International Security
DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs Gao ID: GAO-10-431 April 15, 2010In 2006, the United States created two new programs, authorized in Sections 1206 and 1207 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, to respond to the threats of global terrorism and instability. These programs have provided over $1.3 billion in military and nonmilitary aid to 62 countries and are due to expire in 2011 and 2010, respectively. The Congress mandated that GAO assess the programs. This report addresses the extent to which the programs (1) are consistent with U.S. strategic priorities, (2) are distinct from other programs, (3) address sustainment needs, and (4) incorporate monitoring and evaluation. GAO analyzed data and program documents from the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and interviewed U.S. and host country officials.
The Section 1206 and 1207 programs have generally been consistent with U.S. strategic priorities. The Section 1206 program was established to build the military capacity of foreign countries to conduct counterterrorism and stabilization operations. DOD and State have devoted 82 percent of this program's funds to address specific terrorist threats, primarily in countries the U.S. intelligence community has identified as priorities for the counterterrorism effort. The Section 1207 program was established to transfer DOD funds to State for nonmilitary assistance related to stabilization, reconstruction, and security. DOD, State, and USAID have devoted 77 percent of this program's funds to countries at significant risk of instability, mostly those the United States has identified as vulnerable to state failure. Based on agency guidelines, the Section 1206 program is generally distinct from other programs, while the Section 1207 program is not. In most cases, Section 1206 projects addressed urgent and emergent counterterrorism and stabilization priorities of combatant commanders and did so more quickly than other programs, sometimes in a year, whereas Foreign Military Financing (FMF) projects can take up to 3 years to plan. DOD and embassy officials GAO spoke to consistently explained why projects do not overlap those of FMF and other programs, although project proposals GAO reviewed did not always document these distinctions. Section 1207 projects are virtually indistinguishable from those of other foreign aid programs in their content and time frames. Furthermore, the Section 1207 program has entailed additional implementation costs and funding delays beyond those of traditional foreign assistance programs, while the 1206 program has not. The uncertain availability of resources to sustain Section 1206 projects poses risks to achieving long-term impact. Enabling nations to achieve sustainable counterterrorism capabilities is a key U.S. policy goal. The long-term viability of Section 1206 projects is threatened by (1) the limited ability or willingness of partner nations to support new capabilities, as 76 percent of Section 1206 projects are in low- or lower-middle-income countries, and (2) U.S. legal and policy restrictions on using FMF and additional Section 1206 resources for sustainment. In contrast, sustainment risks for Section 1207 projects appear minimal, because State, USAID, and DOD are not restricted from drawing on a variety of overlapping funding sources to continue them. DOD and State have incorporated little monitoring and evaluation into the Section 1206 and 1207 programs. For Section 1206 projects, the agencies have not consistently defined performance measures, and results reporting has generally been limited to anecdotal information. For Section 1207 projects, the agencies have defined performance measures and State requires quarterly reporting on project implementation. However, State has not fully analyzed this information or provided it to DOD to inform program management. As a result, agencies have made decisions to sustain and expand both Section 1206 and 1207 projects without documentation of progress or effectiveness.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Joseph A. Christoff Team: Government Accountability Office: International Affairs and Trade Phone: (202) 512-8979GAO-10-431, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 15, 2010:
International Security:
DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and
Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs:
GAO-10-431:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-431, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2006, the United States created two new programs, authorized in
Sections 1206 and 1207 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense
Authorization Act, to respond to the threats of global terrorism and
instability. These programs have provided over $1.3 billion in
military and nonmilitary aid to 62 countries and are due to expire in
2011 and 2010, respectively. The Congress mandated that GAO assess the
programs. This report addresses the extent to which the programs (1)
are consistent with U.S. strategic priorities, (2) are distinct from
other programs, (3) address sustainment needs, and (4) incorporate
monitoring and evaluation. GAO analyzed data and program documents
from the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State), and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and interviewed U.S. and
host country officials.
What GAO Found:
The Section 1206 and 1207 programs have generally been consistent with
U.S. strategic priorities. The Section 1206 program was established to
build the military capacity of foreign countries to conduct
counterterrorism and stabilization operations. DOD and State have
devoted 82 percent of this program‘s funds to address specific
terrorist threats, primarily in countries the U.S. intelligence
community has identified as priorities for the counterterrorism
effort. The Section 1207 program was established to transfer DOD funds
to State for nonmilitary assistance related to stabilization,
reconstruction, and security. DOD, State, and USAID have devoted 77
percent of this program‘s funds to countries at significant risk of
instability, mostly those the United States has identified as
vulnerable to state failure.
Based on agency guidelines, the Section 1206 program is generally
distinct from other programs, while the Section 1207 program is not.
In most cases, Section 1206 projects addressed urgent and emergent
counterterrorism and stabilization priorities of combatant commanders
and did so more quickly than other programs, sometimes in a year,
whereas Foreign Military Financing (FMF) projects can take up to 3
years to plan. DOD and embassy officials GAO spoke to consistently
explained why projects do not overlap those of FMF and other programs,
although project proposals GAO reviewed did not always document these
distinctions. Section 1207 projects are virtually indistinguishable
from those of other foreign aid programs in their content and time
frames. Furthermore, the Section 1207 program has entailed additional
implementation costs and funding delays beyond those of traditional
foreign assistance programs, while the 1206 program has not.
The uncertain availability of resources to sustain Section 1206
projects poses risks to achieving long-term impact. Enabling nations
to achieve sustainable counterterrorism capabilities is a key U.S.
policy goal. The long-term viability of Section 1206 projects is
threatened by (1) the limited ability or willingness of partner
nations to support new capabilities, as 76 percent of Section 1206
projects are in low- or lower-middle-income countries, and (2) U.S.
legal and policy restrictions on using FMF and additional Section 1206
resources for sustainment. In contrast, sustainment risks for Section
1207 projects appear minimal, because State, USAID, and DOD are not
restricted from drawing on a variety of overlapping funding sources to
continue them.
DOD and State have incorporated little monitoring and evaluation into
the Section 1206 and 1207 programs. For Section 1206 projects, the
agencies have not consistently defined performance measures, and
results reporting has generally been limited to anecdotal information.
For Section 1207 projects, the agencies have defined performance
measures and State requires quarterly reporting on project
implementation. However, State has not fully analyzed this information
or provided it to DOD to inform program management. As a result,
agencies have made decisions to sustain and expand both Section 1206
and 1207 projects without documentation of progress or effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends:
For Section 1207, unless DOD and State resolve the issues GAO
identified, including duplication, the Congress should consider not
reauthorizing this program and instead appropriating funding to State
and USAID. For Section 1206, GAO recommends that DOD (1) establish a
monitoring and evaluation system, (2) base sustainment funding
decisions on assessment of results, (3) estimate sustainment costs and
seek funding commitments from partner nations, and (4) seek guidance
from the Congress on how to sustain projects. DOD concurred.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-431] or key
components. For more information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202)
512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Section 1206 and 1207 Programs Are Generally Consistent with U.S.
Strategic Priorities:
Section 1206 Program Is Generally Distinct, but Section 1207 Program
Is Not:
Long-term Impact of Section 1206 Projects at Risk without Sustainment
Planning:
Section 1206 and 1207 Program Monitoring and Evaluation Is Weak:
Conclusions:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Descriptions of Traditional DOD and State Assistance
Programs:
Appendix III: Section 1206 and 1207 Funding Allotments:
Appendix IV: Types of Assistance Provided through Section 1206 and
1207 Programs:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Types of Assistance Provided by the Section 1206 Program,
Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Table 2: Types of Assistance Provided by the Section 1207 Program,
Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Table 3: Descriptions of Select U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs and
Accounts:
Table 4: Section 1206 and 1207 Recipients and Funding Allotments,
Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Table 5: Types of Assistance Provided to Section 1206 Recipient
Nations, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Table 6: Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Security Activities
Provided to Section 1207 Recipient Nations, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Figures:
Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Section 1206 Funds, Fiscal Years
2006-2009:
Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of Section 1207 Funds, Fiscal Years
2006-2009:
Figure 3: Radar and Command and Control Equipment Provided to Malaysia
under Section 1206 Program to Conduct Coastal Surveillance, November
2009:
Figure 4: Section 1206 Funds Allotted to Projects That Target Specific
Terrorist Threats, Fiscal Years 2007-2009:
Figure 5: Percentage of Section 1207 Funds Allotted to Countries at
Risk of Instability, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Figure 6: Boat, Ground Vehicles, and Portable Command Center Provided
to the Bahamas under Section 1206 Program to Conduct Counterterrorism
Operations, September 2009:
Figure 7: Spare Parts Provided to Kazakhstan to Maintain Ground
Vehicles for Potential Stability and Peacekeeping Operations, October
2009:
Figure 8: Construction and Renovation of Police Buildings under
Section 1207 Program to Help Stabilize the Cité Soleil Neighborhood in
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, September 2009:
Figure 9: Food Distribution and Well Construction to Aid Internally
Displaced Persons in Skra, Georgia, under Section 1207 Program
Following 2008 Conflict with Russia, October 2009:
Figure 10: Road Construction and Airport Runway Extension in Mindanao
Region of the Philippines Provided under Section 1207 Program to
Promote Economic Growth and Stability, November 2009:
Figure 11: Section 1206 Funds Provided to U.S. Geographic Combatant
Commands, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Figure 12: Section 1207 Funds Provided to U.S. Geographic Combatant
Commands, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FMF: Foreign Military Financing:
IMET: International Military Education and Training:
NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
SAO: security assistance officer:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 15, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
With the threats of terrorism and instability continually emerging and
evolving overseas, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State)
have recognized the need for more flexibility in the tools used to
address these challenges. Sections 1206 and 1207 of the fiscal year
2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) created funding
authorities for DOD to formulate and implement security assistance
programs jointly with State.[Footnote 1] Section 1206 authorizes DOD
to use its own funds to train and equip partner nations' national
military and maritime forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or
to participate in or support military or stability operations in which
the U.S. armed forces participate. Section 1207 authorizes DOD to
transfer funds to State for reconstruction, stabilization, and
security activities in foreign countries. Both authorities have been
renewed as part of national defense authorization legislation.
Currently, the Section 1207 authority will expire after fiscal year
2010, and the Section 1206 authority will expire after fiscal year
2011, unless they are renewed again. The fiscal year 2010 NDAA Report
of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services requires
us to report to the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on
Armed Services, Foreign Affairs (House), and Foreign Relations
(Senate) on the timeliness, effectiveness, and interagency
coordination of these programs.[Footnote 2]
DOD and State have established two programs to implement these broad
authorities, and have written separate guidelines for each program.
[Footnote 3] The agencies have revised both sets of guidelines
periodically to reflect lessons learned, congressional interests, and
other considerations. Though the guidelines for each program are
unique, reflecting fundamental differences in the nature of the two
programs, as of fiscal year 2009 they have several key similarities:
projects funded by the programs are required to address U.S.
priorities, be distinct from those of other traditional foreign
assistance programs, and include plans for long-term sustainment.
For fiscal years 2006 through 2009, DOD has provided more than $1.3
billion through both authorities to support projects in 62 countries.
Through the Section 1206 program, DOD has allotted $985 million in 53
countries for projects such as radars and other maritime surveillance
equipment in several African countries along the Gulf of Guinea,
trucks and small arms to suppress terrorist activities along the
Yemeni border, boats for maritime interdiction in the Philippines, and
training of Georgian mechanized infantry for deployment to
Afghanistan. DOD has provided more than $350 million of Section 1207
funds in 23 countries for projects such as judicial reform and police
training in Somalia, postconflict removal of unexploded ordnance in
Lebanon, reform of extremism education programs in Bangladesh, and
transportation infrastructure initiatives in the Philippines.
We reviewed DOD's and State's use of the Section 1206 and 1207 funding
authorities from fiscal years 2006 through 2009. In particular, we
examined the extent to which the Section 1206 and 1207 programs (1)
have been consistent with U.S. government strategic priorities, (2)
are distinct from other U.S. programs, (3) have addressed the
sustainment needs of executed projects, and (4) incorporate monitoring
and evaluation to assess implementation and effectiveness.
To address these issues, we reviewed and analyzed Section 1206 and
1207 project documentation and program guidelines. We interviewed
agency officials from DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) in Washington, D.C., and all six
U.S. geographic combatant commands. We traveled to seven countries
that received Section 1206 or 1207 funding (Albania, the Bahamas,
Georgia, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and the Philippines) to
interview U.S. embassy and host government officials, implementing
agencies and organizations, as well as project beneficiaries, and to
visit project sites and review relevant project records. In three
additional countries (Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Uganda), we interviewed
U.S. embassy officials in conjunction with other related work we were
conducting. We also interviewed U.S. program officials via telephone
in eight other countries (Honduras, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico,
Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine). We selected the countries we visited
and telephoned primarily based on the amount of Section 1206 and 1207
funds those countries received, the maturity of the projects in those
countries, and geographic distribution. Projects in these countries
account for 62 percent ($831 million) of the $1.3 billion allotted
through the Section 1206 and 1207 programs during fiscal years 2006
through 2009.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2009 to April 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
provides a more detailed description of our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
The Section 1206 and 1207 programs have generally been consistent with
U.S. strategic priorities related to combating terrorism and
addressing instability. The Section 1206 program is designed to build
the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces in order
for that country to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations and (2)
participate in or support military and stability operations in which
the U.S. armed forces are a participant.[Footnote 4] We found that
from fiscal years 2006 to 2009, DOD and State have devoted 82 percent
of these funds to addressing specific terrorist threats, primarily in
countries that the U.S. intelligence community has identified as
priorities for the counterterrorism effort. U.S. law authorizes the
Section 1207 program to fund reconstruction, stabilization, and
security activities overseas.[Footnote 5] We found that DOD, State,
and USAID devoted 77 percent of Section 1207 program resources to
countries at significant risk of instability, mostly those the U.S.
government has identified as vulnerable to state failure.
The Section 1206 program is generally distinct from other programs,
but the Section 1207 program is not. According to DOD and State
guidelines for fiscal year 2009, the Section 1206 program should be
used for projects that (1) address U.S. military priorities; (2)
respond to urgent and emergent needs; (3) do not overlap with other
State and DOD train and equip programs, such as Foreign Military
Financing (FMF); and (4) are administered jointly by DOD and State.
DOD has demonstrated that most approved Section 1206 projects address
U.S. military priorities and urgent and emergent counterterrorism and
stabilization needs identified by DOD combatant commanders. Further,
Section 1206 projects have done so more quickly than other programs
could have--sometimes within a year, whereas FMF projects can take up
to 3 years to plan. Also, DOD and embassy officials we spoke to
consistently described the distinctions of Section 1206 projects from
those of other programs, although project proposals we reviewed did
not always document these distinctions. In addition, DOD and State
have used a "dual key" decision-making process for selecting Section
1206 projects. According to DOD and State guidelines, the Section 1207
program should fund activities that are distinct from those of other
U.S. foreign assistance programs and address urgent or emergent
threats or opportunities that other programs cannot address in the
required time frame. However, the Section 1207 program has funded a
wide range of activities with objectives that other aid programs
commonly address. Our review of all 28 project proposals funded by the
Section 1207 program indicates that 22 expand on recent or ongoing
activities funded through other foreign assistance accounts. In
December 2009, Congress established a new USAID contingency fund,
which provides greater flexibility to USAID to prevent or respond to
emerging or unforeseen complex crises overseas. Moreover, State and
DOD have not necessarily implemented projects more rapidly through the
Section 1207 program than through other programs. Finally, the Section
1207 program has entailed additional implementation costs and funding
delays beyond those of traditional foreign assistance programs, while
the 1206 program has not.
