Defense Infrastructure
Opportunities Exist to Improve the Navy's Basing Decision Process and DOD Oversight Gao ID: GAO-10-482 May 11, 2010Decisions by the military services on where to base their force structure can have significant strategic, socioeconomic, and cost implications for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the communities surrounding the bases. Each service uses its own process to make basing decisions. The House Committee on Armed Services directed GAO to review the services' basing decision processes. GAO examined the extent to which (1) the services have comprehensive processes in place that are designed to result in well-informed basing decisions and (2) DOD exercises management control of these processes. GAO reviewed and analyzed DOD and service guidance, studies, and relevant documents on implementation and oversight of the services' basing processes.
The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force basing decision processes fully incorporate the key elements, associated factors, and management control standards that GAO identified as necessary in a comprehensive process; however, the Navy needs additional guidance for its process to be complete. GAO found that while the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force each have issued comprehensive guidance for their basing possesses that describes the organizational roles and responsibilities within the service, establishes links among all of the service's strategic and environmental guidance documents, and identifies the service's basing criteria, some of the Navy's guidance documents lacked detailed information about specific actions taken during the process and defined responsibility for completing certain types of analyses. For example, the Navy's Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart--one of the five guidance documents used to implement the Navy's process--shows that some types of analyses are conducted to review a range of considerations, such as access to training areas, sailor and family quality of life, and ship size, for a particular basing decision. But the document does not describe in any detail how and by whom these analyses will be conducted. Additionally, Navy guidance does not provide a clear explanation of how its five guidance documents are linked together in implementing the Navy's overall basing process. Without comprehensive and clear guidance on all aspects of the Navy's overall basing decision process, the Navy may lack the completeness and management control to ensure that Navy basing decisions can facilitate external stakeholders' examination and scrutiny or ensure effective implementation of the Navy's basing process. The Secretary of Defense has not set a policy or assigned an office a clear role for providing management control of the services' basing decision processes within the United States, and as a consequence may lack reasonable assurance that certain departmentwide initiatives will be fully supported in the services' basing decisions. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials said that OSD is promoting joint sharing of DOD facilities and seeking to ensure that domestic basing decisions support global operations. However, OSD has not fully promoted service consideration of the joint sharing, global operations, and potentially other initiatives because the Secretary of Defense has neither provided a comprehensive policy for, nor clearly assigned an office within OSD to oversee domestic service basing processes. Without OSD guidance and an office to provide effective oversight of military service basing decision processes, the Secretary of Defense lacks reasonable assurance that departmentwide initiatives are adequately considered by the services in their domestic basing decision making.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Brian J. Lepore Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-4523GAO-10-482, Defense Infrastructure: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Navy's Basing Decision Process and DOD Oversight
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2010:
Defense Infrastructure:
Opportunities Exist to Improve the Navy's Basing Decision Process and
DOD Oversight:
GAO-10-482:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-482, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Decisions by the military services on where to base their force
structure can have significant strategic, socioeconomic, and cost
implications for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the communities
surrounding the bases. Each service uses its own process to make
basing decisions. The House Committee on Armed Services directed GAO
to review the services‘ basing decision processes. GAO examined the
extent to which (1) the services have comprehensive processes in place
that are designed to result in well-informed basing decisions and (2)
DOD exercises management control of these processes. GAO reviewed and
analyzed DOD and service guidance, studies, and relevant documents on
implementation and oversight of the services‘ basing processes.
What GAO Found:
The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force basing decision processes fully
incorporate the key elements, associated factors, and management
control standards that GAO identified as necessary in a comprehensive
process; however, the Navy needs additional guidance for its process
to be complete. GAO found that while the Army, Marine Corps, and Air
Force each have issued comprehensive guidance for their basing
possesses that describes the organizational roles and responsibilities
within the service, establishes links among all of the service‘s
strategic and environmental guidance documents, and identifies the
service‘s basing criteria, some of the Navy‘s guidance documents
lacked detailed information about specific actions taken during the
process and defined responsibility for completing certain types of
analyses. For example, the Navy‘s Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart”one
of the five guidance documents used to implement the Navy‘s process”
shows that some types of analyses are conducted to review a range of
considerations, such as access to training areas, sailor and family
quality of life, and ship size, for a particular basing decision. But
the document does not describe in any detail how and by whom these
analyses will be conducted. Additionally, Navy guidance does not
provide a clear explanation of how its five guidance documents are
linked together in implementing the Navy‘s overall basing process.
