Warfighter Support
Continued Actions Needed by DOD to Improve and Institutionalize Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Gao ID: GAO-10-551T March 17, 2010The Department of Defense (DOD) relies greatly on contractors to support its current operations and is likely to continue to depend on contractors in support of future operations. As of December 2009, DOD estimated that over 207,000 contractor personnel were supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD expects to increase the number of contractors as more troops deploy to Afghanistan. The use of contractors in contingencies has challenged DOD in overseeing and managing contractors. This testimony addresses (1) the challenges DOD faces when trying to provide management and oversight of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, and (2) the extent to which DOD has made progress in institutionalizing a department- wide approach to managing and overseeing operational contract support. Today's testimony is based on GAO's ongoing audit work in Iraq and Afghanistan, looking at planning for operational contract support and at DOD's efforts to manage and oversee contractors, as well as on recently published related GAO reports and testimonies.
DOD continues to face a number of challenges overseeing and managing contractors in ongoing operations. These challenges include: (1) Providing an adequate number of personnel to conduct oversight and management of contractors. (2) Training personnel, including non-acquisition personnel such as unit commanders, on how to work effectively with contractors in operations. (3) Ensuring that local and third-country nationals have been properly screened, given the lack of standardized documents, the lack of national police agencies in many countries, and poor record keeping in many countries. (4) Compiling reliable data on the number of contractor personnel supporting U.S. forces in contingencies. (5) Identifying requirements for contractor support in ongoing operations, although GAO notes that some steps have been taken at the individual unit level. GAO has made many recommendations in the past aimed at addressing each of these challenges. While DOD has implemented some of our recommendations, it has been slow to implement others. For example, DOD has not developed agency-wide procedures to screen foreign national contractor personnel. In addition, the department has not fully addressed congressional direction to include operational contract support in predeployment training. Until DOD has fully implemented GAO's recommendations and congressional direction, it will not be in a position to ensure adequate management and oversight of contractors in contingency operations. Furthermore, inattention to these challenges may negatively affect the military's mission through the inefficient use of personnel, may increase the risk to U.S. personnel through inadequate background screenings, and may result in increased waste of taxpayer dollars. While DOD has taken some actions to institutionalize operational contract support, significant work remains to be done. For example, in 2006 DOD established the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) to act as a focal point for DOD's efforts to improve contract management and oversight at deployed locations. In addition, the department has issued a variety of contractor-related guidance, including the Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook and a Joint Publication that establishes doctrine for operational contract support; however, other guidance, including an Expeditionary Contracting Policy and an update of the DOD Instruction on Contractors Accompanying the Force, has yet to be finalized. Our ongoing work has also shown that the department continues to face challenges identifying contractor requirements in its plans for future operations. Until DOD institutionalizes operational contract support by incorporating it into its guidance, training, and planning, the department may continue to confront the challenges it faces in Iraq and Afghanistan in future operations.
GAO-10-551T, Warfighter Support: Continued Actions Needed by DOD to Improve and Institutionalize Contractor Support in Contingency Operations
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House
of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 1:30 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, March 17, 2010:
Warfighter Support:
Continued Actions Needed by DOD to Improve and Institutionalize
Contractor Support in Contingency Operations:
Statement of William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-10-551T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-551T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies greatly on contractors to
support its current operations and is likely to continue to depend on
contractors in support of future operations. As of December 2009, DOD
estimated that over 207,000 contractor personnel were supporting
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD expects to increase the number
of contractors as more troops deploy to Afghanistan. The use of
contractors in contingencies has challenged DOD in overseeing and
managing contractors.
This testimony addresses (1) the challenges DOD faces when trying to
provide management and oversight of contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and (2) the extent to which DOD has made progress in
institutionalizing a department-wide approach to managing and
overseeing operational contract support.
Today‘s testimony is based on GAO‘s ongoing audit work in Iraq and
Afghanistan, looking at planning for operational contract support and
at DOD‘s efforts to manage and oversee contractors, as well as on
recently published related GAO reports and testimonies.
What GAO Found:
DOD continues to face a number of challenges overseeing and managing
contractors in ongoing operations. These challenges include:
* Providing an adequate number of personnel to conduct oversight and
management of contractors.
* Training personnel, including non-acquisition personnel such as unit
commanders, on how to work effectively with contractors in operations.
* Ensuring that local and third-country nationals have been properly
screened, given the lack of standardized documents, the lack of
national police agencies in many countries, and poor record keeping in
many countries.
* Compiling reliable data on the number of contractor personnel
supporting U.S. forces in contingencies.
* Identifying requirements for contractor support in ongoing
operations, although GAO notes that some steps have been taken at the
individual unit level.
GAO has made many recommendations in the past aimed at addressing each
of these challenges. While DOD has implemented some of our
recommendations, it has been slow to implement others. For example,
DOD has not developed agency-wide procedures to screen foreign
national contractor personnel. In addition, the department has not
fully addressed congressional direction to include operational
contract support in predeployment training. Until DOD has fully
implemented GAO‘s recommendations and congressional direction, it will
not be in a position to ensure adequate management and oversight of
contractors in contingency operations. Furthermore, inattention to
these challenges may negatively affect the military‘s mission through
the inefficient use of personnel, may increase the risk to U.S.
personnel through inadequate background screenings, and may result in
increased waste of taxpayer dollars.
While DOD has taken some actions to institutionalize operational
contract support, significant work remains to be done. For example, in
2006 DOD established the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Program Support) to act as a focal point for DOD‘s efforts to improve
contract management and oversight at deployed locations. In addition,
the department has issued a variety of contractor-related guidance,
including the Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook and a Joint
Publication that establishes doctrine for operational contract
support; however, other guidance, including an Expeditionary
Contracting Policy and an update of the DOD Instruction on Contractors
Accompanying the Force, has yet to be finalized. Our ongoing work has
also shown that the department continues to face challenges
identifying contractor requirements in its plans for future
operations. Until DOD institutionalizes operational contract support
by incorporating it into its guidance, training, and planning, the
department may continue to confront the challenges it faces in Iraq
and Afghanistan in future operations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-551T] or key
components. For more information, contact William Solis, 202-512-8365,
solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss a number of
issues regarding the oversight and management of contracts used to
support U.S. forces in contingency operations, which constitute a key
portion of the broader issues the department refers to as operational
contract support.[Footnote 1] As you know, the Department of Defense
(DOD) relies greatly on contractors to support its missions and
operations, due in part to such factors as the reductions in DOD's
civilian and military personnel following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the increasing complexity of weapons systems, and more
recently, the increased demands related to overseas contingency
operations, such as the need for large numbers of Arabic speakers. DOD
officials have stated that without a significant increase in its
civilian and military workforce, the department is likely to continue
to rely on contractors both in the United States and overseas in
support of future deployments. For example, the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness testified in 2008 that
the structure of the U.S. military had been adapted to an environment
in which contractors were an indispensable part of the force. In that
regard, DOD estimates that more than 207,000 contractor personnel were
supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as of December 2009, and
DOD anticipates that this number will grow as the department increases
its troop presence in Afghanistan.
