Warfighter Support
Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs Gao ID: GAO-10-460 April 30, 2010Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced rapidly changing threats to mission failure or loss of life, highlighting the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to develop and field new capabilities more quickly than its usual acquisition procedures allow. Since 2006, Congress has provided nearly $16 billion to counter improvised explosive devices alone. GAO and others have reported funding, organizational, acquisition, and oversight issues involving DOD's processes for meeting warfighters' urgent needs. The Senate Armed Services Committee asked GAO to determine 1) the extent to which DOD has a means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes, and 2) what challenges, if any, have affected the overall responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs processes. To conduct this review GAO looked at three urgent needs processes--joint, Army, and the Marine Corps processes--visited forces overseas that submit urgent needs requests and receive solutions, and conducted 23 case studies.
Although DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than traditional acquisition procedures, DOD is unable to fully assess how well the processes address critical deficiencies or to measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because it has not established an effective management framework for those processes. GAO found that DOD's guidance for its urgent needs processes is dispersed and outdated. Further, DOD guidance does not clearly define roles and responsibilities for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating all phases of those processes or incorporate all of the expedited acquisition authorities available to acquire joint urgent need solutions. Data systems for the processes lack comprehensive, reliable data for tracking overall results and do not have standards for collecting and managing data. In addition, the joint process does not include a formal method for feedback to inform joint leadership on the performance of solutions. In one case, a solution for a joint request was fielded for 18 months without meeting warfighter needs. In the absence of a management framework for its urgent needs processes, DOD lacks tools to fully assess how well its processes work, manage their performance, ensure efficient use of resources, and make decisions regarding the long-term sustainment of fielded capabilities. In conducting field work in Iraq as well as 23 case studies, GAO found several challenges that could hinder DOD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent warfighter needs. First, not all personnel involved in the initial development and review of urgent needs documentation receive adequate training. DOD policy states that deploying personnel should receive priority for training and be responsive to the needs of the combatant commander; however, officers responsible for drafting, submitting, and reviewing Army and joint urgent needs requests are not likely to receive such training. Hence, once in theater, they often face difficulties processing the large volume of requests, in a timely manner. Second, in 11 of 23 cases GAO studied, challenges obtaining funding were the primary factor that increased the amount of time needed to field solutions. Funding has not always been available for joint urgent needs in part because the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not assigned primary responsibility for implementing the department's rapid acquisition authority. Congress provided OSD with that authority to meet urgent warfighter needs, but OSD has played a reactive rather than proactive role in making decisions about when to invoke it. In addition, DOD can reprogram funds appropriated for other purposes to meet urgent needs requests, but authority for determining when and how to reprogram funds has been delegated to the services and combatant commands. Prior GAO work has shown that strong leadership from OSD over resource control is critical, and midlevel agencies such as the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, which is responsible for facilitating urgent needs requests, including funding, cannot guide other agencies at a high enough level to promote effective interagency coordination. Finally, GAO found that attempts to meet urgent needs with immature or complex technologies can result in significant delays.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: William M. Solis Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-8365GAO-10-460, Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs
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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2010:
Warfighter Support:
Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight
and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs:
GAO-10-460:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-460, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced rapidly changing threats to
mission failure or loss of life, highlighting the Department of
Defense‘s (DOD) need to develop and field new capabilities more
quickly than its usual acquisition procedures allow. Since 2006,
Congress has provided nearly $16 billion to counter improvised
explosive devices alone. GAO and others have reported funding,
organizational, acquisition, and oversight issues involving DOD‘s
processes for meeting warfighters‘ urgent needs. The Senate Armed
Services Committee asked GAO to determine 1) the extent to which DOD
has a means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes,
and 2) what challenges, if any, have affected the overall
responsiveness of DOD‘s urgent needs processes. To conduct this review
GAO looked at three urgent needs processes”joint, Army, and the Marine
Corps processes”visited forces overseas that submit urgent needs
requests and receive solutions, and conducted 23 case studies.
What GAO Found:
Although DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are
more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than traditional
acquisition procedures, DOD is unable to fully assess how well the
processes address critical deficiencies or to measure the
effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because it has not
established an effective management framework for those processes. GAO
found that DOD‘s guidance for its urgent needs processes is dispersed
and outdated. Further, DOD guidance does not clearly define roles and
responsibilities for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating all
phases of those processes or incorporate all of the expedited
acquisition authorities available to acquire joint urgent need
solutions. Data systems for the processes lack comprehensive, reliable
data for tracking overall results and do not have standards for
collecting and managing data. In addition, the joint process does not
include a formal method for feedback to inform joint leadership on the
performance of solutions. In one case, a solution for a joint request
was fielded for 18 months without meeting warfighter needs. In the
absence of a management framework for its urgent needs processes, DOD
lacks tools to fully assess how well its processes work, manage their
performance, ensure efficient use of resources, and make decisions
regarding the long-term sustainment of fielded capabilities.
In conducting field work in Iraq as well as 23 case studies, GAO found
several challenges that could hinder DOD‘s ability to rapidly respond
to urgent warfighter needs. First, not all personnel involved in the
initial development and review of urgent needs documentation receive
adequate training. DOD policy states that deploying personnel should
receive priority for training and be responsive to the needs of the
combatant commander; however, officers responsible for drafting,
submitting, and reviewing Army and joint urgent needs requests are not
likely to receive such training. Hence, once in theater, they often
face difficulties processing the large volume of requests, in a timely
manner. Second, in 11 of 23 cases GAO studied, challenges obtaining
funding were the primary factor that increased the amount of time
needed to field solutions. Funding has not always been available for
joint urgent needs in part because the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) has not assigned primary responsibility for implementing
the department‘s rapid acquisition authority. Congress provided OSD
with that authority to meet urgent warfighter needs, but OSD has
played a reactive rather than proactive role in making decisions about
when to invoke it. In addition, DOD can reprogram funds appropriated
for other purposes to meet urgent needs requests, but authority for
determining when and how to reprogram funds has been delegated to the
services and combatant commands. Prior GAO work has shown that strong
leadership from OSD over resource control is critical, and midlevel
agencies such as the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, which is
responsible for facilitating urgent needs requests, including funding,
cannot guide other agencies at a high enough level to promote
effective interagency coordination. Finally, GAO found that attempts
to meet urgent needs with immature or complex technologies can result
in significant delays.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends the Secretary of Defense take nine actions to improve
DOD‘s ability to assess how well its processes are meeting critical
warfighter needs, address challenges with training, make decisions
about when to use its rapid acquisition authority, and make
reprogramming decisions to expedite fielding of solutions. DOD
generally concurred with our recommendations and noted actions to be
taken.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460] or key
components. For more information, contact William Solis at (202) 512-
8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Provide Solutions to Emerging Battlefield
Threats but DOD Is Unable to Fully Assess the Effectiveness of Those
Processes or of Fielded Solutions:
Challenges Associated with Training and Funding Can Prolong the
Fielding of Solutions to Meet Urgent Warfighter Needs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Case Studies of Selected Urgent Need Requests:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Iraq Freedom Funds Used to Fund Joint Urgent Need Solutions,
Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009:
Table 2: Urgent Needs Funding through OSD's Rapid Acquisition
Authority, 2005-2009:
Figures:
Figure 1: Progression of Urgent Need Request:
Figure 2: Improving Command and Control through Secure Satellite
Phones (1 case study):
Figure 3: X-ray Technology for Vehicle Checkpoints (2 case studies):
Figure 4: Protecting Vehicle Occupants from Fires Caused by IEDs (1
Case study):
Figure 5: Detecting IEDs Using Existing Mine-Detection Technology (2
case studies):
Figure 6: Ability to Detect Improvised Explosive Devices (1 case
study):
Figure 7: Decreasing the Likelihood of Injury to Vehicle Gunners (1
case study):
Figure 8: Clearing Vegetation with a Trailer-Mounted Flame-Thrower (1
case study):
Figure 9: Providing Support for Ground Troops Through Aerial
Surveillance (2 case studies):
Figure 10: Responding to an Adaptive Enemy by Increasing Vehicle Armor
(1 case study):
Figure 11: Helping Marines Use Biometrics to Identify Individuals (1
case study):
Figure 12: Improving Tactical Radio Communications Involving Both
Audio and Data (1 case study):
Figure 13: Improving the Ability to See Clearly Under a Variety of
Conditions Using Vision Enhancement Technology (1 case study):
Figure 14: Resupplying Troops Under Dangerous Conditions through High-
Tech Air Drops (2 case studies):
Figure 15: Discouraging Adversaries or Crowds by Using Electromagnetic
Radiation (2 case studies):
Figure 16: Providing Advanced Video Surveillance Technology to the
Theater (1 case study):
Figure 17: Making Secure Satellite Communications Available from More
Locations (1 case study):
Figure 18: Improving Battlefield Communications Through Adaptive
Satellite Technology (1 case study):
Figure 19: Ability to Provide Improved Force Protection from
Improvised Explosive Devices (1 case study):
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
April 30, 2010:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The dynamic nature of the enemy and tactical conditions encountered by
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted the Department of Defense
(DOD) to rapidly identify and field new capabilities as quickly as
possible in order to prevent mission failure or loss of life.
Warfighters have requested new capabilities such as intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance technology; technology to counter
improvised explosive devices (IED); and command and control equipment
for their operations. With the shift in priority for overseas
operations from Iraq to Afghanistan--a theater that may pose more
complex long-term challenges--deployed or soon-to-deploy units will
likely continue to request critical capabilities to help them
accomplish their missions. Warfighters currently rely on several
processes, such as the Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs
processes, to request such critical capabilities.
The Army's urgent needs process was established in 1987 but has been
expanded since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism and
currently receives an average of almost 300 requests per month. The
Marine Corps established its process in 2003. In 2002, Congress
directed the Secretary of Defense to create a process to rapidly meet
the urgent needs of combatant commands and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff[Footnote 1]. In 2004, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) established the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC[Footnote 2])
to overcome institutional barriers and provide timely, effective
support to facilitate meeting the urgent material and logistics
requirements which combatant commanders certify as operationally
critical. Until 2008, OSD directed that the JRAC report to the
Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) and the Under Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller), for monitoring and tracking joint urgent
needs, facilitating the identification and resolution of issues, and
providing regular status reports to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense. Since 2008, the Under Secretary realigned the JRAC within
the Office of the Director for Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E) and the cell resides currently under the Director, Rapid
Fielding.
Congress provides funding for joint urgent needs related to countering
improvised explosive devices through the Joint Improvised Explosive
Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), to which it has appropriated
nearly $16 billion through fiscal year 2009. In our prior work, we
have raised concerns about JIEDDO's management and operations and
found that the organization lacks full visibility over all counter-IED
initiatives throughout DOD, faces difficulties with transitioning its
counter-IED initiatives to the military services, and lacks criteria
for counter-IED training initiatives it will fund which affects its
training investment decisions. We have recommended that DOD improve
its visibility over all DOD's counter-IED efforts, work with the
military services to develop a complete transition plan for
initiatives, and define criteria for funding training initiatives.
[Footnote 3]
The possibility of similar issues involving DOD's process for meeting
joint urgent needs that are not necessarily related to IEDs has raised
congressional concerns about making similar resource investments in
the JRAC at this time. In October 2008, Congress directed DOD to
commission a study to assess the effectiveness of the department's
processes for the generation of urgent operational need requirements,
and the acquisition processes used to fulfill such requirements.
[Footnote 4] In July 2009, the Defense Science Board issued its report
and made several findings regarding organizational, funding,
acquisition, and oversight issues. In addition to our work on JIEDDO,
we have also reported on challenges in the Army's and Marine Corps'
processes to address urgent force protection needs, such as truck
armor.[Footnote 5] Further, we reported on DOD's challenges to field
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.[Footnote 6]
In light of Congress' continuing interest in the joint and military
services' urgent needs processes to address requests for force
protection capabilities, you asked us to review DOD's processes. Our
objectives for this review were to determine 1) the extent to which
DOD has a means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs
processes and 2) what challenges, if any, have affected the overall
responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs processes.
To conduct this review, we visited forces conducting operations in the
U.S. Central Command's theater of operations and gathered information
on how they identify, document, and submit urgent needs to their chain
of command, and on the fielding and assessment of solutions in the
theater. We reviewed existing policy and guidance applicable to joint,
Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes, and compared them to
our standards for internal control in the federal government. We
analyzed joint, Army, and Marine Corps data management systems in
order to review the data collected on the time frames between decision
points and to determine the responsiveness of each process in
providing solutions to urgent warfighter needs. While our assessment
of databases and systems used to process urgent needs requests showed
that some data elements were accurate and supported by sufficient
documentation, we found that other items for reporting specific urgent
needs requests were incomplete, and not sufficiently reliable for
reporting specific results here, or to support accurate, useful
management reports related to overall results. As a result, we
conducted our own case study reviews to assess DOD's responsiveness to
urgent needs for a select sample of requests. We used data elements
from the information systems that we had determined were sufficiently
reliable to support the selection of case study candidates from the
universe of joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs requests. We
selected a nonprobability sample of 23 cases--11 joint, 6 Army, and 6
Marine Corps--for review based on criteria that included the variety
of needs, high visibility and priority of the needs, and needs
submitted in more than one process. For each case study, we
interviewed responsible officials at the appropriate joint or service
organizations and collected key documentation related to seven phases
of the process we identified: initiation of a request from a
warfighting unit, endorsement of a need by theater command, validation
by command-level leadership, approval of a solution at the
headquarters level, identification and execution of a funding
strategy, awarding of a contract, and production and initial fielding
of urgent need solutions. We interviewed DOD and military service
officials who are responsible for or are participants in the urgent
needs processes, and we collected guidance and documentation on each
process and the associated milestones and decision points. Although
the Navy and Air Force each have their own urgent needs processes, the
Army and Marine Corps have been the principle providers of U.S. ground
forces conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and their
respective processes as well as the joint process have received the
majority of warfighter urgent needs requests. Therefore, we have
focused our review on those three processes. We conducted this
performance audit from June 2008 through March 2010 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are more
responsive to urgent warfighter requests than its traditional
acquisition procedures but is unable to fully assess how well the
urgent needs processes are addressing critical deficiencies or to
measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because
it has not established an effective management framework for those
processes. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government provide a framework for managing agencies' operations
through detailed policies, procedures, and practices capable of
offering reasonable assurance that the objectives of the agency are
being achieved[Footnote 7]. While DOD has developed policies and
procedures to implement its urgent needs processes, DOD's guidance is
fragmented and outdated. The Secretary of Defense, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have each issued guidance providing policies and
procedures related to urgent needs processes. However, the guidance
has not been updated since its creation, although significant changes
in the urgent needs process have occurred since the guidance was
issued. In addition, we found this guidance lacking in four areas:
* First, guidance for the joint urgent needs process does not clearly
define the roles and responsibilities of the OSD, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the military services in implementing, monitoring, and
evaluating all phases of those processes.
* Second, guidance for the joint process does not define or
incorporate a statutory rapid acquisition authority that allows the
waiver of various laws, policies, directives, and regulations that
would impede the rapid acquisition and deployment of some needed
equipment.
* Third, guidance for the joint and Army processes does not include
standards for collecting and managing data, resulting in data
management systems that lack comprehensive, reliable information; are
unable to track some key process milestones; and are incapable of
producing accurate reports for management review, process
improvements, and oversight. Our review of DOD's urgent needs data
found that they could not be used to determine when solutions were
funded, acquired, or fielded to theater.
* Fourth, the joint urgent needs process does not include a formal
method for joint decision makers to receive feedback on how well
fielded solutions met urgent needs. Army officials monitor the
performance of fielded solutions in response to its warfighters'
urgent need requests--including those joint urgent needs that the Army
sponsors--and the Marine Corps is also working to establish a similar
process. While the Army makes its information available to joint
decision makers, the information is Army-centric and does not provide
DOD, JRAC, or Joint Chiefs of Staff with feedback assessing the extent
to which the solutions met the joint urgent needs in the theater. In
one case, DOD fielded a solution to a joint need for an airborne
counter-improvised explosive device, Angel Fire, for more than 18
months, although it did not meet the warfighters' needs.
In addition, we found that DOD's acquisition policy makes no reference
to urgent needs or how program managers should respond to these needs.
Finally, the Army has issued updated guidance for its urgent needs
process that provides more detail regarding roles and
responsibilities, but the Army lacks standard operating procedures for
its headquarters officials to follow when processing urgent needs
requests, and does not distinguish how different types of requests for
solutions should be processed. Because DOD lacks comprehensive and
updated guidance for its urgent needs processes, it does not have the
tools it needs to fully assess how well its processes are working to
address critical warfighter needs, to manage their performance, to
ensure the efficient use of resources, and to make decisions regarding
the long-term sustainment of a fielded combatant command capability.
In conducting field work in Iraq as well as 23 case studies, we found
that with the exception of one system all the solutions to our case
studies were fielded within 2 years of being endorsed by a theater
command. However, we identified several challenges that hinder DOD's
ability to respond to urgent warfighter needs as quickly as possible.
* First, not all personnel involved in the initial development and
review of urgent needs documentation receive adequate training, which
can extend the amount of time required to draft and submit urgent
needs requests, thereby extending the initiation phases of the joint
and Army processes. The Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training
states that deploying personnel should receive priority for training
and be responsive to the needs of the Combatant Commanders across the
full spectrum of operations.[Footnote 8] We found that while the Army
requires selected officers to attend training on how to address
requirements and identify resources for Army forces, officers at the
brigade level responsible for drafting and submitting Army and joint
urgent needs requests and those at the division level responsible for
reviewing the requests prior to submission for headquarters approval
are not likely to receive such training. As a result, once in theater,
Army officers often face difficulties drafting, submitting, and
reviewing the volume of urgent needs requests, which, according to
Army officials, can be over 200 per month.
