Homeland Defense
DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions Gao ID: GAO-10-364 March 30, 2010Numerous occurrences in the United States--both scheduled events and emergencies--require the Department of Defense (DOD) to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize its homeland defense and civil support missions with a broad range of U.S. federal agencies. In response to congressional inquiry, GAO examined the extent to which DOD has (1) identified clearly defined roles and responsibilities for DOD entities to facilitate interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support missions, (2) articulated to its federal partners the DOD entities' approach toward interagency coordination, and (3) adopted key practices for managing homeland defense and civil support liaisons. GAO reviewed numerous DOD policy and guidance documents and interviewed officials from DOD and its partner agencies, including the departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
DOD has many strategy, policy, and guidance documents on interagency coordination for its homeland defense and civil support missions; however, DOD entities do not have fully or clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Key DOD documents are outdated, not integrated, or not comprehensive. Three separate directives, for example, respectively assign overlapping responsibilities related to law enforcement support to three different DOD entities. Because DOD's law enforcement support directive has not been updated or superseded since 1989, it is unclear which entity is responsible for certain coordination activities with law enforcement agencies. By updating, integrating, and ensuring the comprehensiveness of its strategy, policy, and guidance, DOD will be better positioned to enhance and institutionalize its interagency coordination efforts for homeland defense and civil support. DOD makes great effort to communicate with its federal partners through conferences and other forums and multiple documents, but it lacks a single, readily accessible source for its interagency partners to find needed information about its processes. The 2008 National Defense Strategy notes that a unified "whole-of-government" approach to national security issues requires that federal partner agencies understand core competencies, roles, and missions, and the National Response Framework highlights the value of using a common concise partner guide for this purpose. DOD's communication approach, however, relies largely on personal relationships that are subject to frequent rotation of both DOD and non-DOD personnel. DOD identified over 30 documents that embody its approach and processes for interagency coordination. A concise and readily accessible partner guide would provide incoming personnel from both DOD and other agencies information that could enhance their mutual understanding and facilitate a unified and institutionalized approach to interagency coordination. DOD has taken some actions to adopt key practices for managing homeland defense and civil support liaison personnel, but it has not fully implemented these practices. Key practices include situational awareness, staffing-needs assessments, position descriptions, training, and performance assessments. For example, while individual DOD entities may know the liaisons they have assigned to their federal partners, no single DOD entity knows the number or locations of all liaisons exchanged with other federal agencies. Also, while DOD policy recognizes the need to conduct personnel performance assessments, such assessments of its liaisons are not focused on coordination competencies, and DOD does not consistently request input from federal partners on the performance of its liaisons or provide feedback to its federal partners about their liaisons' performance. DOD could optimize its use of liaisons if it fully implemented current DOD human capital policies and issued policies and guidance for the remaining key practices identified above.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Davi M. Dagostino Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: No phone on recordGAO-10-364, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2010:
Homeland Defense:
DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its
Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions:
GAO-10-364:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-364, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Numerous occurrences in the United States”both scheduled events and
emergencies”require the Department of Defense (DOD) to coordinate,
integrate, and synchronize its homeland defense and civil support
missions with a broad range of U.S. federal agencies. In response to
congressional inquiry, GAO examined the extent to which DOD has (1)
identified clearly defined roles and responsibilities for DOD entities
to facilitate interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil
support missions, (2) articulated to its federal partners the DOD
entities‘ approach toward interagency coordination, and (3) adopted
key practices for managing homeland defense and civil support
liaisons. GAO reviewed numerous DOD policy and guidance documents and
interviewed officials from DOD and its partner agencies, including the
departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Health and Human Services,
and Agriculture; and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
What GAO Found:
DOD has many strategy, policy, and guidance documents on interagency
coordination for its homeland defense and civil support missions;
however, DOD entities do not have fully or clearly defined roles and
responsibilities. Key DOD documents are outdated, not integrated, or
not comprehensive. Three separate directives, for example,
respectively assign overlapping responsibilities related to law
enforcement support to three different DOD entities. Because DOD‘s law
enforcement support directive has not been updated or superseded since
1989, it is unclear which entity is responsible for certain
coordination activities with law enforcement agencies. By updating,
integrating, and ensuring the comprehensiveness of its strategy,
policy, and guidance, DOD will be better positioned to enhance and
institutionalize its interagency coordination efforts for homeland
defense and civil support.
DOD makes great effort to communicate with its federal partners
through conferences and other forums and multiple documents, but it
lacks a single, readily accessible source for its interagency partners
to find needed information about its processes. The 2008 National
Defense Strategy notes that a unified ’whole-of-government“ approach
to national security issues requires that federal partner agencies
understand core competencies, roles, and missions, and the National
Response Framework highlights the value of using a common concise
partner guide for this purpose. DOD‘s communication approach, however,
relies largely on personal relationships that are subject to frequent
rotation of both DOD and non-DOD personnel. DOD identified over 30
documents that embody its approach and processes for interagency
coordination. A concise and readily accessible partner guide would
provide incoming personnel from both DOD and other agencies
information that could enhance their mutual understanding and
facilitate a unified and institutionalized approach to interagency
coordination.
DOD has taken some actions to adopt key practices for managing
homeland defense and civil support liaison personnel, but it has not
fully implemented these practices. Key practices include situational
awareness, staffing-needs assessments, position descriptions,
training, and performance assessments. For example, while individual
DOD entities may know the liaisons they have assigned to their federal
partners, no single DOD entity knows the number or locations of all
liaisons exchanged with other federal agencies. Also, while DOD policy
recognizes the need to conduct personnel performance assessments, such
assessments of its liaisons are not focused on coordination
competencies, and DOD does not consistently request input from federal
partners on the performance of its liaisons or provide feedback to its
federal partners about their liaisons‘ performance. DOD could optimize
its use of liaisons if it fully implemented current DOD human capital
policies and issued policies and guidance for the remaining key
practices identified above.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD update and integrate its strategy, policy, and
guidance; develop a partner guide; and implement key practices for
management of homeland defense and civil support liaisons. DOD agreed
with these recommendations and noted several actions it is taking or
plans to take to address them.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-364] or key
components. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202)
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Issued Documents to Facilitate Coordination, but Its Entities
Lack Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities:
DOD Communicates with Federal Partners through Various Means, but Its
Approach Could be Improved:
DOD Has Generally Successfully Exchanged Liaisons with Some Federal
Agencies, but Greater Use of Key Practices Would Enhance Their
Effectiveness:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: List of Key Documents That Identify the Roles and
Responsibilities of DOD Entities Conducting Homeland Defense and Civil
Support Missions:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: DOD's Structure for Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland
Defense and Civil Support Missions:
Table 2: DOD and Non-DOD Organizations Visited During Our Review:
Figures:
Figure 1: Homeland Defense and Civil Support Spectrum:
Figure 2: Civil Support Operation Categories and Operational Types:
Figure 3: Time Line of DOD Homeland Defense and Civil Support Policies
and Guidance and Historical Events That Have Affected How DOD Operates
within the United States:
Abbreviations:
ASD/HD: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Americas' Security Affairs:
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command:
PACOM: U.S. Pacific Command:
USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 30, 2010:
Congressional Requesters:
Numerous events occurring in the United States--ranging from planned
events, such as inaugurations, to unexpected emergencies, such as
natural disasters--require that the Department of Defense (DOD)
coordinate, integrate, and synchronize its homeland security missions
with a broad range of U.S. federal agencies. Examples of such
coordination include those with the Federal Aviation Administration
for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; with the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration for the Space Shuttle Columbia
disaster in 2003; with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
for Hurricane Katrina in 2005; with the Department of Transportation
for the I-35 bridge collapse in Minnesota in 2007; and with the U.S.
Secret Service for the Presidential Inauguration in 2009. According to
DOD's 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, the increased
demands created by today's complex national security environment and
DOD's vision of supporting a whole-of-government approach to national
security problems have made interagency coordination between DOD and
its federal U.S. partners important.[Footnote 1]
According to the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security,
homeland security requires a truly national effort, with shared goals
and responsibilities among agencies for protecting and defending the
homeland.[Footnote 2] DOD protects the homeland through two distinct
but interrelated missions: homeland defense and civil support.
Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory,
domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against
external threats, as directed by the President. As the lead agency for
homeland defense, DOD is responsible for the homeland defense mission,
which it conducts through air, land, maritime, space, and other
supporting operations; other departments and agencies support DOD's
efforts. Civil support is the overarching term for DOD's support to
U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, designated law
enforcement, and other activities. As shown in figure 1, DOD's
homeland defense and civil support missions can overlap or can be in
effect simultaneously, depending on the particular circumstances of an
event.
Figure 1: Homeland Defense and Civil Support Spectrum:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
This figure depicts the Homeland Defense and Civil Support Spectrum,
indicating the following:
Temporary Circumstances: Responsibility of Civil Support; examples
include:
* Special Events;
* Disaster Relief.
Emergency Circumstances: Overlap of responsibility between Civil
Support and Homeland Defense; examples include:
* Counterdrug support;
* Civil Disturbances.
Extraordinary Circumstances: Responsibility of Homeland Defense;
examples include:
* CBRNE[A] Incident Management;
* Execute Operations Plans.
Sources: GAO analysis of DOD agencies‘ information.
[A] Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield
Explosives.
[End of figure]
DOD has assigned interagency coordination for homeland defense and
civil support to a number of different DOD entities at different
organizational levels, including organizations within the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (such as the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security
Affairs, referred to in this report as ASD/HD), the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, various combatant commands [such as U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)], the National Guard
Bureau, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, joint task forces (such as
Joint Task Force-North),[Footnote 3] and the intelligence agencies
(such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency). Additional information about DOD's civil support
operation categories and structural levels for facilitating
interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support
missions appear in the Background section of this report. DOD entities
are called upon to coordinate with their federal partners that have
homeland security roles and responsibilities--including the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), and the respective agencies within these departments,
such as FEMA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S.
Forest Service, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC).
You asked us to examine DOD's interagency coordination efforts with
U.S. federal agencies for its homeland defense and civil support
missions as part of an effort to examine a broad range of planning and
operational considerations related to DOD and NORTHCOM. This report
addresses the extent to which DOD (1) has identified clearly defined
roles and responsibilities for DOD entities to facilitate interagency
coordination for homeland defense and civil support missions, (2) has
articulated to its federal partners the approach of its entities with
regard to interagency coordination, and (3) has adopted and
implemented key practices for managing homeland defense and civil
support liaisons. We are reporting separately to you on DOD's
capabilities and requirements for its civil support mission as
requested.[Footnote 4]
To determine the extent to which DOD has clearly defined its roles and
responsibilities, has articulated its approach to federal partners,
and has managed its liaison exchanges for interagency coordination for
its homeland defense and civil support missions, we reviewed and
analyzed DOD's strategic documents, such as its Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support;[Footnote 5] its policy documents, such as
its 1989 directive on DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement
Officials and its 1993 directive on Military Support to Civil
Authorities;[Footnote 6] and its guidance and doctrine, such as the
Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrines on homeland defense, civil support,
counterdrug operations, and interagency coordination.[Footnote 7] In
addition, to specifically determine the extent to which DOD has
articulated to its federal partners the approach of its entities with
regard to interagency coordination, we reviewed more than 30 DOD
documents, including classified documents, that DOD officials said
articulated the department's homeland defense and civil support
missions, its entities' roles and responsibilities, and its culture
and concepts. To determine the extent to which DOD has adopted and
implemented key practices for managing homeland defense and civil
support liaisons, we reviewed established best practices identified in
prior GAO reports on human capital best practices, DOD interagency
coordination conference proceedings and white papers, as well as joint
DHS-DOJ guidelines for interagency coordination for homeland security,
which similarly recommend the use of such best practices. For all
three objectives, we also met with knowledgeable DOD staff in multiple
offices and commands within the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Guard Bureau, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Defense
Intelligence Agency, NORTHCOM, and PACOM to discuss their roles and
responsibilities and the actions that they are taking to address
interagency coordination. We discussed DOD's interagency coordination
efforts with non-DOD officials from over a dozen U.S. federal agencies
or offices, including four agencies or offices within DHS, four
agencies or offices within DOJ, three agencies or offices within USDA,
two agencies or offices within HHS, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, and the El Paso Intelligence Center. We
selected and visited multiple locations where DOD coordinates with its
federal partners on a daily basis, including four FEMA regions,
NORTHCOM headquarters, PACOM headquarters, DHS headquarters, FEMA
headquarters, the National Counter Terrorism Center, and the El Paso
Intelligence Center and met with knowledgeable officials to discuss
their roles and responsibilities and the actions that they are taking
to address interagency coordination. In selecting the specific
locations we visited, we used criteria such as locations of DOD
commands that have key roles and responsibilities in coordinating with
federal agencies for homeland defense and civil support, such as
NORTHCOM headquarters. We used similar criteria when selecting non-DOD
sites to visit. For example, we selected the four FEMA regions that we
visited based on geographic location; region size; number of requests
for assistance for the region between January 1, 2008, and May 31,
2009; types of assistance requested; and GAO resources required.
