Quadrennial Defense Review
2010 Report Addressed Many but Not All Required Items
Gao ID: GAO-10-575R April 30, 2010
The Department of Defense (DOD) is facing the complex challenge of simultaneously supporting continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and preparing its military forces to meet emerging threats of the new security environment. Congress appropriated $626 billion for DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget and to support current operations. As we have emphasized in previous reports, the federal government is facing serious long-term fiscal challenges, and DOD may confront increased competition over the next decade for federal discretionary funds. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the fourth since 1997 and the second since the start of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, articulates DOD's strategic plan to rebalance capabilities in order to prevail in current operations and develop capabilities to meet future threats. The QDR acknowledged that the country faces fiscal challenges and that DOD must make difficult trade-offs where warranted. Also, the QDR results are intended to guide the services in making resource allocation decisions when developing future budgets. This letter provides our assessment of the degree to which DOD addressed each of these items in its 2010 report on the QDR and the supplemental information provided to the defense committees.
DOD used the 2008 National Defense Strategy as the starting point for the 2010 QDR review. The strategy described an environment shaped by globalization, violent extremist movements, rogue and unstable states, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For its 2010 QDR analyses, DOD examined forces needed for three different sets of scenarios, each consisting of multiple concurrent operations, chosen to reflect the complexity and range of events that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping timeframes in the mid-term (5 to 7 years in the future). The range of potential operations included homeland defense, defense support to civil authorities responding to a catastrophic event in the United States, a major stabilization operation, deterring and defeating regional aggressors, and a medium-sized counterinsurgency mission. According to the QDR report, DOD used the results of its analyses to make decisions on how to size and shape the force and to inform its choices on resourcing priorities. For example, according to DOD officials, the proposed fiscal year 2011 defense budget focuses investments toward the priorities outlined in the QDR report, such as rebalancing the force. Our analysis showed that of the 17 required reporting items, DOD addressed 6, partially addressed 7, and did not directly address 4. The items not directly addressed included items addressing the anticipated roles and missions of the reserve component, the advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan, the extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters, and the appropriate ratio of combat to support forces. According to DOD officials, these items were not directly addressed for a variety of reasons such as changes in the operational environment, the difficulty of briefly summarizing a large volume of data generated through the QDR analyses, or departmental plans to report on some items separately. The 2010 QDR report presented the results of DOD's review and, together with the supplemental information, addressed many of the reporting items that are required by law. The reasons for not directly addressing four of the required items are varied and include: reporting on items separately; the changing operational environment; or difficulty in succinctly characterizing voluminous data resulting from the scenario analyses.
GAO-10-575R, Quadrennial Defense Review: 2010 Report Addressed Many but Not All Required Items
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GAO-575R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 30, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Quadrennial Defense Review: 2010 Report Addressed Many but
Not All Required Items:
The Department of Defense (DOD) is facing the complex challenge of
simultaneously supporting continuing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and preparing its military forces to meet emerging threats
of the new security environment. Congress appropriated $626 billion
for DOD's fiscal year 2010 budget and to support current operations.
As we have emphasized in previous reports, the federal government is
facing serious long-term fiscal challenges, and DOD may confront
increased competition over the next decade for federal discretionary
funds.[Footnote 1] The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the
fourth since 1997 and the second since the start of operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, articulates DOD's strategic plan to rebalance
capabilities in order to prevail in current operations and develop
capabilities to meet future threats. The QDR acknowledged that the
country faces fiscal challenges and that DOD must make difficult trade-
offs where warranted. Also, the QDR results are intended to guide the
services in making resource allocation decisions when developing
future budgets.
DOD is required by law to conduct a comprehensive examination of the
national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans,
infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program
and policies of the United States, every 4 years, with a view toward
determining and expressing the nation's defense strategy and
establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.[Footnote 2] In
addition to the 14 reporting requirements specified in the 1999
legislation that established the standing requirement for the QDR in
the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007,[Footnote 3] Congress added 2 new reporting elements to be
included in subsequent QDRs, including the requirement to report on
the specific capabilities needed to achieve the strategic and
warfighting objectives. The department submitted its report on the
fourth quadrennial review to Congress on February 1, 2010. According
to DOD officials, DOD separately provided supplemental information in
a classified format to the four congressional defense committees.
[Footnote 4] Section 1051 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 requires GAO to report to the congressional
defense committees and the Secretary of Defense not later than 90 days
after QDR report was released on the degree to which the QDR report
addressed the 17 specific reporting items required by law.[Footnote 5]
This letter and enclosure I provide our assessment of the degree to
which DOD addressed each of these items in its 2010 report on the QDR
and the supplemental information provided to the defense committees.
The legislation also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a
report to the congressional defense committees that directly addresses
those items that GAO assessed as not directly addressed by the QDR no
later than 30 days after the submission of GAO's report. The
legislation that establishes the requirements for the QDR review and
report is reprinted in enclosure II.
DOD's Approach to the 2010 QDR:
DOD used the 2008 National Defense Strategy as the starting point for
the 2010 QDR review. The strategy described an environment shaped by
globalization, violent extremist movements, rogue and unstable states,
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For its 2010 QDR
analyses, DOD examined forces needed for three different sets of
scenarios, each consisting of multiple concurrent operations, chosen
to reflect the complexity and range of events that may occur in
multiple theaters in overlapping timeframes in the mid-term (5 to 7
years in the future). The range of potential operations included
homeland defense, defense support to civil authorities responding to a
catastrophic event in the United States, a major stabilization
operation, deterring and defeating regional aggressors, and a medium-
sized counterinsurgency mission. According to the QDR report, DOD used
the results of its analyses to make decisions on how to size and shape
the force and to inform its choices on resourcing priorities. For
example, according to DOD officials, the proposed fiscal year 2011
defense budget focuses investments toward the priorities outlined in
the QDR report, such as rebalancing the force.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy had the lead role in
conducting the 2010 QDR. To conduct the QDR analyses, DOD established
four issue teams, each co-chaired by representatives from the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
and the Joint Staff. Issue teams included: (1) irregular warfare, (2)
high-end asymmetric threats, (3) global posture, and (4) homeland
defense and support to civil authorities. A fifth team integrated the
work of the four issue teams.[Footnote 6] According to DOD officials,
each team was comprised of relevant stakeholders and subject matter
experts from across the department. The results of the teams'
analyses, including proposed solutions to identified gaps and
shortfalls, were reviewed and vetted within the department by
representatives from across DOD, including representatives from the
military services, combatant commands, Joint Staff, and key offices
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such as the Office of
the Comptroller and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The Secretary of Defense
chaired a committee of senior leaders to provide guidance and make
final decisions. As part of the process, DOD officials said that they
coordinated the analyses and communicated the results with other
ongoing reviews, such as the Nuclear Posture Review and the Mobility
Capabilities and Requirements 2016 study. DOD officials also engaged
in discussions with other federal agencies, including the Department
of State and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as the
intelligence community. In addition, DOD held outreach discussions
with allied and other countries and had representatives of some allied
countries participate in issue team discussions.
Scope and Methodology:
For our assessment of the extent to which the 2010 QDR report
addressed the required reporting items, we reviewed the QDR report and
classified supplemental information provided to congressional defense
committees to assess whether each item was addressed, addressed in
part, or not directly addressed in the QDR report and supplemental
information. Specifically, we independently reviewed and compared the
QDR report and supplemental information with the legislative
requirements and assessed whether each item was addressed, addressed
in part, or not directly addressed. The final assessment reflected our
consensus based on the individual assessments. We considered an item
addressed if all parts of the item were explicitly included in either
the QDR report or the supplemental information. We considered the item
addressed in part if one or more parts were included, but not all
parts were explicitly addressed. We considered an item not directly
addressed if neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information
explicitly addressed any part of the required item. In addition, we
interviewed DOD officials involved in the QDR analysis to discuss
their interpretation of the legislative requirements and the review's
analytic approach and findings. We did not evaluate DOD's process and
methodology or validate the results of the QDR analyses. We conducted
this performance audit from February 2010 to April 2010 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objective. Additional information
regarding our scope and methodology appears in enclosure III.
GAO's Assessment of the Extent to Which the 2010 QDR Report and
Supplemental Information Addressed Required Reporting Items:
Our analysis showed that of the 17 required reporting items, DOD
addressed 6, partially addressed 7, and did not directly address 4.
The items not directly addressed included items addressing the
anticipated roles and missions of the reserve component, the
advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan, the extent to
which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters, and the
appropriate ratio of combat to support forces. According to DOD
officials, these items were not directly addressed for a variety of
reasons such as changes in the operational environment, the difficulty
of briefly summarizing a large volume of data generated through the
QDR analyses, or departmental plans to report on some items
separately. Table 1 below shows the items required to be included in
the QDR report and our assessment of each item.
