Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Overarching Guidance Is Needed to Advance Information Sharing Gao ID: GAO-10-500T March 17, 2010The Department of Defense (DOD) has numerous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems--including manned and unmanned airborne, space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems--that play critical roles in support of current military operations. The demand for these capabilities has increased dramatically. Today's testimony addresses (1) the challenges the military services and defense agencies face processing, exploiting, and disseminating the information collected by ISR systems and (2) the extent to which the military services and defense agencies have developed the capabilities required to share ISR information. This testimony is based on GAO's January 2010 report on DOD's ISR data processing capabilities. GAO reviewed and analyzed documentation, guidance, and strategies of the military services and defense agencies in regard to processing, exploiting, and disseminating ISR data as well as information-sharing capabilities. GAO also visited numerous commands, military units, and locations in Iraq and the United States.
The military services and defense agencies face long-standing challenges with processing, exploiting, and disseminating ISR data, and DOD has recently begun some initiatives to address these challenges. First, since 2002, DOD has rapidly increased its ability to collect ISR data in Iraq and Afghanistan, although its capacity for processing, exploiting, and dissemination is limited. Second, transmitting data from ISR collection platforms to ground stations where analysts process, exploit, and then disseminate intelligence to users requires high-capacity communications bandwidth. However, bandwidth can be limited in a theater of operations by the satellite and ground-based communication capacity, and this in turn affects the ability to send, receive, and download intelligence products that contain large amounts of data. Third, shortages of analytical staff with the required skill sets hamper the services' and defense agencies' abilities to exploit all ISR information being collected, thus raising the risk that important information may not be available to commanders in a timely manner. DOD is developing and implementing initiatives to enhance its processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities, such as increasing personnel, but its initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and it is too soon to tell how effective they will be in addressing current challenges. DOD is taking steps to improve the sharing of intelligence information across the department, but progress is uneven among the military services. DOD began plans for its Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS), an interoperable family of systems that will enable users to access shared ISR information in 1998. DOD subsequently directed the military services to transition their service-unique intelligence data processing systems into DCGS and each of the military services is at a different stage. While the Air Force and the Navy each plan to have a fully functional version of DCGS by the end of fiscal years 2010 and 2013, respectively, the Army does not expect to have a fully functional system until 2016. The Marine Corps has not yet established a completion date for the full operational capability of its DCGS. To facilitate the sharing of ISR data on this system, DOD developed the DCGS Integration Backbone, which provides common information standards and protocols. Although the services are responsible for managing their DCGS programs and conforming to information-sharing standards, according to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and military service officials, DOD has not developed overarching guidance, such as a concept of operations that provides direction and priorities for sharing intelligence information within the defense intelligence community. Without this overarching guidance, the services lack direction to set their own goals and objectives for prioritizing and sharing ISR information and therefore have not developed service-specific implementation plans that describe the prioritization and types of ISR data they intend to share. Moreover, the inability of users to fully access existing information contributes to the increasing demand for additional ISR collection assets.
GAO-10-500T, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Overarching Guidance Is Needed to Advance Information Sharing
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces and Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, March 17, 2010:
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
Overarching Guidance Is Needed to Advance Information Sharing:
Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-10-500T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-500T, a testimony before the Subcommittees on Air
and Land Forces and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has numerous intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems”including manned and
unmanned airborne, space-borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems”that
play critical roles in support of current military operations. The
demand for these capabilities has increased dramatically. Today‘s
testimony addresses (1) the challenges the military services and
defense agencies face processing, exploiting, and disseminating the
information collected by ISR systems and (2) the extent to which the
military services and defense agencies have developed the capabilities
required to share ISR information. This testimony is based on GAO‘s
January 2010 report on DOD‘s ISR data processing capabilities. GAO
reviewed and analyzed documentation, guidance, and strategies of the
military services and defense agencies in regard to processing,
exploiting, and disseminating ISR data as well as information-sharing
capabilities. GAO also visited numerous commands, military units, and
locations in Iraq and the United States.
