this table refer to the
RQ-4B.
[B] Fire Scout data presented here are for the Navy program only.
Note: While we also assessed the Navy's Unmanned Combat Aircraft
System Demonstration (UCAS-D) as part of our review, UCAS-D is a
demonstration effort and will not be equipped with any mission
payloads.
[End of table]
Unmanned Aircraft Acquisitions Have Experienced Cost Growth, Schedule
Delays, and Performance Problems:
Despite the proven success of unmanned aircraft on the battlefield and
the growing demand for the aircraft, these acquisitions continued to
incur cost and schedule growth. The cumulative development cost for
the 10 programs we reviewed increased by over $3 billion, or 37
percent, from initial estimates. While 3 of the 10 programs had little
or no development cost growth and one had a cost reduction, six
experienced substantial growth ranging from 60 to 264 percent. This
cost growth was in large part the result of changes in program
requirements and system designs after initiating development. Many of
the programs began system development with unclear or poorly defined
requirements, immature technologies, and unstable designs--problems we
have frequently found in other major acquisition programs.[Footnote 4]
For example, in 2001, the Air Force began the Global Hawk program
based on knowledge gained from a demonstration program, and planned to
incrementally integrate more advanced technologies over time. Within a
year, however, the Air Force fundamentally restructured and
accelerated the program to pursue a larger, unproven airframe with a
multimission capability that relied on immature technologies. The
final design of the new airframe required more substantial changes
than expected. These changes ultimately drove development costs up
nearly threefold.
Procurement costs also increased for 6 of the 7 systems that reported
procurement cost data. Although in large part the cost increases were
due to the planned procurement of additional aircraft, many programs
had also experienced unit cost increases independent of quantity. As
detailed in table 2, overall procurement unit costs increased by 12
percent on average, with three programs experiencing unit cost growth
of 25 percent of more. The Reaper and Shadow had unit cost growth
despite increased quantities. Reaper's unit costs increased in part
because requirements for missiles and a digital electronic engine
control were added--resulting in design changes and increased
production costs. Unit cost increases in the Shadow program were
largely the result of upgrades to the airframe that were needed to
accommodate the size, weight, and power requirements for integrating a
congressionally mandated data link onto the aircraft.[Footnote 5]
Furthermore, the Army is retrofitting fielded systems with
capabilities that it had initially deferred, such as a heavy fuel
engine.
Table 2: Cost and Quantity for Selected Unmanned Aircraft Systems (as
of July 2009):
2009 dollars in millions:
Aircraft: Global Hawk;
Estimated development cost: $3,657.5;
Initial procurement cost estimate: $4,171.4;
Initial quantity: 63;
Current procurement cost estimate: $5,929.7;
Current quantity: 54;
Percent procurement unit cost change: 66%.
Aircraft: Reaper[A];
Estimated development cost: $385.5;
Initial procurement cost estimate: $508.7;
Initial quantity: 33;
Current procurement cost estimate: $2,405.7;
Current quantity: 118;
Percent procurement unit cost change: 32%.
Aircraft: Shadow;
Estimated development cost: $356.6;
Initial procurement cost estimate: $447.0;
Initial quantity: 160;
Current procurement cost estimate: $1,640.7;
Current quantity: 460;
Percent procurement unit cost change: 28%.
Aircraft: Fire Scout[B];
Estimated development cost: $605.0;
Initial procurement cost estimate: $1,625.1;
Initial quantity: 168;
Current procurement cost estimate: $1,743.0;
Current quantity: 168;
Percent procurement unit cost change: 7%.
Aircraft: BAMS;
Estimated development cost: $3,049.1;
Initial procurement cost estimate: $9,048.6;
Initial quantity: 65;
Current procurement cost estimate: $9,048.6;
Current quantity: 65;
Percent procurement unit cost change: 0.
Aircraft: Sky Warrior;
Estimated development cost: $568.5;
Initial procurement cost estimate: $647.5;
Initial quantity: 48;
Current procurement cost estimate: $1,614.2;
Current quantity: 132;
Percent procurement unit cost change: -9%.