* Second, funding has not always been available when needed to acquire
and field solutions to joint urgent needs in part because OSD has not
given any one organization primary responsibility for determining when
to implement the department's statutory rapid acquisition authority or
to execute timely funding decisions. Our prior work has demonstrated
that strong leadership from OSD over resource control is critical to
overcoming the deeply entrenched nature of the department's financial
management challenges.[Footnote 9] In 11 of our 23 case studies--7
joint, 3 Army, and 1 Marine Corps--obtaining funding was a challenge
that increased the amount of time needed to field solutions to the
theater. In a representative case, an effort to field urgently needed
communications equipment to warfighters in Afghanistan took 474 days--
of which 131 days elapsed while JRAC resolved which service would fund
the solution. Congress provided OSD with a rapid acquisition authority
specifically for funding solutions to urgent needs, but OSD has used
this authority only four times since fiscal year 2005. OSD's guidance
for implementing the authority puts it in the position of responding
to requests from DOD components, and JRAC officials told us that the
services have shown little interest in requesting that OSD use the
authority, effectively taking OSD out of the decision-making process.
As a result, OSD may not have used its rapid acquisition authority to
satisfy as many urgent needs as it otherwise could have. In addition
to its rapid acquisition authority, OSD has the authority to reprogram
funds for purposes other than those specified by Congress at the time
of the appropriation, within certain dollar thresholds. However, in
the absence of a high-level authority with primary responsibility for
executing such reprogramming or transfer decisions, JRAC has faced
challenges consistently securing cooperation from the services or
other components to make funds available to field joint urgent needs.
Our prior work has cited the establishment of a senior executive
council as a best practice to facilitate leadership over decision
making and conflict resolution.[Footnote 10] Without a departmentwide
approach to addressing its funding challenges, DOD will continue to
struggle to field timely solutions to problems that create risk to
warfighter lives or mission failure.
Finally, we found that attempts to meet urgent needs with immature
technologies or with solutions that are technologically complex can
lead to longer time frames for fielding solutions to urgent needs. For
example, the Combined Joint Task Force-82 in Afghanistan endorsed a
request in October 2007 for a mounted explosive device detection
system capable of detecting devices that were buried underground.
However, 435 days passed before JIEDDO began initially fielding a
solution because additional time was required to develop the
experimental Husky Mounted Detection System. As with other roles and
responsibilities we noted above, DOD guidance is unclear about who is
responsible for determining whether technologically complex solutions
fall within the scope of DOD's urgent needs processes.
To help ensure that DOD's urgent needs processes achieve their
objectives and are managed effectively, we are making six
recommendations for OSD, together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the military services, to improve guidance, data management, and
feedback mechanisms. To address challenges at the initiation phase of
the services' and joint urgent needs processes, we are also making a
recommendation for the Army to update its training regimen for
officers who initiate and review urgent needs requests. Finally, to
more rapidly fund and field responses to urgent needs request, we are
making two additional recommendations for OSD to designate an entity
with primary responsibility for recommending use of OSD's rapid
acquisition authority and to establish an executive council to make
timely funding decisions on urgent need requests. In written comments
on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with four of our
recommendations and partially concurred with five other
recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III.
Background:
DOD's Established System for Weapon System Acquisition:
DOD's strategy for planning, executing, and funding its weapon system
acquisition programs relies on three principal decision-making
systems. First, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) is a requirements system used to assess gaps in
warfighting capabilities and recommend solutions to resolve those
gaps. Second, the Defense Acquisition System is used to manage the
development and procurement of weapon systems and other equipment.
Third, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process is
used to allocate resources and is intended to provide a framework from
which the department can articulate its strategy; identify force size,
structure, and needed equipment; set program priorities; allocate
resources to individual programs; and assess program performance. All
three of these systems can incur lengthy time frames. For example, the
requirements system can take an average of up to 10 months to validate
a need. The acquisition system involves large budgets and generally
meets materiel warfighter needs in 2 or more years, with some systems
taking decades to develop and procure. The budgeting process is
calendar driven, taking nearly 2 years from planning to the beginning
of budget execution. We have previously reported on challenges the
department faces within each of these systems.[Footnote 11]
DOD Procedures for Rapidly Acquiring and Fielding Equipment to the
Theater:
Each of the military services has established processes to address
urgent warfighter needs. Our review focuses primarily on the following:
* The Army established its Operational Needs Statement process in 1987
to provide a way for unit commanders to identify urgent needs for new
materiel or new capabilities.[Footnote 12] The Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff G3/5/7 oversees the process. Prior to the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army received about 20 requests per year.
From September 2006 to February 2010 the Army's database shows 6,712
Operational Needs Statements containing 21,864 urgent needs requests
that have been or are being processed to support operations in those
two theaters. The Army's process supports deployed units, deploying
units, and units conducting their assigned missions, and responds to a
variety of urgent needs, from new capabilities to shortfalls of
existing equipment in theater, to requests for training equipment for
mobilizing units in the United States. Operational field commanders
also use the Army's process to document the urgent need for a materiel
solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that
impacts upon mission accomplishment. In September 2006, the Equipment
Common Operating Picture, an automated processing tool for Army urgent
needs, became operational. This data management tool is a classified,
Web-based application for processing urgent needs from the unit
submitting the request through all phases of the process. According to
the user's guide, the tool was designed to simplify requests,
consolidate existing sources of information, and significantly speed
the approval process while providing situational awareness to all
involved in a request.
* The Marine Corps created its Urgent Universal Needs Statement
process in November 2003 to meet the immediate operational needs of
deployed forces or forces preparing to deploy. The Marine Corps Combat
Development Command oversees this process. The command establishes
guidance and direction, and provides oversight to ensure solutions are
effectively and efficiently delivered to the warfighter.[Footnote 13]
The Marine Corps received 574 requests through the process between
December 2001 and November 2009. In August 2007, the Marine Corps'
Virtual Universal Urgent Needs Statement data management system for
processing urgent needs requests became operational. The Corps
developed this system as a result of a Lean Six Sigma continuous
improvement initiative to replace the manually updated Combat
Development Tracking System.
In addition to the military services' urgent needs processes, The Bob
Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (the
Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA) directed the Secretary of Defense to create a
process to rapidly meet the urgent needs of combatant commands and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Specifically, Section 806 of the act required
the Secretary of Defense to prescribe procedures for the rapid
acquisition and deployment of items that are currently under
development by DOD or available from the commercial sector, and that
are urgently needed to react to an enemy threat or to respond to
significant and urgent safety situations.[Footnote 14] According to
the legislation, the procedures should include a process for
demonstrating, rapidly acquiring, and deploying items that meet the
needs communicated by the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. In September 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) to create the Joint Rapid Action Cell (JRAC), later
renamed the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, to facilitate meeting the
urgent material and logistics requirements which combatant commanders
certify as operationally critical. Subsequently, in November 2004, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense provided guidance on the procedures,
roles, and responsibilities of the JRAC and on the identification and
validation of urgent operational needs. The Deputy Secretary's memo
defines urgent operational needs as urgent, combatant commander-
prioritized operational needs that, if left unfilled, could result in
loss of life and/or prevent the successful completion of a near-term
military mission. The memo defines immediate warfighter needs as
urgent operational needs requiring a timely materiel or nonmateriel
solution in 120 days or less that, if left unfilled, could result in
loss of life and/or prevent the successful completion of a near-term
military mission. An executive director leads JRAC and reports to the
Director, Rapid Fielding, within DDR&E and under the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L). JRAC's Core Group consists of full-
time professional staff and part-time senior executives and military
officers from the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), DOD General Counsel, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. An Advisory Group supports the Core Group and includes
pertinent Under or Assistant Secretaries based on the specific need.
Just weeks before the Deputy Secretary issued the November 2004
guidance, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2005 (the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA) was enacted. [Footnote
15] It amended section 806 of the Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA by providing
the Secretary of Defense with a rapid acquisition authority to respond
to combat emergencies. Under that authority, when the Secretary of
Defense, without delegation, determines in writing that equipment is
urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability deficiency that has
resulted in combat fatalities, the Secretary is to use procedures
developed under this section to accomplish the rapid acquisition and
deployment of the needed equipment. The amendment states that whenever
the Secretary makes the above determination, the Secretary shall
designate a senior official to ensure that the needed equipment is
acquired and deployed as quickly as possible, with a goal of awarding
a contract within 15 days. Also, under the amendment, the Secretary is
to authorize the senior official to waive certain provisions of law,
policy, directive, or regulation that would unnecessarily impede the
rapid acquisition and deployment of the needed equipment.[Footnote 16]
The amendment also stated the "authority of this section may not be
used to acquire equipment in an amount aggregating more than
$100,000,000 during any fiscal year." In addition, the amendment
stated that "[f]or acquisitions of equipment under this section during
the fiscal year in which the Secretary makes the determination [that
equipment is urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability
deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities] with respect to
such equipment, the Secretary may use any funds available to the
Department of Defense for that fiscal year."
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issued an instruction
in July 2005 establishing policy and procedures to facilitate the
assessment, validation, sourcing, resourcing, and fielding of
operationally driven urgent, combatant command needs during the same
fiscal year that a request is made.[Footnote 17] According to the
instruction, combatant commanders involved in ongoing operations
identify joint urgent needs as life-or combat mission-threatening
needs based on unforeseen military requirements that must be resolved
in days, weeks, or months. Under the instruction, a joint urgent need
must be considered inherently joint in nature; for example, the need
is theaterwide and/or spans multiple military services. Joint urgent
needs must also fall outside of DOD's established guidance for weapon
systems acquisition and the military services' established urgent
operational needs processes. JRAC has applied its guidance to process
joint urgent needs meeting these criteria. The instruction delegates
shared oversight responsibility of the process to the Joint Staff J-8
Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment; the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Deputy Comptroller for Program and
Budget; and JRAC within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(AT&L). Data for joint urgent needs are managed through the CENTCOM
Requirements Information Manager database system, which the command
added to a preexisting Web site it managed in 2005. The database
includes 283 joint urgent needs requests from August 2004 through
February 2010.
Urgent Needs Requests Across DOD Progress Through Similar Decision
Points:
The Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs processes have some
distinctions in guidance, terminology, and data systems; however they
share similar decision points. Although each of these urgent needs
processes is distinct, we identified seven broad phases that we used
to track the progression of each request over time and to compare
performance across the Army's Operational Needs Statement process, the
Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, and the Joint
Urgent Operational Needs processes. These phases are: initiation,
theater endorsement, command validation, headquarters approval,
funding, contract award, and initial fielding. Urgent needs requests
that result in fielded solutions typically move through the process as
follows:
* Initiation: Any of the three urgent needs processes can begin when
either a warfighter in the theater of operations or an official at the
theaterwide or combatant command level identifies a need and an
officer with a rank of Colonel or higher submits the request into the
relevant Army, Marine Corps, or joint process. The request could be
for either a known, specific piece of equipment or for an unknown
materiel or nonmateriel solution based on a description of a
capability gap.
* Theater Endorsement: Theater command leadership reviews, endorses,
and forwards a request for component or combatant command validation.
For example, a joint urgent needs request from a warfighter in Iraq
would be reviewed and endorsed by the theater commands such as Multi
National Force-West, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, or Multi National
Force-Iraq.
* Command Validation: Endorsed urgent needs requests from Iraq or
Afghanistan are elevated to the appropriate commandwide leadership--
U.S. Central Command, U.S. Army Forces Central, or U.S. Marine Corps
Central Command--for validation or rejection.
* Headquarters Approval: Validated Army urgent needs requests are sent
to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army G3/5/7
directorate, while Marine Corps urgent needs are sent to the Marine
Corps Requirements Oversight Council for its headquarters approval.
The combatant commander sends joint urgent needs to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, who send the need to JRAC concurrently in order to alert it
of the impending request. Upon headquarters approval, JRAC assigns the
requests for capabilities related to countering improvised explosive
devices to JIEDDO. For all other joint urgent needs, JRAC designates a
military service to sponsor the procurement and fielding of a solution.
* Funding: The military service or joint sponsor applies funds to the
program office to begin the procurement of approved solutions. When
funds are not already available, the services may obtain funding for
an urgent need through the annual budget process, by reprogramming
funds from other programs during the current fiscal year, or by
requesting the Secretary of Defense to invoke the department's rapid
acquisition authority. For joint urgent needs requests, JRAC may
assist in identifying available funding as needed. In previous years,
sponsors have also requested funding for urgent needs through the
wartime supplemental appropriation.
* Contract Award: The appropriate military service or joint program
office develops and executes an acquisition strategy in order to
procure the solution. Among other options, a new contract may be
awarded using competitive procedures or as a sole source, as provided
in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), or an existing contract
could be amended or modified. [Footnote 18] The rapid acquisition
authority may be available for the acquisition and deployment of some
equipment.
* Production and Initial Fielding: The program office manages the
production and fielding of solutions to the theater. Some solutions
may be readily available from current DOD inventory or from commercial
vendors, while others may require modifications to existing equipment
or substantial efforts to research, develop, and produce new
technologies.
Combatant commanders have sometimes made strategic or tactical changes
that eliminate the need for a solution. Also, an urgent needs request
could be addressed by existing equipment that was previously
unavailable until changes in the combatant commander's plans and
priorities resulted in the availability of the equipment in the
theater. In addition, a joint urgent needs request that meets the
criteria of another urgent needs process may be rerouted; for example,
counter-IED capability gaps may be redirected to JIEDDO for resolution.
Funding For Urgent Needs Was Formerly Made Available Through the Iraq
Freedom Fund:
Beginning in fiscal year 2003, Congress began appropriating funds to
the Iraq Freedom Fund.[Footnote 19] Over 4 years, from fiscal year
2005 to fiscal year 2008, OSD provided approximately $442.54 million
from the Iraq Freedom Fund to DOD components seeking to fund solutions
to joint urgent needs, as shown in table 1.
Table 1: Iraq Freedom Funds Used to Fund Joint Urgent Need Solutions,
Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009:
Iraq Freedom Funds:
2005: $157.08 million;
2006: $115.66 million;
2007: $136.60 million;
2008: $33.20 million;
2009: $0;
2010: $0;
Total: $442.54 million.
Source: Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell.
[End of table]
In fiscal years 2005-2008, JRAC administered funds appropriated to the
Iraq Freedom Fund to assist sponsors in funding solutions to 31, or
about 30 percent of an estimated 102 approved joint urgent needs not
related to countering improvised explosive devices.[Footnote 20]
Beginning in fiscal year 2008, funding for joint urgent needs began to
decline from less than $34 million to nothing in fiscal years 2009 and
2010. When funds are not provided by one of the services or other DOD
components, after the department's annual budget has been approved,
OSD can fund urgent needs, among other ways, by invoking the rapid
acquisition authority granted by Congress and/or by utilizing the
department's existing authority to reprogram or transfer.
DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Provide Solutions to Emerging Battlefield
Threats but DOD Is Unable to Fully Assess the Effectiveness of Those
Processes or of Fielded Solutions:
Although DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are
more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than its traditional
acquisition procedures, DOD is unable to fully assess how well the
urgent needs processes are addressing critical deficiencies or to
measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because
it has not established an effective management framework for those
processes. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government provides a general framework for management control of
agencies' operations.[Footnote 21] In implementing this framework,
management is responsible for developing detailed policies,
procedures, and practices to fit their agency's operations and to
ensure that those controls are built into and are an integral part of
operations. Internal control, which is synonymous with management
control, helps government program managers achieve desired results.
However, we found that DOD's guidance for its joint urgent needs
processes is fragmented and outdated, in addition to lacking other
important internal controls. As a result, the department does not have
the tools it needs to fully assess how well its processes are working
to address critical warfighter needs, to manage their performance, to
ensure the efficient use of resources, and to make decisions regarding
the long-term sustainment of a fielded combatant command capability.
DOD's Guidance for the Joint Urgent Needs Process Is Fragmented and
Outdated:
Existing guidance for the joint urgent needs process is fragmented
among several documents and is outdated, which is inconsistent with
federal internal control standards that prescribe the establishment of
a clearly defined organizational structure that provides a framework
to achieve agency objectives. We found that guidance for DOD's urgent
needs processes is widely dispersed among several memoranda from the
Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Under
Secretary of Defense (AT&L), and an instruction from the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For example, OSD's guidance describing how
joint urgent needs should be processed is contained in memoranda
issued in September and November 2004, and March 2005. In addition,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an instruction in
July 2005 establishing the policies and procedures for warfighters in
the theater and combatant commanders to identify, review, and approve
joint urgent needs.[Footnote 22] As a result, the guidance does not
frame a cohesive common operating picture that explains how the
process should function.
Further, neither the November 2004 memo nor the Chairman's instruction
have been updated since their creation, although significant changes
in the urgent needs process have occurred since both were issued. Once
received and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a joint urgent
need is handed off to JRAC for disposition through additional phases
of the process that address funding, acquisition, and fielding as
outlined in Deputy Secretary of Defense memoranda. The Deputy
Secretary of Defense memo from November 15, 2004, outlined procedures
for JRAC to follow in facilitating joint urgent needs and included a
provision directing that the guidance remain in effect for 3 years
after it had been approved, at which time a determination will be made
as to the continued existence of JRAC. However, OSD has not released
additional guidance or amended the current guidance to address this
provision, and JRAC continues to operate and facilitate the urgent
needs process, more than 5 years after the guidance was issued.
According to GAO's Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool,
one of the steps management can take to ensure consistency with
internal controls is to periodically evaluate the organization
structure and make changes as necessary in response to changing
conditions.[Footnote 23] Neither the November 2004 memo nor the
Chairman's instruction have been updated to incorporate guidance
regarding how the rapid acquisition authority is to be implemented.
