Iraq and Afghanistan
Agencies Face Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Agreements, and Associated Personnel Gao ID: GAO-10-509T March 23, 2010The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors, grantees, and cooperative agreement recipients to support troops and civilian personnel and carry out reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This reliance increases the importance of agencies having reliable data to inform decision-making and oversee the work performed. To help increase oversight of activities supporting DOD, State, and USAID's efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, as amended, required the agencies to identify common databases of information on their contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and associated personnel. In their July 2008 memorandum of understanding (MOU), the three agencies designated the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) as their system for tracking the required information. GAO's testimony addresses (1) how a lack of information hinders agencies' management and oversight of contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and associated personnel, (2) the status of the agencies' continued efforts to implement SPOT, and (3) GAO's prior recommendation to improve SPOT's implementation. It is drawn primarily from GAO's prior work on contracting in contingency operations.
GAO has reported extensively on the need for agencies to have reliable information to manage and oversee work being performed to address challenges related to using contracts and grants. The lack of such information may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce unnecessary risk. For example, GAO reported last year that by not having insight into contractor provided services, DOD may lack needed information to efficiently allocate contracted services to support remaining U.S. forces in Iraq. GAO also previously determined that by not considering contractor and grantee resources in developing an Afghan assistance strategy, USAID's ability to make resource allocation decisions was impaired. Many of GAO's prior recommendations on contractors supporting contingency operations focused on increasing agencies' ability to track contracts and contractor personnel. Agency officials have indicated that SPOT has the potential of consolidating dispersed information to help them better manage and oversee contractors. SPOT may offer the same potential for grants and cooperative agreements as information on them and their personnel are similarly dispersed. Although the agencies have made progress in implementing SPOT, the database falls short of providing information to facilitate oversight and fulfill statutory requirements. GAO reported in October 2009 that the criteria used to determine which personnel are entered into SPOT varied and not all personnel were being entered as required. In particular, the agencies cited the need for a SPOT-generated letter of authorization as the primary factor for deciding whether personnel were entered, but not all personnel, particularly local nationals, need this authorization. As a result, officials from the three agencies acknowledge that SPOT data are incomplete, with some questioning the need for detailed data on all contractors. Because of SPOT's limitations, the agencies have relied on other sources, such as periodic surveys, for data on contractor personnel, but we have found these sources to be unreliable. Although contract information is being entered into SPOT, the system continues to lack the capability to accurately import information from other sources as agreed to in the MOU. For example, because SPOT does not require users to enter contract information in a standardized manner, our work has shown that there will be challenges in identifying which contracts' dollar values and competition information should be imported. While our prior findings are specific to contracts and their personnel, together with our ongoing work they point to challenges the agencies will face in using SPOT to track similar data on grants, cooperative agreements, and their personnel. Last year GAO recommended that the agencies develop a plan for addressing the shortcomings identified in SPOT's implementation. While the agencies agreed coordination is important, they disagreed with the need for a plan. GAO continues to believe that a plan with timeframes that provides consistent criteria and standards is necessary for ensuring that SPOT meets statutory requirements and helping the agencies identify their information needs to manage and oversee contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements.
GAO-10-509T, Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Face Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Agreements, and Associated Personnel
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Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, March 23, 2010:
Iraq And Afghanistan:
Agencies Face Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Grants, Cooperative
Agreements, and Associated Personnel:
Statement of John P. Hutton, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-10-509T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-509T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on
contractors, grantees, and cooperative agreement recipients to support
troops and civilian personnel and carry out reconstruction efforts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. This reliance increases the importance of
agencies having reliable data to inform decision-making and oversee
the work performed.
To help increase oversight of activities supporting DOD, State, and
USAID‘s efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, as amended, required the
agencies to identify common databases of information on their
contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and associated personnel.
In their July 2008 memorandum of understanding (MOU), the three
agencies designated the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational
Tracker (SPOT) as their system for tracking the required information.
