Military Training
Actions Needed to Further Improve the Consistency of Combat Skills Training Provided to Army and Marine Corps Support Forces Gao ID: GAO-10-465 April 16, 2010In conventional warfare, support forces such as military police, engineers, and medical personnel normally operate behind the front lines of a battlefield. But in Iraq and Afghanistan--both in U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of responsibility--there is no clear distinction between front lines and rear areas, and support forces are sometimes exposed to hostile fire without help from combat arms units. The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 directed GAO to report on combat skills training for support forces. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) Army and Marine Corps support forces are completing required combat skills training; (2) the services and CENTCOM have information to validate completion of required training; and (3) the services have used lessons learned to adjust combat skills training for support forces. To do so, GAO analyzed current training requirements, documentation of training completion, and lessons learned guidance; observed support force training; and interviewed headquarters officials, trainers, and trainees between August 2009 and February 2010.
Army and Marine Corps support forces undergo significant combat skills training, but additional actions could help clarify CENTCOM's training requirements, ensure the services fully incorporate those requirements into their training requirements, and improve the consistency of training that is being conducted. CENTCOM has issued a list of training tasks to be completed, in addition to the services' training requirements, before deploying to its area of operations. However, there is confusion over which forces the CENTCOM requirements apply to, the conditions under which the tasks are to be trained, and the standards for successfully completing the training. As a result, interpretations of the requirements vary and some trainees receive detailed, hands-on training for a particular task while others simply observe a demonstration of the task. In addition, while the Army and Marine Corps are training their forces on most of CENTCOM's required tasks, servicemembers are not being trained on some required tasks prior to deploying. While units collect information on the completion of training tasks, additional actions would help higher level decision-makers assess the readiness of deploying units and servicemembers. Currently, both CENTCOM and the services lack complete information on the extent to which Army and Marine Corps support forces are completing required combat skills training. The Army has recently designated the Digital Training Management System as its system of record for tracking the completion of required training, but guidance concerning system implementation is unclear and the system lacks some needed capabilities. As a result, support forces are not fully utilizing the system, and are inconsistently tracking completion of individual and unit training using paper records, stand-alone spreadsheets, and other automated systems. The Marine Corps also uses inconsistent approaches to document training completion. Furthermore, as GAO reported in May 2008, CENTCOM does not have a clearly defined waiver process to provide visibility over the extent to which personnel are deploying to its area of operations without having completed its required training tasks. As a result, CENTCOM and the services have limited visibility over the extent to which servicemembers have or have not completed all required training. While trainers at Army and Marine Corps training sites have applied lessons learned information and made significant changes to the combat skills training they provide support forces, the changes to training have varied across sites. Army and Marine Corps doctrine requires the collection of after action reports, the primary formal vehicle for collecting lessons learned. Lessons are also shared informally, such as through communication between deployed forces and units training to replace them. While the services have these formal and informal means to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned information, trainers at the various training sites are not consistently sharing information about the changes they have made to their training programs. As a result, servicemembers are trained inconsistently and units that are deploying for similar missions sometimes receive different types and amounts of training.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Sharon L. Pickup Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-9619GAO-10-465, Military Training: Actions Needed to Further Improve the Consistency of Combat Skills Training Provided to Army and Marine Corps Support Forces
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2010:
Military Training:
Actions Needed to Further Improve the Consistency of Combat Skills
Training Provided to Army and Marine Corps Support Forces:
GAO-10-465:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-465, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In conventional warfare, support forces such as military police,
engineers, and medical personnel normally operate behind the front
lines of a battlefield. But in Iraq and Afghanistan”both in U.S.
Central Command‘s (CENTCOM) area of responsibility”there is no clear
distinction between front lines and rear areas, and support forces are
sometimes exposed to hostile fire without help from combat arms units.
The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2010 directed GAO to report on combat skills training for support
forces. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) Army and Marine Corps
support forces are completing required combat skills training; (2) the
services and CENTCOM have information to validate completion of
required training; and (3) the services have used lessons learned to
adjust combat skills training for support forces. To do so, GAO
analyzed current training requirements, documentation of training
completion, and lessons learned guidance; observed support force
training; and interviewed headquarters officials, trainers, and
trainees between August 2009 and February 2010.
What GAO Found:
Army and Marine Corps support forces undergo significant combat skills
training, but additional actions could help clarify CENTCOM‘s training
requirements, ensure the services fully incorporate those requirements
into their training requirements, and improve the consistency of
training that is being conducted. CENTCOM has issued a list of
training tasks to be completed, in addition to the services‘ training
requirements, before deploying to its area of operations. However,
there is confusion over which forces the CENTCOM requirements apply
to, the conditions under which the tasks are to be trained, and the
standards for successfully completing the training. As a result,
interpretations of the requirements vary and some trainees receive
detailed, hands-on training for a particular task while others simply
observe a demonstration of the task. In addition, while the Army and
Marine Corps are training their forces on most of CENTCOM‘s required
tasks, servicemembers are not being trained on some required tasks
prior to deploying.
While units collect information on the completion of training tasks,
additional actions would help higher level decision-makers assess the
readiness of deploying units and servicemembers. Currently, both
CENTCOM and the services lack complete information on the extent to
which Army and Marine Corps support forces are completing required
combat skills training. The Army has recently designated the Digital
Training Management System as its system of record for tracking the
completion of required training, but guidance concerning system
implementation is unclear and the system lacks some needed
capabilities. As a result, support forces are not fully utilizing the
system, and are inconsistently tracking completion of individual and
unit training using paper records, stand-alone spreadsheets, and other
automated systems. The Marine Corps also uses inconsistent approaches
to document training completion. Furthermore, as GAO reported in May
2008, CENTCOM does not have a clearly defined waiver process to
provide visibility over the extent to which personnel are deploying to
its area of operations without having completed its required training
tasks. As a result, CENTCOM and the services have limited visibility
over the extent to which servicemembers have or have not completed all
required training.
While trainers at Army and Marine Corps training sites have applied
lessons learned information and made significant changes to the combat
skills training they provide support forces, the changes to training
have varied across sites. Army and Marine Corps doctrine requires the
collection of after action reports, the primary formal vehicle for
collecting lessons learned. Lessons are also shared informally, such
as through communication between deployed forces and units training to
replace them. While the services have these formal and informal means
to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned information, trainers at
the various training sites are not consistently sharing information
about the changes they have made to their training programs. As a
result, servicemembers are trained inconsistently and units that are
deploying for similar missions sometimes receive different types and
amounts of training.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to clarify CENTCOM‘s training
requirements, increase visibility over the completion or waiving of
required training, and improve consistency in the application of
lessons learned. DOD agreed or partially agreed with all of the seven
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-465] or key
components. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-
9619 or PickupS@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Army and Marine Corps Support Forces Receive Significant Combat Skills
Training, but May Not Consistently Complete All Required Tasks:
CENTCOM and the Services Lack Complete Information on Servicemembers'
Completion of Required Combat Skills Training:
The Army and Marine Corps Have Made Significant Changes to Combat
Skills Training as a Result of Lessons Learned, but Information
Concerning These Changes Is Not Being Consistently Shared:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Organizations Interviewed During Our Review:
Abbreviations:
CALL: Center for Army Lessons Learned:
CENTCOM: United States Central Command:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DTMS: Digital Training Management System:
HMMWV: high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle:
MCCLL: Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned:
MRAP: mine resistant ambush protected vehicle:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 16, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
Since 2001, the Army and Marine Corps have deployed a large number of
support forces to U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of
responsibility to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote
1] Support forces reside in both the active and reserve components and
include the following:
* Army support forces consist of: combat support units that provide
fire support and operational assistance to combat elements and include
military police, combat engineers, and military intelligence soldiers,
and combat service support units that provide essential capabilities,
functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain operating forces
including soldiers who provide transportation, medical, and
quartermaster support.[Footnote 2]
* Marine Corps support forces, known as Logistics Combat Elements,
represent one of the four elements of a deploying Marine Corps Air
Ground Task Force and perform tasks such as medical, supply, engineer,
and transportation.[Footnote 3]
In conventional warfare conditions, support forces would normally
operate in rear areas away from the front lines of a battlefield.
However, the current combat environments in Iraq and Afghanistan have
demonstrated that there are no clear distinctions between the front
lines and rear support areas, and support forces are, therefore, at
times exposed to hostile fire without support from combat arms units.
[Footnote 4]
The House Armed Services Committee report to the Fiscal Year 2010
National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report on a number
of military readiness issues, including the adequacy of combat skills
training provided to support forces.[Footnote 5] We have previously
reported on combat skills training for Air Force and Navy forces,
[Footnote 6] and will report separately on other issues called for in
the House report. This report specifically assesses the extent to
which (1) Army and Marine Corps support forces are completing required
combat skills training; (2) the services and Central Command have
information to validate the completion of required combat skills
training; and (3) the Army and Marine Corps have applied lessons
learned from operational experiences to adjust combat skills training
for support forces.