Without comprehensive and clear guidance on all aspects of the Navy‘s
overall basing decision process, the Navy may lack the completeness
and management control to ensure that Navy basing decisions can
facilitate external stakeholders‘ examination and scrutiny or ensure
effective implementation of the Navy‘s basing process.
The Secretary of Defense has not set a policy or assigned an office a
clear role for providing management control of the services‘ basing
decision processes within the United States, and as a consequence may
lack reasonable assurance that certain departmentwide initiatives will
be fully supported in the services‘ basing decisions. The Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials said that OSD is promoting
joint sharing of DOD facilities and seeking to ensure that domestic
basing decisions support global operations. However, OSD has not fully
promoted service consideration of the joint sharing, global
operations, and potentially other initiatives because the Secretary of
Defense has neither provided a comprehensive policy for, nor clearly
assigned an office within OSD to oversee domestic service basing
processes. Without OSD guidance and an office to provide effective
oversight of military service basing decision processes, the Secretary
of Defense lacks reasonable assurance that departmentwide initiatives
are adequately considered by the services in their domestic basing
decision making.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Navy better link its basing guidance documents
and ensure they adequately address management control, and the
Secretary of Defense identify a lead office for oversight and
establish guidance on the consideration of departmentwide priorities
as part of the services‘ basing decision processes. DOD concurred with
two, partially concurred with two, and nonconcurred with one of the
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-482] or key
components. For more information, contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-
4523 or Leporeb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force's Basing Decision Processes Are
Comprehensive, but the Navy's Process Lacks Guidance in Some Areas:
OSD Does Not Have a Clear Process to Exercise Management Control over
the Services' Basing Decision Processes:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Summary of the Navy's Decision to Homeport a Nuclear-
Powered Aircraft Carrier at Mayport, Florida:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Key Elements, Factors, and Management Control Standards of
GAO's Assessment Tool for Evaluating the Services' Basing Decision
Processes:
Figure:
Figure 1: GAO's Assessment of the Services' Basing Decision Processes:
Abbreviations:
[End of section]
BRAC: Base Realignment and Closure
DOD: Department of Defense
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 11, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
Decisions by the military services on where to base their force
structure[Footnote 1] in the United States (the 50 states and the
District of Columbia) can have significant strategic, socioeconomic,
and cost implications for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
communities surrounding the bases. Basing decisions can often result
in changes to the numbers of personnel, military families, and defense-
related contractors working or living at DOD installations and to the
bases' infrastructure, operational, and support requirements.
Similarly, these decisions can have an effect on off-base
infrastructure, community services, businesses, and environmental
considerations of local communities. As a result, the services' basing
processes need to be comprehensive and service basing decisions to be
transparent, repeatable, and defendable. Each of the military
services--the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force--
uses its own process to make basing decisions within the United States
that are not made under the base realignment and closure (BRAC)
legislation.[Footnote 2]
In its June 2009 report on H.R. 2647, the House Committee on Armed
Services directed GAO to review the services' basing decision
processes to determine the manner in which the services consider and
utilize the following factors in making military basing decisions:
changes to military force structure, strategic imperative and risk
assessment, cost, input from combatant commanders, and environmental
and socioeconomic impacts. In response to this report,[Footnote 3] our
objectives were to examine the extent to which (1) the services have
comprehensive processes in place that are designed to result in well-
informed basing decisions within the United States (50 states and the
District of Columbia) that are not made under the BRAC legislation and
(2) DOD exercises management control, such as providing guidance and
oversight for the services' basing decision processes. In addition,
the report requested information about the approach used by the Navy
in making its recent decision to homeport a nuclear-powered carrier at
Mayport, Florida; this information is provided in appendix II.