GAO‘s testimony addresses (1) how a lack of information hinders agencies
‘ management and oversight of contracts, grants, cooperative
agreements, and associated personnel, (2) the status of the agencies‘
continued efforts to implement SPOT, and (3) GAO‘s prior
recommendation to improve SPOT‘s implementation. It is drawn primarily
from GAO‘s prior work on contracting in contingency operations.
What GAO Found:
GAO has reported extensively on the need for agencies to have reliable
information to manage and oversee work being performed to address
challenges related to using contracts and grants. The lack of such
information may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce
unnecessary risk. For example, GAO reported last year that by not
having insight into contractor provided services, DOD may lack needed
information to efficiently allocate contracted services to support
remaining U.S. forces in Iraq. GAO also previously determined that by
not considering contractor and grantee resources in developing an
Afghan assistance strategy, USAID‘s ability to make resource
allocation decisions was impaired. Many of GAO‘s prior recommendations
on contractors supporting contingency operations focused on increasing
agencies‘ ability to track contracts and contractor personnel. Agency
officials have indicated that SPOT has the potential of consolidating
dispersed information to help them better manage and oversee
contractors. SPOT may offer the same potential for grants and
cooperative agreements as information on them and their personnel are
similarly dispersed.
Although the agencies have made progress in implementing SPOT, the
database falls short of providing information to facilitate oversight
and fulfill statutory requirements. GAO reported in October 2009 that
the criteria used to determine which personnel are entered into SPOT
varied and not all personnel were being entered as required. In
particular, the agencies cited the need for a SPOT-generated letter of
authorization as the primary factor for deciding whether personnel
were entered, but not all personnel, particularly local nationals,
need this authorization. As a result, officials from the three
agencies acknowledge that SPOT data are incomplete, with some
questioning the need for detailed data on all contractors. Because of
SPOT‘s limitations, the agencies have relied on other sources, such as
periodic surveys, for data on contractor personnel, but we have found
these sources to be unreliable. Although contract information is being
entered into SPOT, the system continues to lack the capability to
accurately import information from other sources as agreed to in the
MOU. For example, because SPOT does not require users to enter
contract information in a standardized manner, our work has shown that
there will be challenges in identifying which contracts‘ dollar values
and competition information should be imported. While our prior
findings are specific to contracts and their personnel, together with
our ongoing work they point to challenges the agencies will face in
using SPOT to track similar data on grants, cooperative agreements,
and their personnel.
Last year GAO recommended that the agencies develop a plan for
addressing the shortcomings identified in SPOT‘s implementation. While
the agencies agreed coordination is important, they disagreed with the
need for a plan. GAO continues to believe that a plan with timeframes
that provides consistent criteria and standards is necessary for
ensuring that SPOT meets statutory requirements and helping the
agencies identify their information needs to manage and oversee
contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-509T] for key
components. For more information, contact John P. Hutton at (202) 512-
4841 or huttonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss efforts by the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (State), and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to track information
on contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and the personnel
working under them in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reliable, meaningful data
related to contractors, grantees, cooperative agreement recipients,
and the services they provide are a starting point for informing
agency decisions and ensuring proper management and oversight. The
significant reliance on contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements
to support troops and civilian personnel and to carry out
reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan increases the
importance of such data. Since 2008, GAO has reported on the three
agencies' efforts to implement a database to reliably track
statutorily-required data on contracts and contractor personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 1] While our past work focused on
tracking contracts and contractor personnel, we are currently
reviewing the agencies' efforts to track grants, cooperative
agreements, and associated personnel as part of our annual mandated
review of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 2] Our prior
findings along with our ongoing review provide insights into the
continued challenges the agencies face in implementing a database for
tracking information on contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and
their associated personnel that can inform management decisions and
facilitate oversight.