Aircraft: Predator;
Estimated development cost: $428.2;
Initial procurement cost estimate: $642.8;
Initial quantity: 48;
Current procurement cost estimate: $2,546.4;
Current quantity: 320;
Percent procurement unit cost change: -41%.
Aircraft: UCAS-D[C];
Estimated development cost: $1,474.9;
Initial procurement cost estimate: n/a;
Initial quantity: n/a;
Current procurement cost estimate: n/a;
Current quantity: n/a;
Percent procurement unit cost change: n/a.
Aircraft: Total;
Estimated development cost: $10,525.3;
Initial procurement cost estimate: $17,091.1;
Initial quantity: 585;
Current procurement cost estimate: $24,928.3;
Current quantity: 1,317;
Percent procurement unit cost change: 12% (average).
Sources: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[A] Initial procurement cost estimate provided for Reaper was based on
33 aircraft. However, the Air Force initially planned for 63 aircraft.
[B] Fire Scout data presented here are for the Navy program only.
[C] UCAS-D is a demonstration effort only, so the Navy was not
projecting procurement funding or quantities.
[End of table]
A number of programs had experienced problems in both testing and
performance, requiring additional development that contributed to the
cost growth noted above. Four programs had experienced delays of 1 to
nearly 4 years in achieving initial operational capability. Some of
these delays resulted from expediting limited capability to the
warfighter, while others were the result of system development and
testing problems. For example, early demonstration and production
Global Hawks were rushed into operational service. Program officials
noted that as a result, the availability of test resources and time
for testing were limited, which delayed the operational assessment of
the original aircraft model by 3 years. Similarly, in February 2009,
the Air Force reported that initial operational testing for the
larger, more capable Global Hawk aircraft and the program's production
readiness review had schedule breaches. Air Force officials cite the
high level of concurrency between development, production, and
testing; poor contractor performance; developmental and technical
problems; system failures; and bad weather as key reasons for the most
recent schedule breach.
Efforts to Collaborate and Identify Commonality Were Successful in
Some Cases, While Not in Others:
Consistent with DOD's framework for acquiring unmanned systems, some
of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition
programs we reviewed had identified areas of commonality to leverage
resources and gain efficiencies. For example, the Army and Marine
Corps achieved full commonality in the Shadow program. In assessing
options for replacing an aging tactical unmanned aircraft system,
[Footnote 6] the Marine Corps determined that the Army's Shadow system
could meet its requirements for reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition capabilities without any service-unique
modifications. An official from DOD's Office of Unmanned Warfare
emphasized that the Marine Corps believed that Shadow represented a
"100 percent" solution. The Marine Corps also found that it could use
the Army's ground control station to pilot the Shadow aircraft as well
as other Marine Corps unmanned aircraft. A memorandum of agreement was
established in July 2007 to articulate how the Marine Corps and the
Army would coordinate to acquire Shadow systems.
By forgoing any service-unique modifications in order to achieve a
high level of commonality, the Marine Corps avoided the costs of
developing the Shadow. Additionally, the Marine Corps and Army are
likely to realize some benefits in supporting and maintaining the
systems because the components are interchangeable. The Army's Shadow
program office agreed that commonality has allowed the two services to
realize economies of scale while meeting each service's needs.
According to an official at the Navy, the Marine Corps has been able
to realize savings or cost avoidance in other areas such as
administration, contracting, and testing, although quantitative data
on these savings were not available.
In some cases, the services had collaborated to identify common
configuration, performance, and support requirements, but ultimately
were not maximizing efficiencies. For example, the Army and Navy had
different data link requirements for their respective variants of Fire
Scout, primarily because of the Army's requirement for its variant to
operate within the Future Combat Systems network. According to the
Fire Scout contractor, the Army's system could have been equipped with
the same data link as the Navy Fire Scout, as well as the Army's
Shadow and Sky Warrior systems, and placed into service sooner. Though
the services had not agreed on a common data link, the Army and Navy
had settled on common Fire Scout requirements for the air vehicle,
engine, radar, navigation, and some core avionics subsystems
requirements. The services had also agreed to use one contract to
procure the airframe. However, in an information letter sent to
members of Congress on January 11, 2010, the Army noted that it had
terminated the Fire Scout portion of its FCS contract--following a
decision by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to cancel the
FCS program--because analysis indicated that an improved Shadow system
could meet future Army requirements, and the Fire Scout was no longer
needed. Cancellation of the Army Fire Scout could lead to increased
unit cost for the Navy variant.