Additional information on our scope and methodology appears in
appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2009 to March 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
DOD has a number of strategy, policy, and guidance documents related
to interagency coordination for its homeland defense and civil support
missions; however, DOD entities do not have fully or clearly defined
roles and responsibilities because key DOD documents are outdated, are
not integrated, or are not comprehensive. Previous GAO work,[Footnote
8] the National Response Framework,[Footnote 9] and DOD strategy and
guidance[Footnote 10] all identify the need for clearly defined roles
and responsibilities to enhance interagency coordination. Regarding
DOD's documents, its 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support, its series of civil support policies and guidance,[Footnote
11] and its joint guidance for interagency coordination[Footnote 12]
are outdated and not comprehensive. Also, conflicting directives
create confusion as to which DOD office is responsible for
coordinating with law enforcement agencies. For example, three
separate DOD directives, including one on DOD's support to law
enforcement agencies that was last updated in 1989,[Footnote 13]
assign overlapping law enforcement support responsibilities to three
different DOD entities. Planned changes to the 1989 law enforcement
support directive will lead to a gap in DOD's policy on support to law
enforcement agencies for the counterdrug mission. We also found that
specific delineation in interagency coordination and external
communication roles and responsibilities among ASD/HD, NORTHCOM, and
PACOM is lacking. By updating, integrating, and ensuring the
comprehensiveness of its strategy, policy, and guidance, DOD could
enhance its interagency coordination efforts for homeland defense and
civil support and clarify current overlapping roles. Therefore, we are
recommending that DOD issue updated, integrated, and comprehensive
strategy, policy, and guidance.
DOD makes significant effort to communicate with its federal partners
through various formal and informal forums, such as conferences, and
documents, but its approach to identifying roles and responsibilities
and day-to-day coordination processes could be improved. Specifically,
DOD and non-DOD officials told us that benefits accrued from
relationships developed through forums are transient, and we found
documented information is dispersed throughout multiple sources and
may not always be available to federal partners. DOD has not
articulated this needed information to federal partners in a single,
readily accessible source.[Footnote 14] The National Response
Framework recognizes that a concise, common guide is beneficial when
addressing challenges to effective response. Similarly, the National
Defense Strategy notes that a unified "whole-of-government" approach
to national security issues is possible only when every government
department and agency understands the core competencies, roles,
missions, and capabilities of its federal partners. To its credit, DOD
regularly holds numerous conferences and other forums that enable it
to share information with its federal partners which enhances
coordination. However, this communication approach relies on personal
relationships that are subject to frequent rotation of both DOD and
non-DOD personnel, and so the benefits can be transient. The lack of a
DOD partner guide makes it difficult to institutionalize key
information shared at such forums--such as roles and responsibilities
and agreed-upon approaches to coordinating. DOD officials identified
over 30 documents that discuss the roles and responsibilities of DOD
entities. However, such information can be difficult to locate because
it is dispersed and some documents, such as DOD plans for civil
support, are not readily available to DOD's federal partners.[Footnote
15] Without a concise and readily accessible guide, new and incoming
personnel from both DOD and other agencies will lack the information
that could provide them a better understanding of each other as
federal partners and enable a unified and institutionalized approach
to interagency coordination. We are, therefore, recommending that DOD
develop and issue a partner guide.
DOD and non-DOD officials told us that the quality of the liaisons
that their agencies have exchanged was generally very high; however,
DOD has not fully implemented key practices for managing homeland
defense and civil support liaisons. We have previously reported that
key practices for effective and efficient workforce planning and
management include: (1) ensuring situational awareness of personnel,
to include liaisons who are currently exchanged, to be able to
identify gaps and assess their performance in coordinating with their
federal partners; (2) conducting routine staffing-needs assessments to
identify personnel, to include liaisons, needed to further enhance
interagency coordination; (3) developing position descriptions to
identify roles and responsibilities; knowledge, skills, and abilities;
and duration of the exchange; (4) training personnel to ensure that
they possess the critical skills and competencies needed for mission
success; and (5) conducting performance assessments to evaluate the
contributions that individuals have made toward achieving programmatic
results.[Footnote 16] DOD, through various policies and guidance, has
recognized the need to implement such human capital practices, and has
sought to promote interagency coordination by exchanging liaison
personnel with some of its federal partners. However, DOD has not
fully implemented these key practices for managing such liaisons.
Specifically, we found:
* Situational awareness: While individual DOD entities may be aware of
the liaisons they have sent to their federal partners, no single DOD
entity knows the number and location of all of the liaisons it has
sent to other federal agencies, or of the non-DOD liaisons at DOD
entities.
* Staffing-needs assessments: Staffing-needs assessments for the
exchange of liaison personnel have been conducted to a limited extent
by NORTHCOM, but an overall DOD staffing-needs assessment for the
exchange of liaison personnel for homeland defense and civil support
missions has not been conducted.
* Position descriptions: DOD has not consistently developed position
descriptions for liaison personnel to define the roles and
responsibilities; knowledge, skills, and abilities; or the duration of
the exchange of DOD and non-DOD liaisons.
* Training: DOD offers some training opportunities for liaison
personnel, but training adequacy cannot be assessed because DOD has
not defined the roles and responsibilities; or requisite knowledge,
skills, and abilities of its liaison personnel.
* Performance assessments: DOD's assessments of its liaisons are not
focused on coordination competencies, and DOD does not consistently
provide or obtain feedback from its federal partners about their
liaisons' performance.
DOD could optimize its use of liaisons if it fully implemented current
DOD human capital policies and issued policies and guidance for the
remaining key practices identified above. Therefore, we are making
recommendations designed to improve DOD's workforce management of
liaisons.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
recommendations and described actions in process or needed to
implement them. For example, DOD stated that several draft policy and
guidance updates are in coordination and provided estimated time lines
for completion. DOD also agreed with our recommendation to establish a
time line to develop and issue a partner guide for interagency
coordination. Additionally, DOD agreed with our recommendation to
improve its workforce management of liaisons. DOD's written comments
are reprinted in appendix III.
Background:
DOD protects the sovereignty of the United States through its homeland
defense missions, which it conducts through air, land, maritime,
space, and other supporting operations. While DOD is the lead federal
agency for these types of operations, it coordinates with and receives
support from its federal partners. Contrary to its homeland defense
mission where it is the lead federal agency, DOD serves in a support
capacity when it conducts civil support missions. DOD's civil support
missions include providing support during disasters and declared
emergencies (both natural and man-made); providing support for
restoring public health and services and civil order (for example,
counterdrug, or animal/plant disease eradication); providing support
for national special security events (for example, national political
conventions); and periodic planned support (for example, military lab
support), as shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Civil Support Operation Categories and Operational Types:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Civil support operation categories and operational types:
Civil support:
Categories:
* Domestic emergencies;
* Designated law enforcement;
* Other activities.
Types:
* Disasters and declared emergencies;
* Support or restore public health and services and civil order;
* National special security events;
* Periodic planned support.
Examples:
* Natural disasters;
* Man-made disasters;
* CBRNE[A] incidents;
* Civil disturbances;
* Border security and immigration enforcement support;
* Equipment support to law enforcement;
* Counter terrorism and counterdrug;
* Postal services;
* Animal/plant disease eradication;
* Olympics support;
* World fairs;
* Super Bowl;
* Inaugural support;
* State funerals;
* National conventions;
* Sensitive support operations;
* Military training exchanges;
* Community relations;
* Military lab support;
* Civilian critical infrastructure protection.
Source: DOD.
[A] Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield
Explosives.
[End of figure]
DOD has established a structure to facilitate interagency coordination
at three different levels: strategic, operational, and tactical;
however, some DOD entities coordinate across multiple levels as shown
in table 1. Other U.S. federal agencies do not necessarily operate
with a similar structure for interagency coordination.
Table 1: DOD's Structure for Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland
Defense and Civil Support Missions:
Structural level: Strategic;
DOD entity[A]: Office of the Secretary of Defense;
* ASD Homeland Defense;
* ASD (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and
Interdependent Capabilities);
* ASD (Health Affairs);
Primary responsibility: Develop and oversee implementation of policy,
represent the department.
Structural level: Strategic;
DOD entity[A]: Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Primary responsibility: Ensure that homeland defense and civil support
plans and operations are compatible with other military plans.
Structural level: Strategic;
DOD entity[A]: National Guard Bureau;
Primary responsibility: Facilitate and coordinate with federal
agencies regarding the use of National Guard personnel and resources
for operations conducted under Title 32.[B].
Structural level: Strategic;
DOD entity[A]: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
Primary responsibility: Operate as the coordinating federal agency for
an emergency support function within the National Response Framework
based on the agency's historical relationship with FEMA.
Structural level: Strategic;
DOD entity[A]: DOD Intelligence Entities;
* National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
* Defense Intelligence Agency;
Primary responsibility: Provide direct or indirect intelligence
support to federal agencies' headquarters.
Structural level: Strategic;
DOD entity[A]: NORTHCOM and PACOM;
Primary responsibility: Coordinate homeland defense and civil support
operations with federal partners through each department's and
agency's headquarters.
Structural level: Operational;
DOD entity[A]: NORTHCOM and PACOM;
Primary responsibility: Coordinate homeland defense and civil support
missions through their respective command structure, including
NORTHCOM's interagency directorate. PACOM has divided its coordination
efforts among multiple components and directorates.
Structural level: Operational;
DOD entity[A]: Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense (PACOM);
Primary responsibility: Coordinate with various federal interagency
partners to plan, coordinate, and synchronize its homeland defense and
civil support missions.
Structural level: Operational;
DOD entity[A]: Defense Coordinating Officers/Elements;
Primary responsibility: Provide day-to-day DOD planning support to
FEMA regional officials.
Structural level: Tactical;
DOD entity[A]: Defense Coordinating Officers/Elements;
Primary responsibility: Serve as DOD's single point of contact for
requesting assistance from DOD in accordance with the National
Response Framework. Specific responsibilities of this entity can
include processing requirements for military support, forwarding
mission assignments to the appropriate military organizations, and
assigning military liaisons, as appropriate.
Structural level: Tactical;
DOD entity[A]: Joint Task Force-North (NORTHCOM);
Primary responsibility: Provide military support to law enforcement
agencies.
Structural level: Tactical;
DOD entity[A]: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
Primary responsibility: Provide intelligence support (e.g., graphics
and maps) to federal agency field locations through support teams.
Source: GAO analysis based on interviews with DOD officials.
[A] Agencies represented in this column have been identified by DOD
and non-DOD officials as key DOD entities for the department's
interagency coordination for its homeland defense and civil support
missions.
[B] Title 32 refers to a section of the United States Code. Units
operating in a Title 32 status are under the command and control of
the governor of the state, but are federally funded.