Congress has enacted legislation requiring DOD to take specific
actions to improve its management and oversight of contractors in
contingencies, such as (1) improving contractor accountability; (2)
developing joint policies for requirements definition, contingency
program management, and contingency contracting during combat and post-
conflict operations; and (3) developing policies and procedures for
the use of private security contractors in contingency operations. Our
previous work has highlighted long-standing problems regarding the
oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces.
Since the advent of our work on contractor support to deployed forces
in 1997, we have made many recommendations to improve DOD's management
of contractors in deployed locations.[Footnote 2] While the department
has implemented some of our recommendations, it has been to slow to
implement others, including those recommendations related to
operational contract support training for commanders and other
personnel responsible for the management and oversight of contractors.
Further, in part because of the lack of an adequate number of trained
acquisition and contract oversight personnel, GAO has designated DOD
contract management as a high-risk area.
The government contracting process consists of three phases: contract
planning, contract formation, and contract management. The contract
planning phase includes requirements determination, in which specific
requirements and specifications for contracted products and services
are identified and validated. The contract formulation phase typically
involves solicitation and evaluation of offers and the award of a
contract. Finally, the contract management phase begins after the
contract is awarded. Post-award activities include contract oversight
and management, contract completion and close-out activities. The
contracting process is governed by contracting laws, rules, and
guidance, such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation, as well as
specific policies established by DOD on how to administer and manage
contracts that support contingency operations, such as Joint
Publication 4-10 and DOD Instruction 3020.41. DOD has acknowledged
shortcomings in how the role of contractors was addressed in its
planning for Iraq and Afghanistan, and has taken some recent actions
to improve contracting and issue guidance.
In view of this, my statement today will focus on (1) the challenges
DOD faces when trying to provide management and oversight of
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan; and (2) the extent to which DOD
has made progress in institutionalizing a department-wide approach to
managing and overseeing operational contract support. I will conclude
with some observations about further actions the department could take
to improve its use of contractors in contingency operations. My
statement is based on recently published related reports and
testimonies and reflects preliminary observations drawn from ongoing
work looking at planning for operational contract support and the
department's efforts to manage and oversee contractors in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.[Footnote 3]
Background:
The U.S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and
services to deployed U.S. forces, and more recently contractors have
been involved in every major military operation since the 1991 Gulf
War. However, the scale of contractor support DOD relies on today in
Iraq and throughout Southwest Asia has increased considerably from
what DOD relied on during previous military operations, such as
Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and those in the Balkans. At the
end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, DOD estimated the number
of contractors in Iraq to be about 100,000 and the number in
Afghanistan about 107,000. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. citizens
constitute a minority of the total contractor workforce. In Iraq,
approximately 72,000 contractors are third country or Iraqi nationals,
and in Afghanistan approximately 81,000 contractors, or 75 percent,
are Afghan nationals. However, these numbers do not reflect the
thousands of contractors in Kuwait and elsewhere who support
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By way of contrast, an estimated
9,200 contractor personnel supported military operations in the 1991
Gulf War. Factors that have contributed to the increase include
reductions in the size of the military, an increase in the number of
operations and missions undertaken, and DOD's use of increasingly
sophisticated weapons systems.
DOD uses contractors to meet many of its logistical and operational
support needs during combat operations, peacekeeping missions, and
humanitarian assistance missions. Today, contractors located
throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia provide U.S. forces with
such services as linguistic support, equipment maintenance, base
operations support, and security support. In Iraq and Afghanistan,
contractors provide deployed U.S. forces with communication services;
interpreters who accompany military patrols; base operations support
(e.g., food and housing); weapons systems maintenance; intelligence
analysis; and a variety of other types of support. Contractors provide
logistics support that includes parts and equipment distribution,
ammunition accountability and control, port support activities, and
support to weapons systems and tactical vehicles. For example, in
Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and Afghanistan, the Army uses contractors to
refurbish, repair, and return to the warfighters a variety of military
vehicles.
Oversight of contracts--which can refer to contract administration
functions, quality assurance surveillance, corrective action, property
administration, and past performance evaluation--ultimately rests with
the contracting officer, who has the responsibility for ensuring that
contractors meet the requirements as set forth in the contract.
Frequently, however, contracting officers are not located in the
contingency area or at the installations where the services are being
provided. As a result, contracting officers appoint contract monitors,
who are responsible for monitoring contractor performance. For some
contracts, such as LOGCAP,[Footnote 4] AFCAP,[Footnote 5] or theater-
wide service contracts like the Afghan trucking contract, contracting
officers may delegate contract oversight to the Defense Contract
Management Agency (DCMA) to monitor contractor performance. In Iraq
and Afghanistan, these teams include administrative contracting
officers, who direct the contractor to perform work, and quality
assurance representatives, who ensure that the contractors perform
work to the standards written in the contracts and oversee the
Contracting Officer's Representatives (CORs) assigned to DCMA-
administered contracts.[Footnote 6] The DCMA team also includes
property administrators and subject matter experts who advise the
agency on technical issues such as food service, electrical
engineering, and air traffic control procedures.[Footnote 7] These
subject matter experts augment the DCMA staff and provide expertise
not inherent to DCMA's workforce and normally outside of DCMA's core
competency area of oversight responsibilities. Unless the contracting
officer delegates the administrative contract management and oversight
functions to DCMA, the contracting officer is responsible for the
administrative oversight and management of the contract.
Regardless of whether or not DCMA provides administrative oversight of
a contract, contracting officers generally appoint CORs. These
individuals provide much of the day-to-day oversight of a contract
during a contingency operation. They are typically drawn from units
receiving contractor-provided services, they are not normally
contracting specialists, and often their service as contracting
officer's representatives is an additional duty. They cannot direct
the contractor by making commitments or changes that affect price,
quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the
contract. Instead, they act as the eyes and ears of the contracting
officer and serve as the liaison between the contractor and the
contracting officer. In Iraq and Afghanistan, CORs who have been
appointed as contracting officer's representatives for contracts
administered by DCMA report their oversight results to DCMA personnel.
For contracts not administered by DCMA, CORs provide oversight
information to the contracting officer, who may be located in Iraq,
Afghanistan, or outside the theater of operations.
DOD guidance requires that trained CORs be appointed prior to the
award of a service contract. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Joint
Contracting Command requires that its contracting officers appoint
CORs for all contracts valued at more than $2,500 and having
significant technical requirements that require on-going advice and
surveillance from technical/requirements personnel. The contracting
officer may exempt service contracts from this requirement when the
following three conditions are all met:
1. The contract is awarded using simplified acquisition procedures;
2. The requirement is not complex; and:
3. The contracting officer documents the file, in writing, as to why
the appointment of a COR is unnecessary.