[Footnote 24] Among other things, the operational guidance for the
joint urgent needs process could delineate for potential requestors
the advantages of using the authority, the circumstances under which a
request for the use of the authority should be contemplated, what
factors might persuade the Secretary that a given request is a good
candidate for the use of the authority, as well as how and when the
use of waivers would be appropriate under the rapid acquisition
authority. This kind of information could be useful to officials
assigned the responsibility of processing urgent need requests and
finding funds for those requests.
In addition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense memo defines immediate
warfighter needs as urgent operational needs requiring a timely
solution within 120 days or less. According to JRAC officials, because
they have found it difficult to complete all phases of the joint
process and field a solution in 120 days, in practice, they have
modified this time frame by extending it to between 120 days to 2
years. The modification of this time frame occurred informally, and
has not been documented in guidance. Also, it remains unclear whether
OSD approval is required to change the time frame or whether authority
is delegated to JRAC to make this change, which affects the standard
for timeliness in meeting urgent warfighter needs. Additionally, the
November 2004 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum defines
differently the terms urgent operational need and immediate warfighter
need. Officials relate that, in practice, there is no longer a
distinction between the two and both have been subsumed in the term
joint urgent operational need, and are treated as one and the same.
JRAC staff completed a Lean Six Sigma study of the joint urgent needs
process. According to JRAC officials, they plan to use the findings of
that study to guide improvements to the process. However, because this
effort is still ongoing, it is unclear to what extent any actions
taken as a result of this study will address the issues we have
identified. As a result of its current organizational structure and
lack of comprehensive, updated guidance, DOD cannot be assured that
the objectives of the joint urgent needs process are being achieved as
effectively as possible.
DOD's Guidance Does Not Clearly Define Roles and Responsibilities:
Urgent needs guidance for the joint process does not clearly define
the roles and responsibilities of OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the military services in implementing, monitoring, and evaluating all
phases. Federal internal control standards call for clearly
established areas of authority, responsibility, and appropriate lines
of reporting for federal programs. For example, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction directed the creation of the Budget
Office Director's Board within the Joint Staff to adjudicate funding
during the same fiscal year that a request is made for solutions for
joint urgent needs. According to the Chairman's instruction, the board
is responsible for reviewing and approving recommendations to fund
joint urgent needs, and to direct the reprogramming of funding from
military services' or agencies' budgets to do so.[Footnote 25]
However, this board has never convened, and JRAC has assumed
responsibility for identifying funding to procure solutions to joint
needs. The November 2004 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum states
that the JRAC is to assist in resolving issues impeding the resolution
of joint urgent needs, but the memorandum does not give JRAC the
authority or responsibility for identifying funding for solutions.
Rather, the guidance states that the military services, defense
agencies, and combatant commands are responsible for funding solutions.
Further, the Chairman's instruction and the November 2004 Deputy
Secretary of Defense memorandum are inconsistent regarding the scope
of solutions for joint urgent needs. For example, the Chairman's
instruction includes criteria for the scope of solutions to joint
urgent needs, stipulating that they should not involve the development
of a new technology or capability. The instruction further states that
the acceleration of a new technology in progress or the minor
modification of an existing system to adapt to a new or similar
mission is within the scope of solutions to joint urgent needs.
However, the November 2004 memorandum that governs the process after
the Joint Chiefs of Staff approves the need does not prescribe such a
limitation on the scope of solutions. According to JRAC officials,
they have nonetheless received approved joint urgent needs where the
proposed solutions are currently on hold due to their technological
complexity. In the absence of clearly defined roles and
responsibilities, the department faces difficulty in ensuring that the
joint process is implemented efficiently and effectively and in
identifying the appropriate personnel who are accountable for
operations, stewardship of resources, and achieving results.
DOD Guidance for the Joint Process Does Not Describe the Rapid
Acquisition Authority:
With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, military services that
sponsor solutions to joint urgent needs may use the rapid acquisition
authority to expedite the acquisition and fielding of solutions.
However, this authority is not defined or incorporated in DOD's
guidance for the joint urgent needs process. Internal control
standards cite the importance of policies and procedures that enforce
management's directives, and become integral to an agency's
accountability for stewardship of government resources and achieving
effective results.[Footnote 26] Once joint urgent needs are approved
by the Joint Staff and passed on to JRAC for disposition, JRAC assigns
military services to sponsor the acquisition and fielding of solutions
to address those needs. Upon the Secretary of Defense's approval, the
military services may use the rapid acquisition authority created by
the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA.[Footnote 27] That legislation states that
the Secretary of Defense is to use procedures developed under the
authority of that legislation to rapidly acquire and deploy urgently
needed equipment to eliminate a combat deficiency that has resulted in
combat fatalities and, if necessary, to waive laws, policies,
directives, or regulations addressing the solicitation and selection
of sources and the award of the contract, in order to rapidly acquire
and deploy the equipment. As a result of DOD not including the rapid
acquisition authority in its guidance, program managers may not be
aware of all procedures available to them for fielding solutions
quickly to the theater.
DOD's Guidance for the Urgent Needs Processes Does Not Include
Standards for Collecting and Managing Data:
The online data management systems of the joint and Army urgent needs
processes lack comprehensive, complete, and reliable information on
the achievement of key process phases, as well as the ability to
generate reports to track key dates and activities because DOD
guidance has not established standards for the collection and
management of urgent needs data. GAO's Standards for Internal Control
cites the significance of accurately documenting events and creating
and maintaining records as evidence of the execution of agency
activities.[Footnote 28] In addition, those standards call for the
proper classification of transactions and events that includes
appropriate organization and formatting of information from which
reports and statements are prepared. Relevant, reliable, and timely
communications and effective information technology management are
critical to achieving useful, reliable, and continuous recording and
communication of information. However, the milestone data located in
the joint and Army databases are often incomplete and unreliable.
Although both joint and Army systems generally contain documentation
to support completion of milestones at the early phases of the
processes such as theater command endorsement and headquarters
leadership approval, once a request is delegated to the acquisition
community for procurement and fielding, visibility into subsequent
actions is largely lost. For example, the joint system rarely contains
detailed information and support documentation regarding the funding,
contract award, or production and fielding of solutions. Additionally,
the Army database does not contain information regarding acquisition
milestones following the approval of a funding strategy. As a result,
data limitations can prevent managers and decision makers of the
urgent needs processes from assessing the overall responsiveness and
effectiveness of their processes.
Further, Army policy instructs system managers to close out requests
120 days after the scheduled fielding date if no information regarding
actual fielding is received. This may result in the closure of some
requests without confirmation of whether or not solutions were
actually fielded. Although the joint system contains the most detailed
qualitative data of any of the three systems we reviewed, the dates
cited for specific milestones do not reflect the dates on which those
milestones were achieved, and instead reflect the dates the milestones
were recorded in the joint system's electronic record. Consequently,
the dates regarding the funding, acquisition, and fielding of
solutions are vague or inaccurate, and the database usually lacks
documentation to support the dates listed. Additionally, the joint and
Army systems lack a capability to produce either management summary
reports or complete historical information regarding the completion of
phases, which prevents DOD from measuring responsiveness over time and
initiating process improvements. Furthermore, managers of the Army,
Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs processes lack visibility into
other urgent needs data systems across the department, which limits
their ability to determine if possible solutions to their urgent needs
might have already been developed through other processes. Finally,
none of the data systems we reviewed include information regarding the
effectiveness of fielded solutions. As a result, DOD process managers
are unable to identify potentially systemic problems that could
otherwise be mitigated by process improvements and updates.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and JRAC are exploring information-sharing
concepts and data exchange capabilities among DOD's urgent needs data
systems with the modification of DOD's Knowledge Management Database
System to improve visibility into urgent needs requests across the
department. However, these improvements are in the very early stages,
and according to DOD officials it is uncertain when these efforts will
be completed. Therefore, DOD's urgent needs database systems will
continue to lack various characteristics and capabilities that would
enable process managers to better assess the performance of their
processes in responding to warfighter requests.
DOD's Guidance Does Not Include a Formal Method for Providing Feedback
on How Well Fielded Solutions Are Meeting Warfighter Needs:
The joint urgent needs process does not include a formal method for
joint decision makers to receive feedback on how well fielded
solutions have met the urgent needs for which they were requested. The
Army assesses the performance of solutions that are fielded through
its urgent needs process as well as those solutions from the joint
process that the Army sponsors, and the Marine Corps is working to
develop a similar performance assessment process. However neither
service's assessment process includes a mechanism for providing
actionable performance feedback to joint decision makers. Internal
control standards emphasize the importance of routine feedback and
performance monitoring when assessing process effectiveness, and they
direct agencies to assess the quality of performance over time. Such
assessments can occur during normal operations and include regular
management and supervisory activities.
While the Army makes information from its assessment process available
to joint decision makers, the information is narrowly focused on
issues specific to Army personnel and processes, and as such does not
provide DOD, JRAC, or Joint Chiefs of Staff with feedback assessing
the extent to which those solutions met the joint urgent needs of the
combatant command or whether given solutions should be sustained for
the long term and acquired in the future through DOD's established
requirements, budgeting, and acquisition process. We have previously
reported that the department's established requirements process,
JCIDS, has not met its objectives to identify and prioritize
warfighting needs from a joint capability perspective.[Footnote 29] In
2008, we reported that capabilities continue to be driven primarily by
the individual services and that DOD may be losing opportunities to
improve joint warfighting capabilities. In responding to our 2008
report, DOD stated that identifying and prioritizing joint
capabilities occurs through multiple processes within and outside
JCIDS, including the joint urgent needs process. However, without a
joint warfighter perspective on performance, there is not sufficient
information to adequately assess whether a capability should
transition to an acquisition program, particularly when the sponsoring
service would like to phase out or terminate support of the capability.
Joint Chiefs of Staff officials recognize the need for performance
feedback on joint solutions; however, its previous attempt to
establish a process for collecting performance feedback was
unsuccessful. In 2007, the Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to craft a
feedback loop as part of an update to the Chairman's instruction for
joint urgent needs. The draft revision failed to obtain DOD-wide
approval and was canceled--in part due to disagreement over the
feedback process outlined in the draft instruction. According to Joint
Staff and JRAC officials, the combatant commands contended that their
resources were focused on planning and managing contingency
operations, and that providing feedback was a military service
responsibility under Title 10. Conversely, according to officials the
military services believed that since solutions addressed joint urgent
needs, feedback should be provided by the user, the combatant command.
Nevertheless, in 2008, the Joint Staff reinitiated its effort to
revise the Chairman's instruction and establish a feedback mechanism
for joint urgent needs solutions. The draft revision was in
coordination within the department at the time of our report.
In May 2009, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed U.S. Central
Command to establish a joint requirements liaison office as a pilot
program within its Afghanistan joint task force to assist in
processing Army and joint urgent needs statements. At the time of our
report the program had not begun operations, and it was unclear
whether it would collect performance feedback on joint solutions as
part of its operations. Without adequate feedback information from the
theater that addresses how well fielded solutions address the risks to
warfighters and to their missions and whether solutions will be
necessary for the future, DOD cannot assess the performance of the
joint urgent needs process in meeting immediate and future warfighter
needs. Feedback provided by commanders in the field would better
enable Joint Staff and military service officials to determine if
solutions are effective, and whether they need to be sustained,
adopted as a formal acquisition program, or suspended. In one case,
DOD fielded a solution to a joint need for an airborne counter-
improvised explosive device for more than 18 months, although it did
not meet the warfighters' needs. Joint officials stated that the
service did not track the operational effectiveness of the solution,
called Angel Fire, and failed to provide feedback after initial
fielding. The Angel Fire system provided a daytime-only solution, and
did not meet the warfighter's request for a 24-hour surveillance
capability. The warfighter then rescinded the urgent needs request in
December 2008 and the Angel Fire aircraft were scheduled for removal
from the theater to the United States. Internal controls prescribe
that ongoing monitoring should occur in the course of operations to
support timely actions when problems occur or require follow-up.
Feedback information can help prevent the inefficient use of resources
when participants spend time and funding on a solution that is
ineffective.
DOD Has Not Integrated Its Joint Urgent Needs Procedures in its
Departmentwide Policies:
We also found that DOD's acquisition policy makes no reference to
urgent needs or how program managers should respond to these needs.
The department's acquisition policy is articulated in two principal
documents: DoD Directive 5000.01[Footnote 30] which describes
management principles and mandatory policies and procedures for
managing all acquisition programs, and DoD Instruction 5000.02
[Footnote 31] which describes the operation of the Defense Acquisition
System. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook, published by DOD,
complements these two policy documents and provides best business
practices for the acquisition community. According to the Guidebook,
the objective of the Defense Acquisition System is to rapidly acquire
quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements
to mission capability at a fair and reasonable price, and that the
fundamental principles and procedures that the department follows in
achieving those objectives are described in DoD Directive 5000.01 and
DoD Instruction 5000.02. However, we reviewed these documents and
found no discussions about or references to the joint urgent needs
process. As a result of DOD's acquisition policy not referencing to
urgent needs guidance, program managers may be unaware of the range of
options that may be available for responding to urgent warfighter
needs and be unable to assess when use of the urgent needs process may
be appropriate.
Army Guidance for Its Urgent Needs Process Lacks Several Elements:
Until very recently, Army Regulation 71-9, the guidance for force
development and materiel requirements that governs the Army urgent
needs process, had not been updated, predating Operation Iraqi Freedom
and Operation Enduring Freedom. To support these operations, the Army
expanded the scope of its urgent needs process in late 2003 beyond
providing solutions to address capability gaps identified by the
warfighter as an urgent need to including requests for items already
available to units deploying for nonstandard missions. For example, an
artillery unit deploying as an infantry unit will need fewer
howitzers, but will need a greater number of armored vehicles. Other
equipment may be necessary for counter-insurgency operations, but
these items are not included in the unit's authorized list of
equipment known as its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment.
Before the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army headquarters staff
processed less than 10 urgent needs requests per year, but this figure
escalated significantly in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq and
has continued to increase to about 290 per month in 2009. The volume
of requests and the speed of change have strained the Army's urgent
needs process. During our review, we found that Army Regulation 71-9
was ambiguous regarding time frames for approving urgent needs
requests, did not sufficiently define roles and responsibilities, and
did not sufficiently recognize or distinguish between how urgent needs
requests for new warfighter capabilities should be processed from more
routine requests for equipment that is readily available. In a 2007
report, the Army Audit Agency also addressed these deficiencies and
recommended corrective actions.[Footnote 32]
The Army issued updated guidance for its urgent needs process on
December 28, 2009, as we were completing our report. Headquarters
staff now has a goal to provide an "initial response" within 14 days
of receiving a request, and in total there is a 120-day goal for
reviewing requests, but that goal can be changed to 30 days where "the
urgency of warfighter needs dictate a more rapid response."[Footnote
33] While the updated guidance does provide more detail regarding
roles and responsibilities, the Army still lacks standard operating
procedures for Army headquarters officials to follow when processing
urgent needs requests. Furthermore, while the updated guidance
recognizes the dual use of the urgent needs process to address
capability gaps and requests for items already available to units
deploying for nonstandard missions, it does not distinguish how these
different types of requests for solutions should be processed.
Consequently, Army leadership continues to lack a means of assuring
that its process is meeting warfighter needs as efficiently and
effectively as possible and is consistent with internal control
standards.
Challenges Associated with Training and Funding Can Prolong the
Fielding of Solutions to Meet Urgent Warfighter Needs:
During our field work in Iraq as well as our analysis of 23 urgent
needs case studies, we found several challenges that hinder DOD's
ability to respond to urgent warfighter needs as quickly as possible.
We reviewed the joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes
across each of their seven phases and found that, with the exception
of the Active Denial System, the urgent needs in all of our case
studies were met by the initial fielding of solutions within 2 years
of theater endorsement--which is within JRAC's modified time frame.
The highest potential for extended response times occurred in the
initiation and funding phases due to insufficient training, the lack
of timely funding decisions, and other factors. Our case study
analysis also demonstrated that attempts to meet urgent needs with
immature technologies or with solutions that are technologically
complex can lead to longer time frames for fielding solutions to
urgent needs.
Not All Personnel Involved in the Urgent Needs Process Receive
Adequate Training:
Army personnel who utilize the joint and Army urgent needs processes
do not receive adequate training on how to select which process to use
to request a solution for an urgent need and how to submit and review
requests. To acquire needed equipment, units may submit requests for
theater-provided equipment or pursue new capabilities through the
Army's rapid equipping force process which equips operational
commanders with commercial off-the-shelf and existing solutions, or
the Army's Tank-automotive and Armaments Command's weapons loan
program, in addition to one of the three urgent needs processes.
According to Army theater command officials, some warfighters who need
to request a critical capability do not know how to select the process
most appropriate for their situation, and officers responsible for
reviewing and processing the documentation in the theater do not
receive adequate training on how the processes should function, which
may result in inefficiencies and delays in fielding solutions to
critical needs.
In addition, the Army has expanded the scope of its urgent needs
process beyond the requests for new solutions to address capability
gaps, to address equipment shortfalls resulting from units deploying
in nonstandard roles. For example, an artillery unit may be deployed
to perform a force protection mission, requiring a different mix of
equipment than what is authorized to carry out its artillery mission.