Although the Navy BAMS and Air Force Global Hawk programs had
identified commonalities between their airframes, the two programs had
established different payload, subsystem, and ground station
requirements. The Navy anticipated spending more than $3 billion to
modify the Global Hawk airframe and ground stations, and to integrate
Navy-specific payloads, including the radar. In addition, we found
that the Navy had an opportunity to achieve greater efficiency in BAMS
production. While production of the first two BAMS aircraft was
planned to occur at the same California facility that produces Global
Hawk, the remaining aircraft were expected to be produced at a
facility in Florida. We pointed out that this approach might create
duplication in production by staffing and equipping two facilities to
conduct essentially the same work. At the time of our review the Navy
had not assessed the costs or benefits of establishing a second
production facility, and according to contractor officials, the
official business case analysis would not be conducted for several
years. Therefore, it was unclear whether any benefits of a second
production facility would outweigh costs, such as additional tooling
and personnel.
In contrast to the examples of the Shadow, Fire Scout, and BAMS/Global
Hawk programs above, the Army and Air Force missed opportunities to
achieve commonality and efficiencies between their Sky Warrior and
Predator programs. In 2001, the Army began defining requirements for a
replacement to the aging Hunter unmanned aircraft system, and decided
to pursue the development of Sky Warrior. Both the Air Force and the
Joint Staff responsible for reviewing Sky Warrior's requirements and
acquisition documentation raised concerns about duplicating existing
capability--specifically, capability provided by Predator.
Nevertheless, the Army program received approval to forgo an analysis
of alternatives that could have determined whether or not existing
capabilities met its requirements. The Army noted that such an
analysis was not needed and not worth the cost and effort. Instead, it
conducted a source selection competition and began the Sky Warrior
development program in 2005, citing battlefield commanders' urgent
need for the capability. The development contract was awarded to the
same contractor working with the Air Force to develop and produce
Predators and Reapers. Since the Sky Warrior is a variant of the
Predator, the two aircraft are assembled in the same production
facility. Despite the establishment of a memorandum of understanding
in 2006, direction from the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2007 to
combine their programs, and a subsequent memorandum of agreement, the
Army and Air Force maintained separate programs and at the time of our
review, had achieved little commonality.
Service-Centric Acquisition Processes and Ineffective Collaboration
Have Reduced Opportunities for Commonality:
While several of the unmanned aircraft programs we examined had
achieved commonality at the airframe level, service-centric
acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration resulted in
service-unique subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations.
Despite DOD's efforts to encourage a joint approach to identifying and
prioritizing warfighting needs and to emphasize the need for
commonality among the programs, we noted that the individual services
continued to drive requirements and make independent resource
allocation decisions. In many cases, the services had established
requirements so specific that they demanded service-unique solutions,
thereby precluding opportunities for commonality. Within DOD's funding
system, each service has the responsibility and authority to
prioritize its own budget, allowing it to make independent funding
decisions to support unique requirements. Therefore, once a service
concludes that a unique solution is warranted, the service has the
authority to budget for that unique solution, to the exclusion of
other solutions that might achieve greater commonality and
efficiencies. While we recognized that service-unique requirements
appeared to be necessary in some cases, one OSD official we spoke with
emphasized concerns that some of the services' distinctions in
requirements could lead to duplication and inefficiencies. However,
OSD had not quantified the potential costs or benefits of pursuing
various alternatives, including commonality.
In 2007, OSD established the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force and
the Office of Unmanned Warfare primarily to facilitate collaboration
and encourage greater commonality among unmanned aircraft programs.