Table 1: GAO Assessment of Required Items in DOD's 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report:
Required Items and Comments: (1) The results of the review, including
a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the
United States, the strategic planning guidance, and the force
structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate
level of risk;
Comments: The QDR report included a discussion of the national defense
strategy, including four objectives: prevail in today's wars;
prevent and deter conflict; prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed
in a wide range of contingencies; and preserve and enhance the all-
volunteer force. The QDR report also discussed six cross-cutting
missions that are required to achieve these objectives. The report
included strategic planning guidance by identifying capability
enhancements and included a force structure list covering the major
combat elements of each military service that is intended to implement
the defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk;
Our Assessment: Addressed.
Required Items and Comments: (2) The assumed or defined national
security interests of the United States that inform the national
defense strategy defined in the review.
Comments: The QDR report described U.S. interests as linked to the
international system and listed national security interests as
security, prosperity, broad respect for universal values, and an
international order that promotes cooperative action. The report also
asserted that advancing these interests is best accomplished by
integrating all elements of national power including strong regional
allies and partners;
Our Assessment: Addressed.
Required Items and Comments: (3) The threats to the assumed or defined
national security interests of the United States that were examined
for the purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in the
examination of those threats.
Comments: The QDR report outlined current and near-term threats
confronting the United States and explained the scenarios DOD used in
the QDR analyses. The report emphasized that the U.S. is currently at
war and discussed the need for DOD to remain cognizant of global
issues such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Unlike
past reviews that called for U.S forces to be able to fight and win
two major regional conflicts, the 2010 QDR report asserted that U.S.
forces must be capable of conducting a wide range of operations,
including homeland defense and deterrence as well as defeating
regional aggressors. The scenarios analyzed included a combination of
types of operations reflecting a wide range of operations in multiple
theaters in overlapping timeframes;
Our Assessment: Addressed.
Required Items and Comments: (4) The assumptions used in review,
including assumptions relating to--(a) the status of readiness of
United States forces; (b) the cooperation of allies, mission-sharing
and additional benefits to and burdens on United States forces
resulting from coalition operations; (c) warning times; (d) levels of
engagement in operations other than war and smaller-scale
contingencies and withdrawal from such operations and contingencies;
and (e) the intensity, duration, and military and political end-states
of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies.
Comments: The QDR report and the supplemental information provided to
the congressional defense committees discussed the assumptions
underlying the QDR analyses in general terms but did not specifically
include all the assumptions as required;
* Assumptions regarding readiness were not directly addressed in terms
of readiness levels as reported in DOD's readiness reporting systems.
DOD officials told us they used rotation rates in the scenario
analyses as a proxy for readiness, but the assumed rotation rates were
not fully reported;
* Although assumptions regarding the details of allied cooperation
were included in the scenarios, only a general discussion of allied
participation was reported which did not include details such as the
types of forces or capabilities that allies may provide;
* Examples of assumptions relating to warning times were included in
the supplemental information but not all the warning time assumptions
of all the scenarios were reported;
* The scenarios analyzed included U.S. forces participating in a wide
range of activities short of war, although the QDR report did not use
the terms "operations other than war" and "smaller-scale
contingencies;"
* The supplemental information included a general discussion of phases
of a variety of types of operations but did not discuss assumptions
regarding end-states;
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part.
Required Items and Comments: (5) The effect on the force structure and
on readiness for high-intensity combat of preparations for and
participation in operations other than war and smaller-scale
contingencies.
Comments: The QDR report and supplemental information discussed the
need for forces to be capable of engaging in combat operations as well
as a wide range of smaller operations, but these documents did not
specifically explain the effects of these smaller operations on the
force structure or readiness for high-intensity combat. For example,
these documents did not discuss whether involvement in smaller types
of operations may result in lowered readiness for high-intensity
operations as measured by DOD's readiness reporting systems.
According to DOD officials, analysis of the effects of participation
in small-scale contingencies on combat readiness and force structure
were accounted for in the QDR scenario analyses. As the scenarios
began, some forces were rotated back to the United States for
retraining to be ready for the high-intensity operations;
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part.
Required Items and Comments: (6) The manpower and sustainment policies
required under the national defense strategy to support engagement in
conflicts lasting longer than 120 days.
Comments: The QDR report discussed various manpower policies, such as
objectives for rotation rates, in detail, but discussed sustainment
activities in very general terms. The manpower policies discussed
include a wide variety of issues such as improving wounded warrior
care and revising bonus policies to retain personnel. Regarding
sustainment, DOD officials explained that the department interpreted
the requirement to mean an assessment of DOD's ability to continue
operations by sustaining a rotation of forces into and out of ongoing
operations, which was included in the scenario analyses. However, for
purposes other than the QDR report, DOD also defines sustainment as
providing logistical support--food, fuel, spare parts--to maintain
operations. According to DOD officials, the QDR analyses did not
include a detailed analysis of re-supplying forward deployed forces;
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part.
Required Items and Comments: (7) The anticipated roles and missions of
the reserve components in the national defense strategy and the
strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the
reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions.
Comments: Neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information
discussed the roles and missions of the reserve components. The QDR
report stated that the proper mix and roles of active and reserve
components is a key force management issue. The report also stated
that DOD will conduct a comprehensive review of the future roles of
the reserve components which, according to DOD officials, may be
completed in early 2011;
Our Assessment: Not Directly Addressed.
Required Items and Comments: 8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces
to support forces (commonly referred to as the 'tooth-to-tail' ratio)
under the national defense strategy, including, in particular, the
appropriate number and size of headquarters units and Defense Agencies
for that purpose.
Comments: The QDR report did not include a specific ratio of combat
forces to support forces and did not identify the appropriate number
or size of headquarters units or defense agencies. The supplemental
information noted that DOD's forces should be as lean as possible, and
that the distinction between combat and support forces has become
blurred in the current operational environment;
Our Assessment: Not Directly Addressed.
Required Items and Comments: (9) The specific capabilities, including
general number and type of specific military platforms, needed to
achieve the strategic and warfighting objectives identified in the
review.
Comments: The QDR report listed the organizations and platform types
that encompass the major combat elements of each of the services, and
discussed the capabilities that the department assessed as needed to
accomplish each of the six missions of the defense strategy. The QDR
report noted that it did not list all the support forces but did
discuss some support capabilities the department would like to expand
such as increased availability of rotary wing assets. Finally, the
supplementary information provided to the defense committees described
the analysis and issues for various elements of the force structure
including fighters, bombers, and the Navy battle force;
Our Assessment: Addressed.
Required Items and Comments: (10) The strategic and tactical air-lift,
sea-lift, and ground transportation capabilities required to support
the national defense strategy.
Comments: The QDR report listed selected mobility resources and noted
that the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, which was
issued in February 2010, contained more detailed information on the
number of air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation platforms
required to support the strategy;
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part.
Required Items and Comments: (11) The forward presence, pre-
positioning, and other anticipatory deployments necessary under the
national defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate
military response to anticipated conflicts. Comments: The QDR report
discussed forward presence and anticipatory deployments in general
terms and did not discuss what quantities, types, and locations of pre-
positioned equipment were needed under the defense strategy. The QDR
report stated that U.S. presence is to support operations, deter
threats, and reassure allies and partners. However, according to DOD
officials, the department is continuing to study how presence might be
changed to better support the defense strategy;
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part.
Required Items and Comments: (12) The extent to which resources must
be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense
strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.
Comments: Neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information
characterized the extent to which resources must be shifted among two
or more theaters. The supplementary information acknowledged that
moving forces from one theater to another is an option for managing
shortfalls in capabilities. However, neither the QDR report nor the
supplementary information quantified how many or what kind of
resources might need to be shifted or which theaters might need to
receive resources from another;
Our Assessment: Not Directly Addressed.
Required Items and Comments: (13) The advisability of revisions to the
Unified Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy.
Comments: The QDR report did not discuss the advisability of revisions
to the Unified Command Plan. However, DOD is required by law to update
this plan not less than every 2 years. According to DOD officials, the
next update, scheduled to be issued in the fall 2010, will incorporate
QDR results;
Our Assessment: Not Directly Addressed.
Required Items and Comments: (14) The effect on force structure of the
use by the armed forces of technologies anticipated to be available
for the ensuing 20 years.
Comments: The QDR report discussed a number of new technologies
anticipated to be available such as expanding the capacity of attack
submarines for long-range strike and capabilities for defending cyber
networks. However, the QDR report did not specify the effects of
technology on force structure in terms of the numbers and types of
units and platforms;
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part.
Required Items and Comments: (15) The national defense mission of the
Coast Guard.
Comments: The supplemental information provided to the defense
committees cited several Coast Guard national defense missions such as
domestic and expeditionary port operations and port defense, and
coastal sea control operations. In addition, the supplemental
information cited a May 2008 memorandum of agreement between DOD and
the Department of Homeland Security on the use of the Coast Guard that
further describes these missions. For example, port operations and
defense are designed to ensure that port areas are free of threats and
safe for navigation;
Our Assessment: Addressed.