As we have previously reported, units are currently being deployed in
nonstandard roles, and this has caused challenges across the force, in
part because deploying units in nonstandard roles often encounter
unanticipated equipment needs.[Footnote 34] According to Army
requirements officials, the result has been a dramatic increase in the
volume of urgent needs requests from 10 per year prior to September
11, 2001, to about 290 per month in 2009. However the Army has not
increased the number of staff available from prewar levels to provide
support at headquarters despite the rising volume of requests. With
the expansion of the scope of the urgent needs process, the Army found
an increasing number of invalid requests because users do not
understand what type of equipment can be requested through this
process. According to Army requirements officials, about 97 percent of
the Army urgent needs statements are requests for the reallocation of
equipment already available. They estimated over 557,000 pieces of
equipment have been requested through the Army process alone. Further,
theater command officials stated that the increased number of requests
has also contributed to processing backlogs of urgent needs in
theater, when the requests might have been more quickly addressed by
theater-provided equipment or by the weapons loan program. Army
officials stated that prior to deployment, replacement personnel are
informed that a user's guide and help desk are available for the
Army's Equipment Common Operating Picture data system used to process
Army urgent needs requests. Theater command officials said uncertainty
over how to address needs often results in officers submitting a
larger number of urgent needs requests early in a unit's deployment.
This uncertainty, combined with confusion regarding the different
sources and processes available to address capability gaps or
equipment shortfalls, can result in the inefficient use of resources
and prolonged amounts of time needed to request and receive critical
capabilities.
According to DOD's strategic plan for transforming training, deploying
personnel should receive priority for training and be responsive to
the needs of the combatant commander across the full spectrum of
operations.[Footnote 35] The prevailing principle of this strategic
plan states that no one should experience a task in a real-world
operation without having previously experienced that task in training
or education. However, during our field work in Iraq we found that the
requirements officers who prepare urgent needs requests at the brigade
level--where most urgent needs requests originate--are not well
trained in the processes.[Footnote 36] Marine Corps officials told us
that they provide insufficient predeployment training on preparing and
reviewing urgent needs documentation for their own and joint
processes, and Army officials told us that Army requirements officers
responsible for drafting and submitting urgent needs requests at the
brigade level do not receive formal training on these processes prior
to deployment. According to theater command officials, requirements
officers deploying overseas must learn the process on the job.
Frequent rotations of force management officers at the division level
responsible for reviewing brigade-level requests further increase the
likelihood of extended time frames for approving urgent needs and
fielding solutions, as the already steep learning curve recurs each
time a new reviewing official is deployed into the theater. We found
that lack of knowledge about how and under what circumstances to
prepare an urgent needs request, especially among recently deployed
personnel, may cause reviewing officers to initially reject requests.
In turn, some reviewing officers, who themselves have not received
adequate training, may reject urgent needs applications based on
personal preferences. As a result, reviewers may receive multiple
resubmissions of requests related to the same urgent need, increasing
the overall amount of time needed to field solutions to the theater.
Although information that would have allowed us to determine what
factors contributed to the time frames for processing urgent needs in
the theater was unavailable, in the 13 case studies for which we were
able to obtain documentation, we observed that the time between the
creation of a joint urgent need document and theater command-level
endorsement varied widely from as few as 6 days to as many as 446 days.
Moreover, senior force management officers in theater at the division
level or higher who are responsible for reviewing and processing
urgent needs requests may have received limited exposure to the urgent
needs process as part of force management training. [Footnote 37] In
some cases, force management officers in theater, who are trained in
the organization and execution of requirements determination, force
structuring, and combat development, are employed in the urgent needs
review process either on a part-time or full-time basis. However, the
formal urgent needs process training they receive is limited to an
hour-and-a-half introductory segment within a 14-week course. In
addition, officials responsible for the force management training
course stated that the course focuses on duties performed in the
United States, rather than those that will be required as part of a
deployed task force. Further, the division-level training segment on
the urgent needs process has only been included in the course since
2005 and officers who completed the 14-week course prior to 2005 are
exempt from repeating it. According to Army training officials, no
provision has been made to update force management officers on the
urgent needs elements of the course or to train them on the joint
urgent needs process. As a result, most force management officers
arriving in theater to review and process urgent needs requests at the
division level or higher, like their counterparts at the brigade
level, must learn about reviewing and processing urgent needs on the
job, and likewise this pattern tends to repeat itself with each
rotation of new forces to the theater.
The previous commander of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq recognized in
2008 that warfighters in the theater needed assistance in requesting
critical capabilities. On September 16, 2008, he wrote a memorandum to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense that recommended the establishment of
a joint requirements liaison office in theater to assist the
warfighter in identifying capability or equipment shortfalls and in
preparing Army and joint urgent needs statements. On April 20, 2009,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense responded by directing the Commander,
U. S. Central Command; in coordination with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff; Under Secretaries of Defense (for Personnel and Readiness,
and Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); and the Commander, U.S.
Forces-Afghanistan, to create a pilot joint requirements liaison
program in Afghanistan to assist in the identification of capability
and equipment needs via the military services' and joint urgent needs
processes. Officials in theater said that these liaison offices would
function at the division level or higher; however, since most urgent
needs requests are generated at lower levels, the joint requirements
liaison office will not eliminate the need to address the lack of
training at both the division and brigade levels. We have reported in
the past that military personnel have received limited or no training
on key operational functions--such as using and managing deployed
contractors--as part of their predeployment training or professional
military education.[Footnote 38] Similarly, improved training on the
appropriate use of the urgent needs process and how to craft urgent
needs documentation can improve the overall timeliness of addressing
capability gaps and delivering solutions to help ensure that
warfighters receive critical capabilities as quickly as possible.
Funding Has Not Always Been Available to Field Urgent Needs Solutions
in Part Because OSD Has Not Taken Actions to Ensure Timely Funding
Decisions:
After urgent needs requests have been approved by service headquarters
or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the funding needed to field solutions
to those needs has not always been provided in a timely manner.
Although urgent needs can be funded in a variety of ways, the funding
phase for some urgent needs requests--through the joint process in
particular--is often lengthy. This is due in part because OSD has not
designated any one organization with primary responsibility for
determining when to implement the department's statutory rapid
acquisition authority or to execute other timely funding decisions.
In 11 of our 23 case studies--7 joint, 3 Army, and 1 Marine Corps--
obtaining funding was a challenge that increased the amount of time
needed to field solutions to the theater.[Footnote 39] In a
representative example from our case studies (which comprised a
nonprobability sample, and thus are not representative of urgent needs
requests as a whole), it took 474 days to field communications
equipment to warfighters in Afghanistan after the request was endorsed
by theater command. During that time, JRAC delayed assigning a sponsor
for that joint urgent need for 131 days because it was unable to
resolve which service would fund the solution. JRAC officials told us
that, although the services and components assigned to sponsor joint
urgent needs solutions have never refused to fill that role, assigned
sponsors sometimes allow requests to wait--up to 2 years--until the
next budget cycle. In one of the more extreme cases we found, it took
509 days for the Army to field a solution to a joint urgent need for
mobile explosive scanning equipment. Within that time, the Army took
293 days after the solution was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to reprogram the necessary funding and an additional 4 months to award
a contract for the equipment. In another joint case, it took almost a
year after theater endorsement to field an aerial surveillance
capability known as Angel Fire. Of that time, approximately 5 months
was spent awaiting funding--in addition to 2 months the Marine Corps
spent pursuing its own funding strategy prior to approval of the joint
request. The Marine Corps began efforts to fund Angel Fire in July
2006, with the intent of seeking full funding from JIEDDO. However, a
Deputy Secretary of Defense decision prevented JIEDDO from funding the
purchase of platforms, such as vehicles or aircraft, so this urgent
need request was split into two--$19.5 million for the development of
surveillance sensors and platform integration submitted through the
joint process and approximately $15 million for aircraft and services
through the Marine Corps process. Funding of approximately $34.5
million was finally arranged in February 2007.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense assigned JRAC the responsibility of
helping to resolve issues that could prevent timely and effective
warfighting support but did not give JRAC the authority to allocate
funding for solutions. As a general rule, JRAC forwards approved
solutions aimed at countering IEDs to JIEDDO,[Footnote 40] which
receives funding through its own direct appropriation.[Footnote 41]
According to JRAC officials, 123 or approximately 55 percent of the
estimated 225 joint urgent needs requests it has received since 2004
have been related to IEDs. JRAC delegates the other 45 percent of
approved joint solutions for critical needs, such as intelligence
surveillance and recognizance, biometerics, communications, and force
protection, to the military services, geographic combatant commands
such as U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command, or
other DOD components who sponsor the funding and fielding of
solutions. In addition to the department's annual budget process and
congressional appropriations dedicated to efforts to counter IEDs, DOD
may rapidly fund non-counter IED joint urgent needs by invoking the
rapid acquisition authority granted by Congress, by using the
department's authority to reprogram funds except as otherwise
precluded by law, or by using any applicable statutory authority to
transfer funds from another appropriation. OSD has, however, allowed
the military services or other DOD components to make most of the
decisions about when to initiate these funding options.
OSD Has Not Actively Pursued the Use of Its Rapid Acquisition
Authority:
OSD has not frequently used the rapid acquisition authority that
Congress made available specifically for rapidly fulfilling
warfighters' operational needs. In amending the Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA,
the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA provided the Secretary of Defense a rapid
acquisition authority. [Footnote 42] Under this authority, OSD can use
any funds available to the Department of Defense for that fiscal year
to accomplish the rapid acquisition and deployment of equipment that
is urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability deficiency that
has resulted in combat fatalities.[Footnote 43]
Our review of the Secretary of Defense's use of rapid acquisition
authority over the past 5 years shows that DOD has used that authority
four times to obligate $170 million for three projects, as shown in
table 2. [Footnote 44]
Table 2: Urgent Needs Funding through OSD's Rapid Acquisition
Authority, 2005-2009:
Years: 2005;
Authority used (in Millions): $10;
Capability: Scorpion[A];
Service sponsor: Army;
Source of funding: Procurement.
Years: 2006;
Authority used (in Millions): $18;
Capability: CREW[B];
Service sponsor: Navy;
Source of funding: JIEDDO.
Years: 2007;
Authority used (in Millions): 0;
Capability: [Empty];
Service sponsor: [Empty];
Source of funding: [Empty].
Years: 2008;
Authority used (in Millions): $94;
Capability: Sky Warrior[C];
Service sponsor: Army;
Source of funding: Procurement.
Years: 2009;
Authority used (in Millions): $48;
Capability: Sky Warrior;
Service sponsor: Army;
Source of funding: Procurement.
Years: Total;
Authority used (in Millions): $170.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] Scorpion jammer is a handheld capability that counteracts remote-
controlled explosive devices.
[B] Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device (RCIED)
Electronic Warfare (CREW) systems are electronic jammers designed to
prevent the initiation of remote controlled IEDs.
[C] Sky Warrior is an unmanned aerial vehicle with intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and tactical strike capabilities.
[End of table]
OSD plays a reactive, rather than proactive, role in the use of its
rapid acquisition authority, while many approved urgent needs requests
aimed specifically at preventing combat fatalities wait for funding.
Rather than identifying cases eligible for funding through the rapid
acquisition authority at a high level, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense issued an implementing memorandum for its rapid acquisition
authority that directed JRAC to recommend cases for the use of this
authority to the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), based on requests
from the military departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant
Commands, Under Secretaries of Defense, and other OSD directorates,
agencies, and activities. Consequently, the services are in a position
to limit the number of funding requests for urgent needs that reach
OSD. Moreover, JRAC officials we spoke with said that the services
have shown little interest in requesting the use of rapid acquisition
authority to begin funding joint urgent needs because the acquisition
strategy and funding of existing programs could be disrupted,
preferring instead either to reprogram funds themselves or, in most
cases, to await funding through DOD's annual budget for overseas
contingency operations.[Footnote 45] As a result, OSD is effectively
taken out of the process of deciding which urgent needs request should
be considered for funding through the rapid acquisition authority. As
previously noted, obtaining initial funding was the primary challenge
to rapidly fielding solutions for 11 of the 23 cases we studied. By
not employing its rapid acquisition authority more frequently, OSD may
not have enabled the acquisition of as many urgent needs solutions as
it otherwise could have.
In a December 2007 action memorandum requesting the support of OSD and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in stabilizing JRAC's leadership, staffing,
and funding, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command noted that,
at that time--over 2 months into fiscal year 2008--the Command was
aware of 38 joint urgent needs from fiscal year 2007 that remained
unresolved because of funding shortages. Further, the Deputy Commander
predicted that JRAC would be unable to address urgent warfighting
needs that had already been submitted or were emerging in fiscal year
2008.
To help resolve funding shortages, the Deputy Commander recommended in
2007 that OSD and the Joint Staff provide JRAC with, among other
things, executive leadership and funds to support the combatant
commands and the warfighter. Our prior work has demonstrated that,
given the long-standing and deeply entrenched nature of the
department's financial management challenges, combined with the
numerous competing DOD organizations--each operating with varying,
often parochial views and incentives--strong leadership from the
Secretary of Defense over resource control is critical.[Footnote 46]
Without greater high-level participation in the decision-making
process over when to invoke, or not to invoke, its rapid acquisition
authority, OSD will continue to play a reactive, rather than
proactive, role in the timely use of DOD resources to meet urgent
warfighter needs.
OSD Has Not Provided Leadership Over Reprogramming Appropriated Funds
to Meet Joint Urgent Needs:
Apart from the Secretary's rapid acquisition authority, DOD has a
reprogramming authority, but the military services are reluctant to
reprogram funds from their respective budgets to fund solutions to
joint urgent needs, and OSD has not exercised its authority to do so.
The Secretary of Defense--and in some cases the military departments
and defense agencies--have the authority to reprogram funds for
purposes other than those originally specified by Congress without
prior congressional approval as long as the reprogrammed amount
remains below established dollar thresholds. Reprogrammed funds may be
used to initiate a new procurement program, subprogram, or
modification as long as the estimated cost is less than $20 million
for the first 3 years. DOD may also use reprogrammed funds to start a
new research, development, testing, and evaluation program, project,
or subproject if the estimated cost for the first 3 years is less than
$10 million. In cases where the amount of funding needed exceeds
established thresholds, DOD may seek congressional approval. In fiscal
year 2009, for example, JRAC--as facilitator of the urgent needs
process, including funding---reviewed and worked with Joint Staff, the
military services, JIEDDO, and the combatant commands to prioritize
urgent needs DOD-wide. This effort resulted in a congressionally
approved end-of-year reprogramming action of $624 million from Army
and Defense-Wide Operation and Maintenance accounts that could be
reapplied to the Other Procurement, Army procurement account to obtain
force protection capabilities for warfighters in Afghanistan.
However, in the absence of a high-level authority with primary
responsibility to execute such reprogramming or transfer decisions,
JRAC has faced challenges consistently securing cooperation from the
services or other components to initiate other reprogramming actions
to make funds needed to field joint urgent needs available in a timely
manner. Military service officials we spoke with said that they are
reluctant to use their own funds to initiate acquisition of a joint
urgent need without first receiving assurance that funding will be
replaced during the next budget cycle. According to those officials,
without such assurance, the acquisition strategy of existing programs
could be disrupted. Our prior work on interagency collaboration has
shown that top-level leadership--such as that provided by OSD and its
Deputy or Under Secretaries--is a necessary element for sustaining
collaboration among federal agencies, including among DOD components,
particularly when effective interagency coordination is needed to
better leverage resources.[Footnote 47] This work has also found that
midlevel agencies, such as JRAC, can not guide policies at a high
enough level to promote effective interagency cooperation.
Although JRAC was initially created with direct reporting
responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), the Under
Secretary realigned JRAC in March 2008 to report to the Director of
the Rapid Reaction Technology Office, within the Office of the
Director for Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). In July 2009,
JRAC and the Rapid Reaction Technology Office were both realigned
under the Director of Rapid Transition to accomplish the
responsibilities of DDR&E, which were expanded to include oversight of
the Systems Engineering Development Test and Evaluations functions.
Currently, the JRAC resides under the Director, Rapid Fielding.
According to JRAC officials, the most recent realignment will help the
department better anticipate emerging threats and ensure the
technology needed to counter urgent threats is mature before the
threat fully materializes, as well as improve the synergy between the
requirements, acquisition, and research communities. However, JRAC's
most difficult challenge, according to its Director, continues to be
prioritizing needs and quickly identifying the resources needed to
execute a solution, which is the responsibility of the DOD components.
Referring to JRAC as "mission essential" for effective coordination
with the services, JIEDDO, and other agencies addressing urgent
warfighter needs, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command has
called for a permanent organizational structure led by a senior leader
capable of coordinating, influencing, and directing actions. We and
others have found that establishing a senior executive council is a
best practice that can provide an implementation team--such as JRAC--
access to senior leadership while reinforcing the team's
accountability for successfully implementing the program.[Footnote 48]
An executive council can set policies, ensure that decisions are made
quickly, resolve conflicts that arise, review and approve plans, and
monitor and report progress back to top leaders of the organization.
Members of such a council, which could include both political and
career executives within the organization, would work with the
department Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and other high-level
appointees to develop a leadership direction and communicate the
leadership's position.
Without a departmentwide approach to addressing its funding
challenges, DOD will continue to struggle to field timely solutions to
problems that create risk to warfighter lives or mission failure.
Further, extended time frames in identifying and securing funding for
solutions to joint urgent needs and challenges to JRAC's mission will
persist. Conversely, a JRAC with support from an interagency executive
council with the means to better leverage funding from across DOD, all
under the oversight of top-level DOD officials, would be in an
improved position to provide timely solutions to meet the urgent needs
of warfighters while assuring effective use of DOD resources.