[End of table]
DOD Has Issued Documents to Facilitate Coordination, but Its Entities
Lack Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities:
While DOD has issued a number of strategies, policies, and guidance
related to interagency coordination for its homeland defense and civil
support missions, DOD entities lack clearly defined roles and
responsibilities because key documents are outdated, are not fully
integrated, or are not comprehensive. Previous GAO work,[Footnote 17]
the National Response Framework, and DOD strategy and
guidance[Footnote 18] all identify the need for clearly defined roles
and responsibilities to enhance interagency coordination. In addition,
DOD policy requires the department to review DOD directives to ensure
that they are necessary, current, and consistent with DOD policy,
existing law, and statutory authority 4 years from the date that the
directive is issued.[Footnote 19] Although DOD's civil support
directives were issued between 1985 and 2000, DOD has yet to fulfill
this requirement. We found that roles and responsibilities identified
in DOD's homeland defense and civil support strategy, its series of
civil support directives, its interagency guidance for support to law
enforcement authorities, and its joint publication on interagency
coordination no longer provide a clear, comprehensive, and current
description of DOD's interagency coordination efforts for its civil
support mission. A detailed time line of the outdated strategy,
guidance, and policies is shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: Time Line of DOD Homeland Defense and Civil Support Policies
and Guidance and Historical Events That Have Affected How DOD Operates
within the United States:
[Refer to PDF for image: timeline]
Year: 1985;
Document: DOD Directive 3025.13: Employment of Defense Resources in
Support of the Secret Service.
Year: 1989;
Document: DOD Directive 5525.5: DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Officials.
Year: 1993;
Document: DOD Directive 3025.1: Military Support to Civil Authorities.
Year: 1994;
Document: DOD Directive 3025.1-M: Manual for Civil Emergencies;
Document: DOD Directive 3025.12: Military Assistance for Civil
Disturbances.
Year: 1997;
Document: DOD Directive 3025.15: Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities.
Year: 2000;
Document: DOD Directive 3025.16: Military Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Officer(EPLO).
Documents up to this point do not reflect operations environment
following 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina updates.
Year: 2001;
Event: September 11 terrorist attacks.
Year: 2002;
Event: Establishment of NORTHCOM;
Event: Establishment of DHS.
Year: 2003;
Event: Establishment of ASD/HD.
Year 2004:
Document: NORTHCOM‘s Concept of Employment--Civil Support.
Year: 2005;
Document: NORTHCOM‘s Concept of Operations;
Document: DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support;
Event: Hurricane Katrina.
Year: 2006;
Event: Defense Coordinating Officers assigned to 10 FEMA regions.
Year: 2007;
Document: DOD Joint Publication 3-27: Homeland Defense;
Document: DOD Joint Publication 3-28: Civil Support.
Year: 2008;
Document: DOD Directive 5136.01: Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs;
Document: DOD National Defense Strategy;
Event: National Response Framework issued.
Year: 2009;
Document: DOD Directive 5111.10: Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent
Capabilities;
Document: DOD Directive 5111.13: Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Americas‘ Security Affairs;
Document: Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
[End of figure]
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support is Outdated:
DOD issued its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support in June
2005. Among other things, this strategy identifies the roles and
responsibilities of some of the key DOD entities for support to civil
authorities. For example, the strategy identifies ASD/HD, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NORTHCOM, and PACOM as several key DOD
entities responsible for coordinating with federal partners for
homeland defense, and it provides brief descriptions of their roles in
homeland defense missions. However, the 2005 strategy does not reflect
the current environment in which DOD supports civil authorities. For
example, while the strategy primarily discusses DOD's civil support
mission in the context of the department's response to a weapon of
mass destruction--DOD's primary focus after the 2001 terrorist
attacks--it does not address the breadth of civil support missions
that DOD must be prepared to support subsequent to Hurricane Katrina
in 2005. Such civil support missions include catastrophic natural or
man-made disasters, pandemic influenza, and the southwest border
counterdrug efforts.
Additionally, DOD's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
has not been updated to incorporate important recommendations made to
DOD to define roles and responsibilities for its entities during
federal response activities. For example, in a February 2006 report on
lessons learned after Hurricane Katrina, the White House recommended
DOD should provide imagery support and coordinate with DHS through the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.[Footnote 20] However, the
strategy does not identify this agency's roles and responsibilities
for coordination. The strategy also does not reflect changes to the
national preparedness system since September 2005--such as the
issuance of the National Response Framework.[Footnote 21]
Additionally, the June 2005 strategy does not incorporate changes made
in the National Defense Strategy when it was reissued in June 2008,
nor does it reflect changes made in the National Homeland Security
Strategy when it was reissued in October 2007. According to ASD/HD
officials, revision of the strategy began in October 2008 but was
postponed due to the change in presidential administrations. ASD/HD
officials told us that they expect this strategy will be updated and
issued no later than December 2011. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD estimated the updated strategy will be completed in March
2011.
DOD's Series of Military Support to Civil Authorities Policies and
Guidance Is Outdated:
In addition to DOD's outdated Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support, we found that DOD's series of civil support policies and
guidance, such as its 1997 DOD directive Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities, are also outdated, as most of them were written in the
1990s and thus do not reflect changes that occurred subsequent to
their issuance.[Footnote 22] For example, none of these directives
identify the roles and responsibilities of either NORTHCOM or ASD/HD--
both of whom have had key interagency coordination roles and
responsibilities with federal partners since their establishment in
2002 and 2003, respectively. These directives also do not reflect the
substantial changes that occurred in the national preparedness system
after the late 1990s, including the establishment of DHS in November
2002 and the subsequent issuance of extensive civilian policy and
doctrine for homeland security.[Footnote 23] For example, the
directives do not identify the current roles and responsibilities of
DOD entities supporting civil authorities under the National Response
Framework, such as DOD's Defense Coordinating Officers. According to
ASD/HD officials, DOD intends to replace current directives on
military support and assistance to civil authorities with a new draft
directive on military support to civil authorities that is currently
undergoing internal revision by DOD.[Footnote 24] ASD/HD officials
stated this new directive will likely be updated in early 2010;
however, this office has previously extended deadlines for making
these needed revisions.
Roles and Responsibilities for Support to Law Enforcement Are Unclear:
DOD's directive on supporting law enforcement agencies, which was last
updated in 1989 and is still in effect, is outdated and results in
unclear roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 25] This directive
assigns several responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Force Management and Personnel--subsequently renamed the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Personnel--related to coordination with
civilian law enforcement officials.[Footnote 26] However, this
directive conflicts with a 2009 directive that assigns many of the
same responsibilities to ASD/HD[Footnote 27]--and additionally,
another directive tasks the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities
with overseeing DOD's counterdrug mission in support of federal law
enforcement agencies instead of ASD/HD.[Footnote 28] Because DOD's law
enforcement support directive has not been updated or superseded in 20
years, it is unclear which DOD office is responsible for coordinating
with law enforcement agencies.
DOD plans to cancel its directive on DOD cooperation with civilian law
enforcement agencies and integrate aspects of its policy for law
enforcement support into a new DOD instruction to be issued in 2010.
However, according to ASD/HD officials, this policy revision will not
include DOD's support for counterdrug missions. As DOD does not have
another directive for its support to law enforcement agencies for its
homeland defense missions--such as Joint Task Force-North's support of
federal partners for counterdrug missions--there will be a gap in
DOD's law enforcement support policy.
Roles and Responsibilities between Homeland Defense and Health Affairs
Are Unclear:
Furthermore, DOD's directive delineating the roles and
responsibilities of ASD/HD and other offices within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense that directly coordinate with federal partners
are not integrated, which leads to unclear roles and responsibilities.
For example, ASD/HD is designated as the principal DOD representative
to interagency partners. However, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Health Affairs has a DOD liaison located at CDC who does not
directly coordinate with ASD/HD. CDC officials and the DOD liaison to
CDC told us that they were not aware of ASD/HD's roles and
responsibilities as the principal DOD representative to interagency
partners. Consequently, it is unclear as to the extent to which ASD/HD
or the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs is the
principal DOD representative to CDC. We found similar issues in
September 2006, when we reported that there was uncertainty about the
roles and responsibilities among DOD entities, including ASD/HD and
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, for preparing
for a pandemic influenza.[Footnote 29]
Joint Doctrine on Interagency Coordination Is Not Comprehensive:
DOD's joint doctrine on interagency coordination, which is supposed to
provide DOD entities information that will enable them to work with
their federal partners in meeting the entities' missions, does not
provide comprehensive information to the DOD entities. Specifically,
we found that this guidance primarily focuses on interagency
coordination overseas, leaving DOD entities supporting homeland
defense and civil support missions with limited information regarding
their federal partners. For example, DOD's joint guidance focuses only
on USDA's roles and responsibilities for foreign activities and does
not delineate the role of the USDA entity or DOD's potential
relationship to it during civil support operations.
This joint doctrine on interagency coordination is designed to provide
guidance to DOD personnel by providing descriptions of federal
agencies that DOD may encounter during the course of contingency
operations, but it is not comprehensive.[Footnote 30] USDA, for
example, is identified as the lead coordinating agency within the
National Response Framework for the Emergency Support Function annex
regarding Agriculture and Natural Resources, and DOD is identified
within the annex as a supporting agency to USDA.[Footnote 31] Within
the annex, the homeland security and emergency response roles and
responsibilities for a range of USDA entities, such as the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service, are detailed,[Footnote 32] and DOD is
expected to provide civil support to this USDA entity if needed during
an emergency or disaster. However, DOD's joint doctrine on interagency
coordination does not describe this USDA entity's domestic roles and
responsibilities and thus does not provide DOD entities sufficient
information that would facilitate their coordination efforts.
Roles and Responsibilities between ASD/HD, NORTHCOM, and PACOM Are
Unclear:
We found that roles and responsibilities among DOD entities, such as
ASD/HD, NORTHCOM, and PACOM were unclear with regard to interagency
coordination and external communication because ASD/HD had not
developed a memorandum or other policy document that described the
relationships among these entities. Specifically, while the Deputy
Secretary of Defense tasked ASD/HD in 2003 to prepare a memorandum
within 30 days describing the relationships between that office,
NORTHCOM, and other combatant commands,[Footnote 33] ASD/HD did not
develop such a memorandum. In January 2009, DOD issued a directive
identifying the roles and responsibilities of ASD/HD and canceled the
Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum with this tasking. However, the
January 2009 directive did not describe the relationships between that
office, NORTHCOM, PACOM, and other combatant commands. If developed as
instructed, this memorandum could have clarified the interagency
coordination and external communication roles and responsibilities for
homeland defense and civil support matters among ASD/HD, NORTHCOM, and
PACOM especially since two of these DOD entities--ASD/HD and NORTHCOM--
have representatives at DHS headquarters.
By updating, integrating, and ensuring the comprehensiveness of its
strategy, policy, and guidance, DOD would be better positioned to
improve and institutionalize its interagency coordination and external
communication efforts for homeland defense and civil support matters.
Similarly, the relationships among ASD/HD, NORTHCOM, and PACOM could
be clearer for interagency coordination if DOD issued a policy
document that clarifies the interagency coordination and external
communication roles and responsibilities of DOD entities.
DOD Communicates with Federal Partners through Various Means, but Its
Approach Could be Improved:
DOD communicates with its federal interagency partners through
numerous formal and informal forums, such as conferences, and
documents; however, DOD has not clearly identified the roles and
responsibilities and day-to-day coordination processes with its
federal partners through a single, readily accessible source for DOD's
federal partners that articulates such information. DOD and
interagency-related documents, such as DOD's joint doctrine on
interagency coordination,[Footnote 34] consistently recognize that
sharing information--including information about the agency's mission,
roles and responsibilities, culture, and lexicon--is critical for the
success of interagency coordination between federal agencies. For
example, the 2008 National Defense Strategy states that a unified
"whole-of-government" approach is possible only when every government
department and agency understands the core competencies, roles,
missions, and capabilities of its partners. DOD's 2009 Quadrennial
Roles and Mission Review Report states that the department supports a
coherent framework that includes commonly understood strategic
concepts, operational principles, relationships between agencies, and
roles and responsibilities that could help delineate how to best
coordinate and synchronize efforts between DOD and other federal
agencies. The National Response Framework recognizes that a concise,
common guide is valuable when addressing challenges to effective
response, such as the relatively high turnover and short tenure among
officials responsible for response at all levels. DOD officials also
agreed that given the growing importance of whole-of-government
planning, there is a need to inform interagency partners of DOD's
coordination approach.