Required Items and Comments: (16) The homeland defense and support to
civil authority missions of the active and reserve components,
including the organization and capabilities required for the active
and reserve components to discharge each such mission.
Comments: the QDR report included a general discussion of this item
and discussed initiatives for enhancing capabilities, but the QDR
report did not clearly identify the active and reserve component
missions for homeland defense and support to civil authorities or
specify the organization and capabilities of the active and reserve
components required to discharge those missions;
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part.
Required Items and Comments: (17) Any other matter the Secretary
considers appropriate. Comments: The supplemental information referred
to three issues in the QDR report as addressing this item:
* taking care of U.S. servicemembers and their families;
* institutional reform; and;
* global defense posture and deterrence;
Our Assessment: Addressed.
[End of table]
Enclosure I includes our detailed evaluation of each of the above
required reporting items.
Concluding Observations:
The 2010 QDR report presented the results of DOD's review and,
together with the supplemental information, addressed many of the
reporting items that are required by law. The reasons for not directly
addressing four of the required items are varied and include:
reporting on items separately; the changing operational environment;
or difficulty in succinctly characterizing voluminous data resulting
from the scenario analyses. In previous reports we have examined the
strengths and weaknesses of the previous QDRs and made recommendations
for strengthening analytic approaches, especially in determining the
force structure best suited to execute the defense strategy. We
reported that the previous QDR did not adequately assess different
options for organizing and sizing DOD's forces to provide needed
capabilities and that DOD did not fully apply its risk management
framework because DOD had not developed assessment tools to measure
risk. In addition, in our 2007 report we noted that some defense
analysts suggested that eliminating some reporting requirements--such
as those that may no longer be relevant due to changes in the security
environment or those that are addressed in other reports--could enable
DOD to focus its quadrennial review and reporting on broad strategic
issues.[Footnote 7] For example, DOD officials noted that calculating
a single preferred ratio of combat to support forces would be
difficult given the blurring between combat and support activities in
the new security environment where support activities are increasingly
forward deployed and subject to enemy attack, and technology has
enabled remote participation in combat activities, such as through
remotely piloted vehicles. In our 2007 report we suggested that
Congress consider revisions to the QDR legislation, including
eliminating some detail on reporting elements that could be addressed
in different reports or may no longer be relevant due to changes in
the security environment. We continue to believe that these options
could help clarify Congress's expectations for the report and
encourage DOD to focus on high priority matters.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD recognized that the
department did not directly address four items in the QDR report. DOD
stated that a review of the QDR legislative requirements is merited in
light of the changed security environment and that eliminating or
revising some of the reporting items could help to ensure that the
next QDR focuses on the issues of greatest saliency. DOD's comments
included a discussion of why each of the four items was not addressed--
either work is on-going or DOD believes the item is no longer relevant
in the current security environment. The department's comments are
reprinted in their entirety in enclosure IV. In addition, DOD
officials provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as
appropriate.
We are sending copies of the report to the congressional defense
committees. This report is also available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Should you or your staffs
have any questions, please contact me at (404) 679-1816 or
pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Key contributors to this report were Margaret G. Morgan,
Assistant Director; Brenda M. Waterfield, Analyst-in-Charge; Simon J.
Hirschfeld; Erika A. Prochaska; Rachel E. Dunsmoor, Ophelia Robinson,
Terry Richardson, K. Nicole Harms, and Erik S. Wilkins-McKee.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosures-4:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Detailed Assessments of Required Items:
Reporting Item: The Results of the Review, Strategic Planning
Guidance, and Force Structure:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(1), the QDR report shall include the
results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the
national defense strategy of the United States, the strategic planning
guidance, and the force structure best suited to implement that
strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk.
Our Assessment: Addressed:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed because the QDR report and
supplemental information explained the defense strategy, discussed
strategic planning guidance, and identified major elements of force
structure required to implement the strategy at a low-to-moderate risk
level. The report identified four objectives of the defense strategy:
prevail in today's wars; prevent and deter conflict; prepare to defeat
adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and preserve
and enhance the all-volunteer force. To achieve these objectives, the
report identified six key missions: defend the United States and
support civil authorities; achieve success in counterinsurgency,
stability, and counterterrorism operations; build the security
capacity of partner states; deter and defeat aggression in anti-access
environments; prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass
destruction; and operate effectively in cyberspace. Department of
Defense (DOD) officials explained that the objectives and missions
collectively constitute the defense strategy.
The QDR report offered strategic planning guidance by identifying
capability enhancements needed to address shortfalls that, officials
believe, will enable the department to implement the defense strategy.
The guidance was based on the findings from DOD's analyses of three
scenarios that it used to identify the force structure and
capabilities needed in the mid-term to conduct the six missions and
achieve each of the four defense objectives. The QDR analyses
identified some capability gaps and shortfalls in current forces,
which were discussed in the QDR report. For example, some of the
enhancements needed to conduct the counterinsurgency mission include
increasing the availability of rotary-wing assets, expanding aircraft
systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and
improving capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices. DOD
expects the services to use this guidance in making resource
allocation decisions as they plan for the size and capabilities of
their respective forces. The QDR report also included more general
strategic planning guidance such as identifying broad areas for
development of future capabilities”for example, long-range strike”and
directing needed studies, such as the study of reserve component roles
and missions.
The QDR report included a force structure list of the major combat
elements of each service. DOD officials told us that they chose to
identify only major force elements because a comprehensive force list
would be too lengthy. In the supplemental information provided to the
defense committees, DOD stated that the force structure reflected in
the fiscal years 2011-2015 Future Years Defense Program is intended to
execute the defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk,
predicated on the assumption that the United States will reduce its
forces in Iraq and make progress toward accomplishing its missions in
Afghanistan, and will therefore be able to return to a sustainable
rotation rate and "reset" readiness to conduct the full range of
missions.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: Assumed or Defined National Security Interests:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(2), the QDR shall include the assumed
or defined national security interests of the United States that
inform the national defense strategy defined in the review.
Our Assessment: Addressed:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed because the QDR report included
statements on the assumed main national security interests that inform
the strategy. The report described America's main national security
interests as inextricably linked to the integrity and resilience of
the international system and lists as chief national security
interests security, prosperity, broad respect for universal values,
and an international order that promotes cooperative action. The QDR
report asserted that advancing these interests is best accomplished by
integrating all elements of national power, including diplomacy,
economic development, cooperation and engagement, and strong allies
and partners. The QDR report discussed the interests the United States
has in common with allies and partners, such as NATO countries. It
also discusses the importance of building relationships in Europe,
Asia, and elsewhere. For example, the report discussed interests the
United States shares with Russia such as countering proliferation and
confronting terrorism, and with Korea and Japan in building alliances
and restructuring allied security roles and capabilities.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: Threats to the Assumed or Defined National Security
Interests of the United States:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(3), the QDR report shall include the
threats to the assumed or defined national security interests of the
United States that were examined for the purposes of the review and
the scenarios developed in the examination of those threats.
Our Assessment: Addressed:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed because the QDR report outlined
current and near-term threats confronting the United States and
explained the scenarios the Department of Defense (DOD) used in the
QDR analyses.
The report described a time of complexity and uncertainty in the
security environment and challenges faced by the United States in
pursuing the national goals of promoting stability in key regions,
providing assistance to nations in need, and promoting the common
good. The report emphasized that the United States is currently at
war, with ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and continuing
assistance to Pakistan to counter threats from violent extremists. The
report discussed the need for DOD to remain cognizant of global
geopolitical changes, such as the rise of China and India, operational
threats due to the increased power of nonstate actors with access to
advanced technology, and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. The report also noted that powerful trends, such as
rising demand for resources and cultural and demographic tensions,
could spark or exacerbate future conflict. Finally, the report
discussed continuing and future threats such as terrorist threats, the
further development and spread of weapons for anti-access strategies,
antiship cruise missiles, development of capabilities to disrupt or
destroy satellites, and threats to cyberspace that may disrupt
military networks.
Unlike past reviews that called for the armed forces to be able to
fight and win two major regional conflicts in overlapping timeframes,
the 2010 QDR report asserted that the armed forces must be capable of
conducting a wide range of operations, including homeland defense,
deterrence and preparedness missions, as well as defeating regional
aggressors. To assess the force structure and capabilities needed to
meet many types of demands, the 2010 QDR examined three scenario
combinations designed to reflect current and projected security
environment. Each scenario included a different combination of types
of operations ranging from engaging in major stabilization operations,
deterring and defeating two regional aggressors, conducting
counterinsurgency, maintaining a long-duration deterrence operation,
and extending support to civil authorities. The QDR report explained
that the scenarios reflected the expectation that U.S. forces need to
be capable of conducting a wide range of operations in multiple
theaters in overlapping timeframes. The classified supplemental
information DOD provided to the defense committees contained more
details of the QDR scenarios than are provided in the unclassified
report. The report noted that the force structure presented reflects
the demands of ongoing operations, and that the appropriate size and
mix of forces could change as demands evolve.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: The Assumptions Used in the Review:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(4), the QDR report shall include the
assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating to: (A)
the status of readiness of United States forces; (B) the cooperation
of allies, mission-sharing and additional benefits to and burdens on
the United States forces resulting from coalition operations; (C)
warning times; (D) levels of engagement in operations other than war
and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations
and contingencies; and (E) the intensity, duration, and military and
political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies.