My statement focuses on (1) how a lack of information hinders
agencies' management and oversight of contracts, grants, cooperative
agreements, and associated personnel and (2) the status of DOD, State,
and USAID's efforts to track statutorily-required information on
personnel and contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements in Iraq
and Afghanistan. I will also provide some observations regarding our
2009 recommendation to address shortcomings in the agencies' efforts
to track contracts and contactor personnel. While informed by our
ongoing work, this statement is drawn from our prior work related to
contracting in contingency operations. Both our ongoing and prior
performance audits have been conducted in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that
we plan and perform the audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Section 861 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 (NDAA for FY2008) directed the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator to sign a memorandum
of understanding (MOU) related to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[Footnote 3] The law specified a number of issues to be covered in the
MOU, including the identification of common databases to serve as
repositories of information on contract and contractor personnel. The
NDAA for FY2008 required the databases to track the following, at a
minimum:
* for each contract that involves work performed in Iraq or
Afghanistan for more than 14 days,
- a brief description of the contract,
- its total value, and:
- whether it was awarded competitively; and:
* for contractor personnel working under contracts in Iraq or
Afghanistan,
- total number employed,
- total number performing security functions, and:
- total number killed or wounded.
In July 2008, DOD, State, and USAID signed an MOU in which they agreed
the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) would be
the system of record for the statutorily-required contract and
personnel information. The MOU specified SPOT would include
information on DOD, State, and USAID contracts with more than 14 days
of performance in Iraq or Afghanistan or valued at more than the
simplified acquisition threshold, which the MOU stated was $100,000,
as well as information on the personnel working under those contracts.
Since the signing of the July 2008 MOU, the requirements of section
861 have been amended. The Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 added additional matters to be
covered in the agencies' MOU to address criminal offenses committed by
or against contractor personnel.[Footnote 4] According to the law, the
MOU was to be modified by February 11, 2009. Additionally, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA for
FY2010) amended the original requirements by redefining "contract in
Iraq and Afghanistan" to include grants and cooperative agreements and
redefining "contractor" for these purposes, to include grantees and
cooperative agreement recipients.[Footnote 5] The NDAA for FY2010 also
revised the minimum threshold for tracking contracts, task and
delivery orders, grants, and cooperative agreements from 14 days of
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan to 30 days. DOD, State, and USAID
have drafted a new MOU to address the changes from the NDAAs for FY
2008 and FY 2010, but as of March 19, 2010, the MOU has not been
signed by all three agencies.
SPOT is a Web-based system that was initially developed by DOD to
provide greater visibility over contractors deployed with U.S. forces.
DOD is responsible for all maintenance and upgrades to the database,
but as agreed in the July 2008 MOU, it is the responsibility of each
agency to require its contractors to accurately input data elements
related to contractor personnel, such as the number of personnel
employed on each contract in Iraq or Afghanistan. Although the law
only directs the agencies to track aggregate data, DOD configured SPOT
in a manner that requires users to manually enter detailed information
for each covered person working in Iraq or Afghanistan. SPOT tracks
individuals by name and records information such as contracts they are
working under, deployment dates, blood type, next of kin, and whether
an individual has been killed or injured. To track contract-related
information, such as value and extent of competition, the agencies
agreed in the MOU to import data into SPOT from the Federal
Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG), the federal
government's system for tracking information on contracting actions.
Lack of Information on Contracts, Grants, and Cooperative Agreements
and Associated Personnel Can Hinder Agencies' Management and Oversight:
DOD, State, and USAID's significant reliance on contracts, grants,
cooperative agreements, and their associated personnel makes it
critical that agency officials have accurate and reliable information
to inform decision making and properly oversee work being performed in
Iraq and Afghanistan. We have reported extensively on the management
and oversight challenges of using contracts and grants to help
agencies carry out their missions during contingency operations. As
our prior work has shown, the agencies' lack of complete and accurate
information may inhibit planning, increase costs, and introduce
unnecessary risk:
* Limited visibility over contractors obscures how extensively
agencies rely on them to support operations and carry out missions. In
our 2006 review of DOD contractors supporting deployed forces, we
reported that a battalion commander in Iraq was unable to determine
the number of contractor-provided interpreters available to support
his unit.[Footnote 6] This limited visibility can create challenges
for planning and carrying out missions. Further, a lack of visibility
into the extent to which agencies rely on contractors can hinder their
ability to plan for the role of contractors. For example, we reported
in November 2009 that without insight into services provided by
contractors as part of the drawdown in Iraq, DOD planners may lack
information necessary to efficiently allocate contracted services to
support the remaining U.S. forces as the drawdown progresses.[Footnote
7]
* Without incorporating information on contractors and grantees into
planning efforts, agencies risk making uninformed programmatic
decisions. As we noted in our 2004 and 2005 reviews of Afghanistan
reconstruction efforts, when developing its interim development
assistance strategy, USAID did not incorporate information on the
contractor and grantee resources required to implement the
strategy.[Footnote 8] We determined this impaired USAID's ability to
make informed decisions on resource allocations for the strategy.