What GAO Found:
The military services and defense agencies face long-standing
challenges with processing, exploiting, and disseminating ISR data,
and DOD has recently begun some initiatives to address these
challenges. First, since 2002, DOD has rapidly increased its ability
to collect ISR data in Iraq and Afghanistan, although its capacity for
processing, exploiting, and dissemination is limited. Second,
transmitting data from ISR collection platforms to ground stations
where analysts process, exploit, and then disseminate intelligence to
users requires high-capacity communications bandwidth. However,
bandwidth can be limited in a theater of operations by the satellite
and ground-based communication capacity, and this in turn affects the
ability to send, receive, and download intelligence products that
contain large amounts of data. Third, shortages of analytical staff
with the required skill sets hamper the services‘ and defense agencies‘
abilities to exploit all ISR information being collected, thus raising
the risk that important information may not be available to commanders
in a timely manner. DOD is developing and implementing initiatives to
enhance its processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities,
such as increasing personnel, but its initiatives are in the early
stages of implementation and it is too soon to tell how effective they
will be in addressing current challenges.
DOD is taking steps to improve the sharing of intelligence information
across the department, but progress is uneven among the military
services. DOD began plans for its Distributed Common Ground/Surface
System (DCGS), an interoperable family of systems that will enable
users to access shared ISR information in 1998. DOD subsequently
directed the military services to transition their service-unique
intelligence data processing systems into DCGS and each of the
military services is at a different stage. While the Air Force and the
Navy each plan to have a fully functional version of DCGS by the end
of fiscal years 2010 and 2013, respectively, the Army does not expect
to have a fully functional system until 2016. The Marine Corps has not
yet established a completion date for the full operational capability
of its DCGS. To facilitate the sharing of ISR data on this system, DOD
developed the DCGS Integration Backbone, which provides common
information standards and protocols. Although the services are
responsible for managing their DCGS programs and conforming to
information-sharing standards, according to the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and military service officials,
DOD has not developed overarching guidance, such as a concept of
operations that provides direction and priorities for sharing
intelligence information within the defense intelligence community.
Without this overarching guidance, the services lack direction to set
their own goals and objectives for prioritizing and sharing ISR
information and therefore have not developed service-specific
implementation plans that describe the prioritization and types of ISR
data they intend to share. Moreover, the inability of users to fully
access existing information contributes to the increasing demand for
additional ISR collection assets.
What GAO Recommends:
In the January 2010 report, GAO recommended that DOD develop
overarching guidance for sharing intelligence information and that the
military services develop plans with timelines that prioritize and
identify the types of ISR data they will share. DOD agreed with these
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-500T] or key
components. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202)
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss GAO's recently issued report
on the Department of Defense's (DOD) intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) data processing capabilities.[Footnote 1] DOD's
numerous ISR systems--including manned and unmanned airborne, space-
borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems--play critical roles in
supporting military operations as well as commanders' force protection
requirements. In Iraq and Afghanistan, commanders at all levels depend
on timely and accurate ISR information on their adversaries' tactics,
capabilities, and vulnerabilities to plan military operations. The
success of ISR systems has led to a dramatic increase in demand for
more ISR systems to collect data, and DOD continues to invest in ISR
assets, requesting approximately $6.1 billion in fiscal year 2010 for
new unmanned aircraft system capabilities alone. However, a November
2008 Joint Defense Science Board/Intelligence Science Board Task Force
report on integrating sensor-collected intelligence[Footnote 2]
concluded that the rapid increase in collected information overwhelms
current ISR capabilities and much of the collected data is never
analyzed.