To address the first objective, we obtained the military services'
basing decision regulations, instructions, or orders and other
pertinent documentation provided by the services.[Footnote 4] We
interviewed service officials to gain an understanding of the
processes and analyzed the services' basing decision processes using
an assessment tool we developed. This tool identifies the key
elements, including specific factors within each element, and
management control standards[Footnote 5] designed for a process to be
comprehensive and its decisions to be transparent, repeatable, and
defendable. In developing this assessment tool, we conducted a
literature search of prior GAO reports on relevant subject areas,
including results-oriented government, resource decisions, internal
control,[Footnote 6] military force structure issues, defense
management challenges, and BRAC legislation that includes criteria and
planning processes. We also considered the factors that the House
Committee on Armed Services included in its report--changes to
military force structure, strategic imperative and risk assessment,
cost, input from combatant commanders, and environmental and
socioeconomic impacts. We discussed the services' basing processes,
our assessment tool, and analyses with DOD and service officials
knowledgeable about making basing decisions. Our review focused on
assessing the services' processes. We did not assess the extent to
which the services implemented their guidance and processes to support
past basing decisions. We interviewed officials from the offices of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment and the Joint
Staff and Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps headquarters and
command staff. In commenting on our assessment tool, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and service officials agreed that our tool
was reasonable and complete. We also interviewed staff at U.S.
Northern and U.S. Southern Commands to obtain an understanding of the
combatant commands' participation in the services' basing decision
processes.
To address the second objective, we analyzed relevant law, the
military services' basing decision regulations, instructions, or
orders and other pertinent documentation to identify the roles and
responsibilities within DOD and management control of the services'
basing decision processes. We interviewed officials from the offices
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment to determine
how DOD exercises management control, such as oversight, to coordinate
and facilitate basing decisions across the services. Additionally, in
our examination of the Navy's decision to establish a second East
Coast nuclear-capable homeport at Mayport, Florida, we obtained and
reviewed key Navy and DOD strategy and planning documents, relevant
law and legislative history, environmental studies, and other
supporting documentation. We interviewed officials in OSD and Navy
officials knowledgeable about the Navy's rationale for its Mayport
decision. We also visited and interviewed Navy officials at Naval Air
Station North Island, California, and Naval Station Mayport, Florida,
to understand the extent of potential upgrades required to homeport a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport. Additional information on
our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 through May 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Roles in the Basing Decision Process:
The secretaries of the Army, Navy,[Footnote 7] and Air Force have a
key role in making decisions on where to locate their services' forces
when they are not otherwise employed or deployed by order of the
Secretary of Defense or assigned to a combatant command. The service
secretaries are authorized, subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of Defense, to conduct all affairs of their
departments--including functions such as organizing, equipping,
training, and maintaining[Footnote 8] force structure. The secretaries
also have the authority to construct, maintain, and repair buildings,
structures and utilities, and to acquire the real property or
interests in real property necessary to carry out their
responsibilities. In addition, the secretaries may assign forces under
their jurisdiction to carry out these functions, unless otherwise
directed by the Secretary of Defense or the forces are assigned to a
combatant command.[Footnote 9]
The Secretary of Defense has authority, direction, and control over
DOD,[Footnote 10] including the military services, and may perform any
of his functions through organizations of the department as he may
designate, unless prohibited by law.[Footnote 11] Furthermore, OSD was
established in part to assist the Secretary of Defense in carrying out
his duties and responsibilities and to carry out such other duties as
may be prescribed by law.[Footnote 12] Senior officials within OSD
develop policy and guidance for their unique areas of responsibility.
For example, among the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is establishing policies for
logistics, maintenance, and sustainment support for all elements of
DOD.[Footnote 13]
DOD periodically monitors, as part of its oversight role, its
significant investments of military force structure and resources
through its Quadrennial Defense Review that is generally conducted
every four years.[Footnote 14] Under law, the Secretary of Defense is
to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense
strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure,
budget plan, and other elements of the country's defense program and
policies with a view toward determining and expressing the nation's
defense strategy and establishing a defense program for the next 20
years.