While the two groups act as advisors and have implemented OSD's
recommendations regarding areas where further commonality might be
achieved key officials from these groups emphasized to us that they do
not have direct decision-making or resource allocation
authority.[Footnote 7] OSD repeatedly directed the Army and Air Force
to collaborate on their Sky Warrior and Predator programs, but the
services continued to pursue unique systems. In response to OSD
direction to merge their unique signals intelligence payload efforts
into a single acquisition program, the Army and Air Force concluded
that continuing their separate programs was warranted, and recommended
that OSD direct an objective, independent organization--such as a
federally funded research and development center--to conduct a
business case analysis to assess the impact of merging the two
programs.[Footnote 8] Table 3 summarizes OSD's directions and the
services' responses over the past few years.
Table 3: OSD and Service Efforts to Achieve Predator and Sky Warrior
Commonality:
November 2006:
OSD: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics (AT&L) establishes goal for the programs to have a common
aircraft, propulsion system, and avionics configuration.
September 2007:
OSD: Deputy Secretary of Defense directs the services to combine the
programs into a single acquisition program and to migrate to a single
contract by October 2008.
February 2008:
Services: Army and Air Force program executive officers sign a
memorandum of agreement.
May 2008:
OSD: Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L reiterates the Deputy
Secretary of Defense's directive to combine the programs into a single
acquisition program, states that fiscal year 2009 funds can only be
used to purchase a common airframe, and expresses dissatisfaction with
the progress made on achieving a common electro-optical and infrared
sensor.
October 2008:
OSD: Undersecretary of Defense for AT&L grants a waiver to the Air
Force to buy 20 additional Predators, but also directs the Air Force
to buy five common airframes and noted that no additional waivers
would be granted.
January 2009:
OSD: Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology and the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) for Portfolio,
Programs, and Resources direct the services to conduct a comprehensive
business case analysis to assess the impacts of migrating to a single
signals intelligence payload acquisition program.
February 2009:
Services: Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology) and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition) issue a joint memorandum, noting that despite more than
15 months of work and a dozen meetings, neither service supports the
assertion that a joint program makes sense, and recommend that an
objective, independent agency or organization do the business case
analysis.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Congress and OSD took additional action in 2009 aimed at increasing
collaboration and commonality among unmanned aircraft programs. In
section 144 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2009, Congress directed "[t]he Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [to]
establish a policy and an acquisition strategy for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance payloads and ground stations for
manned and unmanned aerial vehicle systems. The policy and acquisition
strategy shall be applicable throughout the Department of Defense and
shall achieve integrated research, development, test, and evaluation,
and procurement commonality." [Footnote 9] In an acquisition decision
memorandum issued on February 11, 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics identified the opportunity
to adopt a common unmanned aircraft ground control station
architecture that supports future capability upgrades through an open
system and modular design. Similar to OSD's approach to ground control
stations, the Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force expected
future unmanned aircraft to be developed as open, modular systems to
which new capabilities could be added instead of developing entirely
new systems each time a new capability is needed.
DOD Continues to Increase Its Emphasis on and Funding For Unmanned
Aircraft Systems:
Since July 2009 when our report was issued, DOD has made several key
investment decisions regarding unmanned aircraft systems that will
likely impact those estimates. In general, these decisions reflect
increased emphasis on developing more advanced unmanned aircraft
capabilities and acquiring larger numbers of specific systems, but
they do not appear to focus on increasing collaboration or commonality
among systems.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reported that "U.S. forces
would be able to perform their missions more effectively--both in the
near-term and against future adversaries--if they had more and better
key enabling capabilities at their disposal." The QDR report included
unmanned aircraft systems among these key enablers, and emphasized the
importance of rapidly increasing the number and quality of unmanned
aircraft systems--among other enablers--to prevail in today's wars,
and to deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments. The
report also noted that: the Air Force is going to increase the total
number of Predator/Reaper aircraft it plans to buy; the Army will
accelerate the production of its Predator-class Sky Warrior[Footnote
10] system; and the Navy will conduct field experiments with prototype
versions of its Unmanned Combat Aircraft System, which, the QDR points
out, offers the potential to greatly increase the range of strike, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations from
the Navy's carrier fleet.