DOD hosts or participates in numerous forums to enhance interagency
coordination and share information with its federal partners. For
example, DOD leadership, including the Secretary of Defense and
ASD/HD, participates in National Security Council meetings and
Homeland Security Council meetings to discuss national security policy
matters with the President of the United States and other federal
partners. NORTHCOM hosts a biweekly planning conference via telephone
that includes DOD and non-DOD officials from locations across the
United States. DOD officials stated that the department sends
representatives to the annual pre-and postwildfire season conferences
hosted by the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho. DOD
and non-DOD officials told us that these forums are great tools for
sharing current information and establishing and maintaining
relationships between and among DOD and its federal partners. However,
DOD, DHS, and DOJ officials also stated that the benefits gained
through these forums (such as establishing interagency relationships)
are transient because they depend on personnel who rotate out of their
positions frequently.
The National Response Framework similarly identifies high turnover and
short tenure of officials responsible for response activities
throughout government as a challenge for effective response. To
address this challenge, the National Interagency Fire Center created a
partner handbook that identifies key information, such as the roles
and responsibilities, missions, and agreed-upon protocols of its
mission partners. However, DOD has not developed a similar vehicle for
institutionalizing its information-sharing efforts so that its federal
partners can maintain institutional knowledge and have readily
accessible information about key issues, such as the different DOD
entities that have homeland defense and civil support missions--
including their missions, roles and responsibilities, agreed-upon
coordination protocols and procedures, and processes for initiating
new coordination relationships.
For those cases in which DOD has internally documented its missions,
roles, and responsibilities, we found that the information is
dispersed among multiple sources (for example, DOD strategy,
directives, manuals, and joint publications); the documents may not
always be readily accessible to federal partners; and they may be
written in a manner that leads to unclear expectations. We reviewed
more than 30 DOD documents, including classified documents, that DOD
officials said articulated the department's homeland defense and civil
support missions, its entities' roles and responsibilities, and its
culture and concepts. For example, there are 5 DOD strategy documents
(including 2 that are classified); 9 DOD directives that articulate
DOD's policy for civil support (including those that we have
previously identified as outdated resulting in unclear roles and
responsibilities); 4 joint doctrine documents that guide DOD entities
on matters pertaining to interagency coordination, homeland defense,
civil support, and counterdrug operations; 2 joint instructions; 6
NORTHCOM-specific guidance documents on the command's interagency
coordination policy and the roles and responsibilities of its
different command components; 2 DOD handbooks or manuals that discuss
civil support processes or provide guidance on interagency
coordination; and 8 concept plans that focus on interagency
coordination and civil support missions. DOD has no single directive
that articulates DOD's policy for homeland defense. DHS, HHS, and USDA
officials told us that they are unable to access classified
information on a regular basis because their agencies do not provide
security clearances or access to classified systems with the
information to all of their personnel, including their liaisons. DOD
also generally prohibits its concept plans from being shared with its
federal partners, even though DOD entities are supposed to support
these federal agencies within the homeland, and several of these
concept plans are unclassified documents.[Footnote 35] By not
providing a single, readily accessible partner guide to its federal
partners, DOD is in effect expecting them to research, attempt to
obtain access to, and then determine the mission of, roles and
responsibilities of, protocols for, and methods for initiating
relationships with DOD entities. The National Response Framework
recognizes the importance of partner guides, as they provide
stakeholder-specific ready references describing key roles and actions
for response partners. In March 2010, FEMA issued a series of partner
guides to serve as ready references of key roles and actions for
local, tribal, state, federal, and private-sector response.
In addition, some of the DOD documents were written in a manner that
could lead to misunderstandings and unclear expectations between DOD
and its federal partners. For example, Joint Task Force-North
officials told us that they believed their command had clearly
communicated to its law enforcement partners through command briefings
that it does not serve as the DOD entity those partners should contact
for immediate or near-term (i.e., within a week) DOD law enforcement
support assistance. The estimated time frame for fulfilling a support
request, according to Joint Task Force-North officials, would be at
least 180 days, and sometimes more than a year. However, officials
from a law enforcement agency told us that they would contact Joint
Task Force-North if they needed immediate or near-term DOD assistance,
as it was their belief that this would be part of that command's
mission. Our review of the briefing slides that the command presents
to its federal partners showed that they were written from the
perspective of Joint Task Force-North officials, who understood the
differences between the different types of requests that DOD could
receive from its law enforcement partners--differences that were not
clearly described in the briefing slides to these partners. DHS
officials told us that such examples highlight the need for DOD to do
a better job of sharing information regarding its civil support
missions in a single, readily accessible partner guide that is written
for use by the department's federal partners.
DOD officials told us that while there is a general recognition among
DOD officials and non-DOD officials of the need to proactively share
information about their respective agencies, DOD has yet to issue any
policy or guidance requiring a particular DOD entity to issue a
single, readily accessible partner guide written for use by the
department's federal partners. Such a guide would provide DOD's
federal partners more readily accessible information about key issues,
such as information about the different DOD entities that have a
homeland defense and civil support mission--including their missions,
roles and responsibilities, agreed-upon coordination protocols and
procedures, and processes for initiating new coordination
relationships.[Footnote 36]
DOD Has Generally Successfully Exchanged Liaisons with Some Federal
Agencies, but Greater Use of Key Practices Would Enhance Their
Effectiveness:
DOD and non-DOD officials told us that the quality of the liaisons
that their agencies have exchanged was generally very high; however,
DOD has not fully implemented key practices for managing homeland
defense and civil support liaisons. We have previously
reported[Footnote 37] and DOD recognizes[Footnote 38] that leading
organizations' key practices for effective and efficient workforce
planning and management include:
* ensuring situational awareness of liaisons that are currently
exchanged to be able to leverage resources, identify gaps, and assess
their performance in coordinating with their federal partners;
* conducting routine staffing-needs assessments to identify liaison
personnel needed to further interagency coordination;
* developing position descriptions to identify roles and
responsibilities; knowledge, skills, and abilities; and duration of
the exchange;
* training personnel to ensure that they possess the critical skills
and competencies needed for mission success; and:
* conducting performance assessments to evaluate the contributions
that individuals have made toward achieving programmatic results.
DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Knowledge Regarding Exchanged DOD and
Non-DOD Liaisons:
While various DOD entities, such as NORTHCOM and ASD/HD, may be aware
of the liaisons they have individually assigned to their federal
partners, neither of these two entities nor any other DOD entity has
comprehensive situational awareness of liaisons exchanged with other
federal agencies. We have previously reported that key practices for
effective and efficient workforce planning and management include,
among others, ensuring complete situational awareness of personnel--in
this case, liaisons exchanged for interagency coordination--to be able
to identify gaps or redundancies, as well as to be able to identify
assigned personnel whose performance needs to be assessed.[Footnote
39] DOD recognizes the need to have situational awareness of its
liaisons. For example, at a January 2009 interagency coordination
conference that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy hosted with DOD and non-DOD agencies,[Footnote 40] DOD
officials found that the department should increase the level of
awareness of the liaisons it has detailed to non-DOD agencies, as well
as non-DOD liaisons that have been detailed to DOD entities, to
minimize duplication and widen the overall interagency collaborative
effort. Similarly, a DOD instruction[Footnote 41] requires the
department's Washington Headquarters Services to track and record
approved liaisons.[Footnote 42]
We found that DOD's Washington Headquarters Services and ASD/HD, the
principal DOD representative with interagency partners for homeland
defense and civil support matters, did not have a complete list of all
the liaisons DOD has detailed to its partners, or vice versa.
According to Washington Headquarters Services' records, there were
only 2 DOD personnel at DHS headquarters for fiscal year 2009--yet an
informal survey of DOD personnel conducted by the ASD/HD
representative to DHS headquarters during the summer of 2009 found
more than 110 DOD personnel, from a variety of DOD entities, working
at DHS as liaisons, subject-matter experts, or in other capacities.
[Footnote 43] Officials at DOD's Washington Headquarters Services told
us that they did not have complete awareness of DOD liaisons sent to
DOD's federal partners because this information had not been provided
to Washington Headquarters Services by the DOD entities exchanging
liaisons. Similarly, ASD/HD and DOD's Washington Headquarters Services
lacked knowledge of the liaisons whom their federal partners had
assigned to different DOD entities, because DOD lacks policy or
guidance that requires such action. As a result, DOD entities, such as
Defense Coordinating Officers and Joint Task Force-North, may not be
fully aware of the liaisons whom they could leverage for their
specific missions. For example, a Defense Coordinating Officer told us
that a point of contact and relationship with a representative from
the Department of Energy would enhance his ability to meet some of his
responsibilities. The Defense Coordinating Officer told us he was not
aware of the Department of Energy liaison assigned at NORTHCOM
headquarters and available for his needs.
Further, while Washington Headquarters Services and ASD/HD are not
precluded from sharing information with each other, they have not done
so. ASD/HD officials told us they were not utilizing the information
possessed by Washington Headquarters Services regarding DOD liaisons
detailed to other federal agencies because they were not aware of the
instruction directing Washington Headquarters Services to track and
record approved liaisons. Officials from ASD/HD acknowledged that DOD
currently has a gap in its guidance regarding situational awareness of
liaisons exchanged for homeland defense and civil support missions,
and that it plans to issue such guidance by the end of 2010. By
enforcing compliance with DOD's current instruction on tracking its
liaisons and by issuing additional guidance regarding liaisons
exchanged for homeland defense and civil support matters, DOD will be
better positioned to have complete situational awareness of exchanged
liaisons, minimize duplication of resources, and broaden the overall
interagency collaborative effort.
DOD Has Not Conducted an Overall Staffing-Needs Assessment for the
Exchange of Liaison Personnel:
DOD has not conducted a departmentwide staffing-needs assessment of
liaisons that the department sends to its federal partners and vice
versa to ensure that the department is leveraging resources
appropriately and is sensitive to its federal partners' missions and
capacities. DOD guidance recognizes the need to determine resource
requirements for the exchange of liaison personnel, stating that DOD
combatant commanders are to utilize liaison officers, as appropriate,
to facilitate coordination with other federal agencies and ensure
sound management of DOD resources.[Footnote 44] At the same time, DOD
officials at the January 2009 interagency coordination conference
recognized that DOD needs to be sensitive to the capacity of its
federal partners to provide liaisons to a range of DOD entities
requesting such liaisons. We have also previously reported that key
practices for effective and efficient workforce planning and
management include, among others, conducting routine staffing-needs
assessments to identify personnel resource requirements needed to
further the agency's mission.[Footnote 45]
According to NORTHCOM officials, the command has conducted informal
staffing-needs assessments for some of its non-DOD liaisons.
Specifically, DOD initially assessed the command's need for liaisons
from other federal agencies when the department funded three liaisons
to the command upon its establishment in 2003.[Footnote 46]
Subsequently, NORTHCOM conducted informal staffing-needs assessments
by surveying the command staff to determine whether they had
identified additional liaisons who should be located at the
headquarters to support the command's mission.[Footnote 47] As a
result of these informal determinations of staffing needs at
NORTHCOM's headquarters, the number of federal agencies with
representatives located at the command's headquarters has increased
from 3 in 2003 to 18 in 2009. NORTHCOM has additional representatives
from agencies that are not located at the command's headquarters.
According to NORTHCOM officials, these personnel are able to set up
temporary offices at the command's headquarters for exercises and
other events, as needed. NORTHCOM used a similar informal approach to
assign 2 liaisons to DHS and FEMA headquarters and 3 additional
interagency coordination representatives to the command's Washington
Office.[Footnote 48] As with NORTHCOM, PACOM officials stated that
PACOM has not conducted a formal staffing needs assessment for the
exchange of liaisons. Rather, the federal partner liaisons located at
PACOM reflect evolving informal determinations of staffing needs.