Overview of the Services' Basing Decision Processes:
The four military services each use different terminology and
definitions when describing their basing decision processes. For
example, the Army describes its basing decision process as
"stationing," the Marine Corps generally uses the term "force
laydown," and the Air Force uses the term "beddown." The Navy
describes its basing decision process using the terms "strategic
laydown" and "strategic dispersal;" the strategic laydown process
provides the Navy with a methodology to align, organize, and position
naval forces between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The strategic
dispersal process is used to determine the distribution of ships by
homeport in regard to infrastructure, operational availability,
proximity to ranges and support, port loading, quality of service and
quality of life, and antiterrorism and force protection factors. For
the purposes of this report, we use "basing" to refer to the services'
processes to make decisions about where to establish locations for
their force structure within the United States (the 50 states and the
District of Columbia) that are not made under BRAC legislation.
Our analysis showed that, generally, each of the services has
established a basing decision process that uses similar criteria,
scope, and methodologies to determine where to locate its force
structure within the United States and globally. The basing process
begins by the service identifying the goals for the planned change in
the location of military force structure. The service then conducts a
series of analyses, such as capability and capacity analyses, to
determine the specific requirements for meeting those goals. Based on
the results of the services' analyses, potential installations are
identified. Further analyses are conducted using cost estimates and
environmental considerations to develop a list of candidate basing
locations. The candidate locations are presented to the service's
leadership, and after further review, a final basing decision is
reached. Throughout their processes, the services conduct multiple
risk assessments; coordinate with internal and external stakeholders,
including combatant commanders; and use military judgment to support
their decisions.
The services have guidance documents that are used to implement the
processes for making basing decisions within the United States and not
made under the BRAC legislation. This guidance and its implementation
is part of the services' management control, which provides oversight
of the basing processes. In addition, service officials stated that
the same guidance and processes are used to make overseas or global
basing decisions. The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force use a
comprehensive regulation, order, and instruction, respectively, for
their processes. According to Navy officials, the Navy currently uses
five guidance documents[Footnote 15] to implement its basing decision
process:
* Chief of Naval Operations Instruction: Navy Organization Change
Manual:
* Strategic Laydown Flow Chart:
* Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart:
* Chief of Naval Operations Instruction: Environmental Readiness
Program Manual:
* Secretary of the Navy Instruction: Environmental Planning for
Department of the Navy Actions:
As an aspect of management control--to continually seek ways to better
achieve an agency's mission and program results--each of the services
is taking steps to strengthen its basing process. The Army and Air
Force have made revisions to their regulation and instruction,
respectively, to incorporate changes made in how their processes are
conducted. For example, Army officials stated that the Army's basing
regulation will incorporate an analysis of military value,[Footnote
16] which was identified as a priority criterion to be used by the
Secretary of Defense during the BRAC process. Army officials said that
the addition of this analysis in its process will provide more data to
its leaders for making future basing decisions. Air Force officials
told us that the Air Force recently changed from a decentralized to a
centralized process to better clarify roles and responsibilities in
the process and ensure that the Air Force performs an objective review
of all operational and training options. The Marine Corps' most recent
revisions to its basing process clearly emphasizes the integration of
strategic guidance (top-down direction) and commander-generated
recommendations (bottom-up requests); mandates a detailed integrated
examination of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership,
personnel, and facilities; and explicitly defines leadership roles and
responsibilities. Navy officials stated that while the Navy has used
its strategic laydown process to make basing decisions for the past 20
years, it recently refined the process and added a strategic dispersal
process, which was designed to align with the transformation described
in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Navy's Maritime
Strategy.
GAO Assessment Tool Used to Evaluate the Services' Basing Decision
Processes:
To assist in evaluating the military services' basing decision
processes, we developed an assessment tool that included the key
elements, factors within the elements, and management control
standards[Footnote 17] that are part of a comprehensive process, and
when incorporated in the process, increase its transparency,
repeatability, and defendability. Our tool includes four key elements--
strategic and force structure planning, infrastructure analysis,
implementation considerations, and authority for making the basing
decision--together with various factors that make up each element (see
table 1). Within each of the four key elements are a series of factors
that represent supporting analyses and activities that are important
for completing the element. The strategic and force structure planning
element, for example, includes factors such as national strategies,
DOD and service planning and guidance documents, the results of risk
assessments, and military judgment. Risk assessment is also considered
as a factor in the infrastructure analysis and implementation
considerations elements and as a standard for management control.