To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps support forces
are completing required combat skills training, between August 2009
and February 2010, we reviewed U.S. Central Command, Army, and Marine
Corps training requirements and guidance, and we interviewed combatant
command and service officials to discuss these documents. We also
observed support force training, interviewed Army and Marine Corps
trainers, and active and reserve component units participating in
predeployment training, and analyzed information from training sites.
Specifically, we conducted discussions with trainers and members of
four Army active component, five Army Reserve, and one Army National
Guard support units and three active component Marine Corps combat
logistics battalions. These units were either conducting training or
stationed at some of the services' largest training facilities--Fort
Hood, Fort Dix, Camp Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Twentynine Palms. To
assess the extent to which the services and Central Command have
information to validate the completion of required combat skills
training, we reviewed joint and service guidance to determine the
requirements for documenting the completion or waiving of training
requirements. We also interviewed combatant command and service
headquarters and training command officials as well as members of the
previously listed Army and Marine Corps units and reviewed service
documentation concerning the extent to which servicemembers were
completing required training. To assess the extent to which the Army
and Marine Corps have applied lessons learned information to adjust
combat skills training for support forces, we evaluated service
policies on the collection and dissemination of this information. At
the sites we visited, we also interviewed training command officials,
trainers, unit officials in charge of developing training plans, and
liaisons from the service lessons learned centers. Additionally, we
discussed the collection and dissemination of lessons learned
information with officials from the service lessons learned centers
and we reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of formal lessons learned
reports they had published.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 through February
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional
details on our scope and methodology are in appendix I.
Background:
The services and combatant commands both have responsibilities for
ensuring servicemembers are trained to carry out their assigned
missions. As a result, both the services and combatant commands have
developed specific training requirements.
CENTCOM and Service Responsibilities:
Combatant commanders and service secretaries both have
responsibilities related to ensuring the preparedness of forces that
are assigned to the combatant commands. Under Title 10 of the U.S.
Code, the commander of a combatant command is directly responsible for
the preparedness of the command to carry out its assigned missions. In
addition, according to Title 10 of the U.S. Code, each service
secretary is responsible for training their forces to fulfill the
current and future operational requirements of the combatant
commands.[Footnote 7] In addition, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense has issued guidance for managing and developing training for
servicemembers. Specifically, DOD issued a directive, which stated the
services are responsible for developing service training, doctrine,
procedures, tactics, and techniques, and another that required that
training resemble the conditions of actual operations and be
responsive to the needs of the combatant commanders.[Footnote 8]
Unit Commanders' Responsibilities:
According to Joint Publication 1, unit commanders are responsible for
the training and readiness of their units.[Footnote 9] Army and Marine
Corps guidance also assigns unit commanders responsibility for
certifying that their units have completed all required training and
are prepared to deploy. Specifically, Army Regulation 350-1 states
that unit commanders are responsible for the training proficiency of
their unit and, when required, for certifying that training has been
conducted to standard and within prescribed time periods.[Footnote 10]
In addition, a Department of the Army Executive Order states that, for
the reserve component, unit commanders, in concert with service
component commands, certify completion of training and the service
component command--the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve--
validates units for deployment.[Footnote 11] Marine Administrative
Message 740/07 states that coordination of predeployment training is
the responsibility of the unit commander and all questions concerning
the training should be vetted through the commander or his operations
element.[Footnote 12] Further, unit commanders validate that their
units are certified for deployment, doing so through a certification
message that documents the extent to which deploying Marines have
successfully completed predeployment training.[Footnote 13]
CENTCOM Training Requirements:
Combatant commanders have wide-reaching authority over assigned
forces. In this capacity, CENTCOM has established baseline theater
entry requirements that include training tasks that all individuals
must complete before deploying to the CENTCOM area of
operations.[Footnote 14] Specifically, these CENTCOM training
requirements include minimum training tasks for both units and
individuals. Required individual tasks include, but are not limited
to, basic marksmanship and weapons qualification, high-mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and mine resistant ambush
protected (MRAP) vehicle egress assistance training, non-lethal
weapons usage, first aid, counter-improvised explosive device
training, and a number of briefings including rules of engagement.
Service Training Requirements:
The services have established combat training requirements that their
servicemembers must complete at various points throughout their
careers. During initial entry training, recruits are trained on
service tasks and skills, including basic military tactics, weapons
training, and marksmanship. In addition, the services have annual
training requirements that are focused on tasks such as crew-served
weapons training, reacting to chemical and biological attacks, and
offensive and defensive tactics. Prior to deploying overseas,
servicemembers must also complete a set of service directed
predeployment training requirements. These predeployment requirements
incorporate the combatant commander's requirements for the area where
the forces will be deployed. U.S. Army Forces Command and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps have both issued training requirements
for forces deploying to the CENTCOM area of operations or in support
of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 15] These documents
also require that units complete a final collective event prior to
deployment to demonstrate proficiency in collective tasks.[Footnote 16]
Collection and Dissemination of Lessons Learned:
Lessons learned are defined as results from an evaluation or
observation of an implemented corrective action that produced an
improved performance or increased capability.[Footnote 17] The primary
vehicle for formally collecting and disseminating lessons learned
information is the after action report. Army and Marine Corps guidance
require that units submit after action reports to the services'
respective lessons learned centers.[Footnote 18] Army Regulation 11-33
established its Army Lessons Learned Program to create an information
sharing culture and a system for collecting, analyzing, disseminating,
integrating, and archiving new concepts, tactics, techniques, and
procedures. The regulation further assigned the Center for Army
Lessons Learned (CALL) primary responsibility for the Army Lessons
Learned Program. The Marine Corps established its Marine Corps Center
for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) to provide a relevant, responsive source
of institutional knowledge that facilitates rapid adaptation of
lessons into the operating forces and supporting establishments.
The Army and Marine Corps have both formal and informal approaches to
collect and disseminate lessons learned information. Their formal
approaches often rely on a wide network of MCCLL and CALL liaison
officers at training centers and in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the
centers also publish relevant information on their Web sites to make
it widely available. The informal networks based on personal
relationships between unit commanders, trainers, or individual
soldiers and marines have also facilitated the sharing of lessons
learned information.
Prior GAO Work:
GAO has previously reported on combat skills training provided to
nonstandard forces.[Footnote 19] In May 2008, we reported that the Air
Force and Navy waived CENTCOM established training requirements
without consistently coordinating with the command, so CENTCOM lacked
full visibility over the extent to which all of its forces were
meeting training requirements.[Footnote 20] We recommended that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, develop and issue a policy to guide the training and
use of nonstandard forces, to include training waiver responsibilities
and procedures. DOD agreed with our recommendation, stating that it
had work underway to ensure that the necessary guidance was in place
for effective training of nonstandard forces. However, as of February
2010, it had not issued such guidance.
Army and Marine Corps Support Forces Receive Significant Combat Skills
Training, but May Not Consistently Complete All Required Tasks:
Although Army and Marine Corps support forces undergo significant
training, they may not consistently or successfully complete all
required training tasks prior to deploying. Both CENTCOM and the
services have issued predeployment training requirements. However,
some of CENTCOM's training requirements lack associated conditions and
standards, and confusion exists over which forces the requirements
apply to. In addition, the Army and Marine Corps have not included
certain CENTCOM required tasks in their predeployment training
requirements, and unit commanders can certify their units for
deployment even if all the required individual and collective training
tasks have not been successfully completed.
Army and Marine Corps Support Forces Receive Significant Combat Skills
Training:
The services provide combat skills training to their servicemembers,
including support forces, at various points throughout their careers.
During initial entry training, recruits are trained on service tasks
and skills, including basic military tactics, weapons training, and
marksmanship. In addition, servicemembers participate in annual
training that is focused on tasks such as crew-served weapons
training, reacting to chemical and biological attacks, and offensive
and defensive tactics. Soldiers and marines also participate in combat
skills training prior to deploying for any overseas operations. As a
result, the predeployment combat skills training that support unit
personnel receive should be viewed as a significant piece of their
training to operate in an asymmetric environment, but not as their
only training to operate in that environment.
Some of CENTCOM's Training Requirements Do Not Clearly Define
Conditions and Standards, and Confusion Exists over to Whom the
Requirements Apply:
CENTCOM has issued a list of training tasks that all individuals
assigned to its area of responsibility, including support unit
personnel, must complete before deploying in support of ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the CENTCOM training
requirements outline tasks that must be trained, the command does not
always clearly define the conditions and standards to which all of the
tasks should be trained. Task conditions identify all equipment,
tools, materials, references, job aids, and supporting personnel
required to perform the task, while standards indicate the basis for
judging effectiveness of task performance. For some training tasks,
CENTCOM includes specific guidance. For example, weapons qualification
requirements include a detailed discussion of when the qualification
must take place, equipment that must be worn, and range distances.