As part of DOD's fiscal year 2011 budget development process, OSD made
several unmanned aircraft-related adjustments to the services' budget
submissions. As part of those adjustments, OSD:
* Directed the Army to stop development and initial fielding of its
Fire Scout unmanned aircraft;
* Provided the Air Force an additional $344 million from FY2011 to
FY2015 to develop, procure, and integrate counter-communication and
counter-improvised explosive device jamming pods onto 33 MQ-9 Reaper
aircraft, and directed the Air Force to present its assessment of
platforms for this capability by June 1, 2010;
* Provided an additional $1.8 billion from FY2011 through FY2015 to
purchase an additional 74 MQ-9 Reaper aircraft;
* Added $2 billion to the Navy budget from FY2013 to FY2015 to define
requirements and develop unmanned carrier based capability, and
directed the Navy to develop an execution plan by March 30, 2010;
* Added $201.6 million to the Global Hawk procurement budget to
procure 19 Block 40 aircraft by 2015, and 22 total;
* Added $270.5 million for development and procurement of Global Hawk
satellite communication terminals;
* Added $2.4 billion over the Future Years Defense Program to the
Army's Extended Range Multi-Purpose (Sky Warrior) Aircraft budget to
procure an additional 12 aircraft and 5 ground stations (one company)
per year from 2011 through 2015.
In concert with the QDR and the fiscal year 2011 budget, DOD also
published its first submission of a long-range, fixed-wing aviation
procurement plan. Among other things, the plan addresses DOD's
strategy for meeting the demand for persistent, unmanned, multi-role
ISR capabilities by:
* Emphasizing "long-endurance, unmanned ISR assets--many with strike
capabilities--to meet warfighter demands;
* Projecting an increase in the number of platforms in this category
from approximately 300 in 2011 to more than 800 in 2020, nearly 200
percent increase;
* Noting the "replacement of Air Force Predators with more capable
Reapers;"
* Establishing a specific category for Unmanned Multi-role
Surveillance and Strike systems, that distinguishes those systems from
other types of aircraft, such as fighters and bombers;
* Noting that the department will continue to adapt the mix of
unmanned and manned systems as security needs evolve; and:
* Noting that unmanned systems are being considered as future long-
range strike platforms and future fighter/attack aircraft.
Concluding Observations:
In closing, recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has proven that
unmanned aircraft are extremely valuable to the warfighter, and it is
clear that more are needed. However, DOD will continue to be
challenged to meet this increasing demand within available resources.
Many of DOD's larger unmanned aircraft acquisition programs have
experienced cost growth, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls,
while not enough have achieved the efficiencies one might expect from
commonality. DOD recognizes that to more effectively leverage its
acquisition resources, it must achieve greater commonality among the
military services' various unmanned system programs. However, in many
cases the services have preferred to pursue unique solutions. In
general, the military services continue to establish unique
requirements and prioritize resources while foregoing opportunities to
achieve greater efficiencies. As a result, commonality has largely
been limited to system airframes, and in most cases, has not been
achieved among payloads, subsystems, or ground control stations.
Opportunities for identifying commonality are greatest when
requirements are being established. Therefore, as the department
continues to develop and procure unmanned aircraft systems, it must
take more care in setting requirements for those systems. Rather than
looking for unique solutions to common problems, DOD must increasingly
find common solutions to those problems. However, we recognize that
commonality is not a panacea, and in some cases, given legitimate
differences in operating environments or mission needs, may not make
sense. We also recognize that achieving commonality is not always
easy, especially given the strong service-driven acquisition processes
and culture within the department. Therefore, in our July 2009 report
we recommended that DOD (1) direct an objective, independent
examination of unmanned aircraft requirements and report a strategy to
Congress for achieving greater commonality among systems and
subsystems, and (2) require future unmanned aircraft programs to take
an open systems approach to product development and to clearly
demonstrate that potential areas of commonality have been analyzed and
identified. We believe that these steps could help overcome these
barriers and could go a long way to ensuring that DOD maximizes
efficiency as it continues to greatly increase emphasis on developing
and acquiring more capable and larger quantities of unmanned aircraft.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further questions about this statement please contact Michael J.