* A lack of accurate financial information on contracts impedes
agencies' ability to create realistic budgets. As we reported in July
2005, despite the significant role of private security providers in
enabling Iraqi reconstruction efforts, neither DOD, State, nor USAID
had complete data on the costs associated with using private security
providers.[Footnote 9] Agency officials acknowledged such data could
help them identify security cost trends and their impact on the
reconstruction projects, as increased security costs resulted in the
reduction or cancellation of some projects.
* Lack of visibility into the services being performed increases
agencies' risk of duplicative efforts. In our May 2009 review of DOD
funding for humanitarian and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan,
we found that DOD lacked visibility into development projects being
undertaken by USAID.[Footnote 10] In particular, by not having a
centralized, interagency database of all ongoing projects in
Afghanistan, the U.S. government may not be in a position to fully
leverage the resources available and risks duplicating reconstruction
efforts.
Many recommendations from our prior work on contractors supporting
contingency operations focused on increasing agencies' ability to
track contracts and contractor personnel so decision makers--whether
in the field or at headquarters--can better understand the extent to
which they rely on contractors, better plan, and better account for
costs. While they have taken actions to address our recommendations,
DOD, State, and USAID officials told us access to information on
contracts and associated personnel still needs improvement.
Specifically, information on contracts and the personnel working on
them in Iraq and Afghanistan may reside solely with the contractors,
be stored in a variety of data systems, or exist only in paper form in
scattered geographic regions. These officials indicated SPOT has the
potential to bring some of this dispersed information together so it
can be used to better manage and oversee contractors. SPOT may offer
the same potential for managing grants and cooperative agreements
since data on them and their associated personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan are similarly dispersed.
Though SPOT Implementation Continues, Challenges Remain in Tracking
Personnel and Contracts, Grants, and Cooperative Agreements:
DOD, State, and USAID have made progress in implementing SPOT, but as
we reported in October 2009, the agencies' ongoing implementation of
SPOT falls short of providing information that would help facilitate
oversight and inform decision making as well as fulfill statutory
requirements. Specifically, we found the criteria for deciding which
contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan are entered into the
system varied and as a result, not all required personnel have been
entered. Additionally, information on contractor personnel killed or
wounded in either country still is not systematically tracked in SPOT.
Because of SPOT's limitations, the agencies have relied on other
sources, such as periodic surveys, for information on contractor
personnel, including those that were killed or wounded, but we have
found these sources to be unreliable as well. Regarding contracts, we
found SPOT lacks the capability to track required contract information
as agreed to in the MOU. Although our prior findings are specific to
tracking contracts they point to challenges the agencies may face as
they use SPOT to track similar information on grants, cooperative
agreements, and the personnel working on them.
Tracking Information on Personnel Working in Iraq and Afghanistan:
DOD, State, and USAID have been phasing in the July 2008 MOU
requirement to use SPOT to track information on contracts with
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan and the personnel working on them.
Specifically, all three agencies currently require their contractors
in Iraq to enter personnel data into SPOT. DOD and State contractors
also have this requirement for work performed in Afghanistan. However,
USAID has not yet imposed a similar requirement on its contractors in
Afghanistan but is developing a plan to do so.