For some training tasks, however, CENTCOM does not provide any
conditions or standards. For example, as noted above, CENTCOM requires
that all deploying forces complete HMMWV rollover training, but it
does not specify how the training should be conducted. Consequently,
service training has varied within and among the Army and Marine
Corps. At one Marine Corps site, training officials explained that
HMMWV rollover training could be completed in less than a half hour.
On the other hand, trainers at one Army training site noted that their
HMMWV rollover training consisted of a full day of training that
included a classroom overview and hands-on practice in a simulator
with both day and night scenarios, pyrotechnics to simulate improvised
explosive devices, and the incorporation of casualty evacuation
procedures.
For other training tasks, the CENTCOM requirements contain only
general guidance on training conditions. For example, for some tasks
such as first aid and improvised explosive device training, CENTCOM
requires that classroom training be followed up with practical
application during field training that mimics the harsh, chaotic, and
stressful conditions servicemembers encounter in the CENTCOM area of
operations. However, the requirements do not identify the materials or
training aides to be used in conducting the training and they do not
indicate the standard for successfully completing the training. While
service officials acknowledged that, as outlined in Title 10 of the
U.S. Code,[Footnote 21] it is their responsibility to train
servicemembers, they stated that CENTCOM's list of minimum theater
entry training tasks was unclear, which resulted in varying service
interpretations of the tasks.
Furthermore, CENTCOM training requirements are communicated to the
services in a document that also outlines training requirements for
joint sourced forces.[Footnote 22] Service officials have expressed
confusion over these training requirements and the extent to which
they apply to all forces given that the tasks are listed in a document
that focuses primarily on unit training requirements for joint sourced
forces. Service officials reported that changes to training
requirements have also added to the confusion over training
requirements and priorities. While the latest set of CENTCOM
requirements contained in the joint sourced forces document was issued
on May 7, 2009, ground commanders have issued several requirements
since then.[Footnote 23] For example, in January 2010, the Commander,
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, issued an order that contained additional
training requirements for all forces deploying to Afghanistan.
However, CENTCOM officials said that these Afghanistan-specific
requirements had not yet been validated. When CENTCOM validates new
requirements it promulgates them in several different ways, including
in updates to the training requirements contained in the joint sourced
forces document, in individual request for forces, or by CENTCOM
messages.
The Services Are Providing Training on Most of CENTCOM's Required
Tasks, but Have Not Included Certain Tasks:
While the Army and Marine Corps have provided most of the CENTCOM
required training, in some cases, they have not provided training on
the specific tasks called for by CENTCOM. For example, neither service
has provided MRAP vehicle rollover training to all of their support
forces. MRAP vehicle rollover training has been identified as a key
combat skill for deploying forces. MRAP vehicles have much larger
profiles and weights than the vehicles they replaced in theater, and
as a result, pose a greater risk of tip or rollover when negotiating
slopes, trenches, ditches, and other obstacles. Further, rollover
risks are higher in Afghanistan due to uneven terrain and sub-par road
conditions.
A November 2009 DOD study on MRAP vehicle rollovers noted that since
2007, 178 MRAP vehicle mishaps involved some type of rollover that
resulted in a total of 215 injuries and 11 fatalities.[Footnote 24]
The study recommended more practice on rollover drills, and CENTCOM
has required this training for all deploying forces. According to
Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps is prioritizing MRAP vehicle
rollover training, and current Marine Corps guidance requires this
training only for marines expected to utilize MRAP vehicles. However,
use of these vehicles in theater has been increasing, and officials at
I Marine Expeditionary Force explained that they are trying to train
deploying forces to meet the MRAP vehicle rollover training
requirement. A rollover trainer was originally scheduled to arrive at
their training area in February 2010, but the delivery has been
delayed and there is currently not a projected delivery date.
Army officials explained that they have attempted to meet the CENTCOM
requirement, but that a lack of MRAP rollover trainers at the Army's
training bases in the United States has prevented them from fully
training all forces on this task prior to deployment. In the meantime,
some support forces are getting required training after they deploy,
but Army officials were unable to confirm whether all forces were
getting the required training.
Moreover, neither the Army nor the Marine Corps have provided non-
lethal weapons training to all deploying support forces. CENTCOM
requires that all individuals deploying to its area of responsibility
complete training in non-lethal weapons usage, planning, and
understanding of non-lethal weapons capability sets.[Footnote 25] DOD
reported in December 2009 that operational experience dictates the
need for forces to be trained in non-lethal weapons and that current
operations have highlighted the imperative for the discriminate use of
force to minimize civilian casualties and the integral role that non-
lethal weapons capabilities provide in achieving that objective.
[Footnote 26] In that report, DOD noted that non-lethal weapons
training has been mandated by CENTCOM for all deploying forces and
that non-lethal weapons training must be further integrated into
service training. Further, GAO has previously reported that DOD needed
to provide clearer weapons employment guidance for non-lethal weapons
and incorporate this guidance into training curricula.[Footnote 27]
Due to the confusion over what forces CENTCOM's joint sourced training
requirements apply to, Marine Corps officials explained that they do
not believe the non-lethal weapons training requirement applies to
them and do not require this training. The Army requires non-lethal
weapons training only for combat arms units. Army officials explained
that they do not have sufficient resources to train all deploying
forces, including support forces, on non-lethal weapons, but have not
sought formal waivers for this task.
Unit Commanders Can Certify Units for Deployment without Successfully
Completing All Tasks in Their Final Collective Training Event:
According to Joint Publication 1, unit commanders are responsible to
their respective Service Chiefs for the training and readiness of
their unit.[Footnote 28] Service guidance emphasizes this
responsibility, assigning unit commanders' responsibility for the
coordination and completion of predeployment training and validating
that servicemembers are certified for deployment.[Footnote 29] Before
forces deploy, Army and Marine Corps guidance requires that units
complete a final collective training event.[Footnote 30] These events
can vary based on unit type, assigned mission, and the theater of
operations and provide an opportunity for the unit to demonstrate
proficiency in collective tasks.
While service guidance requires that units undergo a final collective
training event, the guidance does not specifically require that units
successfully complete the training before commanders can certify their
units for deployment. Army and Marine Corps officials explained that
if a support unit does not demonstrate combat skills proficiency
during the final event, when and where remediation is to occur is left
to the discretion of the individual unit commander and can be
completed in theater after deploying. For example, a Marine Corps
combat logistics battalion that deployed in January 2010 was assessed
fully trained in its logistics mission, but not proficient in basic
warrior tasks during its final collective training event at Exercise
Mojave Viper.[Footnote 31] Specifically, the unit was not proficient
in fifteen of sixteen warrior tasks including reacting to ambush,
escalation of force, individual continuing actions, and casualty
evacuation procedures. The Marine Corps logistics training officer who
conducts the final unit after action reviews for combat logistics
battalions explained that poor ratings on basic warrior skills were
not uncommon for support units during their final collective training
event. While the unit conducted remedial training on casualty
evacuation procedures prior to deployment, it did not conduct remedial
training in other areas, since the unit had 15 days to complete both
required training that they were unable to accomplish prior to
Exercise Mojave Viper and remedial training, and the unit deployed on
time. Service officials explained that it is the responsibility of
unit commanders to exercise judgment in assessing whether the unit has
the collective skills needed to accomplish its mission. However,
without visibility over the completion of remediation, Army and Marine
Corps support forces may not successfully complete all CENTCOM or
service required training tasks prior to deploying.
CENTCOM and the Services Lack Complete Information on Servicemembers'
Completion of Required Combat Skills Training:
The Army and Marine Corps take steps to document the completion of
required combat skills training tasks, but face inconsistencies in the
way the services track completion of training. While the Army has a
service-wide system of record for tracking the completion of training
requirements, the system is not being fully utilized. Furthermore, the
Marine Corps lacks a service-wide system for tracking the completion
of training requirements. Instead, both services rely on paper rosters
and stand-alone spreadsheets and databases to track training
completion. In addition, even though CENTCOM requires that all forces
deploying to its area of responsibility complete a set of required
training tasks, the command lacks a clearly defined process for
waiving individual training requirements if they cannot be met.
Unit Commanders Lack Full Visibility over Completion of Required
Training Tasks Due to Inconsistent Service Tracking Systems:
According to Joint Publication 1, unit commanders are responsible to
their respective Service Chiefs for the training and readiness of
their units.[Footnote 32] Service guidance emphasizes this
responsibility, assigning unit commanders' responsibility for
coordinating and completing predeployment training and validating that
servicemembers are ready for deployment.[Footnote 33] Higher level
decision-makers, including the higher headquarters elements of the
units in training, are then responsible for validating the unit
commanders' assessments. The Army and Marine Corps take slightly
different approaches to validating units for deployment, particularly
as it applies to the Army's reserve component. While the Army and
Marine Corps active components rely heavily on unit commanders to
validate units and higher headquarter elements, such as brigade and
division commanders for the Army's active component and the Marine
Logistics Groups and Marine Expeditionary Forces for the Marine Corps,
to validate the commander's assessment, the Army's reserve component
relies heavily on a validation board that convenes at the completion
of a unit's training at a mobilization training center. However,
according to Army officials, in the end, the final decision is largely
based on individual unit commanders' assessments of the readiness of
their units.