ASD/HD has also placed liaisons with its federal partners, including
11 officials at DHS, 1 official at the Homeland Security Council, and
1 official at the White House.
However, officials from ASD/HD--the principal DOD entity responsible
for coordinating the determination of requirements for the DOD-wide
exchange of liaisons with federal partners for homeland defense and
civil support--told us that they have not conducted a formal DOD-wide
staffing-needs assessment to determine which DOD entities should
exchange liaisons with which federal partners. As a result, ASD/HD
does not have a way of ensuring that DOD entities, which have been
able to establish their own liaison requirements without a DOD-wide
staffing-needs assessment, have not placed too many liaisons at
certain agencies and have not neglected to place an adequate number of
liaisons with DOD's other federal partners. In addition, NORTHCOM
officials told us that they lack guidance on determining the
appropriate number and selection of agencies from which they should be
exchanging liaisons. Officials from ASD/HD acknowledged that DOD
currently has a gap in its guidance for determining the appropriate
number and selection of agencies and that it plans to issue such
guidance in 2010. A DOD-wide staffing-needs assessment would better
position DOD to ensure the most appropriate and efficient exchange of
liaisons between DOD entities and DOD's federal partner agencies, and
thus maximize the effectiveness of interagency coordination efforts.
DOD Has Not Consistently Developed Position Descriptions to Define the
Roles and Responsibilities of DOD and Non-DOD Liaisons:
DOD has not consistently developed position descriptions for liaison
personnel to define their roles and responsibilities; requisite
knowledge, skills, and abilities; or the duration of exchanges for DOD
and federal partner liaisons. We have previously reported that leading
organizations' key practices for effective and efficient workforce
planning and management include the development of such position
descriptions.[Footnote 49] DOD policy and guidance also state that
both uniformed and civilian personnel, which include DOD liaisons to
federal agencies, should have position descriptions that identify
their duties, qualifications, supervisory status, and other
requirements of the position.[Footnote 50] For example, in March 2007,
DOD's Joint Forces Command issued guidance for combatant commanders
that provided generic position descriptions, qualifications, and
exchange durations for federal partner liaisons assigned to a Joint
Interagency Coordination Group within a combatant command.[Footnote
51] Participants at the January 2009 DOD interagency coordination
conference endorsed the need for liaisons to have defined roles and
responsibilities, and recommended that the department ensure that
memoranda of understanding--one approach to identifying position
descriptions--are developed early in relationships between DOD and
federal partner agencies. For example, the position description for
the DOD personnel assigned to FEMA regional offices should be
developed with input from FEMA so that both agencies understand what
FEMA needs from the person filling this position as well as what it
needs from DOD.
According to officials from ASD/HD and NORTHCOM, DOD liaisons sent to
federal partners do not consistently have formal position descriptions
that are specific to their interagency coordination role for homeland
defense and civil support missions. For example, we found that the
principal DOD representative to DHS does not have a position
description that describes that position's roles and responsibilities;
requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities; or duration of the
exchange. DOD entities have not fully complied with the policy and
guidance requiring them to develop position descriptions for their
liaison personnel.
We also found that DOD has not consistently issued position
descriptions or guidance to federal agencies sending liaisons to DOD
entities. DOD officials told us that they do not believe it is their
responsibility to identify the roles and responsibilities; requisite
knowledge skills, and abilities; and duration of exchange of non-DOD
personnel. Instead, they said, that responsibility belongs to the non-
DOD liaisons' agencies. We note, however, that while that
responsibility might belong with the other agencies, DOD exposes
itself to potentially conflicting expectations and negative
relationships with liaisons or their agencies by not consistently
identifying the DOD entity's expectations to its federal partners
before the liaisons are selected. For example, we were told about two
separate instances in which expectation differences between NORTHCOM
and non-DOD liaisons limited the command's ability to fully utilize
the non-DOD liaisons as the command had initially intended. NORTHCOM
officials told us that they have learned from both of these instances
and are developing a standard memorandum of understanding that
identifies the roles and responsibilities; requisite knowledge,
skills, and abilities; and duration of exchange for each non-DOD
liaison assigned to the command, and that it will be signed by the
command and the liaison's home agency.[Footnote 52] DOD entities have
not consistently developed position descriptions for their non-DOD
liaisons, either through memoranda of understanding or other means,
because they lack policy that requires them to take such action.
Officials from ASD/HD acknowledged that DOD currently has gaps in its
guidance with regard to defining the roles and responsibilities;
requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities; and duration of exchange
for liaison positions, as well as for the use of memoranda of
understanding to define such positions. They said that they plan to
issue related guidance in 2010. By enforcing compliance with DOD's
current policies requiring such position descriptions for DOD
personnel as well as by having ASD/HD issue additional guidance, DOD
will be better positioned to ensure that roles and responsibilities,
requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities, and the duration of
exchange of DOD and federal partner liaison personnel are well
defined; and that they have mitigated the risk of having conflicting
expectations with their federal partners and their representatives.
DOD Cannot Assess Training Adequacy Because It Has Not Identified
Requisite Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Liaisons:
DOD offers some training opportunities for liaison personnel, but
training adequacy cannot be assessed because, as noted previously, DOD
has not consistently developed position descriptions for liaison
personnel to define their roles and responsibilities as well as
requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities. We have previously
reported that key practices for effective and efficient workforce
planning and management include, among other practices, training
personnel to ensure that they possess the critical skills and
competencies needed for mission success.[Footnote 53] DOD policy and
guidance also recognize the importance of specialized training,
calling for the use of liaisons specifically trained for their liaison
duties.[Footnote 54] For example, DOD's 2009 Quadrennial Roles and
Missions Review Report stated that training is a critical element in
achieving the department's vision of an institutionalized, whole-of-
government approach to addressing national security challenges. DOD's
Joint Forces Command 2007 focus paper on interagency coordination best
practices stated that DOD and non-DOD liaisons should receive training
that enhances that coordination, such as training that would allow the
liaisons to develop a more thorough understanding of their federal
partners.[Footnote 55] Further, participants at the January 2009
interagency coordination conference stated that interagency
coordination would be improved by having combatant commands devote
additional resources to the training of exchanged liaisons, in part
because liaison personnel from other federal agencies can have
difficulty in adjusting to a military culture and working in the DOD
joint environment.[Footnote 56]
Officials from ASD/HD, NORTHCOM, and PACOM told us that exchanged
liaisons receive a variety of training through a range of forums. For
example, liaison personnel may receive informal training by attending
activities such as planning conferences, coordination working group
meetings, and training opportunities offered prior to exercises. Joint
Forces Command's focus paper on interagency coordination best
practices states that getting people together has value because it
supports the learning process. DOD also offers some more structured
training that, according to DOD and DHS officials, enhances
interagency coordination duties. For example, all staff assigned to
NORTHCOM headquarters, including non-DOD liaisons, attend a weeklong
set of indoctrination training sessions where new staff learn about
the command's mission to support civil authorities and about some of
the federal agencies that have representatives at the command. PACOM
officials stated that the command also has indoctrination in-briefs
for all new personnel, including non-DOD liaisons. However, PACOM
officials acknowledged that non-DOD liaisons located off-site may be
missing this training and this is an area where the command could
improve. At both locations, non-DOD officials who represent their
agencies but are not co-located at the command told us that they did
not receive the indoctrination training that co-located liaisons
received.
NORTHCOM, through its Army component command, offers a civil support
training course that consists of three phases: an online course that
takes about 8 hours to complete, a residential course that lasts 1
week, and ongoing training through e-mails that provide updates and
reminders about information provided in the other two phases. While
the residential course is offered to both DOD and non-DOD personnel,
it has not been widely attended by liaisons from the full range of
DOD's federal partners. Specifically, 2,902 DOD personnel and 109 non-
DOD federal personnel attended the residential training from April
2006 through June 2009.[Footnote 57] Of the non-DOD personnel
attendees, 101 came from FEMA, 5 from HHS, and 1 each from the
Transportation Security Administration, Department of Transportation,
and the Environmental Protection Agency. According to NORTHCOM
records, agencies identified as coordinating federal agencies that DOD
might be called upon to support in accordance with the National
Response Framework (such as DOJ and USDA) have not attended this
training program. Similarly, NORTHCOM's civil support training course
does not address all of the different aspects of civil support as
identified in DOD's civil support joint doctrine.[Footnote 58]
DOD recognizes that it needs to improve training for interagency
coordination. For example, its January 2009 Quadrennial Roles and
Mission Review Report concluded that lingering challenges for
interagency personnel may be partially attributable to a lack of
knowledge about other federal agencies. Tailored and specialized
training for liaison personnel to develop this knowledge is valuable
and necessary, because each federal agency has its own organizational
culture, goals, priorities, requirements, practices, and processes.
Additional DOD guidance and the development of position descriptions
that identify specific roles and responsibilities as well as
knowledge, skills, and abilities, for which liaisons should be
trained, could enable DOD to ensure that its training programs are
adequate.
DOD Conducts Performance Assessments of Its Liaisons but Has
Opportunities to Enhance Their Scope:
DOD policy recognizes the need to conduct personnel performance
assessments. However, DOD's performance assessments of its liaisons
are not focused on coordination competencies, and DOD does not
consistently provide feedback to its federal partners about their
liaisons' performance. We have previously reported that key practices
for effective and efficient workforce planning and management include
conducting performance assessments to evaluate the contributions that
individuals have made toward achieving programmatic results--in this
case, in interagency coordination efforts for homeland defense and
civil support missions.[Footnote 59] DOD policy also recognizes the
need to conduct personnel performance assessments. For example, an
Army regulation requires uniformed Army personnel to receive
performance assessments based on their particular duties,
responsibilities, tasks, and objectives.[Footnote 60] Similarly, DOD
civilian personnel are to be assessed on their performance based on
their roles and responsibilities as defined within their position
descriptions.[Footnote 61]
DOD and non-DOD officials told us that they were generally very
satisfied with the quality of the liaisons they received from each
other. The officials stated that the liaisons have tended to be great
ambassadors of their home agency and described them as being
professional, cooperative, proactive, and team-oriented. However, we
found that DOD liaisons' performance assessments do not consistently
focus on the competencies and achievements required for interagency
coordination. According to officials from ASD/HD and NORTHCOM, DOD
liaisons sent to other federal agencies are not necessarily assessed
on their performance specific to their role as liaisons for
interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support
missions. For example, a DOD uniformed officer serving as a liaison
could be assessed according to the position description for an officer
of that individual's rank, but not necessarily as a liaison. Thus, the
assessment is not specifically designed to assess the officer's
performance as a liaison engaged in interagency coordination.
Similarly, civilian DOD personnel were not consistently or fully
assessed for their coordination efforts, because formal position
descriptions are not yet in place. DOD's assessments of its
interagency coordination efforts for homeland defense and civil
support have not specifically focused on the performance of individual
liaison personnel in part because, according to DOD officials, they
lack guidance on how to include interagency coordination competencies
and achievements in the current performance management policy.
We also found that DOD did not consistently request input from its
federal partners on the performance of its liaisons, nor did it
provide input for the performance assessments of non-DOD liaisons
working at DOD entities. Such feedback would be valuable because the
home agency performance rating official lacks the physical proximity
needed to effectively judge the liaison's performance on a day-to-day
basis. According to NORTHCOM officials, NORTHCOM's director of its
interagency coordination directorate provides informal feedback to
some federal agencies regarding the performance of their liaisons
located at NORTHCOM headquarters. While in some cases the expectation
for this input into the non-DOD liaisons' performance assessments is
identified in memoranda of understanding between the command and the
federal partners, in other cases input is provided at the request of
the non-DOD liaisons or at the director's discretion. Conversely, DOD
officials do not systematically request or receive performance
feedback from the federal agencies that host DOD liaisons. ASD/HD
officials told us that they believe memoranda of understanding between
the DOD entity and the federal partner constitute the best approach to
incorporate such feedback. However, DOD officials told us that they do
not consistently request input from federal partners on the
performance of DOD liaisons or provide input into the performance
assessments of non-DOD liaisons working at DOD entities because they
are not required to do so and because they lack guidance on how to
incorporate this human capital practice into their current efforts.
