Operation Iraqi Freedom
Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq Gao ID: GAO-10-376 April 19, 2010The drawdown from Iraq is a complex operation of significant magnitude. Established drawdown timelines dictate a reduction in forces to 50,000 troops by August 31, 2010, and a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. While DOD has made progress toward meeting these goals, a large amount of equipment, personnel, and bases remain to be drawn down. Moreover, escalating U.S. involvement in Afghanistan may increase the pressure on DOD to efficiently execute the drawdown. Due to broad congressional interest in drawdown issues, GAO performed this work under the Comptroller General's Authority. GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOD has planned for the drawdown from Iraq in accordance with set timelines, and (2) factors that may impact the efficient execution of the drawdown. To evaluate these efforts GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from over 20 DOD organizations in the U.S., Kuwait, and Iraq.
Several DOD organizations have issued coordinated plans for the execution of the drawdown and created new organizations to oversee, synchronize, and ensure unity of effort during the drawdown. To date, DOD reports that its drawdown efforts have exceeded its goals. For example, in January 2010, DOD reported that it had exceeded its target figure for withdrawing wheeled and tracked combat vehicles in Iraq, among other items, by over 2,600 pieces, yet a large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down. However, DOD has not (1) fully included contracted support in its operational planning for the drawdown, (2) allowed sufficient time in its guidance to ensure that all contracted services can be put on contract in a responsible manner, or (3) clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of various contract validation review boards. Several other issues may impede the efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq. First, challenges associated with the planned simultaneous transition of several major contracts may lead to the interruption of vital services. Second, DOD has not determined whether the benefits of transitioning its major base and life support contract in Iraq outweigh the costs and risks of doing so. Third, shortages of contract oversight personnel may increase the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. Fourth, key decisions concerning equipment that will be retrograded from Iraq have yet to be made. And finally, DOD lacks precise visibility over its inventory of equipment and shipping containers. While DOD has begun to address some of these issues, GAO has not fully assessed DOD's actions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: William M. Solis Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-8365GAO-10-376, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2010:
Operation Iraqi Freedom:
Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and
Equipment from Iraq:
GAO-10-376:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-376, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The drawdown from Iraq is a complex operation of significant
magnitude. Established drawdown timelines dictate a reduction in
forces to 50,000 troops by August 31, 2010, and a complete withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. While DOD has made
progress toward meeting these goals, a large amount of equipment,
personnel, and bases remain to be drawn down. Moreover, escalating
U.S. involvement in Afghanistan may increase the pressure on DOD to
efficiently execute the drawdown.
Due to broad congressional interest in drawdown issues, GAO performed
this work under the Comptroller General‘s Authority. GAO examined (1)
the extent to which DOD has planned for the drawdown from Iraq in
accordance with set timelines, and (2) factors that may impact the
efficient execution of the drawdown. To evaluate these efforts GAO
reviewed documents and interviewed officials from over 20 DOD
organizations in the U.S., Kuwait, and Iraq.
What GAO Found:
Several DOD organizations have issued coordinated plans for the
execution of the drawdown and created new organizations to oversee,
synchronize, and ensure unity of effort during the drawdown. To date,
DOD reports that its drawdown efforts have exceeded its goals. For
example, in January 2010, DOD reported that it had exceeded its target
figure for withdrawing wheeled and tracked combat vehicles in Iraq,
among other items, by over 2,600 pieces, yet a large amount of
personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down. However, DOD
has not (1) fully included contracted support in its operational
planning for the drawdown, (2) allowed sufficient time in its guidance
to ensure that all contracted services can be put on contract in a
responsible manner, or (3) clearly defined the roles and
responsibilities of various contract validation review boards.
Figure: Drawdown Progress Since May 2009 and What Remains to Be Drawn
Down through August 31, 2010, and December 31, 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph]
U.S. Forces[A]:
Drawn down since May 2009: 27%;
To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010: 36%;
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 37%.
DOD Contractor Personnel[B]:
Drawn down since May 2009: 20%;
To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010: 36%;
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 44%.
Rolling Stock[C]:
Drawn down since May 2009: 25%;
To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010: 34%;
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 41%.
Containers[B]:
Drawn down since May 2009: 34%;
To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010: 38%;
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 28%.
Bases[A]:
Drawn down since May 2009: 33%;
To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010: 28%;
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 39%.
Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.
[A] Data current as of February 2010.
[B] Data current as of December 2009.
[C] Data current as of January 2010.
[End of figure]
Several other issues may impede the efficient execution of the
drawdown from Iraq. First, challenges associated with the planned
simultaneous transition of several major contracts may lead to the
interruption of vital services. Second, DOD has not determined whether
the benefits of transitioning its major base and life support contract
in Iraq outweigh the costs and risks of doing so. Third, shortages of
contract oversight personnel may increase the risk of fraud, waste,
and abuse. Fourth, key decisions concerning equipment that will be
retrograded from Iraq have yet to be made. And finally, DOD lacks
precise visibility over its inventory of equipment and shipping
containers. While DOD has begun to address some of these issues, GAO
has not fully assessed DOD‘s actions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO makes several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
regarding operational planning, the management and transition of
contracts, the cost and benefits of transitioning contracts, contract
oversight, and DOD‘s plans for the disposition of equipment. DOD
concurred with all but one of GAO‘s recommendations. GAO revised the
last recommendation accordingly.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376] or key
components. For more information, contact Bill Solis at (202) 512-8365
or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Coordinated Plans and New Organizations Have Facilitated Progress in
the Drawdown from Iraq, but DOD Has Yet to Plan for All Contracted
Support Needed During the Drawdown:
Several Additional Challenges May Affect the Efficient Execution of
the Drawdown:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Breakdown of U.S. Army Equipment in Iraq as of February 2010:
Figure 2: Drawdown Progress Since May 2009 and What Remains to Be
Drawn Down through August 31, 2010, and December 31, 2011:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 19, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
On November 17, 2008, the United States and the Government of Iraq
signed a Security Agreement that took effect on January 1, 2009, which
includes a timeline and requirements for the drawdown of U.S. forces
from Iraq. In addition, on February 27, 2009, President Obama
announced that by August 31, 2010, the U.S. military mission will
change from combat to supporting the Iraqi government and its security
forces. In light of these developments, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-
I) issued a phased plan aligned with goals and time frames set forth
by the Security Agreement and the President, including a transition in
mission, the reduction of U.S. troops to 50,000 by August 31, 2010,
and a complete withdrawal of forces by the end of 2011.
The drawdown is one of several tasks U.S. forces in Iraq are
conducting concurrently in a continuously evolving environment during
a period of Iraqi political uncertainty. For example, besides
overseeing operations in Iraq, MNF-I and its subordinate headquarters
merged into a single headquarters called United States Forces-Iraq
(USF-I) in January 2010.[Footnote 1] In addition, brigade combat teams
are being replaced by relatively new Advise and Assist Brigades that
will focus less on combat operations and more on advising and
assisting the Iraqi security forces, providing force protection for
U.S. military and civilian personnel and facilities, conducting
targeted counter-terrorism operations, and supporting civilian
agencies and international organizations in their capacity-building
efforts. Moreover, although the Department of Defense (DOD) reported
that enemy activity decreased markedly since its highest point in June
2007, the insurgency in Iraq remains dangerous.[Footnote 2] For
example, according to the USF-I commanding general, Al Qaeda in Iraq
retains the capability to execute high-profile attacks. And finally,
on December 1, 2009, the President announced his decision to send an
additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, a decision that may impact
efforts to draw down U.S. forces from Iraq.
In addition to its military forces, DOD relies on thousands of
contractor personnel in Iraq and Kuwait to perform a wide range of
tasks essential for the drawdown including repairing military
vehicles, providing trucks and drivers for logistics convoys, and
maintaining airfields necessary for the retrograde of equipment.
According to DOD, there were over 110,000 contractor personnel in Iraq
as of fourth quarter fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 3] According to DOD
data, approximately 52 percent of these contractor personnel are
working under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the
largest single contract supporting operations in Iraq and Kuwait.
[Footnote 4]
When we reported in September 2008 on the progress of planning for the
drawdown from Iraq, we concluded that DOD had not adequately
delineated roles and responsibilities for executing the drawdown,
resulting in a variety of disparate teams engaged in retrograde
operations without a unified or coordinated chain of command.[Footnote
5] In light of the findings presented in that report, we recommended
that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) and the military departments, take steps to clarify
the chain of command over logistical operations in support of the
retrograde effort. DOD generally concurred with this recommendation,
and took steps to remedy the unclear chain of command. Since the
publication of our September 2008 report, we have continued to monitor
DOD's progress in planning for and executing the drawdown and have
communicated our preliminary findings in briefings to several
congressional committees. We also communicated our preliminary
findings during testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting
in Iraq and Afghanistan in November 2009.[Footnote 6] This report is
based upon our continued analysis and observation of DOD's progress in
planning for and executing the drawdown from Iraq. Our specific
objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which DOD has planned
for the drawdown from Iraq in accordance with timelines set by the
Security Agreement and presidential direction and (2) factors that may
impact the efficient execution of the drawdown.
The planning for and execution of the drawdown has and may continue to
change rapidly due to evolving logistics considerations, new rules for
the management of certain types of equipment, the uncertain Iraqi
political and security environment, and developments elsewhere in the
region, particularly Afghanistan. For example, fluid security
conditions in Iraq may influence the order in which bases are
transferred to the Government of Iraq and the rate of equipment
retrograde.[Footnote 7] Moreover, the Iraqi elections initially
planned for January 16, 2010, did not occur until March 7, 2010, a
development that could impact drawdown timelines because DOD's planned
troop withdrawal is contingent upon the completion of Iraqi elections
and the formation of a new government.
This rapidly changing situation and corresponding evolution in DOD's
drawdown planning and execution also impacts our reporting on this
issue. For example, in this report we do not discuss two issues raised
during our earlier testimony. First, in November 2009 we reported that
MNF-I's timely execution of the drawdown from Iraq depends on its
obtaining clear guidance as to what equipment can and will be provided
to the Government of Iraq and the identification of the mechanisms
that will be used for such transfers. According to DOD testimony
before Congress, recommendations on equipment that will be transferred
to the Government of Iraq and the mechanisms for executing the
transfers are complete. However, future progress in executing the
transfers may depend in large part on the outcome of ongoing
discussions between DOD and the Government of Iraq. Second, we
reported two data system weaknesses that hindered DOD's ability to
efficiently retrograde equipment. Officials reported that solutions to
the issues we identified have been developed and implemented although,
according to one DOD official, problems with the data systems may
continue to surface and require attention.
To determine the extent to which DOD planned for the drawdown and how
these plans conform to the established timelines, we reviewed relevant
documents to include DOD, MNF-I, and USF-I plans, command briefings,
the Security Agreement, and transcripts of speeches and congressional
testimony by U.S. officials. Additionally, we spoke with DOD officials
throughout the chain of command in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq
that were involved in the development and execution of drawdown plans.
We also drew from our body of previously issued work examining Iraq
and drawdown-related issues in order to identify areas in which DOD
made improvements to its drawdown plans.[Footnote 8] Throughout the
engagement, the team also relied upon staff working from our Baghdad
Field Office to conduct interviews with officials in theater and to
periodically refresh key information.
To identify factors that may impact the efficient execution of the
drawdown, we reviewed and analyzed briefings, e-mail correspondence,
orders, plans, joint doctrine, DOD guidance, and other data obtained
from DOD organizations in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq. Using
this information, we determined the way processes are supposed to work
as well as any challenges encountered. While in Kuwait and Iraq, we
also visited locations at which various aspects of the redeployment
and retrograde process are performed and spoke with local commanders,
on-site supervisors, staff officers, among others, about their
experiences and challenges. Following our trip to Kuwait and Iraq, we
followed up with relevant DOD organizations and officials in the
United States and CENTCOM's area of responsibility, to include the USF-
I commanding general and his staff, to obtain updated information.