The long-term impact of Section 1206 projects is at risk because U.S.
agencies have not fully addressed how to sustain these projects.
According to State planning documents, enabling partner nations to
achieve advanced and sustainable counterterrorism capabilities is a
key foreign policy goal. However, the long-term impact of Section 1206
projects is potentially threatened by limited ability or willingness
of partner nations to support these new capabilities, as 76 percent of
Section 1206 projects are in low-or lower-middle-income countries.
Only 35 (26 percent) of the 135 approved project proposals we reviewed
explicitly address the recipient countries' ability to sustain the
projects, and 9 (7 percent) of those 135 proposals provided specific
estimates of the costs involved. Furthermore, U.S. law potentially
limits the availability of FMF funds for sustainment, and fiscal year
2009 DOD and State guidelines for the 1206 program preclude funding
projects that require follow-on U.S. resources to sustain them. For
the Section 1207 program, there are no such statutory or policy
restrictions for sustaining projects, and State, USAID, and DOD may
draw on a variety of overlapping funding sources to continue and
expand these projects. Thus, sustainment risks appear minimal.
DOD and State have incorporated little monitoring and evaluation into
the Section 1206 and Section 1207 programs. The Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to develop objective
performance measures, monitor their progress in achieving goals, and
report progress in their annual performance reports.[Footnote 6] In
addition, federal standards for internal controls indicate that U.S.
agencies should monitor and assess the quality of performance over
time.[Footnote 7] We have previously reported that monitoring,
evaluating, and reporting the results of collaborative programs, like
the Section 1206 and 1207 programs, are key practices for enhancing
and sustaining interagency cooperation.[Footnote 8] DOD and State have
not consistently defined performance measures for the Section 1206
projects, and reporting on progress and effectiveness has generally
been limited to anecdotal information. For the Section 1207 program,
implementing agencies have largely developed performance measures and
submitted quarterly reports required by State. However, State has not
analyzed all the information in these reports or disseminated them to
DOD to inform program management and funding decisions. As a result of
these deficiencies, U.S. agencies have made decisions to sustain and
expand both Section 1206 and 1207 projects without documented
assessments of project progress or impact.
In preparing to reauthorize U.S. national defense programs, the
Congress should consider requiring the Secretaries of Defense and
State to document how Section 1207 projects are distinct from those of
other foreign assistance programs and that these projects incur no
additional implementation costs and experience no funding delays
beyond those of other foreign assistance programs. Without this
documentation, the Congress should consider not reauthorizing the
Section 1207 program for fiscal year 2011 and, instead, appropriate
funds to State and USAID programs. We are also making several
recommendations for both programs. For the Section 1206 program, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, (1) develop and implement specific plans to
monitor, evaluate, and report routinely on Section 1206 project
outcomes and their impact on U.S. strategic objectives; (2) base
further decisions about sustaining existing Section 1206 projects on
the results of such monitoring and evaluation; (3) estimate the cost
of sustaining projects at the time they are proposed and, where
possible, obtain a commitment from partner nations to fund those
costs; and (4) seek further guidance from the Congress on what funding
authorities are appropriate to sustain Section 1206 projects when the
Secretary determines that (a) projects address specific terrorist and
stabilization threats in high-priority countries, (b) reliable
monitoring and evaluation has shown that projects are effective, and
(c) partner nation funds are unavailable. For the Section 1207
program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID, develop
and implement specific plans to monitor, evaluate, and report on their
outcomes and their impact on U.S. strategic objectives to determine
whether continued funding for these projects is appropriate under
other authorities and programs.
The Departments of Defense and State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development provided written comments on a draft of this
report (see appendices V, VI, and VII respectively). DOD concurred
with all of our recommendations. State indicated in written comments
that it would take our observations into account when shaping the new
contingency fund requested for fiscal year 2011 to replace the Section
1207 program. State explained that this new fund will solve many of
the issues outlined in our report, including funding delays. State
also found our findings regarding limited monitoring and evaluation
for the Section 1207 program and additional implementation costs
entailed by the program to be contradictory, noting that State's
increased monitoring and evaluation has required adequate funding
support. We disagree. We do not believe that State's monitoring and
evaluation efforts through the time of our review justified the
additional fees charged to the program beyond those that State and
USAID already charged to implement the projects. USAID noted in its
written comments that our report highlights several issues of interest
to all agencies participating in the 1207 process and that USAID looks
forward to continuing to refine its business processes based on our
review.
Background:
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
established the authority for the Section 1206 and 1207 programs.
Section 1206 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to use up to $350
million each year, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to
train and equip foreign military and nonmilitary maritime forces, such
as coast guards, to conduct counterterrorist operations or to support
military and stability operations in which the U.S. armed forces are a
participant. The authority will expire at the end of fiscal year 2011
if it is not renewed. Section 1207 of the fiscal year 2006 NDAA
provides authority for DOD to transfer up to $100 million per fiscal
year to State to support reconstruction, stabilization, and security
activities in foreign countries. A congressional notification
describing the project is required upon the exercise of the transfer
authority. The funds are subject to the authorities and limitations in
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, or
any law making appropriations to carry out such acts. The funds also
remain available until expended. This authority was intended to be
temporary and expires at the end of fiscal year 2010.
The Foreign Military Financing[Footnote 9] program has traditionally
been the primary mechanism for providing training and equipment
assistance to foreign military forces.[Footnote 10] State and USAID
have traditionally addressed civilian reconstruction, stabilization,
and security needs abroad through programs funded by several foreign
operations appropriations accounts, including Development Assistance;
Economic Support Funds; Freedom Support Act (now Assistance for
Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia); International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement; Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and
Related Programs; Peacekeeping Operations; and Transitions
Initiatives. (See appendix II for a description of U.S. foreign
assistance programs and accounts.)
For both the Section 1206 and 1207 programs, DOD and State established
an interagency process to implement each program. Within DOD, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations,
Low Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities has overall
responsibility for both programs. This office coordinates primarily
with State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs for the Section 1206
program and with State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization (State/S/CRS) for the Section 1207 program. DOD and
State solicit project proposals for each program annually, in
accordance with guidelines and project proposal instructions for each
program that are revised periodically to reflect lessons learned,
congressional concerns, and other considerations. Interagency boards
review the proposals--approved by both the relevant U.S. combatant
commander and ambassador--and select projects to recommend to the
Secretaries of Defense and State for final funding approval. Once
projects are approved, DOD and State may begin implementation after
notification to designated congressional committees.[Footnote 11] For
approved Section 1206 projects, the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency assumes overall responsibility for procuring training and
equipment, while security assistance officers (SAO)[Footnote 12]--
posted at U.S. embassies and reporting to both the ambassador and the
relevant U.S. geographic combatant commands[Footnote 13]--are
responsible for coordinating in-country project implementation. For
approved Section 1207 projects, country teams at U.S. embassies are
responsible for implementing projects in cooperation with relevant
State and USAID offices, while State/S/CRS is responsible for
oversight.
For fiscal years 2006 through 2009, DOD has allotted about $985
million for Section 1206 projects in 53 countries and $350 million for
Section 1207 projects in 23 countries.[Footnote 14] Figures 1 and 2
depict the geographic distribution of Section 1206 and 1207 resources,
respectively. (See appendix III for detailed information on the
geographic distribution of Section 1206 and 1207 funds.)
Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of Section 1206 Funds, Fiscal Years
2006-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: world map]
Albania;
Algeria;
Azerbaijan;
Bahamas;
Bahrain;
Belize;
Bangladesh;
Benin;
Cameroon;
Cape Verde;
Chad;
Djibouti;
Dominican Republic;
Ethiopia;
Gabon;
Gambia;
Georgia;
Ghana;
Guinea;
Guyana;
Honduras;
Indonesia;
Kazakhstan;
Kenya;
Kyrgyzstan;
Lebanon;
Liberia;
Macedonia;
Malaysia;
Mali;
Mauritania;
Mauritius;
Mexico;
Morocco;
Mozambique;
Nicaragua;
Niger;
Nigeria;
Pakistan;
Panama;
Philippines;
São Tomé and Principe;
Senegal;
Seychelles;
Sierra Leone;
Sri Lanka;
Suriname;
Tanzania;
Togo;
Tunisia;
Ukraine;
Yemen.
Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and State data; MapInfo (map).
Note: The area of each proportionally sized circle included in this
figure represents the amount of funding provided to individual partner
nations.
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of Section 1207 Funds, Fiscal Years
2006-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: world map]
Afghanistan;
Bangladesh;
Colombia;
Democratic Republic of Congo;
Georgia;
Haiti;
Indonesia;
Kenya;
Lebanon;
Malaysia;
Mali;
Mauritania;
Morocco;
Nepal;
Niger;
Panama;
Paraguay;
Philippines;
Somalia;
Sri Lanka;
Tajikistan;
Uganda;
Yemen.
Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and State data; MapInfo (map).
Note: The area of each proportionally sized circle included in this
figure represents the amount of funding provided to individual partner
nations.
[End of figure]
The Section 1206 and 1207 programs incorporate a wide variety of
assistance. The most common types of Section 1206 program assistance
have been training and technical assistance and radios and other
communications equipment. Under the Section 1207 program, the most
common types of assistance activities are local government capacity
development and police training and equipment. Tables 1 and 2 list the
types of assistance provided by the Section 1206 and 1207 programs,
respectively, and the number of countries receiving them. (See
appendix IV for more detailed information on the types of assistance
provided through the Section 1206 and 1207 programs from fiscal years
2006 to 2009.)
Table 1: Types of Assistance Provided by the Section 1206 Program,
Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Type of assistance: Training/technical assistance;
Number of recipient countries: 47.
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools;
Number of recipient countries: 43[A].
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/radios;
Number of recipient countries: 41.
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment;
Number of recipient countries: 37.
Type of assistance: Boats;
Number of recipient countries: 28.
Type of assistance: Computers/software;
Number of recipient countries: 25.
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles;
Number of recipient countries: 24.
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment;
Number of recipient countries: 17.
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems;
Number of recipient countries: 14.
Type of assistance: Night vision devices;
Number of recipient countries: 12.
Type of assistance: Facilities;
Number of recipient countries: 12.
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns;
Number of recipient countries: 11.
Type of assistance: Ammunition;
Number of recipient countries: 7.
Type of assistance: Site surveys and assessments;
Number of recipient countries: 3.
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft;
Number of recipient countries: 2.
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment;
Number of recipient countries: 25.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD congressional notifications.
[A] According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency Section 1206
project manager, this number may be understated, as virtually all
assistance the agency coordinates includes a basic spare parts
allotment.
[End of table]
Table 2: Types of Assistance Provided by the Section 1207 Program,
Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Type of assistance activity: Local government capacity building;
Number of recipient countries: 13.
Type of assistance activity: Police training and equipment;
Number of recipient countries: 13.
Type of assistance activity: Infrastructure improvements;
Number of recipient countries: 11.
Type of assistance activity: Public awareness campaigns;
Number of recipient countries: 9.
Type of assistance activity: Youth-targeted jobs, training;
Number of recipient countries: 8.
Type of assistance activity: Judicial sector reform;
Number of recipient countries: 6.
Type of assistance activity: Border security;
Number of recipient countries: 5.
Type of assistance activity: Education reform/school rehabilitation;
Number of recipient countries: 5.
Type of assistance activity: Jobs, vocational training;
Number of recipient countries: 5.
Type of assistance activity: National government capacity building;
Number of recipient countries: 4.
Type of assistance activity: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal;
Number of recipient countries: 2.
Type of assistance activity: Food, shelter assistance;
Number of recipient countries: 2.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.
[End of table]
Figure 3 shows an example of radar and surveillance equipment provided
to Malaysia and 36 other countries under the Section 1206 program to
conduct coastal surveillance.
Figure 3: Radar and Command and Control Equipment Provided to Malaysia
under Section 1206 Program to Conduct Coastal Surveillance, November
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Section 1206 and 1207 Programs Are Generally Consistent with U.S.
Strategic Priorities:
The Section 1206 and 1207 programs have generally been consistent with
U.S. strategic priorities relating to combating terrorism and
addressing instability. DOD and State have devoted 82 percent of
Section 1206 counterterrorism resources spent through fiscal year 2009
to addressing specific terrorist threats, primarily in countries
designated as priorities by the U.S. government. DOD, State, and USAID
devoted 77 percent of Section 1207 program resources to relatively
unstable countries, mostly those the U.S. government has identified as
vulnerable to state failure.
Section 1206 Program Consistent with U.S. Counterterrorism Strategic
Priorities:
Implementation of the Section 1206 program has generally been in
alignment with U.S. counterterrorism priorities. Section 1206
authorizes DOD and State to build the capacity of partner nations'
national military forces to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations or
(2) participate in or support military and stability operations in
which the U.S. armed forces are a participant. From fiscal year 2006
to 2009, DOD and State allotted $932 million (95 percent) of all
Section 1206 funding for counterterrorism-related equipment and
training and $47 million (5 percent) to build the capacity of five
partner nations to participate in stability operations with the United
States.[Footnote 15] Overall, DOD and State have allotted 82 percent
of these resources to projects that address specific terrorist
threats, based on our review of approved project proposals.
Furthermore, we found that most Section 1206 counterterrorism
resources have been directed to countries that the U.S. intelligence
community has identified as priority countries for the
counterterrorism effort.[Footnote 16]
The focus on specific terrorist threats increased in fiscal year 2009.
In fiscal years 2007 and 2008, DOD and State allotted 75 percent ($405
million) of $536 million to fund Section 1206 projects targeted at
specific terrorist threats. Proposals for the remaining projects
identify global terrorist threats in general or security issues
indirectly related to terrorism, such as ungoverned spaces and
smuggling.[Footnote 17] For example, in the Caribbean region, several
Section 1206 projects funded in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 were
justified as countering a terrorist threat but did not specifically
identify the source of that threat, and appeared to address narcotics
trafficking more directly. In Albania, a U.S. official noted that the
country received Section 1206 funding in fiscal year 2008 even though
there was no significant terrorist threat there. He explained that
Section 1206-funded boats would be used primarily to respond to
potential security threats such as smuggling and human trafficking in
coastal waters that the Albanian government had not previously
patrolled. For fiscal year 2009, DOD and State issued instructions
that project proposals must describe the "actual or potential
terrorist threat" to be addressed and how the project responds to "an
urgent and emergent threat or opportunity." In line with these
instructions, we found that 92 percent ($306 million) of the $334
million approved for fiscal year 2009 proposals identified a specific
terrorist threat to be addressed (see figure 4).