Sullivan at (202) 512-4841. Individuals making key contributions to
this statement include Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Travis
Masters; Rae Ann Sapp; Leigh Ann Nally; Laura Jezewski; and Susan
Neill.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Additional Unmanned Aircraft Program Data and Information:
This appendix contains 3 tables that provide additional information
about the 8 unmanned aircraft systems assessed in our July 2009
report. Table 4 contains the combined total development and
procurement funding DOD has requested in its fiscal year 2011 budget
submission for each of the programs. The budget data is presented in
then year dollars and may not add precisely due to rounding. Tables 5
and 6 detail many of the key characteristics and compare the
capabilities of the systems discussed in this statement.
Table 4: Fiscal Year 2011 Development and Procurement Funding
Requested for Selected Unmanned Aircraft Programs:
Then year dollars in millions:
Aircraft: Reaper;
2010: $689.8;
2011: $1,474.3;
2012: $1,406.3;
2013: $1,600.2;
2014: $1,522.9;
2015: $1,661.1;
FY10-FY15: $8,354.7.
Aircraft: Global Hawk[A];
2010: $911.2;
2011: $961.4;
2012: $1,021.9;
2013: $855.1;
2014: $726.5;
2015: $653.9;
FY10-FY15: $5,130.1.
Aircraft: BAMS;
2010: $439.0;
2011: $529.3;
2012: $541.0;
2013: $744.5;
2014: $807.2;
2015: $723.2;
FY10-FY15: $3,783.9.
Aircraft: Sky Warrior;
2010: $568.2;
2011: $644.2;
2012: $544.2;
2013: $519.9;
2014: $532.2;
2015: $497.4;
FY10-FY15: $3,306.1.
Aircraft: Shadow;
2010: $607.9;
2011: $610.6;
2012: $88.0;
2013: $118.4;
2014: $125.7;
2015: $171.1;
FY10-FY15: $1,781.4.
Aircraft: UCAS-D;
2010: $304.9;
2011: $266.4;
2012: $216.0;
2013: $165.2;
2014: $51.3;
2015: $52.7;
FY10-FY15: $1,056.4.
Aircraft: Predator;
2010: $188.9;
2011: $208.2;
2012: $123.0;
2013: $99.7;
2014: $75.1;
2015: $44.8;
FY10-FY15: $829.5.
Aircraft: Fire Scout;
2010: $118.6;
2011: $61.6;
2012: $50.9;
2013: $70.3;
2014: $90.8;
2015: $90.8;
FY10-FY15: $472.4.
Aircraft: Total;
2010: $3,921.1;
2011: $4,781.4;
2012: $4,003.2;
2013: $4,178.1;
2014: $3,935.6;
2015: $3,895.1;
FY10-FY15: $24,714.5.
Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation):
[A] Information on the RQ-4B Global Hawk is presented in this chart.
[End of table]
Table 5: Key Characteristics of Selected Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
Aircraft: Reaper;
Length (feet): 36;
Wing Span (feet): 66;
Gross Weight (pounds): 10,500;
Payload Capacity (pounds): 3,750;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 24;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 50,000.
Aircraft: Global Hawk[B];
Length (feet): 48;
Wing Span (feet): 131;
Gross Weight (pounds): 32,250;
Payload Capacity (pounds): 3,000;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 28;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 60,000.
Aircraft: BAMS;
Length (feet): 48;
Wing Span (feet): 131;
Gross Weight (pounds): 32,250;
Payload Capacity (pounds): 3,200;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 34+;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 60,000.
Aircraft: Sky Warrior;
Length (feet): 28;
Wing Span (feet): 56;
Gross Weight (pounds): 3,200;
Payload Capacity (pounds): 800;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 40;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 25,000.
Aircraft: Shadow;
Length (feet): 11;
Wing Span (feet): 14;
Gross Weight (pounds): 375;
Payload Capacity (pounds): 60;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 6;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 15,000.
Aircraft: UCAS-D;
Length (feet): 38;
Wing Span (feet): 62;
Gross Weight (pounds): 46,000;
Payload Capacity (pounds): 4,500;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 9;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 40,000.
Aircraft: Predator;
Length (feet): 27;
Wing Span (feet): 55;
Gross Weight (pounds): 2,250;
Payload Capacity (pounds): 450;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 24+;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 25,000.
Aircraft: Fire Scout;
Length (feet): 23;
Wing Span (feet): 28;
Gross Weight (pounds): 3,150;
Payload Capacity (pounds): 600;
Endurance (hours)[A]: 6+;
Maximum Altitude (feet): 20,000.