While the Army issued guidance requiring tracking of training
completion through a servicewide system, the system has not been fully
utilized. In December 2009, the Army updated a training regulation and
required that all individual and collective training tasks be
documented for soldiers through the Digital Training Management System
(DTMS) in order to better standardize training.[Footnote 34] Army
units were required to report completion of certain requirements, such
as suicide prevention classes and the Army physical fitness test
tasks, in DTMS prior to the revision of this regulation.[Footnote 35]
However, the revised regulation designates DTMS as the only authorized
automated system for managing unit training and requires units to
track each individual soldier's completion of all required training
tasks, to include all predeployment individual and collective
training. The regulation was effective as of January 18, 2010, and
states that DTMS will be able to provide units with the ability to
plan, resource, and manage unit and individual training. However, as
of February 2010, the system was not fully operational, and while
active component units were able to enter all of their data into DTMS,
reserve component units were not yet able to do so because of a lack
of interfaces among existing tracking systems and DTMS. The Army has
not yet developed a detailed schedule with milestones and resource
requirements for fully developing the capability for reserve component
units to input data. Neither has it established milestones for active
and reserve component units to enter data into the system.
Furthermore, the guidance does not assign responsibility for ensuring
compliance and does not make it clear whether previously completed
training needs to be entered into the system or only training that is
completed after the January 18, 2010, implementation date.
The Army's active and reserve components have both begun using DTMS,
but DTMS is not being fully or consistently used by either component.
U.S. Army Forces Command officials reported that the capabilities of
DTMS are fully operational among the active component, but that units
have not consistently used the system. During our discussions with
commanders from four active component battalions in February 2010, we
found that the system, while operational, was not being fully
utilized. We noted that the battalions used DTMS to different degrees.
Specifically, two commanders said that their battalions relied on DTMS
to track training schedules and some tasks, such as weapons
qualification and physical fitness, but they said that their
battalions did not track completion of all required tasks down to the
individual soldier level. The other two battalion commanders noted
that they did not use DTMS to track completion of any training tasks.
Overall, none of the four battalions used DTMS the way the Army
intended it to be used, but emphasized interest in incorporating the
system into how they track training. First Army officials[Footnote 36]
reported that DTMS is not fully operational among the reserve
component. Army officials reported that not all of the individual
systems the reserve component used to track completion of training
were interchangeable with DTMS, and as such, the system was not fully
operational. Moreover, in our discussions with unit commanders from
five Army Reserve units and one National Guard unit in November 2009,
we noted that the system was not being utilized. In fact, none of
those commanders were familiar with DTMS despite the fact that the
Army had required the entry of suicide prevention classes and the Army
physical fitness test tasks into DTMS by September 2009.
Instead of using DTMS, Army support units rely on tools such as paper
rosters and stand-alone spreadsheets and databases to track completion
of individual and unit training, and the tools used are not consistent
among units and commands. For the reserve component, First Army has
established an Excel spreadsheet, referred to as the Commander's
Training Tool, to track completion of individual training tasks.
According to officials, the tool, intended to serve as an "in-lieu-of"
system until DTMS reached full operational capability, is used as a
model for tracking systems at the individual mobilization training
centers. Specifically, officials at one mobilization training center
told us that they had developed an individualized tracking system
based on the Commander's Training Tool, but had tailored the system to
meet the needs of the individual command. Within the active component,
unit commanders we spoke with noted that they also rely on tools such
as paper rosters and stand-alone spreadsheets and databases to track
completion of individual and unit training at the battalion level and
below, providing regular status updates to the brigade and division
commanders. Reliance on various inconsistent tracking mechanisms
instead of the servicewide DTMS limits the visibility unit commanders
have over completion of required training tasks.
The Marine Corps also uses inconsistent approaches to track completion
of required training and relies instead on paper rosters and stand-
alone spreadsheets for tracking. Specifically, 2nd Marine Logistics
Group officials said that individual units are responsible for
tracking completion of individual training and that this tracking is
completed through large Excel spreadsheets, but that the information
is regularly reviewed by the Marine Logistics Group. A commander from
a support unit within the 2nd Marine Logistics Group noted that
training was tracked and reviewed using Excel spreadsheets. Further,
the unit's operations officer noted that within the battalion,
individual training is tracked at the company level, and once a week,
the information is provided to the battalion operations officer, who
then briefs the battalion commander on overall percentages of marines
who have completed the required tasks.
We also spoke with officials from the 1st Marine Logistics Group who
noted that the individual units are responsible for tracking the
completion of both individual and unit training requirements. While
the 1st Marine Logistics Group provides units with a summary level
spreadsheet to report the status of the unit training, the individual
units are responsible for tracking the completion of individual
training and the Marine Logistics Group does not track the completion
of individual training. Officials from the 1st Marine Logistics Group
noted that unit operations officers have visibility over individuals
and their respective training, and this information is rolled up and
provided at a high level to the Commanding Officer.
A commander of a support unit we spoke with noted that his unit used
the Excel spreadsheet provided by the 1st Marine Logistics Group to
track completion of individual training requirements, with individual
tracking being done at the company level. Further, sometimes when
marines transfer among units, documentation of completed training
tasks is not provided to the receiving unit. For example, a support
battalion operations officer we spoke with noted that the battalion
received many marines throughout the deployment process, but some
marines arrived without documentation of the training they had
previously completed. In the absence of a consistent approach to track
completion of training tasks, the Marine Corps relies on inconsistent
tracking mechanisms among individual units and commands. These
inconsistent tools limit the visibility unit commanders have over
completion of required training tasks, particularly when marines are
transferred from one unit to another for deployment purposes.
CENTCOM Lacks a Process for Waiving Training Requirements, Limiting
the Command's Visibility over Whether Forces Are Completing Required
Training:
While CENTCOM has issued a consolidated list of minimum theater entry
requirements for all individuals deploying to its area of
responsibility, it has not issued overarching waiver guidance or
established a formal process for waiving each of these requirements
(e.g., basic marksmanship and weapons qualification, law of land
warfare, and HMMWV and MRAP vehicle egress assistance training) in
circumstances where the requirements are not going to be met. However,
CENTCOM officials provided an example of a case where waiver
requirements for one specific task were outlined. In September 2007,
the command issued a message requiring HMMWV egress assistance
training for all forces deploying to its area of
responsibility.[Footnote 37] This requirements message included steps
the services needed to take to waive the requirement in the event that
the training could not be completed by 100 percent of the deploying
personnel before deployment. However, a similar waiver process is not
outlined for other required CENTCOM tasks.
Officials from both the Army and Marine Corps noted that there are
instances where servicemembers are not completing all of the required
training. Specifically, when we spoke to unit commanders and unit
training officers, we were told that some personnel were not meeting
these individual training requirements and that units were not
requesting formal waivers from CENTCOM or communicating this
information to CENTCOM. For example, an operations officer from a
Marine Corps' combat logistics battalion reported that some of the
unit's deploying marines would not complete their required individual
training tasks, such as the CENTCOM-required MRAP vehicle egress
training.[Footnote 38] Moreover, the commander of an active component
Army support battalion noted that in validating his unit for
deployment, he did not focus on completion of individual tasks,
instead assessing the unit's ability to complete tasks collectively.
As such, the unit commander's decision was not based on whether all
individuals completed all of the required individual training tasks.
There is no clearly defined process for waiving these training
requirements, and there is no clear or established method for the
services to report to CENTCOM that some servicemembers are not
completing CENTCOM's required training. As a result, CENTCOM cannot
determine if additional training is required following arrival in
theater.
In May 2008, we reported that the Air Force and Navy implemented
procedures for waiving CENTCOM-required training without fully
coordinating with the CENTCOM headquarters office responsible for
developing the training requirements.[Footnote 39] Specifically, we
reported that Navy nonstandard forces that completed Navy combat
skills training more than 90 days prior to their deployment would
normally have to update their training by repeating the course, but
that they could waive this requirement if they completed relevant
combat skills training that significantly exceeded what they would
have received in the Navy course. We further reported that the Air
Force granted waivers for combat skills training on a case-by-case
basis. At the time, CENTCOM officials noted that the services had not
consistently coordinated these waiver policies with their command.
Therefore, CENTCOM did not have full visibility over the extent to
which its assigned forces had met its established training
requirements. At the time, we recommended that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense develop a policy to guide the training and use of
nonstandard forces, and the policy include training waiver
responsibilities and procedures. In February 2010, an official from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense reported that they planned to
issue a revised policy on non-standard forces by the end of the year,
and that the revised guidance would address the issue of granting
waivers. Furthermore, during our review, we learned that CENTCOM's
lack of visibility applies to a larger population of forces than just
the Air Force and Navy nonstandard forces, instead applying to all
forces deploying to the CENTCOM area of responsibility.