DOD Continues to Face Challenges in Providing Management and Oversight
of Contractors in Ongoing Operations:
Based on preliminary observations from our ongoing work in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we found that DOD continues to be faced with five
challenges related to providing management and oversight of
contractors in ongoing operations. First, DOD continues to be
challenged in having an adequate number of personnel to provide
oversight and management of contracts. While DOD has acknowledged
shortages of personnel and has made some efforts to address them,
these efforts are in the early stages of implementation. Second,
training non-acquisition personnel such as CORs and unit commanders to
work with contractors continues to be a problem. For example, we found
some instances in which a lack of training raised concerns over the
potential risk of military commanders directing contractors to perform
work outside the scope of the contract--something commanders lack the
authority to do. Third, DOD continues to face badging and screening
challenges, particularly of local national and third-country national
contractor personnel. Fourth, DOD lacks reliable tracking data on
contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fifth, DOD faces
challenges in identifying its operational contract support
requirements for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For
instance, officials from U.S. Forces-Afghanistan's logistics staff
appeared to be unaware of their responsibility as defined by DOD
guidance to identify contractor requirements or develop the contract
management and support plans required by guidance.
Challenges in Providing an Adequate Number of Contract Oversight and
Management Personnel in Deployed Locations Are Likely to Continue to
Hinder DOD's Oversight of Contractors:
As we noted in several of our previous reports, having the right
people with the right skills to oversee contractor performance is
crucial to ensuring that DOD receives the best value for the billions
of dollars spent on contractor-provided services supporting
contingency operations. Additionally, as our previous work has shown,
poor contract oversight and the poor contractor performance that may
result can negatively affect the military's mission. Although we could
find no DOD guidelines regarding the appropriate number of personnel
needed to oversee and manage DOD contracts at a deployed location,
several reviews by GAO and DOD organizations have consistently found
significant deficiencies in DOD's oversight of contractors due to
having an inadequate number of personnel to carry out these duties. In
2004,[Footnote 8] 2006,[Footnote 9] and again in 2008,[Footnote 10] we
reported on DOD's inability to provide an adequate number of oversight
personnel in CENTCOM's theater of operation, and our ongoing work in
Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates that this problem has not been
resolved. For example,
* During our December 2009 trip to Afghanistan, officials at a
contracting command told us that their workload required them to
devote all their efforts to awarding contracts, and as a result they
could not provide contract oversight.
* During that same trip, the commander of a maintenance battalion in
Afghanistan expressed concern over having an inadequate number of
personnel available to provide oversight of a key maintenance contract
used to support the increase of troops in Afghanistan. He noted that
the lack of sufficient quality assurance personnel and technical
experts was an identified problem they were working to correct, but
that the additional civilian personnel were slow to arrive.
Furthermore, he expressed concern that the expanding U.S. mission in
Afghanistan would require additional technical experts and quality
assurance personnel to oversee the increased number of contractors
expected to be needed to support the increased vehicle maintenance and
repair requirements.
* In preliminary findings concerning the drawdown of forces from Iraq,
we noted that an Army unit in Kuwait that was responsible for ensuring
the steady flow of equipment out of Kuwait and for conducting certain
maintenance tasks had 32 government personnel to provide oversight for
more than 3,000 contractor personnel. In January 2010, Army Materiel
Command requested funding to double to approximately 800 the number of
this unit's contractor personnel assigned to conduct retrograde-
specific tasks--for example, receiving, accounting for, sorting, and
moving equipment--necessary to prevent equipment backlogs in Kuwait.
In July 2009 this unit identified the lack of oversight personnel as a
significant concern with respect to successfully moving equipment out
of Kuwait. According to contracting officials, the unit had requested
an increase in civilian oversight personnel. However, we have
previously reported on the Army's difficulties in filling civilian
personnel vacancies in Kuwait.[Footnote 11]
* In a June 2009 report, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq
and Afghanistan found that DOD had insufficient logistics subject
matter experts in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 12] In the
department's response to the June 2009 report, DOD noted that DCMA had
in March 2009 requested 57 subject matter experts for food, water,
medical, fire, and petroleum services, but only 40 of the 57 positions
had been filled. Furthermore, according to DCMA as of January 2010,
only 19 of the 40 personnel had arrived in theater. During our
December 2009 trip to Afghanistan, DCMA officials stressed to us the
need for more subject matter experts, and they have requested an
additional 47 subject matter experts, but officials do not know when
these positions will be filled. To help mitigate the shortfall of
subject matter experts, DCMA intends to use contractors to provide the
needed expertise, according to DCMA officials.
Since 2004, we and others have reported that DOD has a lack of
contract oversight officials, including CORs, to provide contract
oversight and management in contingency operations. During operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the shortage of CORs has been particularly
acute for DCMA-administered contracts. For example, in June 2009 DCMA
had a requirement for 1,252 CORs in Iraq but had only 985 in place.
Similarly, in June 2009 DCMA in Afghanistan had a COR requirement of
576 but had less than half (or 253) of the needed CORs in place. In
October 2009 DCMA announced a new risk-based approach toward assigning
CORs. According to DCMA officials, it had been DCMA's policy that a
COR would be designated for each contractor-provided service at the
location of the service. According to DCMA officials and
documentation, DCMA now recommends that units assign CORs only to key
services--which they define as high-and medium-risk services that
could put health, life, and safety at risk if not executed in a manner
consistent with the contract. Examples of high-and medium-risk
services include food service, power generation, and postal services.
Services such as morale, welfare and recreation are considered low
risk. Services that are not designated as "key services" do not
require CORs, but are monitored on a quarterly basis by a quality
assurance representative. Since implementing this policy, DCMA has
reduced the requirement for CORs to oversee its contracts in Iraq from
1,100 in October 2009 to 580 in January 2010, and DCMA officials in
Iraq anticipate that they will be able to reduce the COR requirement
further as they continue to designate additional services as low-risk.
In January 2010 DCMA reported that it had 88 percent of its required
CORs in place in Afghanistan. We have not evaluated the effectiveness
of this risk-based management program at this time.
In an effort to build economic capacity within Iraq and Afghanistan,
Congress has authorized and DOD has developed programs to encourage
the use of local contractor firms. However, these programs, the Iraq
First Program and the Afghan First Program, further strain the
availability of personnel to provide contract management and
oversight. According to officials from the Joint Contracting Command-
Iraq/Afghanistan local national contractors frequently require more
oversight than U.S. firms because they lack experience, have limited
capacity, are frequently less capable then their U.S. counterparts,
are unfamiliar with U.S. quality standards and expectations, and lack
the quality control processes that U.S. firms have in place. For
example, according to DOD officials, buildings constructed by Afghan
contractors have had to be re-wired when the LOGCAP program assumed
responsibility for them because the LOGCAP contractors responsible for
maintenance lacked assurance that the electrical work was done
correctly. Other officials described receiving poor quality office
furniture, while still others noted that trucking companies contracted
to move U.S. goods often failed to meet delivery schedules. Without a
sufficient number of contract oversight personnel in place, including
subject matter experts, DOD may not be able to obtain reasonable
assurance that contractors are meeting their contract requirements
efficiently and effectively at each location, and that health and
safety concerns have been addressed.