Again, we also relied upon our staff working from GAO's Baghdad Field
Office to conduct follow-up interviews with officials, observe a
drawdown rehearsal exercise in Kuwait, and periodically update key
information.
We conducted our work from January 2009 through March 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
includes more detailed information on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
Several DOD organizations have issued coordinated plans for the
execution of the drawdown, but DOD has yet to fully plan for
requirements for contracted services needed during the drawdown. Since
our September 2008 report, DOD created new organizations to oversee,
synchronize, and ensure unity of effort during the drawdown and
established goals and metrics for measuring progress. To date, DOD
reports that its drawdown efforts have exceeded its goals. For
example, as of January 2010, DOD reported that it exceeded its target
figure for withdrawing rolling stock in Iraq--which includes wheeled
and tracked combat vehicles, some construction equipment, and
trailers--by over 2,600 pieces. However, a large amount of personnel,
equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down. In addition, although
DOD took some steps to plan for contracted services, limited
operational planning for contracted support has challenged its ability
to identify the full range of its needs for contracted services to
support the drawdown; existing processes may not allow sufficient time
for all contracted services needed to be put on contract in a
responsible manner; and there exists a lack of clarity regarding the
roles and responsibilities of various contract validation review
boards. Without addressing these issues, DOD risks not having the
right contracted services in place to meet drawdown timelines, which
may lead to inefficient and wasteful practices as the drawdown
continues.
There are several other factors that may impact the efficient
execution of the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq in accordance with
established timelines. First, challenges associated with the planned
simultaneous transition of several major contracts may lead to the
interruption of services essential to the drawdown effort. Moreover,
some of these challenges have not been adequately addressed in DOD
plans. For example, ensuring that contractor personnel can obtain the
appropriate credentials in a timely manner so that they can assume
their positions without risking an interruption of vital services may
be problematic. Second, DOD has not determined whether the benefits of
transitioning its major base and life support contract in Iraq,
LOGCAP, will outweigh the costs and risks that could be incurred as a
result of the transition. Without adequate planning and review to
identify and weigh the potential benefits, costs, and risks of making
the LOGCAP transition in Iraq, DOD cannot ensure that the decision to
transition LOGCAP in Iraq will be beneficial to the government. Third,
persistent shortages of qualified contract oversight personnel may
increase the risk for fraud, waste, and abuse during the drawdown.
Joint doctrine emphasizes that commanders must ensure that appropriate
administration and oversight personnel are in place when using
contractors. We found, however, that despite a recent policy change
that reduces the requirement for oversight personnel for some
contracts, other contracts will still have an insufficient number of
qualified oversight personnel. Fourth, although DOD has made some
improvements in its equipment disposition process, key decisions
concerning equipment that will be retrograded from Iraq have yet to be
made. According to DOD officials, it is essential that equipment move
out of Iraq and Kuwait at a steady pace. However, given the amount of
equipment that is and will continue to flow out of Iraq and through
Kuwait, it is important that DOD develop contingency plans for the
staging of this equipment or pursue alternative retrograde hubs. This
is imperative to avoid equipment build-up in Kuwait as equipment
awaits onward movement to the designated final destination. Without
the necessary contingency plans to stage equipment retrograded from
Iraq, DOD may not be able to ensure that equipment required elsewhere
is available within the required timelines. Finally, DOD lacks
complete visibility over its inventory of equipment and shipping
containers, although it is aware of and has taken steps to address
this issue.
To ensure DOD can efficiently execute the drawdown of U.S. forces from
Iraq in accordance with established timelines, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense ensure that joint and service guidance regarding
operational planning for contract support is followed, that contract
support requirements are identified in a timely manner, and that the
roles and responsibilities of the various contract review boards in
CENTCOM be clarified. Furthermore, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense assess and develop options to mitigate risks associated with
transitioning contracts in Kuwait and Iraq, analyze the benefits and
costs of transitioning its major contract in Iraq, reevaluate plans
for contract oversight, and clarify its planning regarding the extent
to which Kuwait and other locations in southwest Asia can support the
temporary staging of equipment and materiel retrograded from Iraq.
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the
first five of our recommendations, but did not concur with our last
recommendation. Based on DOD's comments and subsequent discussions
with senior officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the Department of the Army, we revised the last recommendation and
related sections throughout the report where we discuss the equipment
disposition process for moving equipment out of Iraq and Kuwait. The
department also provided a number of general and technical comments
that we considered and incorporated, as appropriate. The department's
comments and our evaluation of those comments are discussed in detail
in a later section of this report. A complete copy of DOD's written
comments is included in appendix II.
Background:
The drawdown of equipment and personnel from Iraq is a highly complex
operation of significant magnitude. According to DOD, as of February
2010, there were approximately 98,100 U.S. military personnel in Iraq,
spread among 228 bases throughout the country. Additionally, as of
February 2010, the Army reported that there were approximately 3.1
million pieces of equipment in Iraq, worth almost $28 billion, about
20 percent of which is DOD owned, theater provided equipment, which is
a pool of permanent stay behind equipment that has accumulated in Iraq
since combat operations began in 2003. Theater provided equipment
includes both standard and non-standard equipment. Standard equipment
refers to those items authorized on a military unit's modified table
of organization and equipment.[Footnote 9] Non-standard equipment
refers to equipment issued to units that is not authorized on their
modified table of organization and equipment, and includes a wide
range of items such as construction equipment, materiel handling
equipment, flat screen televisions, certain types of radios, and Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP). Figure 1 provides a more
detailed breakdown of the U.S. Army equipment in Iraq.
Figure 1: Breakdown of U.S. Army Equipment in Iraq as of February 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Unit Owned/Authorized Equipment: 62% (1,907,271);
Contractor Acquired Property: 19% (592,393);
Theater Provided Equipment, Non-standard: 12% (357,646);
Theater Provided Equipment, Standard: 8% (234,301).
Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.
Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
[End of figure]
The logistics infrastructure supporting the redeployment and
retrograde effort in the Iraqi theater of operations is large and
complex, consisting of military organizations operating in both Iraq
and Kuwait, and it is through Kuwait's three seaports and two airports
that the majority of U.S. forces, materiel, and equipment flow from
the theater of operations.[Footnote 10] Moreover, myriad logistics
organizations in both Iraq and Kuwait also support these operations,
including elements of CENTCOM, U.S. Transportation Command, the
Defense Logistics Agency, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT), the 1st Theater
Sustainment Command, Army Materiel Command, U.S. Marine Corps Central
Command, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. Air Forces Central
Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command. According to our
previous reports and testimonies on Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm, the retrograde of materiel and equipment is likely to
consume the most time and resources throughout the drawdown effort.
[Footnote 11]
We have also reported extensively on the use of contractor personnel
for combat and logistics support and the need for improvements in the
management of contractors used to support military operations.
[Footnote 12] DOD contracted services needed in Iraq and Kuwait as the
drawdown progresses fall under two general categories: (1) services
that will need to be decreased as the U.S. military presence declines
and (2) services for which demand may temporarily increase due to
drawdown-specific needs, such as transporting equipment for
retrograde. Contracted services can be further categorized as those
services provided under LOGCAP, including the majority of base and
life support in Iraq such as meals, sleeping arrangements and laundry
services, transportation within Iraq, and postal services, and those
not provided by LOGCAP, such as security guards for bases.
Coordinated Plans and New Organizations Have Facilitated Progress in
the Drawdown from Iraq, but DOD Has Yet to Plan for All Contracted
Support Needed During the Drawdown:
A number of DOD organizations have issued plans outlining a phased
drawdown from Iraq that meet time frames set forth in the Security
Agreement and presidential guidance while being responsive to security
conditions on the ground. Furthermore, in accordance with these plans,
DOD created several organizations to facilitate the retrograde of
equipment and support unity of effort[Footnote 13], and established
goals and metrics to track its progress. According to DOD, these
efforts to date contributed to the meeting or exceeding of targets for
drawing down forces and retrograding equipment. However, while DOD has
made significant progress executing the drawdown, there remains a
large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases yet to be drawn down
within the established timelines. Moreover, DOD has yet to fully plan
for contracted services needed during the drawdown.
DOD Has Issued Plans for the Drawdown, Taken Steps Toward Executing
Them, and Exceeded Some Targets:
Beginning in May 2009, MNF-I and its subordinate command responsible
for executing the drawdown from Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-
I); Headquarters, Department of the Army; and USF-I issued coordinated
plans outlining how the drawdown of military and contractor personnel,
equipment, and bases should be managed over time. These plans support
DOD's goals for reducing, by August 31, 2010: (1) the number of
military personnel to 50,000, (2) the number of contractor personnel
to 55,000 while increasing the proportion of Iraqi contractor
personnel, and (3) the number of bases to 134. In addition, to
mitigate the risk of bottlenecks of equipment during the later phases
of the drawdown, commanders were directed to identify organizational
equipment and theater provided equipment no longer essential for
ongoing operations and turn it in for retrograde. Accordingly, MNC-I
set a goal of retrograding 1,500 non-mission essential items of
rolling stock per month until April 2010, and 2,500 per month after
this date to reach a level of 16,500 of these items remaining in Iraq
by the change-of-mission date. Similarly, MNC-I set a goal of drawing
down 3,000 containers full of other equipment through April 2010, and
then 3,800 containers per month after that date, leaving 17,000
containers worth of non-rolling stock in Iraq.
In support of its plans DOD created several organizations to oversee
the drawdown and ensure unity of effort. In September 2008, we
reported that the variety of organizations exercising influence over
the retrograde process and the resultant lack of a unified or
coordinated command structure was not consistent with joint doctrine,
which led to confusion and inefficiencies in the retrograde process.
To bolster unity of effort, MNF-I established a new organization, the
Drawdown Fusion Center, to provide a strategic picture of drawdown
operations, identify potential obstacles, address strategic issues,
and assist in the development of policy and guidance related to
several aspects of the drawdown. Assisting the Drawdown Fusion Center
was ARCENT's Support Element-Iraq, a liaison element established to
enhance synchronization and coordination among MNF-I; MNC-I; ARCENT;
Headquarters, Department of the Army; and Army Materiel Command. This
organization also generated theater and Department of the Army
disposition guidance for all forces and materiel redeploying and
retrograding out of Iraq. USF-I has subsequently integrated the
Drawdown Fusion Center, ARCENT's Support Element-Iraq, and the MNF-I
and MNC-I logistics offices into one organization under the USF-I
Logistics Directorate. Moreover, it has established a Drawdown
Synchronization Center as the single entity within USF-I responsible
for synchronizing, analyzing, and capturing drawdown data and then
disseminating the data to the appropriate DOD organizations. Finally,
in order to assist with the provision of disposition instructions for
materiel retrograding out of Iraq and synchronize those instructions
with the reset of Army equipment, the Department of the Army, with
Army Materiel Command as the lead agency, created a Responsible Reset
Task Force.[Footnote 14]
The drawdown from Iraq commenced with the publication of MNF-I's plan
in May 2009. According to the metrics DOD established to track
drawdown progress, efforts to reduce personnel and retrograde
equipment in the initial months of the drawdown exceeded targeted
goals. For example, according to USF-I, as of February 8, 2010, there
were just over 98,100 servicemembers in Iraq, approximately 3,200
fewer than had been projected. In addition, as of January 2010, DOD
retrograded 2,610 more pieces of rolling stock than projected and, as
of December 2009, 5,195 more containers of equipment than projected.