The Army and Marine Corps Have Made Significant Changes to Combat
Skills Training as a Result of Lessons Learned, but Information
Concerning These Changes Is Not Being Consistently Shared:
The Army and Marine Corps have made significant changes to their
combat skills training for support forces as a result of lessons
learned, but the services have not uniformly applied lessons learned.
Both the Army and Marine Corps require the collection of lessons
learned information, and each service relies on formal and informal
collection methods to obtain relevant information. While it can take
time to incorporate lessons learned into service doctrine, service
training facilities are often able to utilize lessons learned to
adjust their training almost immediately. However, training facilities
do not consistently share information obtained as a result of lessons
learned or share changes made to training as a result of lessons
learned among other facilities, resulting in servicemembers being
trained inconsistently. As such, support forces have been deploying
for similar missions with different training.
The Army and Marine Corps Have Incorporated Changes from Lessons
Learned into Training and Deployment Preparation:
The Army and Marine Corps collect lessons learned information through
both formal and informal processes, and they have made significant
changes to their training and deployment preparations as a result of
this information. Army and Marine Corps doctrine require the formal
collection of lessons learned and designate after action reports as
the primary vehicle for this formal collecting of lessons learned
information.[Footnote 40] Trainers and units noted that they prepare
after action reports at several different times including after final
collective training exercises and during and after deployment.
Depending on the complexity of the deficiency that is addressed in an
after action report and the resources required to address the
deficiency, it can sometimes take considerable time to see actions
that result from formal after action reports. However, after action
reports have resulted in changes to the way the services train and
deploy their forces, as the following examples illustrate.
* In July 2009, the Marine Corps officially established and began
training Female Engagement Teams, small detachments of female marines
whose goal was to engage Afghan women. The concept of a Female
Engagement Team was first introduced in February 2009 as part of a
special operations mission in Afghanistan. An after action report
emphasizing the need for forces to be organized and trained to engage
Afghan women was submitted in response to an incident in May 2009, in
which the enemy escaped dressed as women because male Marines were not
allowed to engage Afghan women. As a result, the Marine Corps expanded
the use of the Female Engagement Team concept, developing an actual
program and implementing a training plan. In December 2009, U.S.
Forces-Afghanistan released a memorandum that emphasized the need for
increased training and use of Female Engagement Teams.[Footnote 41]
Prior to that time, the use of Female Engagement Teams was primarily a
Marine Corps effort. However, the memorandum stated that all services
should create these teams, and since the memorandum was issued,
officials noted that the Army has begun to assess how it can best meet
the needs in theater for these teams with its available personnel.
* In November 2009, the 1st Marine Logistics Group established and
conducted a new predeployment training course for support forces that
focused on combat logistics patrols. The course was developed in
response to at least two different units' after action reports, one
submitted by a unit returning from Afghanistan and another submitted
by a unit undergoing final predeployment training, which highlighted
the need for leaders of support units to receive additional training
and experience with combat patrols. The redeploying unit's after
action report identified shortcomings in how support units conducting
convoy missions outside of forward operating bases were trained, and
the unit undergoing final training's after action report identified
deficiencies in the amount of time spent on training. The new 5-day
course--the Combat Logistics Patrol Leaders Course--focuses on
providing support units with the skills they need to conduct combat
logistics patrols, which require support forces to leave protected
areas where they can become the target for enemies, as opposed to
simply convoy missions conducted inside protected forward operating
bases.
The services also rely on lessons collected through informal means
when adjusting predeployment training. Informal collection methods
include obtaining feedback from units currently deployed in Iraq and
Afghanistan through informal discussions, observations made by
trainers or deploying unit leaders during brief visits to theater, and
informal conversations among personnel within service commands and
training organizations. Army and Marine Corps officials stated that
there is regular communication between personnel who are deployed in
theater and the personnel who are preparing to deploy to replace them.
Furthermore, they said that the deployed personnel often provide vital
information regarding the current conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan,
which the deploying unit commander and trainers can use to make
immediate adjustments to training. Much like changes made as a result
of formal lessons learned, the informal collections have also resulted
in changes to the way the services train and deploy their forces, as
the following examples illustrate.
* An Army installation established an Individual Replacement Training
program to provide individual replacement soldiers with the combat
skills needed to join their parent units in theater. Army officials
noted that approximately 2 years ago, certain units were tasked to
train these individual replacements on a 4-to 5-month rotating basis.
However, the units that conducted the training were unable to keep
pace with the flow of individual replacements because of their high
pace of operations. Based on feedback obtained from the units and
observations by unit leadership, Army civilians were assigned
responsibility for the training, which resulted in the Individual
Replacement Training program. As of 2009, the Individual Replacement
Training program trained approximately 3,400 soldiers, and combat
skills have been trained more consistently.
* Since improvised explosive devices are commonly used against
military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, training regarding the defeat
of these devices is a CENTCOM predeployment training requirement and
was cited as a key focus at the training facilities we visited.
Officials we spoke with explained that improvised explosive devices
pose a serious threat to military forces because the types of devices
the enemies use constantly change. While training facilities have
incorporated the most recent improvised explosive device defeat
tactics into their training based on information provided by the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization,[Footnote 42] they
also obtain and immediately incorporate the tactics provided
informally by individuals in theater.
The Services Would Benefit from Sharing Changes Made as a Result of
Lessons Learned:
Trainers at the sites we visited told us that they had made
adjustments to training based on both informal and formal lessons
learned information that they had received. However, they also told us
that they did not consistently share information about the adjustments
they had made with other sites that were training forces on the same
tasks, and even in cases where the information was shared, there were
still some differences in the training that was being provided to
deploying support forces. For example:
* One site significantly enhanced its HMMWV rollover training based on
informal feedback. Specifically, the training was enhanced to include
hands-on practice in a simulator with both day and night and land and
water scenarios, as well as an emphasis on new vehicle features, such
as the dual release seatbelts, when exiting the vehicle in an
emergency. While trainers from this site provided information about
these enhancements to some of their counterparts at other training
facilities, HMMWV rollover training varies significantly from site to
site. At one of the sites we visited, HMMWV rollover training
consisted simply of a short demonstration.
* At one training site we visited, trainers were teaching Army Reserve
support forces who had not been mobilized specific tactics for
entering and clearing buildings, while other trainers at the same site
were teaching soldiers who had been mobilized different tactics for
the same task. Officials we spoke with stated that these differences
in tactics are a result of a lack of sharing of information among
trainers. Specifically, the First Army trainers who were training
soldiers after mobilization were not consistently sharing information
with U.S. Army Reserve trainers who were training soldiers prior to
mobilization. Since one of the primary purposes for conducting
repetitive training is to develop an intuitive response to certain
circumstances, repetitive training that employs different tactics may
not be as effective as repetitive training that uses consistent
tactics.
Although officials at the training facilities we visited note that
they have made efforts to share some of the information obtained and
subsequent changes made as a result of lessons learned with their
counterparts at other training facilities, the sharing has been
inconsistent. According to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction, organizations participating in the joint lessons learned
program are to coordinate activities and collaboratively exchange
observations, findings, and recommendations to the maximum extent
possible.[Footnote 43] While the services have formal and informal
means to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned information,
trainers at the various training sites are not consistently sharing
information about the changes they have made to their training
programs. As a result, servicemembers are trained inconsistently and
units that are deploying for similar missions sometimes receive
different types and amounts of training.
Conclusions:
U.S. forces deployed to CENTCOM's area of responsibility, including
support forces, are operating in an environment that lacks clear
distinctions between the front lines and rear support areas. As a
result, support units such as military police, engineers, and medical
personnel may be exposed to hostile fire and other battlefield
conditions. The Army, Marine Corps, and CENTCOM continue to emphasize
the importance of training and have identified specific tasks to be
accomplished as part of predeployment training that they believe will
better prepare forces to operate in the current operational
environment. While forces clearly undergo significant training,
clarifying CENTCOM's training requirements, including more clearly
defining the specific tasks to be completed by different types of
forces and the conditions and standards for the content of training,
would enhance the service's ability to ensure that forces are
consistently trained on required tasks. Furthermore, in order to make
informed decisions on deploying forces and assigning missions once
deployed, the services and CENTCOM need information on the extent of
training completed by forces prior to deployment. Inconsistencies in
existing approaches for documenting the completion of training and the
lack of a formal process for granting waivers to training and
communicating waiver decisions hamper the services and CENTCOM in
their ability to get a clear picture of which units or individuals
have been fully trained for certain missions and whether any
capability gaps might exist upon the forces' arrival in theater. Last,
the services are making significant adjustments in training regimens
based on captured lessons learned from actual operational experiences.