[Footnote 18] In commenting on our assessment tool, OSD and service
officials agreed that our tool was reasonable and complete.
Table 1: Key Elements, Factors, and Management Control Standards of
GAO's Assessment Tool for Evaluating the Services' Basing Decision
Processes:
Key elements: Strategic and force structure planning;
Factors within each key element:
* Consideration of national level strategies;
* Consideration of DOD/service planning and guidance documents;
* Coordination with and input from other stakeholders, including
combatant commanders;
* Risk assessment;
* Military judgment.
Key elements: Infrastructure analysis;
Factors within each key element:
* Clear definition of requirement(s);
* Consideration of DOD/service infrastructure plans;
* Capability analysis;
* Capacity analysis;
* Coordination with and input from other stakeholders, including
combatant commanders;
* Order of magnitude cost estimate;
* Risk assessment;
* Military judgment.
Key elements: Implementation considerations;
Factors within each key element:
* Consideration of regional or installation infrastructure plans;
* Detailed cost estimate;
* Environmental impact;
* Socioeconomic impact;
* Coordination with and input from other stakeholders;
* Risk assessment;
* Military judgment.
Key elements: Authority for making the basing decision;
Factors within each key element:
* Determination of the basing decision and approval by applicable
service secretary or the Secretary of Defense.
Management control:
Five standards for management control:
* Control environment;
* Risk assessment;
* Control activities;
* Information and communications;
* Monitoring.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Management control underpins the entire basing process, and the
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government[Footnote 19]
provides a foundation that can help government program managers
achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public
resources. Management control comprises the plans, methods, and
procedures used to meet the organization's missions, goals, and
objectives and consists of five standards--control environment, risk
assessment, control activities, information and communications, and
monitoring. For example, management control recommends that an
organization issue a governing instruction that specifies who is
responsible for each step of a process, including oversight and review
of decisions made at critical steps by an official or group other than
those who made the original decision, and directs those responsible to
document the steps of a key decision process, such as the basing
decision process.
The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force's Basing Decision Processes Are
Comprehensive, but the Navy's Process Lacks Guidance in Some Areas:
The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force basing decision processes
include all of the key elements, associated factors, and management
control standards that we identified as necessary in a comprehensive
process and that when incorporated in the process, increase its
transparency, repeatability and defendability. However, the Navy's
basing process needs additional guidance for its infrastructure
analysis--a key element--and for related management control standards
for its process to be complete. We found, for example, that one of
Navy's guiding documents--the Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart--did not
provide details about how and by whom specific actions will be done
during the process. In addition, management control underpins all
aspects of a basing decision process, and the Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government recommends policies and procedures
to enforce management's directives; specify who is responsible for
each step of the process, including oversight and review of decisions
made; and direct those responsible to maintain appropriate
documentation. Specifically, we found that some of the Navy's guidance
documents do not provide detailed information about how certain types
of analyses will be completed and who is responsible for completing
them. Additionally, Navy officials acknowledged that the Navy has not
clearly described the linkage between all five guidance documents it
uses to implement its basing decision process. Without comprehensive
and clear guidance of the Navy's overall basing decision process, the
Navy may lack the completeness and management control to ensure that
its basing decisions can facilitate external stakeholders' examination
and scrutiny or ensure effective implementation of Navy's basing
process.
The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force Basing Processes Are
Comprehensive, but Navy's Guidance Is Incomplete:
Our assessment found that the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force basing
processes incorporated all of the key elements, associated factors,
and management control standards that we identified as necessary for a
process to be comprehensive and its decisions to be transparent,
repeatable, and defendable. However, the Navy has not provided
complete guidance for its infrastructure analysis--a key element--and
for some of its related management control standards in its basing
process. Figure 1 summarizes our assessment and the rating we assigned
to the key elements and management control for each of the services'
basing decision processes.