Figure 4: Section 1206 Funds Allotted to Projects That Target Specific
Terrorist Threats, Fiscal Years 2007-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2007;
Specific terrorist threats: 85%;
Other: 15%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Specific terrorist threats: 66%;
Other: 34%.
Average, Fiscal years 2007-2008: 75%.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Specific terrorist threats: 92%;
Other: 8%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.
[End of figure]
Section 1207 Program Generally Consistent with U.S. Stabilization
Priorities:
The Section 1207 program has generally been consistent with U.S.
stabilization priorities. According to State guidelines for the
program, State uses DOD funds to provide reconstruction,
stabilization, and security assistance to a foreign country for the
purpose of restoring or maintaining peace and security. State has
therefore indicated that countries eligible to receive Section 1207
funding should be at significant risk of instability or working to
recover from instability. State uses a U.S. government source--an
interagency "watchlist" developed to identify countries vulnerable to
state failure--to help determine which countries could merit conflict
prevention and mitigation efforts, and has established inclusion on
the list as one of the criteria for a country to receive funding
through the Section 1207 program. We found that most countries
receiving Section 1207 funding appear on this watchlist.[Footnote 18]
Further, according to our analysis of data we obtained from an
independent risk forecasting firm, DOD, State, and USAID allotted 77
percent of Section 1207 funds to countries measuring high, very high,
or extremely high levels of instability, as shown in figure 5.
[Footnote 19] In addition, our review of all 28 approved proposals for
Section 1207 projects shows that these projects address either the
prevention of instability in a particular country or region or the
recovery from instability or conflict. Eighteen proposals (about two-
thirds) were for projects to help countries recover from instability
or conflict, as in Georgia, Kenya, and Lebanon.[Footnote 20] The
remaining 10 proposals (about one-third) were for projects that help
prevent instability, as in Bangladesh, Panama, and the Philippines.
[Footnote 21]
Figure 5: Percentage of Section 1207 Funds Allotted to Countries at
Risk of Instability, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Political risk rating: Extremely high;
Percentage of allocated Section 1207 funds: 12%.
Political risk rating: Very high[A];
Percentage of allocated Section 1207 funds: 26%.
Political risk rating: High;
Percentage of allocated Section 1207 funds: 40%.
Political risk rating: Moderate;
Percentage of allocated Section 1207 funds: 13%.
Political risk rating: Low;
Percentage of allocated Section 1207 funds: 5%.
Political risk rating: Very low;
Percentage of allocated Section 1207 funds: 3%.
Political risk rating: Not rated[B];
Percentage of allocated Section 1207 funds: 2%.
Source: GAO analysis of IHS Global Insight data.
Note: Totals may not equal 100 because of rounding.
[A] "Very high" category includes Haiti and Somalia, which were not
rated for short-term, internal political risk, but assigned to this
category according to alternate scoring from IHS Global Insight.
[B] "Not rated" category is for Paraguay, which was not rated for
short-term, internal political risk and accounts for less than 2
percent of Section 1207 funds.
[End of figure]
Section 1206 Program Is Generally Distinct, but Section 1207 Program
Is Not:
According to DOD and State guidelines, the Section 1206 program has
generally been distinct from other train and equip programs. DOD and
State have used it to address unforeseen U.S. military needs
relatively quickly compared with FMF and other programs. The Section
1207 program is not distinct from other programs, as it has funded
reconstruction, stability, and security-related activities that are
virtually indistinguishable from those of other foreign aid programs
in their content and time frames. Furthermore, using Section 1207
program funding for these projects has entailed additional
implementation costs and funding delays.
Section 1206 Program Is Generally Distinct from Other Train and Equip
Programs:
According to DOD and State guidelines for fiscal year 2009, the
Section 1206 program should be distinct from security assistance
programs in that its projects (1) address U.S. military priorities;
(2) respond to urgent and emergent needs; (3) do not overlap with
other State and DOD train and equip programs, such as FMF, by
"backfilling" lower-priority projects unfunded by those programs; and
(4) are administered with a dual key, or DOD and State interagency
process, to ensure they accord with U.S. foreign policy.
Addressing U.S. Military Priorities:
DOD and State have consistently used Section 1206 to address U.S.
military priorities. Each U.S. geographic military command reviews
proposals from U.S. embassy country teams in its area of
responsibility and endorses for final submission those proposed
projects that address its highest priorities. Furthermore, the U.S.
Special Operations Command reviews all Section 1206 project proposals
to ensure that each aligns with U.S. military strategy and ranks each
proposal across the geographic combatant commands in accordance with
counterterrorism priorities.[Footnote 22] Our review of approved
Section 1206 project proposals indicates that projects are designed
primarily to address U.S. military requirements that are also aligned
with the countries' security interests. DOD officials we interviewed
described the Section 1206 program as a way to meet U.S. military
priorities that they may not have been able to address without the
Section 1206 program. For example, in Kazakhstan, according to a U.S.
embassy official, DOD and State have used Section 1206 funds to
address its priority of enhancing the country's counterterrorism
capacity in the Caspian Sea, while Kazakhstan has requested FMF
funding for its priority to develop its military airlift capability.
In Pakistan, U.S. officials used Section 1206 funds to increase
special operations capacity to support counterterrorism operations on
its western border, a U.S. military counterterrorism priority for
which DOD and State had not been able to persuade the country to use
FMF resources.
Responding to Urgent and Emergent Needs:
DOD and State can use Section 1206 funds to respond to urgent and
emergent needs more quickly than they have been able to do with FMF
and other security assistance programs. With the Section 1206 program,
DOD and State have often formulated and begun implementing projects
within 1 fiscal year, while FMF projects have usually required up to 3
years of planning. U.S. geographic combatant commands and embassies
submit project proposals early in the fiscal year, and DOD and State
select projects for funding in the months that follow. DOD and State
had already approved Section 1206 project proposals for fiscal year
2009 when we interviewed most SAOs, some of whom told us that
equipment associated with those proposals had already begun to arrive
in country. For example, radios approved as part of a fiscal year 2009
equipment package for Mali arrived and were installed in September of
that same fiscal year. In contrast, several SAOs we interviewed in
fiscal years 2009 and the beginning of 2010 were either drafting or
had recently submitted FMF requests for fiscal year 2012. This
requires the SAOs to plan for training and equipment relatively far in
advance, without necessarily knowing what the geopolitical context
will be when the countries receive the assistance. According to DOD
and State officials, this process, including consultation and
negotiation with partner nations, incorporating funding requests into
State's budget, and obtaining appropriations, can take up to 3 years.
Because DOD and State can review and approve Section 1206 project
proposals more quickly than this, SAOs have used Section 1206 projects
to begin addressing new requirements that DOD may not have not
foreseen when it submitted the FMF request for the same fiscal year.
Avoiding Overlap with Other Train and Equip Programs:
DOD officials we interviewed stated that the narrower goals of the
Section 1206 program prevent overlap with the FMF program. They
indicated that FMF program objectives have traditionally been to
achieve a variety of U.S. foreign policy and partner nation military
goals, which have not necessarily included counterterrorism and
stability operations. For example, State has used the FMF program to
strengthen bilateral relationships, gain access to foreign
governments, foster long-term defense modernization of partner
nations, and achieve other broad foreign policy objectives. Eight of
15 SAOs we interviewed noted that the Section 1206 projects they were
implementing addressed objectives substantially different from those
of the FMF program. SAOs further explained that there is no guarantee
that partner nations will use FMF to fund counterterrorism and
stability operations. For example, the SAO in Kazakhstan explained
that FMF has been used to enhance diplomatic relations with that key
ally by responding to its request for helicopters.
The Section 1206 program is also distinct in that it allows the United
States to provide partner countries with complete assistance packages,
whereas other funding sources might provide only a portion of the aid
needed to build a counterterrorism or stability operations capability.
Eight of the 15 SAOs we interviewed noted that the Section 1206
program offered a unique means to provide bundled training and
equipment, such as operations and maintenance training and spare
parts. Agency officials in Washington, D.C., also attested that one of
the unique strengths of the 1206 program is that it allows the United
States to provide partner countries with comprehensive assistance
packages. Of the 53 countries receiving assistance in fiscal years
2006 through 2009, 50 (94 percent) received spare parts or training,
and 40 (75 percent) received both. SAOs we interviewed indicated that
other programs, such as FMF, may be used to fund spare parts, or that
Joint Combined Exchange Training might be used to provide additional
training for foreign troops, but those programs may not be able to
independently provide all the equipment and training components
typical of a Section 1206 package.
Although DOD and embassy officials we interviewed consistently
explained why there was no overlap between Section 1206 projects and
other programs, project proposals we reviewed have not always
documented the distinctions. DOD and State revised program guidelines
in fiscal year 2009 in response to congressional concerns regarding
program overlap with counternarcotics and other funding sources.
However, in reviewing the 25 approved Section 1206 project proposals
for fiscal year 2009, 11 identified similar ongoing efforts that were
funded by FMF or other U.S. programs. Only 1 proposal clearly
explained why there was no overlap with other programs, and the
remaining proposals did not specifically address this issue. Also,
during our overseas visits, we observed some potential overlap between
Section 1206 projects and other U.S. security assistance programs that
was not explained in corresponding project proposals. In the Bahamas,
DOD and State used Section 1206 program funds to provide that country
with the same type of boats that State had previously provided with
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding. (See
figure 6.)
Figure 6: Boat, Ground Vehicles, and Portable Command Center Provided
to the Bahamas under Section 1206 Program to Conduct Counterterrorism
Operations, September 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photographs]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In Kazakhstan, DOD and State used both the Section 1206 program and
the Global Peace Operations Initiative to provide equipment to a
Kazakh peacekeeping unit.[Footnote 23] The Global Peace Operations
Initiative has also funded training and equipment for at least 572
foreign troops worldwide for deployments to operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, which could overlap with Section 1206 program
stabilization objectives.[Footnote 24] Figure 7 shows an example of
U.S. assistance to Kazakhstan to build its capacity for conducting
stability operations, in part by providing spare parts for its ground
vehicles.
Figure 7: Spare Parts Provided to Kazakhstan to Maintain Ground
Vehicles for Potential Stability and Peacekeeping Operations, October
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Using a Dual Key Interagency Approach:
DOD and State have used a dual key decision-making process for
selecting Section 1206 projects, and in doing so have addressed three
key practices for interagency collaboration we have previously
identified.[Footnote 25] DOD and State incorporate interagency input
at several stages of the Section 1206 proposal development and
selection process. First, SAOs at recipient country embassies have
typically developed Section 1206 project proposals--including
objectives and implementation strategies--with input from State and
other colleagues. For instance, 12 of the 15 SAOs we interviewed
indicated that they had requested country team counterparts to at
least review, if not help draft, Section 1206 proposals before
submitting them. Through this process, DOD and State have defined
common outcomes and joint strategies for achieving them, two key
practices for interagency collaboration. Second, the relevant regional
U.S. geographic combatant commander and ambassador have approved each
proposal before officially submitting them to the Joint Staff for
consideration. Once a proposal is submitted, a DOD-State working group
reviews it and considers how Section 1206 projects will support U.S.
foreign policy and foreign assistance goals. Last, the Secretary of
State concurs with the Secretary of Defense's approval of Section 1206
projects, thereby leveraging resources for mutually beneficial
projects--another key practice for enhancing interagency collaboration.
Section 1207 Projects Are Largely Indistinguishable from Other State
and USAID Activities, but Add Implementation Costs and Funding Delays:
DOD and State guidelines indicate that Section 1207 projects should
fund activities that are distinct from those of other U.S. government
foreign assistance programs, and address urgent or emergent threats or
opportunities that conventional foreign assistance programs cannot
address in the required time frame.
Funding Distinct Activities:
Section 1207 program-funded projects are consistent with the purposes
stated in the law but are not distinct from activities funded by other
foreign assistance programs. Overall, Section 1207 projects achieved
objectives commonly addressed through a variety of other programs. In
our country visits to Haiti, Georgia, and the Philippines, we observed
many Section 1207 program-funded activities with objectives similar to
those of prior or existing State and USAID programs in those
countries. Moreover, according to State and USAID officials in those
countries, the same activities implemented through Section 1207
funding could be accomplished with additional funding from traditional
foreign assistance accounts, such as Economic Support Funds and
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia.
* Haiti's Section 1207 project in fiscal year 2007 was aimed at
stabilizing Cité Soleil, an urban area of Port-au-Prince, Haiti's
capital, through rapid implementation of short-term job creation
activities, infrastructure improvements, and security enhancement
through police training and equipment. However, from 2004 to 2006
(prior to the Section 1207 project) USAID had implemented the Haiti
Transition Initiative, which attempted to stabilize urban areas, such
as Cité Soleil, by rebuilding local services and infrastructure and
providing short-term employment. In 2005, USAID also began the Urban
Peace-Building Initiative, which attempted to stabilize urban areas,
including Cité Soleil, through economic development. According to a
USAID official in Haiti, this initiative was the precursor to Haiti's
Section 1207 project. USAID used existing contracts with
nongovernmental organizations implementing other projects to carry out
the short-term job creation and infrastructure improvements in Haiti's
Section 1207 project (see figure 8).
Figure 8: Construction and Renovation of Police Buildings under
Section 1207 Program to Help Stabilize the Cité Soleil Neighborhood in
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, September 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
* Georgia's Section 1207 project in fiscal years 2008 and 2009
provided reconstruction assistance after the August 2008 Russian
invasion, including support for resettlement of internally displaced
persons (see figure 9), police training and equipment, and removal of
unexploded ordnance. However, according to State and USAID embassy
officials, the Section 1207 project funded some activities with
objectives that were previously being addressed through existing
programs. For example, by amending a cooperative agreement with a
nongovernmental organization partner, USAID carried out its Section
1207-funded school rehabilitation activities through an infrastructure
initiative that had been operating since 2004. Also, State's Bureau
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement's (State/INL) plans to
use Section 1207 funds to upgrade the Ministry of Interior's emergency
communications system and national criminal database were
continuations of previously established State/INL programs in Georgia.
The removal of unexploded ordnance to facilitate the return of
internally displaced persons was carried out through a State
humanitarian demining program that had been operating in Georgia for
several years.
Figure 9: Food Distribution and Well Construction to Aid Internally
Displaced Persons in Skra, Georgia, under Section 1207 Program
Following 2008 Conflict with Russia, October 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
* The Philippines' Section 1207 projects in fiscal years 2007 and 2009
attempt to stabilize the region of Mindanao through economic
development, with a focus on infrastructure development activities as
well as police training and equipment. However, USAID implemented the
Section 1207 infrastructure development activities in Mindanao through
an existing program--Growth with Equity in Mindanao--which had been
carrying out similar activities in the region since 1995 (see figure
10). Also, the Department of Justice has been conducting similar
police training and equipment activities in the Philippines, including
in Mindanao, since 2006.