Actions to Improve Availability of Oversight Personnel:
Several individual organizations or services within DOD have taken
actions to help mitigate the problem of not having enough personnel to
oversee and manage contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example,
the Army issued an Execution Order on CORs in December 2009. In the
order, the Army Chief of Staff directed the commanders of deploying
units to coordinate with the unit they will replace in theater to
determine the number of CORs they will need to designate prior to
deployment. The order states that if the commander is unable to
determine specific COR requirements, each deploying brigade should
designate and train 80 CORs prior to deployment.
In addition, a deploying Marine Expeditionary Force has created an
operational contracting support cell within the logistics element of
its command headquarters. The members of the cell will assist
subordinate units with contracting oversight and guidance on policy,
and they will act as contracting liaisons to the Joint Contracting
Command-Iraq/Afghanistan and as conduits to the regional contracting
commands should any issue arise. The Marines were prompted to set up
this cell by lessons learned from their deployment to Operation Iraqi
Freedom, where problems arose as a result of a lack of expertise and
personnel to help oversee and manage contractors. In addition, the
Marine Expeditionary Force trained approximately 100 Marines as CORs
prior to its deployment to Afghanistan this spring. While not all
personnel have been designated as CORs for the upcoming deployment,
all could be called upon to serve as CORs should the need arise.
While we recognize the efforts DOD has under way to develop long-term
plans intended to address its personnel shortages, the problems we
have identified in the past continue. In previous reports we have
recommended that DOD develop strategies to address its oversight
problems, and noted that unless DOD takes steps to address its current
shortages, the department will continue to be at risk with regard to
its assurance that contractors are providing their required services
in an effective and efficient manner.
Training of CORs and Non-Acquisition Personnel, Such as Unit
Commanders, to Provide Contract Oversight and Management Remains an
Issue:
Equally important as having enough CORs is having CORs who are
properly trained to provide contract oversight. According to the Army
Chief of Staff's Execution Order, the lack of personnel in theater who
are sufficiently trained in COR responsibilities is hindering
effective oversight and management of contracts in support of
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, a lack of CORs with
the right skills can make it more difficult to resolve contractor
performance issues.
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement requires that
CORs be qualified by training and experience commensurate with the
responsibilities to be delegated to them. Specifically, DOD requires
that potential CORs complete courses (which are available on line)
that include training on specific COR duties, an awareness course on
trafficking in persons to help combat this practice and ethics
training. In 2006 we reported that individuals deployed without
knowing that they would be assigned as CORs, thus precluding their
ability to take the required training prior to deployment. Individuals
we spoke with noted that it was difficult to set aside the time
necessary to complete the training once they arrived in Iraq.[Footnote
13] During our recent visit to Afghanistan we found that units
continue to deploy without nominating CORs beforehand, and as a result
the personnel assigned to serve as CORs have to take the required
training upon arrival in theater. Because training is offered through
online courses, staff officers at a combined joint command as well as
at an Army sustainment command in Afghanistan told us that technical
limitations, including a lack of bandwidth, make it difficult to
access the training from Afghanistan. In November 2009 DOD
acknowledged concerns regarding web-based COR training due to
connectivity issues.
We also found that although CORs and other oversight personnel are
responsible for evaluating the technical aspects of a contractor's
performance, these oversight personnel often lack the technical
knowledge and training needed to effectively oversee certain
contracts. For example, in Afghanistan, officials from various
organizations expressed concern to us that there were not enough CORs
trained in trades such as electrical wiring and plumbing to provide
oversight over all the construction contracts, and that this problem
will only worsen as the number of construction projects continues to
grow. Also, in a November 2009 analysis, a DOD task force acknowledged
the importance of having CORs with the right skills, noting that units
nominating CORs should consider the technical aspects, monitoring
frequency, and monetary value of the contract to ensure that CORs'
subject matter expertise and availability are commensurate with the
requirement.
An additional, long-standing training challenge hindering management
and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces is the lack of
training for military commanders and other non-acquisition personnel,
such as senior leaders who need contractors to execute their mission.
As we testified in 2008, limited or no pre-deployment training on the
use of contractor support can cause a variety of problems for military
commanders in a deployed location, such as being unable to adequately
plan for the use of those contractors, or confusion regarding the
military commanders' roles and responsibilities in managing and
overseeing contractors.[Footnote 14] Currently, military commanders
and other unit leaders are not required to complete operational
contract support training prior to deployment.[Footnote 15] In
Afghanistan we continued to find that some commanders had to be
advised by contract oversight personnel that they had to provide
certain support, such as housing, force protection, and meals to the
contractors they were overseeing. In addition, having limited or no
pre-deployment training for military commanders on the use of
contractor support to deployed forces can result in confusion
regarding their roles and responsibilities in managing and overseeing
contractors. For example, we found some instances in which a lack of
training raised concerns over the potential risk of military
commanders directing contractors to perform work outside the scope of
the contract--something commanders lack the authority to do.
According to several contract oversight personnel, some commanders did
not understand the command and control relationship between themselves
and the contractor, and were unclear as to whether they could direct
the contractor to perform work. Similarly, in a January 2010
acquisition conference, DCMA noted as a challenge the education of
unit commanders on working with contractors. These challenges include
educating the commanders on the value of contractors as a force
multiplier, the unit's role in providing oversight, and distinguishing
between command and contractual authority. The commander of the
operational contract support cell at a Marine Expeditionary Force
headquarters noted that he considered educating commanders to be one
of his key challenges as his unit prepared to deploy. Without a clear
understanding of the command and control relationship for contractors,
commanders and other key leaders run the risk of directing the
contractor to perform work beyond what was called for in the contract.
As Army guidance makes clear, when military commanders try to direct
contractors to perform activities outside the scope of the contract,
this can cause the government to incur additional charges because
modifications would need to be made to the contract. In some cases,
the direction may potentially result in a violation of competition
requirements.
While we continue to observe issues regarding training on the use of
contractor support, initiatives have been taken to implement and
emphasize enhanced training for contract management and oversight
personnel. For example, the Army's December 2009 Execution Order
directs the Army's Training and Doctrine Command to develop additional
training, including training to familiarize CORs with LOGCAP. It also
requires brigade commanders to identify and train individuals as CORs
prior to deployment, and it requires that training scenarios for CORs
be incorporated into mission rehearsal and mission readiness
exercises. In an independent effort in Afghanistan, two sustainment
units provided training that incorporated a set of contract-related
scenarios prior to their deployment to Afghanistan. One of the units
also sent an officer to the new 2-week Operational Contract Support
course conducted by the Army Logistics Management College. Ninety
soldiers from one of the units also attended COR training, either
through the Defense Acquisition University or through equivalent
training. In another example, one of the Marine Corps' expeditionary
forces preparing to deploy to Afghanistan identified Marines who may
have contract oversight roles in Afghanistan and brought in an
instructor from the Defense Acquisition University to provide three
sessions of COR training prior to their deployment. In addition, DCMA
has begun reaching out to deploying units to provide them with pre-
deployment training on what to expect when they arrive in Afghanistan,
particularly with regard to LOGCAP. Officials responsible for
overseeing a contract for linguist services also stated that their
CORs received contract-specific training prior to deployment. However,
these efforts do not address the concerns about CORs lacking the
technical skills required to provide oversight on more technical
contracts, specifically construction-related contracts. While these
training efforts are promising, they have been driven by individual
services and units.