Figure 1: GAO's Assessment of the Services' Basing Decision Processes:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Services‘ Basing Decision Processes:
Key element: Strategic and force structure planning;
Army: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a large
extent;
Navy: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a large
extent;
Marine Corps: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a
large extent;
Air Force: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a
large extent.
Key element: Infrastructure analysis;
Army: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a large
extent;
Navy: Incorporates the key elements or management control to some
extent;
Marine Corps: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a
large extent;
Air Force: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a
large extent.
Key element: Implementation considerations;
Army: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a large
extent;
Navy: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a large
extent;
Marine Corps: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a
large extent;
Air Force: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a
large extent;
Key element: Authority for making basing decision:
Army: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a large
extent;
Navy: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a large
extent;
Marine Corps: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a
large extent;
Air Force: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a
large extent;
Management control:
Army: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a large
extent;
Navy: Incorporates the key elements or management control to some
extent;
Marine Corps: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a
large extent;
Air Force: Incorporates the key elements or management control to a
large extent.
Sources: GAO analysis.
None of the services fell into this category: Incorporates the key
elements or management control to a little or no extent.
[End of figure]
During our assessment, we found that the Army, Marine Corps, and Air
Force incorporate the key elements and management control to a large
extent. The following are examples of how each of these services
incorporated one of the key elements and the management control
standards during its basing process:
* Strategic and force structure planning element: According to Army
planning officials, they would ask about the strategic risk of
performing a mission or not performing a mission and would complete
tactical and strategic risk analyses using Army's force structure.
* Infrastructure analysis element: In implementing their guidance, the
Marine Corps required that a list of location alternatives and
associated implications be submitted to the Marine Requirements
Oversight Council for approval.
* Implementation considerations element: According to officials, the
Air Force would rank the potential locations and determine which
locations could best meet the Air Force's basing needs.
* Management control standards: The Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force
guidance documents clearly defined which office is responsible for
each step of the process and who had the authority to make decisions
at various steps, allowed for oversight and review of decisions made
at critical steps, and developed records associated with various steps
that provided evidence that the process was being followed.
We also found that the Navy incorporated to a large extent three out
of the four key elements in its basing process. For example, in the
implementation considerations element, as part of the Navy's basing
process, the Navy uses its Environmental Readiness Program Manual,
which considers regional or installation infrastructure plans,
detailed cost estimates, environmental impacts, socioeconomic impacts,
coordination with and input from other stakeholders, risk assessment,
and military judgment during the process of assessing environmental
impact. In addition, the Navy has coordinated with senior leadership
within the office of the Secretary of the Navy and Naval Facilities
Engineering Command and with other applicable agencies, such as the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service,
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Environmental Protection
Agency. Furthermore, the Navy has performed risk assessments for such
events as hurricanes, man-made disasters, and other military and port
threats. However, for its infrastructure analysis key element and for
related management control standards, the Navy needs additional
guidance for its process to be complete.
Some Navy Guidance Lacks Specific Details:
Our assessment, found, however, that some of the guidance that the
Navy uses to implement its basing process is incomplete. The Army,
Marine Corps, and Air Force have a regulation, order, and instruction,
[Footnote 20] respectively, which describe the organizational roles
and responsibilities; links between other necessary strategic and
environmental guidance documents; and service basing analyses,
factors, and criteria that should be used when making basing
decisions. However, some of the Navy's current guidance documents,
primarily used for the infrastructure analysis key element and
management control, do not contain detailed information about the
specific actions that are taken during its basing process or clearly
define who is responsible for completing certain types of analyses. In
addition, according to Navy officials, the Navy uses the following
five guidance documents to implement its overall basing decision
process: (1) Chief of Naval Operations Instruction: Navy Organization
Change Manual, (2) Strategic Laydown Flow Chart, (3) Strategic
Dispersal Flow Chart, (4) Secretary of the Navy Instruction:
Environmental Planning for Department of the Navy Actions, and (5)
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction: Environmental Readiness Program
Manual. However, Navy guidance does not provide a clear explanation
for how all of these guidance documents are linked together in the
process.