Figure 10: Road Construction and Airport Runway Extension in Mindanao
Region of the Philippines Provided under Section 1207 Program to
Promote Economic Growth and Stability, November 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In addition, we reviewed all 28 approved Section 1207 proposals for
fiscal years 2006 through 2009, including the 6 proposals for the
countries we visited. We found that 22 proposals expand on recent or
ongoing State and USAID activities funded through other foreign
assistance accounts. For example, Colombia's Section 1207 project in
fiscal year 2007, which aimed to stabilize regions of that country
recently freed from insurgent control, supported an interagency body
of the Colombian government that the U.S. Southern Command had funded
3 years earlier.[Footnote 26] In addition, Tajikistan's Section 1207
project in fiscal year 2008, intended to reduce the potential for
conflict in unstable areas, supports community policing and local
government development activities that build upon previous and
continuing USAID and State initiatives. Finally, Uganda's Section 1207
project in fiscal year 2009, aimed at reestablishing the rule of law
in the north of the country, includes training for police and
construction of community justice centers, which have both been
implemented under previous and current USAID initiatives.
In December 2009, the Congress established the Complex Crises Fund,
which provides greater flexibility to USAID to prevent or respond to
emerging or unforeseen complex crises overseas. The Congress
appropriated $50 million for this fund, with which the Administrator
of USAID can fund such programs and activities, in consultation with
the Secretary of State. Furthermore, in its proposed budget for fiscal
year 2011, released in February 2010, State requested another $100
million in flexible contingency funding to meet unforeseen
reconstruction and stabilization needs. This request is intended to
transition the funding of the Section 1207 program from DOD to State.
DOD has not requested Section 1207 funding for fiscal year 2011.
Addressing Urgent or Emergent Threats or Opportunities More Quickly
than Other Programs:
We found that State and USAID can provide funding to address urgent or
emergent threats or opportunities just as quickly, or more quickly,
through other foreign assistance programs, than through the Section
1207 program. For example, in Georgia, where DOD and State allotted
$100 million in Section 1207 funds for reconstruction projects after
the 2008 Russian invasion, State provided over $50 million in Economic
Support Funds to start similar projects before the full amount of
Section 1207 funds was available. In the Philippines, when faced with
an initial delay in receiving approved Section 1207 funds in fiscal
year 2007 for police training in Mindanao, State reprogrammed
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds for this
purpose. Furthermore, our review of Section 1207 project proposals
shows that the proposals for projects in Lebanon in fiscal year 2006
and Kenya in fiscal year 2009 describe using reprogrammed funds from
conventional accounts alongside Section 1207 funds to help achieve
similar stabilization goals.
Additional Implementation Costs and Funding Delays:
Using Section 1207 funding for reconstruction, stabilization, and
security-related projects has created a new layer of program
management through State's Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (State/S/CRS)--the office responsible
for oversight of the Section 1207 program--which has entailed
additional implementation costs and funding delays with negative
consequences.
* In addition to State and USAID's normal administrative costs for
implementing an assistance project, State/S/CRS charges a fee for
oversight of Section 1207 projects to cover the cost of program
support and coordination from Washington, D.C., and in the field. For
fiscal years 2008 and 2009, this fee totaled nearly $2.5 million,
which State/S/CRS deducted from the project funds DOD transferred to
State. When added to State and USAID administrative costs of nearly
$5.4 million during the same period, the State/S/CRS fee represents an
increase of 46 percent for overall administrative costs for Section
1207 projects during these 2 years. Furthermore, according to embassy
officials we spoke to in Haiti, Georgia, and the Philippines,
State/S/CRS oversight over Section 1207 has not necessarily improved
project implementation or effectiveness. State and USAID officials at
these embassies questioned the added value of State/S/CRS's oversight
of the Section 1207 program. According to the officials, State/S/CRS
offers to coordinate interagency efforts and facilitate interagency
collaboration within the country teams to help develop and execute
Section 1207 projects. However, the embassy officials stated that
interagency collaboration is already a part of how their country teams
operate, through country team working groups and the development of
mission strategic plans, and that the ambassador or deputy chief of
mission can encourage such collaboration when necessary. In our
discussions with State/S/CRS officials, they identified their ability
to facilitate a whole-of-government approach for embassy country teams
as their key added value and cited six countries--Lebanon, Nepal,
Panama, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and Uganda--where their involvement
brought benefits. However, they did not provide any documentation to
support this claim.
* We also found that addressing urgent or emergent threats or
opportunities through the Section 1207 program has caused funding
delays, which have had some negative consequences. In two countries we
visited, funding for State/INL-implemented activities was
significantly delayed compared with funding for USAID activities
within the same project. In the Philippines, U.S. embassy officials
told us that State borrowed funds from an existing police assistance
project in order to start its Section 1207-funded police training on
time, with an understanding that Section 1207 funds would arrive
quickly for reimbursement. However, the Section 1207 funds took 6
months longer than expected to arrive, which subsequently delayed the
existing police assistance project by 18 months and decreased the
overall quantity of equipment procured. According to officials at the
U.S. embassy in Georgia, a 6-month delay in receiving State's Section
1207 funds for law enforcement activities interfered with the
embassy's goal of simultaneously improving the security and economy in
the conflict zone. We also found in our review of quarterly reporting
documents for all Section 1207 projects that funding delays for State
activities was an issue in at least three other countries--Bangladesh,
Kenya, and Malaysia. For example, in Kenya, U.S. embassy officials
reported that the delay of Section 1207 funds for State's police
assistance resulted in the postponement of a State/INL assessment
visit necessary to begin providing assistance.
In contrast, DOD and State implement the 1206 program within the
existing management structure of FMF, under the auspices of the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Hence, the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency charges the same administrative fees for both
programs and procures training and equipment at least as quickly for
Section 1206 projects as for FMF.[Footnote 27]
Long-term Impact of Section 1206 Projects at Risk without Sustainment
Planning:
The long-term impact of Section 1206 projects is at risk, because it
is uncertain whether funds will be available to sustain the military
capabilities that these projects are intended to build. U.S. law and
DOD and State policies limit the use of U.S. government funds for
sustainment of Section 1206 projects, and most participating countries
have relatively low incomes and may be unwilling or unable to provide
the necessary resources. For the Section 1207 program, since State,
USAID, and DOD are not restricted by law or agency policy from drawing
on a variety of overlapping funding sources to continue and expand
Section 1207 projects, sustainment risks are not as significant.
Availability of Funding to Sustain Section 1206 Projects Is Uncertain:
According to State planning documents, including department-and bureau-
level performance plans, helping partner nations achieve sustainable
counterterrorism capabilities is a key foreign policy objective.
[Footnote 28] In addition, the joint DOD and State Inspectors General
report on the Section 1206 program found that continued sustainment is
essential to achieving the intended objectives of the Section 1206
program and that long-term sustainability of Section 1206 projects
depends on continued investment by the partner nations or U.S.
government.[Footnote 29] DOD officials have noted that some Section
1206 projects are intended to address an immediate threat and may not
require long-term sustainment. Nevertheless, according to Section 1206
project proposal instructions, proposals must explain how projects
will be sustained in future years.
However, we found that the availability of sustainment funds from the
U.S. government is uncertain. DOD and State policy has potentially
constrained the use of U.S. government funding for Section 1206
project sustainment. According to fiscal year 2009 program guidelines,
the Section 1206 program should not fund projects that must be
continued over long periods (more than 3 years) to achieve a
capability for a partner nation. However, Section 1206 projects are
highly dependent on U.S. funding for long-term sustainment. Prior to
fiscal year 2009, 62 (56 percent) of 110 approved Section 1206
proposals we reviewed indicated that FMF resources would be used to
sustain projects. Other potential sources of sustainment funds
identified in proposals include partner nations' own resources and
other U.S. programs.
Despite the new guidelines, 13 (52 percent) of the 25 approved fiscal
year 2009 Section 1206 proposals we reviewed indicated that partner
nations would use FMF resources to sustain Section 1206 projects.
Furthermore, 11 (73 percent) of the 15 SAOs we interviewed had already
requested or planned to request FMF resources to sustain Section 1206
projects. However, several SAOs were not certain that State would
award the funds they had requested. State determines FMF allotments to
recipient countries based on congressional direction and availability
of funds, and at the time of our interviews, State had not finalized
fiscal year 2010 allotments. Moreover, in fiscal years 2006 through
2009, 18 (34 percent) of the 53 Section 1206 recipient countries did
not receive any FMF funding. While proposals continue to cite FMF for
Section 1206 project sustainment, a provision of the fiscal year 2009
Omnibus Appropriations Act potentially further constrains the use of
FMF to sustain Section 1206 projects.[Footnote 30] This provision,
which prohibits the use of FMF funds to support or continue any
Section 1206 projects unless the Secretary of State justifies such use
to the Committees on Appropriations, may limit the availability of FMF
for Section 1206 project sustainment.
The ability of partner nations to sustain Section 1206 projects in the
absence of U.S. funding is also uncertain. DOD and State have not
required countries to sign formal commitments to sustain Section 1206
projects, and only 35 (26 percent) of the 135 proposals we reviewed
for fiscal years 2007-2009 projects explicitly address the recipient
country's ability or willingness to bear sustainment costs.
Furthermore, only 9 (7 percent) of those 135 proposals provided
estimates of the project's maintenance, operation, or other
sustainment costs. Moreover, DOD and State have implemented 113 (76
percent) of 149 Section 1206 projects in low-or lower-middle-income
countries, as classified by the World Bank, where funding for
sustainment efforts may be scarce.[Footnote 31] Only 1 of the SAOs we
interviewed in 15 countries indicated that he believed his partner
nation had the ability to sustain its Section 1206 projects
independently; 6 SAOs said that they did not believe their partner
nations had this ability, and 8 were uncertain. For example, the SAO
in Nigeria was concerned about that country's ability to support long-
term maintenance activities for the vehicles, surveillance, and other
Section 1206-funded equipment. Similarly, the SAO in Mali noted that
sustainment of the Section 1206 project to train and equip that
country's light infantry units would be problematic if the country had
to find its own funding. Only the SAO in Malaysia believed that the
partner nation would fund the necessary sustainment of its maritime
surveillance projects, based on that government's stated intention to
do so. Furthermore, Section 1206 program managers at U.S. geographic
combatant commands also questioned the likelihood of partner nations
to sustain Section 1206 projects. For example, at the U.S. Africa
Command, the Section 1206 program manager explained that while the
command would prefer that partner nations budget for sustainment
activities, it was unlikely this would happen.[Footnote 32]
State and USAID Can Leverage Other U.S. Assistance Program Resources
to Sustain Section 1207 Projects:
Since the Section 1207 program does not have the same statutory or
policy constraints as the Section 1206 program on using other U.S.
assistance program resources to sustain projects, State and USAID use
other U.S. assistance program resources for this purpose. State and
DOD acknowledged in fiscal year 2008 guidelines that Section 1207
projects should seek to achieve short-term security, stabilization, or
reconstruction objectives that are coordinated with longer-term
development efforts to be sustained by the host government,
international organizations, or other forms of U.S. foreign
assistance. In our visits to Haiti, Georgia, and the Philippines, we
found that State and USAID have provided assistance through other
projects that are similar to Section 1207 projects and help sustain
and consolidate their impacts. For example, in Haiti, USAID's
implementing partners have helped support the goals of the fiscal year
2007 Section 1207 project by funding assistance activities in Cité
Soleil and neighboring areas through other ongoing USAID projects. In
addition, in September 2009, State and USAID officials in Haiti told
us that they planned to continue efforts to stabilize Port-au-Prince
by using Economic Support Funds and International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement funding. In the Philippines, where the Section
1207 project in fiscal year 2007 has attempted to stabilize the region
of Mindanao through economic development, USAID applied funds from an
ongoing project in the region to supplement a Section 1207 activity--
an upgrade to a local water distribution system--that required
additional support.
Furthermore, in our review of all 28 proposals for Section 1207
projects, we found that 21 proposals address the issue of sustainment
by identifying possible sources of funding to sustain or build on
project results. Among the 21 proposals, 17 identify additional U.S.
foreign assistance funding as a source, 10 cite host government
resources, and 5 mention other donors, such as other countries and
international organizations.[Footnote 33] Only 3 proposals identify
host government resources as the sole source of possible sustainment
funding: Two of these are for upper-middle-income countries and the
third is in a lower-middle-income country. Not every project goal
funded through the Section 1207 program requires sustainment funding.
For example, in Georgia's Section 1207 project in fiscal year 2008,
USAID funded a "winter wheat" initiative, which was designed as
onetime assistance to provide seed, fertilizer, and other supplies so
that farmers disrupted by the 2008 Russian invasion could produce a
wheat crop in the months after the conflict. As a result of this
initiative, the farmers harvested a better than expected wheat crop in
the fall of 2009, according to the Georgian Deputy Minister of
Agriculture.
Section 1206 and 1207 Program Monitoring and Evaluation Is Weak:
DOD and State have conducted little monitoring and evaluation of the
Section 1206 and Section 1207 programs. DOD and State have not carried
out systematic program monitoring for the Section 1206 program, and
reporting has generally consisted of anecdotal information, although
DOD has taken initial steps to establish such a system. For the
Section 1207 program, State requires quarterly reporting on project
implementation but has not analyzed this information or reported
results to DOD to inform program management and funding decisions. As
a result of these deficiencies, U.S. agencies have made decisions to
sustain and expand both Section 1206 and 1207 projects without formal
assessments of project progress or impact.
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies
to develop objective performance measures, monitor progress on
achieving goals, and report on their progress in their annual
performance reports.[Footnote 34] Our previous work has noted that the
lack of clear, measurable goals makes it difficult for program
managers and staff to link their day-to-day efforts to achieving the
agency's intended mission.[Footnote 35] Furthermore, according to
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, U.S.
agencies should monitor and assess the quality of performance over
time.[Footnote 36] In addition, we have previously reported that key
practices for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration
include developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report the
results of collaborative programs; reinforcing agency accountability
for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and
reinforcing individual accountability for collaborative efforts
through agency performance management systems.[Footnote 37] Also, the
Congress has directed the Secretaries of Defense and State to report
on the implementation and impact of Building Global Partnership
authorities provided under the Section 1206 and 1207 authorities no
later than December 31, 2010.[Footnote 38]
Section 1206 Program Lacks Measurable Performance Objectives,
Monitoring and Evaluation Plans, and Results Reporting:
DOD and State have not consistently defined performance measures for
their Section 1206 projects, although the agencies have made some
improvement in doing so. Section 1206 program guidelines and
instructions for fiscal year 2007 required project proposals to
identify measures of effectiveness, and in fiscal year 2008, revised
instructions required project proposals to identify the anticipated
outcomes. However, we found that only 27 percent (30) of 110 approved
proposals for fiscal year 2007 and 2008 provided this
information.[Footnote 39] DOD and State refined the instructions for
fiscal year 2009 by requiring project proposals to identify measures
of effectiveness.[Footnote 40] As a result, 72 percent (18 of 25) of
projects approved in fiscal year 2009 include this information.
Overall, DOD and State have defined measures of effectiveness or
anticipated outcomes for only 32 percent (48 of 149) of all projects
approved from fiscal years 2006 through 2009.