Technological Immaturity or Complexity of Potential Solutions Can Lead
to Longer Response Times:
In 14 of 23 case studies we conducted (8 joint, 2 Army, and 4 Marine
Corps), technological immaturity or complexity was a factor that led
to longer time frames for fielding solutions to urgent needs. In the 8
technologically challenged joint urgent needs cases we found,
solutions for 2 requests--both related to the Active Denial System--
were never fielded because the capability was technologically immature
and could not be adequately sized or adapted for operational use in a
wartime environment and under changing theater conditions. Solutions
for the remaining 6 technologically challenged joint urgent needs were
eventually fielded, but the average response time from theater
endorsement to fielding ranged from 320 to 497 days with an average of
393 days. In one of the more protracted cases, the Combined Joint Task
Force-82 in Afghanistan endorsed a request on October 20, 2007, for an
improvised explosive device detection system capable of detecting
devices that were buried underground. However, following JRAC's
request that JIEDDO accept responsibility for providing a solution,
497 days passed before JIEDDO began initially fielding a solution
because additional time was required to develop the experimental Husky
Mounted Detection System. In a recent DOD Inspector General report,
the Inspector General determined that JIEDDO decided to produce the
system in large numbers before determining its operational
effectiveness and suitability.[Footnote 49] Nevertheless, while these
cases exceeded the original 120-day fielding target expressed in both
Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD guidance, they fall within the 2-year
time frame used by JRAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Guidance for the Army process does not address the technological
complexity or maturity of a potential solution to an urgent need.
Guidance for the Marine Corps process states that capability gaps and
solutions to urgent needs are not restricted to commercially available
equipment or technologies and may require the rapid development of new
capabilities. Conversely, when Congress directed the Secretary of
Defense to prescribe procedures for the rapid acquisition and
deployment of urgently needed items in the Fiscal Year 2003 NDAA, it
specified that those items should be either currently under
development by DOD or already available from the commercial sector.
Further, DOD guidance on the scope of its joint urgent needs process
states that urgent operational solutions should not involve the
development of a new technology or capability. However, the
acceleration of an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration or the
minor modification of an existing system to adapt to a new or similar
mission is within the scope of the joint process.[Footnote 50]
According to JRAC and military service sponsors for solutions to joint
urgent needs, requests are becoming increasingly more technologically
complex. As of June 2, 2009, JRAC indicated that approximately 20
joint urgent needs were sufficiently impacted by technological
development concerns that their projected fielding date is uncertain.
For example, one urgent need request asked for explosive ordinance
disposal suits and helmets equipped with night vision capability. The
Multi-National Force Iraq submitted the request in May 2005.
Initially, the Army worked with the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflicts to
develop a prototype to meet the warfighter's need, but this effort
proved unsuccessful. In March 2007, U.S. Central Command consolidated
the initial urgent need with two additional urgent needs requests it
had received from the theater for bomb suit helmets with night vision
capability. In April 2007, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and JRAC
validated and approved the urgent need request and assigned it to
JIEDDO, which has thus far been unable to develop a successful
prototype.
We have reported on the department's success in fielding MRAPs in
response to an urgent need, and stated that, among several factors
contributing to the success of the program were that 1) DOD kept the
requirements simple, clear, and flexible and did not dictate a single
acceptable solution, and 2) the department made sure that only mature
technologies and stable designs were used by setting a very short and
inflexible schedule.[Footnote 51] In addition, the Defense Science
Board reported recently that any rapid response to an urgent need must
be based on proven technology and robust manufacturing processes
because attempts to squeeze new technology development into an urgent
time frame create risks for delays and ultimately may not adequately
address an existing capability gap. The board stated in its report
that, in order to achieve initial deployment of a solution in weeks or
months, technology must be sufficiently mature and likely filled by
commercial or government off-the-shelf products, or foreign government
sources. Further, the board stated that needs that cannot be met with
mature technology should be handed to the defense science and
technology community as a high priority for further development.
Sponsors for joint solutions we spoke with expressed concerns that the
maturity of the technology associated with approved urgent needs
solutions is often overstated, ultimately requiring further
integration, development, and testing before the solutions can be
successfully acquired and produced. The board advocated a triage
process to differentiate between different urgent needs and determine
whether an urgent need should be addressed through expedited
acquisition procedures or the department's traditional acquisition
system.
Both of the services' processes include procedures for reviewing
whether a potential solution that requires the development of a new
technology should be sustained for the long term, across the service,
as a formal acquisition program. Army and Marine Corps officials
involved in their respective urgent needs processes stated that they
prefer urgent needs requests that cite capability gaps rather than
specific solutions in order to provide the warfighter with flexibility
to utilize creative solutions that may be inexpensive and readily
available but unknown to the warfighter. CJCSI 3470.01 is unclear
about who should be responsible for applying the technological
maturity criteria, and based on our case studies it remains unclear
who is responsible during the review, endorsement, and approval phases
to apply the criteria, remove those urgent needs that fall outside of
the scope of the process, and recommend a different approach.[Footnote
52] Based on the results of our case studies, we found that attempts
to meet urgent needs with technologically complex or immature
technologies risk prolonging the fielding of solutions, and could
result in fielding a capability too late to effectively address
rapidly changing theater conditions. As we state earlier in this
report, DOD lacks clearly defined roles and responsibilities for
managing DOD's urgent needs processes in general. As a result, the
department faces difficulty in ensuring that the joint process is
implemented efficiently and effectively and in identifying the
appropriate personnel who are accountable for operations, stewardship
of resources, and achieving results.
Conclusions:
Due to rapidly changing battlefield threats in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Congress has recognized DOD's need to be more nimble in its response
to warfighter requests for urgently needed capabilities than the
department's usual acquisitions process allows. Similarly, DOD's
leadership has recognized the importance of rapidly procuring
solutions to meet warfighter needs during contingency operations.
Although the establishment of the Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent
needs processes improved capabilities available to the warfighter,
without improvements to the management framework to incorporate
additional internal control standards, DOD risks fielding solutions
that are either too late to do good or that do not successfully meet
warfighter needs. In the absence of consolidated and updated
departmentwide guidance permanently establishing its joint urgent
needs process, and clearly delineated roles, responsibilities, and
authorities of various stakeholders, the department will continue to
face challenges implementing the process, monitoring the process to
ensure efficiency and effectiveness in each of its phases, and
evaluating results. In addition, unless DOD's joint urgent needs
guidance and acquisition policy clearly communicate the availability
of the rapid acquisition authority that the services and the JRAC can
use to meet urgent needs, the services could continue to miss
opportunities to quickly field urgently needed solutions to the
theater of operations and inadvertently increase costs by
unnecessarily prolonging the acquisition process. Furthermore, without
more comprehensive, complete, and reliable data that can be used to
accurately track and document key process milestones, as well as to
create reports for management review, DOD will continue to lack the
ability to oversee and track the progress of individual requests or to
determine which phases of the process, if any, might need adjustments
to prevent unnecessary delays. Finally, a formal mechanism for
soliciting and collecting feedback from servicemembers in theater is
essential for determining how well fielded solutions are meeting
warfighter requests as well as ensuring that the resources invested in
the urgent needs process are achieving the desired results.
For the Army, Marine Corps, and joint urgent needs processes,
challenges in the initiation and funding phases, in particular, can
significantly increase the number of days--or weeks, or months--that
elapse between the time a warfighter submits an urgent request and the
time a solution is fielded. When the personnel responsible for
documenting and reviewing urgent needs requests do not receive needed
training before arriving in the theater of operations, they can become
quickly overwhelmed by the volume of requests, leading to backlogs,
errors, and delays. Unless DOD takes steps to ensure that both unit
requirements officers and senior force management officers responsible
for processing urgent needs requests receive training on appropriate
uses of the service and joint processes, as well as how to craft
related documentation, before they arrive in theater, warfighter
requests are likely to continue to face delays early in those
processes. More consistent predeployment training would be an
important step toward ensuring that warfighters receive critical
capabilities as quickly as possible. Moreover, in the absence of OSD
leadership on recommending when to use the rapid acquisition authority
Congress provided the department specifically for the purpose of
funding solutions to urgent needs, some requests that have been
validated as urgent may continue to experience increasing time frames
during the funding phase of the process. Until OSD begins to play a
proactive, rather than a reactive role in the use of its rapid
acquisition authority, urgent requests that have been assigned to one
of the services or components for funding are likely to continue to
compete with longer-term service programs and, in some cases, wait
until the next annual budget process to be funded from the base budget
for the next fiscal year. Similarly, without a means to secure
cooperation from the services and other DOD components to reprogram
and transfer funds to meet joint urgent needs, JRAC will continue to
face challenges in providing timely solutions.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following nine
actions:
To improve the department's ability to fully assess how well the
urgent needs processes are addressing critical warfighter deficiencies
and to measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, military
services, and other DOD components, as necessary, take the following
actions to permanently establish the joint urgent needs process and to
improve consistency with federal internal control standards:
* Clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services,
and other DOD components, as necessary, through the issuance of new or
updated OSD and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, to identify who is
accountable for implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all
phases of the process--including applying the technological maturity
criteria.
* Include rapid acquisition authority procedures available to
officials responsible for meeting joint urgent need requests.
* Develop and implement standards for accurately tracing and
documenting key process milestones such as funding, acquisition,
fielding, and assessment, and for updating data management systems to
create activity reports to facilitate management review and external
oversight of the process.
* Develop an established, formal feedback mechanism or channel, for
the military services to provide feedback to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and JRAC on how well fielded solutions met urgent needs.
To better inform DOD personnel of the options for acquiring
capabilities to meet warfighters' needs, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense amend DOD Directive 5000.01 and DOD Instruction
5000.02 to reflect that officials responsible for acquisition of
urgently needed equipment may need to consider using joint urgent
processes, including rapid acquisition authority.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Secretary of
the Army to amend the urgent needs process guidance in Army Regulation
71-9 to include distinct performance standards that distinguish how
different types of urgent needs, such as nonstandard mission equipment
shortages and new capabilities, should be processed, and to develop
and implement standard operating procedures for headquarters officials
to use when processing urgent needs requests.
To better address training challenges the department faces in
preventing process delays and improving its ability to more quickly
field solutions to the theater, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to update training procedures
to include instruction for unit requirements officers regarding the
development of joint and Army urgent need statements in order to
ensure that these personnel are prepared to effectively draft urgent
requirement documents upon arrival in theater.
To more rapidly field urgent needs solutions aimed at eliminating
deficiencies that have resulted in combat fatalities, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense amend its implementing memorandum for
the department's rapid acquisition authority to designate an OSD
entity, such as the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L, with primary
responsibility for recommending to the Secretary of Defense when to
implement the department's statutory rapid acquisition authority--as
provided in Pub. L. No. 108-375--as urgent needs are validated by the
Joint Staff.
To expedite the funding needed to field approved solutions to joint
urgent needs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense create an
executive council to include the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), the Director of JRAC, the Comptrollers of each of the
military services, and other stakeholders as needed, and appoint a
chair for the purpose of making timely funding decisions as urgent
needs are validated by the Joint Staff.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with four
of our recommendations and partially concurred with five other
recommendations. Technical comments were provided separately and
incorporated as appropriate. The department's written comments are
reprinted in appendix III.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to clearly define roles,
responsibilities, and accountability through the issuance of new or
updated OSD and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. The department stated
that it is developing new DOD policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is
updating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
3470.01 Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational
Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution, to clearly define roles and
responsibilities of all DOD components.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to include rapid acquisition
authority procedures available to officials responsible for meeting
joint urgent need requests in the issuance of new or updated OSD and
Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. In its response, the department noted
that it is developing additional DOD policy to facilitate the use of
rapid acquisition authority and has issued guidance to Service
Acquisition Executives to ensure the use of rapid acquisition
authority is considered when necessary to address urgent needs. While
we agree that the proposed action is a good step towards addressing
our recommendation, we also believe, as we recommended, that DOD
should include these procedures in the new urgent needs policy it is
also developing in order to better inform program managers of all
procedures available to them for fielding solutions quickly to the
theater and to follow internal control standards that cite the
importance of policies and procedures that enforce management's
directives and integrate accountability for achieving effective
results.
DOD concurred with our recommendations to develop and implement
standards for accurately tracing and documenting key process
milestones and for updating data management systems; and to develop an
established, formal feedback mechanism or channel for the military
services to use. The department stated that it is developing new DOD
policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is updating the Chairman's
instruction to establish requirements for oversight and management of
the fulfillment of urgent needs from initiation, operational
assessment, fielding, and ultimate disposition. DOD stated further
that visibility of actions of the DOD components to fulfill urgent
needs is expected to be incorporated into new DOD policy and should
improve the ability for OSD to provide oversight of the fulfillment of
urgent needs and satisfaction of the warfighter's requirements. We
agree that new and updated policy is a good first step to addressing
these deficiencies. However, it is not clear from DOD's response if
the updated policies will directly establish standards for collecting
accurate data and updating data systems, and include a method for
obtaining feedback from the warfighter. Unless these components are
part of DOD's revised policies, DOD will still fall short of being
able to fully oversee and manage the urgent needs processes and will
remain inconsistent with internal control standards.
DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to amend DOD Directive
5000.01 and DOD Instruction 5000.02 to reflect that officials
responsible for acquisition of urgently needed equipment may need to
consider using joint urgent processes, including rapid acquisition
authority. The department noted that it is developing new DOD policy
to establish responsibilities for oversight and management of the
fulfillment of urgent needs and the utilization of rapid acquisition
authority. DOD stated further that this policy development is expected
to result in a DOD directive that will be separate from the DOD
Directive 5000.01 and DOD Instruction 5000.02. While we agree that
DOD's effort to develop new policy for the urgent needs process is a
positive step, as stated in our report, the DOD acquisition directive
and instruction represent the overarching guidance for the Defense
Acquisition System. As such, we continue to believe that these
documents should also be amended to better inform program managers of
the range of options available to respond to urgent warfighter needs.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to amend the Army's
urgent needs process guidance in Army Regulation 71-9 to include
distinct performance standards that distinguish how different types of
urgent needs should be processed, and to develop and implement
standard operating procedures. The department stated that, in December
2009, the Army updated its regulation and partially addressed our
recommendations. DOD stated further that upon issuance of additional
DOD policy and an update to the Chairman's instruction, additional
changes to the Army regulation and other DOD components policies may
be required. We are aware of the Army's update to its regulation and
reviewed it prior to issuance of our draft to DOD. Based on our
review, we found that the updated regulation did not address the lack
of distinct performance standards and standard operating procedures.
Therefore, we continue to support our recommendation to further amend
the regulation to address these issues.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to update the Army's
training procedures regarding the development of joint and Army urgent
need statements. The department noted that the proposed direction by
the Secretary of Defense should be to all military department
secretaries as well as the heads of other DOD components because our
findings based upon the assessment of the Army's urgent needs
processes are applicable across the department. DOD acknowledged that
training and improved instructions for all DOD component personnel
involved in the generation of urgent needs requirements and their
fulfillment would improve the department's ability to respond to the
warfighter's urgent needs. The department stated further that it is
developing additional DOD policy that will direct DOD components to
develop procedures for urgent operational needs and the implementation
steps of these procedures will be monitored by OSD to ensure they are
accomplished and include the training we recommended. While our
evaluation focused specifically on Army practices, we agree that if
the Secretary has determined deficiencies in training present a
capability gap across DOD in the urgent needs process, updated
training procedures for all department personnel involved in the
process are appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to amend its
implementing memorandum for the department's rapid acquisition
authority to designate an OSD entity with primary responsibility for
recommending when the authority should be implemented. The department
stated that it is developing additional DOD policy to facilitate the
use of rapid acquisition authority and has issued guidance to Service
Acquisition Executives to ensure the use of rapid acquisition
authority is considered when necessary to address urgent needs. DOD
noted further that it is continuing to evaluate the need for
legislative changes to enhance rapid acquisition authority. While we
recognize DOD's efforts to develop additional policy, issue guidance,
and evaluate potential legislative changes, we continue to support our
recommendation that the Secretary designate an OSD entity to recommend
when this authority should be implemented. During our evaluation, we
found that unless OSD plays a proactive role in identifying cases
eligible for this authority rather than a reactive role, requests for
urgent needs may not be funded in a timely manner due to other
competing service priorities.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to create an executive
council to make timely funding decisions as urgent needs are validated
by the Joint Staff. The department noted that it is developing
additional DOD policy that is expected to clarify processes for
funding urgent needs, and intends to use established senior governance
councils to achieve the goal of the recommendation rather than
establish a new council. We did not evaluate the roles and missions of
these existing senior governance councils as to the extent they
constitute the appropriate body to address funding solutions for
urgent needs. We agree in principle with the intent to utilize
existing councils to make timely funding decisions for urgent needs as
long as those councils have the authority to directly address our
recommendation and their membership includes those offices we cited.
The department also recommended we change language in our report from
"...as solutions are validated by the Joint Staff to "...as needs are
validated by the Joint Staff" because the Joint Staff does not
validate solutions but the requirements, or needs. We incorporated
this language in our final report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report will be available
at no charge on GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8365 or by e-mail at SolisW@GAO.GOV. Contact
information for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who
have made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has a
means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes we
conducted site visits, reviewed key documentation, and interviewed
relevant DOD, joint, and military service officials. During this
review we focused on urgent wartime needs submitted through the joint,
Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes as these are the
processes most frequently used, and commanders used the Air Force and
Navy urgent needs processes much less frequently. Air Force officials
stated they had one active request under their urgent needs process
when we began our review, and Navy officials stated they had eight
active requests under their urgent needs process when we began our
review. We visited forces conducting operations in the U.S. Central
Command area of responsibility and gathered information on how they
identify, document, and submit urgent requests through the urgent
needs processes, and on the fielding and assessment of solutions in
the theater. We conducted site visits to joint, Army, and Marine Corps
offices responsible for the respective urgent needs processes, as well
as offices of officials who participate in reviewing urgent needs
requests and developing funding strategies and solutions to be
fielded. We reviewed existing policy and guidance applicable to joint,
Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes, and compared them to
our standards for internal control in the federal government.[Footnote
53] We also compared actual practices, tools, and data systems used to
manage the joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs processes to our
internal control standards. We assessed the reliability of the
databases and information systems used to process urgent needs
requests by 1) interviewing knowledgeable officials, 2) reviewing data
system guidance and procedures when they were available, and 3)
conducting limited electronic testing that included comparing values
from source documentation with data elements in the data systems.