Our prior work has shown that the criteria DOD, State, and USAID used
for determining which contractor personnel are entered into SPOT
varied and were not always consistent with the MOU. Specifically, DOD,
State, and USAID officials stated the primary factor, particularly in
Iraq, for deciding which contractor personnel were entered into SPOT
was whether a contractor needed a SPOT-generated letter of
authorization (LOA).[Footnote 11] Not all contractor personnel,
particularly local nationals, need LOAs and agency officials informed
us that information on such personnel is generally not entered into
SPOT. Furthermore, in some instances we found the determining factor
for entering personnel into SPOT was the result of other agency
directives. For example, DOD officials from one contracting command in
Afghanistan stated they followed DOD's 2007 guidance on the use of
SPOT, which requires contractor personnel working on contracts valued
over $25,000 be entered into SPOT--as opposed to the MOU's $100,000
threshold--and as a result, local nationals were being entered into
the system despite not needing an LOA.
Officials from the three agencies expressed confidence that their SPOT
data were relatively complete for contractor personnel needing LOAs in
Iraq, with DOD and State expressing similar confidence for personnel
in Afghanistan. However, they acknowledged that since local nationals
generally do not need LOAs, they are generally not being entered into
SPOT. As a result, SPOT does not fully reflect the number of local
nationals working on the agencies' contracts. Agency officials further
explained that ensuring SPOT contains information on local nationals
is challenging because their numbers tend to fluctuate due to the use
of day laborers and local firms do not always track the individuals
working for them. Further, USAID has not begun entering information on
local nationals into SPOT because of concerns that doing so could pose
a threat to local nationals' safety, should the database be
compromised. To help address USAID's security concern, DOD is
currently testing a classified version of SPOT and expects the system
to be fully active this month. However, USAID officials told us the
agency's limited access to classified computers would make it
difficult to use a classified system. To address similar security
concerns, State developed an alternative that assigns a unique
identification number for local nationals entered into SPOT in place
of using their names.
Varying criteria and practices about who to include in SPOT stem in
part from differing agency views on the need to collect detailed data
on all contractor personnel. SPOT collects data that is more detailed
than what was required by the NDAA for FY 2008 or what was agreed upon
by the agencies in the July 2008 MOU. USAID officials questioned the
need for entering detailed information into SPOT because personnel
working on its contracts, particularly in Afghanistan, typically have
limited interaction with U.S. government personnel or do not receive
support services from the U.S. government. Similarly, some DOD
officials we spoke with questioned the need to track individual
personnel by name as opposed to their total numbers given the high
cost of collecting detailed data compared to the minimal benefit of
having this information. DOD officials responsible for SPOT informed
us the agencies did not conduct any analyses of what information
should be entered into SPOT prior to the agencies' designating it as
the system of record in the MOU.
Even though DOD, State, and USAID agreed in their July 2008 MOU to use
SPOT for tracking contractor personnel, the agencies have relied on
periodic surveys of their contractors to obtain data on the number of
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, our prior work has shown
that data from these surveys are generally incomplete and unreliable,
and, therefore, should not be used to identify trends or draw
conclusions about the number of contractor personnel in each country.
For example, while U.S. Central Command's quarterly census provides
the most comprehensive information on the number of DOD contractor
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD officials acknowledged that it
represents only a rough approximation of the actual number contractor
personnel in each country.[Footnote 12] Officials from all three
agencies stated that they lack the resources to verify the information
reported by the contractors, particularly for work performed at remote
sites where security conditions make it difficult for U.S. government
officials to regularly visit.
In addition to agreeing to use SPOT to track contractor personnel
numbers, the agencies agreed to use SPOT to track information on
contractor personnel killed or wounded. Although SPOT was upgraded in
January 2009 to track casualties, officials from the three agencies
informed us they are not relying on the database for this information
because contractors are generally not updating the status of their
personnel to indicate whether any of their employees were killed,
wounded, or are missing. In the absence of using SPOT to identify the
number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the agencies obtain these data from other sources.