[Footnote 15]
While DOD's progress since May 2009 exceeded some of its targets, a
large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn
down within the established timelines. To meet the presidential target
of reducing the number of U.S. forces in Iraq to 50,000 by August 31,
2010, USF-I must reduce its present force by almost 50 percent by this
summer. Furthermore, to meet other drawdown targets for August 31,
2010, USF-I must draw down 45 percent of its contractor personnel
workforce, retrograde 46 percent of its rolling stock, and close 41
percent of its bases in Iraq. The remaining forces, contractor
personnel, and equipment will have to be drawn down during the final
16 months, from August 31, 2010 to December 31, 2011, during which
time some of the largest bases in Iraq will also have to be closed or
transferred to the Government of Iraq, a task the commanding general
of USF-I stated could take 9 to 10 months to complete. Figure 2
illustrates the numbers of U.S. forces, contractor personnel, rolling
stock, containers, and bases that have already been drawn down; what
must be drawn down before the August 31, 2010 change-of-mission date;
and what will remain to be drawn down before December 31, 2011.
Figure 2: Drawdown Progress Since May 2009 and What Remains to Be
Drawn Down through August 31, 2010, and December 31, 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph]
U.S. Forces[A]:
Drawn down since May 2009: 27% (35,918);
To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010: 36% (48,182);
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 37% (50,000).
DOD Contractor Personnel[B]:
Drawn down since May 2009: 20% (25,128);
To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010: 36% (45,035);
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 44% (55,000).
Rolling Stock[C]:
Drawn down since May 2009: 25% (10,398);
To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010: 34% (13,890);
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 41% (16,500).
Containers[B]:
Drawn down since May 2009: 34% (20,195);
To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010: 38% (22,805);
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 28% (17,000).
Bases[A]:
Drawn down since May 2009: 33% (113);
To be drawn down through Aug. 31, 2010: 28% (94);
To be drawn down through Dec. 31, 2011: 39% (134).
Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data.
[A] Data current as of December 2009.
[B] Data current as of January 2010.
[C] Data current as of February 2010.
[End of figure]
While DOD Has Planned for Some Contracted Services Needed to Support
the Drawdown, Challenges Remain:
DOD took some steps to plan for and source contracted services needed
during the drawdown. For instance, DOD planned for some LOGCAP
requirements needed during the drawdown, including the number of
transportation systems, Army post offices, and logistics support
services required at specific bases. According to DOD documentation,
operational commands in Iraq validated these requirements for LOGCAP
at the bases that will remain open past August 31, 2010, and
communicated these requirements to the LOGCAP program office which, in
turn, took steps toward awarding the LOGCAP task orders. Additionally,
other supporting contracting organizations in Iraq took steps to meet
the needs for non-LOGCAP services that were identified as required by
military units or other deployed organizations. For example, the Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, an organization that manages non-
LOGCAP service contracts, which comprise about 20 percent of all
contracts in Iraq, plans to expand its use of theaterwide contracts to
provide food services, medical support, fire protection, facilities
and housing, and other base and life support needs.
Despite these steps, limited operational planning for contracted
support has challenged USF-I's ability to identify the full range of
its needs for contracted services to support the drawdown. According
to joint doctrine and service guidance, operational personnel who
plan, support, and execute military operations must also determine the
contracted support needed to accomplish their missions. In Iraq and
Kuwait, these operational personnel include combat force commanders,
base commanders, and logistics personnel, among others, who are
responsible for determining the best approach to accomplish their
assigned tasks and, if the approach includes contractors, identifying
the types and levels of contracted support needed. Army guidance also
states that planning for contracted support must be integrated early
in the deliberate planning process to ensure that it is adequately
considered and that it must include specific requirements identified
by operational personnel, such as the identification of the full
extent of contractor involvement and how and where contracted support
should be provided.[Footnote 16] MNF-I's drawdown plan, however,
delegated the responsibility for determining contracted support
requirements to contracting agencies, such as the Joint Contracting
Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, rather than to operational personnel. But
according to Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan officials,
they could not determine the theaterwide levels of contracted services
required, or plan for mandated reductions based on those needs,
because they lack sufficient, relevant information on future
requirements for contracted services, information that should have
been provided by operational personnel. For example, according to MNF-
I documentation, during an October 2009 meeting between operational
personnel and contracting officials, MNF-I reiterated that the levels
of contracted services ultimately needed in Iraq during the drawdown
were unknown. This is consistent with an overarching weakness
identified by a Joint Staff task force, which recognized limited, if
any, visibility of contracted support and plans and a lack of
requirements definition. As a result, rather than relying on
information based on operationally driven requirements for contracted
services, MNF-I planned for, and USF-I is subsequently tracking, the
reduction of contracted support in Iraq using historical ratios of
contractor personnel to servicemembers in Iraq, which may not
accurately reflect the actual levels of contracted support needed
during the drawdown. Although several DOD officials have stated that
uncertainties associated with the changing operational environment in
Iraq hinders DOD's ability to project the full range of contracted
services needed, joint doctrine emphasizes that planning entails
making logical and realistic assumptions and does not demand
certainty, and that plans can be adjusted to reflect changes on the
ground.[Footnote 17] Without incorporating appropriately specific
details on contract support in its operational planning for the
drawdown, USF-I risks hindering the communication of contract-related
decisions to those who must implement and execute them, including
decisions about funding, deployment and redeployment, operational and
life support, force protection, and the location of contractors on the
battlefield. Further, this may continue to limit USF-I's ability to
plan for the full range of contracted services needed during the
drawdown and jeopardize its ability to provide the right service at
the right place and time.
Timely planning for contracted services needed to support the drawdown
is also critical in order to avoid potential waste and ensure
continuity of services. USF-I guidance, however, may not allow
sufficient time for all contracted services needed during the drawdown
to be put on contract in a responsible manner. Sound business
practices specify that the full definition of requirements for
contracted services should occur as early as possible to ensure the
personnel responsible for putting the needed services on contract can
do so on time and at the agreed-upon cost.[Footnote 18] If operational
personnel fail to communicate their needs for contracted services with
enough lead time for contracting officials to put these services on
contract responsibly, DOD may incur unnecessary costs by authorizing
undefinitized contract actions, as it has in the past, which allow
contractors to begin work before reaching a final agreement on
contract terms and conditions, including price. While a contract
action remains undefinitized, the contractor has little incentive to
control costs, creating the potential for waste. In addition, a lack
of timely planning for contract support may lead to other poor
outcomes, such as increased cost, lengthened schedules,
underperformance, and service delays. According to MNF-I's plan and
the former Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan commander, DOD's
need for contracted services in Iraq, such as security,
transportation, engineers, and materiel handling teams, may
temporarily increase during the drawdown. Officials have also
acknowledged that additional contractor personnel will be needed to
provide services currently being provided by U.S. forces as these
forces redeploy. For example, DOD officials stated that they
contracted for airfield painting in Iraq and Kuwait because the
servicemembers normally responsible for this task had redeployed, and
that similar requirements regularly surface. As a result, senior
contracting officials in Iraq expressed concern that the needs for
some services may increase beyond levels available under existing
contracts as the drawdown progresses. Because increasing the level of
existing services or adding new ones may necessitate new contracts,
additional time may be necessary to obtain these services. For
example, contracting officials in Iraq stated that obtaining
additional contracted security services outside of existing contracts
would take about five months, compared to about three months necessary
to increase the levels of services already on contract. Further, USF-
I's goal to increase the proportion of Iraqi contractors may entail
greater lead time to put these vendors' services on contract because
it may take longer to review Iraqi vendor proposals. Yet USF-I's
standard operating procedures for requirements validation in Iraq only
state that personnel should submit requirements for contracted
services at least 90 days prior to the date funding is needed. Without
directing operational personnel in Iraq to identify requirements for
services with enough time for contracting officials to responsibly put
them on contract, DOD increases its risk of not being able to obtain
these services on time, or employing inefficient contracting practices
such as undefinitized contract actions.
Although DOD has established new organizations that are intended to
facilitate efficient contracting during the drawdown, it has not
clarified how these contracting organizations differ from one another
or specified how they fit into the requirements identification and
validation process. In accordance with joint doctrine and Army
guidance, when planning for contractor support, planners must be aware
of the operational principle of centralized contracting management to
achieve unity of effort.[Footnote 19] Centralized management can be
achieved through means intended to synchronize and coordinate all
contracting support actions being planned for and executed in the
operational area. The MNF-I drawdown plan called for the Joint
Logistics Procurement Support Board, composed of senior operational
personnel and contracting officials, to reduce costs and redundant
contracting and develop and promote strategies for coordinating
approaches to common or similar requirements. However, MNF-I's
drawdown plan also referred similar functions to the Strategic
Sourcing Board, which also includes members from both the operational
and contracting communities. Officials' statements and DOD
documentation illustrate differing views of the composition, roles,
and responsibilities of these boards, such as the extent to which
these boards review requirements for contracted services. For example,
senior contracting officials told us that the Joint Logistics
Procurement Support Board is responsible for collecting contract
requirements as they emerge, yet one of these officials later told us
that this board does not gather contract requirements. Moreover, USF-
I's process by which operational personnel and contacting officials
review and validate requirements for contracted services includes two
other boards--the Joint Facilities and Acquisition Review Board and
the Contract Review Board--yet it is unclear how the previously
mentioned Joint Logistics Procurement Support Board or the Strategic
Sourcing Board fit into USF-I's process, nor how these boards differ
from one another. As a result, the specific functions of the Joint
Logistics Procurement Support Board and the Strategic Sourcing Board,
and the relationship of these boards to USF-I's established processes,
are unclear. Without clarifying the responsibilities of these boards
and how they fit into the existing requirements validation process,
DOD may not be able to ensure contracting unity of effort so that its
requirements for contracted services needed during the drawdown are
effectively consolidated and prioritized.
Several Additional Challenges May Affect the Efficient Execution of
the Drawdown:
Efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq may be complicated by
several challenges. First, challenges associated with the planned
simultaneous transition of several key contracts may lead to the
interruption of vital services and wasteful contracting practices.
Second, insufficient analysis to quantify the costs and benefits of
transitioning the LOGCAP contract in Iraq prevents DOD from ensuring
that the transition will be beneficial to the government. Third,
persistent shortages of contract oversight personnel may increase the
potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. Fourth, a lack of clarity
concerning the extent to which and for how long equipment retrograded
from Iraq may be staged in Kuwait or other locations in southwest Asia
may affect DOD's plans for reset and equipping. And lastly, DOD lacks
complete visibility over its inventory of equipment and shipping
containers. DOD is aware of and has begun addressing some of these
issues. For example, DOD is in the process of implementing new systems
and procedures to improve its equipment disposition process. In
addition, units in Iraq were required to complete a 100 percent
inventory of their equipment, identify equipment that can be
immediately retrograded, and account for previously undocumented
equipment. Despite these efforts, however, challenges remain.
Near-Simultaneous Transition of Key Contracts Creates Risk for
Interruption of Services:
Lessons learned and documented during the LOGCAP transition in Kuwait
indicate that other upcoming major contract transitions may be
problematic. With the exception of the LOGCAP contract for Iraq, which
is discussed in more detail below, four other major service contracts
in Iraq and Kuwait, which provide field support maintenance, base and
life support, and convoy trucking services, have reached their
expiration dates.[Footnote 20] According to USF-I and Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan leadership, the services provided
under these contracts, particularly in areas like maintenance and
convoy trucking, are critical to mission success, highlighting the
need to ensure continuity of these services during the drawdown. These
four contracts, plus LOGCAP III in Iraq, are scheduled to be
transitioned to new contracts or task orders between January 2010 and
January 2012.[Footnote 21] According to Army Sustainment Command
officials, DOD has re-competed one of the maintenance contracts and
made an award in October 2009.[Footnote 22] However, it has not yet
awarded new contracts for two other contracts which have already
expired, and the first task order to be awarded under the new LOGCAP
was delayed.