However, additional efforts to share information on these adjustments
among and within training facilities would provide greater assurance
that the training is consistent.
Recommendations:
To improve the consistency of training, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense:
* direct the commander, U.S. Central Command to:
- clarify which of the command's mandatory training requirements apply
to all forces deploying to CENTCOM's area of responsibility and which
requirements apply only to joint sourced forces, and clearly
communicate this information to the services.
- clearly outline the conditions under which CENTCOM's mandatory
training requirements are to be accomplished and the standards to
which the tasks should be trained.
* direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps to:
- include all of CENTCOM's minimum training requirements in their
service training requirements.
To improve commanders' visibility over the extent to which support
forces are completing required combat skills training, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to
fully implement the service's system of record for tracking training
completion--the Digital Training Management System by (1) developing a
schedule for fully implementing the system, including the work to be
performed and the resources to be used, and (2) including the actual
start and completion dates of work activities performed so that the
impact of deviations on future work can be proactively addressed. We
further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commandant
of the Marine Corps to establish and fully implement consistent
approaches for documenting the completion or waiving of combat skills
training requirements. We are also broadening our prior recommendation
on waiver oversight and recommending that the Secretary of Defense
direct the commander, U.S. Central Command, to establish a formal
process for waiving training requirements for all deploying forces,
not just nonstandard forces, and to communicate this process to the
services.
To maintain training consistency as training evolves in response to
ongoing operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to
develop a method for consistently sharing information concerning
changes that are made to training programs in response to formal or
informal lessons learned.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or
partially concurred with our recommendations. Specifically, DOD
concurred with our six recommendations related to the definition,
completion, and waiver of training requirements, and sharing
information on changes to training based on lessons learned. DOD
stated that it has inserted draft language into its 2010 update to the
"Guidance for the Development of the Force" and its draft DOD
Instruction 1322.mm entitled "Implementing DOD Training" to address
our recommendations.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to fully implement the
Digital Training Management System (DTMS)--the service's system of
record for tracking training completion--by (1) developing a schedule
for fully implementing the system, including the work to be performed
and the resources to be used, and (2) including the actual start and
completion dates of work activities performed so that the impact of
deviations on future work can be proactively addressed. In its
comments, DOD stated that the Army's training management system of
record has been directed to be implemented and that in order to fully
leverage this capability, it will take time, training and resources to
extend the system to the entire organization. Instead of stipulating
DTMS, DOD requested that GAO address (in our recommendation) more
generally the Army's training management system of record. We
recognize that it will take time for the Army to fully implement the
system, but also note that it has not set a specific schedule, with
key elements, such as work to be performed, resources needed, and
milestones for start and completion of activities, which we believe
will add discipline to the process, help guide its efforts, and help
the Army to plan for any schedule deviations. We recognize that the
Army continues to refine DTMS and that changes could occur. However,
at this point in time, Army guidance specifically characterizes DTMS
as the Army's training management system of record; therefore, we do
not agree that our recommendation should be adjusted.
Furthermore, DOD stated that some findings in the draft report are
partially accurate, but that a number of points of information and
clarification related to DTMS provided by the Department of the Army
do not appear in the findings. For example, DOD noted that ongoing
efforts by the Army designed to improve DTMS will expand existing
functionality and interfaces to enhance and broaden operational use of
the application by Army units. It noted the Army has a review process
that, among other things, monitors progress of DTMS implementation and
allows for the establishment and approval of priorities for developing
interfaces with other existing legacy systems and manual processes. In
addition, DOD stated that the report cites that DTMS is not fully
operational because all interfaces are not completed to the
satisfaction of a subordinate organization, which, in DOD's view, does
not drive the level of program functionality or define the point in
time when the system is fully operational. DOD noted that the
inclusion of updated interfaces enables data input from other sources
and that the basic functionality of DTMS is in place, operational, and
available for use by units across the Army. DOD also noted some Army
units are still using spreadsheets and/or legacy systems to track
individual training rather than DTMS, but that this is a function of
compliance, not operational capability or the availability of system
interfaces. It further stated that the Army is currently working to
institute methods to improve compliance as outlined in AR 350-1, the
Army's regulation that guides training.[Footnote 44]
We recognize that the basic functionality of DTMS exists and that the
Army is continuing to take steps to implement DTMS, improve the
interfaces between DTMS and legacy systems and processes, and improve
overall compliance with the requirement for units to report in DTMS.
However, our work suggests that it is not only a lack of compliance
preventing full utilization of the system, but also a lack of
awareness among all of the operational units that DTMS even exists.
For example, within the reserve component, some unit commanders we
interviewed were unfamiliar with DTMS or that they were required, by
Army guidance, to use the system to report training completion.
Further, while we recognize interfaces exist, our work shows they are
not fully mature to the point where they are compatible with existing
tracking systems, thereby limiting the ability of the reserve
component to fully use DTMS as intended.
DOD further noted that the report infers that DTMS could or should be
the source for CENTCOM and the Army to certify and/or validate unit
training for deployments, but due to it not being fully utilized, the
completion of combat skills training could be in question. DOD
explained that DTMS is a training management system, and it is the
responsibility of Commanders and Army Service Component Commands to
certify and validate units. As stated in our report, we recognize that
commanders and the service component commands are responsible for the
certification and validation of units for deployment. However, in
order to be more fully informed about the training and readiness
status of units before making decisions about deployments, those
making these decisions need visibility over the completion of the
combatant command and service pre-deployment training requirements.
Currently, DTMS does not provide unit commanders or service component
commands with this type of visibility, and therefore, these
individuals and commands must rely on the tracking mechanisms we
outlined in this report when certifying and validating units, and
these tracking mechanisms are not always complete or consistent. The
full text of DOD's written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which Army and Marine Corps support forces are
completing required combat skills training, we reviewed combatant
commander and service individual and unit predeployment training
requirements, including CENTCOM's Theater Entry Requirements, the U.S.
Army Forces Command's Predeployment Training Guidance for Follow-on
Forces Deploying In Support of Southwest Asia, and Marine Corps Order
3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process. To determine if the
services were fully addressing the CENTCOM minimum requirements, we
compared the CENTCOM minimum training requirements to the Army and
Marine Corps minimum requirements, making linkages where possible and
obtaining service explanations when linkages did not appear to exist.
We also reviewed policy documents on service training, such as the
services' common skills manuals and training programs of instruction.
Additionally, we interviewed and analyzed information from officials
responsible for developing and implementing training requirements at
CENTCOM, Department of the Army Training Directorate, U.S. Army Forces
Command, First Army, U.S. Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve
Command, Marine Corps Training and Education Command, and Marine
Forces Command. Lastly, we observed support force training at four of
the Army and Marine Corps' largest training facilities--Fort Dix, Camp
Lejeune, Camp Pendleton, and Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Base. At
the training sites, we interviewed and collected various training-
related documents from Army and Marine Corps active and reserve
component units participating in predeployment training as well as
training command officials on the implementation of service training
guidance. We also obtained information from Army active component
support forces stationed at Fort Hood.
To assess the extent to which the services and Central Command have
information to validate the completion of required combat skills
training, we reviewed Army and Marine Corps policies on training,
including Army Regulation 350-1, which outlines requirements for
servicewide tracking through the Digital Training Management System,
and Marine Corps Order 3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process.
We also coordinated with the U.S. Army Audit Agency regarding their
ongoing efforts in reviewing the Digital Training Management System.
We interviewed service headquarters officials to discuss the processes
the services use to track completion of training requirements. We
reviewed Joint Publication 1, and other joint and service policies
that document the role and responsibilities of unit commanders in
tracking and reporting completion of training requirements. We
interviewed Department of the Army Training Directorate, Marine Corps
Training and Education Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, Marine
Forces Command, First Army, and U.S. Army Reserve Command officials
and reviewed documents from these commands, which are involved in the
process of tracking the completion of combat skills training.
Additionally, we interviewed an Army training command and the 1st,
2nd, and 4th Marine Corps Logistics Groups to discuss the processes
used to track completion of training requirements at the unit level.
We reviewed the means these organizations use to document the extent
to which servicemembers were completing required training--paper
records, automated spreadsheets, and databases. We further interviewed
thirteen unit commanders of units preparing to deploy or returning
from deployment to identify individual processes being used to track
completion of training requirements. Lastly, we interviewed and
obtained information from officials representing CENTCOM, Army and
Marine Corps headquarters, and the Army and Marine Corps force
providers and training commands to discuss the processes the services
use to waive service and combatant command training requirements. We
also reviewed past related GAO reports regarding the tracking and
waiving of training requirements.