Sources: DOD, Unmanned Systems Roadmap 2007-2032 and BAMS Program
Office:
[A] Endurance capacity reported here is the maximum endurance
possible, without external payloads. For some aircraft, the addition
of external payloads can impact endurance capacity.
[B] Information on the RQ-4B Global Hawk is presented in this chart.
[End of table]
Table 6: Comparison of Key System Capabilities:
Aircraft: Global Hawk;
Imagery Intelligence: Electro-Optical/Infrared: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Synthetic Aperture Radar: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Full Motion Video: [Empty];
Signals Intelligence: Communications Intelligence: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: Electronic Intelligence: [Check];
Weapons: [Empty].
Aircraft: Predator;
Imagery Intelligence: Electro-Optical/Infrared: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Synthetic Aperture Radar: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Full Motion Video: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: Communications Intelligence: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: Electronic Intelligence: [Empty];
Weapons: [Check].
Aircraft: Reaper;
Imagery Intelligence: Electro-Optical/Infrared: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Synthetic Aperture Radar: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Full Motion Video: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: Communications Intelligence: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: Electronic Intelligence: [Empty];
Weapons: [Check].
Aircraft: Sky Warrior;
Imagery Intelligence: Electro-Optical/Infrared: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Synthetic Aperture Radar: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Full Motion Video: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: Communications Intelligence: [Empty];
Signals Intelligence: Electronic Intelligence: [Empty];
Weapons: [Check].
Aircraft: Shadow;
Imagery Intelligence: Electro-Optical/Infrared: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Synthetic Aperture Radar: [Empty];
Imagery Intelligence: Full Motion Video: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: Communications Intelligence: [Empty];
Signals Intelligence: Electronic Intelligence: [Empty];
Weapons: [Empty].
Aircraft: Fire Scout - Navy;
Imagery Intelligence: Electro-Optical/Infrared: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Synthetic Aperture Radar: [Empty];
Imagery Intelligence: Full Motion Video: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: Communications Intelligence: [Empty];
Signals Intelligence: Electronic Intelligence: [Empty];
Weapons: [Empty].
Aircraft: Fire Scout - Army;
Imagery Intelligence: Electro-Optical/Infrared: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Synthetic Aperture Radar: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Full Motion Video: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: Communications Intelligence: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: Electronic Intelligence: [Check];
Weapons: [Empty].
Aircraft: BAMS;
Imagery Intelligence: Electro-Optical/Infrared: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Synthetic Aperture Radar: [Check];
Imagery Intelligence: Full Motion Video: [Check];
Signals Intelligence: Communications Intelligence: [Empty];
Signals Intelligence: Electronic Intelligence: [Empty];
Weapons: [Empty].
Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation):
Note: While we also assessed the Navy's Unmanned Combat Aircraft
System Demonstration (UCAS-D) as part of our review, UCAS-D is a
demonstration effort and will not be equipped with any mission
payloads.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater
Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-520] (Washington, D.C.:
July 30, 2009).
[2] Open systems allow the use of commercially available and widely
accepted standard products from multiple vendors, rather than
developing unique components.
[3] The programs we focused on are often referred to as tactical-level
and theater-level systems.
[4] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009).
[5] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, § 141.
[6] Shadow was identified as a replacement system for the Marine Corps
Pioneer unmanned aircraft. Specifically, the cost for maintaining the
Pioneer fleet was cited as a reason for selecting the Shadow system.
The Marine Corps is considering a future replacement to the Shadow,
which is not expected before 2015.
[7] GAO recently reported [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-175[ that the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the task
force in 2007 to lead a DOD-wide effort to coordinate critical
unmanned aircraft systems issues and develop a way ahead to enhance
operations and streamline acquisitions.
[8] In a March 2010 meeting with the Air Force Predator and Reaper
program office, program officials noted that the Air Force and Army
are now pursuing a common sensor payload for their respective aircraft.
[9] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 144.
[10] The 2010 QDR specifically refers to the Extended Range Multi-
Purpose system, which at the time of our 2009 report was being
referred to as Sky Warrior.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