Contract transition can be a time-consuming process requiring careful
planning and management, and lessons learned during the LOGCAP
transition in Kuwait indicate that the upcoming major contract
transitions may be problematic. In light of the transition from LOGCAP
III to LOGCAP IV in Kuwait, which occurred between February and June
2009, the Army, in conjunction with the Defense Contract Management
Agency, created a lessons learned document to help inform planners of
potential challenges they may face in managing future contract
transitions. These lessons are particularly relevant given that
contract management officials predict that the challenges experienced
during the earlier transitions will likely be magnified during those
scheduled to occur during the drawdown. According to Army guidance on
the lessons learned process, lessons learned, which can result from an
evaluation or observation of a positive finding worthy of continuing
or emulating, should be integrated into planning activities in order
to better prepare for future operations.[Footnote 23]
One of the main lessons learned during the LOGCAP transition in Kuwait
is that communication is the most essential element of the transition
process. Accordingly, the Kuwait LOGCAP transition lessons learned
document lists 10 practices used successfully during the transition in
Kuwait to ensure effective communication between the government,
outgoing contractor, and incoming contractor. For example, during the
LOGCAP transition in Kuwait, representatives of the government,
outgoing contractor, and incoming contractor formed an integrated
planning team to ensure a common understanding of their respective
roles, responsibilities, and approaches for executing the transition.
In light of the positive results which could be achieved through these
practices, the lessons learned document contains 11 recommendations to
ensure continued effective communication that are applicable to future
contract transitions. Accordingly, Army Material Command's LOGCAP
transition plan references the lessons learned document and
establishes a synchronized methodology for ensuring effective
information exchange and a common operational picture, such as by
requiring kick-off meetings and rehearsal of concept drills. However,
information from Army officials indicates that the plans for
transitioning other major contracts may not be as extensive. Without
extensive planning, to include steps necessary to establish and
maintain effective communications such as those outlined in the
lessons learned document, DOD may be unable to ensure that major
contracts in Iraq will transition smoothly as the drawdown progresses.
Transferring personnel between contracts is another key challenge
identified in the lessons learned document. Certain contracted
positions require specialized skills and experience. For example,
operating the material handling equipment used to bring containers to
wash racks for cleaning and customs inspection requires a materiel
handling equipment license.[Footnote 24] Because the supply of
personnel with this skill and qualification is limited, incoming
contractors rely on hiring personnel who worked under the outgoing
contract rather than hiring new personnel. Moreover, according to the
lessons learned document, during the LOGCAP transition in Kuwait the
incoming contractor intended to hire at least 80 percent of the
outgoing contractor's personnel to begin providing services according
to schedule. Yet the outgoing contractor needed to retain its
employees to continue to provide the services for which it was
contracted. As a result, although the incoming and outgoing
contractors agreed to a protocol for transferring employees, poor
execution at some sites led to staffing shortages and some service
interruptions. For example, according to the lessons learned document,
a shortage of personnel available to operate large machinery in Kuwait
forced officials to shut down the wash racks, which are critical to
maintaining the flow of equipment out of Kuwait. According to a DOD
report, analogous problems arising from an insufficient number of
properly skilled and experienced workers have also been experienced
during the LOGCAP transition in Afghanistan. A senior contracting
official in Iraq expressed concern that similar challenges will occur
during the drawdown as other contracts transition. Moreover, although
the LOGCAP transition plan specified steps to facilitate the transfer
of the outgoing contractors' pool of trained individuals to the
incoming vendor should these personnel decide to seek employment, it
does not assess the risk of an insufficient number of these personnel
deciding to work for the incoming contractor. Furthermore, the extent
to which any of these issues are addressed for the other contracts
scheduled for transition is unclear. Joint doctrine states that
effective contract support planning must be based on a thorough
mission analysis, including an assessment of risks.[Footnote 25]
Without assessing the risk of an insufficient number of properly
skilled and experienced contractor personnel available under each of
the new contracts and developing appropriate mitigation strategies,
DOD may not be able to ensure the full performance of tasks critical
to the drawdown during the upcoming contract transitions.
Issuing credentials to contractor personnel was another major
challenge experienced during the LOGCAP transition in Kuwait. Of all
contract transition issues, the need for timely credentialing, which
includes badges such as common access cards and other location-
specific badges, has caused some of the greatest concerns, according
to DOD officials. According to those officials, DOD requires new
badges for contractor personnel following contract transitions,
regardless of whether a new contractor wins the award, because
credentials are tied to specific contracts. According to the lessons
learned document, this credentialing process can take between two and
three weeks to complete. Consequently, contractors experienced delays
in credentialing their employees during the LOGCAP transition in
Kuwait. This may be exacerbated during contract transitions in Iraq
because of the planned increase in the proportion of Iraqi nationals
working under contract and the fact that obtaining credentials for
them typically takes more time than it does for contractor personnel
of other nationalities. Moreover, the contractor responsible for
operating the credentialing office in Kuwait is also transitioning as
a part of the Kuwait base and life support services contract, which
may, in turn, create additional delays and illustrates a potential
difficulty in conducting multiple, near-simultaneous contract
transitions. Although the LOGCAP transition plan includes a process
for facilitating the credentialing process for contractor personnel,
neither this plan nor DOD's other planning documents address possible
stresses on credentialing offices that might occur during these
contract transitions. Without fully incorporating the risks inherent
to conducting multiple contract transitions concurrently into its
planning for each contract scheduled to transition, including options
to mitigate those risks derived from key lessons learned during the
LOGCAP transition in Kuwait, DOD may be unable to effectively manage
the timely transition of these contracts and prevent the interruption
of key services needed to facilitate mission success during the
drawdown. This is especially true because these transitions may need
to occur within compressed time frames due to delays in awarding key
contracts.
DOD Has Not Determined Whether the Potential Benefits of Transitioning
LOGCAP in Iraq Outweigh the Potential Costs and Risks:
Although the current active LOGCAP contract in Iraq, LOGCAP III, does
not expire until after U.S. forces are scheduled to leave Iraq,
officials plan to transition LOGCAP III to other means of contracted
support in the midst of the drawdown. Specifically, USF-I plans to
transition base and life support, logistics, transportation, and
postal functions currently provided by LOGCAP III to other contracts,
including LOGCAP IV, the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, and
individual sustainment contracts with Iraqi contractors.[Footnote 26]
These transitions are expected to be completed by December 2010,
although, according to LOGCAP officials, some of the locations at
which base and life support services will transition remain uncertain.
And while the LOGCAP transition in Iraq is intended to produce certain
benefits, these benefits may not be fully attainable within the
drawdown timelines, and may be outweighed by costs and risks that
could be incurred during the transition. An analysis of whether the
potential benefits of this transition outweigh the potential costs and
risks is part of the planning and review process for transitioning to
LOGCAP IV and other service contracts. Acquisition planning is
intended to "ensure that the Government meets its needs in the most
effective, economical, and timely manner."[Footnote 27] To this end,
acquisition plans should include an examination of costs, risks, and
other considerations, such as feasible alternatives and the impact of
prior acquisitions.[Footnote 28] Further, DOD guidance states that
service acquisitions should receive adequate planning and management,
including senior level reviews and in some instances independent
management reviews, to achieve required cost, schedule, and
performance outcomes.[Footnote 29]
Although officials anticipate benefits from making the LOGCAP
transition in Iraq, these benefits may not be fully realized. Senior
DOD officials have stated that the rationale for making the transition
away from LOGCAP III in Iraq includes reducing the cost of base and
life support services, mitigating the risks associated with relying on
a single contractor to provide essential services, and bolstering the
Iraqi economy by transitioning services to local Iraqi vendors.
However, these anticipated benefits may not be fully realized since
DOD will have only until December 31, 2011, to realize potential cost
savings before the U.S. military completely withdraws. This may leave
insufficient time to recoup transition costs, compensate the
government for taking on risk, and provide value to the government.
In addition to the uncertainty regarding the realization of
anticipated benefits from the LOGCAP transition in Iraq, DOD will
likely incur additional costs and risks during the transition. Costs
may increase because the outgoing and incoming contractors will need
to perform work simultaneously to avoid the interruption of services,
thereby increasing the number of contractor personnel needed to
facilitate the transition. The LOGCAP transition in Iraq may also
increase the contract management and oversight responsibilities for
operational commanders, who play a significant role in the management
and oversight of the LOGCAP contractor. For example, the Army requires
commanders to periodically evaluate their contractors' performance and
provide feedback to the contractor during monthly performance
evaluation boards. Because the Army intends to award several task
orders for base and logistics services, possibly to multiple
contractors, the number of monthly evaluations could increase for some
commanders. Furthermore, an increase in the number of contracts and
contractors during the transition may complicate commanders' abilities
to obtain essential contracted support. Under the current LOGCAP III
contract in Iraq, commanders generally need to speak with one program
manager to obtain the full range of contracted services. Under LOGCAP
IV, however, services may be divided among multiple contractors for
any particular location. As a result, the task of determining how to
obtain particular services and correcting service problems may divert
commanders' limited resources from other responsibilities. Therefore,
should the upcoming LOGCAP transition in Iraq proceed as planned,
commanders will need to overcome challenges on which we have
previously reported, such as inexperience in dealing with contractors,
uncertainty regarding oversight responsibilities, and the inability to
dedicate resources for oversight, or DOD risks having inadequate
management and oversight.[Footnote 30]
The planned LOGCAP transition in Iraq may also impact the continuity
and quality of service provided to the warfighter. While service
disruptions like those experienced during the transition to LOGCAP IV
in Kuwait caused only temporary inconveniences, similar service
disruptions in a continuously evolving environment like Iraq have a
greater potential for negatively impacting ongoing operations. For
example, according to a senior Defense Contract Management Agency
official responsible for contract management and oversight in Iraq,
there is concern about DOD's plan to begin transitioning the theater
transportation mission, since it could require a new contractor to
assume the mission just as the department undertakes a significant
troop level reduction planned for March-April 2010. Executing the
rapid movement of troops and equipment out of Iraq will require
significant truck assets, and transitioning the mission to a new
contractor that must be immediately capable of providing 23,000 trucks
and accompanying crews could be daunting. Transitioning contracts to
local vendors may also impact the quality of services provided to the
warfighter. Commanders in Iraq have already noted that some base and
life support services that were being provided to U.S. forces through
newly transitioned contracts managed by local vendors have not met the
level of quality U.S. forces expect. Service interruptions and
inefficiencies have also been experienced in Kuwait as a result of
transitioning to local vendors.
Finally, limited oversight resources coupled with a projected
significant increase in oversight demands during the LOGCAP transition
in Iraq heightens the risk of waste. The successful transition from
LOGCAP III to multiple base and life support contractors requires a
large number of government oversight personnel, as the transition from
LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV in Kuwait demonstrated. However, overseeing
the LOGCAP transition in Iraq will be an added responsibility for the
Defense Contract Management Agency, which is also responsible for the
day-to-day management and administration of the LOGCAP III contractor,
private security contracts, and the Air Force Contract Augmentation
Program. A Defense Contract Management Agency official expressed
concern about conducting LOGCAP transitions at multiple locations
simultaneously throughout Iraq because this will require a greater
number of oversight personnel than consecutive transitions at single
locations. For example, Defense Contract Management Agency officials
cited insufficient numbers of property administrators available to
transfer billions of dollars worth of property from LOGCAP III to one
of several dozen possible contracts. These personnel shortages may
delay the transfer of property, such as materiel handling equipment
critical for loading, unloading, and moving containers which, in turn,
may inhibit the timely retrograde of equipment from Iraq. According to
DOD documentation, similar difficulties in managing government
property are currently complicating the transition of LOGCAP III to
LOGCAP IV in Afghanistan.