We have previously reported on DOD's challenges associated with ISR
integration, requirements, tasking, and governance. For example, in
December 2005, we reported that some sensors, communications
equipment, and weapons associated with one type of unmanned aircraft
were not always compatible with other unmanned aircraft.[Footnote 3]
In April 2007, we testified that although DOD had initiatives under
way to improve integration of ISR assets, it had not comprehensively
identified future ISR requirements, set funding priorities, or
established mechanisms to measure ISR integration progress.[Footnote
4] In July 2007, we reported that DOD had not been able to fully
optimize the use of its unmanned aircraft system assets because it
lacked an approach to allocating and tasking them that considered the
availability of all assets in determining how best to meet warfighter
needs and that DOD lacked metrics to fully evaluate the success of its
unmanned aircraft system missions.[Footnote 5] Moreover, in March
2008, we reported that DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap did not include a
long-term view of what capabilities were required to achieve strategic
goals and did not provide detailed information that would make it
useful as a basis for deciding alternative investments. [Footnote 6]
In July 2009, we reported that while several unmanned aircraft
programs had achieved airframe commonality, most were pursuing service-
unique subsystems, sensors, communications equipment, and weapons and
ground control stations.[Footnote 7] Further, we are also evaluating
DOD's efforts to support its increasing inventory of unmanned aircraft
systems, including whether it has sufficient plans and strategies for
providing the necessary personnel, facilities, communications
infrastructure, training, and other elements.
My testimony today is based on our January 2010 report on ISR
processing capabilities[Footnote 8] and will discuss (1) the
challenges the military services and defense agencies face processing,
exploiting, and disseminating the information collected by ISR systems
and (2) the extent to which the military services and defense agencies
have developed the capabilities required to share ISR information. I
will conclude with some observations regarding our recommendations and
DOD's response to our recommendations.
In conducting our audit work to support our January 2010 report, we
reviewed and analyzed policies, guidance, strategies, and assessments
of the military services and defense agencies in regard to processing,
exploiting, and disseminating ISR data as well as their information
sharing capabilities. We also interviewed officials at the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; the Joint Staff; all
four military services; the National Security Agency; the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and numerous commands, military units,
and locations in Iraq and the United States. Our work on that report
was conducted from September 2008 to December 2009 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
To be most useful to the warfighter, intelligence data must be
collected, analyzed, and shared appropriately in a timely manner.
[Footnote 9] The intelligence data processing cycle is commonly
described in five phases: (1) planning and direction, (2) collection,
(3) processing and exploitation, (4) dissemination, and (5) evaluation
and feedback. However, in implementation the cycle is tailored to
mission needs, so the phases may not always be performed in order. For
example, information collected from an unmanned aircraft system may be
disseminated directly to the user, without undergoing detailed
processing and exploitation. Figure 1 depicts the intelligence data
processing cycle. My testimony today focuses on the processing,
exploitation, and dissemination of ISR information, shown in figure 1
as steps 3 and 4 of the intelligence data processing cycle.
Figure 1: The Intelligence Data Processing Cycle:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration of cycle]
Phase 1: Planning and Direction:
Identifying the intelligence need.
Phase 2: Collection:
Tasking collection assets & acquiring raw data;
* Geospatial intelligence;
* Signals intelligence;
* Measurement and signature intelligence;
* Open source intelligence.
Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination:
Phase 3: Processing & Exploitation;
Phase 4: Dissemination:
Transforming raw data into a usable form and getting ISR information
to the right people.
Phase 5: Evaluation and Feedback:
Evaluating intelligence operations and products and provide feedback.
Source: GAO analysis of the intelligence process.
[End of figure]
Analysts who are responsible for processing, exploiting, and
disseminating ISR data can only use collected intelligence data if
data are visible to them. Making ISR data discoverable in this way can
be accomplished through meta-data tagging--a process in which data are
described through other data (meta-data) that are usually produced at
the time the data of interest are created. For example, a camera may
create meta-data for a photograph, such as date, time, and lens
settings. The photographer may add further meta-data, such as the
names of the subjects. The process by which information is meta-data
tagged depends on the technical capabilities of the systems collecting
the information. Most ISR systems do not automatically meta-data tag
the ISR data when they are transferred from the sensor to the ground
station for processing and exploitation because most of these systems
were developed prior to DOD's emphasis on enforcing meta-data
standards. Since the sensors on these legacy systems are not able to
meta-data tag automatically, it is up to each of the military services
to prioritize the cataloging of the ISR data manually after collection.