We have been discussing the need for better pre-deployment training on
the use of contractors to support deployed forces since the mid-1990s,
and have accordingly made several recommendations that DOD improve its
training. For example, in 2003 we recommended that DOD develop
training courses for commanding officers and other senior leaders who
are deploying to locations with contractor support, and in 2006 we
expanded on our recommendation and recommended that operational
contract support be included in professional military education and
pre-deployment training. [Footnote 16]In both instances DOD agreed
with our recommendations but has not fully implemented them.
Furthermore, in 2008, Congress mandated that DOD policies provide for
contingency contracting training for certain non-acquisition
personnel, including operational commanders expected to have
acquisition or contract oversight responsibilities.[Footnote 17]
However, these policies have not yet been finalized, and consequently
the training required has not been institutionalized throughout DOD.
[Footnote 18]
DOD Continues to Face Badging and Screening Challenges:
In Iraq and Afghanistan military commanders and other military
officials have expressed concerns about the risks that contractor
personnel, particularly third country and local nationals, pose to
U.S. forces due to limitations in the background screening process. In
2006 we first reported on the challenges that DOD faced in ensuring
that contractor personnel had been thoroughly screened and vetted.
[Footnote 19] In July 2009 we reported that DOD had not developed
department-wide procedures to screen local national and third-country
national contractor personnel, in part because two offices within the
department---that of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
and that of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics--could not agree on the level of detail that
should be included in background screening for third country and local
national employees, and therefore lacked assurance that all contractor
personnel were properly screened. To resolve this issue we recommended
that the Secretary of Defense designate a focal point at a
sufficiently senior level and possessing the necessary authority to
ensure that the appropriate offices in DOD coordinate, develop, and
implement policies and procedures to conduct and adjudicate background
screenings in a timely manner.[Footnote 20]
DOD has still not developed a department-wide policy on how to screen
local national and third-country national contractor personnel, and as
a result it continues to face challenges in conducting background
screening of these personnel. As we reported in July 2009, absent a
DOD-wide policy, commanders develop their own standards and processes
to ensure that contractor personnel have been screened. In Iraq, U.S.
Forces-Iraq, the U.S. led military organization responsible for
conducting the war in Iraq, has developed a command-wide policy for
screening and badging contractors. However, in Afghanistan, U.S.
Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)[Footnote 21] has not established a
command-wide policy for screening and badging contractors. Instead,
each base is responsible for developing its own background screening
and base access procedures, resulting in a variety of different
procedures. Moreover, requirements differ between U.S. bases and NATO
bases. The lack of guidance also affects the ability of force
protection officials to determine the sufficiency of their background
screening procedures. For example, at one base, force protection
officials told us that while they require contractor personnel to
provide valid background screening from their home countries, they had
not received guidance on how to interpret those screenings, and did
not know whether the screenings they received were valid or not.
Officials stated that they rely on a biometric system, also used in
Iraq, to screen local national and third-country national contractor
personnel. However, as we reported in July 2009, the name-checks and
biometric data collection associated with issuing badges rely
primarily upon U.S.-based databases of criminal and terrorist
information. In 2006, we reported that background checks that are
reliant upon U.S.-based databases, such as the biometric system used
in Iraq and Afghanistan, may not be effective in screening foreign
nationals who have not lived or traveled to the U.S.[Footnote 22]
Further, some DOD contracts require contractors to conduct background
screenings of their personnel. In July 2009 we reported that contracts
for private security services often contained unrealistic background
screening requirements.[Footnote 23] For example, the requirements
directed contractors to use data sources to which private firms may
not have access, such as databases maintained by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. We continue to find
that some DOD contracts include unrealistic background screening
requirements similar to those identified in our July 2009 report. As
we concluded in July 2009, without a coordinated DOD-wide effort to
develop and implement standardized policies and procedures to ensure
that contractor personnel--particularly local nationals and third-
country nationals--have been screened, DOD cannot be assured that it
has taken all reasonable steps to thoroughly screen contractor
personnel and minimize any risks to the military posed by these
personnel.
DOD Lacks Reliable Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in Iraq
and Afghanistan:
Since 2002, we have reported on the challenges faced by commanders and
other leaders to obtain accurate information on the number of
contractors and the services they are providing in contingencies and
have made recommendations to improve DOD's ability to obtain
contractor information. For example, in December 2006 we reported that
commanders had limited visibility of contractors because information
on the number of contractors at deployed locations or the services
they provide was incomplete, unreliable, and not aggregated within any
one DOD organization, a limitation that can inhibit planning, increase
costs, and introduce unnecessary risks.[Footnote 24] Although DOD has
recognized the need for commanders and other leaders to have reliable
data on the number of contractors and the services they provide, DOD
continues to face challenges in tracking contracts and contractor
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent complete and accurate
information on contractors supporting contingency operations, the
agencies are limited in their ability to develop a complete picture of
their reliance on contractors, the tasks being performed, and their
associated costs. Reliable and meaningful data on contractors and the
services they provide are a starting point for agency discussions
about when and how to effectively use contractors; support contractors
in terms of housing, security, and other services; and ensure that
contractors are properly managed and overseen.
In January 2007, DOD designated the Synchronized Pre-deployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT) as its primary system for collecting data
on contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces, and it directed
contractor firms to enter personnel data for contracts performed in
Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 25] The SPOT database is designed to
provide accountability of contractor personnel by name, a summary of
the services being provided, and information on government-provided
support.
Our reviews of SPOT have highlighted shortcomings in DOD's
implementation of the system in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 26]
Most important, we found that as a result of diverse interpretations
as to which contractor personnel should be entered into the system,
the information in SPOT does not present an accurate picture of the
total number of contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. For
example, in Iraq, DOD officials stated that the primary determinant of
whether contractor personnel were entered into SPOT was a contractor's
need or lack of need for a SPOT-generated letter of authorization.
Contractor personnel need SPOT-generated letters of authorization to,
among other things, enter Iraq, receive military identification cards,
travel on U.S. military aircraft, or, for security contractors,
receive approval to carry weapons.[Footnote 27] However, not all
contractor personnel in Iraq, and particularly local nationals, need
letters of authorization, and agency officials informed us that such
personnel were not being entered into SPOT. Similarly, officials with
one contracting office in Afghanistan stated that the need for a
letter of authorization determined whether someone was entered into
SPOT, resulting in Afghans not being entered. However, officials from
another office stated that office was following DOD's 2007 guidance
[Footnote 28] on the use of SPOT and entering local nationals into the
system.
Because of the varying practices for entering personnel into SPOT,
there are inconsistencies and gaps in the data generated by the
system. For example, while DOD officials expressed confidence that the
SPOT data were relatively complete for contractor personnel who need a
letter of authorization, they acknowledged that SPOT does not fully
reflect the number of local nationals working on contracts. Tracking
local nationals in SPOT presents particular challenges because their
numbers tend to fluctuate due to the use of day laborers, and because
local firms do not always keep track of the individuals working on
their projects. DOD officials also explained that they have had to
develop workarounds to get around the SPOT requirement of a first and
last name to be entered for each individual, along with a birth date
and unique identification number. The officials noted that many Afghan
laborers have only one name, do not know their birth dates, and lack
identification numbers.