Furthermore, DOD and State have not established a plan to monitor and
evaluate Section 1206 program results systematically. DOD officials
stated that they had not consistently monitored Section 1206 projects,
and State officials were not involved with or aware of a formal
evaluation process. In addition, only 34 (25 percent) of 135 approved
fiscal year 2007-2009 proposals we reviewed documented an intention to
monitor project results. Some SAOs we interviewed noted that embassy
officials sometimes informally monitor Section 1206 project
activities. For example, in Georgia, U.S. military trainers observed
the use and maintenance of some Section 1206 program-funded equipment
when they helped prepare troops for deployment to Afghanistan. Also,
in Sri Lanka, DOD officials inspected some Section 1206 equipment when
they hosted an Inspector General visit to the country.
Although regular reporting on performance is an established good
management practice, DOD and State have not required Section 1206
program managers to report on progress or results. Only one of the six
U.S. geographic combatant commands indicated that it routinely
required SAOs implementing Section 1206 projects overseas to submit
regular progress reports. Furthermore, 13 of the 15 SAOs we
interviewed indicated that they do not routinely submit any formal
reports to DOD or State on the Section 1206 projects they implement.
For example, 1 SAO indicated that no reports were required and that he
had not volunteered to write any. A few SAOs noted that they report
the status of equipment deliveries, but not project results or impact.
DOD and State have undertaken two evaluations of the Section 1206
program, focusing largely on initial projects. The first, prepared by
a contractor in July 2008, addressed fiscal year 2006 and 2007
projects in Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan, and São Tomé and Principe.
[Footnote 41] The second, prepared jointly by the DOD and State
Inspectors General, focused on seven countries with projects approved
in fiscal year 2006.[Footnote 42] Since DOD and State had not
established objective performance measures for most of the projects
reviewed, these reports relied heavily on anecdotal information to
assess progress and effectiveness.
These monitoring, evaluation, and reporting deficiencies may stem from
DOD's and State's unclear assignment of roles and responsibilities for
these tasks. We have previously reported that clearly identifying
roles and responsibilities and establishing policies to operate across
agency boundaries are key practices for enhancing interagency
collaboration. However, DOD and State have not applied these practices
for Section 1206 program monitoring and evaluation. Section 1206
program managers we spoke to at U.S. geographic combatant commands had
varied opinions regarding who should be responsible for monitoring
Section 1206 projects. For example, officials at the U.S. Central
Command indicated that monitoring and evaluation should be the joint
responsibility of State, relevant embassies' chiefs of mission, U.S.
geographic combatant commands, as well as the SAOs. The security
assistance manager at the U.S. Africa Command understood that
monitoring was a responsibility of the relevant embassy country teams.
Meanwhile, DOD officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
told us they thought the U.S. geographic combatant commands should
evaluate Section 1206 projects. One project proposal indicated only
that "the embassy" should be responsible for monitoring the project in
question, without identifying any particular office for this task.
DOD and State lack a monitoring and evaluation system; nevertheless,
they have requested additional funding to sustain Section 1206
projects without documented evidence of results. SAOs have sometimes
submitted FMF requests for Section 1206 project sustainment before the
projects are fully implemented in order to have those funds available
by the end of the 2-year period for which spare parts are typically
included in Section 1206 packages. For example, the SAO in Lebanon
explained that the Lebanon Armed Forces planned to use FMF to sustain
its Section 1206 projects, and that he had already submitted FMF
requests to that end despite the fact that most Section 1206 projects
in Lebanon have not yet been fully implemented. In Ukraine, the SAO
has submitted FMF requests for fiscal years 2010 through 2012,
although some of the Section 1206 equipment had not yet been shipped
to the country.
According to a DOD official in the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict, and
Interdependent Capabilities--the office with overall responsibility
for the Section 1206 program--DOD has begun to implement a new two-
phase initiative to assess Section 1206 projects. This assessment
process is intended to use both quantitative and qualitative
performance-related data to form the basis for measuring progress
toward desired project outcomes. For the first phase, DOD has hired a
contractor to identify current Section 1206 roles, data sources, and
ongoing assessment activities to develop a framework for implementing
Section 1206 assessments. The contract was signed in January 2010 and
the final deliverable is due 8 months later. According to the officer,
the second phase will consist of using the newly designed framework to
assess a sample of Section 1206 projects. In addition, the official
indicated that resources would not be available to evaluate all
Section 1206 projects, and that the agency had not yet determined what
sample of countries would be assessed.
Section 1207 Projects Have Measures of Effectiveness, but State Has
Conducted Limited Monitoring and Evaluation:
In general, State and USAID have established measures of effectiveness
for individual Section 1207 projects. In our review of all 28 approved
proposals for the Section 1207 program, we found that 25 proposals
identified measures of effectiveness or performance indicators. For
example, in the Philippines, State and USAID indicated that they would
assess the effectiveness of a Section 1207 project by measuring
changes in private sector investment, the prevalence of waterborne
diseases, and police response times, among other performance
indicators.
State and DOD first issued guidelines for Section 1207 project
monitoring in January 2008, 2 years after the program began. According
to these guidelines, embassies with Section 1207 projects are
responsible for submitting quarterly progress reports containing both
narrative and financial data to State's Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (State/S/CRS) and to DOD's Office of
Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations.[Footnote 43] According
to the guidelines, the reports should describe the project's progress
against the measures of effectiveness established in the project
proposal, identify any challenges expected over the next quarter, and
describe the expenditure to date on different project activities.
[Footnote 44] State/S/CRS officials told us that, initially, embassies
typically submitted these reports several months later than expected,
but that punctuality improved after State/S/CRS hosted a Section 1207
program conference in May 2009. Since then, State/S/CRS officials said
they usually receive reports within 30 days after the end of the
quarter.
State/S/CRS officials told us that they had not fully analyzed the
quarterly reports they received. According to these officials,
State/S/CRS began systematically analyzing the financial information
contained in the reports in April 2009, thereby monitoring the
progress of project implementation by tracking the obligation and
expenditure of funds over time for each component of the projects.
However, State/S/CRS officials indicated that they routinely reviewed
the reports when they arrived, but had not systematically analyzed
them, because of staffing shortages. Thus, State/S/CRS was not
systematically monitoring project effectiveness or implementation
challenges described in the narrative section of these reports as a
basis for providing program oversight. In December 2009, State/S/CRS
assigned an additional employee to review the narrative reports.
Although Section 1207 program guidelines instruct embassies to submit
quarterly reports to both State and DOD, embassies have not been
sending these reports to DOD, and State/S/CRS has not forwarded them.
State/S/CRS officials indicated that they have provided DOD
information on problems with Section 1207 projects but not on progress
or effectiveness. An official in DOD's Office of Partnership Strategy
and Stability Operations responsible for the Section 1207 program
issues told us that, as of mid-December 2009, he had not received any
Section 1207 quarterly reports, but that he was working with
State/S/CRS to develop an evaluation process for Section 1207
projects. Because of limited monitoring and evaluation, State and DOD
have made decisions about sustaining Section 1207 projects without
documentation on project progress or effectiveness. For example,
officials at the U.S. Southern Command told us that they did not
support a proposal from the U.S. embassy in Haiti for a second Section
1207 project in fiscal year 2008 because they were not aware of the
implementation progress or results of the first project. Nevertheless,
State/S/CRS officials told us that the information obtained from the
quarterly reports informed decisions about proposal approval and
funding at the decision-making level.
State/S/CRS officials told us that in January 2010 they began efforts
to develop information for the congressionally required report on the
implementation and impact of the Section 1207 program, which is due on
December 31, 2010. In particular, State/S/CRS offered to hire
evaluation specialists to help embassies receiving Section 1207
program funds in fiscal year 2009 meet the congressional reporting
requirement by developing a monitoring strategy and carrying out data
collection and analysis. State/S/CRS has not offered this assistance
to embassies that received program funds in prior years, which
represent 59 percent of all Section 1207 funding through fiscal year
2009.
Conclusions:
The Section 1206 and 1207 programs are aimed at achieving high-
priority counterterrorism, stabilization, reconstruction, and security
objectives for the United States. Anecdotal evidence from some early
Section 1206 and 1207 projects suggests that individual projects under
both programs could achieve noteworthy results, but achieving long-
term results from the projects is likely to require a sustained U.S.
effort, especially in poorer countries. State and USAID can continue
to draw upon traditional foreign aid programs to continue nonmilitary
assistance initiated under Section 1207. However, as the appropriate
funding source for sustaining military assistance under Section 1206
is unclear, given current legal restrictions and agency policy, DOD
and State need guidance from the Congress on how to fund longer-term
assistance. Furthermore, without a rigorous monitoring and evaluation
system, DOD and State have gathered little evidence to prove that the
programs have been effective and whether continued funding should be
provided to sustain the efforts they have initiated. The Section 1207
authority has allowed DOD to infuse existing USAID and State programs
with additional resources to help those agencies achieve their
objectives. However, channeling these resources through the Section
1207 authority has created a new layer of program management, which
appears to be largely redundant and entails additional implementation
costs and funding delays. Moreover, a new funding source for projects
similar to those of the Section 1207 program may supplant the need to
continue Section 1207 funding.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
In preparing to reauthorize U.S. national defense programs, the
Congress should consider requiring the Secretaries of Defense and
State to document how Section 1207 projects are distinct from those of
other foreign assistance programs and that these projects incur no
additional implementation costs and experience no funding delays
beyond those of other foreign assistance programs. In the absence of
this documentation, the Congress should consider not reauthorizing the
Section 1207 program for fiscal year 2011 and, instead, appropriate
funds to State and USAID programs.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making five recommendations relating to the Section 1206 and
1207 programs. For the Section 1206 program, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, (1)
develop and implement specific plans to monitor, evaluate, and report
routinely on Section 1206 project outcomes and their impact on U.S.
strategic objectives; (2) base further decisions about sustaining
existing Section 1206 projects on the results of such monitoring and
evaluation; (3) estimate the cost of sustaining projects at the time
they are proposed and, where possible, obtain a commitment from
partner nations to fund those costs; and (4) seek further guidance
from the Congress on what funding authorities are appropriate to
sustain Section 1206 projects when the Secretary determines that (a)
projects address specific terrorist and stabilization threats in high-
priority countries, (b) reliable monitoring and evaluation have shown
that projects are effective, and (c) partner nation funds are
unavailable. For the Section 1207 program, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Administrator of USAID, develop and implement specific plans to
monitor, evaluate, and report on their outcomes and their impact on
U.S. strategic objectives to determine whether continued funding for
these projects is appropriate under other authorities and programs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, and USAID. We
received written comments from all three, which we have reprinted in
appendixes V, VI, and VII, respectively. The agencies also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated throughout the report, as
appropriate.
DOD concurred with all of our recommendations.
State indicated in its written comments that it appreciated the
observations contained in our report and would take them into account
when shaping the Complex Crises Fund, which State requested for fiscal
year 2011 to replace the Section 1207 program. State noted that this
new fund will solve many of the issues outlined in our report,
including an unwieldy funds transfer process that has sometimes
prevented as rapid a response to immediate needs as State would have
preferred. State also indicated that our findings regarding the
limited monitoring and evaluation for the Section 1207 program and
additional administrative costs entailed by the program were
contradictory, noting that State has increasingly developed and
refined its monitoring and evaluation of Section 1207 projects,
requiring adequate administrative costs to carry out. We disagree.
While State/S/CRS had taken some steps to increase its monitoring of
Section 1207 projects, it had neither systematically analyzed embassy
reports on the effectiveness of Section 1207 projects nor provided
these reports to its DOD counterparts responsible for the projects'
funding. Accordingly, we do not believe that these efforts justified
the additional fees this office charged beyond those that State and
USAID already charged to implement the projects.
USAID noted in its written comments that our report highlights several
issues of interest to all agencies participating in the Section 1207
process and that USAID looks forward to continuing to refine its
business processes based on our review.
We are sending copies of the report to the Secretaries of Defense and
State and other interested parties or interested congressional
committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-8979 or at christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix VIII.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Colombia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Our review encompassed all projects funded by the Department of
Defense (DOD) under authorities in Sections 1206 and 1207 of the
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006, as amended,
during fiscal years 2006 through 2009. For more in-depth project
review, we focused on 18 of the 62 countries receiving assistance
under these programs: Albania, the Bahamas, Georgia, Haiti,
Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and the Philippines, where we visited with U.S.
embassy officials and host country officials, as well as implementing
partner representatives in Section 1207 recipient countries; Ethiopia,
Pakistan, and Uganda, where we interviewed U.S. embassy officials in
conjunction with other GAO work; and Honduras, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali,
Mexico, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine, where we conducted interviews
with security assistance officers (SAO) or other project managers via
telephone. To select countries to visit, we ranked all 62 countries
based on the following criteria: (1) the amount of Section 1206 and
1207 program funding a country had received in order to include
countries representing a significant portion of total funding, as well
as both large and small individual projects from each program; (2) the
year when a country's projects began, in order to visit mature
projects; (3) the presence of both Section 1206 and Section 1207
projects in a country, in order to use our time efficiently in
visiting projects from both programs in single country visits; (4) DOD
and State suggestions; (5) recent GAO or DOD and State Inspectors
General visits, to reduce the burden on embassies; (6) congressional
interest; (7) security considerations; and (8) opportunities to
consolidate the fieldwork of multiple GAO engagements. We selected the
highest-ranking countries within the areas of responsibility of each
of the six U.S. geographic combatant commands. For telephone
interviews, we selected the next-highest-ranking country within the
area of responsibility of each combatant command and four additional
countries of strategic importance.[Footnote 45] The results of our
work for the 18 countries we selected are not necessarily
generalizable to all 62 countries receiving assistance under these
programs.
To assess the extent to which the Section 1206 and 1207 programs have
been consistent with U.S. government strategic priorities, we
conducted the following work.
* We interviewed DOD, State, and U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) officials involved in implementing Section 1206
and 1207 programs and documented their views on how ongoing projects
relate to U.S. strategies and priorities. At DOD we spoke to officials
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff and
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in Washington, D.C.; the U.S.
Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida; the six geographic
combatant commands--the U.S. Africa Command and the U.S. European
Command in Stuttgart, Germany; the U.S. Central Command in Tampa,
Florida; the U.S. Northern Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado (by
telephone); the U.S. Pacific Command in Honolulu, Hawaii; and the U.S.
Southern Command in Miami, Florida; and the Africa Command Navy
component, in Naples, Italy. At State we spoke to officials in the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (State/S/CRS) in Washington, D.C.
At USAID we spoke to officials from the Office of the Chief Operating
Officer and the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian
Assistance in Washington, D.C. We also interviewed U.S. embassy
officials (by telephone or in person) in all 18 countries we selected.
[Footnote 46] To identify U.S. strategic priorities, we also obtained
and analyzed documents, such as mission strategic plans and lists of
priority countries identified by the U.S. intelligence community.
* We analyzed Section 1206 program funding data and DOD's priority
country list to determine the percentage of funding that has been
allotted for countries on this list. We calculated this amount overall
and for each year to identify any trends over time. Since the list of
priority countries is classified, we aggregated the information we
reported from our analysis to avoid disclosing classified information.