During its planning and review process for the planned transition from
LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV and other service contracts in Iraq, DOD has
not determined whether the benefits of the transition will outweigh
the costs and risks that could be incurred as a result. DOD has,
during its acquisition planning, analyzed potential benefits and risks
of transitioning the overarching LOGCAP IV contract worldwide. In
addition, it has taken some steps to mitigate the risk of
transitioning LOGCAP in Iraq, such as planning to transition base and
life support from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV mainly on the bases that
will remain under U.S. control after August 31, 2010. However,
according to DOD officials, DOD has not analyzed the benefits of
transitioning LOGCAP specifically for the major task orders it plans
to award in Iraq. Given the unique circumstances in Iraq, where the
anticipated benefits of making the LOGCAP transition may not be fully
realized due to drawdown timelines and additional costs and risks the
transition will incur, the current plan for LOGCAP transition in Iraq
warrants additional consideration through DOD's planning and review
process. This is particularly important in light of the fluid nature
of ongoing operations in Iraq, and the significant congressional
interest in LOGCAP issues. In fact, according to CENTCOM, external
pressure based on expectations of enhanced competition and reduced
costs is the driving force behind the transition. Without adequate
planning and review to identify and weigh the potential benefits,
costs, and risks of making the LOGCAP transition in Iraq, DOD cannot
ensure the transition will meet benefit expectations while minimizing
the impacts of additional costs and risks.
Long-Standing Contract Oversight Personnel Shortages Could Increase
Potential for Fraud, Waste, and Abuse during the Drawdown:
DOD's long-standing inability to provide an adequate number of trained
oversight personnel in deployed locations will continue to challenge
the department as it proceeds through the drawdown in Iraq despite
apparent improvements in the number of contracting officer's
representatives (COR) assigned to contracts administered by the
Defense Contract Management Agency. Joint doctrine emphasizes that
commanders must ensure appropriate administration and oversight
personnel are in place when using contractors.[Footnote 31] Although
contracting officers are responsible for providing contract oversight,
day-to-day oversight of contractors is generally the responsibility of
CORs, who ensure that the government receives the agreed-upon services
at the agreed-upon quality, avoids poor outcomes, and minimizes
fraudulent practices. According to DOD documentation, it had been the
Defense Contract Management Agency's policy for the LOGCAP contract
that a COR would be designated for each contractor-provided service at
the location of the service. According to Defense Contract Management
Agency officials and documentation, in recognition that units in Iraq
were unable to provide all the needed CORs to oversee all aspects of
the LOGCAP contract, the Defense Contract Management Agency now
recommends that units assign CORs only to key services--which they
define as high-and medium-risk services.[Footnote 32] Conversely, the
new policy does not require units to provide CORs for services it
considers low risk to mission success. Since implementing this policy,
the Defense Contract Management Agency has reduced its requirement for
CORs in Iraq from 1,000 in October 2009 to 580 in January 2010, and
anticipates that it will be able to reduce the COR requirement further
as it continues to designate additional services as low risk. Although
the percentage of filled LOGCAP COR requirements has increased from 85
percent in November 2009 to 94 percent in January 2010 because of this
policy, we have not evaluated the effectiveness of this risk-based
approach to contract oversight. However, because this policy is
specific to Defense Contract Management Agency oversight of LOGCAP, it
does not apply to contracts awarded by the Joint Contracting Command-
Iraq/Afghanistan, which in a recent update to USF-I's drawdown plan,
was given the goal of maximizing the use of Iraqi firms in its
contracting efforts for drawdown-related requirements. According to
senior officials in Iraq, local national contractors frequently
require more oversight than U.S. firms because, as the former Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan commander explained, Iraqi firms
lack experience, have limited capacity, are less capable than their
U.S. counterparts, are unfamiliar with U.S. quality standards and
expectations, and lack the quality control processes that U.S. firms
have in place. Furthermore, according to DOD documents, some services,
such as ice production, cannot be reduced despite a reduction in force
levels, yet when force levels decrease, so does the pool of available
CORs since CORs are drawn from military units. In addition, in some
cases, USF-I is likely to require additional contract services to
replace capabilities previously provided by the military. In its
drawdown plan, for example, MNF-I anticipated an increase in the use
of private security contractors, an increase that could require
additional CORs depending on the types of services being provided and
the location of the services. Without adequate contract oversight
personnel in place to monitor its many contracts during the drawdown,
DOD may not be able to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors
are meeting their contract requirements efficiently and effectively at
each location, especially given its planned increased reliance on
Iraqi contractors.
Shortages in available contract oversight personnel may also increase
the risk of wasteful practices as the drawdown progresses. For
example, an Army unit in Kuwait responsible for ensuring the steady
flow of equipment out of Kuwait and for conducting certain maintenance
tasks has 32 government personnel but oversees more than 3,000
contractor personnel. In January 2010, Army Materiel Command requested
funding to double, to approximately 800, the number of this unit's
contractor personnel that conduct retrograde-specific tasks, including
receiving, accounting for, sorting, and moving equipment, necessary to
prevent equipment backlogs in Kuwait. In addition, according to
contracting officials, this unit has requested a concurrent increase
in oversight personnel. In July 2009, this unit identified the lack of
oversight personnel as a significant concern to successfully moving
equipment out of Kuwait. Given that these services will transition to
a new contract which has not yet been awarded, it is unclear whether
the current request will represent the total increase in contractor
personnel needed during the drawdown, and thus whether sufficient
oversight personnel will be in place as the drawdown progresses.
Further, until the current request is filled, this unit risks not
having the necessary oversight personnel in place, as has been the
case in the past. In January 2008, we reported that this unit did not
have adequate staff to conduct oversight of an equipment maintenance
contract in Kuwait.[Footnote 33] As a result of the vacant oversight
positions, its personnel were unable to fully monitor contractor
performance. Further, we noted that poor contractor performance
resulted in this unit spending $4.2 million to rework items that were
initially presented to the Army as meeting contract standards but
subsequently failed inspection. We have reported on DOD's inability to
provide an adequate number of oversight personnel in CENTCOM's theater
since 2004.[Footnote 34] For example, in 2008 we reported that the
Army assigned seven CORs to provide oversight for about 8,300
linguists in 120 locations across Iraq and Afghanistan. In one case, a
single person provided oversight for linguists stationed at more than
40 different locations spread throughout the theater of operations.
Officials responsible for the contract agreed that there were not
enough CORs to effectively oversee the contract.[Footnote 35]
Improvements to the Equipment Disposition Process Have Been Made but
Some Decisions Yet Remain:
According to DOD officials, it is essential that equipment move out of
Iraq and Kuwait at a steady pace to accommodate the large amount of
equipment needing to be retrograded within the drawdown time frames.
This was underscored in a DOD report to Congress that stated that the
successful removal, demilitarization, or transfer by the end of
December 2011 of all items belonging to DOD is contingent upon the
timely receipt of disposition instructions, among other
factors.[Footnote 36] Hence, the issuance of disposition instructions,
which dictate where a specific piece of equipment will be shipped
after it is no longer needed in Iraq, is a critical component of the
retrograde process, a fact we highlighted in our September 2008
report. Ensuring timely equipment disposition has therefore been a
focus for officials in Iraq and Kuwait as they plan for and execute
the drawdown. Specifically, their planning assumes that 90 percent of
theater provided equipment being retrograded will have disposition
instructions before it leaves Iraq, which they consider an essential
step toward ensuring this equipment does not sit idle for long periods
of time in Kuwait.
Partly in response to our September 2008 report, representatives from
the Secretary of Defense's Lean Six Sigma office conducted six reviews
to optimize theater logistics, one of which focused on the process for
retrograding equipment from Iraq, including the issuance of
disposition instructions.[Footnote 37] Results from the Lean Six Sigma
studies influenced the development of a new data system--the Theater
Provided Equipment Planner--which is intended to automate the issuance
of disposition instructions for theater provided equipment while the
equipment is still in Iraq, and to document all decisions for
centralized visibility. Although its implementation was initially
delayed, according to USF-I the system became fully operational on
January 11, 2010, following a successful test during which disposition
instructions were issued for over 25,000 items of equipment.
Complementing the Theater Provided Equipment Planner is a second
system, the Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard Equipment database, into
which the Army's Life Cycle Management Commands are cataloging all
types of non-standard equipment in Iraq in order to facilitate its
retrograde. According to USF-I, the Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard
Equipment database has improved management and accountability of non-
standard equipment, although we have not assessed this claim.
From the perspective of ARCENT, Army Materiel Command, and
Headquarters, Department of the Army, responsibly drawing down forces
from Iraq requires maintaining a steady flow of equipment through
Kuwait and onward to other locations. For example, the Army Materiel
Command commander defines success as the smooth, efficient
redeployment and redistribution of materiel to sources of repair or
disposal facilities, which will enable regeneration of combat power
for the Army. This view corresponds with Army Materiel Command's
mission and responsibilities, and reflects limiting factors in Kuwait
such as storage capacity. According to senior logistics officials from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, they are looking to the
military departments to ensure the smooth onward movement and
redistribution of their retrograded equipment to meet current mission
needs, rebalance their respective services, or satisfy future
requirements. For example, Army officials told us that there are no
plans to store any equipment, including MRAPs, in Kuwait. In fact, the
Army has a preliminary strategy for incorporating MRAPs into its
manned ground vehicle fleet, which may likely include adding these
vehicles to transportation, medical, and explosive ordnance disposal
unit modified tables of organization and equipment, while other MRAPs
are to be shipped to military installations for use during
predeployment training. However, given the amount of equipment that is
and will continue to flow out of Iraq and through Kuwait, it is
important that DOD develop contingency plans for the staging of this
equipment or pursue alternative retrograde hubs. This is imperative to
avoid equipment build-up in Kuwait as equipment awaits onward movement
to its designated final destination. According to Army officials, much
of this planning has been accomplished or is currently underway,
although we have not yet assessed these plans.
Decisions that have not yet been made about the Army's future
composition and equipment reset contribute to the current lack of
final disposition instructions for some equipment being retrograded
out of Iraq. For example, the Army has not decided what equipment and
how much of each type of equipment it will transfer to Army
Prepositioned Stocks[Footnote 38] and Theater Sustainment Stocks.
[Footnote 39] Similarly, its strategy for incorporating MRAPs into its
manned ground vehicle fleet is still pending final approval. In
addition, Army officials stated they are considering changing one or
more heavy brigade combat teams into Stryker brigade combat teams, a
decision that will have a direct effect on equipment allocation. Other
factors also add uncertainty to the disposition of equipment. For
example, while the Army has taken steps to streamline the reset
induction process for equipment in Iraq, disposition for reset depends
on when the equipment is retrograded from Iraq and its condition.
Finally, until recently, decisions were not finalized on the exact
quantities and types of equipment that will be transferred from Iraq
to Afghanistan to meet surge requirements. Given the amount of
equipment being retrograded out of Iraq, and the uncertainty arising
from the decisions listed above, there is a degree of risk associated
with the potential build-up of equipment in Kuwait, which, as stated
above, requires planning for the temporary staging of this equipment.