Military Services and Defense Agencies Face Long-standing Challenges
with Using ISR Data and Recognize the Need to Address These Challenges:
The military services and defense agencies face three long-standing
challenges with processing, exploiting, and disseminating ISR data.
First, since 2002, DOD has rapidly increased its ability to collect
ISR data in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, its capacity for
processing, exploiting, and dissemination is limited and has not kept
pace with the increase in collection platforms and combat air patrols.
For example, the Air Force has substantially increased the number of
combat air patrols that ISR collection platforms are performing in the
U.S. Central Command theater of operations. Specifically, the number
of combat air patrols flown by the Air Force's Predator and Reaper
unmanned aircraft systems has increased from 13 to 36 since 2007.
Moreover, in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,[Footnote 10]
DOD stated that it will continue to expand the Predator and Reaper
combat air patrols to 65 by fiscal year 2015. This increase in data
collection will also increase the burden on the Air Force's ground
processing system, which processes, exploits, and disseminates the ISR
information collected by these platforms.
Second, transmitting data from ISR collection platforms to ground
stations where analysts process, exploit, and then disseminate
intelligence to users requires high-capacity communications bandwidth.
However, bandwidth can be limited in a theater of operations by the
satellite and ground-based communication capacity. An insufficient
amount of bandwidth affects the ability to send, receive, and download
intelligence products that contain large amounts of data. For example,
intelligence products derived from ISR geospatial data have high
bandwidth requirements--the higher the resolution of the product, the
longer the transmission time via a given bandwidth. DOD officials have
acknowledged that limited bandwidth is a continual challenge in Iraq
because of the warfighter's reliance on geospatial data. GAO and
others have reported that DOD continues to face a growing need for
communications bandwidth in combat operations.[Footnote 11]
Third, the military services and defense agencies are challenged by
shortages in the numbers of analytical staff available to exploit all
of the electronic signals[Footnote 12] and geospatial ISR information
being collected, raising the risk that important information may not
be analyzed and made available to commanders in a timely manner. For
example, according to U.S. Central Command officials, the command
exploits less than one-half of the electronic signals intercepts
collected from the Predator. According to DOD officials, finding
native speakers of the collected languages to successfully translate
and exploit data collected in those foreign languages is difficult,
and training language analysts takes time and is difficult to manage
with the deployment schedule. In addition, language analysts who
translate and exploit electronic signals intelligence data must
qualify for security clearances that require rigorous background
examinations. The National Security Agency has experienced
difficulties in hiring language analysts who can obtain clearances and
have the appropriate skill levels in both English and the language for
translation.
DOD has recognized the need to enhance its processing, exploitation,
and dissemination capabilities and is developing and implementing
initiatives to do so, but its initiatives are in the early stages of
implementation and it is too soon to tell how effective they will be
in addressing current challenges. For example, in the short term, DOD
has placed its priority for processing, exploitation, and
disseminating electronic signals intelligence on the information
collected in Afghanistan because the Commander of U.S. Central Command
has designated those missions as a high priority. In the long term,
DOD has taken several actions intended to sustain, expand, and improve
processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities. For example,
DOD has studies, such as an ISR force-sizing study, under way which
include examining how to improve the management of its processing,
exploitation, and dissemination capabilities. However, DOD has not set
dates for when all of these studies will be complete and it is too
soon to know whether they will lead to the desired effect of increased
support to the warfighter for current operations. The Air Force and
the National Security Agency also have plans to increase analyst
personnel in response to the increase in ISR collection. The Air
Force, reacting to scheduled increases in Predator and Reaper combat
air patrols, is planning to add personnel who process, exploit, and
disseminate ISR data. The National Security Agency also has taken
steps to address shortages in language analyst personnel. For example,
to better target its hiring effort for language analysts the agency is
using U.S. Census Bureau data to locate centers of populations that
contain the language skills needed to translate and exploit the
foreign languages that are collected. According to National Security
Agency officials, these efforts have helped increase the number of
language analysts available to process and exploit collected signals
intelligence data. DOD is also working on developing technical
solutions to improve processing, movement, and storage of data. For
example, files from wide-area sensors have to be saved to a computer
disk and flown back to the United States for exploitation and
dissemination because current networks in the theater of operations
cannot handle the large amounts of data these sensors collect. U.S.