Specifically, in response to requests made as part of our ongoing
review, State and USAID provided us with manually compiled lists of
the number of personnel killed or wounded, whereas DOD provided us
with casualty data for U.S citizens, but could not differentiate
whether the individuals identified were DOD civilian employees or
contractors.
The agencies have begun implementing SPOT to obtain information on
personnel working under grants and cooperative agreements.
Specifically, prior to the NDAA for FY2010 changes, in January 2009,
State issued a directive requiring assistance award recipients with
personnel deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan to enter information into
SPOT.[Footnote 13] Similarly, in April 2009, USAID issued a policy
directive requiring all personnel deploying to Iraq to work under
grants and cooperative agreements meeting the July 2008 MOU criteria
to be entered into SPOT.[Footnote 14] This directive specified that
information on Iraqi local nationals would not be entered into SPOT at
this time. While DOD also plans to use SPOT to track personnel working
on grants and cooperative agreements, DOD officials informed us that
they do not plan to issue specific guidance on entering these
personnel into SPOT because of DOD's limited use of grants and
cooperative agreements in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the three agencies
continue to implement SPOT for personnel working on grants and
cooperative agreements, our ongoing work to date indicates that they
will experience challenges similar to those with contractor personnel,
such as ensuring consistent criteria for whom to enter and accounting
for local nationals.
Tracking Information on Contracts, Grants and Cooperative Agreements
with Performance in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Although the agencies are entering information on contracts into SPOT,
the system continues to lack the capability to accurately import and
track the contract data elements as agreed to in the MOU. While the
MOU specifies that contract values, competition information, and
descriptions of services would be pulled into SPOT from FPDS-NG, this
capability is not expected to be available until October 2010. Even
when a direct link with FPDS-NG is established, our prior work has
shown that pulling data from FPDS-NG into SPOT may present challenges
because SPOT users are not required to enter information, such as
contract numbers, in a standardized manner. In our 2009 review of DOD,
State, and USAID data, we determined that at least 12 percent of the
contracts in SPOT had invalid contract numbers and, therefore, could
not be matched to records in FPDS-NG.[Footnote 15] Furthermore, using
contract numbers alone may be insufficient since specific task and
delivery orders are identified through a combination of the contract
and order numbers, but SPOT users are not required to enter task or
delivery order numbers. For example, as we stated in our October 2009
report, we reviewed one SPOT entry for a contract with 12 orders
placed against it. Because only the contract number and no order
numbers were included in SPOT, there was no way to determine the
correct value and competition information that should be imported from
FPDS-NG.
When using SPOT to track information on grants and cooperative
agreements, the agencies will face challenges similar to those faced
with contracts. For example, as part of our ongoing work, State and
USAID officials have informed us that complete information on their
grants and cooperative agreements is not available from a single
source, like FPDS-NG, but instead they rely on multiple databases to
record information on their grants and cooperative agreements
performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the agencies will need
to determine how the information from multiple databases is to be
entered or linked to SPOT. Additionally, the information contained in
these databases is generally not maintained in a standardized manner,
which may present additional difficulties if the agencies were to pull
these data into SPOT.
Prior Recommendation for Executive Action and Concluding Observations:
To address the shortcomings of the agencies' implementation of SPOT to
track contracts and contractor personnel, we recommended in October
2009 that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the USAID
Administrator jointly develop and execute a plan with associated
timeframes to continue implementing the NDAA for FY2008 requirements.
Specifically, we recommended:
* ensuring the agencies' criteria for entering contracts and
contractor personnel into SPOT are consistent with the NDAA for FY2008
and with the agencies' respective information needs for overseeing
contracts and contractor personnel;
* revising SPOT's reporting capabilities to ensure they fulfill
statutory requirements and agency information needs; and:
* establishing uniform requirements on how to enter contract numbers
into SPOT so contract information can accurately be pulled from FPDS-
NG as agreed to in the MOU.