While our assessment of databases and systems used to process urgent
needs requests showed that some data elements were accurate and
supported by sufficient documentation, we found that other items for
reporting specific urgent needs requests were incomplete, and not
sufficiently reliable for reporting specific results here, or to
support accurate, useful management reports related to overall
results. As a result, we determined that we would conduct case studies
of selected urgent needs requests to provide insights related to this,
and the following objective. We used data elements from the
information systems that we had determined were sufficiently reliable
to support the selection of case study candidates from the universe of
joint, Army, and Marine Corps urgent needs requests.
To determine what challenges, if any, have affected the overall
responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs processes we analyzed joint,
Army, and Marine Corps data management systems in order to review the
data collected on the time frames between decision points and
determine how timely and effective each process was for providing
solutions to urgent warfighter needs. To conduct this analysis we
selected a nonprobability sample of cases to review from a universe of
49 Joint Urgent Operational Needs, 4,054 Army Operational Needs
Statements, and 524 Marine Corps Universal Urgent Need Statements. Our
selected cases included 11 joint, 6 Army, and 6 Marine Corps for a
total of 23 urgent needs cases reviewed. To ensure that the case
studies reflect the current DOD urgent response processes as much as
possible, we selected cases that were submitted after the latest
iteration of updates in each process. We considered urgent needs
requests initiated in the Marine Corps process after September 1,
2006; initiated in the Army process after October 1, 2006; and
initiated in the joint process after August 1, 2006. We then
eliminated 1) requests for which solutions have not been fielded and
2) requests for items that the Army already procures. We selected
cases for which solutions have not been produced in order to explore
aspects of the process based on their visibility, cost, and scope. We
selected cases in order to represent distinct types of needs such as:
Command and Control; Force Protection; Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance; Counter-Improvised Explosive Device; Logistical
Support; and Miscellaneous (such as nonlethal weapons or other items
not so easily categorized). We also selected cases where duplication
of effort appeared possible, and urgent needs requests that commanders
in Iraq or Afghanistan identified as high priority. Assessments of the
selected cases were based on a comparison of the time required to
achieve key objectives in completing the urgent needs process against
stated goals and interviewing knowledgeable officials regarding the
relative ease or difficulty in accomplishing these objectives, as well
as end users in theater regarding the sufficiency of fielded
solutions. In order to allow for comparison across the joint and
service urgent needs processes, we constructed a chronology of each
urgent need beginning with initiation of the urgent needs process and
culminating with the initial fielding of a solution in theater, if
applicable. Since each urgent needs process within DOD is distinct and
uses differing terms and procedures, we used a consistent approach to
demonstrate progression between key events and decision points across
time lines from initiation of an urgent need request to initial
fielding of a solution However, in collecting data for our case
studies, we found that documentation regarding the initial theater
recognition of an urgent need was inconsistent and often unavailable.
For further details and the results of our case studies see appendix
II.
We interviewed officials from the Department of Defense; the Joint
Chiefs of Staff; all four of the military services; two selected
combatant commands; and military activities participating in ongoing
military operations. The specific offices and military activities we
interviewed and obtained information from include the following:
* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Arlington, Va.;
- Office of the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Innovation & Technology Transition, Arlington, Va.;
- Joint Rapid Action Cell, Arlington, Va.
- Rapid Reaction Technology office, Arlington, Va.
* Defense Information Systems Agency, Falls Church, Va.
* U.S. Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Roslyn,
Va.
* U.S. Army Headquarters, Arlington, Va.;
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Operations:
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, Force Development:
- U.S. Army, 224th Military Intelligence Battalion:
- Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology), Crystal City, Va.
* U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich.
* U.S. Army, 1st Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade, Headquarters, Camp
Liberty, Victory Base Complex, Baghdad, Iraq.
* U.S. Army, 18th Airborne Corps, 525th Battlefield Surveillance
Brigade, Fort Bragg, N.C.
* U.S. Army, 15th Military Intelligence Battalion, Joint Base Balad,
Iraq.
* U.S. Army, Army Requirements and Resourcing Board Council of
Colonels.
* U.S. Army, Program Executive Office for Ammunition, Picatinny
Arsenal, N.J.
* U.S. Army, Communications Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, N.J.
* U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Central Command, Tampa, Fla.
* U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Capability Development Command,
Quantico, Va.
* U.S. Navy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Rapid Capability Development
and Deployment, Arlington, Va.
* U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Requirements
Division, Arlington, Va.
- U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Va.
* Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and
Assessment Directorate (J8), Capabilities and Acquisition Division,
Arlington, Va.
* Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Crystal City,
Va.
- Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Quantico, Va.
* U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Fla.
* Multi-National Corps-Iraq; Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq.
* Commander, Multi-National Forces-West, Al Asad Air Base, Anbar
Province, Iraq.
* Multi-National Division-Baghdad, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq.
* Multi-National Division-Central, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq.
* Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Science and Technology (MND S&T); Camp
Victory, Baghdad, Iraq.
* U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Fla.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 to March 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Case Studies of Selected Urgent Need Requests:
We selected 23 urgent need requests as case studies to illustrate
issues that may impact the amount of time required to provide
solutions to the warfighter. We reviewed 6 Army, 6 Marine Corps, and
11 joint requests.[Footnote 54] Although each of these urgent needs
processes is distinct, we identified seven broad phases that we used
to track the progression of each request over time and to compare
performance across the Army's Operational Needs Statement process, the
Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, and the Joint
Urgent Operational Needs processes. These phases are: initiation,
theater endorsement, command validation, headquarters approval,
funding, contract award, and initial fielding. Figure 1 illustrates
these phases.
Figure 1: Progression of Urgent Need Request:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Initiation:
Warfighting unit submits an urgent need statement for theater command
level review.
Theater endorsement:
Theater command endorses and forwards need statement to appropriate
component or combatant command.
Command validation:
Component or combatant command validates need statement and forwards
to service or joint headquarters staff.
Headquarters approval:
Service or joint headquarters staff develops and approves a solution
and funding strategy.
Funding:
Service or joint sponsor applies funds to program office for
procurement of solution.
Contract award:
Service or joint program office develops and executes an acquisition
strategy.
Production and initial fielding:
Program office manages the production and delivery of solution to
theater.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
For each of our 23 case studies, we tracked the progress of an urgent
need request beginning with the initiation of an urgent needs process
and culminating with the initial fielding of a solution, if any. Each
of the figures that follow represents the case studies we selected,
describing an identified need or capability gap, the proposed
solution, and a brief description of challenges, if any, affecting the
ability of the urgent needs process(es) in question to rapidly field a
response to that request, and a photograph. Although each urgent needs
request is unique some of the requests we reviewed were closely
related. Where appropriate we combined these case studies in our
discussion below.[Footnote 55] Challenges, if any, to providing a
solution for an urgent needs request were identified in discussions
with agency officials and supported by our review of the request's
progress through each phase of the process. Further information on our
methodology can be found in appendix I. Issues associated with funding
and technical complexity were the most frequent challenges affecting
the response or causing delays.
Figure 2: Improving Command and Control through Secure Satellite
Phones (1 case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Officer using an Iridium
Satellite Telephone]
Case study A:
Process used: Army:
Date of theater endorsement: 12/04/2006:
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 175 days.
Urgent need: Improve command and control capability at remote
locations:
Military personnel require a method for communicating with each other
in areas without established infrastructure or in case of a break-down
in existing communications capabilities.
Solution: Secure Satellite Communication Handsets (Iridium Phones):
Iridium phones provide secure communications, enabling command and
control of military personnel in the absence of established
infrastructure and act as an emergency back-up to established
communication.
Challenge(s), if any: Lengthy approval and order processes:
Although Iridium Phones are readily available and units purchase them
with their own funds, an Army regulation requires units to submit
requests for Iridium satellite telephones through the Army‘s
operational urgent needs process to assure operational security and
system integrity and then, after that request has been approved, to
initiate an order through the Directorate of Information Management to
procure them. However, before the directorate will approve an order
for fulfillment, it must independently validate that the unit placing
the order has an approved urgent needs request. Requiring an approved
urgent needs request and an independent validation of the approved
request before filling the order affected the response time for this
urgent needs request.
Source: U.S. Air Force (photo).
[A] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 25-1,
Information Management: Army Knowledge Management and Information
Technology (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 4, 2008).
[End of figure]
Figure 3: X-ray Technology for Vehicle Checkpoints (2 case studies):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Z-backscatter Van at security
checkpoint in Iraq]
Case study A:
Process used: Army;
Date of theater endorsement: 6/17/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 501 days.
Case study B:
Process used: Joint;
Date of theater endorsement: 6/09/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 509 days.
Urgent need: Capability to reveal hidden items or people at
checkpoints:
The Iraq Multi-National Division-Center requested 12 Z-Backscatter
vans through the Army urgent needs process to be used at security
checkpoints during counter-insurgency operations. Multi-National Corps-
Iraq submitted a separate joint request for 10 additional Z-
Backscatter vans in part to support a safe environment for Iraqi
elections.
Solution: Z-Backscatter Vans:
The Z-Backscatter uses X-ray technology mounted on a van chassis. This
device produces bright, photo-quality images to reveal the presence of
hidden people and/or contraband in vehicles or cargo containers. The Z-
Backscatter can also be used to detect explosives, weapons, and drugs.
The request for this equipment noted that it was available as a
commercial off-the-shelf item.
Challenge(s), if any: Funding:
It took approximately 251 days after the 12 vans were approved for the
Army to provide funding and 293 days after the 10 vans were approved
through the joint process because these requests”22 vans in total”
were combined with requests for 55 other nonintrusive inspection
systems. Funding for all 77 items requested was divided into 3
installments from July 2007 through April 2008. Although the Z-
Backscatter vans were listed as a high priority by theater commanders,
they were funded in the last installment.
Source: GAO (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Protecting Vehicle Occupants from Fires Caused by IEDs (1
Case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Crew compartment fire suppression
system with manual activation and battery back-up installed in a
HUMVEE]
Case study A:
Process used: Army;
Date of theater endorsement: 08/13/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 521 days (to provide a solution
for Humvees”one of 17 vehicle types in this urgent needs request).
Urgent need: Capability to prevent casualties from vehicle fires:
Improvised explosive devices can ignite fuel or tires, causing vehicle
fires.
Solution: Tactical vehicle fire protection:
Existing High Mobility, Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (Humvees) have
been retrofitted with upgraded fire suppression equipment for their
crew compartments, while solutions are being integrated into new
vehicles. Many of the refinements necessary have already been adopted,
as other efforts continue to address the threat across a variety of
vehicle platforms as technology develops.
Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity, funding:
This request applied to over 48,000 vehicles including tracked
vehicles, such as Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and wheeled
vehicles such as Humvees, Route Clearance Vehicles, Heavy Equipment
Transporters, Medium Tactical Vehicles, and Palletized Loading Systems
(forklifts) to name a few. In addition to the magnitude of the
request, the solutions are technically complex. For example, one of
the solutions involved providing a fire suppression system for the
crew compartments of those vehicles that suppresses or extinguishes
any fire present while allowing crew members to safely evacuate. In
addition, this system was combined with back-up systems to allow fire
suppression equipment to be manually activated despite engine or power
failure. Further, it took time for program managers to develop
solutions that were not too complex or too varied to sustain in
theater. Some solutions (such as the one depicted at left) have
already been fielded, but Army officials told us that the request for
this capability may take many years to address.
To upgrade existing vehicles, program managers used about $14 million
in funds already appropriated for vehicle maintenance and
modifications to modify vehicles already in use. However, more money
will be needed to provide fire suppression capabilities for the 17
varieties and almost 49,000 individual vehicles covered in this
request.
Source: U.S. Army (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 5: Detecting IEDs Using Existing Mine-Detection Technology (2
case studies):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: ’Husky“ Mine Detection Vehicle]
Case study A:
Process used: Army;
Date of theater endorsement: 10/04/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 454 days.
Case study B:
Process used: Marine Corps;
Date of theater endorsement: 6/14/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 581 days.
Urgent need: Improved force protection from improvised explosive
devices:
Army forces operating in Afghanistan determined that the emerging
threat from IEDs in that theater was from devices whose main charge is
triggered by a pressure plate.
Solution: Interim Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (IVMMD):
The IVMMD or ’Husky“ was built for the South African National Defense
Forces. Designed for a single occupant, the body of the IVMMD is
constructed of heavy gauge steel, contoured in a "V" shape to minimize
vehicle resistance to an explosion. The front and rear axles are
attached to the vehicle by open steel frameworks that offer little
resistance to an explosive force.
Challenge(s), if any: Limited production schedule:
At the time these urgent needs requests were being fulfilled,
production was limited because there was only one manufacturing source
for these vehicles, which was operating at full capacity. These
vehicles were initially resourced as a commercial off-the-shelf
solution, and a contract was in place with the vendor. However, a lack
of flexibility in the production schedule contributed to lengthy time
lines between contract award and fielding. Officials stated that as
demand for this type of vehicle grew, other companies began to
manufacture similar V-shaped vehicles.
Source: U.S. Marine Corps (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Ability to Detect Improvised Explosive Devices (1 case
study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Husky-Mounted Detection System]
Case study A:
Process used: Joint;
Date of theater endorsement: 10/20/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 497 days.
Urgent need: Improved force protection from improvised explosive
devices:
Army forces in Afghanistan determined an emerging threat from IEDs in
that theater was from buried IEDs, whose main charge is triggered by a
pressure plate.
Solution: Husky-Mounted Detection System (HMDS):
HMDS is a counter-IED/counter-mine system that can detect underbelly
IEDs, pressure plates used to detonate IEDs, and antitank landmines
buried in primary and secondary roads. HMDS provides advanced high-
performance ground penetrating radar to detect buried threats,
including IEDs that are constructed of bulk explosives and pressure
plates and provides location marking of the buried threats.
Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity:
Joint forces in Afghanistan requested an improvised explosive device
detection system that could be mounted on Husky mine detection
vehicles such as those discussed in fig. 4. A joint urgent needs
official stated that technical complexity resulted in delays as the
proposed solution required time for development, testing, and
performance assessment of the experimental HMDS prior to them making a
decision to purchase it in large numbers. Testing for the HMDS
officially began in March 2008. JIEDDO approved the purchase of 30
systems in September 2008. The first HMDS arrived at Bagram Airfield
in Afghanistan in February 2009.
Source: U.S. Army (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 7: Decreasing the Likelihood of Injury to Vehicle Gunners (1
case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Humvee with FK-7 installed]
Case study A:
Process used: Army;
Date of theater endorsement: 12/17/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 409 days.
Urgent need: Additional protection for crews of up-armored vehicles:
This protection was requested to decrease the likelihood of injury to
vehicle gunners from small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, hand
grenades, rocks, extreme weather, and fragmentation resulting from
explosions.
Solution: Objective Gunners' Protection Kit and Fragmentation Kit #7:
These solutions are the latest in a series of efforts to provide
additional protection to crews operating up-armored High Mobility
Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (Humvees).
Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity:
This solution includes an Objective Gunner Protection Kit, upgrades to
external armor on the roof and sides, a windshield that is releasable
from the interior for rapid egress, improved door handles, and a fire
suppression system. In addition, the weight of added armor requires
adjustments to the suspension and drive-train of the vehicle”including
new brakes, an improved suspension, and new tires”and existing armor
or other features may need to be removed or altered. One unit we
interviewed indicated that it took between 1.5 and 2 weeks to complete
the installations. The initial request to provide additional armor for
130 vehicles was increased at the theater endorsement phase of the
process to over 15,000 vehicles, and again at the Command validation
level to almost 19,000 vehicles to improve existing Humvees and Mine
Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles being used in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In October 2008, Army Headquarters approved the purchase
of about 10,000 kits. By February 2009, 125 kits had been shipped and
installation had begun.
Source: GAO (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Clearing Vegetation with a Trailer-Mounted Flame-Thrower (1
case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: "Ground Torch" being used in Iraq
(trailer not pictured)]
Case study A:
Process used: Army;
Date of theater endorsement: 02/11/2008;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 504 days.
Urgent need: Capability to remove vegetation to reduce the threat from
improvised explosive devices:
Units identified the need to clear vegetation from the banks of
irrigation channels and other locations to deny insurgents the ability
to conceal improvised explosive devices and eliminate hiding places
for people who could trigger such devices.
Solution: "Ground Torch" Trailer-Mounted Flame-Thrower:
Marine Corps personnel, and some Army units, have used a commercial
off-the shelf flame-thrower, used in forestry, for this purpose.
Challenge(s), if any: Funding:
An incremental approach was used to fund this solution. The Army's
Rapid Equipping Force provided $68,500 in September 2008 to purchase
and test a prototype system. The Army provided another $500,000 in
October 2008. Finally, $1.3 million was provided from Fiscal Year 2008
Omnibus funding to field and support 10 systems for 1 year When it
became apparent that testing would be successfully completed, a
competition was conducted and a contract was awarded in January 2009.
Army officials stated that efforts to arrange funding continued
through March 2009”-almost a year after approval of the urgent needs
request. The Army delivered the first two systems to the theater of
operations in late June 2009.