Because of the short-comings of SPOT, DOD has conducted quarterly
censuses to obtain information on the number of contractor personnel
in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 29] DOD officials have regarded the
census as the most complete source of contractor personnel data, but
they acknowledged that the census numbers represent only a rough
approximation of the actual number of contractor personnel working in
either country. We found that census data were sometimes incomplete,
while in other cases personnel were doubly counted.[Footnote 30]
Because of these and related limitations, we determined that the
census data should not be used to identify trends or draw conclusions
about the number of contractor personnel in either Iraq or Afghanistan.
Challenges in Identifying Operational Contract Support Requirements in
Iraq and Afghanistan:
DOD guidance highlights the need to plan for operational contract
support early in an operations planning process because of the
challenges associated with using contractors in contingencies. These
challenges include overseeing and managing contractors in contingency
operations. In previous reports and testimonies we have noted that DOD
has not followed long-standing guidance on planning for operational
contract support.[Footnote 31] Specifically, joint guidance calls for
DOD to identify contract support requirements as early as possible, to
ensure that the military receives contract support at the right place,
at the right time, and for the right price. Other guidance directs the
combatant commander or joint task force commander to identify
operational contract support requirements as well as develop plans to
obtain and manage contract support and include them in operation
plans, operation orders, or fragmentary orders. Our preliminary
observations from ongoing work continue to show that DOD has not fully
planned for the use of contractors in support of ongoing contingency
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
On December 1, 2009, the President announced that an additional 30,000
U.S. troops would be sent to Afghanistan to assist in the ongoing
operations there, and the Congressional Research Service estimates
that between 26,000 and 56,000 additional contractors may be needed to
support the additional troops. However, during our December 2009 trip
to Afghanistan, we found that only limited planning was being done
with regard to contracts or contractors. Specifically, we found that
with the exception of planning for the increased use of LOGCAP, USFOR-
A had not begun to consider the full range of contractor services that
might be needed to support the planned increase of U.S. forces. More
important, officials from USFOR-A's logistics staff appeared to be
unaware of their responsibility as defined by DOD guidance to identify
contractor requirements or develop the contract management and support
plans required by guidance.[Footnote 32] However, we did find some
planning being done by U.S. military officials at Regional Command-
East. According to planners from Regional Command-East, the command
had identified the types of units that are being deployed to their
operational area of Afghanistan and was coordinating with similar
units already in Afghanistan to determine what types of contract
support the units relied on. Furthermore, according to operational
contract support personnel associated with a Marine Expeditionary
Force getting ready to deploy to Afghanistan, the staff offices within
the Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters organization were directed
to identify force structure gaps that could be filled by contractors
prior to deployment and begin contracting for those services.[Footnote
33] For example, one section responsible for civil affairs identified
the need to supplement its staff with contractors possessing
engineering expertise because the needed engineers were not available
from the Navy.
In addition, although U.S. Forces-Iraq[Footnote 34] has taken steps to
identify all the LOGCAP support they will need for the drawdown, they
have not identified the other contracted support they may need.
According to DOD joint doctrine and service guidance, personnel who
plan, support, and execute military operations must also determine the
contracted support needed to accomplish their missions. Such personnel
include combat force commanders, base commanders, and logistics
personnel. In particular, these personnel are responsible for
determining the best approach to accomplish their assigned tasks and--
if the approach includes contractors--identifying the types and levels
of contracted support needed. Multi-National Force-Iraq's (MNF-I)
drawdown plan, however, delegated the responsibility for determining
contract support requirements to contracting agencies, such as the
Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, rather than to operational
personnel. Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan officials told
us, however, that they could not determine the theater-wide levels of
contracted services required, or plan for mandated reductions based on
those needs, because they lack sufficient, relevant information on
future requirements for contracted services--information that should
have been provided by operational personnel. For example, according to
MNF-I documentation, during an October 2009 meeting between
operational personnel and contracting officials, MNF-I reiterated that
the levels of contracted service ultimately needed in Iraq during the
drawdown were unknown. This is consistent with an overarching weakness
identified by a Joint Staff task force, which recognized limited, if
any, visibility of contractor support and plans, and a lack of
requirements definition. As a result, rather than relying on
information based on operationally driven requirements for contracted
services, MNF-I planned for, and U.S. Forces-Iraq (USFOR-I) is
subsequently tracking, the reduction of contracted support in Iraq
using historical ratios of contractor personnel to servicemembers in
Iraq, which may not accurately reflect the actual levels of contracted
support needed during the drawdown.
Insufficient planning may also lead to shortages in contractor
personnel available to perform key functions affecting contractor
responsiveness. For instance, during our December visit to
Afghanistan, multiple DOD officials, including the commander of a
base, told us that the current LOGCAP contractor had pulled many of
its skilled workers off the job, which led to issues such as
electrical problems that remained unresolved for longer than desired
periods of time. Furthermore, a maintenance battalion commander told
us that without the assistance of soldiers and civilian mechanics from
the Red River Army Depot, the contractor would not have had enough
personnel to maintain and repair the vehicles and equipment necessary
to meet the mission. Additionally, in December 2009, an official from
USFOR-A-South told us that in Kandahar military personnel were called
upon to augment the operations of a supply facility because the
contractor had not fully staffed the operation. In response to a DCMA
letter of concern regarding contractor personnel shortages, the
contractor agreed to have a full complement of contractor personnel in
place by the middle of February 2010.
Timely planning is critical to avoiding potential waste and ensuring
that critical services are available when needed as the United States
increases troops in Afghanistan and withdraws them from Iraq. In a
January 2008 statement before Congress we again highlighted the need
for the department to follow its long-standing planning guidance
regarding the use of contractors to support deployed forces.[Footnote
35] In that testimony we called upon DOD leadership to take steps to
ensure compliance with existing guidance. Insufficient planning for
requirements may lead to other poor outcomes, such as increased cost,
lengthened schedules, underperformance, and delays in receiving
services. We continue to believe that the department should take steps
to ensure that it adheres to the guidance detailed in both joint and
service publications.
While DOD Has Taken Some Actions to Institutionalize Operational
Contract Support, Much Remains to Be Done:
In response to congressional direction and GAO recommendations, DOD
has taken some actions to institutionalize operational contract
support, however much remains to be done. The department has appointed
a focal point to lead in these efforts, has issued some new guidance,
and has begun to determine its reliance on contractors, but it has yet
to finalize the policies required by Congress in the National Defense
Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008. In addition, the
department needs to take additional actions to improve its planning
for operational contract support for future operations.