Joint Forces Command is currently designing and testing technology
already in use by the commercial entertainment industry to improve
storage, movement, and access to full motion video data from wide-area
sensors.
DOD Is Taking Steps to Improve Intelligence Information Sharing, but
Progress Is Uneven:
Although DOD has recognized the need for maximizing the efficiency and
effectiveness of the information it collects and has been taking steps
to increase information sharing across the defense intelligence
community, progress has been uneven among the military services. DOD
began plans for its Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS),
an interoperable family of systems that will enable users to access
shared ISR information, in 1998. DOD subsequently directed the
military services to transition their service-unique intelligence data
processing systems into DCGS and each of the military services is at a
different stage. As shown in table 1, the Air Force and the Navy each
plan to have a fully functional version of DCGS by the end of fiscal
years 2010 and 2013, respectively, and the Army does not expect to
have a fully functional system until 2016. The Marine Corps has not
yet established a completion date for the full operational capability
of its DCGS.
Table 1: Status of Military Services' DCGS Programs:
Military service: Air Force;
Reached milestone B[A]: Yes;
Full operational capability date: 2010.
Military service: Navy;
Reached milestone B[A]: Yes;
Full operational capability date: 2013.
Military service: Army;
Reached milestone B[A]: Yes;
Full operational capability date: 2016.
Military service: Marine Corps;
Reached milestone B[A]: No;
Full operational capability date: Undetermined.
Source: GAO analysis of military services' data.
[A] Milestone B is the second major decision point in the acquisition
process and comes after the technology development phase.
[End of table]
DOD has developed a system of standards and protocols, called the DCGS
Integration Backbone (DIB), which serves as the foundation for
interoperability between each of the four military services' DCGS
programs. However, the services have not completed the process of
prioritizing and tagging the data they want to share in accordance
with these standards and protocols or developed timelines to do so. As
a result, the services are not sharing all of their collected ISR data.
* Although the Air Force has the capability to share some Air Force-
generated ISR information with other DOD users through the DIB
standards and protocols, it has not developed timelines or taken steps
to prioritize the types of additional data that should be shared with
the defense intelligence community.
* The Army also has the capability to share some of its intelligence
data with other users, but has experienced difficulties tagging all of
its data because of its large inventory of legacy ISR systems.
Moreover, the Army has not established timelines for sharing data.
* The Navy and Marine Corps are not currently tagging all of the ISR
data they intend to share and have neither developed timelines nor
taken steps to prioritize the types of data that should be shared with
the defense intelligence community.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has responsibility for
ensuring implementation of DOD intelligence policy, including
monitoring the services' progress toward interoperability. Although
the services are responsible for managing their DCGS programs and
conforming to information-sharing standards, according to Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and military service
officials, DOD has not developed overarching guidance, such as a
concept of operations that provides needed direction and priorities
for sharing intelligence information within the defense intelligence
community. Without this overarching guidance, the services lack
direction to set their own goals and objectives for prioritizing and
sharing ISR information and therefore have not developed service-
specific implementation plans that describe the prioritization and
types of ISR data they intend to share with the defense intelligence
community. For example, a concept of operations could provide
direction to the military services and defense agencies to select data
to prioritize for meta-data tagging and sharing, such as electronic
signals intelligence data. As a result, it is not clear how much of
the collected data are not being shared. Until DOD identifies what
types of ISR information should be shared and assigns priorities for
sharing data, it is unclear whether mission-critical information will
be available to the warfighter. In addition, the inability of users to
fully access existing information in a timely manner is a contributing
factor to the increasing demand for additional ISR collection assets.