Source: U.S. Army (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 9: Providing Support for Ground Troops Through Aerial
Surveillance (2 case studies):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Angel Fire Platform vehicle]
Case study A:
Process used: Joint;
Date of theater endorsement: 09/15/2006;
Time elapsed until initial fielding (of a partial solution): 357 days.
Case study B:
Process used: Marine Corps;
Date of theater endorsement: 09/15/2006;
Time elapsed until initial fielding (of a partial solution): 357 days.
Urgent need: Around-the-clock aerial surveillance:
Ground troops requested the ability to detect snipers on rooftops or
enemy mortar teams beyond their line of sight, enabling them to
respond to such threats in near-real time, and to review recent
activity.
Solution: Angel Fire System:
Engineers at the Air Force Research Laboratory and the Los Alamos
National Laboratory were the early developers of this solution. Angel
Fire is designed to provide a wide field of view, and persistent
aerial surveillance in support of ground troops at the tactical level.
The solution provided was for daytime use only rather than for an
around-the-clock capability as requested.
Challenge(s), if any: Funding, technical complexity:
In November 2005, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command began
pursuing a new aerial surveillance capability that could deploy within
6 months to a year. U.S. Strategic Command and the Office of Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, Defense
Acquisition Challenge program provided initial support to develop the
capability. In July 2006” 2 months prior to theater endorsement”the
Marine Corps began efforts to deploy Angel Fire, with the intent of
seeking full funding from JIEDDO. However, a Deputy Secretary of
Defense decision prevented JIEDDO from funding the purchase of
platforms, such as vehicles or aircraft, so the urgent need request
was split into two requests”one followed the joint process to allow
JIEDDO to fund $19.5 million for the development of
surveillance sensors and platform integration, and the other through
the Marine Corps process to fund approximately $15 million for
aircraft and services. Funding of approximately $34.5 million was
finally arranged about 6 months later in February 2007.
Furthermore, the technical complexity of the Angel Fire system caused
the Marine Corps and joint processes to close their urgent needs
requests without having received a solution that met the warfighter
need. JIEDDO determined as early as December 2006 that it would be
unable to meet the need for night-time surveillance because the
infrared sensors were too technologically immature. Although the
Marine Corps and JIEDDO continued to invest in the program, further
studies showed that infrared resolution was too low quality to satisfy
the requirement. According to JIEDDO officials, as of March 2009, the
four aircraft equipped with daytime sensors, which had been deployed
to Iraq, were scheduled to be relocated to the United States, and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence did not recommend
deploying Angel Fire to Afghanistan.
Source: U.S. Air Force (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 10: Responding to an Adaptive Enemy by Increasing Vehicle Armor
(1 case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs: Under-Carriage IED Blast-
Protection; MTVR with blast protection]
Case study A;
Process used: Marine Corps;
Date of theater endorsement: 10/05/2006;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 564 days.
Urgent need: Force protection from improvised explosive device:
Medium Tactical Vehicles were equipped with rollers attached to the
front of vehicles as last-chance mitigation to defeat mines or
pressure-activated IEDs by initiating the blast in front of the cab of
the vehicle rather than underneath it. This urgent needs request was
initiated in anticipation of enemy adapting so that the vehicle cab
would still be affected by the blast.
Solution: Medium Tactical Vehicle-Replacement (MTVR) Force Protection
from Improvised Explosive Devices:
Vehicles with higher clearances and heavier under-carriages were
recognized as better protection against the threat.
Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity:
As with any vehicle-related up-armoring effort, the need to provide
increased blast protection on MTVRs involved a certain degree of
technical complexity. First, the armor protection itself had to be
developed to protect servicemen from under-carriage IED blasts. Next,
the vehicle variants had to be evaluated to determine if redesigning
the vehicle to accommodate additional weight on the under-carriage was
necessary. Finally, the solution had to be tested and a method for
systematically retrofitting the MTVRs had to be developed. The armor
systems eventually approved were integrated kits made of
metal/composite panel armor capable of withstanding small arms, IED,
and mine blasts as a permanent modification to the vehicle.
An estimated lead time of at least 6 months was required for
production. Adding to the complexity of fielding solutions rapidly,
the First Marine Expeditionary Force's initial urgent needs request to
protect 110 vehicles was later increased to cover every MTVR in
theater, with the exception of wrecker variants”approximately 1,050
vehicles. The first 80 blast protection kits were received in theater
in April 2008.
Source: U.S. Marine Corps (photos).
[End of figure]
Figure 11: Helping Marines Use Biometrics to Identify Individuals (1
case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Individual performing identity
verification with an Iris scanner]
Case study A;
Process used: Marine Corps;
Date of theater endorsement: 05/25/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 177 days.
Urgent need: Assistance in using biometric identification equipment:
Biometric tools have been helping Marines to positively identify
persons of interest or high-value individuals for several years.
However, Marines required additional support at the battalion level to
effectively and consistently operate systems such as the biometric
automated tool kit because units may not have been sufficiently
staffed or trained to use these technically complex tools in a manner
consistent with their concept of operations.
Solution: Biometric Support Personnel:
Provide contract personnel to work as network and database
administrators, subject matter experts, and trainers for Marines and
unit staff members, and to provide recommendations on the effective
use of biometric systems.
Challenge(s), if any: No significant issues were identified:
Technical complexity did not significantly delay the ability of the
Marine Corps' urgent needs process to respond to this request.
In May 2007, Multi-National Forces West in Iraq initiated an urgent
needs request for 17 contract personnel to work as network and
database administrators for the biometric systems. In August 2007,
Marine Corps Systems Command awarded a contract for supplies and
services to support the Biometric Automated Tool Kit, including
providing biometric system administrators. The biometric system
administrators arrived in theater in November 2007.
Source: U.S. Marine Corps (photos).
[End of figure]
Figure 12: Improving Tactical Radio Communications Involving Both
Audio and Data (1 case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: PRC 150 Remote Interface]
Case study A;
Process used: Marine Corps;
Date of theater endorsement: 06/26/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 314 days.
Urgent need: Remote radio operation support for newer equipment:
Marines rely heavily on tactical radio communications. In Iraq,
divisions used "antenna hills" as remote radio signal relays to and
from combat operations centers. This prevented enemy forces from using
electronic emissions to target Marines. However, newer radios, capable
of transmitting data as well as audio, could not be relayed in this
manner.
Solution: Portable Radio Communications Remote Interface (PRC-150
Remote Control):
Although officials indicate that ideally, an urgent needs request
should cite a capability gap, in this case, the warfighter identified
a specific item”Harris RF 5800-RC 111 remote control devices. These
devices can provide full remote control capability for compatible
radios and accommodate a variety of data link options when combined
with commercial off-the-shelf equipment.
Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity:
Technical complexity exists in any effort to remotely relay electronic
signals. This is particularly true when developing a rugged system
capable of surviving extreme temperatures and a marine environment. In
this case, the requested capabilities also included high-speed data
transmission, which had not been available with earlier remote radios.
There was only one known system available that could provide the
capability requested, but a longer lead time was required to
manufacture components, such as chips and circuit boards, and to
perform testing.
Source: U.S. Marine Corps (photos).
[End of figure]
Figure 13: Improving the Ability to See Clearly Under a Variety of
Conditions Using Vision Enhancement Technology (1 case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Individual Weapon Night Sight-
Thermal]
Case study A;
Process used: Marine Corps;
Date of theater endorsement: 11/18/2006;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 621 days.
Urgent need: Improved ground-based threat recognition and targeting
capability:
Forces wanted the ability to better detect and recognize targets under
varying conditions. Marine Corps Systems Command had been working for
several months to develop such a capability before a draft urgent
needs request was prepared for the Marine Corps' urgent needs process.
Solution: Individual Weapon Night Sight-Thermal:
The Individual Weapon Night Sight-Thermal is an in-line clip-on
thermal sight designed to detect and recognize targets and threats at
300 meters without affecting the sight picture in all lighting
conditions, including total darkness, and atmospheric obscurants such
as smoke and fog. Because thermal optics are not subject to background
light "wash-out", they are ideal for use in both day and night
lighting conditions.
Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity, contracting delays:
The solution called for the device to be used in two modes: 1) hand
held”to search for hostile persons, false wails, weapons and ammo
caches, and IED indicators and 2) as a rifle clip-on for target
engagement. Production and performance issues, such as achieving the
needed sight resolution and modifications to improve reliability in
the field, needed to be resolved and prototypes tested before any
design for a large-volume production of sights could be approved.
After initial fielding began in July 2008, field-tested units were
sent back for a design change. In addition, tactics, techniques, and
procedures had to be developed along with the solution, and a program
of instruction was needed to teach Marines how to program the sight,
acquire targets, and recognize activities associated with IEDs. Marine
Corps officials stated that feedback on the usefulness of the sights
has been mixed.
Rapid acquisition authority was not used, and nine separate companies
responded to the request for proposal. The source selection for a
contractor took almost 10 months. A contract for 2,192 systems was
awarded in November 2007. Moreover, the contractor had difficulty
obtaining a key component used in making sights, vision enhancement
chips, which were in short supply, due in part to competition with a
higher-priority urgent need. By March 2009, only 528 thermal sights
had been delivered to Iraq and a few hundred had been sent to training
facilities in the United States. By April 2009, the Commander, Marine
Forces, Central Command directed 873 thermal sights to be shipped to
Afghanistan, and those sights had been delivered.
Source: U.S. Marine Corps (photos).
[End of figure]
Figure 14: Resupplying Troops Under Dangerous Conditions through High-
Tech Air Drops (2 case studies):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Joint Precision Air Drop System]
Case study A;
Process used: Joint;
Date of theater endorsement: 02/22/2006;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 335 days.
Case study B:
Process used: Joint;
Date of theater endorsement: 12/20/2006;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 320 days.
Urgent need: Resupply capability if traditional methods cannot be used:
Mountainous terrain, poor roads, bad weather, and enemy forces can
hinder standard airdrop or ground-based resupply missions to units in
remote parts of Afghanistan. Precision-guided air drops were needed to
expand coalition Forward Operating Bases into remote and austere
environments.
The Army and the Air Force were both interested in this solution.
Solution: Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS):
The "Screamer" JPADS system with a payload capacity of up to 2200
pounds with a standoff range of 14 Km could be fielded quickly as an
interim solution, and had a history of success. However, officials
stated it was not supportable or sustainable over time.
The "Firefly" JPADS system is capable of delivering a payload of up to
2,100 pounds with twice the standoff distance, twice the time aloft,
improved accuracy, and could be set for automatic or directionally
controlled landings. The Firefly was selected for longer-term
development.
Challenge(s), if any: Funding, technical complexity:
Some delays occurred as Army headquarters refused to fund the
capability and returned the request to the Commander, U.S. Army
Central Command, recommending that it be resubmitted through the Joint
urgent needs process. Although the original proposal for 50 "Screamer"
systems estimated a cost of $4.5 million, due to the critical nature
of the need and the desire to have the solution in theater prior to
the onset of winter, CENTCOM released $2 million from supplemental
funds for 12 systems 9 months after the request was initiated. Four
months later, the Air Force agreed to supply $2.5 million for the
remaining 38 "Screamer" systems. However, technical complexity,
including issues related to testing and final modifications, prevented
the "Screamers" from being deployed as quickly as desired.
In March 2007, the joint process awarded another contract for
development and testing of "Firefly" JPADS systems. In July 2007, the
Army's Rapid Equipping Force arranged for $5 million to fund the first
Firefly order under the March 2007 contract. However, funds needed for
the remaining 105 Firefly systems”-later taken from the fiscal year
2008 supplemental appropriation”-were not received by the program
manager until August 2008. As of June 2009, 200 Firefly systems had
been delivered to Afghanistan.
Source: U.S. Air Force (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 15: Discouraging Adversaries or Crowds by Using Electromagnetic
Radiation (2 case studies):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Active Denial System 2]
Case study A:
Process used: Joint;
Date of theater endorsement: 11/12/2006;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: Not fielded;
Request rescinded: 01/24/2008.
Case Study B:
Process used: Joint;
Date of theater endorsement: 06/03/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: Not fielded;
Request rescinded: 04/14/2008.
Urgent Need: Capability to engage potential adversaries at distances
in a safe, effective, and nonlethal manner and nonlethal capability to
quell violence among detainees:
The first requests arose from the desire of Marines to disperse crowds
or repel attackers without using lethal force. The second need request
originated from the Camp Bucca Detention Center in Iraq.
Solution: Active Denial System 2:
No commercial solution existed for these requests, but DOD was
developing the Active Denial System (ADS). ADS is a nonlethal counter-
personnel, directed-energy weapon that causes an intense, temporary
burning sensation on the skin. ADS can purportedly provide troops with
the ability to compel potential adversaries to either cease
threatening behavior or leave, from distances well beyond small arms
range and in a safe, effective, and nonlethal manner. ADS was briefed
to JRAC in February 2007 with ADS 2 presented as a viable alternative.
ADS 2 was demonstrated in October 2007 and selected as the potential
solution.
Challenge(s), If Any: Technical complexity, requests withdrawn:
The Marine Corps considered the components of Active Denial System 2”
including the system's gyrotron, waveguides, super-conducting magnets,
antenna, and other major subsystems”too complex to allow extensive
field repair, and combat damage to the antenna could create a
logistics problem because storage and replacement of such large items
is difficult. Further, Marine Corps officials stated that if the
system were deployed, its mobility could be limited due to its weight
and size. Therefore, the Marine Corps rescinded its request a little
over a year after it was initiated.
Although the U.S. Central Command Chief of Staff endorsed the urgent
need for a nonlethal crowd control capability at the detention center,
DOD did not want to use this system in a detention facility, until it
had first been used and evaluated in an operational setting. U.S.
Central Command rescinded its urgent need request in April 2008.
However, the system is being maintained in a ready condition in the
event an operational need arises.
Source: U.S. Air Force (photo).
[A] ADS-2 was being developed as part of an advanced concept
technology demonstration.
[End of figure]
Figure 16: Providing Advanced Video Surveillance Technology to the
Theater (1 case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Rapidly Configured Camera Control
Station for RDISS]
Case study A:
Process Used: Joint;
Date of Theater Endorsement: 08/04/2007;
Time Elapsed Until Initial Fielding: 375 days.
Urgent Need: Video Surveillance Equipment for Forward Operating Bases:
The Army's Rapid Equipping Force”a group within the Army that equips
commanders with off-the-shelf technology to speed delivery of
capabilities to the warfighter”created this capability. Army officials
told us that urgent needs request are often based on equipment
offerings proposed by the group. As a result, this request specified a
material solution rather than simply describing a capability gap.
Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF-82) initiated this joint urgent
needs request.
Solution: Rapid Deployment Integrated Surveillance System (RDISS):
The Rapid Deployment Integrated Surveillance System (RDISS) is one
part of the Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance System-
Combined (BETSS-C) portfolio. The BETSS-C portfolio is intended to
provide warfighters with the ability to maintain enhanced situational
awareness on the battlefield.
Challenge(s), If Any: Technical complexity, Funding:
Program managers stated that requirement determination for the BETSS-C
was the most complex aspect of developing the solution and that
ascertaining CENTCOM requirements was an iterative, time consuming
process. Once identified, the requirement specified the integration of
a variety of systems into a single compatible "system of systems,"
which involved reconfiguring multiple software systems into compatible
packages. The request also covered a vast number of locations and
different mixes of system components for each location, which further
complicated efforts to quickly develop a solution.
In addition, multiple offices within DOD and the Army had to
coordinate to develop a funding strategy and field the solution. The
estimated cost for the BETSS-C portfolio was roughly $1.5 billion, of
which $8 million was estimated for RDISS). The program managers told
us that they attempted to obtain funding for the entire BETSS-C
program from the Army in early 2007, but the Army declined. In
February 2008, JIEDDO agreed to provide the $8 million needed to
satisfy this urgent needs request. The first system was fielded to
theater in August of 2008.
Source: U.S. Army (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 17: Making Secure Satellite Communications Available from More
Locations (1 case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: SNAP VSAT satellite dish in use
in Iraq]
Case study A:
Process used: Joint;
Date of theater endorsement: 08/06/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 428 days.
Urgent need: Portable satellite communications terminals for voice and
data exchanges:
The Commander, Multi-National Corps Iraq requested additional portable
satellite communications terminals for classified voice and data
exchanges at remote border crossing points, joint security stations,
and combat outposts in remote locations.
Solution:
NIPR Access Point Portable Very Small Aperture Terminal (SNAP VSAT):
SNAP VSATs use commercial off-the-shelf equipment to provide secure
beyond line-of-sight communications.
Challenge(s), if any: Funding, manufacturing delay:
In October 2007, JRAC and the Army agreed to a funding strategy for
the SNAP VSAT system in which JRAC would administer the transfer of
approximately $3 million from the Iraq Freedom Fund to the Army, which
in turn would use the funds to award a contract for the system. The
Army would then place additional SNAP VSAT orders against the contract
to satisfy the urgent need, once it received additional funding for
the system in the Army's Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) supplemental.
However, JRAC was unable to affect the Iraq Freedom Fund transfer to
the Army until February 2008, due to changes in personnel and a lack
of influence, according to JRAC officials. Moreover, after receiving
the $3 million transfer from the Iraq Freedom Fund, the Army did not
award a contract for the SNAP VSAT until July 2008, the same month
that it received its GWOT supplemental funding.
In addition, program officials stated that hardened travel cases for
the systems purchased under this contract had to be custom made to
protect the equipment amid harsh combat environments. This resulted in
slight delays when compared to other off-the-shelf items. As a result,
the SNAP VSAT systems purchased under the contract resulting from this
request arrived in theater 14 months after the request was initiated.