For example, during our July 2009 visit to Kuwait, officials in charge
of a retrograde lot stated that the lot was close to its capacity for
holding tactical wheeled vehicles, which occurred in part due to
limited capacity to process these vehicles elsewhere. Although the
number of tactical wheeled vehicles in this lot has since decreased,
the Army has directed the shipment of relatively few tactical wheeled
vehicles from Kuwait to other locations, leaving a significant number
of vehicles to be retrograded from Kuwait. Without the necessary
contingency plans to stage equipment retrograded from Iraq, DOD may
not be able to ensure that equipment required elsewhere is available
when needed.
DOD's Lack of Precise Visibility Over Its Inventory of Equipment and
Shipping Containers May Inhibit the Retrograde or Transfer of
Equipment:
The execution of the drawdown from Iraq in accordance with established
timelines may also be affected by the lack of a complete and accurate
inventory of three broad types of equipment: contractor acquired
property,[Footnote 40] non-standard equipment, and shipping
containers. According to Army data, contractor acquired property and
non-standard equipment comprise at least 30 percent of the total DOD
property in Iraq as of February 2010. In order to establish a more
complete and accurate record of equipment in Iraq, MNF-I directed its
subordinate units to complete a 100 percent inventory of their
equipment, identify equipment that can be immediately retrograded, and
account for previously undocumented equipment by June 27, 2009.
According to MNF-I guidance as well as several DOD officials, meeting
drawdown requirements and timelines depends upon establishing an
accurate and complete inventory of the amount and types of equipment
that will have to be retrograded from Iraq.
DOD officials have stated that overall accountability for property in
Iraq has improved since 2006, especially with regard to theater
provided equipment. In addition, officials stated that the MNF-I order
calling for a 100 percent inventory by July 2009 was intended to
account for undocumented items, which would then be entered onto unit
property books, thereby making commanders responsible for them. The
intent was to facilitate drawdown planning and execution by providing
commanders an incentive to take action on items that otherwise may not
have been factored into their retrograde plans. However, although DOD
states that the inventory is complete, previously undocumented
equipment continues to be found every month. Although USF-I's current
projections indicate that the amount of equipment that still needs to
be brought to record is not sufficient to alter projected
transportation requirements, we have not assessed this.
During our visit in July 2009, officials in Iraq and Kuwait stated
that, of all categories of equipment, they had the least visibility
over contractor acquired property. As of February 2010, records
indicate that 19 percent of total Army equipment in Iraq is contractor
acquired property. However, officials have stated that although they
have high confidence in the accountability of LOGCAP contractor
acquired property, they have lower confidence in the accountability of
non-LOGCAP contractor acquired property. This is because while
contractors are typically required under the terms of their contract
to maintain accountability over contractor acquired property, there is
no standardized process for doing so, limiting DOD's accountability
and visibility over this equipment and frustrating officials' efforts
to establish and maintain such visibility.[Footnote 41] As a result,
the total sum of contractor acquired property in Iraq is unknown which
may, in turn, adversely affect DOD's ability to efficiently retrograde
or transfer this equipment to the Government of Iraq.
In July 2009, ARCENT officials noted they have low confidence in
accountability and visibility of non-standard equipment in Iraq,
adding another potential risk to their ability to efficiently
retrograde this equipment out of Iraq in accordance with established
timelines. Moreover, despite recent initiatives such as the
implementation of the Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard Equipment
database, Army and ARCENT officials stated that obtaining an accurate
inventory of non-standard equipment is complicated by the fact that
many of these items have multiple identification numbers and that
commanders have significant flexibility in accounting for this
equipment. For example, a piece of non-standard equipment that is
valued at greater than $5,000 must be recorded on a military unit's
property book, but after the value of that item depreciates below the
$5,000 threshold it is left to the individual commander's discretion
whether to continue recording the property. In addition, according to
ARCENT officials, even when these items are entered onto unit or
theater property books, personnel responsible for making these entries
have not done so in a consistent format. Not knowing the precise
amount and types of non-standard equipment in Iraq further contributes
to planning uncertainty for the organizations tasked with executing
the drawdown, and also complicates the task of determining disposition
using the Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard Equipment database, as
discussed earlier.
Although DOD has taken steps to improve its visibility over shipping
containers available to retrograde equipment from Iraq, the number of
containers in Iraq remains uncertain. Containers are unique in that
not only are they items that have to be retrograded from Iraq, they
are also a primary means of shipping non-rolling stock out of Iraq.
During our July 2009 visit to Kuwait, ARCENT officials responsible for
overseeing and managing containers in Iraq and Kuwait told us that the
data system in place to track containers is inaccurate and incomplete
primarily because unit personnel in Iraq had not updated the system
every time a container left or arrived at a particular location. These
officials also explained that units did not always have personnel
available to monitor container flows and update the data system and
that those personnel who were available received this tasking as an
extra duty, which limited proper data entry. As a result, a September
2009 DOD report based on the data from this system indicated that the
system was, at best, 25 percent accurate; that the location of 7,000
containers remained unverified; and that the serviceability--the
extent to which the containers were seaworthy and thus available to
retrograde equipment--of 39 percent was also unknown. Moreover, many
containers in Iraq have been used for storage, office space, and
living quarters, among other purposes, yet had not been documented as
such. In an effort to improve visibility over containers, in May 2009,
MNC-I issued an order directing a 100 percent inventory of containers
in Iraq, including instructions for reporting their serviceability.
According to DOD data, as of September 21, 2009, approximately 53,000
containers had been physically inventoried, which was more than 24,000
fewer than the number of containers entered into the data system.
Subsequently, in an update to its drawdown plan USF-I added a
container management plan which directed the appointment of container
control officers at multiple levels of command to ensure
accountability through monthly inventories, among other
responsibilities, and established a list of prohibited container uses,
including using them as offices and living quarters. Although this
plan calls for container control officers to record the movements of
containers as they enter or leave a location and establishes
procedures to locate containers in case these movements are not
properly recorded, it requires that only some of these officers be
appointed container control officers as a primary duty. As a result,
USF-I's container management plan may not fully alleviate the root
cause, as identified by ARCENT officials, of poor container
accountability. Further, the monthly container inventory requirement
existed prior to the new USF-I container management plan yet, during
our visit to Kuwait in July 2009, we observed that these inventories
were not always completed as directed. Finally, according to CENTCOM,
personnel in Iraq and Kuwait report different levels of container
accountability system accuracy, although these personnel are working
together to rectify the discrepancies. Until these efforts are
complete, the number of containers available to retrograde equipment
from Iraq remains uncertain.
DOD has taken steps to mitigate uncertainty regarding the number of
containers it will need to retrograde equipment from Iraq and adjust
its tracking of container retrograde. For example, to ensure that it
has sufficient containers available to retrograde equipment, DOD
operates two container repair facilities in Iraq and Kuwait that
repair damaged containers to a standard at which they can be used to
ship equipment. In July 2009, we visited a container repair facility
in Kuwait that could repair between 15 and 20 containers per day that
otherwise would remain unavailable for use. According to USF-I, its
present container repair capability has increased to 3,000 containers
per month. Additionally, officials have stated that DOD can buy
additional containers as needed for the drawdown. Specifically,
officials stated that, if needed, DOD could purchase about 30,000
containers and have them available for use in less than 2 months.
Finally, in its metrics to track the retrograde of non-rolling stock,
USF-I no longer uses containers as a unit of measure, focusing instead
on the movement of individual pieces of equipment, which officials
believe will provide them with greater operational flexibility and
greater fidelity in forecasting transportation requirements. As a
result of these efforts, USF-I anticipates that it will have
sufficient containers on hand to complete the drawdown from Iraq.
While DOD's efforts to ensure the availability of containers for the
drawdown and track their retrograde appear to be positive steps, their
effects are still somewhat uncertain.
Poor unit container loading practices and insufficient efforts to
document some containerized equipment have also presented challenges.
During our visit to Kuwait in July 2009, U.S. Navy customs officials
told us that about 60 percent of unit owned containers shipped from
Iraq to Kuwait must be unloaded and repacked in Kuwait because units
in Iraq did not affix or fill out the proper customs documentation. As
a result, customs officials had to unpack, re-inspect, and then repack
the containers, which slowed the flow of equipment through the
retrograde process in Kuwait and required significant man-hours,
unnecessarily taxing an already limited pool of available experienced
customs inspectors. In addition, during our July 2009 visit to Kuwait,
officials stated that a large proportion of equipment sent to a
retrograde lot for unserviceable items was not properly documented. As
a result, the process of unloading and sorting the contents of these
containers took longer than it otherwise would have, and although the
process for unloading and documenting the items appeared orderly and
the lot was nearly empty, personnel expected the flow of such
containers to increase significantly as the drawdown progressed. This
was underscored during a subsequent GAO visit to Kuwait in December
2009, when we observed undocumented containers and unidentified
equipment that had filled a large portion of the staging area at a
parts warehouse. While commands in Iraq and Kuwait have noted that
improved process controls and additional training have been
implemented, we have not evaluated these controls nor have we received
updated information on the magnitude of containers with improper
documentation. Further, USF-I has issued new guidance to improve
container packing discipline. Although this guidance is a positive
step in that it requires proper container packaging to avoid damage
during shipment, it does not ensure that unit personnel properly
document equipment or, for equipment shipped to the United States,
affix the correct customs documentation to the containers.
Conclusions:
The drawdown of equipment and personnel from Iraq is a highly complex
operation of significant magnitude that is being conducted in a
continuously evolving environment during a period of Iraqi political
uncertainty. It is also an operation governed by timelines set by the
Security Agreement and the President and requires for its execution
the involvement of several DOD organizations. Moreover, it is an
operation that may be impacted by the President's decision, announced
in December 2009, to increase the size of the U.S. force in
Afghanistan by an additional 30,000 troops, a decision that will
require the development of synchronized plans addressing operations in
both countries.
Much has been done to facilitate the drawdown from Iraq. For example,
to ensure unity of effort, the DOD organizations most closely
associated with the drawdown have issued coordinated plans outlining
the specific means by which their respective drawdown-related tasks
will be accomplished. Furthermore, several new DOD organizations have
been created to oversee and help synchronize the effort, and goals and
metrics have been established to measure progress. According to DOD
reports, these efforts to date have contributed to the meeting or
exceeding of established goals for drawing down forces and
retrograding equipment.
However, while DOD has made significant progress executing the
drawdown, there remains a large amount of personnel, equipment, and
bases yet to be drawn down, and several actions needed to facilitate
this are incomplete. For example, while DOD has taken some steps to
plan for its needs for contracted services as the drawdown progresses,
the full extent of contracted services needed during the drawdown
remains uncertain. Without an awareness of the spectrum of contracted
services available and planning for the necessary contracted services
during the drawdown, DOD may not be able to efficiently arrange for
the contracted services necessary to support the drawdown, which may
result in service gaps or opportunities for wasteful contracting
practices. Moreover, without addressing challenges related to contract
transitions and contract oversight, DOD increases the potential for
fraud, waste, and abuse. And finally, a failure to efficiently manage
and retrograde equipment from Iraq, especially high-demand items such
as MRAPs, will likely impact DOD's ability to get that equipment to
wherever it is needed next. If these challenges delay the movement of
equipment out of Iraq, the 50,000 U.S. forces remaining in Iraq after
August 31, 2010, will likely have a greater workload than currently
anticipated, which may strain logistics and transportation systems and
thereby impact their ability to close bases, oversee contractors,
provide security, train the Iraqi security forces, and complete
equipment retrograde. While DOD has begun to address some of these
issues, none of them has yet been fully resolved.