Officials from ASD/HD acknowledged that DOD currently has gaps in its
guidance regarding position descriptions for liaisons, as well as
regarding performance assessments of liaison personnel specific to
their role in interagency coordination. These officials told us they
plan to issue related guidance in 2010, and that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff is updating joint doctrine on interagency coordination. Until
position descriptions for liaisons are consistently established, roles
and responsibilities for interagency coordination will continue to
lack clear definition, and DOD will be unable to assess liaisons from
a performance perspective. Once liaison position descriptions are
established and guidance is put into place requiring performance
assessments--including feedback solicited from or offered by the
receiving agency--specific to liaisons' roles and responsibilities in
interagency coordination, DOD will be better positioned to ensure that
liaisons are comprehensively assessed on a regular basis to evaluate
the contributions they have made toward achieving program goals.
Conclusions:
Close coordination between DOD and its federal partners is essential
for DOD's two homeland security missions--homeland defense and civil
support. The success of these missions depends fundamentally on
clearly defined roles and responsibilities; DOD and its federal
partners' mutual understanding of each other's entities, missions,
organization, culture, and lexicon; and an effective and efficient
liaison exchange program. Over the years, DOD has issued a number of
strategy, policy, and guidance documents related to interagency
coordination for its homeland defense and civil support missions.
However, DOD entities still lack clearly defined roles and
responsibilities, because key DOD documents are outdated, or not
integrated, and are not comprehensive. Without updated policy and
guidance to ensure its comprehensiveness, it is not always clear which
DOD office is responsible for coordinating and communicating with
certain federal agencies and for what purpose. Conversely, the roles
and responsibilities of DOD entities that coordinate with federal
partners would be more clearly defined and internally synchronized by
updating, integrating, and ensuring the comprehensiveness of the
department's key strategic and operational documents and issuing a
policy document that defines the relationship between ASD/HD,
NORTHCOM, and PACOM.
In an effort to develop and maintain relationships with its federal
partners, DOD entities host and participate in a plethora of forums
annually. However, there are opportunities to enhance the ability of
those responsible for interagency coordination by more clearly
communicating and identifying DOD entities, missions, organization,
culture, and lexicon to DOD's federal partners. A DOD partner guide
that identifies these components could facilitate and institutionalize
DOD's efforts to share key information with its federal partners. The
National Response Framework recognizes the importance of such partner
guides as they provide stakeholder-specific references describing key
roles and actions for response partners. A DOD partner guide could
complement FEMA's National Response Framework Federal Partner Guide.
Liaisons exchanged between DOD and non-DOD agencies are one of the
most critical components of interagency coordination. Considering
DOD's overseas commitments and the nation's fiscal constraints, these
resources should be used effectively and efficiently. During our
review, DOD and non-DOD officials told us that they were generally
very satisfied with the quality of the liaisons they received from
each other and that they tended to be great ambassadors of their home
agency. By fully implementing key practices for managing homeland
defense and civil support liaisons, DOD will be better positioned to
ensure that it has a fully effective and efficient liaison exchange
program.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To more clearly define roles and responsibilities for interagency
coordination within DOD, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
establish a time line and update and ensure the integration and
comprehensiveness of DOD policy and guidance that delineate the roles
and responsibilities of and relationships between DOD entities, such
as ASD/HD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, the combatant
commands, the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
and DOD intelligence agencies. Specifically, updates of such policy
and guidance should include:
* DOD's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support;
* DOD's law enforcement support policy (or policies) that address the
different missions of such support, including civil support,
counterdrug, and counterterrorism support;
* DOD's series of civil support policies and guidance (i.e., DOD's
directive and instruction 3025 series);
* DOD's joint interagency coordination guidance (i.e., Joint
Publication 3-08), ensuring sufficient and comprehensive coverage of
homeland defense and civil support interagency coordination
requirements and partners; and:
* a policy document that clearly and specifically defines the
relationships among ASD/HD, NORTHCOM, and other combatant commanders,
including interagency coordination and external communication roles
and responsibilities for homeland defense and civil support.
To facilitate and institutionalize a unified approach between DOD and
its federal partners for interagency coordination for homeland defense
and civil support missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to establish a time line to develop and
issue a partner guide that identifies the roles and responsibilities
of DOD entities, processes, and agreed-upon approaches for interagency
coordination for homeland defense and civil support efforts.
To ensure that DOD has adopted and implemented key practices for
managing homeland defense and civil support liaisons, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct ASD/HD, in coordination with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to establish a time line to take the following
two actions:
* Ensure implementation of DOD's current instruction on the tracking
of DOD liaisons assignments to other federal agencies, as well as the
establishment of position descriptions for uniformed military and DOD
civilian personnel.
* Develop and issue additional workforce management policy and
guidance regarding DOD liaisons to other federal agencies, as well as
other federal agencies' liaisons to DOD. Such policy and guidance
should ensure that:
- routine staffing-needs assessments are conducted;
- position descriptions or memoranda of understanding are developed;
- appropriate interagency coordination training is available to
liaisons; and:
- routine performance assessments of liaison personnel are conducted,
to include feedback from the host agency or component.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with our
recommendations and discussed steps it is taking or plans to take to
address these recommendations. In response to our recommendation that
DOD establish a time line and update DOD policy and guidance that
delineate the roles and responsibilities of and the relationships
between DOD entities, DOD agreed and stated that several draft policy
and guidance updates are in coordination and provided estimated time
lines for completion. In response to our recommendation to establish a
time line to develop and issue a partner guide that identifies the
roles and responsibilities of DOD entities, processes, and agreed-upon
approaches for interagency coordination, DOD agreed and stated a time
line would be developed by June 2010. In response to our
recommendation that DOD ensure implementation of its current
instruction on tracking liaison assignments to other federal agencies,
establish position descriptions for personnel, and develop and issue
additional workforce management policy and guidance regarding DOD
liaisons to other federal agencies as well as other federal agencies'
liaisons to DOD, the department agreed that it would implement this
recommendation through ASD/HD.
DOD comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD, DHS, DOJ, and HHS
reviewed the draft of the report and provided technical comments,
which we have incorporated into the report where appropriate. USDA and
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence also reviewed a
draft of this report but did not provide any comments.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until
30 days after its date. At that time, we will send copies to the
appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Attorney General, and the
Director of National Intelligence. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov or
William O. Jenkins at (202) 512-8757 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by:
William O. Jenkins:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Jeff Miller:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher S. Bond:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
As part of our review, we interviewed numerous officials from the
Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD organizations to determine the
extent to which DOD coordinates with its federal agency partners in
support of its homeland defense and civil support missions. We
selected the DOD entities with whom we met based on those that were
identified by either DOD documents or officials as having a key role
for interagency coordination for homeland defense and civil support
missions. DOD officials at the strategic level with whom we met
included representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global
Threats, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We also met with U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) officials because
they are the combatant commanders whose areas of responsibilities
include the United States and its territories. During the engagement's
design phase, we identified over 30 non-DOD agencies that had some
type of relationship with NORTHCOM. As such, we selected other DOD and
non-DOD entities to visit during our engagement using a
nongeneralizable sample of entities that coordinate with NORTHCOM
since it was established specifically to address homeland defense and
civil support and its area of responsibility includes 49 states, the
District of Columbia, 1 commonwealth, and 1 territory (compared to
PACOM whose area of responsibility includes 1 state, 1 commonwealth,
and 2 territories). Specifically, using five conduits through which
NORTHCOM coordinates with its federal partners--including the
command's interagency coordination directorate, the command's
intelligence directorate, Defense Coordinating Officers, joint task
forces, and liaison exchanges--we selected DOD and non-DOD agencies
that coordinated with NORTHCOM officials through at least one of these
conduits. In selecting the nongeneralizable sample of non-DOD
agencies, we also considered whether the agencies were identified as a
lead support agency under the National Response Framework with whom
DOD would need to coordinate during a Stafford Act-declared event.
Since Defense Coordinating Officers and their support elements are
located at each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions,
we decided to select a nongeneralizable sample of Defense Coordinating
Officers and their support elements to visit during our review. In
selecting the specific regions we would visit, we used criteria such
as geographic location; region size; number of requests for assistance
for the region between January 1, 2008, and May 31, 2009; types of
assistance requested; and GAO resources required. For the selection
process, we identified the combination of regions that would meet
every criterion so as to get a representative sample. As shown in
table 2, we visited a number of DOD and non-DOD organizations,
including DOD and non-DOD entities that would provide a cross-
selection of missions in which DOD supports civil authorities (e.g.,
law enforcement versus emergency management).
Table 2: DOD and Non-DOD Organizations Visited During Our Review:
Federal agency: Department of Defense:
Entities visited during our review: Office of the Secretary of Defense;
* Office of the Executive Secretary;
* Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs (ASD/HD);
* Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs;
* Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and
Global Threats;
* ASD/HD liaison to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Entities visited during our review: Joint Chiefs of Staff;
* Joint Directorate of Manpower and Personnel;
* Joint Directorate of Military Support;
* Joint Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy.
Entities visited during our review: National Guard Bureau;
* Headquarters;
* Liaison to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Headquarters;
* Liaison to NORTHCOM;
* Liaison to PACOM;
* Liaison to Joint Task Force-North;
* Liaison to U.S. Coast Guard.
Entities visited during our review: DOD Washington Headquarters
Services.
Entities visited during our review: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
* Headquarters;
* Liaison to ASD/HD;
* Liaison to FEMA headquarters;
* Liaison to PACOM.
Entities visited during our review: Defense Intelligence Agency.
Entities visited during our review: National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency.
Entities visited during our review: NORTHCOM;
* Directorate of Interagency Coordination;
* Directorate of Intelligence;
* Directorate of Operations;
* Directorate of Logistics and Engineering;
* Directorate of Plans and Policy;
* Directorate of Training and Exercise;
* Directorate of Programs, Resources, and Analysis;
* Washington Office;
* Liaison to DHS;
* Liaison to FEMA.
Entities visited during our review: U.S. Army North Command.
Entities visited during our review: Joint Task Force North;
* Commanding General;
* Chief of Staff;
* Directorate of Personnel;
* Directorate of Intelligence;
* Directorate of Operations;
* Directorate of Logistics;
* Directorate of Plans and Policy;
* Directorate of Communications;
* Judge Advocate;
* Liaison to U.S. Army North Command.
Entities visited during our review: PACOM;
* Directorate of Intelligence;
* Directorate of Operations;
* Directorate of Logistics, Engineering, and Security Assistance;
* Directorate of Plans and Policy;
* Joint Interagency Coordination Group;
* Joint Interagency Task Force West;
* Joint Task Force - Homeland Defense.
Entities visited during our review: U.S. Joint Forces Command;
* Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, Building
Partnerships Division;
* Joint Doctrine and Education Group.
Entities visited during our review: Defense Coordinating
Officer/Defense Coordinating Element located at:
* FEMA Region II;
* FEMA Region IV;
* FEMA Region VI;
* FEMA Region IX (Oakland, California, office);
* FEMA Region IX (Pacific Area Office).
Federal agency: Department of Homeland Security:
Entities visited during our review: DHS Headquarters;
* Military Advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security;
* Senior DHS liaison to DOD;
* Liaison to NORTHCOM.
Entities visited during our review: FEMA;
* Office of Policy, Program Analysis;
* Mitigation Directorate;
* Logistics Directorate;
* Operations Directorate;
* FEMA Region II;
* FEMA Region IV;
* FEMA Region VI;
* FEMA Region IX (Oakland, California, office);
* FEMA Region IX (Pacific Area Office).
Entities visited during our review: Customs and Border Protection;
* Headquarters;
* Border Patrol Special Coordination Center;
* Liaison to NORTHCOM;
* Liaison to PACOM.
Entities visited during our review: Immigration and Customs
Enforcement;
* Headquarters;
* U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters;
* El Paso, Texas, office;
* Liaison to NORTHCOM.