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed in part because the QDR report
and supplemental information provided to congressional defense
committees discussed the assumptions underlying the QDR analysis in
general terms but did not specifically include all assumptions
required.
* Neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information directly
addressed the assumptions relating to readiness in terms of DOD's
readiness reporting systems. Instead, DOD used rotation rates in the
scenario analyses as a proxy for readiness, according to DOD
officials. Since forces involved in on-going operations may not be
immediately available or ready for a major event, the forces were
assumed to rotate back to the United States for retraining before
being made available for a major event in the scenarios. However, the
rotation rates used as a proxy for readiness were also not fully
reported in the report or supplemental information.
* While the supplemental information included some discussion of the
assumptions relating to allied contributions, it did not set out the
assumptions relating to the specific types of forces or capabilities
allies may provide in each scenario, although these details were used
in the QDR scenario analyses. The supplemental information noted that
DOD continues to work with allies to better understand their capacity
to contribute to coalition operations.
* The supplemental information included some examples of
assumptions relating to warning times but did not include all warning
times for all the scenarios. DOD officials explained that warning
times were included as assumptions in each of the scenarios analyzed.
* The terms "operations other than war" and "smaller-scale
contingencies" were not used in the QDR report, and DOD officials told
us that these terms are generally no longer used by the department.
However, the QDR report stated that U.S. forces must be capable of
conducting a wide range of operations from homeland defense to
deterrence, and the supplemental information stated that U.S. forces
must be prepared to engage in a wide range of activities short of war.
DOD officials told us that they assumed ongoing involvement in these
activities in the analysis of three scenarios.
* Regarding assumptions as to the intensity, duration, and end states
of conflicts, the supplemental information noted that DOD assessed the
force against a wide range of scenarios and its analysis reflected
various phases of operations, ranging from deterrence to warfighting
to stabilization. However, the assumed military and political end
states of conflicts were not defined.
In discussing these assumptions, DOD officials agreed with our
assessment and stated that the scenario analyses yielded voluminous,
classified data. The officials explained that they used their judgment
on how much information was appropriate and prudent to report.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: Effect of Preparations for, Participation in
Operations Other Than War and Smaller Contingencies:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(5), the QDR report shall include the
effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-intensity
combat of preparations for and participation in operations other than
war and smaller-scale contingencies.
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed in part because although the QDR
report and supplemental information provided to congressional defense
committees presented a force structure designed to meet a range of
threats and discussed the need for forces to be capable of engaging in
combat operations as well as smaller-scale operations, these documents
did not specifically explain the effects of smaller-scale operations
on the force structure or on readiness for high-intensity combat.
The terms "operations other than war" and "smaller-scale
contingencies" were not used in the QDR report, and Department of
Defense (DOD) officials told us that these terms are generally no
longer used by the department. DOD officials told us that the QDR's
scenario analyses assumed that U.S. forces will almost always be
engaged in smaller-scale missions, such as deterrence operations or
humanitarian relief missions”now called foundational activities. The
analyses also assumed that over time, forces could be redirected to
meet more pressing operational needs.
Neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information specified the
effects on force structure and readiness for high-intensity combat of
forces involved in foundational activities. For example, although the
supplemental information stated that the biggest influence on the size
of the force is long-duration stability and deterrence operations, the
report did not provide details such as whether involvement in these
types of operations results in the need for more brigades, or more
aircraft squadrons, or more ships. Further, these documents did not
discuss whether involvement in foundational activities may result in
lowered readiness for high-intensity combat operations (as measured by
DOD's readiness reporting systems) for some portion of the force
structure.
According to DOD officials, the effects of forces' participation in
foundational activities were accounted for in the QDR scenario
analyses and the forces listed in the QDR report reflect the results
of the scenario analyses which included involvement in foundational
activities. For example, as each scenario began, some forces were not
immediately available for the high-intensity operation but continued
to be engaged in ongoing foundational activities. Before rotating to
the high-intensity operation, these forces were rotated back to the
United States for retraining to prepare for the high-intensity
operation. DOD officials agreed that the effects on readiness are not
explicitly reported because they viewed readiness as a force
management issue and the QDR analyses focused on force capabilities
and structure.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: Manpower and Sustainment Policies:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(6), the QDR report shall include the
manpower and sustainment policies required under the national defense
strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting longer than 120
days.
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.
Detailed Assessment of this Item:
We found that this item was addressed in part because although the QDR
report discussed several manpower policies, it did not include a
discussion of sustainment policies required under the national defense
strategy. The manpower policies that the QDR report discussed include
a wide variety of issues such as wounded warrior care, managing
deployment tempo, recruiting and retention, supporting families,
developing future military leaders, and developing the total defense
workforce. For example, in its discussion of recruiting and retention,
the QDR report described the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to
revise bonus policies to retain personnel. Also, the QDR report
discussed goals for wounded warrior care such as improving health
benefits and creating new policies for mental health care. The report
discussed sustainment in general terms, such as the need to reset
equipment, increase the number and quality of key "enablers" such as
logisticians and communications support assets, and continue to
prioritize the effective delivery of logistical support. However, the
report did not include a discussion of sustainment policies.
DOD officials explained that the department interpreted the reporting
requirement for sustainment as an assessment of DOD's ability to
continue operations by sustaining a rotation of forces into and out of
ongoing operations. This force movement was modeled in the QDR
scenario analyses by using different rotation rates for active and
reserve forces. By rotating forces, the model accounted for the need
to rest and retrain personnel and the continuous movement of forces
into an area to sustain operations. However, DOD also defines
sustainment as providing logistics”delivering materiel such as
ammunition, spare parts, and fuel to military forces”to maintain
operations. According to DOD officials, the QDR analyses did not
include a detailed analysis of supplying forces with food, fuel, and
spare parts. Also, DOD officials said that the QDR analyses did not
include a detailed assessment of contractor-provided support yet the
Joint Staff concluded earlier this year that the joint force relies on
contract support across all capability areas.
Related GAO Findings: Reliance on Contractor-Provided Support:
We reported in 2006 that, since the 1990s, DOD has increasingly relied
on contractors to meet many of its logistical support needs during
combat operations.[Footnote 8] We also reported in March 2010 that few
of the combatant commanders' operation plans include information on
contractor support and the information that is included provides
little insight into the extent to which DOD will need to rely on
contractors to support contingency operations.[Footnote 9]
[End of item]
Reporting Item: Roles, Missions, Strength, Capabilities, and Equipment
of the Reserve Components:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(7), the QDR report shall include the
anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the
national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and
equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably
discharge those roles and missions.
Our Assessment: Not Directly Addressed:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was not directly
addressed.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the
QDR report nor the supplemental information provided to the defense
committees discussed the roles and missions of the reserve components
in the national defense strategy or outlined the strength,
capabilities, and equipment necessary to discharge those roles and
missions.
The QDR report explained that the defense strategy requires the
reserves to serve in an operational capacity and necessitates the
continued use of some high-demand skills in the reserve components.
However, some statements in the report implied that the roles and
missions of the reserve components might need to change. For example,
the report stated that ensuring the proper mix and roles of active and
reserve components is a key force management issue. Further, given the
current operational tempo, Department of Defense (DOD) officials
acknowledged that the department cannot meet its goal of demobilizing
all reserve forces for 5 years for every 1 year mobilized. Finally,
although the defense strategy requires the National Guard and the
reserves to be integrated with the active component, the report did
not explain how the reserve components' capabilities and equipment
should complement those of the active components to achieve this
integration. The force structure listed in the QDR report included
some reserve units, but the list cited only examples of major force
elements. The report also noted that existing National Guard forces
will be used to build a homeland response force in each of the 10
Federal Emergency Management Agency regions.
DOD officials agreed that this item is not directly addressed even
though some reserve forces are included in the force structure listed
in the report. DOD officials agreed this is an important issue
considering that heavy use of reserve forces over the last several
years can have long-term consequences. The QDR report stated that over
the coming year, DOD will conduct a comprehensive review of the future
role of the reserve components, including an examination of the
balance between active and reserve forces. DOD officials told us that
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
is responsible for conducting this study and expects it will be
completed in early 2011.