Therefore, in our January 2010 report, we recommended that the
Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in
coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to develop guidance,
such as a concept of operations that provides overarching direction
and priorities for sharing intelligence information across the defense
intelligence community.
* Direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to develop
service-specific implementation plans, consistent with the concept of
operations, which set timelines and outline the prioritization and
types of ISR data they will share with the defense intelligence
community through the DIB.
In written comments on our report, DOD agreed with our recommendations
overall and stated that there is guidance either issued or in
development to address our recommendations. However, this guidance
does not fully address the intent of our recommendations, and we
believe additional guidance is necessary.
Concluding Remarks:
DOD officials cite ISR as vital to mission success in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and Congress has responded by funding additional ISR
assets. However, until all participants in the defense enterprise
successfully share ISR information, inefficiencies will hamper the
effectiveness of efforts to support the warfighter, and ISR data
collection efforts may be unnecessarily duplicative. While the focus
of my testimony has been on the processing, exploiting, and
disseminating of ISR data, our prior work has also shown that
collection taskings are fragmented in theater and visibility into how
ISR assets are being used is lacking. These challenges increase the
risk that operational commanders may not be receiving mission-critical
ISR information, which can create the perception that additional
collection assets are needed to fill gaps.
Mr. Chairmen and members of the subcommittees, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that you
may have at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Davi
M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. In addition,
contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals
who made key contributions to this testimony are Margaret G. Morgan
and Marc J. Schwartz, Assistant Directors; Grace A. Coleman; Gregory
A. Marchand; Erika A. Prochaska; Kimberly C. Seay; and Walter K.
Vance. In addition, Amy E. Brown; Amy D. Higgins; Timothy M. Persons;
and Robert Robinson made significant contributions to the January 2010
report that supported this testimony.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Establishing
Guidance, Timelines, and Accountability for Integrating Intelligence
Data Would Improve Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-265NI] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22,
2010). This report is not available through GAO's Web site. Copies of
this report are available upon request by calling (202) 512-6000, toll
free (866) 801-7077, or TDD (202) 512-2537.
[2] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, Report of the Joint Defense Science Board/
Intelligence Science Board Task Force on Integrating Sensor-Collected
Intelligence (Washington, D.C., November 2008).
[3] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: DOD Needs to More Effectively
Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-49] (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 13, 2005).
[4] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary
Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for New
Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-596T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19,
2007).
[5] GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Advance Coordination and Increased
Visibility Needed to Optimize Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-836] (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2007).
[6] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can
Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development
of Future ISR Requirements, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24,
2008).
[7] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater
Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-520] (Washington, D.C.:
July 30, 2009).
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-265NI].
[9] The process of converting data into usable intelligence and
disseminating it to users in a suitable format is commonly referred to
as processing, exploitation, and dissemination.
[10] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, D.C., Feb. 1, 2010).
[11] GAO, Department of Defense Actions to Modify its Commercial
Communications Satellite Services Procurement Process, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-480R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17,
2006), and Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain
Use of Best Practices, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-730T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19,
2007). Congressional Research Service, Defense Program Issue: Global
Information Grid, Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) (Washington, D.C., Jan.
9, 2006), and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Report of the Joint Defense
Science Board/Intelligence Science Board Task Force on Integrating
Sensor-Collected Intelligence.
[12] Signals intelligence is information derived from intercepted
communications and electronic and data transmissions.
[End of section]
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