Federal agency: Department of Justice:
Entities visited during our review: Federal Bureau of Investigation;
* Headquarters;
* Liaison to NORTHCOM;
* Special-agent-in-charge Honolulu;
* FBI El Paso.
Entities visited during our review: Drug Enforcement Administration;
* Headquarters;
* Liaison to PACOM.
Entities visited during our review: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives;
* Liaison to NORTHCOM;
* Honolulu, Hawaii office.
Entities visited during our review: U.S. Attorneys;
* Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys;
* U.S. Attorney's Office El Paso, Texas;
* U.S. Attorney's Office Honolulu, Hawaii.
Federal agency: Department of Health and Human Services:
Entities visited during our review: Headquarters;
* Liaison to NORTHCOM.
Entities visited during our review: Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention;
* Headquarters;
* Honolulu, Hawaii, office.
Federal agency: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Entities visited during our review: Office of Homeland Security.
Entities visited during our review: Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service;
* Headquarters;
* Liaison to NORTHCOM.
Entities visited during our review: U.S. Forest Service headquarters.
Federal agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence:
Entities visited during our review: Headquarters;
* Liaison to NORTHCOM;
* Liaison to PACOM.
Federal agency: Interagency Centers:
Entities visited during our review:
* El Paso Intelligence Center;
* National Counter Terrorism Center;
* National Interagency Fire Center.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To determine the extent to which DOD has identified clearly defined
roles and responsibilities for DOD entities to facilitate interagency
coordination for homeland defense and civil support missions, we
reviewed a plethora of strategies, doctrine, policies, directives,
guidance, concept plans, and other documents that address DOD's
homeland defense and civil support missions, as shown in appendix II.
We analyzed these documents for currency, accuracy, and
comprehensiveness based on discussions with DOD officials, including
those listed above. We also obtained DOD leadership memoranda to
identify the extent to which DOD had been required to take action that
could enhance interagency coordination. To the extent that DOD had
taken such action, we analyzed the extent to which it addressed the
requirements and the extent to which it was comprehensive.
To determine the extent to which DOD has articulated its roles and
responsibilities and day-to-day coordination processes with federal
partners, we asked DOD and non-DOD officials about different means
that DOD uses to communicate this information to its partners,
including those listed above. The officials identified a variety of
forums, such as planning conferences, and documents that DOD had
issued. To determine the extent to which DOD hosts or participates in
interagency forums, we asked department officials to identify forums
involving DOD and its federal partners, including interagency planning
conferences, educational training, frequent interagency meetings,
exercises, and working groups. We then reviewed charters, agendas, and
meeting minutes from multiple forums such as working groups that
involved the department coordinating with its federal partners.
Additionally, we observed multiple forums hosted by DOD, such as a
NORTHCOM biweekly interagency synchronization teleconference, to
provide context to our assessment of the extent to which DOD
coordinates with its federal partners. We also reviewed DOD documents
that DOD officials told us they use to communicate this information to
their partners. Such documents included DOD strategies, doctrine,
policies, directives, guidance, and concept plans. In analyzing both
the forums and DOD documents, we discussed with DOD and non-DOD
officials the extent to which these means address factors that affect
interagency coordination, including quality and availability of
information about the agency's mission, roles and responsibilities,
culture, and lexicon. In analyzing documents that DOD officials had
identified, we evaluated the extent to which these documents were
current, comprehensive, and readily available.
To determine the extent to which DOD has adopted and implemented key
practices for managing homeland defense and civil support liaisons, we
identified established best practices, reviewed related DOD documents,
and interviewed officials from DOD and DOD's federal partner agencies.
To identify key practices for workforce management that can enhance
interagency coordination, we reviewed prior GAO reports on human
capital best practices.[Footnote 62] These reports identify, among
others, key principles for effective strategic workforce planning and
management as well as actions that agencies can take to enhance
interagency coordination for national security. We also reviewed DOD
interagency coordination conference proceedings and white papers, as
well as joint Department of Homeland Security-Department of Justice
guidelines for interagency coordination for homeland security, which
similarly recommend the use of such best practices. To determine the
extent to which DOD has adopted these practices, we reviewed DOD
strategy, policy, doctrine, and guidance, as well as liaison position
descriptions and training materials. For example, we reviewed DOD
policy concerning its personnel management system and the detail of
DOD personnel to duty outside of the department, as well as combatant
command guidance for interagency coordination. We also interviewed
officials from a range of DOD entities and DOD's federal partner
agencies who send and/or receive interagency coordination liaisons, or
have a role in the management of such liaisons. Specifically, DOD
entities with liaison management responsibilities with whom we
interviewed included ASD/HD, the DOD's Joint Directorate of Manpower
and Personnel, DOD Administration and Management's Washington
Headquarters Services, as well as combatant command officials
responsible for interagency coordination activities at NORTHCOM and
PACOM.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2009 to March 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: List of Key Documents That Identify the Roles and
Responsibilities of DOD Entities Conducting Homeland Defense and Civil
Support Missions:
Document type: DOD Strategy;
Title: DOD's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support;
Date: June 2005.
Document type: DOD Strategy;
Title: DOD's National Defense Strategy;
Date: June 2008.
Document type: DOD Strategy;
Title: DOD Joint Operating Concept - Homeland Defense and Civil
Support;
Date: October 1, 2007.
Document type: DOD Directive;
Title: DOD Directive 3025.13 - Employment of Department of Defense
Resources in Support of the United States Secret Service;
Date: September 13, 1985.
Document type: DOD Directive;
Title: DOD Directive 5525.5 - DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Officials;
Date: December 20, 1989.
Document type: DOD Directive;
Title: DOD Directive 3025.1 - Military Support to Civil Authorities
(MSCA);
Date: January 15, 1993.
Document type: DOD Directive;
Title: DOD Directive 3025.12 - Military Assistance for Civil
Disturbances (MACDIS);
Date: February 4, 1994.
Document type: DOD Directive;
Title: Document type: DOD Directive 3025.15 - Military Assistance to
Civil Authorities;
Date: February 18, 1997.
Document type: DOD Directive;
Title: Document type: DOD Directive 3025.16 - Military Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program;
Date: December 18, 2000.
Document type: DOD Directive;
Title: DOD Directive 5136.01 - Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs (ASD(HA));
Date: June 4, 2008.
Document type: DOD Directive;
Title: DOD Directive 5111.13 - Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA);
Date: January 16, 2009.
Document type: DOD Directive;
Title: DOD Directive 5111.10 - Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent
Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC));
Date: January 16, 2009.
Document type: DOD Joint Publication;
Title: Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental
Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During
Joint Operations Volumes I & II;
Date: March 17, 2006.
Document type: DOD Joint Publication;
Title: Joint Publication 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations;
Date: June 13, 2007.
Document type: DOD Joint Publication;
Title: DOD Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense;
Date: July 12, 2007.
Document type: DOD Joint Publication;
Title: DOD Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support;
Date: September 14, 2007.
Document type: DOD Concept Plans (CONPLANs);
Title: Multiple CONPLANs for issues ranging from nuclear accident
response to pandemic influenza planning;
Date: various dates.
Document type: NORTHCOM Guidance Documents;
Title: NORTHCOM's Concept of Operations;
Date: June 13, 2005.
Document type: NORTHCOM Guidance Documents;
Title: NORTHCOM's Concept of Employment - Homeland Defense;
Date: March 2, 2007.
Document type: NORTHCOM Guidance Documents;
Title: NORTHCOM's Concept of Employment - Civil Support;
Date: August 20, 2004.
Document type: NORTHCOM Guidance Documents;
Title: NORTHCOM Publication 1-01 - Battle Staff Standard Operating
Procedures;
Date: July 22, 2008.
Document type: NORTHCOM Guidance Documents;
Title: NORTHCOM Manual 38-153 - NORAD And USNORTHCOM Organizations and
Functions;
Date: August 1, 2007.
Document type: NORTHCOM Guidance Documents;
Title: NORTHCOM Instruction 10-165 - Interagency Coordination;
Date: March 16, 2009.
Document type: DOD Reports;
Title: Report to Congress on;
Establishment of U.S. Northern Command;
Date: September 2003.
Document type: DOD Reports;
Title: Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report;
Date: January 2009.
Document type: DOD Reports;
Title: DOD Report Responding to NDAA FY08, Sec. 952 (P.L. 110-181);
Date: August 18, 2009.
Document type: Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions;
Title: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
5715.01B - Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs;
Date: July 31, 2006.
Document type: Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions;
Title: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
3710.01B - DOD Counterdrug Support;
Date: January 26, 2007.
Document type: DOD Manual/Handbook;
Title: DOD Manual 3025.1-M - Manual for Civil Emergencies;
Date: June 1994.
Document type: DOD Manual/Handbook;
Title: Joint Forces Command - Commander's Handbook for the Joint
Interagency Coordination Group;
Date: March 1, 2007.
Document type: Non-DOD Documents;
Title: DHS National Response Framework;
Date: January 2008.
Document type: Non-DOD Documents;
Title: FEMA Incident Management Handbook;
Date: March 2009.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Homeland Defense & Americas' Security Affairs:
2600 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2600:
March 10, 2010:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO 10-364, "Homeland Defense: DoD Needs to Take Actions to
Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil
Support Missions" dated January 29, 2010 (Job Code 351320). DoD
concurs with all three recommendations. Responses to the
recommendations are enclosed.
Our point of contact for this action is LTC Kathleen McDill, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
Security Affairs (OASD (HD&ASA)), (703) 697-5358 or
kathleen.mcdill@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Christine E. Wormuth:
Principal Deputy:
Enclosure: As stated:
Enclosure:
GAO Draft Report ” Dated January 29, 2010:
GAO Code 351320/GAO-10-364:
"Homeland Defense: DoD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency
Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
establish a time line and update and ensure the integration and
comprehensiveness of DoD policy and guidance that delineate the role
and responsibilities of and the relationships between DoD entities,
such as the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs) ASD(HD&ASA), Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)), Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent
Capabilities) (ASD (SOLIC/IC)), combatant commands, National Guard
Bureau, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the DoD Intelligence
Agencies. Specifically, updates of such policies and guidance should
include:
* DoD's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support;
* law enforcement support policy (or policies) that address the
different missions of such support, including civil support,
counterdrug, and counterterrorism support;
* DoD series of civil support policies and guidance (i.e. DoD
directives and instruction 3025 series);
* DoD's joint interagency coordination guidance (i.e. Joint
Publications 3-08, ensuring sufficient and comprehensive coverage of
the homeland defense and civil support interagency coordination
requirements and partners; and;
* A policy document that clearly and specifically defines the
relationships among ASD(HD&ASA), U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and
other combatant commanders, including interagency coordination and
external communication roles and responsibilities for homeland defense
and civil support.
DoD Response: Concur. Several draft issuances are in coordination; DoD
Directive (DoDD) 3025.dd, Defense Support of Civil Authorities with
estimated completion date (ECD) June 2010; the Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support, ECD March 2011; DoD Instruction (DoDI)
3025.ff, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, which
includes law enforcement support for civil support and
counterterrorism missions, ECD August 2010 (counterdrug updates will
be coordinated with applicable OSD offices under separate cover); DoDI
3025.gg Defense Support of Special Events, ECD September 2010.
Corresponding Joint Publications will be updated by September 2011.
Also, a new issuance is in coordination to describe Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, combatant command, Service, and
Defense Agency interagency coordination/communication roles and
responsibilities for homeland defense and civil support.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), in coordination with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to establish a time line to develop and
issue a partner guide that identifies the roles and responsibilities
of DoD entities, processes, and agreed-upon approaches for interagency
coordination for homeland defense and civil support efforts.
DoD Response: Concur. A time line will be developed with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on a new issuance as described in Recommendation 1
response (ECD June 2010).
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and
Americas' Security Affairs), in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, to establish a time line to take the following two actions:
* Ensure implementation of DoD's current instruction on the tracking
of DoD liaisons assignments to other Federal agencies, as well as the
establishment of position descriptions for uniformed military and DoD
civilian personnel.