Related GAO Findings: Reserves' Missions Changing but Some Units Have
Difficulty Meeting Readiness Goals:
GAO reported in 2009 that the Army is changing the organization and
missions of some of its reserve units to provide more operational
forces, but faces challenges in achieving sustainable mobilization
rates and readiness goals.[Footnote 10] In 2007, we found that
planning for the National Guard's response to potential large-scale
catastrophic events was not complete.[Footnote 11] These findings
underscore the importance of DOD studying the roles and missions of
the reserve components.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: Ratio of Combat Forces to Support Forces:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(8), the QDR report shall include the
appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly
referred to as the "tooth-to-tail" ratio) under the national defense
strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of
headquarters units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.
Our Assessment: Not Directly Addressed:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was not directly
addressed.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the
QDR report nor the supplemental information provided to the defense
committees identified a ratio of combat forces to support forces under
the national defense strategy and neither identified the appropriate
number or size of headquarters units or defense agencies for that
purpose.
In the supplemental information provided to the defense committees,
the Department of Defense (DOD) noted that the ratio of combat forces
to support forces and enablers should be as lean as possible and that
current operational environments blur the distinctions between combat
and support forces. For example, support may need to be forward-
deployed with forces engaged in combat operations. The supplemental
information explained that current enemy tactics, new technologies,
and the increased lethality of weapons make the differences between
combat and support forces less relevant. DOD also reported that some
aspects of the current operating environment, such as working with
other U.S. agencies and allies, increase support requirements such as
command and control. DOD noted in the supplemental information that it
has established new headquarters units, such as U.S. Africa Command,
and DOD officials said that although this command is considered
support, it is important for achieving the strategy's objective to
prevent and deter conflict.
DOD officials agreed that this item is not directly addressed and
explained that since the current operational environment blurs the
distinction between combat and support, such a ratio would not provide
a meaningful measure of efficient use of resources. Also, DOD
officials said that in contrast to previous defense strategies that
focused on two major wars, counterinsurgency, stability, or
counterterrorism operations depend on strengthening key non-combat
capabilities.
Related GAO Findings: Ratio of Combat to Support Difficult to Measure:
In our report on the last QDR, we identified options Congress could
consider for improving future QDRs which included eliminating some
reporting items, such as the ratio of combat forces to support forces.
We reported that given rapidly changing technologies, differentiating
between combat and support troops has become increasingly irrelevant
and difficult to measure.[Footnote 12]
[End of item]
Reporting Item: The Specific Capabilities and Platforms Needed to
Achieve Strategic and Warfighting Objectives:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(9), the QDR report shall include the
specific capabilities, including the general number and type of
specific military platforms, needed to achieve the strategic and
warfighting objectives identified in the review.
Our Assessment: Addressed:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed because the QDR report listed
capabilities, including the general number and type of specific
military platforms, needed to achieve the strategic and warfighting
objectives identified in the review.
The QDR report listed the organizations and platform types that
encompass the major combat elements of each military service and
discussed the capabilities that the Department of Defense (DOD)
assessed as needed to accomplish each of the six missions of the
defense strategy. The report noted that it did not list all the
support forces”called enabler forces”that play crucial roles in
supporting operations in complex environments, but did discuss some of
the enabler capabilities the department wants to expand, such as
increased availability of rotary wing assets and expanded aircraft
systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Also, the
QDR report discussed other needed capabilities that are not explained
in terms of platforms. For example, the need to develop a joint air-
sea battle concept and expand future long-range strike capabilities
were discussed in general terms. The QDR report made reference to
other reports, such as the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements
Study 2016 and the Nuclear Posture Review Report, which contain more
information about platforms needed to achieve objectives.[Footnote 13]
Finally, the supplementary information that DOD provided to the
defense committees described the analysis and issues for various
elements of the force structure, including fighter force structure,
bomber force structure, the Navy battle force, and airlift and aerial
refueling force structure.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: Strategic and Tactical Air-lift, Sea-lift, and Ground
Transportation Capabilities Required to Support the National Defense
Strategy:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(10), the QDR report shall include the
strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation
capabilities required to support the national defense strategy.
Our Assessment: Addressed In Part:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed in part because the QDR report
contained a limited discussion of mobility capabilities, noting that
the capacity of mobility resources was validated in the Department of
Defense's (DOD) Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016,
issued shortly after the QDR report.[Footnote 14] However, neither the
QDR report nor the supplementary information provided to congressional
defense committees contained detailed results of the mobility study,
such as the number of strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and
ground transportation platforms required to support the national
defense strategy.
The QDR report referred to the mobility study report which contained
detailed information on the numbers of platforms for air-lift, sea-
lift, and ground transportation required to conduct a range of
missions. In conducting the mobility study, DOD analyzed three
scenarios to determine mobility requirements, gaps, and overlaps in
capabilities in the 2016 timeframe. Although the mobility scenarios
were different from the QDR scenarios in some details, officials told
us that the mobility scenarios were more demanding and, as a result,
the requirements derived in the mobility analysis would be adequate to
meet the demands of the QDR scenarios. Although the QDR report
acknowledged that support capabilities are important, the report only
listed selected sea-lift and airlift platforms, such as cargo ships
and refueling wings, but did not discuss ground transportation
capabilities. According to DOD officials, DOD did not report more
detail on mobility requirements because the details were contained in
the other report which was also provided to the defense committees
and, at the time the QDR report was issued, the results of the
mobility study had not been fully vetted within the department.
Related GAO Findings: Civil Reserve Air Fleet Passenger Capacity Has
Declined:
The mobility report noted that projected Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) capacity is significant and exceeds the requirements of the
scenarios studied. We reported in 2009 that DOD depends on CRAF
charter passenger aircraft to move more than 90 percent of its
peacetime requirements, as well as all contingency surges.[Footnote
15] However, CRAF passenger capacity has declined 55 percent since
2003. This underscores the importance of DOD carefully studying the
requirements for and risks to its mobility capabilities.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: Forward Presence, Pre-Positioning, and Other
Anticipatory Deployments for Conflict Deterrence and Military Response:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(11), the QDR report shall include the
forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments
necessary under the national defense strategy for conflict deterrence
and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part.
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed in part because the QDR report
and supplemental information provided to congressional defense
committees discussed forward presence and anticipatory deployments in
general terms but did not provide detail as to their necessity under
the national defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate
military response to anticipated conflicts. In addition, details of
pre-positioning needed under the defense strategy were not discussed.
The QDR report discussed forward presence in Europe, the Pacific, the
Greater Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere in varying
degrees of detail. In Europe, for example, the report noted that the
U.S. will retain four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps
headquarters, but the discussion of forces to be positioned in Asia
and Africa was less specific. For example, the QDR report stated that
U.S. defense posture calibrates the U.S. presence in each region to
best support ongoing and future operations, deter potential threats,
and reassure allies and partners. According to DOD officials, the QDR
scenario analyses included forward presence of U.S. forces, and the
department is continuing to study how presence might be changed to
better support the defense strategy.
Neither the QDR report nor the supplemental information discussed
prepositioning-”placing materiel and equipment at strategic locations
to enable DOD to field combat ready forces quickly”-in detail, such as
specifying how much of what equipment is needed at which locations to
support the defense strategy. However, the QDR report stated that
reset and pre-positioned stock replacement are two crucial issues for
maintaining readiness.
The QDR report discussed anticipatory deployments briefly, stating
that DOD is examining options for deploying selected forces in regions
facing new challenges. For example, selectively homeporting additional
naval forces forward could strengthen deterrence and expand maritime
security cooperation with partner navies. However, the report did not
provide details of what ships might be deployed at which locations.
Related GAO Findings: Some Pre-positioned Equipment Depleted:
We reported in 2009 that assessing risk to operations based on
shortfalls in pre-positioned equipment would provide DOD better
information to assess how pre-positioning could support current and
future operations.[Footnote 16] We also testified in 2008 that ongoing
operations have depleted some pre-positioned equipment and it is not
clear when it will be replenished.[Footnote 17] These findings
underscore the importance of assessing pre-positioning requirements in
support of the defense strategy.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: The Extent to Which Resources Must Be Shifted:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(12), the QDR report shall include the
extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters
under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such
theaters.
Our Assessment: Not Directly Addressed.
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was not directly
addressed.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the
QDR report nor the supplementary information provided to the defense
committees contained a discussion of the extent to which resources
must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense
strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.
The supplementary information provided to the defense committees
acknowledged that moving forces from one theater to another is an
option for managing shortfalls in key capabilities. In addition,
Department of Defense (DOD) officials told us that in analyzing the
forces needed in each of the scenarios, DOD's analyses included what
types of forces would need to be shifted between theaters. However,
DOD officials agreed that neither the QDR report nor the supplementary
information discussed the extent to which resources must be shifted,
such as the quantities or kinds of resources that might need to be
shifted, how frequently such adjustments may need to occur, or which
theaters' resources have priority for shifting resources. According to
DOD officials, DOD did not report information on the extent to which
resources must be shifted among theaters because the data were
voluminous, classified, and would have been difficult to succinctly
characterize in the proper context.