We used funding data based on allotments for each Section 1206
project, in line with DOD's notifications to the Congress, which we
determined were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
* We analyzed all written project proposals for approved Section 1206
program-funded projects to determine how many of them described
specific terrorist threats. DOD officials consistently identified
these proposals as the most authoritative and detailed documents about
each project's purpose and objectives. In all, DOD and State have
approved 92 proposals, accounting for 149 projects. No formal
proposals had been submitted for the 11 projects approved in fiscal
year 2006 and 3 projects approved in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. We
analyzed the proposals for 135 projects from fiscal years 2007-2009:
62 projects approved in 2007, 48 projects approved in 2008, and 25
projects approved in 2009. We determined that a project proposal
addressed a specific threat if it (1) provided information indicating
that some terrorist act had occurred, had been attempted, or had been
or was being planned for in the country/region of the project, or (2)
referred to a terrorist organization or individual in the
country/region of the project that posed a threat that was being
targeted by the proposed project. If project proposals did not meet
these criteria, we determined that they addressed a nonspecific
threat. Projects that we determined fell into this second category
included those that addressed the global threat of terrorism, the
existence of ungoverned territory, illegal fishing, smuggling,
narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, piracy, or other illegal
activities not specifically tied to observable terrorist-related
activity in the country/region in question. Two analysts independently
reviewed all the proposals according to these criteria, and any
disagreements in the determinations both made were resolved through
discussion.
* We reviewed applicable Section 1207 program guidelines to identify
the requirements related to meeting U.S. stabilization priorities. We
then analyzed Section 1207 program funding data and a U.S. government
watchlist identifying countries vulnerable to state failure to
determine the percentage of program funding that has been allotted for
countries on this list. Since the watchlist is classified, we did not
present specific data from our analysis to avoid disclosing classified
information. We also analyzed political risk data compiled by IHS
Global Insight, a private forecasting firm, to determine the
percentage of project funds that were allotted to countries
categorized as having high, very high, or extremely high short-term,
internal political risk. This political risk score is a weighted
average summary of probabilities that different political events, both
domestic and external, such as civil war and trade conflicts, will
reduce gross domestic product growth rates. The subjective
probabilities are assessed by economists and country analysts at
Global Insight on the basis of a wide range of information, and are
reviewed by a team to ensure consistency across countries. The
measures are revised quarterly; the measure we used comes from the
first quarter of the year after each project proposal for the
corresponding country was approved, except in the case of fiscal year
2009 projects, for which we used data from the third quarter of 2009
because data from the first quarter of 2010 were not yet available at
the time of our review. We combined the results for all years to
indicate what percentage of total funding was allotted to countries
within each political risk category. To assess the reliability of the
risk rating data, we interviewed officials of IHS Global Insight and
reviewed related documents describing the methods used to gather these
data and the internal control mechanisms employed to ensure
consistency and reliability. We also compared the risk scores of
similar sources of data related to country political risk to assess
overall consistency. We determined that these risk rating data were
sufficiently reliable for the purpose of assessing the general level
of political stability of countries receiving Section 1207 program
assistance. In addition, we reviewed all 28 approved proposals
relating to 25 projects in the Section 1207 program in fiscal years
2006 through 2009 and assessed the extent to which proposals were for
projects to help countries recover from or prevent instability.
[Footnote 47] We considered that a project proposal addressed the
prevention of instability if (1) the project objectives described an
attempt to prevent, deny, counter, or reduce threat(s) to stability,
such as armed conflict, violence, extremism, or terrorism/terrorists,
or (2) the project objectives described an attempt to strengthen or
enhance stability, and (3) the project did not address recovery from a
specific event or occurrence of instability. We considered that a
project proposal addressed the recovery from instability if (1) the
project objectives described a specific event or occurrence of
instability (e.g., insurgency, war, or episodic or recurring violence)
and supported postconflict reconstruction or rebuilding efforts, or
(2) the project objectives described efforts to help foreign
governments regain or reestablish control over territories or
institutions that were previously ungoverned or under the control of
criminals, terrorists, or insurgents. Two analysts independently
reviewed all the proposals according to these criteria, and any
disagreements in the determinations both made were resolved through
discussion. We used funding data based on allotments for each Section
1207 project, in line with DOD's notifications to the Congress, which
we determined were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To assess the extent to which the Section 1206 and 1207 programs are
distinct from other U.S. programs, we conducted the following work.
* We reviewed applicable Section 1206 program guidelines to identify
the requirements relating to project distinctness. We then reviewed
all available written proposals for projects to which these
requirements applied (e.g., we compared projects approved in fiscal
year 2009 with fiscal year 2009 guidelines) and analyzed the
information that the proposals provided to distinguish the proposed
project from those funded by other security assistance programs. We
categorized each proposal based on whether the proposal (1) explained
the reason(s), other than the lack of available funds, that another
program could not be used; (2) did not address whether the proposed
project was distinct from projects funded by other programs, other
than the lack of available funds; or (3) identified one or more
similar or related projects funded by another program but did not
explain how the proposed project was distinct. Two analysts
independently reviewed all the proposals according to these criteria,
and any disagreements in the determinations both made were resolved
through discussion. We considered only those proposals meeting the
first criterion to have documented that the proposed project was
distinct.
* We also interviewed relevant staff--at OSD; State's Bureau for
Political-Military Affairs; all six geographic combatant commands; the
Africa Command Navy component; and the U.S. embassies in Albania, the
Bahamas, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Ethiopia,
Pakistan, Honduras, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and
Ukraine--in person or by telephone, and documented their views on the
factors that distinguish Section 1206 projects from other train and
equip projects that they help implement under other programs. To
determine whether funding assistance under Section 1206, instead of
other traditional security assistance programs, entailed additional
costs or funding delays, we asked an official from the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency overseeing the Section 1206 program about
the fees and implementation timing under this program and Foreign
Military Financing (FMF).
* We reviewed applicable Section 1207 program guidelines to identify
the requirements relating to project distinctness. We then reviewed
all proposals for projects to which these requirements applied (i.e.,
28 approved proposals for fiscal years 2006 through 2009) and assessed
the extent to which the proposals included information to distinguish
the respective project from those funded under other foreign
assistance programs. We considered a proposed project to be distinct
from other projects if (1) no other related projects were identified
in the proposal, or (2) the proposed project did not fund a
continuation of a prior or existing program in that country, through
expansion of its geographic scope or an increase in the number of
identical or closely related activities. For example, we did not
consider an initiative to increase funding for an existing school
construction program to build additional schools in other regions of a
country to be distinct. We did not consider projects to be undertaken
using existing contracting mechanisms, grants, or cooperative
agreements to be distinct unless the type of proposed activity funded
was described as being substantially different from ongoing
activities. Two analysts independently reviewed all the proposals
according to these criteria, and any disagreements in the
determinations both made were resolved through discussion.
* We reviewed quarterly reports from countries that received Section
1207 program funding for State's Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement activities to determine if funding delays were an
issue. We also reviewed Section 1207 program funding data to determine
the administrative costs charged by State/S/CRS, State (at U.S.
embassies), and USAID. In addition, we interviewed cognizant officials
at the U.S. embassies in Georgia, Haiti, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Uganda, and documented their views of the factors that distinguish
respective Section 1207 projects from other assistance activities that
they help implement under other programs. We also interviewed
cognizant officials at USAID, State/S/CRS, and five geographic
commands and documented their views on this topic.
To determine the extent to which the Section 1206 and 1207 projects
have addressed the sustainment needs of executed projects, we
conducted the following work.
* We reviewed State and USAID documents describing U.S. foreign policy
goals relating to sustainment of international counterterrorism-
related efforts. We also reviewed Section 1206 program guidelines to
identify requirements relating to project sustainment. We then
reviewed all available written proposals for projects to which these
requirements applied (i.e., projects approved in fiscal year 2009) and
analyzed the information that each proposal included relating to
project sustainment. We identified all the sources of funding that
each proposal indicated would be used to sustain the project and
categorized them as Foreign Military Financing, U.S. programs other
than FMF, or host country funds. We also identified those proposals
that indicated that host nation funds alone would be used for
sustainment. Two analysts independently reviewed all the proposals
according to these criteria, and any disagreements in the
determinations both made were resolved through discussion.
* We also interviewed cognizant officials at OSD, State's Bureau for
Political-Military Affairs, all six geographic combatant commands, the
Africa Command Navy component, and the U.S. embassies in Albania, the
Bahamas, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia,
Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and
Ukraine, and documented their views regarding sustainment of ongoing
Section 1206 projects. We also used the World Bank's 2010 country
income ratings to analyze the potential ability of recipient countries
to independently sustain Section 1206 projects.
* We reviewed applicable Section 1207 program guidelines to identify
the requirements relating to project sustainment. We then reviewed all
available written proposals to which these requirements applied (i.e.,
all 28 approved proposals for fiscal years 2006 through 2009) and
assessed whether each proposal included information relating to
project sustainment. We identified all the sources of funding that
each proposal indicated would be used to sustain the project and
categorized them as U.S. government assistance, host nation funds, or
non-U.S. donors or other sources. We also identified those proposals
that indicated that host nation resources alone would be used for
sustainment. Two analysts independently reviewed all the proposals
according to these criteria, and any disagreements in the
determinations both made were resolved through discussion. In
addition, we interviewed relevant staff at U.S. embassies in Georgia,
Haiti, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and documented their views
regarding sustainment of ongoing Section 1207 projects. We also
documented the views on this topic from cognizant officials at USAID,
State/S/CRS, and five geographic combatant commands. For those
projects where potential sustainment from U.S. or other donor sources
was not addressed by project proposals, we used the World Bank's 2010
country income ratings to analyze the potential ability of the
recipient countries to independently sustain Section 1207 activities.
We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the
purpose of this analysis.
To establish the extent to which the Section 1206 and 1207 programs
incorporate plans for monitoring and evaluation to assess project
impact and inform program implementation, we conducted the following
work.
* We reviewed applicable Section 1206 and 1207 program guidelines, as
well as authorizing legislation, the Government Performance and
Results Act of 2003, and Standards for Internal Controls in the
Federal Government to identify the requirements relating to project
monitoring and evaluation.
* To determine what monitoring and evaluation has been conducted and
what was planned for the Section 1206 program, we interviewed
cognizant DOD and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at the six
U.S. geographic combatant commands and the Africa Command Navy
component, as well as U.S. officials in Albania, the Bahamas,
Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine in
person or via telephone. We also analyzed the 135 available written
project proposals to determine the extent to which they identified
measurable program objectives. We considered a proposal as having a
measurable objective if (1) it identified an objective or an expected
outcome and a means of quantitatively or qualitatively assessing
achievement of that objective or outcome, or (2) it identified a
specific expected outcome, such as the establishment of a particular
military capability or deployment of troops in a particular
stabilization operation, specific enough that an observer could
reasonably be expected to determine by objective means whether the
outcome had been achieved. We did not consider a proposal as having a
measurable objective if (1) it did not identify any objective or
expected outcome or (2) it described the objective or expected outcome
in general terms, such as achieving long-term stability or
establishing an effective deterrence against extremist incursions,
without identifying potential indicators or other quantitative or
qualitative means to assess the achievement of that objective or
outcome. Two analysts independently reviewed all the proposals
according to these criteria, and any disagreements in the
determinations both made were resolved through discussion.
* To determine what monitoring and evaluation has been conducted and
what was planned for the Section 1207 program, we interviewed
cognizant DOD, State, and USAID officials, as well as agency officials
at five U.S. geographic combatant commands. In addition, we
interviewed relevant staff at U.S. embassies in Georgia, Haiti,
Malaysia, and the Philippines, and documented their views regarding
monitoring and evaluation of ongoing Section 1207 projects. We also
analyzed all 28 approved proposals to determine the extent to which
they identified measures of effectiveness. We considered a proposal to
have measures of effectiveness if it identified either quantitative or
qualitative measures or performance indicators that would be used to
assess the results of the proposed project. We did not require the
proposal to provide detailed information about every measure or
indicator that would be used, but we considered a basic description of
them or examples as adequate evidence to meet the criteria. We did not
consider a reference to State's standard performance measurement
structure as adequate evidence to meet our criteria unless the
proposal identified which standard measures would be used. Two
analysts independently reviewed all the proposals according to these
criteria, and any disagreements in the determinations both made were
resolved through discussion.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2009 to April 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Descriptions of Traditional DOD and State Assistance
Programs:
Table 3 describes selected U.S. foreign assistance programs and
accounts that DOD, State, and USAID have traditionally used to fund
training and equipment for counterterrorism and stabilization
operation support and assistance related to reconstruction, security,
and stabilization.
Table 3: Descriptions of Select U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs and
Accounts:
Assistance program: Foreign Military Financing;
Description: Foreign Military Financing provides grants and loans to
foreign governments and international organizations for the
acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. FMF
assists the militaries of friendly countries to promote bilateral,
regional, and multilateral coalition efforts, notably in the global
war on terrorism; improve military capabilities to contribute to
international crisis response operations, including peacekeeping and
humanitarian crises; contribute to the professionalism of military
forces to include the rule of law and military subordination to
civilian control; enhance interoperability of military forces;
maintain support for democratically elected governments; and support
the U.S. industrial base by promoting the export of U.S. defense-
related goods and services.
Assistance program: Development Assistance;
Description: The Development Assistance account is used to foster
sustainable broad-based economic progress and social stability in
developing countries through support of long-term projects in areas
such as economic reform, private sector development, democracy
promotion, environmental protection, and improvement of human health.
Assistance program: Economic Support Funds;
Description: The Economic Support Funds promote economic and political
stability in strategically important regions where the United States
has special security interests. The funds are generally provided as
grants or loans provided on a grant basis and are available for a
variety of economic purposes, such as infrastructure and development
projects.
Assistance program: Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia;
Description: The Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia
account supports assistance to the independent states of the former
Soviet Union under the FREEDOM Support Act and supports East European
democracy under the SEED Act.
Assistance program: International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement;
Description: The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
account supports country and global programs for combating
transnational crime, including the illegal drug trade, through
projects such as judicial sector reform and police training and
equipment.
Assistance program: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and
Related Programs;
Description: The Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and
Related Programs account supports programs that address the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, assist other countries in fighting
terrorism, and support humanitarian assistance programs such as
demining.
Assistance program: Peacekeeping Operations;
Description: The Peacekeeping Operations account supports multilateral
peacekeeping and regional stability operations that are not funded
through the United Nations, and also addresses gaps in capabilities to
enable countries and regional organizations to participate in
peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, or counterterrorism operations,
and to reform security forces in the aftermath of conflict.
Assistance program: Transition Initiatives;
Description: The Transition Initiatives account funds the activities
of USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives for international disaster
rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance, including strengthening
democratic institutions, revitalizing basic infrastructure, and
fostering conflict resolution.
Assistance program: International Military Education and Training;
Description: The International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program provides training to military and related civilian personnel.
IMET training exposes foreign students to U.S. military organizations
and procedures and the manner in which military organizations function
under civilian control. IMET aims to strengthen democratic and
civilian control of foreign militaries, improve their understanding of
U.S. military doctrine and operational procedures, and enhance
interoperability. IMET facilitates the development of professional and
personal relationships, which aim to provide U.S. access and influence
to foreign governments.
Assistance program: Global Peace Operations Initiative;
Description: The U.S. Department of State Global Peace Operations
Initiative addresses gaps in international peace operations support by
building and maintaining the capabilities, capacities, and
effectiveness of peace operations.