* Develop and issue additional workforce management policy and
guidance regarding DoD liaisons to other Federal agencies, as well as
other Federal agencies' liaisons to DoD. Such policy and guidance
should ensure that:
- routine staffing-needs assessments are conducted;
- position descriptions or memorandums of understanding are developed;
- appropriate interagency coordination training is available to
liaisons; and;
- routine performance assessments of liaison personnel are conducted,
to include feedback from the host agency or component.
DoD Response: Concur. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs) (OASD (HD&ASA)) will
enforce procedures to ensure implementation of DoD's current
instruction for tracking of homeland defense (HD) and civil support
liaison assignments to other Federal agencies and establishment of
position descriptions for uniformed military and DoD civilian
personnel. To support development of these position descriptions
and/or memoranda of agreement, OASD (HD&ASA) will coordinate an
issuance document for assessments, feedback and training of HD and
civil support liaisons to other Federal agencies, as well as other
Federal agencies' liaisons to OASD (HD&ASA).
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Davi M. D'Agostino (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:
William O. Jenkins, Jr. (202) 512-8757 or jenkinswo@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contacts named above, the following individuals
made significant contributions to this report: Penney Harwell Caramia
and Lorelei St. James (Assistant Directors), Tommy Baril, Courtney R.
Reid, David G. Lysy, Raymond A. Griffith, Katie A. Mauldin, Lonnie J.
McAllister III, Terry Richardson, Robert Robinson, Cheryl A. Weissman,
Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Michael Willems.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to
Support Civil Authorities During Disasters. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-386]. Washington, D.C.: March 30,
2010.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of
National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and
Information Sharing. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2009.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program,
but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-849]. Washington, D.C.:
September 9, 2009.
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete
and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369]. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2009.
Influenza Pandemic: Sustaining Focus on the Nation's Planning and
Preparedness Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-334]. Washington, D.C.: February
26, 2009.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns,
Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated
with the U.S. Africa Command. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181]. Washington, D.C.: February
20, 2009.
Actions Taken To Implement the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-59R]. Washington, D.C.: November
21, 2008.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to
Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251]. Washington, D.C.:
April 16, 2008.
Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern
Command's Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, but
Gaps Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-252].
Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.
Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support
Missions May Depend on DOD's Implementation of the 2008 National
Defense Authorization Act. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-311]. Washington, D.C.: April 16,
2008.
Homeland Security: Guidance from Operations Directorate Will Enhance
Collaboration among Departmental Operations Centers. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-683T]. Washington, D.C.: June 20,
2007.
DHS Multi-Agency Operations Centers Would Benefit from Taking Further
Steps to Enhance Collaboration and Coordination. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-686R]. Washington, D.C.: April 5,
2007.
Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at
24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-89]. Washington, D.C.: October, 20,
2006.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but
Accountability, Funding, and Communications Need to be Clearer and
Focused Departmentwide. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1042]. Washington, D.C.: September
21, 2006.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618]. Washington, D.C.: September
6, 2006.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. Washington, D.C.: October 21,
2005.
Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce
Planning. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39].
Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003.
Exposure Draft: A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 15, 2002.
Managing For Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-00-106]. Washington,
D.C.: March 29, 2000.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] DOD, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (January 2009).
[2] White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington,
D.C.: October 2007).
[3] Joint Task Force-North, formerly referred to as Joint Task Force-
6, was created in 1989 to serve as the planning and coordinating
operational headquarters to support local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies within the southwest border region to counter the
flow of illegal drugs into the United States. In the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the
command was officially renamed Joint Task Force-North and its mission
was expanded to include providing homeland security support to the
nation's federal law enforcement agencies.
[4] GAO, Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify
Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities During Disasters,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-386] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 30, 2010).
[5] DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington,
D.C.: June 2005).
[6] Department of Defense Directive, 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with
Civilian Law Enforcement Officials (Dec. 20, 1989); and Department of
Defense Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (Jan.
15, 1993).
[7] Joint Publication 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations (June 13,
2007); Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense (July 12, 2007); and
Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support (Sept. 14, 2007).
[8] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[9] DHS, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: January 2008).
[10] DOD, National Defense Strategy (June 2008); and Joint Publication
3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental
Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Volumes I and II
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2006).
[11] DOD Directive 3025.1 (Jan. 15, 1993); Department of Defense
Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)
(Feb. 4, 1994); Department of Defense Directive 3025.13, Employment of
Department of Defense Resources in Support of the United States Secret
Service (Sept. 13, 1985); Department of Defense Directive 3025.15,
Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (Feb. 18, 1997); Department
of Defense Directive 3025.16, Military Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officer (EPLO) Program (Dec. 18, 2000); DOD Manual 3025.1-M, Manual
for Civil Emergencies (June 2, 1994).
[12] Joint Publication 3-08 (Mar. 17, 2006).
[13] DOD Directive 5525.5 (Dec. 20, 1989).
[14] Such a single, readily accessible source could be accomplished
through a variety of formats, including a handbook or a Web-based tool.
[15] On November 2, 2009, the Secretary of Defense created a category
of civil support plans that could be released to DOD's federal and
other partners.
[16] GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic
Workforce Planning, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003); Exposure Draft: A Model of
Strategic Human Capital Management, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15,
2002).
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[18] National Defense Strategy and Joint Publication 3-08.
[19] DOD Instruction 5025.01, DOD Directives Program (Oct. 28, 2007).
[20] White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
[21] DHS issued the National Response Plan in December 2004 and made
revisions to the plan in May 2006 to address lessons learned from
Hurricane Katrina, such as a lack of clarity in federal leadership
roles and responsibilities which resulted in disjointed and delayed
efforts by emergency responders. DHS issued the National Response
Framework in January 2008 to replace the National Response Plan.
[22] DOD Directive 3025.1 (Jan. 15, 1993), DOD Directive 3025.12 (Feb.
4, 1994), DOD Directive 3025.13 (Sept. 13, 1985), DOD Directive
3025.15 (Feb. 18, 1997), DOD Directive 3025.16 (Dec. 18, 2000), and
DOD Manual 3025.1-M (June 2, 1994).
[23] For more details on civilian policy and doctrine that defines
roles and responsibilities for emergency response activities, see app.
II of GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to
Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 30, 2009).
[24] ASD/HD officials stated that a number of instructions to
implement the directive are planned as well; however, the total number
of instructions to be developed has not yet been finalized. Two of the
instructions are currently in draft--one for DOD support for special
events (e.g., the Super Bowl) and another for DOD support to law
enforcement. ASD/HD is currently in the process of developing a third
instruction detailing defense liaison coordination activities.
[25] DOD Directive 5525.5 (Dec. 20, 1989).
[26] DOD Directive 5525.5 § 5.1 (Dec. 20, 1989).
[27] DOD Directive 5111.13 § 4.b.(1) (Jan. 16, 2009).
[28] Department of Defense Directive 5111.10 (Jan. 16, 2009).
[29] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to
Prepare, but Accountability, Funding, and Communications Need to be
Clearer and Focused Departmentwide, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1042] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21,
2006).
[30] Joint Publication 3-08 (Mar. 17, 2006).
[31] The National Response Framework Emergency Support Function
Annexes provide the structure for coordinating federal interagency
support for a federal response to an incident. Each annex designates a
federal agency as the lead coordinator for that particular Emergency
Support Function Annex. The Emergency Support Function coordinator--in
this case, USDA--is the entity with management oversight for that
particular Support Function.
[32] As a lead coordinator for an emergency support function under the
National Response Framework, USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service is responsible for providing an integrated response to an
animal or plant disease outbreak. DOD may need to provide civil
support to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to assist in
these efforts.
[33] DOD, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Implementation
Guidance Regarding the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense (Mar. 25, 2003).
[34] Joint Publication 3-08 (Mar. 17, 2006).
[35] In December 2008, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy allowed NORTHCOM to provide some of its federal partners
copies of certain civil support concept plans. In a November 2, 2009,
memorandum, the Secretary of Defense created a category of civil
support plans that could be released to DOD's federal and other
partners. DOD, Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Creation of the Civil
Support Category of Plans (Nov. 2, 2009).
[36] Such a single, readily accessible source could be accomplished
through a variety of formats, including a handbook or a Web-based tool.
[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP].
[38] Department of Defense Instruction 1000.17, Detail of DOD
Personnel to Duty Outside the Department of Defense (Apr. 16, 2008);
Department of Defense Instruction 1400.25, DOD Civilian Personnel
Management System (Nov. 18, 2008); Department of Defense Instruction
1315.18, Procedures for Military Personnel Assignments (Jan. 12,
2005); U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Commander's Handbook for the
Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) (Suffolk, Va.: March
2007); and U.S. Joint Forces Command, Insights and Best Practices:
Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Coordination,
Focus Paper #3 (Suffolk, Va.: July 2007).
[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP].
[40] According to a post-conference DOD report, conference
participants included a range of senior DOD and federal partner agency
officials. DOD officials in attendance included representatives from
eight combatant commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Federal partner agency officials in
attendance included representatives from 10 departments and agencies.
[41] DOD Instruction 1000.17, § 5.2.3 (Apr. 16, 2008).
[42] DOD's Washington Headquarters Services is a DOD entity aligned
under the Director of Administration and Management that manages DOD-
wide programs and operations for the Pentagon Reservation and DOD-
leased facilities in the National Capital Region.
[43] The ASD/HD official stated that he did not believe that he had
identified all the DOD representatives located at DHS headquarters
during this informal survey.
[44] DOD Instruction 1000.17, § 4.1 (Apr. 16, 2008) and DOD Directive
3025.1, § 4.4.6.3 (Jan. 15, 1993).
[45] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP].
[46] The three initial liaisons assigned to NORTHCOM were from the
Department of State, HHS, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
[47] According to NORTHCOM officials, lessons learned from contingency
responses or exercises may be another informal means that has been
used to determine the need for the exchange of additional liaisons
with NORTHCOM's federal partners.
[48] The representatives located at the Washington Office are
interdepartmental coordination officers to support health and medical
issues, law enforcement issues, and training and exercises.
[49] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP].
[50] DOD Instruction 1400.25-V250, § 4.e.2 (Nov. 18, 2008) and DOD
Instruction 1315.18, Enclosure 5 (Jan. 12, 2005).
[51] The Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination
Group (JIACG).
[52] In its technical comments on a draft of this report, DOJ stated
that NORTHCOM should be prepared to modify the standard memorandum of
understanding that it is developing if a non-DOD agency believes that
it does not meet their needs.
[53] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP].
[54] DOD Directive 3025.1, §§1.2, 4.4.7, and 5.7.13 (Jan. 15, 1993).
[55] Insights and Best Practices: Interagency, Intergovernmental, and
Nongovernmental Coordination, Focus Paper #3.
[56] Among the recommendations developed at the conference, DOD
combatant command officials recommended that DOD ensure that combatant
commands establish a robust organizational entity that is responsible
for the training and in-processing of liaisons sent by other federal
agencies; develop a predeployment DOD orientation short course for
incoming interagency personnel to introduce them to DOD as a whole;
develop a comprehensive orientation and training program specifically
designed to meet the needs of incoming non-DOD federal partner
personnel with little or no prior exposure to the military; and
mandate recurring education and training for interagency and DOD
personnel.
[57] In addition, NORTHCOM officials reported that 151 civilian
contractors also took the training. However, NORTHCOM officials were
unable to provide a breakdown of how many of the contractors were DOD
contractors versus how many were contractors working for non-DOD
entities, so these 151 recipients are not counted in the totals for
DOD and non-DOD recipients of the training.
[58] Joint Publication 3-28.
[59] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP].
[60] Army Regulation 623-3, Personnel Evaluation: Evaluation Reporting
System § 1-8 (a)(2)(d) (Aug. 10, 2007).
[61] DOD Instruction 1400.25-V250, § 4.e. (Nov. 18, 2008).
[62] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005); Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce
Planning, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003); Exposure Draft: A Model of
Strategic Human Capital Management, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15,
2002).
[End of section]
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