Related GAO Findings: Shifting Resources Item Related to Two-Major-
Theater-War Planning Construct:
In our report on the last QDR, we identified options Congress could
consider for improving the usefulness of future QDRs, including
eliminating some reporting items such as the extent to which resources
must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense
strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters. We reported that
this element was related to the old two-major-theater-war planning
construct, and that it may be more useful for DOD's force structure
assessments to be tied to requirements for a broad range of potential
threats.[Footnote 18]
[End of item]
Reporting Element: Advisability of Revisions to the Unified Command
Plan:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(13), the QDR report shall include the
advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of
the national defense strategy.
Our Assessment: Not Directly Addressed.
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was not directly
addressed.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the
QDR report nor the supplementary information provided to the defense
committees provided an assessment of the advisability of revisions to
the Unified Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy.
The Unified Command Plan establishes the missions, responsibilities,
and geographic areas of responsibilities for commanders of combatant
commands. The Unified Command Plan is required by law to be updated
not less than every 2 years.[Footnote 19] The supplemental information
noted that the Department of Defense (DOD) is currently updating the
Unified Command Plan. According to DOD officials, the updated Unified
Command Plan, which is expected to be issued in the fall of 2010, will
capture the direction and strategic themes outlined in the 2010 QDR
report. DOD officials agreed, however, that neither the QDR report nor
the supplementary information provided to the defense committees
provided an assessment of the advisability of revisions to the Unified
Command Plan because the plan is regularly updated in a separate
process.
Related GAO Findings: Updates to Unified Command Plan Required Under
Separate Legislation:
GAO reported in 2007 that some items that are required to be included
in the QDR report are addressed by other laws as well. The requirement
to report changes to the Unified Command Plan is one example.[Footnote
20] We also reported that DOD had a process for assessing the Unified
Command Plan and that legislation requires that the President notify
Congress not more than 60 days after either establishing a new
combatant command or significantly revising the missions,
responsibilities, or force structure of an existing command.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: The Effect on Force Structure of Technologies
Anticipated to be Available:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(14), the QDR report shall include the
effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of
technologies anticipated to be available for the ensuing 20 years.
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed in part because the QDR report
discussed a number of new technologies anticipated to be available for
use by the armed forces and listed major elements of the force
structure, but the effects on force structure of the new technologies
were not specified.
According to the QDR report, the capabilities, flexibility, and
robustness of U.S. forces will be improved by fielding more and better
enabling systems, including intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), electronic attack, communications networks, and
enhanced cyber defenses. The QDR report cited capabilities to be
developed with anticipated technologies to conduct the six key mission
areas, including expanding the capacity of attack submarines for long-
range strike, conducting field experiments with prototype versions of
naval unmanned combat aerial systems for ISR, and developing the
latest technologies to enable U.S. forces to operate in cyberspace.
The QDR report also noted that DOD will explore technologies that have
the potential to detect, track, and identify threats to the United
States. For example, DOD is working with the Department of Homeland
Security and the Defense Intelligence Agency to explore new
technologies to assist in the detection of tunnels. The QDR report
listed major elements of the force structure DOD determined was needed
over the next 5 years in accordance with the defense strategy.
However, the effect of these new technologies on force structure in
terms of the numbers and types of units and platforms was not
specified. DOD noted in the supplemental information that most of its
quantitative analyses focused on the mid term (5-7 years in the
future). DOD officials agreed that the effects on force structure were
not fully reported and explained that it would be premature to attempt
firm conclusions about changes in force structure that might result
from the incorporation of new technologies over the long term (through
2030). The QDR report cautioned that requirements for new systems are
too often set at the far limit of current technological boundaries,
which often results in disappointing performance and cost and schedule
overruns.
Related GAO Findings: Technology and System Acquisition:
Management of DOD's major weapon system acquisitions has been on GAO's
high-risk list since 1990. GAO has stated that in the absence of
product knowledge at critical junctures, managers rely heavily on
assumptions about technology and design maturity, which are too
optimistic.[Footnote 21] This exposes programs to significant and
unnecessary technology and design risk and, ultimately, cost growth
and schedule delays. GAO also reported in 2006 that DOD needs to
strengthen its processes for transitioning new technologies to ensure
that technologies are ready when needed.[Footnote 22] These findings
underscore the importance of balancing improvements with program risk
and cost.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: The National Defense Mission of the Coast Guard:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(15), the QDR report shall include the
national defense mission of the Coast Guard.
Our Assessment: Addressed:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed because the supplemental
information provided to the defense committees described the national
defense missions of the Coast Guard.
The supplemental information stated that the national defense missions
of the Coast Guard include: maritime interception operations; domestic
and expeditionary port operations, security and defense; military
environmental response operations; coastal sea control operations;
combating terrorism; and rotary wing intercept. The supplemental
information also cited other documents, including the statutory basis
for the Coast Guard's defense role and two memorandums of agreement
between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security on the use of
the Coast Guard in support of national defense. The November 2004
memorandum of agreement detailed the peacetime and wartime joint
command and control structure for the Navy and Coast Guard. The 2008
memorandum of agreement described some of the missions listed above.
For example, maritime intercept operations may include stopping,
boarding, searching, diverting, or redirecting vessel traffic Coast
Guard port operations, security, and defense are designed to ensure
that port and harbor areas are maintained free of hostile threats and
safety deficiencies in order to safeguard freedom of navigation for
vessels.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: The Homeland Defense and Support to Civil Authority
Missions of the Active and Reserve Components:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(16), the QDR report shall include the
homeland defense and support to civil authority missions of the active
and reserve components, including the organization and capabilities
required for the active and reserve components to discharge each such
mission.
Our Assessment: Addressed in Part:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed in part.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed in part because the QDR report
included a general discussion of homeland security and support to
civil authorities. However, the QDR report did not clearly identify
the active and reserve component missions for homeland defense and
support to civil authorities or specify the organization and
capabilities of the active and reserve components required to
discharge those missions.
Defending the United States and supporting civil authorities at home
was one of the six key mission areas outlined in the QDR report as
part of the defense strategy. Through the QDR analyses, the Department
of Defense (DOD) identified four areas requiring increased
capabilities. For example, it identified the need to field faster,
more flexible consequence management response forces. To meet this
need, the QDR report described a planned initiative to use existing
National Guard forces to build a response force in each of the 10
Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. The QDR report also
discussed other initiatives intended to enhance capabilities for
domain awareness, accelerate the development of capabilities to detect
radiological and nuclear material and weapons at a distance, and
enhance domestic abilities to counter improvised explosive devices.
However, the report and supplemental information did not outline the
full range of missions required of active and reserve forces and did
not identify the full range of organization and capabilities to
discharge those missions.
According to DOD officials, forces for homeland defense and support to
civil authorities were included in its scenario analyses. However, DOD
officials said that the QDR report did not fully report the missions
of the active and reserve components for homeland defense and support
to civil authorities or identify the active and reserve component
forces needed for each of these missions.
Related GAO Findings: Civil Support Missions and Capabilities:
In March 2010, we reported that DOD has many strategy, policy, and
guidance documents on homeland defense and support to civil
authorities, but that DOD has not fully or clearly defined roles and
responsibilities for these missions.[Footnote 23] For example, DOD has
not addressed the breadth of civil support missions that it must be
prepared to support. In another March 2010 report, we found that
although DOD has identified some capability gaps for civil support
missions, the precise scope of these shortfalls has not been
determined because of a lack of interagency agreement on the extent of
the capabilities that DOD is expected to provide.[Footnote 24] These
findings underscore the importance of fully identifying and clearly
assigning civil support missions.
[End of item]
Reporting Item: Matters the Secretary Considers Appropriate:
Reporting Requirement:
According to 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d)(17), the QDR report shall include any
other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.
Our Assessment: Addressed:
Based on our assessment, we found that this item was addressed.
Detailed Assessment of This Item:
We found that this item was addressed because the supplemental
information provided to the congressional defense committees listed
three matters that the Secretary considered appropriate: taking care
of U.S. service members and their families; institutional reform; and
global defense posture and deterrence.
Taking care of U.S. service members and their families. The QDR report
stated that multiple long deployments are taking a significant toll on
soldiers and their families and, as a result, one of the defense
strategy objectives is to preserve and enhance the all-volunteer
force. The QDR report discussed initiatives the Department of Defense
(DOD) is undertaking in six areas: wounded warrior care, managing
deployment tempo, recruiting and retention, supporting families,
developing future military leaders and developing the total defense
workforce.
Institutional reform. The QDR report listed four areas where the
department believes reform is important: security assistance, defense
acquisition, the defense industrial base, and energy security and
climate change. Regarding security assistance, the QDR report stated
that building security capacity of partners and allies is critical and
that enabling our partners to respond to security challenges may
reduce risk to U.S. forces. Regarding defense acquisition, the QDR
report discussed acquisition system problems, such as overly
optimistic cost estimates and a decline in the acquisition workforce.