Assistance program: Joint Combined Exchange Training;
Description: The Joint Combined Exchange Training program activities
involve training U.S. Special Operations Forces with foreign forces to
ensure readiness regarding language, culture, knowledge of foreign
environments, combat and combat support, and instructor skills.
Training ranges from land navigation, first aid, and basic rifle
marksmanship to leadership techniques and special operations
techniques and tactics. The primary purpose of the program is to train
U.S. Special Operations Forces. Benefits to the host nation forces are
incidental.
Assistance program: Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund;
Description: The Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund enables the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act quickly to support the
combatant commanders when they lack the flexibility and resources to
solve emergent challenges and unforeseen contingency requirements
critical to joint war fighting readiness and national security
interests. The strongest candidates for approval are initiatives that
support combatant command activities and functions, enhance
interoperability, and yield high benefits at low cost. Initiatives
support authorized activities such as force training, joint exercises,
contingencies, command and control, military education and training of
foreign personnel, defense personnel expenses for bilateral or
regional cooperation programs, urgent and unanticipated humanitarian
relief and reconstruction assistance, and joint war fighting
capabilities.
Source: DOD and State.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Section 1206 and 1207 Funding Allotments:
Table 4 lists the recipient countries and their allotments of Section
1206 and 1207 funds for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, ranked
according to total amount funding provided.
Table 4: Section 1206 and 1207 Recipients and Funding Allotments,
Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Funding rank: 1;
Country: Pakistan;
Section 1206 funding: $203,388,677;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $203,388,677.
Funding rank: 2;
Country: Lebanon;
Section 1206 funding: $105,461,059;
Section 1207 funding: $30,000,000;
Total: $135,461,059.
Funding rank: 3;
Country: Georgia;
Section 1206 funding: $17,947,000;
Section 1207 funding: $100,000,000;
Total: $117,947,000.
Funding rank: 4;
Country: Yemen;
Section 1206 funding: $97,284,553;
Section 1207 funding: $8,845,200;
Total: $106,129,753.
Funding rank: 5;
Country: Philippines;
Section 1206 funding: $55,098,843;
Section 1207 funding: $24,900,000;
Total: $79,998,843.
Funding rank: 6;
Country: Indonesia;
Section 1206 funding: $57,493,827;
Section 1207 funding: $5,000,000;
Total: $62,493,827.
Funding rank: 7;
Country: Bahrain;
Section 1206 funding: $44,992,361;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $44,992,361.
Funding rank: 8;
Country: Malaysia;
Section 1206 funding: $43,931,221;
Section 1207 funding: $1,000,000;
Total: $44,931,221.
Funding rank: 9;
Country: Kenya;
Section 1206 funding: $29,048,763;
Section 1207 funding: $8,000,000;
Total: $37,048,763.
Funding rank: 10;
Country: Sri Lanka;
Section 1206 funding: $18,283,008;
Section 1207 funding: $18,280,000;
Total: $36,563,008.
Funding rank: 11;
Country: Ethiopia;
Section 1206 funding: $34,882,574;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $34,882,574.
Funding rank: 12;
Country: Kazakhstan;
Section 1206 funding: $31,744,945;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $31,744,945.
Funding rank: 13;
Country: Bangladesh;
Section 1206 funding: $15,744,500;
Section 1207 funding: $15,100,000;
Total: $30,844,500.
Funding rank: 14;
Country: Somalia;
Section 1206 funding: [Empty];
Section 1207 funding: $25,000,000;
Total: $25,000,000.
Funding rank: 15;
Country: Kyrgyzstan;
Section 1206 funding: v21,132,370;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $21,132,370.
Funding rank: 16;
Country: Haiti;
Section 1206 funding: [Empty];
Section 1207 funding: $20,000,000;
Total: $20,000,000.
Funding rank: 17;
Country: Tunisia;
Section 1206 funding: $18,525,758;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $18,525,758.
Funding rank: 18;
Country: Djibouti;
Section 1206 funding: $17,324,183;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $17,324,183.
Funding rank: 19;
Country: Nigeria;
Section 1206 funding: $16,023,915;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $16,023,915.
Funding rank: 20;
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo;
Section 1206 funding: [Empty];
Section 1207 funding: $14,870,000;
Total: $14,870,000.
Funding rank: 21;
Country: Mexico;
Section 1206 funding: $13,945,854;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $13,945,854.
Funding rank: 22;
Country: Colombia;
Section 1206 funding: [Empty];
Section 1207 funding: $13,800,000;
Total: $13,800,000.
Funding rank: 23;
Country: Albania;
Section 1206 funding: $12,036,340;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $12,036,340.
Funding rank: 24;
Country: Ukraine;
Section 1206 funding: $11,998,982;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $11,998,982.
Funding rank: 25;
Country: Panama;
Section 1206 funding: $6,789,842;
Section 1207 funding: $5,070,000;
Total: v11,859,842.
Funding rank: 26;
Country: Mali;
Section 1206 funding: $5,218,826;
Section 1207 funding: $5,000,000;
Total: $10,218,826.
Funding rank: 27;
Country: Afghanistan;
Section 1206 funding: [Empty];
Section 1207 funding: $10,000,000;
Total: $10,000,000.
Funding rank: 28;
Country: Nepal;
Section 1206 funding: [Empty];
Section 1207 funding: $10,000,000;
Total: $10,000,000.
Funding rank: 29;
Country: Tajikistan;
Section 1206 funding: [Empty];
Section 1207 funding: $9,900,000;
Total: $9,900,000.
Funding rank: 30;
Country: Honduras;
Section 1206 funding: $9,159,831;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $9,159,831.
Funding rank: 31;
Country: Bahamas;
Section 1206 funding: $9,086,403;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $9,086,403.
Funding rank: 32;
Country: Dominican Republic;
Section 1206 funding: $8,953,051;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: v8,953,051.
Funding rank: 33;
Country: Nicaragua;
Section 1206 funding: $6,731,518;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $6,731,518.
Funding rank: 34;
Country: Paraguay;
Section 1206 funding: [Empty];
Section 1207 funding: $6,690,000;
Total: $6,690,000.
Funding rank: 35;
Country: Jamaica;
Section 1206 funding: $6,546,396;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $6,546,396.
Funding rank: 36;
Country: Uganda;
Section 1206 funding: [Empty];
Section 1207 funding: $6,460,000;
Total: $6,460,000.
Funding rank: 37;
Country: Belize;
Section 1206 funding: $6,183,654;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $6,183,654.
Funding rank: 38;
Country: Niger;
Section 1206 funding: $142,725;
Section 1207 funding: $6,000,000;
Total: $6,142,725.
Funding rank: 39;
Country: Cameroon;
Section 1206 funding: $5,902,428;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $5,902,428.
Funding rank: 40;
Country: Chad;
Section 1206 funding: $5,792,725;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $5,792,725.
Funding rank: 41;
Country: Morocco;
Section 1206 funding: $321,318;
Section 1207 funding: $5,080,000;
Total: $5,401,318.
Funding rank: 42;
Country: São Tomé and Principe;
Section 1206 funding: $4,960,564;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $4,960,564.
Funding rank: 43;
Country: Mozambique;
Section 1206 funding: $4,853,356;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $4,853,356.
Funding rank: 44;
Country: Senegal;
Section 1206 funding: $4,710,181;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $4,710,181.
Funding rank: 45;
Country: Gabon;
Section 1206 funding: $4,242,509;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $4,242,509.
Funding rank: 46;
Country: Ghana;
Section 1206 funding: $3,711,833;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $3,711,833.
Funding rank: 47;
Country: Tanzania;
Section 1206 funding: $3,232,162;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $3,232,162.
Funding rank: 48;
Country: Macedonia;
Section 1206 funding: $2,978,000;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $2,978,000.
Funding rank: 49;
Country: Sierra Leone;
Section 1206 funding: $2,492,565;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $2,492,565.
Funding rank: 50;
Country: Suriname;
Section 1206 funding: $2,063,009;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $2,063,009.
Funding rank: 51;
Country: Guyana;
Section 1206 funding: $1,823,391;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $1,823,391.
Funding rank: 52;
Country: Azerbaijan;
Section 1206 funding: $1,744,000;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $1,744,000.
Funding rank: 53;
Country: Mauritania;
Section 1206 funding: $142,725;
Section 1207 funding: $1,550,000;
Total: $1,692,725.
Funding rank: 54;
Country: Cape Verde;
Section 1206 funding: $1,403,481;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $1,403,481.
Funding rank: 55;
Country: Mauritius;
Section 1206 funding: $1,229,501;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $1,229,501.
Funding rank: 56;
Country: Benin;
Section 1206 funding: $1,145,148;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $1,145,148.
Funding rank: 57;
Country: Togo;
Section 1206 funding: $966,555;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $966,555.
Funding rank: 58;
Country: Seychelles;
Section 1206 funding: $179,654;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $179,654.
Funding rank: 59;
Country: Liberia;
Section 1206 funding: $178,594;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $178,594.
Funding rank: 60;
Country: Guinea;
Section 1206 funding: v178,593;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $178,593.
Funding rank: 61;
Country: Gambia;
Section 1206 funding: $178,593;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $178,593.
Funding rank: 62;
Country: Algeria;
Section 1206 funding: $142,725;
Section 1207 funding: [Empty];
Total: $142,725.
Funding rank: Total;
Country: [Empty];
Section 1206 funding: $979,674,589[A];
Section 1207 funding: $350,545,200;
Total: $1,330,219,789.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.
[A] Section 1206 funding total excludes $3,053,843 in transportation
costs and $2,117,059 in human-rights-training costs that could not be
attributed to specific projects or countries.
[End of table]
Figures 11 and 12 show the allotments of Section 1206 and 1207 funds,
respectively, to U.S. geographic combatant commands for fiscal years
2006 through 2009.
Figure 11: Section 1206 Funds Provided to U.S. Geographic Combatant
Commands, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked multiple line graph]
Year: 2006;
Central Command: $38.1 million;
Pacific Command: $29.3 million;
Africa Commend: $13.0 million;
Southern Commend: $14.4 million;
European Commend: 0;
Northern Command: 0.
Year: 2007;
Central Command: $114.3 million;
Pacific Command: $68.0 million;
Africa Commend: $43.8 million;
Southern Commend: $17.6 million;
European Commend: $28.2 million;
Northern Command: $6.8 million.
Year: 2008;
Central Command: $96.2 million;
Pacific Command: $62.1 million;
Africa Commend: $61.7 million;
Southern Commend: $16.2 million;
European Commend: $18.5 million;
Northern Command: $16.3 million.
Year: 2009;
Central Command: $255.4 million;
Pacific Command: $31.1 million;
Africa Commend: $48.6 million;
Southern Commend: 0;
European Commend: 0;
Northern Command: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.
[End of figure]
Figure 12: Section 1207 Funds Provided to U.S. Geographic Combatant
Commands, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked multiple line graph]
Year: 2006;
Central Command: $10 million;
Pacific Command: 0;
Africa Commend: 0;
Southern Commend: 0;
European Commend: 0.
Year: 2007;
Central Command: $8.8 million;
Pacific Command: $26.9 million;
Africa Commend: $37.6 million;
Southern Commend: $24.0 million;
European Commend: 0.
Year: 2008;
Central Command: $29.9 million;
Pacific Command: $6 million;
Africa Commend: $9.1 million;
Southern Commend: $5 million;
European Commend: $50 million;
Year: 2009;
Central Command: $10 million;
Pacific Command: $41.4 million;
Africa Commend: $25.3 million;
Southern Commend: $16.6 million;
European Commend: $50 million.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Types of Assistance Provided through Section 1206 and
1207 Programs:
Table 5 lists the recipients of Section 1206 funds and the type of
equipment DOD and State have provided to each country for fiscal years
2006 through 2009.
Table 5: Types of Assistance Provided to Section 1206 Recipient
Nations, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Company: Albania;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Algeria;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Azerbaijan;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Bahamas;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Bahrain;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Bangladesh;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Belize;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Benin;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Cameroon;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Cape Verde;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Chad;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Djibouti;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Check];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Dominican Republic;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Ethiopia;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Gabon;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Gambia;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Georgia;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Ghana;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Guinea;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Guyana;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Honduras;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Indonesia;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Jamaica;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Kazakhstan;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Kenya;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Kyrgyzstan;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Lebanon;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Check];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Check];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Liberia;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Macedonia;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Malaysia;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Mali;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Check];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Mauritania;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Mauritius;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Mexico;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Check];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Morocco;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Mozambique;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Nicaragua;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Niger;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Nigeria;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Check];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Pakistan;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Check];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Check];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Panama;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Philippines;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Check];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: São Tomé and Principe;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Senegal;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Seychelles;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Sierra Leone;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Sri Lanka;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Suriname;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Tanzania;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Check].
Company: Togo;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Tunisia;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Check];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Check];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Ukraine;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Check];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Yemen;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: [Check];
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: [Check];
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: [Check];
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Boats: [Check];
Type of assistance: Computers/software: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: [Check];
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Facilities: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Ammunition: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: [Empty].
Company: Total recipients;
Type of assistance: Training/technical Assistance: 47;
Type of assistance: Spare parts/tools: 43;
Type of assistance: Communication equipment/Radios: 41;
Type of assistance: Radar/surveillance equipment: 37;
Type of assistance: Boats: 28;
Type of assistance: Computers/software: 25;
Type of assistance: Ground vehicles: 24;
Type of assistance: Body armor/individual equipment: 17;
Type of assistance: Global positioning systems: 14;
Type of assistance: Night vision devices: 12;
Type of assistance: Facilities: 12;
Type of assistance: Small arms/machine guns: 11;
Type of assistance: Ammunition: 7;
Type of assistance: Site survey/assessment: 3;
Type of assistance: Helicopters/aircraft: 2;
Type of assistance: Miscellaneous equipment: 25.
[End of table]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.
Table 6 lists the recipients of Section 1207 funds and the type of
reconstruction, stabilization, and security assistance provided by
State and USAID.
Table 6: Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Security Activities
Provided to Section 1207 Recipient Nations, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Country: Afghanistan;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Check];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Bangladesh;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Check];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Colombia;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Check];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Check];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: DRC;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Check];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Check];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Georgia;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Check];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Check];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Check];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Check];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Check];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Check].
Country: Haiti;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Check];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Check];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Check];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Indonesia;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Check];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Kenya;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Check];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Check];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Lebanon;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Check];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Malaysia;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Check];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Mali;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Check];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Check];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Check];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Mauritania;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Check];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Check];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Morocco;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Check];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Check];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Nepal;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Check];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Niger;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Check];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Check];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Check];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Panama;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Check];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Paraguay;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Check];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Philippines;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Check];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Somalia;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Check];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Check];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Check];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Check];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Sri Lanka;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Check];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Check];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Check];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Check].
Country: Tajikistan;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Check];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Check];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Uganda;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Check];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Check];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Yemen;
Type of assistance: Local government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: [Check];
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Border security: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: [Empty];
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: [Empty];
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: [Empty].