DOD Has Taken Some Department-wide Steps to Institutionalize
Operational Contract Support:
In October 2006, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics
and Materiel Readiness established the office of the Assistant Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) to act as a focal point
for leading DOD's efforts to improve contract management and oversight
at deployed locations. That office has, for example established a
community of practice for operational contract support comprising
subject matter experts from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Staff, and the services, and this community may be called
upon to work on a specific task or project. Additionally, the office
has established a Council of Colonels, which serves as a "gatekeeper"
for initiatives, issues, or concepts, as well as a Joint Policy
Development General Officer Steering Committee, which includes senior
commissioned officers or civilians designated by the services. The
committee's objective is to guide the development of Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and service policy, doctrine, and
procedures to adequately reflect situational and legislative changes
as they occur within operational contract support. The Program Support
office is also developing an Operational Contract Support Concept of
Operations, and it has provided the geographic combatant commanders
with operational contract support planners to assist them in meeting
contract planning requirements.
To provide additional assistance to deployed forces, the department
and the Army introduced several handbooks to improve contracting and
contract management in deployed locations. For example,
* In 2007 the department introduced the Joint Contingency Contracting
Handbook, which provides tools, templates, and training that enable a
contingency contracting officer to be effective in any contracting
environment. The handbook also contains resources for contracting
officers to promote uniform contracting practices, including
standardized contract forms and language for terms and conditions The
handbook is currently being updated and the department expects it to
be issued in July 2010.
* In 2008 the Army issued the Deployed Contracting Officer's
Representative Handbook. This handbook provides the basic tools and
knowledge needed for use in conjunction with formal COR training. The
handbook was designed to address the realities that CORs face when
operating outside the United States in a contingency operation.
* Additionally in October 2008, the department issued Joint
Publication 4-10, "Operational Contract Support," which establishes
doctrine and provides standardized guidance for planning, conducting,
and assessing operational contract support integration, contractor
management functions, and contracting command and control
organizational options in support of joint operations.
Finally, in 2008, the Joint Staff (J-4), at the direction of the
Chairman, undertook a study to determine how reliant the department
was on contractors in Iraq. The intent of the study was to (1) better
understand contracted capabilities in Iraq, to determine areas of high
reliance or dependence; (2) determine where the department is most
reliant, and in some cases dependent, on contractor support, to inform
longer-term force structure and potential "buy back" implications; and
(3) guide the development of future contingency planning and force
development. According to the Joint Staff their initial findings
suggest that in Iraq the department was highly dependent on
contractors in four of the nine joint capability areas, including
Logistics.[Footnote 36] For example, the study showed that in the
third quarter of fiscal year 2008, over 150,000 contractors were
providing logistical support, while slightly more than 31,000 military
personnel were providing similar support. Having determined the level
of dependency and reliance on contractors in Iraq, the Joint Staff
plans to examine ways to improve operational contract support
planning, including the development of tools, rules, and refinements
to the existing planning process.
DOD Has Yet to Finalize Operational Contract Support Guidance to Meet
Congressional Direction:
In 2006 Congress directed the Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop joint
policies by April 2008 for requirements definition, contingency
program management, and contingency contracting during combat and post-
conflict operations.[Footnote 37] In 2008, Congress amended this
requirement by directing that the joint policies also provide for the
training of military personnel outside the acquisition workforce who
are expected to have acquisition responsibilities, including oversight
of contracts or contractors during combat operations, post-conflict
operations, and contingency operations.[Footnote 38] It also directed
that GAO review DOD's joint policies and determine the extent to which
those policies and the implementation of such policies comply with the
statutory requirements. In November 2008 we reported that the
department had yet to finalize several key documents designed to meet
the requirements established by Congress.[Footnote 39] We also noted
that DOD was developing an Expeditionary Contracting Policy to address
the requirement to develop a joint policy on contingency contracting,
and was revising the October 2005 version of DOD Instruction 3020.41,
Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces, to
meet the congressional direction to develop a joint policy on
requirements definition; program management, including the oversight
of contractor personnel supporting a contingency operation; and
training. At the time of our 2008 report, the draft Instruction
directed combatant commanders and service component commanders to
conduct planning to identify military capability shortfalls that
require acquisition solutions in commanders' operational plans, and
combatant commanders to integrate operational contract support issues
into training simulations, mission rehearsals, and exercises. The
draft Instruction also directed the service to include requirements of
the Instruction in their training.
As of March 2010, the department had yet to issue either of these
documents. According to the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Program Support), the revisions to DOD Instruction 3020.41
have been held up in the review process. The current plan is to post
the proposed revisions in the Federal Register and issue the revised
instruction in the summer of 2010. Until the DOD instruction is
revised and issued, the department's overarching policy document will
not reflect the department's current approach to operational contract
support. Furthermore, the provisions of the draft instruction that
were intended to meet the congressional requirement for joint policy
applicable to combatant commanders and the military services have not
been established. Regarding the expeditionary contracting policy, the
department has determined that it will not issue the expeditionary
policy because the practitioners do not believe a joint policy is
necessary.
Plans for Future Operations Lack Information on Contractor Support
Requirements:
DOD also faces challenges incorporating operational contract support
issues in its operation plans for potential future contingencies.
Since 2003, we have identified the need for the department to ensure
that specific information on the use and roles of contract support to
deployed forces is integrated into its plans for future contingency
operations.[Footnote 40] DOD guidance has long recognized the need to
include the role of contractors in operation plans and, since early
2006, this guidance has required planners to include an operational
contract support annex--known as Annex W--in the combatant commands'
most detailed operation plans. Our ongoing work has found that the
department has made some progress in both meeting this specific
guidance and, more generally, in incorporating contract requirements
in its operation plans. However, additional steps are needed to fully
implement DOD guidance.
First, we found that four operation plans with Annex Ws have been
approved, and planners have drafted Annex Ws for an additional 30
plans. However, according to combatant command officials, most of the
annexes drafted to date restate broad language from existing DOD
guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces and
included few details on the type of contractors needed to execute a
given plan--despite guidance requiring Annex Ws to list contracts
likely to be used in theater. This was due to several factors,
including a lack of information within the operation plans on matters
such as the size and capabilities of the military force involved.
According to combatant command planners, this information is needed to
enable them to identify the details on contracted services and
capabilities needed to support an operation. In addition, shortcomings
in guidance on how and when to develop these annexes have resulted in
a mismatch in expectations between senior DOD leadership and combatant
command planners regarding the degree to which Annex Ws will contain
specific information on contract support requirements. We found that
several senior DOD officials have the expectation that most combatant
command plans should at least identify the capabilities that
contractors may provide, regardless of the level of plan. However, the
contract support planners and other officials responsible for
developing the Annex Ws disagreed, stating that given the limited
amount of information on military forces in most operation plans, the
expected level of detail was difficult if not impossible to achieve.
In most cases, we found that Annex Ws did not contain the level of
detail expected by senior DOD leadership and envisioned in current
guidance, thus limiting the utility of the Annex W as a planning tool
to assess and address contract support requirements.
Second, in discussion with combatant command officials responsible for
developing operation plans, we found that detailed information on
operational contract support requirements is generally not included in
other sections or annexes of these plans. Although the Annex W is
intended to be the focal point within an operation plan for discussing
operational contract support, DOD guidance underscores the importance
of addressing contractor requirements throughout an operation plan.