DOD, State, and USAID agreed that coordination among the three
agencies is important, but DOD and State disagreed that they needed a
plan to address the issues we identified. They cited their ongoing
coordination efforts and anticipated upgrades to SPOT as sufficient.
USAID cited a number of steps it has taken that would facilitate SPOT
implementation but did not address our recommendation.
We also believe continued coordination among the three agencies is
important as they attempt to obtain greater visibility into their
reliance on contractors, grantees, and cooperative agreement
recipients in dynamic and complex environments. However, continued
coordination without additional actions is not sufficient. By jointly
developing and executing a plan with specific time frames, the
agencies can identify the concrete steps needed to assess their
progress in ensuring that SPOT collects the data necessary to fulfill
statutory requirements. In developing this plan, each agency should
further consider its respective information needs. By working with
potential users of SPOT data to better understand their information
needs, each agency can help ensure the information entered into the
system is sufficiently but not overly detailed and will assist it in
managing and overseeing contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Otherwise, not only do the agencies risk not
collecting the information they need but also collecting detailed data
they will not use.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy
to respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee
may have.
GAO Contacts and Acknowledgment:
For further information about this statement, please contact John P.
Hutton (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key
contributions to this statement include Johana R. Ayers, Assistant
Director; Noah Bleicher; Raj Chitikila; Kathryn Edelman; David Greyer;
Christopher Kunitz; Heather B. Miller; and Morgan Delaney Ramaker.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and
Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1,
2008); GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Are Taking
Actions to Track Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-538T]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2009); GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD,
State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor
Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1,
2009); GAO, Contingency Contracting: Further Improvements Needed in
Agency Tracking of Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-187]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov 2, 2009).
[2] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 863, requires GAO to annually review and
report on DOD, State, and USAID's acquisition and assistance
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Work on our third annual review is
currently on-going and will be issued no later than October 1, 2010.
[3] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 861.
[4] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 854 (2008).
[5] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 813 (2009).
[6] GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors
Supporting Deployed Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2006).
[7] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DOD
Planning for the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-179] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2,
2009).
[8] GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and
Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy
Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-403]
(Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004); GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction:
Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles
Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. Goals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-742] (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2005).
[9] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private
Security Providers, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-737] (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2005).
[10] GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and
Interagency Coordination for the Commander's Emergency Response
Program in Afghanistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-615] (Washington, D.C.: May 18,
2009).
[11] An LOA is a document issued by a government contracting officer
or designee that authorizes contractor personnel to travel to, from,
and within a designated area; and to identify any additional
authorizations, privileges, or government support the contractor is
entitled to under the contract. Contractor personnel need SPOT-
generated LOAs to, among other things, enter Iraq, receive military
identification cards, travel on U.S. military aircraft, or, for
security contractors, receive approval to carry weapons.
[12] CENTCOM is one of DOD's unified combatant commands. It is
responsible for overseeing U.S. security interests in 20 countries--
including Iraq and Afghanistan--that stretch from the Arabian Gulf
region into Central Asia. CENTCOM initiated its quarterly census of
contractor personnel in June 2007 as an interim measure until SPOT is
fully implemented. The census relies on contractor firms to self-
report their personnel data to DOD components, which then aggregate
the data and report them to CENTCOM at the end of each quarter.
[13] State Grants Policy Directive Number 33, Recipient Performance in
a Designated Area of Combat Operations, January 6, 2009, as amended on
August 13, 2009. State's amended policy provides an exemption for
personnel working on assistance instruments for Public International
Organizations. State considers an assistance award to be either a
grant, cooperative agreement, or voluntary contribution.
[14] USAID Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive 09-01, Contract
Clause and Assistance Provision for Awards in Iraq, April 1, 2009.
[15] Contract numbers consist of 13 alphanumeric characters. For our
review of SPOT data covering fiscal year 2008 and the first half of
fiscal year 2009, we considered a contract number invalid if the
contract number entered into SPOT had a different number of characters.
[End of section]
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