To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have applied
lessons learned from operational experiences to adjust combat skills
training for support forces, we reviewed service policies on the
collection and dissemination of lessons learned, specifically Army
Regulation 11-33 for the Army Lessons Learned Program and Marine Corps
Order 3504.1 for the Marine Corps Lessons Learned Program and the
Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. These policies, which
establish the services' lessons learned centers, also require the
collection of after action reports. Further, we reviewed joint
guidance to determine whether requirements existed for the training
facilities and services to collaborate and share lessons learned
information. We interviewed and obtained information on the collection
and implementation of lessons learned from officials representing the
Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Marine Corps Center for
Lessons Learned. We also interviewed lessons learned liaisons,
training command officials, trainers, and officials responsible for
developing unit training plans at five of the Army and Marine Corps'
largest training sites--Fort Hood, Fort Dix, Camp Lejeune, Camp
Pendleton, and Twentynine Palms. While interviewing officials from the
lessons learned centers and the training facilities, discussions
included: the use of various lessons learned to alter and improve
predeployment training; the types of products the centers create and
distribute; and the extent to which trainers shared the information
among training sites. Based on these discussions with lessons learned
officials, we identified and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of the
formal lessons learned reports and handbooks that applied specifically
to training for support forces. We also reviewed past related GAO and
DOD reports regarding lessons learned.
To gain insight on support forces' perspectives on completion of
combatant command and service combat skills training requirements, we
conducted discussions with five Army Reserve and one Army National
Guard support units--military intelligence, movement control, combat
camera, medical, and human resources--located at the combined pre-and
post-mobilization training center Fort Dix, New Jersey, and three
active component Marine Corps combat logistics battalions from the two
Marine Corps Divisions located in the continental United States that
were preparing to deploy to either Iraq or Afghanistan, as well as
four of Fort Hood's active component Army support battalions that have
recently returned from deployment. To conduct these discussion
sessions, we traveled to one Army installation and three Marine Corps
installations in the continental United States from August 2009
through December 2009 and conducted telephone discussions with
representatives from one active duty Army installation in February
2010. In selecting units to speak with, we asked the service
headquarters and force providers to identify all support units that
would be in pre-mobilization or predeployment training during the time
frame of our visit. The basic criteria used in selecting these units
was that they were an Army or Marine Corps support unit participating
in pre-mobilization or predeployment training and preparing to deploy
to or recently redeployed from either Iraq or Afghanistan. Thus, our
selection was limited since the time frame was so narrow. Once units
were identified, we spoke with the unit command elements and senior
enlisted servicemembers from nine support units that were available at
the individual sites we visited. Overall, we spoke with Army and
Marine Corps support units preparing to deploy to Iraq and
Afghanistan, and within these units, some servicemembers who had
previously deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. We also spoke with four
available active component Army support unit representatives who had
recently returned from Iraq. Topics of discussion during the sessions
included development and implementation of unit training plans,
verification of training completion, and equipment and manning
challenges that impact training. We also administered a short
questionnaire to participants in the senior enlisted discussion
sessions to obtain their feedback on the combat skills training their
unit received. Comments provided during the discussion groups, as well
as on the questionnaire, cannot be projected across the entire
military community because the participants were not selected using a
generalizable probability sampling methodology. To validate
information we heard in the discussion groups, we interviewed the
unit's higher headquarters, where available, as well as officials from
the training commands and service headquarters and force providers.
Table 1 outlines all of the organizations we interviewed during the
course of our review.
Table 1: Organizations Interviewed During Our Review:
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness),
Arlington, Va.
U.S Army:
* Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans (G-3), Arlington, Va.
* Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
* Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Va.
* U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va.
* U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga.
* U.S. Army Audit Agency, Alexandria, Va.
* First Army, Fort Gillem, Ga.
* U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Ga.
* Army National Guard, Arlington, Va.
* Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
* Fort Dix, N.J.
- 72nd Field Artillery Brigade.
- Regional Training Center-East.
- New Jersey National Guard.
- Center for Army Lessons Learned Representatives.
- Select Support Units.
* Fort Hood, Tex.
- Individual Replacement Training Team.
- Centers for Army Lessons Learned Representatives.
- Select Support Units.
U.S. Marine Corps:
* Headquarters Marine Corps, Arlington, Va.
* Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Quantico, Va.
* Marine Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.
* Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Quantico, Va.
* Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force Training Command and Tactical
Training Exercise Control Group, Twentynine Palms, Calif.
* I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, Calif.
* II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
* 1st Marine Logistics Group, Camp Pendleton, Calif.
* 2nd Marine Logistics Group, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
* 4th Marine Logistics Group, New Orleans, La.
U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fl.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 through February
2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Under Secretary Of Defense:
Personnel And Readiness:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-4000:
March 24, 2010:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense Response to the Government
Accountability Office Draft report titled: Actions Needed To Further
Improve the Consistency of Combat Skills Training Provided for Army
and Marine Corps Support Forces (GAO 10-465.) We thank you for the
opportunity to comment. Regarding the recommendations, we concur with
items 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8. We partially concur with items 4 and 5.
Elaboration on these positions is in the enclosure appended to this
letter.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Samuel D. Kleinman:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense:
Readiness:
[End of letter]
Enclosure:
GAO Draft Report Dated March 1, 2010:
GA0-10-465 (GAO CODE 351385):
"Military Training: Actions Needed To Further Improve The Consistency
Of Combat Skills Training Provided To Army And Marine Corps Support
Forces"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Central Command to clarify which of the
command's mandatory training requirements apply to all forces
deploying to U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM's) area of responsibility
and which requirements apply only to joint sourced forces, and clearly
communicate this information to the services. (See page 28/GAO Draft
Report.)
DoD Response: Concur. Delineating training requirements between joint
sourced forces and all forces deploying to CENTCOM will streamline
minimum theatre training requirements for sourced personnel. Draft
language to that effect has been inserted into 2010 update to
'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' In addition, similar
language specifying CCDRs clarify and update their requirements is
added to the draft DoDI 1322.mm, Implementing DoD Training. Stipulated
training requirements should be vetted through the Joint Staff with
collaboration from CENTCOM and the Services for final disposition.
Recommend item be closed.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commander, U.S. Central Command to clearly outline the
conditions under which CENTCOM's mandatory training requirements are
to be accomplished and the standards to which the tasks should be
trained. (See page 28/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Concur. Draft language to that effect has been inserted
into 2010 update to 'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' Draft
language to that effect has been inserted to the draft DoDI 1322.mm,
Implementing DoD Training. Stipulated training requirements should be
vetted through the Joint Staff with collaboration from CENTCOM and the
Services for final disposition. Recommend item be closed.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps to include all of CENTCOM's minimum training requirements in
their training requirements. (See page 28/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Concur. Draft language to that effect has been inserted
into 2010 update to 'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' Draft
language to that effect has been inserted into the draft DoDI I322.mm,
Implementing DoD Training Stipulated training requirements should be
vetted through the Joint Staff with collaboration from CENTCOM and the
Services for final disposition. Recommend item be closed.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to fully implement the service's
system of record for tracking training completion-the Digital Training
Management System by developing a schedule for fully implementing the
system, including the work to be performed and the resources to be
used. (See pages 28 & 29/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Partially concur. Army's training management system of
record has been directed to be implemented. In order to fully leverage
this capability, it will take time, training and resources to extend
the system to the entire organization. Instead of stipulating Digital
Training Management System specifically, DoD requests that GAO
address, more generally, the Army's training management system of
record. The Army states that the report narrative and recommendations
#4 & #5 are not supportive of each other. The recommendations
currently state that the Secretary of Defense needs to direct the
Secretary of the Army to fully implement the Digital Training
Management System (DTMS) by developing a schedule to fully implement
the system, including the work to be performed and the resources to be
used, and identifying the actual start and completion dates of work
activities performed so that the impact of deviations on future work
can be addressed.
(1) Some of the findings in the draft report are partially accurate;
however, a number of Digital Training Management System points of
information/clarification provided by the Department of the Army to
the audit team do not appear in the findings. Army requests these
points be integrated into the final report.
(2) Ongoing efforts by the Army designed to improve DTMS will expand
existing functionality and interfaces to enhance and broaden
operational use of the application by Army units LAW AR 350-1. The
Army conducts a semi-annual DIMS Requirements Control Board (RCB)
governed by the G-3/5/7 Training General Officer Steering Committee
(TGOSC). This review process will continue to monitor the progress of
DTMS implementation throughout the Army. This process allows the RCB
and TGOSC to establish and approve priorities for developing
interfaces with other existing legacy systems and manual processes.
Additionally, this process supports the addition of functional modules
to DTMS that better support the training information desires of
individual commands. DTMS developments and improvements do compete for
resources and operate within that constraint. DIMS is an Army
developed Training Management System designed to support unit level
training management, individual training records and managing unit
level training. The application is, however, limited to the
capabilities defined in support of Army Training Management and may
not meet every need or desire across the spectrum of units within the
Army.
(3) Some Army units (not limited to support units) are still using
spreadsheets and/or legacy systems to track individual training rather
than using DIMS is a function of compliance, not operational
capability or the availability of system interfaces. The Army is
currently working to institute methods to improve compliance IAW AR
350-1.