The report also discussed efforts to address these problems such as
increasing the numbers and skills of the acquisition workforce and
strengthening cost analysis capabilities.
Global defense posture and deterrence. The QDR report described three
elements as key to U.S. defense posture: forward-stationed and
rotationally deployed forces, capabilities, and equipment; a
supporting overseas network of infrastructure and facilities; and a
series of treaty, access, transit, and status-protection agreements
and arrangements with allies and key partners. Also, see our
assessment of the required reporting item on forward presence on page
22.
[End of item]
[End of Enclosure I]
Enclosure II: QDR Legislative Requirements:
10 U.S.C. § 118 Quadrennial Defense Review:
(a) Review required.”The Secretary of Defense shall every four years,
during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a
comprehensive examination (to be known as a "quadrennial defense
review") of the national defense strategy, force structure, force
modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements
of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view
toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United
States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. Each
such quadrennial defense review shall be conducted in consultation
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(b) Conduct of review. Each quadrennial defense review shall be
conducted so as:
(1) to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most
recent National Security Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant
to section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a);
(2) to define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans,
infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program
of the United States associated with that national defense strategy
that would be required to execute successfully the full range of
missions called for in that national defense strategy;
(3) to identify (A) the budget plan that would be required to provide
sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of
missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-
moderate level of risk, and (B) any additional resources (beyond those
programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to
achieve such a level of risk; and;
(4) to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with
the budget submitted to Congress by the President pursuant to section
1105 of title 31.
(c) Assessment of risk. The assessment of risk for the purposes of
subsection (b) shall be undertaken by the Secretary of Defense in
consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That
assessment shall define the nature and magnitude of the political,
strategic, and military risks associated with executing the missions
called for under the national defense strategy.
(d) Submission of QDR to Congressional committees. The Secretary shall
submit a report on each quadrennial defense review to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The
report shall be submitted in the year following the year in which the
review is conducted, but not later than the date on which the
President submits the budget for the next fiscal year to Congress
under section 1105(a) of title 31. The report shall include the
following:
(1) The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of
the national defense strategy of the United States, the strategic
planning guidance, and the force structure best suited to implement
that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk.
(2) The assumed or defined national security interests of the United
States that inform the national defense strategy defined in the review.
(3) The threats to the assumed or defined national security interests
of the United States that were examined for the purposes of the review
and the scenarios developed in the examination of those threats.
(4) The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating
to:
(A) the status of readiness of United States forces;
(B) the cooperation of allies, mission-sharing and additional benefits
to and burdens on United States forces resulting from coalition
operations;
(C) warning times;
(D) levels of engagement in operations other than war and smaller-
scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations and
contingencies; and;
(E) the intensity, duration, and military and political end-states of
conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies.
(5) The effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-
intensity combat of preparations for and participation in operations
other than war and smaller-scale contingencies.
(6) The manpower and sustainment policies required under the national
defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting longer
than 120 days.
(7) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in
the national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and
equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably
discharge those roles and missions.
(8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly
referred to as the 'tooth-to-tail' ratio) under the national defense
strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of
headquarters units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.
(9) The specific capabilities, including the general number and type
of specific military platforms, needed to achieve the strategic and
warfighting objectives identified in the review.
(10) The strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground
transportation capabilities required to support the national defense
strategy.
(11) The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory
deployments necessary under the national defense strategy for conflict
deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.
(12) The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more
theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict
in such theaters.
(13) The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a
result of the national defense strategy.
(14) The effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of
technologies anticipated to be available for the ensuing 20 years.
(15) The national defense mission of the Coast Guard.
(16) The homeland defense and support to civil authority missions of
the active and reserve components, including the organization and
capabilities required for the active and reserve components to
discharge each such mission.
(17) Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.
(e) CJCS review. (1) Upon the completion of each review under
subsection (a), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall
prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense the Chairman's
assessment of the review, including the Chairman's assessment of risk
and a description of the capabilities needed to address such risk.
(2) The Chairman's assessment shall be submitted to the Secretary in
time for the inclusion of the assessment in the report. The Secretary
shall include the Chairman's assessment, together with the Secretary's
comments, in the report in its entirety.
(f) Independent panel assessment. (1) Not later than six months before
the date on which the report on a Quadrennial Defense Review is to be
submitted under subsection (d), the Secretary of Defense shall
establish a panel to conduct an assessment of the quadrennial defense
review.
(2) Not later than three months after the date on which the report on
a quadrennial defense review is submitted under subsection (d) to the
congressional committees named in that subsection, the panel appointed
under paragraph (1) shall submit to those committees an assessment of
the review, including the recommendations of the review, the stated
and implied assumptions incorporated in the review, and the
vulnerabilities of the strategy and force structure underlying the
review. The assessment of the panel shall include analyses of the
trends, asymmetries, and concepts of operations that characterize the
military balance with potential adversaries, focusing on the strategic
approaches of possible opposing forces.
(g) Consideration of effect of climate change on department
facilities, capabilities, and missions. (1) The first national
security strategy and national defense strategy prepared after January
28, 2008, shall include guidance for military planners:
(A) to assess the risks of projected climate change to current and
future missions of the armed forces;
(B) to update defense plans based on these assessments, including
working with allies and partners to incorporate climate mitigation
strategies, capacity building, and relevant research and development;
and;
(C) to develop the capabilities needed to reduce future impacts.
(2) The first quadrennial defense review prepared after January 28,
2008, shall also examine the capabilities of the armed forces to
respond to the consequences of climate change, in particular,
preparedness for natural disasters from extreme weather events and
other missions the armed forces may be asked to support inside the
United States and overseas.
(3) For planning purposes to comply with the requirements of this
subsection, the Secretary of Defense shall use:
(A) the mid-range projections of the fourth assessment report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;
(B) subsequent mid-range consensus climate projections if more recent
information is available when the next national security strategy,
national defense strategy, or quadrennial defense review, as the case
may be, is conducted; and;
(C) findings of appropriate and available estimations or studies of
the anticipated strategic, social, political, and economic effects of
global climate change and the implications of such effects on the
national security of the United States.
(4) In this subsection, the term "national security strategy" means
the annual national security strategy report of the President under
section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a).
(h) Relationship to budget. Nothing in this section shall be construed
to affect section 1105(a) of title 31.
(i) Interagency overseas basing report. (1) Not later than 90 days
after submitting a report on a quadrennial defense review under
subsection (d), the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
congressional defense committees a report detailing how the results of
the assessment conducted as part of such review will impact:
(A) the status of overseas base closure and realignment actions
undertaken as part of a global defense posture realignment strategy;
and;
(B) the status of development and execution of comprehensive master
plans for overseas military main operating bases, forward operating
sites, and cooperative security locations of the global defense
posture of the United States.
(2) A report under paragraph (1) shall include any recommendations for
additional closures or realignments of military installations outside
of the United States and any comments resulting from an interagency
review of these plans that includes the Department of State and other
relevant Federal departments and agencies.
[End of Enclosure II]
Enclosure III: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) reported
on the items required by 10 U.S.C. § 118 (d), we evaluated the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report published by DOD in February
2010 as well as the supplementary information provided to the
congressional defense committees in February 2010. For the purposes of
determining the extent to which DOD addressed each of the items
required by law, we considered both the QDR report and the
supplementary information since the supplementary information was
provided to the defense committees.
We determined that the extent to which DOD addressed each item
required by subsection (d) would be rated as either "addressed,"
"addressed in part," or "not directly addressed." These categories
were defined as follows:
* Addressed: A required QDR item is addressed when the QDR report or
supplementary information explicitly address all parts of the item.
* Addressed in part: A required QDR item is addressed in part when the
QDR report or supplementary information addresses at least one or more
parts of the required item, but not all parts of the item are
explicitly addressed. Also, an item is considered addressed in part if
the QDR or supplementary information states that the item is addressed
in another document and specifically refers to the document, and we
are able to verify that the requirement is addressed in that
referenced document. Studies and reports that were not completed and
issued at the time of our review were not considered to have fulfilled
the requirement to any extent.
* Not directly addressed: A required QDR item is not directly
addressed when the QDR report and supplementary information do not
explicitly address any part of the required item.
Specifically, three GAO analysts independently reviewed and compared
the QDR report and supplemental information with the legislative
requirements, assessed whether each item was addressed, addressed in
part, or not directly addressed, and recorded their assessment and the
basis for the assessment on a data collection instrument. The final
assessment reflected the analysts' consensus based on the individual
assessments. We considered an item addressed if all parts of the item
were explicitly included in either the QDR report or the supplemental
information. We considered the item addressed in part if one or more
parts were included, but not all parts were explicitly addressed. We
considered an item not directly addressed if neither the QDR report
nor the supplementary information explicitly addressed any part of the
required item. Information DOD developed as part of the QDR analyses
but did not reported in either the QDR report or supplemental material
provided to the defense committees was not factored into our
assessment of whether the item was addressed. In addition, we
interviewed DOD officials involved in the QDR analysis to discuss
their interpretation of the legislative requirements and the review's
analytic approach and findings. We did not evaluate DOD's process, or
methodology, or validate the results of the QDR analyses.