Source: GAO (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 18: Improving Battlefield Communications Through Adaptive
Satellite Technology (1 case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Depiction of Distributed Tactical
Communications System being used in the field]
Case study A;
Process used: Joint;
Date of theater endorsement: 11/08/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 474 days.
Urgent need: Over-the-horizon, on-the-move, beyond-line-of-sight
communications:
Warfighters in Afghanistan identified the need for improved
communications because the current communication handset devices did
not operate adequately in the mountainous terrain.
Solution: Distributed Tactical Communication System (DCTS):
To develop tactical commercial satellite communications for
warfighters in any terrain and in any location on earth, in a cost-
effective manner, providing push-to-talk, one-to-many communications
to facilitate tactical actions and command-and-control, the Navy
planned to leverage commercial off-the-shelf technology. A
collaborative agreement allowed DOD to participate in industry-funded
development of the DCTS. One general officer referred to the result as
"the most significant tactical communications improvement developed
and fielded during the Global War on Terror."
Challenge(s), if any: Technical complexity, funding:
The solution to this urgent needs required developing a technology
that was previously unavailable. The program manager told us that work
would have taken longer without the urgent needs process. Limited
testing of handsets in and out of the continental United States began
in November 2008.
The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab began developing this capability in
2001, but acquiring funding within DOD has been a challenge. JRAC
delayed assigning a sponsor for a joint urgent need for communication
equipment for 131 days because it was unable to resolve which service
would fund the solution. After assigning a sponsor, JRAC administered
the transfer of approximately $14.5 million from the Iraq Freedom Fund
to rapidly acquire 20 prototype handsets and to expedite low-rate
production. As the usefulness of the solution was recognized, the
initial request for 20 handsets was increased to 500. The Army has
since provided additional funds of about $15 million. Total funding to
date has been about $30 million, but officials state additional
funding will be needed beyond 2010.
Source: U.S. Navy (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 19: Ability to Provide Improved Force Protection from
Improvised Explosive Devices (1 case study):
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph: Parked "Razorback' Boom Mower
with mower head stowed]
Case study A;
Process used: Joint;
Date of theater endorsement: 11/26/2007;
Time elapsed until initial fielding: 253 days.
Urgent need: Improved force protection from improvised explosive
devices:
U.S. forces in Iraq identified dense vegetation along roadways as
potentially concealing IEDs and insurgents. DOD officials stated other
methods to address this threat, such as chemical defoliation, are no
longer viable due to policies prohibiting the use of chemicals.
Solution: "Razorback" Boom Mowers:
The Razorback is a commercially available mower assembly that can be
mounted to forklifts or front-end loaders. The configuration chosen by
the military involves mounting the mower on a boom fitted to a 5-ton
capacity cargo truck modified with an armor protection kit, suitable
tires, anti-lock brakes, air conditioning, and chemical-resistant
paint. The Razorback can cut vegetation alongside roads and on steep
side slopes near canals.
Challenge(s), if any: Solution did not fully meet the need:
Multiple contract modifications were executed for the development,
integration, and sustainment of Razorback systems, and testing
revealed many safety concerns. However, the Army awarded the principal
contract for 29 Razorback systems, for $2.35 million, in June 2008.
The first Razorbacks were shipped to theater in August 2008.
However, soldiers who operated the truck told us that they had
performed two missions with the Razorback in the 2 months since
delivery and completion of training. On one mission, the boom was not
long enough to reach the area needing to be mowed without risking
getting the heavy truck stuck in the soft ground. On the other
mission, standing water prevented mowing because the truck could not
be used in standing water. The soldiers were also uncomfortable with
the slow speed”only 2 miles per hour”at which the Razorback must move
while operating. Soldiers told us that they could easily and
effectively perform their route clearance missions without the
Razorback mower.
Source: GAO (photo).
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000
April 6, 2010:
Mr. William Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report 10-460, "Warfighter Support: Improvements to DoD's Urgent Needs
Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts To Meet
Critical Warfighter Needs," dated March 5, 2010 (GAO Code 351236).
Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed.
The Department has initiated multiple actions to address the
recommendations of the GAO. During the extended review by the GAO the
Department completed other studies that, along with the dialogue with
the GAO, directly contributed to actions to improve the Department's
ability to respond to the Warfighter's Urgent Needs. Updated policy is
expected to be issued that will address many of the specific
recommendations of the GAO.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. Technical comments were provided separately for your
consideration. Should you have any questions, please contact Mr.
William Beasley, William.Beasley@osd.mil, 703-692-5722.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Thomas P. Dec:
Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated March 5, 2010:
GAO-10-460 (GAO Code 351236):
"Warfighter Support: Improvements To DOD's Urgent Needs Processes
Would Enhance Oversight And Expedite Efforts To Meet Critical
Warfighter Needs"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense in
conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant
Commands, Military Services, and other DoD components, as necessary,
clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense(OSD), Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services and
other DoD components, as necessary, through the issuance of new or
updated OSD and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, to identify who is
accountable for implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all
phases of the process ” including applying the technological maturity
criteria. (See page 45/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The Department is developing new DoD policy and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is updating Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of
Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3470.01 Rapid Validation and Resourcing of
Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution, to
clearly define roles and responsibilities of all DoD Components.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense in
conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant
Commands, the Services, and other DoD components, as necessary,
include rapid acquisition authority procedures available to officials
responsible for meeting joint urgent need requests. (See page 45/GAO
Draft Report.)
DOD Response: Concur. The Department is developing additional DoD
policy to facilitate the use of Rapid Acquisition Authority and has
issued guidance to Service Acquisition Executives to ensure the use of
Rapid Acquisition Authority is considered when necessary to address
urgent needs.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense in
conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant
Commands, the Services, and other DoD components, as necessary,
develop and implement standards for accurately tracing and documenting
key process milestones such as funding, acquisition, fielding, and
assessment, and for updating data management systems to create
activity reports to facilitate management review and external
oversight of the process. (See page 45/GAO Draft Report.)
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Department is developing new DoD policy and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is updating the Chairman's Instruction to
establish requirements for oversight and management of the fulfillment
of urgent needs from initiation through fielding and ultimate
disposition. Visibility of actions of the DoD Components to fulfill
urgent needs is expected to be incorporated into new DoD policy.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense in
conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant
Commands, the Services, and other DoD components, as necessary,
develop an established, formal feedback mechanism or channel, for the
Military Services to provide feedback to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell on how well fielded solutions met
urgent needs. (See page 46/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. The Department is developing new DoD policy and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff is updating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
Of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3470.01 Rapid Validation and Resourcing
of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of Execution, to
establish requirements for oversight and management of the fulfillment
of urgent needs from initiation, operational assessment, fielding, and
ultimate disposition. Visibility of actions of the DoD Components to
fulfill urgent needs, is expected to be incorporated into new DoD
policy. This is expected to improve the ability for OSD to provide
oversight of the fulfillment of urgent needs and satisfaction of the
urgent Warfighter's requirements.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
amend DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.02 to reflect that
officials responsible for acquisition of urgently needed equipment may
need to consider using joint urgent processes, including rapid
acquisition authority. (See page 46/GAO Draft Report.)
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department is developing new DoD
policy to establish responsibilities for oversight and management of
the fulfillment of urgent needs and the utilization of Rapid
Acquisition Authority. This policy development is expected to result
in a DoD Directive that will be separate from the DoD Directive 5000.1
and DoD Instruction 5000.02.
Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to amend the urgent needs process
guidance in Army Regulation 71-9 to include distinct performance
standards that distinguish how different types of urgent needs, such
as non-performance standard mission equipment shortages and new
capabilities, should be processed, and to develop and implement
standard operating procedures for headquarters officials to use when
processing urgent needs requests. (See page 46/GAO Draft Report.)
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department of the Army recently
(December 2009) updated Army Regulation 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities
Determination. This update partially addresses the GAO recommendation.
Upon issuance of additional DoD policy and update to the Chairman's
Instruction, additional changes to the Army Regulation and other DoD
Component's polices may be required.
Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to update training procedures to
include instruction for unit requirements officers regarding the
development of joint and Army urgent need statements in order to
ensure that these personnel are prepared to effectively draft urgent
requirement documents upon arrival in theater. (See page 46/GAO Draft
Report.)
DOD Response: Partially concur. The proposed direction by the
Secretary should be to all military department Secretaries as well as
the heads of the other DoD Components. The findings of the GAO, based
upon assessment of the Department of the Army urgent needs processes,
are applicable across the Department. Training and improved
instructions for all DoD Component personnel involved in the
generation of urgent needs requirement and their fulfillment would
improve the Department's ability to respond to the War-fighter's
urgent needs. The Department is developing additional DoD policy that
will direct DoD Components to develop procedures for urgent
operational needs. Implementation steps of these procedures by DoD
Components will be monitored by OSD to ensure the procedures,
including the GAO recommended training, are accomplished.
Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
amend its implementing policy for the Department's rapid acquisition
authority to designate an OSD entity, such as the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, with primary
responsibility for recommending to the Secretary of Defense when to
implement the Department's statutory rapid acquisition authority ” as
provided in Public Law Number 108-375 ” as solutions are validated by
the Joint Staff. (See page 46/GAO Draft Report.)
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department is developing
additional DoD policy to facilitate the use of Rapid Acquisition
Authority and has issued guidance to Service Acquisition Executives to
ensure the use of Rapid Acquisition Authority is considered when
necessary to address urgent needs. The Department is continuing to
evaluate the need for legislative changes to enhance the Department's
Rapid Acquisition Authority. We recommend that the GAO change "...as
solutions are validated by the Joint Staff." to "...as needs are
validated by the Joint Staff." The Joint Staff does not validate
solutions. The Joint staff validates needs (the requirement).
Recommendation 9: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
create an executive council to include the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller), the Director of the Joint Rapid Acquisition
Cell, the Comptrollers of each of the Services, and other stakeholders
as needed, and appoint a chair for the purpose of making timely
funding decisions as solutions are validated by the Joint Staff. (See
page 47/GAO Draft Report.)
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department is developing
additional DoD policy that is expected to clarify processes for
funding urgent needs. The Department intends to use established senior
governance councils to achieve the goal of the recommendation rather
than establish a new council. We recommend that the GAO change "...as
solutions are validated by the Joint Staff." to "...as needs are
validated by the Joint Staff" The Joint Staff does not validate
solutions. The Joint staff validates needs (the requirement).
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
For further information please contact William Solis, (202) 512-8365
or solisw@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Cary B. Russell (Assistant
Director), Susan Ditto, Larry Junek, Ron La Due Lake, Lonnie
McAllister, Jason Pogacnik, Paulina T. Reaves, Matthew Tabbert, and
John E. Trubey made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, Sec. 806 (2002).
[2] Until November 2004, JRAC was known as the Joint Rapid Action Cell.
[3] GAO, Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and
Coordination of DOD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95] (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 29, 2009); and Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD's
Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive
Devices Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2009).
[4] Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, Sec. 801 (2008).
[5] GAO, Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and
Installation of Army Truck Armor During Current Wartime Operations,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-160] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 22, 2006); and Defense Logistics: Lack of a Synchronized Approach
between the Marine Corps and Army Affected the Timely Production and
Installation of Marine Corps Truck Armor, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-274] (Washington, D.C.: June 22,
2006).
[6] GAO, Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
Vehicles, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-884R]
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008).
[7] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[8] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness), Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training (Feb. 5,
2009).
[9] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665] (Washington, D.C.:
June 17, 2008).
[10] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).
[11] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Lasting Reform,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-663T] (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 30, 2009).
[12] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 71-9,
Warfighting Capabilities Determination (Dec. 28, 2009), in conjunction
with several Army memoranda, collectively provide the guidance for the
urgent needs process.
[13] The most recent guidance for the process can be found in the
Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Order 3900.17, The Marine Corps
Urgent Needs Process (UNP) and the Urgent Universal Need Statement
(Urgent UNS) (Oct. 17, 2008).
[14] Pub. L. No. 107-314, Sec. 806(a) (2002).
[15] Pub. L. No. 108-375, Sec. 811 (2004).
[16] The senior official would be authorized to waive any provision of
law, policy, directive, or regulation addressing (a) the establishment
of the requirement for the equipment; (b) the research, development,
test, and evaluation of the equipment; or (c) the solicitation and
selection of sources, and the award of the contract for the
procurement of the equipment.
[17] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01, Rapid
Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) In
The Year of Execution (July 15, 2005).
[18] FAR Subpart 6.3.
[19] The Iraq Freedom Fund was a Department of Defense account
providing funds for "additional expenses for ongoing military
operations in Iraq, and those operations authorized by Pub. L. No. 107-
40 (2001)." Pub. L. No. 108-11 (2003).
[20] JRAC forwards to JIEDDO approved countering improvised explosive
devices joint urgent needs that fall within JIEDDO's rule set for
accepting joint urgent needs, as outlined in JIEDDOI 5000.1, Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and
Management Process (JCAAMP) (Nov. 9, 2007).
[21] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[22] CJCSI 3470.01 (July 15, 2005).
[23] GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1008G] (Washington, D.C.: August
2001).
[24] In a January 25, 2005, memo, the Secretary of Defense notified
department components of the existence of rapid acquisition authority.
The memo explains that requests for use of the authority should be
submitted to JRAC and directs requestors to follow the process and
format outlined in the Deputy Secretary of Defense's November 2004
"Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs" memo. Requestors are left to
infer from such direction that they are to submit requests for the use
of rapid acquisition authority using the format and following the
process for requesting that an urgent operational need or an immediate
warfighter need be validated.
[25] CJCSI 3470.01 (July 15, 2005).
[26] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[27] Pub. L. No. 107-314, Sec. 806 (2002); Pub. L. No. 108-375, Sec.
811 (2004).
[28] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[29] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination
Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 2008).
[30] Department of Defense Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition
System (Nov. 20, 2007).
[31] Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the
Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008).
[32] U.S. Army Audit Agency, Army's Operational Needs Statement
Process: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Audit Report A-
2008-0014-ALA (Alexandria, Va.: Nov. 13, 2007).
[33] The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is required to
review all urgent needs requests for implications of needed change to
current or future Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
Leadership and education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) or
policy, with a written response to headquarters staff coordinating the
urgent needs request. The 120-day goal applies to headquarters' and
TRADOC's review combined, not to providing a definitive response to an
urgent needs request.
[34] GAO, Military Readiness: Joint Policy Needed to Better Manage the
Training and Use of Certain Forces to Meet Operational Demands,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-670] (Washington, D.C.:
May 30, 2008).
[35] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness), Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training (Feb. 5,
2009).
[36] For purposes of this report, we have used the term "requirements
officers" to denote officers at the tactical level who, in addition to
their specialized training, are assigned the responsibility for
locating equipment and other necessary items, and arranging logistical
support for their own tactical-level units such as brigades and/or
battalions.
[37] For purposes of this report, we have used the term "force
management officers" to denote officers at the operations level (as
part of a division, task force, or command staff) assigned
responsibility for reviewing requests from the tactical level
(brigades or battalions) for equipment, other necessary items, and/or
logistical support. Force management officers may also generate
requests at the operations level and may or may not be officially
designated as FA-50 Force Management Officers.
[38] GAO, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors
Supporting Deployed Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-145] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2006).
[39] As will be discussed later in this report, in 7 of these 11
cases, technical complexity was also a challenge. Technical complexity
was the major challenge to DOD's ability to field timely solutions in
7 other cases. For details on all 23 case studies see appendix II.
[40] Joint IED Defeat Organization Instruction, Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition
Management Process (JCAAMP), JIEDDOI 5000.01 (Nov. 9, 2007).
[41] For example, Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, Pub.
L. No. 109-289, 120 Stat. 1303 (2006); Department of Defense
Appropriations Act 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1868 (2009).
[42] Pub. L. No. 108-375, Sec. 811 (2004).
[43] The authority may not be used to acquire equipment in an amount
aggregating more than $100,000,000 in any fiscal year.
[44] Rapid acquisition authority was twice used for the Sky Warrior
urgent need request.
[45] Beginning with the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request in April
2009, the administration now refers to funds for the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan as Overseas Contingency Operations funds instead of Global
War on Terrorism funds.
[46] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665] (Washington, D.C.:
June 17, 2008); High Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January
2009); Defense Acquisitions: Charting A Course for Lasting Reform,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-663T] (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 30, 2009); and Defense Transformation: Sustaining Progress
Requires Continuity of Leadership and an Integrated Approach,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-462T] (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2008).
[47] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665] (Washington, D.C.:
June 17, 2008); Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: October
2005).
[48] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2003).
[49] Inspector General, United States Department of Defense, DOD
Countermine and Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Systems Contracts -
Husky Mounted Detection System, D-2010-032 (Dec. 31, 2009).
[50] The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program was
started by DOD as a way to get new technologies that meet critical
military needs into the hands of users faster and for less cost. The
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program is currently known
as the "Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration" program.
[51] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Rapid Acquisition of MRAP Vehicles,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-155T] (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 8, 2009). MRAP production began in February 2007 with one
vendor producing 10 vehicles. By March 2008--a little more than a year
after the contracts were awarded--6,935 vehicles had been produced.
[52] The instruction states that "they [solutions] should not involve
the development of a new technology or capability; however the
acceleration of an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) or
minor modification of an existing system to adapt to a new or similar
mission is within the scope of the JUON validation and resourcing
process." CJCSI 3470.01, Encls. A, para. 3.e. (July 15, 2005).
[53] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[54] For information on how we selected cases for our study, see
appendix I.
[55] In some cases, the same urgent need was submitted through more
than one of the three urgent needs processes, or the same solution was
proposed or provided to meet similar urgent needs. For the purposes of
our analysis, and to eliminate redundancy, we have synthesized related
case studies, as appropriate, in the figures below. As a result, the
number of figures is less than 23.
[End of section]
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