(4) The report cites that DTMS is not fully operational because all
interfaces are not completed to the satisfaction of a subordinate
organization. This does not drive the level of program functionality
or define the point in time when it is fully operational. The
inclusion of updated interfaces enables data input from other sources.
The basic functionality of the application is in place, operational,
and is available for use by units across the Army.
(5) The report infers that DTMS could or should be the source for
CENTCOM and the Army to certify/validate unit training for
deployments, but due to it not being fully utilized, the completion of
combat skills training could be in question. DIMS is a training
management system; Commanders and Army Service Component Commands
certify/validate units.
Recommend item be closed.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to fully implement the service's
system of record for tracking training completion-the Digital Training
Management system by including the actual start and completion dates
of work activities performed so that the impact of deviations on
future work can be proactively addressed. (See page 29/GAO Draft
Report.)
DoD Response: Partially concur. See notes in response to
recommendation 4. Recommend item be closed.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to establish and fully
implement consistent approaches for documenting the completion or
waiving of combat skills training requirements. (See page 29/GAO Draft
Report.)
DoD Response: Concur. Draft language to that effect has been inserted
into 2010 update to 'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' Draft
language to that effect has been inserted into the draft DoDI 1322.mm,
Implementing DoD Training Stipulated training requirements should be
vetted through the Joint Staff with collaboration from CENTCOM and the
Services for final disposition. Recommend item be closed.
Recommendation 7: The GAO is broadening their prior recommendation on
waiver oversight and recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to establish a formal process for
waiving training requirements for all deploying forces, not just
nonstandard forces, and to communicate this process to the services.
(See page 29/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Concur. Draft language to that effect has been inserted
into 2010 update to 'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' Draft
language to that effect has been inserted into the draft DoDI 1322.mm,
Implementing DoD Training. Stipulated training requirements should be
vetted through the Joint Staff with collaboration from CENTCOM and the
Services for final disposition. Recommend item be closed.
Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps to develop a method for consistently sharing information
concerning changes that are made to training programs in response to
formal or informal lessons learned. (See page 29/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Concur. Draft language to that effect has been inserted
into 2010 update to 'Guidance for the Development of the Force.' Draft
language to that effect has been inserted into the draft DoDI 1322.mm,
Implementing DoD Training. DoD plans to review and improve, where
appropriate, the dissemination of changes to training programs
resulting from the analysis of lessons learned. Recommend item be
closed.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this
report were Michael Ferren (Assistant Director), Susan Ditto, Lonnie
McAllister, Terry Richardson, Michael Silver, Christopher Watson,
Natasha Wilder, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Kristy Williams.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Combat support and combat service support forces are often
referred to as noncombat arms forces. For the purposes of this report,
we will refer to these forces as support forces.
[2] The function of the Quartermaster Corps is to provide support to
the Army in the following areas: general supply--except for ammunition
and medical supplies; mortuary affairs; subsistence; petroleum and
water; aerial delivery; shower, laundry, fabric/light textile repair;
and materiel and distribution management.
[3] The other three elements of the Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force
are the command element, the ground combat element, and the aviation
combat element.
[4] Combat arms forces provide direct combat power to meet operational
requirements, performing their core missions within service deployment
constructs, such as Army brigades or Marine Corps regiments.
[5] H.R. Rep. No. 111-166, at 293-94 (2009).
[6] GAO, Military Training: Navy and Air Force Need to More Fully
Apply Best Practices to Enhance Development and Management of Combat
Skills Training, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-220R]
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2009).
[7] See 10 U.S.C. §164 (2010) for responsibilities of commanders of
combatant commands and sections 3013, 5013, and 8013 of Title 10, U.S.
Code (2010) for the responsibilities of the service secretaries.
[8] DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and
Its Major Components (Aug. 1, 2002) and DOD Directive 1322.18,
Military Training (Jan. 13, 2009).
[9] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces
of the United States (May 14, 2007), incorporating Change 1, March 20,
2009.
[10] Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development (Dec.
18, 2009).
[11] Headquarters, Department of the Army Executive Order 150-08,
Reserve Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre-and Post-
Mobilization Training Strategy (March 2008).
[12] Marine Administrative Message 740/07, The Pre-Deployment Toolkit
(Dec. 19, 2007).
[13] Marine Corps Order 3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process
(Jan. 26, 2010).
[14] U.S. Central Command FY10 Joint Sourced Training Requirement (May
7, 2009). As outlined in CENTCOM guidance, all individuals deploying
to its area of responsibility are required to complete the outlined
theater entry requirements before deploying to the CENTCOM area of
operation.
[15] U.S. Army Forces Command Pre-deployment Training Guidance for
Follow-on Forces Deploying In Support Of Southwest Asia (Oct. 27,
2009) and Marine Corps Order 3502.6 (Jan. 26, 2010).
[16] The Army commonly refers to this event as the culminating
training event, while the Marine Corps commonly refers to this as the
mission rehearsal exercise.
[17] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25D, Joint
Lessons Learned Program (Oct. 10, 2008). According to Army guidance,
lessons learned are defined as validated knowledge and experience
derived from observations and the historical study of military
training, exercises and combat operations that leads to a change in
behavior at either the tactical (standard operating procedures,
tactics, techniques, and procedures, and so forth), operational, or
strategic level or in one or more of the Army's doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. Army Regulation 11-33, Army Lessons
Learned Program (ALLP) (Oct. 17, 2006).
[18] Army Regulation 11-33 (Oct. 17, 2006) and Marine Corps Order
3504.1, Marine Corps Lessons Learned Program (MCLLP) and the Marine
Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) (July 31, 2006). After action
reports highlight best practices or areas for improvement, and service
officials explained that these reports capture feedback at various
points, to include during pre-deployment training, while deployed in-
theater, and post-deployment.
[19] Nonstandard forces are defined as joint sourced, in-lieu of, and
ad hoc forces as well as individual augmentees.
[20] GAO, Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the
Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-670] (Washington, D.C.:
May 30, 2008).
[21] See sections 3013, 5013, and 8013 of Title 10, U.S. Code (2010)
for the responsibilities of the service secretaries.
[22] Joint sourced forces consist of units from one service that are
deployed to perform their core missions in place of units from another
service; for example, Navy or Air Force medical units deployed to fill
requirements for Army medical units.
[23] U.S. Central Command FY10 Joint Sourced Training Requirement (May
7, 2009).
[24] Department of Defense, Defense Research and Engineering. "Safety
of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, November 2007-
August 2009" (November 2009).
[25] DOD defines non-lethal weapons as weapons that are explicitly
designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or
materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel,
and undesired damage to property and the environment. Non-lethal
weapons include acoustic devices and non-lethal munitions.
[26] Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics. "Department of Defense Report to Congress on
Requirements for Non-Lethal Weapons" (December 2009).
[27] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Improve Program Management,
Policy, and Testing to Enhance Ability to Field Operationally Useful
Non-lethal Weapons, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-344]. (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21,
2009).
[28] Joint Pub. 1 (May 14, 2007).
[29] AR 350-1 (Dec. 18, 2009) and MARADMIN 740/07 (Dec. 19, 2007).
[30] U.S. Army Forces Command Pre-deployment Training Guidance for
Follow-on Forces Deploying In Support Of Southwest Asia (Oct. 27,
2009) and Marine Corps Order 3502.6 (Jan. 26, 2010).
[31] Exercise Mojave Viper is the integration of all elements of the
Marine Air Ground Task Force into a service-level, pre-deployment
training program assessment exercise. It consists of 29 days of
evaluated training, with a final collective training event at the end
of the curriculum.
[32] Joint Pub. 1 (May 14, 2007).
[33] AR 350-1 (Dec. 18, 2009) and MARADMIN 740/07 (Dec. 19, 2007).
[34] AR 350-1 (Dec. 18, 2009).
[35] ALARACT 208/2009. Army Training Records Data Integration/Digital
Training Management System (DTMS) (July 2009).
[36] First Army is the command responsible for mobilizing, training,
validating, and deploying reserve component units in accordance with
Combatant Commander, Department of the Army, and U.S. Army Forces
Command directives.
[37] Headquarters, U.S. Central Command, HMMWV Egress Assistance
Trainer (HEAT) Predeployment Training Requirement (Sep. 14, 2007).
[38] This operations officer was also designated as the unit's
training officer.
[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-670].
[40] Army Regulation 11-33 (Oct. 17, 2006) and Marine Corps Order
3504.1 (July 31, 2006).
[41] Headquarters, United States Forces-Afghanistan, Training
Improvement Recommendations for US Forces Deploying to Afghanistan
(Dec. 6, 2009).
[42] The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization is a
jointly manned activity of DOD established to reduce and eliminate the
effects of all forms of improvised explosive devices used against U.S.
and coalition forces.
[43] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI
3150.25D, Joint Lessons Learned Program (Oct. 10, 2008).
[44] A.R. 350-1 (Dec. 18, 2009).
[End of section]
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