However, we found that non-logistics personnel tend to assume that the
logistics community will address the need to incorporate operational
contract support throughout operation plans. For example, combatant
command officials told us they were not aware of any assumptions
specifically addressing the potential use or role of operational
contract support in their base plans. Assumptions are used to focus
attention of senior DOD leadership on factors that could present risks
to mission success. Similarly, according to DOD planners, there is a
lack of details on contract support in other parts of most base plans
or in the non-logistics (e.g., communication or intelligence) annexes
of operation plans. DOD guidance for these annexes directs planners to
identify the means or capabilities necessary for meeting mission
requirements. Although this guidance does not specifically mention
contractors, contractors provide significant support in these areas.
The lack of details on contract support requirements in Annex Ws,
along with the limited discussion of contractors in other portions of
operation plans, can hinder the ability of combatant commanders to
understand the extent to which their plans are reliant on contractors.
Moreover, senior decision makers may incorrectly assume that operation
plans have adequately addressed contractor requirements. As a result,
they risk not fully understanding the extent to which the combatant
command will be relying on contractors to support combat operations,
and being unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight
of deployed contractor personnel.
Concluding Observations:
In closing, DOD has taken positive steps in recognizing its reliance
on contractors to support operations both now and in the future, and
it has emphasized the need for increased oversight and management over
these contractors. However, more work is needed to address the long-
standing challenges I have discussed today. Many of the challenges I
have identified, particularly those related to contract management,
oversight, and planning, stem from DOD's inability to institutionalize
operational contract support by accepting contractors as an integral
part of the total force. Reforming the way DOD approaches operational
contract support will require a fundamental cultural change for the
department. As part of the effort to bring about such changes, DOD
will need to continue to evaluate the role that contractors play in
contingency operations to determine the appropriate balance of
contractors and military forces and institutionalize operational
contract support at all levels of professional military education as
well as in predeployment training and exercises.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer
any questions.
GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information about this statement, please contact William
Solis at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. In addition, contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key
contributions to this statement are Carole Coffey, Assistant Director;
Vincent Balloon, Laura Czohara, Melissa Hermes, Guy LoFaro, Emily
Norman, Jason Pogacnik, James Reynolds, and Cheryl Weissman.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Operational contract support is the process of planning for and
obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources
in support of joint operations, along with the associated contractor
management functions. Operational contract support includes planning
for contracted support, requirements development, contract execution,
oversight of contractors, accountability and support of contractors,
property management, and retrograde of contractors and equipment. In
the past, DOD has used the phrase "contractors accompanying the force"
to encompass the process the department now refers to as operational
contract support.
[2] GAO, Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-63] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
11, 1997)
[3] Generally accepted government auditing standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based
on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained
provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives.
[4] The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, commonly referred to as
LOGCAP, is a program to provide worldwide logistics and base and life
support services in contingency environments and provides the majority
of base and life support services to U.S. forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
[5] The Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) is a logistics
and engineering support contract used to support contingency
operations.
[6] The administrative contracting officer is a certified contracting
officer with specialized training and experience. Administrative
contracting officers may be responsible for many duties including
ensuring contractor compliance with contract quality assurance
requirements, approving the contractor's use of subcontractors,
reviewing the contractor's management systems, reviewing and
monitoring the contractor's purchasing system, and ensuring that
government personnel involved with contract management have the proper
training and experience.
[7] The responsibilities of the property administrator include
administering the contract clauses related to government property in
the possession of the contractor, developing and applying a property
systems analysis program to assess the effectiveness of contractor
government property management systems, and evaluating the
contractor's property management system to ensure that it does not
create an unacceptable risk of loss, damage, or destruction of
property.
[8] GAO, Military Operations: DOD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support
Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-854] (Washington, DC: July 19,
2004).
[9] GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors
Supporting Deployed Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145] (Washington, DC: Dec. 18,
2006).
[10] GAO, Military Operations: DOD Needs to Address Contract Oversight
and Quality Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to Support Contingency
Operations, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1087]
(Washington, DC: Sept. 26, 2008).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1087].
[12] Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, "At
What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan" Interim
Report, June 2009.
[13] GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems with Oversight and Management of Contractors,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145] (Washington, DC:
Dec. 18, 2006).
[14] GAO, Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and
Other Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Oversight and Management of
Contractors in Future Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-436T] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24,
2008.
[15] While DOD does not require military commanders to take
operational contract support courses, Joint Forces Command has two
operational contract support courses available online and other
courses are available through the Defense Acquisition University and
the Army.
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-695] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145].
[17] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-181, § 849 (2008).
[18] Section 849 of the 2008 NDAA.
[19] GAO, Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor
Employees Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information,
but U.S. Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risk Contractors May Pose,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-999R] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 22, 2006).
[20] GAO, Contingency Contract Management: DOD Needs to Develop and
Finalize Background Screening and Other Standards for Private Security
Contractors, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-351]
(Washington D.C.: July 31, 2009).
[21] U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), is the headquarters for U.S.
forces operating in Afghanistan and was established in October 2008.
[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-999R].
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-351].
[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145].
[25] In July 2008, DOD signed a memorandum of understanding with the
Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development
in which the three agencies agreed to track information on contracts
meeting specified thresholds performed in Iraq or Afghanistan and the
personnel working on those contracts.
[26] GAO, Contingency Contracting: Further Improvements Needed in
Agency Tracking of Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-187]
(Washington D.C.: Nov. 2, 2009).
[27] A letter of authorization (LOA) is a document issued by a
government contracting officer or designee that authorizes contractor
personnel to travel to, from, and within a designated area and to
identify any additional authorizations, privileges, or government
support the contractor is entitled to under the contract.
[28] This guidance was implemented in the Defense FAR Supplement, §
252.225-7040(g), which specifies that contractors are to enter
information into SPOT for all personnel authorized to accompany the
U.S. Armed Forces during contingency operations and certain other
actions outside the United States. However, Class Deviation 2007-O0010
excluded contracts with performance in the U.S. Central Command's area
of responsibility that did not exceed $25,000 and had a period of
performance of less than 30 days.
[29] In January 2010 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics issued a memo stating that the department
would begin transitioning from the manual quarterly census to an
automated report generated from SPOT. However, U.S.Forces-Iraq has
decided to continue its monthly census instead of relying on SPOT to
help manage the drawdown.
[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1].
[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-854] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-436T].
[32] Joint Publication 3-33, "Joint Task Force Headquarters," 16
February 2007, pg. C-7 and C-9.
[33] Examples of staff sections include Comptroller, Civil Affairs,
Engineering, and Communications.
[34] Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate
headquarters merged into a single headquarters called United States
Forces-Iraq (USF-I) in January 2010. Documents obtained and
discussions held prior to January 2010 will be attributed to MNF-I or
one of its subordinate commands as appropriate. Discussions held and
documents obtained after January 2010 will be attributed to USF-I.
[35] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-436T].
[36] Joint capability areas are a collection of like DOD capabilities
functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy
development, investment decision making, capability portfolio
management, and capabilities-based force development and operational
planning.
[37] John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 854 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2333).
[38] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-181, § 849 (2008).
[39] GAO, Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for
Operational Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative
Requirements, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-114R]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2008)
[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-695].
[End of section]
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