Recommendations:
To facilitate DOD's ability to efficiently conduct the drawdown of
U.S. forces and equipment from Iraq in accordance with established
timelines, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
appropriate authorities to:
* Ensure that joint doctrine regarding operational planning for
contract support is followed and that operational personnel identify
contract support requirements in a timely manner to avoid potential
waste and abuse and facilitate the continuity of services;
* Ensure unity of effort in contract management is attained through
the clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the various
contract review boards in the CENTCOM theater;
* Assess and develop options to mitigate the risks associated with the
upcoming simultaneous contract transitions in Iraq and Kuwait;
* Conduct an analysis of the benefits, costs, and risks of
transitioning from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV and other service contracts
in Iraq under current withdrawal timelines to determine the most
efficient and effective means for providing essential services during
the drawdown;
* Evaluate the risk of having too few qualified contract oversight
personnel in light of the planned proportional increase in the number
of Iraqi contractors during the drawdown and take steps to rectify, if
needed;
* Clarify in existing planning the extent to which Kuwait and other
locations in southwest Asia can support the temporary staging of
equipment and materiel retrograded from Iraq while DOD is finalizing
the disposition instructions for certain types of equipment.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
first five recommendations listed above, but did not concur with an
earlier version of our last recommendation. In its comments regarding
the first five recommendations, the department highlighted a number of
corrective actions it is taking to (1) improve contract support and
contract management in the CENTCOM theater and (2) mitigate the risks
associated with upcoming concurrent contract transitions, including
the planned transition from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV in Iraq. Regarding
our first recommendation, DOD commented that it recognizes that
improvements can be made to DOD's planning for contractor support and
stated that the Joint Staff is working to improve strategic guidance,
processes and tools available to plan for contracted support through
the Chairman's Operational Contract Support Task Force. DOD also
commented that it recognizes the need for better synchronization
between operational needs and contractor activities and, to that end,
CENTCOM has taken steps to increase visibility and synchronization of
operational contract support through initiatives such as the creation
of the Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, instituting a Joint
Contracting Support Board, and collaborating with the Joint Staff to
improve guidance. DOD also agreed with our second recommendation and
commented that the importance of unity of contract management through
clarification of roles and responsibilities cannot be overstated. DOD
further commented that, although the functions of various boards are
articulated in Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support,
the Joint Staff is recommending that new guidance on the roles and
responsibilities of the various boards be incorporated in CENTCOM's
pending fragmentary order that will establish the Joint Theater
Support Contracting Command. With regard to our third recommendation,
DOD stated that a soon-to-be-released fragmentary order will require
the standup of a Joint Contracting Support Board, with participation
by all those delivering or executing contracted support in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Pakistan, and expects that this forum will
help mitigate risks associated with contract transitions. In response
to our fourth recommendation, DOD stated that the Army has completed
an analysis of the benefits, costs, and risks of transitioning from
LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV inn Iraq and is in the process of assessing
options to ensure that essential services are provided in the most
effective and efficient manner. DOD also stated that the risk factors
of going from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV will be based on operational
conditions on the ground, and it will direct the appropriate
authorities to provide the results of its analysis and corresponding
courses of action to the CENTCOM commander to ensure operational risks
are taken into account before going forward. Finally, regarding our
fifth recommendation, DOD commented that the Contingency Contracting
Administration Services Executive Steering Group has identified that
the risk of having too few qualified contract oversight personnel in
light of the planned proportional increase in the number of Iraqi
contractors during the drawdown is a concern and has established a
working group to study the matter and provide recommendations to
mitigate the risks.
In its comments regarding a previous version of our last
recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate
authorities to clarify in existing planning the extent to which Kuwait
and other locations in southwest Asia can support the storage of
equipment and materiel retrograded from Iraq, including the types of
equipment and length of time it can be stored given possible
requirements for the equipment elsewhere, DOD did not concur and
commented that this recommendation was based on what it believed was a
misinterpretation of statements made by senior DOD officials, taken
out of context. Specifically, DOD commented that the section in our
draft report that discussed the equipment disposition process for
moving equipment out of Iraq and Kuwait misstated DOD's policy
regarding the speed at which equipment would be evacuated from Kuwait,
and what GAO saw as the potential equipment build-up and long-term
equipment storage in Kuwait that could result. As a result of DOD's
comments and subsequent meetings with senior officials from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and Department of the Army, we revised
this section of the report, other related references throughout the
report, and the related recommendation. Specifically, we revised these
sections of the report to reflect the department's position that,
although equipment will be temporarily staged in Kuwait prior to its
shipment elsewhere, there are no plans for long-term storage of
equipment in Kuwait other than equipment stored in the Army's
Prepositioned Stocks. These officials subsequently commented that the
information contained in this final report, as revised, is both
accurate and reflective of the views of senior DOD officials.
The department also provided a number of general and technical
comments that we considered and incorporated, as appropriate. A
complete copy of DOD's written comments is included in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We
will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed
in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this letter. GAO staff who
made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Flake:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for the drawdown and
how these plans conform to the established timelines, we reviewed and
analyzed the major plans that guide the execution of drawdown,
including those published by CENTCOM, MNC-I, Headquarters, Department
of the Army, MNF-I, and USF-I. We also reviewed other relevant
documents, including command briefings, the Security Agreement between
the United States and the Republic of Iraq, and transcripts of
speeches in which the president established timelines for the drawdown
of forces from Iraq. Additionally, we spoke with officials at many
levels of the chain of command involved in the preparation and
execution of drawdown plans to include: the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, which worked with commanders in Iraq to weigh the merits of
contending plans for the drawdown; the Joint Staff; U.S.
Transportation Command; CENTCOM; ARCENT; MNF-I; USF-I; and MNC-I. We
also spoke with officials from myriad supporting commands including
Army Materiel Command, Army Sustainment Command; Joint Contracting
Command-Iraq/Afghanistan; the Defense Contract Management Agency; the
Defense Logistics Agency; Army Contracting Command; and the LOGCAP
Program Executive Office. In support of this effort, we traveled to
Kuwait and Iraq in July 2009, where we reviewed documents and
interviewed DOD officials most directly involved with the execution of
drawdown plans. We spoke with officials and reviewed documents from
new organizations created to oversee, synchronize, and ensure unity of
effort for the retrograde of equipment, including the Drawdown Fusion
Center; U.S. ARCENT's Support Element-Iraq; and Army Materiel
Command's Responsible Reset Task Force. Moreover, we observed the
processes instituted to facilitate the drawdown, including the Theater
Provided Equipment Planner and the Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard
Equipment system. Throughout the engagement, the team relied upon
staff working from our Baghdad Field Office to conduct interviews with
officials in theater and to periodically refresh key information.
To identify factors that may impact the efficient execution of the
drawdown we reviewed DOD plans and interviewed officials in the United
States, Iraq, and Kuwait on issues that may hamper the progress of the
drawdown. In Iraq and Kuwait, we conducted over 60 interviews in which
we learned about potential obstacles to the efficient execution of
drawdown. We spoke with officials from: MNF-I, USF-I, MNC-I, Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Joint Contracting Command-
Iraq/Afghanistan, ARCENT, U.S. Marine Corps Central, U.S. Air Force
Central, U.S. Navy Central, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the MRAP
Program Executive Office. We also interviewed officials in the United
States, including officials from CENTCOM, Army Sustainment Command,
Army Materiel Command, and U.S. Transportation Command, to further
inquire about challenges that may compromise the efficient execution
of the drawdown, and to corroborate observations we made while in
Kuwait and Iraq. We also obtained and analyzed relevant documents,
including those pertaining to equipment transfers between the United
States and the Government of Iraq, the retrograde of certain types of
non-standard equipment, and the management and oversight of contract
personnel. Our travel also enabled us to observe key elements of the
retrograde process, including customs inspections, container repair
facilities, systems used to issue disposition instructions, Retrograde
Property Assistance Team yards, central receiving and processing lots,
and management of Defense Reutilization Marketing Offices. Again, we
also relied upon staff working from our Baghdad Field Office to
conduct follow-up interviews with officials, travel to Kuwait to
observe a drawdown rehearsal exercise, and periodically update key
information. Finally, we used our body of issued work examining Iraq
and drawdown-related issues as a basis of comparison to identify areas
in which DOD has made improvements to its drawdown planning, as well
as areas in which it continues to face challenges.
We conducted our audit from January 2009 through March 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Logistics And Materiel Readiness:
3500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3500:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-10-376, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to
Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. forces and Equipment from
Iraq", dated March 5, 2010 (GAO Code 351429). Detailed comments on the
report recommendations are enclosed.
The draft report also does not accurately capture the statements made
by senior officials in DoD and the Army. For example, there is an
inaccurate assumption that the Department of Defense intends to store
equipment in Kuwait and a misrepresentation of the facts that led to
the final recommendation.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Technical comments were provided separately for your consideration.
Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Kevin Doxey,
kevin.doxey@osd.mil, 703-697-1368.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Alan F. Estevez:
Principal Deputy:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated March 5, 2010:
GA0-10-376 (GAO CODE 351429):
"Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient
Drawdown of U.S. forces and Equipment from Iraq"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the appropriate authorities to ensure that joint doctrine
regarding operational planning for contract support is followed and
that operational personnel identify contract support requirements in a
timely manner to avoid potential waste and abuse and facilitate the
continuity of services. (Page 39/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur.
The DoD agrees that according to joint doctrine and service guidance,
operational personnel who plan, support, and execute military
operations must also determine contracted support needed to accomplish
their missions. We recognize improvements can be made in DoD's
planning for contractor support. The Joint Staff is working to improve
strategic guidance, processes and tools available to plan for
contracted support via the Chairman's Operational Contract Support
Task Force. This includes, but is not limited to, inclusion of OCS
planning equities in the Guidance for the Development of the Force
(GDF), Guidance for the Employment of the Force, Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System (JOPES). With respect to the draw-down, there needs
to be additional operational planning that clearly signals the
additional or decreased levels of contracted support, which the Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-IA) and other contracting
authorities could act upon. We recognize the need for synchronization
between operational needs and contractor activities. U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM) has taken steps to mitigate risks in this area, to
increase visibility and synchronization of Operational Contract
Support (OCS) through several initiatives, such as creating the Joint
Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC), instituting a Joint
Contracting Support Board (JCSB) and collaborating with the Joint
Staff to improve guidance.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the appropriate authorities to ensure unity in contract
management is attained through the clarification of the roles and
responsibilities of the various contract review boards in the CENTCOM
Theater. (Page 39/GAO Draft Report.
DOD Response: Concur.
The DoD agrees that the importance of ensuring the unity of contract
management through clarification of roles and responsibilities cannot
be overstated. The functions of various boards are articulated in JP-4-
10, Operational Contract Support. USCENTCOM has established monthly
Commandant Commanders Logistics Procurement Support Boards (CLPSBs)
with their Service components. JCC-I/A hosts monthly Joint Logistics
Procurement Support Boards (JLPSBs) in Iraq. Similarly, U.S. Army
Forces Central Command hosts a monthly JLPSB for Kuwait. US Forces-
Afghanistan hosts an Inter-departmental Combined Joint Logistics
Procurement Support Board (ICJLPSB) for contracting in Afghanistan.
USCENTCOM Regulations 715-1, Contracting Operations, outlines the
roles of these Boards. The JTSCC, once established, will be
responsible for hosting a JCSB with all contracting activities with
performance in Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In light of
this transition, the Joint Staff is recommending USCENTCOM incorporate
new guidance on the roles and responsibilities of various boards in
their pending JTSCC Fragmentary order (FRAGO). Ongoing OUSD(AT&L)
efforts to improve Theater Business Clearance policies, processes and
tools should improve this as well.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the appropriate authorities to access and develop options to
mitigate the risks associated with the upcoming concurrent contract
transitions in Iraq and Kuwait. (Page 39/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur.