To obtain DOD's perspective on how the department believed it had
addressed the legislative requirements, we reviewed documentation
related to DOD's analyses and interviewed DOD officials who were
involved in the review, including officials in the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the
Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate. To
provide context, our assessment also reflected our review of relevant
DOD documents and issues raised in recent GAO reports that
specifically relate to some of the required reporting items.
We conducted our work from February 2010 to April 2010, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of Enclosure III}
Enclosure IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Principal Deputy Under Secretary Of Defense:
Policy:
2100 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2100:
April 22, 2010:
Mr. John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton:
I am pleased to enclose the Department of Defense's response to the
GAO Draft Report, GAO-10-575R, "Quadrennial Defense Review: 2010
Report Addresses Many But Not All Required Items," dated April 8, 2010
(GAO Code 351441).
The United States faces a complex and challenging security landscape
in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. The Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) strove, successfully in our view, to take account
of this complexity in setting a course for the future evolution of our
armed forces. We support GAO's assessment that a review of the
legislative requirements for the QDR is merited in light of changes to
the security environment that have occurred since the legislation was
established in 1999. By eliminating or revising some of the reporting
elements, the legislation could help to ensure that the next QDR
focuses on the issues of greatest saliency to the development of a
sound defense program.
The Department recognizes the draft report's assessment that we did
not directly address four requested items in the Quadrennial Defense
Review and appreciates the opportunity to explain further.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James N. Miller:
Attachment ” Reply to GAO assessment:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report ” Dated April 8, 2010:
GAO CODE 351441/GAO-10-575R:
"Quadrennial Defense Review: 2010 Report Addresses Many But Not All
Required Items"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Four Items Of Legislation
Assessed As "Not Directly" Addressed:
Reporting Item - Roles, Missions, Strength, Capabilities and Equipment
of the Reserve Components: GAO found that this item was not directly
addressed because neither the QDR report nor the supplemental
information provided to the defense committees discussed the roles and
missions of the reserve components in the national defense strategy or
outlined the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to
discharge those roles and missions.
DoD Response: As noted on page 54 of the report, the QDR specifically
acknowledged the need to review the future roles of the Reserve
Component, including an examination of the balance between active and
reserve forces. It is essential that DoD integrate the National Guard
and Reserves into the broader All-Volunteer Force in order to meet the
challenges of a dynamic security environment. The Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)) is undertaking this
review, which should be completed in early 2011.
Reporting Item ” Ratio of Combat Forces to Support Forces: GAO found
that this item was not directly addressed because neither the QDR
report nor the supplemental information provided to the defense
committees identified a ratio of combat forces to support forces under
the national defense strategy and neither identified the appropriate
number or size of headquarters units or defense agencies for that
purpose.
DoD Response: The traditional "tooth to tail" paradigm is no longer a
useful or relevant metric to apply to U.S. military forces. In today's
complex security environment the distinction between "combat" forces
and "support" elements is blurring. Today UAV pilots located in the
United States are flying reconnaissance and strike missions in the
Afghanistan; logistic convoys are on constant guard against improvised
explosive devises; and combat enablers, such as helicopters,
intelligence fusion centers, secure communications and mobile
logistics, are critical to the effectiveness of the front line troops.
As the distinction between tooth and tail becomes less relevant, it is
no longer a meaningful measure of efficient use of resources. The key
endeavor is to ensure that U.S. forces have the capabilities and
capacity they need to accomplish their missions, irrespective of
whether those capabilities are regarded as "combat" or "support"
assets. This was the focus of the QDR.
Reporting Item ” The Extent to Which Resources Must Be Shifted: GAO
found that this item was not directly addressed because neither the
QDR report nor the supplementary information provided to the defense
committees contained a discussion of the extent to which resources
must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense
strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.
DoD Response: The legislation's provision for reporting on which
resources might have to be shifted from one contingency to another was
more applicable to an era when force planning could be adequately
based on a small number of scenarios. The QDR, however, was premised
on a recognition that in a complex security environment, U.S. forces
must be capable of conducting a wide range of mission (see, for
example, pages 17 and 42-43 of the QDR Report.) For this reason,
assessments of U.S. forces conducted by the QDR examined many
scenarios and tested future forces against multiple combinations of
scenarios.
Analysis supported the conclusion that U.S. forces can perform the
missions called for by the defense strategy and the QDR. However,
because of the multi-faceted nature of those missions it was
impractical to report in detail which force elements might have to be
shifted between contingencies.
Reporting Item ” Advisability of Revisions to the Unified Command
Plan: GAO found that this item was not directly addressed because
neither the QDR report nor the supplementary information provided to
the defense committees provided an assessment of the advisability of
revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the national
defense strategy.
DoD Response: Title 10 U.S.C., Section 161, requires the Chairman to
review "the missions, responsibilities, and force structure of each
combatant command" and "recommend to the President, through the
Secretary of Defense, any changes to such missions, responsibilities,
and force structures as may be necessary." The Unified Command Plan
(UCP) 2010 review, which is now ongoing, will account for the national
defense strategy and other elements of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
A revised UCP will be issued in the fall of 2010.
[End of Enclosure IV}
Related GAO Products:
Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using
Contractors to Support Future Military Operations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-472]. Washington, D.C.: March 30,
2010.
Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to
Support Civil Authorities during Disasters. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-386]. Washington, D.C.: March 30,
2010.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency
Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-364]. Washington, D.C.:
March 30, 2010).
The Federal Government's Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: January 2010
Update. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-468SP].
Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2010.
Defense Logistics: Department of Defense's Annual Report on the Status
of Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Can Be Further Enhanced to
Better Inform Congress. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-172R]. Washington, D.C.: November
4, 2009.
Military Airlift: DOD Should Take Steps to Strengthen Management of
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-625]. Washington, D.C.: September
30, 2009.
Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and
Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-898]. Washington, D.C.:
September 17, 2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January
2009.
Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve
Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619]. Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2008.
Force Structure: Restructuring and Rebuilding the Army Will Cost
Billions of Dollars for Equipment but the Total Cost is Uncertain,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-669T] (Washington,
D.C.: April 10, 2008).
Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Could Benefit from Improved
Department of Defense Analyses and Changes to Legislative
Requirements. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-709].
Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2007.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic
Equipment Requirements and Readiness. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-60]. Washington, D.C.: January 26,
2007.
Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-
standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors
Supporting Deployed Forces. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145]. Washington, D.C.: December
18, 2006.
Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology
Transition Processes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-883]. Washington, D.C.: September
14, 2006.
218t Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal
Government. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-05-325SP].
Washington, D.C.: February 2005.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, The Federal Government's Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: January
2010 Update, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-468SP]
(Washington, D.C.: March 2010); 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining
the Base of the Federal Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-325SP] (Washington, D.C.: February
2005). Also see our related products list at the end of this report.
[2] The first QDR was completed in response to section 923 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-201 (1996). Congress created a continuing requirement for DOD to
conduct a QDR every 4 years in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 § 901 (1999), codified at 10
U.S.C.§ 118.
[3] Pub. L. No. 109-364, §1031 (2006).
[4] The four defense committees are the House Committee on Armed
Services, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Defense
of the House Committee on Appropriations, and the Subcommittee on
Defense of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The supplemental
information contained some classified information, and is therefore
not publicly available.
[5] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-84 § 1051 (2009). Although the law refers to the "2009 QDR",
the QDR report was issued in February 2010, and we refer to it in this
report as the "2010 QDR".
[6] According to DOD officials, DOD had also initially established a
team to improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness in business
processes, but this team was dissolved because other DOD offices were
doing comparable work, the results of which, according to DOD
officials, were incorporated in the QDR report. There were also
additional cross-cutting teams which met as needed to support the work
of the four issue teams, such as a cyber issues team.
[7] GAO, Quadrennial Defense Review: Future Reviews Could Benefit from
Improved Department of Defense Analyses and Changes to Legislative
Requirements, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-709]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2007).
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-07-445].
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-472].
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-09-898].
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-60].
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-07-709].
[13] Department of Defense, Mobility Capabilities and Requirements
Study 2016, (Washington, D.C., Feb. 26, 2010). Department of Defense,
Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C., April 6, 2010).
[14] Department of Defense, Mobility Capabilities and Requirements
Study 2016, (February 2010).
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-09-625].
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-172R].
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-669T].
[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-709].
[19] 10 U.S.C. § 161.
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-709].
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619].
[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-883].
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-364].
[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-386].
[End of section]
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