Country: Total recipients;
Type of assistance: Local government: 13;
Type of assistance: Police training and: equipment: 13;
Type of assistance: Infrastructure improvements: 11;
Type of assistance: Public awareness: campaigns: 9;
Type of assistance: Youth-targeted: jobs, training: 8;
Type of assistance: Judicial sector reform: 6;
Type of assistance: Border security: 5;
Type of assistance: Education reform/school rehabilitation: 5;
Type of assistance: Jobs, vocational training: 5;
Type of assistance: National government: capacity building: 4;
Type of assistance: Demining, unexploded ordnance removal: 2;
Type of assistance: Food, shelter assistance: 2.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Special Operations/low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent
Capabilities:
2500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500:
March 29, 2010:
Mr. Joseph Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment. Enclosed is the Department
of Defense response to the GAO draft report, GA0-10-431, International
Security: State and DOD Need to Improve Sustainment Planning, and
Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance
Programs," dated March 12, 2010 (GAO Code 320663).
The Department of Defense has reviewed the GAO draft report and
concurs with all recommendations. We look forward to implementing
these recommendations to improve the Section 1206 and 1207 assistance
programs.
Signed by:
Michael Vickers:
Enclosure:
Department of Defense Comments to the GAO Recommendations:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated March 12, 2010:
GAO-10-431 (GAO Code 320663):
"International Security: State And DOD Need To Improve Sustainment
Planning, And Monitoring And Evaluation For Section 1206 And 1207
Assistance Programs"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: For the Section 1206 program, the GAO recommends
that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
State develop and implement specific plans to monitor, evaluate, and
report routinely on Section 1206 project outcomes and their impact on
U.S. strategic objectives. (See page 34/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Concur.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, base further decisions about
sustaining existing Section 1206 projects on the results of such
monitoring and evaluation. (See page 34/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Concur.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, estimate the cost of
sustaining projects at the time they are proposed and, where possible,
obtain a commitment from partner nations to fund those costs. (See
page 34 and 35/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Concur.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, seek further guidance from
the Congress on what funding authorities are appropriate to sustain
Section 1206 projects when the Secretary determines that: (a) projects
address specific terrorist and stabilization threats in high-priority
countries; (b) reliable monitoring and evaluation have shown that
projects are effective; and (c) partner nation funds are unavailable.
(See page 35/GAO Draft Report.)
2
DoD Response: Concur.
Recommendation 5: For the Section 1207 program, the GAO recommends
that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and Administrator of USAID, develop and implement specific plans
to monitor, evaluate, and report on their outcomes and their impact on
U.S. strategic objectives to determine whether continued funding for
these projects is appropriate under other authorities and programs.
(See page 35/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Concur.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
March 30, 2010:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"International Security: State and DOD Need to Improve Sustainment
Planning, and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207
Assistance Programs," GAO Job Code 320663.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Caitlin Conaty, 1207 Oversight Program Officer, Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization at (703) 875-6692.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc: GAO ” Jeff Phillips:
PM ” Andrew J. Shapiro:
S/CRS ” John Herbst:
State/OIG ” Tracy Burnett:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
International Security: State and DOD Need to Improve Sustainment
Planning, and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207
Assistance Programs (GA0-10-431, GAO Code 320663):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this GAO report. The
Department of State commends GAO for the thoughtful and complete
analysis of the 1207 program; however, we would like to offer the
following clarifications and comments in response.
One of the key objectives of the 1207 program was to provide timely
funding to cope with emerging crises for which other appropriated
funding was not available. 1207 was always intended to be a temporary
transfer authority pending the creation of a similar stand-alone
account for the Department of State. For FY11, however, the
Administration has requested a 1207-like account for State, the
Complex Crisis Fund. Having funds dedicated to conflict prevention,
stability and security appropriated to State will eliminate the
current unwieldy 1207 transfer process, which, at times, has prevented
as rapid a response to immediate on-the-ground needs as State would
have preferred. We believe that the appropriation of the Complex
Crisis Fund to State will solve many of the issues outlined in the
report.
The report notes that the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization (S/CRS) has not done sufficient analysis of the
effectiveness of the 1207 programs and has not been sufficiently
aggressive in monitoring the programs, while also criticizing the
charging of administrative costs. These findings are contradictory.
Since the inception of the 1207 program in 2006, S/CRS has
increasingly developed and refined the monitoring and evaluations of
projects. Quantitative and qualitative evaluations of program
effectiveness are ongoing and have been completed for 1207 projects
that are in-progress or recently completed. Further, without adequate
administrative support, S/CRS would be unable to provide any
monitoring or evaluations thereby resulting in the very concern
expressed. S/CRS's administrative costs for 1207 are also far lower
than those charged by similar programs in the U.S. government.
Finally, because the 1207 authority will not be reauthorized in FY11,
we appreciate the observations contained in this report and will take
them into account when shaping the future 1207-like program under the
Complex Crisis Fund.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
March 31, 2010:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff,
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International
Development's (USAID) formal response to the GAO draft report
entitled: "International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve
Sustainment Planning, and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206
and 1207 Assistance Programs" (GAO-10-431).
The enclosed USAID comments are provided for incorporation with this
letter as an appendix to the final report.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit
review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Drew W. Luten:
Acting Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Management:
Enclosure: a/s:
[End of letter]
USAID Comments On GAO Draft Report No. GAO-10-431:
USAID has worked closely with S/CRS and our interagency partners
throughout the 1207 processes each year since FY 2006. As the draft
GAO report points out, learning from the 1207 authority and
incorporating lessons from one year to the next have been among the
best features of interagency 1207 management and integration.
At the same time, there is still more work to be done to maximize the
timeliness of funding availability, the use of reporting data, and our
ability to incorporate necessary sustainment requirements for 1207
funded activities into base budgets, areas which are highlighted in
the draft GAO report. These are, of course, issues of interest to all
agencies participating in 1207 processes.
We have appreciated our strategic partnership with others from the
Department of State and Department of Defense related to the exercise
of the 1207 authority and management of 1207 resources and look
forward to continuing to refine our business processes based on GAO's
review.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joseph Christoff (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Key contributors to this report include Jeffrey Phillips, Assistant
Director; James Michels; Kathryn Bolduc; Robert Heilman; Martin de
Alteriis; Michael Silver; Mark Dowling; John Pendleton; Marie Mak;
Alissa Czyz; Jodie Sandel; Erin Smith; Thomas Costa; Kathryn Bernet;
John Neumann; Michael Rohrback; Sally Williamson; Jeff Isaacs; Ophelia
Robinson; Jenna Beveridge; Joseph Carney; Lynn Cothern; Anthony
Pordes; and Jeremy Sebest.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3136 (2006).
[2] H. R. Rep. No. 111-166 (2009).
[3] Hereinafter referred to as the Section 1206 program and the
Section 1207 program. These programs are also known as the Global
Train and Equip Program and the Security and Stabilization Assistance
Program, respectively.
[4] Pub. L. 109-163.
[5] Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119 Stat. 3136 (2006).
[6] Pub. L. No. 103-62, as amended.
[7] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999).
[8] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[9] FMF provides grants and loans to foreign governments and
international organizations for the acquisition of U.S. defense
equipment, services, and training. FMF assists the militaries of
friendly countries to promote bilateral, regional, and multilateral
coalition efforts, notably in the global war on terrorism; improve
military capabilities to contribute to international crisis response
operations, including peacekeeping and humanitarian crises; contribute
to the professionalism of military forces to include the rule of law
and military subordination to civilian control; enhance
interoperability of military forces; maintain support for
democratically elected governments; and support the U.S. industrial
base by promoting the export of U.S. defense-related goods and
services.
[10] In addition to FMF, State and DOD have employed other, smaller
programs to fund training or equipment for partner nations, such as
International Military Education and Training and Global Peace
Operations Initiatives, funded by State, and Joint Combined Exchange
Training and Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund, funded by DOD.
[11] These committees include the House Committees on Appropriations,
Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committees on
Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations. For the Section
1206 program, DOD and State must wait 15 days after notification
before beginning project implementation.
[12] DOD and State use the term "security assistance officer," to
refer to personnel in all organizations, regardless of actual name or
size, located within overseas U.S. missions and assigned
responsibility of carrying out security assistance functions under the
Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act, such as FMF
and International Military Education and Training.
[13] The six geographic combatant commands are the U.S. Africa
Command, the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. European Command, the U.S.
Northern Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the U.S. Southern
Command.
[14] Funding data for Section 1206 and 1207 projects represent the
allotment of appropriated funds, in line with DOD's notifications to
the Congress.
[15] Albania, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, and Ukraine.
[16] The list of priority countries is classified, which limits the
precision of the analytical information we can report.
[17] We reviewed proposals for 135 of 149 projects, or about 91
percent of all executed Section 1206 projects. According to DOD, no
formal proposals were submitted for the 11 projects approved in 2006
and 3 projects approved in 2007 and 2008.
[18] This watchlist is a classified document, which limits the
analytical information we can report.
[19] As reported by IHS Global Insight's Global Risk Service in the
country rating section for short-term, internal political risk. IHS
Global Insight is a private forecasting company that provides
economic, financial, and political analyses, including risk
assessments, of over 200 countries. IHS Global Insight's Global Risk
Service monitors and updates country risk assessments on a quarterly
basis. The Global Risk Service political risk score is a weighted
average summary of probabilities that different political events, both
domestic and external, such as civil war and trade conflicts, will
reduce gross domestic product growth rates. The subjective
probabilities are assessed by economists and country analysts at IHS
Global Insight, on the basis of a wide range of information, and are
reviewed by a team to ensure consistency across countries.
[20] Recovery from instability or conflict refers to reconstruction
activities in Georgia after the August 2008 Russian invasion, efforts
to address postelection violence in Kenya in December 2007, and
measures to strengthen Lebanon's internal security forces after armed
conflict in 2006 and 2007.
[21] Prevention of instability refers to combating extremism in
Bangladesh's vulnerable geographic regions and educational system,
denying safe havens to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in
Panama's southern Darien region, and countering terrorism and
lawlessness in the Mindanao region of the Philippines.
[22] The U.S. Special Operations Command is responsible for preparing
special operations forces to carry out assigned missions and to plan
and conduct special operations. Its mission is (1) to provide fully
capable special operations forces to defend the United States and its
interests and (2) to synchronize global operations against terrorist
networks, including receiving, reviewing, coordinating, and
prioritizing all DOD plans that support the global campaign against
terror.
[23] The U.S. Department of State Global Peace Operations Initiative
addresses gaps in international peace operations support by building
and maintaining the capabilities, capacities, and effectiveness of
peace operations.
[24] GAO, Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States Is
Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are
Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-754]
(Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2008).
[25] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005). We have identified eight key practices for enhancing
interagency collaboration, the first three of which are relevant in
this context: (1) defining and articulating a common outcome; (2)
establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies to achieve the
outcome; (3) identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources;
(4) agreeing upon agency roles and responsibilities; (5) establishing
compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across
agency boundaries; (6) developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and
report the results of collaborative efforts; (7) reinforcing agency
accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and
reports; and (8) reinforcing individual accountability for
collaborative efforts through agency performance management systems.
[26] U.S. Southern Command is the U.S. geographic combatant command
responsible for Central and South America and most of the Caribbean
island nations.
[27] According to fiscal year 2009 NDAA, Section 1206 program funds
must be obligated by the end of the fiscal year after which they are
appropriated. FMF funds are generally available for obligation for
four years after the end of the fiscal year for which they were
appropriated.
[28] U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2008 Performance Summary,
Strategic Goal 1: Achieving Peace and Security; Department of State
and U.S. Agency for International Development, Fiscal Year 2007 Joint
Performance Summary, Strategic Goal 2: Counterterrorism. See also GAO,
State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved Guidance and
More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes, GAO-08-336 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 29, 2008).
[29] U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State
Inspectors General, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global
Train and Equip Program, DOD Report Number IE-2009-007 and State
Report Number ISP-I-09-69 (August 31, 2009).
[30] Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 855 (2009).
[31] The World Bank is an international organization that fights
global poverty by providing low-interest loans, interest-free credits,
and grants to developing countries for a wide array of purposes that
include investments in education, health, public administration,
infrastructure, financial and private sector development, agriculture,
and environmental and natural resource management.
[32] The U.S. Africa Command is the U.S. geographic combatant command
responsible for U.S. military activities in African countries.
[33] The breakdown of proposals identifying possible sources of
sustainment does not add up to 21 because some proposals mention more
than one source. For example, one proposal may identify funding from
both the U.S. government and other donors.
[34] Pub. L. No. 103-62, as amended.
[35] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid
Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-38] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10,
2004).
[36] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[37] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices that Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[38] Section 1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009 directs the Secretaries of Defense and State to report on
the implementation of the Building Global Partnership authorities,
including Sections 1206 and 1207, and must include an assessment of
the impact of the assistance provided under these authorities. The
report is due no later than December 31, 2010, to the Senate and House
of Representatives Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations,
Foreign Affairs (House), and Foreign Relations (Senate). Pub. L. No.
110-417, § 1237.
[39] DOD and State were unable to provide proposals for the projects
approved in fiscal year 2006; thus we were unable to determine whether
those proposals identified performance measures.
[40] In their 2009 review of the Section 1206 program, the DOD and
State Inspectors General recognized the need for metrics of
effectiveness and recommended that the agencies establish clearly
defined Section 1206 project outputs and program outcomes.
[41] CNA, Assessments of the Impact of 1206-Funded Projects in
Selected Countries: Lebanon, Pakistan, Yemen, São Tome and Principe,
CRM D0017988.A4/1REV (July 2008).
[42] U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State
Inspectors General, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global
Train and Equip Program, DOD Report Number IE-2009-007 and State
Report Number ISP-I-09-69 (August 31, 2009).
[43] This office is located within the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense (Policy) and oversees DOD's capabilities to conduct
reconstruction, stabilization, and security operations with
interagency and international partners.
[44] According to the guidelines, the Section 1207 quarterly reports
should (1) provide a brief summary of the project's progress and any
upcoming challenges or opportunities over the next quarter; (2)
describe interagency cooperation involved in implementation, including
challenges and successes; (3) highlight critical successes or
challenges encountered during implementation; (4) discuss how the
project demonstrates a whole-of-government approach in response to
instability and improves U.S. government operations in reconstruction,
stabilization, and security-related activities; (5) report against the
measures of effectiveness established in the original project
proposals; and (6) provide detailed financial data on funding
obligations and expenditures to date.
[45] Although Pakistan and Indonesia were ranked highly, because of
logistical complications, we conducted limited work in Pakistan and
did not visit or interview officials in Indonesia.
[46] The 18 countries include Albania, the Bahamas, Georgia, Haiti,
Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and the Philippines, which we visited (7);
Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Uganda, where we conducted interviews with
U.S. embassy officials in conjunction with other related work GAO was
conducting (3); and Honduras, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria,
Sri Lanka, and Ukraine, for which we conducted interviews via
telephone (8).
[47] Note that in the Section 1207 program from fiscal years 2006 to
2009, the 25 projects were based on 28 approved proposals; 23 projects
were based on one proposal each, but one project (in Lebanon in fiscal
year 2008) was based on two proposals, and another project (in Georgia
in fiscal years 2008 and 2009) was based on three proposals.
[End of section]
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