Contract support and risk management is described in joint doctrine as
a responsibility of the CLSPB. JCC-IA is transitioning to a Joint
Theater Support Contracting Command, with a direct reporting
relationship to USCENTCOM, which should raise the visibility of
contract management issues to mitigate risks associated with the
drawdown. The pending Fragmentary order requires standup of a Joint
Contracting Support Board, with participation by all those delivering
or executing contracted support in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait and
Pakistan. This forum will help mitigate risks associated with contract
transitions.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the appropriate authorities to conduct an analysis of the
benefits, costs, and risks of transitioning from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP
IV and other service contracts in Iraq under current withdrawal
timelines, to determine the most efficient and effective means for
providing essential services during the drawdown. (Page 39/GAO Draft
Report)
DOD Response: Concur.
The Army has completed an analysis of the benefits, costs, and risks
of transitioning from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV and is in the process of
assessing options to ensure that essential services are provided in
the most effective and efficient manner. However, the risk factors of
going from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV will be based on the operational
conditions on the ground. The Department will direct the appropriate
authorities to provide the results of this analysis and corresponding
courses of action to the Combatant Commander to ensure operational
risks are taken into account going forward.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the appropriate authorities to evaluate the risk of having too
few contractor oversight personnel in light of the planned
proportional increase in the number of Iraqi contractors during the
drawdown and take steps to rectify, if needed. (Page 39/GAO Draft
Report)
DOD Response: Concur.
The Contingency Contracting Administration Services (CCAS) Executive
Steering Group has identified this as a concern and established a
joint working group, led by Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
(DPAP), to study the matter and provide recommendations to mitigate
associated risks.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the appropriate authorities to clarify in existing planning the
extent to which Kuwait and other locations in southwest Asia can
support the storage of equipment and materiel retrograded from Iraq,
including the types of equipment and length of time it can be stored
given possible requirements for the equipment elsewhere. (Page 40/GAO
Draft Report)
DOD Response: Nonconcur.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has no intent to store equipment in
Kuwait (other than Army Prepositioned Stock). Equipment disposition
instructions are issued in Iraq and most equipment moves through
Kuwait where it is prepared for onward movement to its final
destination ” either within the Army Central (ARCENT) Area of
Responsibility, or to the Continental United States.
Additionally, at the request of the Joint Staff, RAND conducted a
study in March 2009, titled "Withdrawing From Iraq", which concluded
that Kuwait has sufficient capacity to redeploy four-plus Brigades per
month, a number that exceeds current planning requirements. In fact,
the study found that both the port and ship berthing capacity can
exceed four-plus Brigades.
We believe this recommendation is based on a misinterpretation of
statements made by senior DoD officials. This misinterpretation of
statements has led to an incorrect conclusion/recommendation. The
specific comments and corresponding page numbers contributing to this
recommendation, which should be deleted from this draft report, are as
follows:
* "However, senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense define the drawdown as moving military personnel and equipment
out of Iraq and attach less priority to moving equipment out of Kuwait
and on to its final destination." (page 6)
* "Without clarifying in its drawdown plans what is to be done with
equipment retrograded from Iraq, to include a determination of the
extent to which equipment can be stored in Kuwait or other locations
in southwest Asia, DoD may not be able to ensure that equipment
required elsewhere or for other initiatives such as reset or equipping
will be available." (page 6)
* "Fourth, a lack of clarity concerning the extent to which and for
how long equipment retrograded from Iraq will be stored in Kuwait or
other locations in southwest Asia may affect DoD's plans for reset and
equipping." (page 18)
* "Yet despite these efforts to improve the equipment disposition
process for equipment retrograded from Iraq, organizations within DoD
differ in how they view the final destination of this equipment."
(page 31)
* "However, despite the global scope of their responsibilities, senior
logistics officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense define
the drawdown as moving military personnel and equipment out of Iraq
and attach less priority to moving equipment out of Kuwait and on to
its final destination." (page 31)
* "Thus, the extent to which DoD will use Kuwait or other locations in
southwest Asia to store equipment retrograded from Iraq, and for how
long, is unclear and may affect other DoD organizations' plans to
ensure the smooth flow of equipment out of Iraq, through Kuwait, and
on to its final destination." (page 31)
* "Finally, decisions have not been finalized on what additional
equipment will be transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan. As a result,
equipment retrograded from Iraq may build up in Kuwait awaiting
disposition instructions, which, as stated above, would be acceptable
outcome for senior DoD logistics officials but which also contradicts
the tenets on which officials in Iraq, Kuwait and at the U.S. Army
Materiel Command have based their drawdown planning." (page 32)
We recommend the above statements be stricken from the report as they
are inaccurate and misrepresentation of the facts.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key
contributions to this statement include Vincent Balloon, John
Bumgarner, Carolynn Cavanaugh, Carole Coffey, Timothy DiNapoli,
Laurier Fish, Walker Fullerton, Guy LoFaro, Greg Marchand, Emily
Norman, Jason Pogacnik, Mark Pross, David Schmitt, Cheryl Weissman,
Gerald Winterlin, and Gwyneth Woolwine.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Many of the initiatives discussed in this report were undertaken
before the transition from MNF-I to USF-I. Actions or initiatives
undertaken before January 2010 will be attributed to MNF-I or one of
its subordinate commands as appropriate. Actions or initiatives taken
after January 2010 or that are currently ongoing will be attributed to
USF-I.
[2] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress
in Accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental
Appropriations Act 2008, Section 9204, Public Law 110-252 (July 23,
2009).
[3] We have determined that agency-reported data should not be used to
identify trends or draw conclusions about the number of contractor
personnel in Iraq due to limitations such as incomplete and inaccurate
data. GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to
Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq
and Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2009).
[4] The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, commonly referred to as
LOGCAP, is a program to provide worldwide logistics and base and life
support services in contingency environments, and is currently
providing most base and life support in Iraq.
[5] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD
Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-930] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10,
2008).
[6] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DOD
Planning for the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-179] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2,
2009).
[7] We use the term "retrograde" to indicate the removal of military
equipment from an operating area.
[8] For a list of this work, see GAO's Web page, Topic Collection:
Iraq and Afghanistan, at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/featured/oif.html].
[9] A modified table of organization and equipment documents the
specific types and amounts of equipment Army units are authorized to
have.
[10] DOD has also initiated plans to use other ports in Jordan,
Turkey, and Iraq to facilitate the retrograde of materiel and
equipment out of Iraq. However, at present, the majority of materiel
and equipment exits through Kuwait.
[11] See GAO, Operation Desert Storm: DOD's Funding Actions Relating
to Leftover Inventories, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-93-143FS] (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 26, 1993); Materiel Disposal: Alleged Improper Disposition and
Destruction of Serviceable Materiel and Supplies in Saudi Arabia,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-93-139R]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 1993); Operation Desert Storm: Lack of
Accountability Over Materiel During Redeployment, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-92-258] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
23, 1992); and Desert Shield/Storm Logistics: Observations by U.S.
Military Personnel, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-92-26] (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
13, 1991).
[12] See GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to
Address Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of
Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2006) and Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to
Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-695] (Washington, D.C.:
June 24, 2003).
[13] Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all
forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not
necessarily part of the same command structure. Joint Publication 1,
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Mar. 20, 2009).
[14] We use the term "reset" to refer to the repair, recapitalization,
and replacement of military equipment in order to restore units'
equipment to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with
mission requirements and availability of resources.
[15] Rolling stock is a subset of class VII equipment and includes
wheeled vehicles, tracked combat vehicles, wheeled/tracked
construction equipment, trailers, semi-trailers, and standard trailer-
mounted equipment such as generators.
[16] Army Field Manual 3-100.21 (100-21), Contractors on the
Battlefield (Jan. 3, 2003). While this guidance is Army-specific, it
was incorporated by reference into the MNF-I drawdown plan.
[17] Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 2006).
[18] GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Overcome Long-Standing
Challenges with Weapon Systems Acquisition and Service Contract
Management, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-362T]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2009).
[19] Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support (Oct 17,
2008) and Army Field Manual 3-100.21.
[20] These are, respectively, the Global Maintenance and Supply
Services contracts for Iraq and Kuwait, which expired in September
2009 but were extended to December 2009; the Combat Service Support-
Kuwait contract, which expired in July 2009 but was extended until
December 2009; and the HEAVYLIFT VI contract, which expired in January
2010 but was extended until March 2010.
[21] The new contracts will be awarded under Field Installation
Readiness Support Team, Kuwait Base Operations and Security Support
Services, and HEAVYLIFT VII respectively.
[22] The Global Maintenance and Supply Support-Iraq contract was re-
competed and a task order was issued in October 2009.
[23] Army Regulation 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program (Oct. 17,
2006).
[24] Prior to returning to the United States all materiel and
equipment must be cleaned to U.S. Department of Agriculture standards.
To meet these standards of cleanliness, all materiel vehicles
returning to the United States are pressure washed on wash racks in
Kuwait.
[25] Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support (Oct. 17,
2008) and Joint Publication 5-0.
[26] Sustainment contracts provide supplies and services to deployed
U.S. forces, such as food services and housing.
[27] Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 7.102(b).
[28] FAR § 7.105(a). One consideration could be the availability of
options under existing contracts, which may generally be exercised if
they are the "most advantageous" method of fulfilling the government's
needs based on price and other factors, such as continuity and
potential costs of disrupting operations. FAR § 17.207.
[29] DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System, encl. 9 (Dec. 8, 2008) and Memorandum from the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics),
Peer Reviews of Contracts for Supplies and Services (Sep. 29, 2008).
[30] GAO, Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and
Other Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Oversight and Management of
Contractors in Future Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-436T] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24,
2008) and Military Operations: High Level DOD Action Needed to Address
Longstanding Problems with the Management and Oversight of Contractors
Supporting Deployed Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2006).
[31] Joint Publication 4-10.
[32] High-and medium-risk services are those services which, if
provided in a manner inconsistent with the contract, would have a
negative impact on mission success or be harmful to life, health, and
safety. Dining facilities and power generation are considered high-
risk services, while postal operations are considered medium risk.
[33] GAO, Defense Logistics: The Army Needs to Implement an Effective
Management and Oversight Plan for the Equipment Maintenance Contract
in Kuwait, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-316R]
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2008).
[34] For a summary, see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-436T].
[35] GAO, Military Operations: DOD Needs to Address Contract Oversight
and Quality Assurance Issues for Contracts Used to Support Contingency
Operations, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1087]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008).
[36] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: September 2009
Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense
Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-
252) (September 2009).
[37] Lean Six Sigma, a disciplined process improvement methodology,
has been endorsed by DOD leadership as a key means by which the
department will become more efficient in its operations and more
effective in its support of the warfighter. On April 30, 2007, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the establishment of a program
office to drive DOD-wide activities associated with Lean Six Sigma.
[38] The Army Prepositioned Stocks program supports the National
Military Strategy by strategically prepositioning critical war stocks
afloat and ashore worldwide and, thus, reducing the deployment
response times of the modular expeditionary Army.
[39] Theater Sustainment Stocks are a pool of military equipment in
theater that can be used to expedite the replacement of equipment
damaged during operations.
[40] For simplicity, we use the term "contractor acquired property" to
include all items that the contractor manages expressly to perform the
contract, including items given to the contractor by the U.S.
government (government furnished equipment) and items
acquired/fabricated by the contractor using U.S. government funds.
[41] FAR §§ 45.105, 52.245-1.
[End of section]
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