In reviewing the infrastructure analysis element of the process, we
found that the Navy's Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart neither includes
sufficient detail about the specific actions nor provides clearly
defined responsibilities in the organization for completing and
coordinating them. For example, the flow chart shows that some types
of capability and capacity analyses of potential homeport locations
are conducted that take into consideration access to training areas,
sailor quality of life, family quality of life, and collocating of
ships, and support units and planned military construction projects,
port capacity and loading, pier space, and ship size, respectively.
However, the Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart does not describe in any
detail how the analysis is to be conducted and who is to conduct it.
Furthermore, while Navy officials stated that there are working groups
with appropriate stakeholders throughout the Navy's basing process, we
found that the Navy's Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart does not describe
in detail the type of coordination with other stakeholders that should
occur.
For management control, our assessment showed that some of the Navy's
five guidance documents only partially describe the standards for
management control--risk assessment, information and communications,
control environment, control activities, and monitoring. Specifically,
some of the Navy's basing process guidance documents do not:
* describe how risk is evaluated and who conducts this analysis;
* provide detail to show how information flows down, across, and up
the organization, or identify the means of communication with external
stakeholders;
* clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility and
establish appropriate lines of reporting;
* properly document policies and procedures, such as approvals and the
creation and maintenance of related records, which would provide
evidence that these activities have been executed;
* show how regular management and supervisory activities and other
actions are performed during the normal course of its basing decision
process; and:
* clearly link all five guidance documents to enforce management's
directives.
Two of the Navy's guidance documents lack specific key management
controls. First, the Navy's Strategic Laydown Process Flow Chart does
not describe how risk assessment should be evaluated. Second, the
Navy's Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart does not show how and who is
responsible for conducting and evaluating risk assessment, how
information is disseminated within the organization, and how it is
exchanged with external stakeholders; clearly define key areas of
authority and responsibility and establish appropriate lines of
reporting; show proper documentation in executing the process and how
it should be maintained; show how regular management and supervisory
activities are performed during the normal course of Navy officials'
duties; and show the organizational roles and responsibilities for
completing and coordinating this process.
Navy's Guidance Documents Are Not All Clearly Linked:
While each of the Navy's five guidance documents for its basing
process provides support for one or more key elements or for
management control, Navy officials could not identify to us any
guidance or related documents that clearly describe how these guidance
documents are linked together in the process. For example, Navy
officials told us that the flow charts describing its strategic
laydown and strategic dispersal processes were the primary
documentation used to support Navy's basing methodology. However,
these flow charts do not describe the Navy's entire basing decision
process. Specifically, the flow charts do not provide references to
show that the Navy's organization change manual and the two
environmental planning guidance documents are also a part of the
overall basing process. In addition, Navy officials acknowledged that
without the linkage of these five documents, the Navy's basing process
may not be transparent to outside stakeholders. Since the five
guidance documents are not all clearly linked, Navy management and
staff may not have a clear and complete understanding of the roles,
responsibilities, and relationships between various organizations
within the process; the range of actions, analyses, and supporting
documentation required; and the interrelationship of all the elements,
factors, and management control standards needed to implement the
process.
OSD Does Not Have a Clear Process to Exercise Management Control over
the Services' Basing Decision Processes:
The Secretary of Defense has not set a policy or assigned an office a
clear role for providing management control of the services' basing
decision processes within the United States and not made under the
BRAC legislation, and as a consequence may lack reasonable assurance
that certain DOD-wide initiatives will be fully supported in service
basing decisions. Specifically, in its 2007 Defense Installation
Strategic Plan, DOD indicated it would attempt to reshape the overall
structure of its installations in the United States to better support
all DOD components and joint warfighting needs.[Footnote 21] In
addition, DOD is continuing its efforts to reduce the number of troops
permanently stationed overseas and consolidate overseas bases.
Moreover, the 2007 Defense Installation Strategic Plan's "Right
Management Practices" goal suggests the DOD intends to embrace best
business practices and modern asset management techniques to improve
its installation planning and operations. Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government recommends that management control
should be built into an organization to help managers run it and
achieve their aims on an ongoing basis. OSD officials told us that OSD
provides management control over basing issues through its annual
reviews of the services' budgets and other program reviews, such as
the Quadrennial Defense Review.[Footnote 22]
According to OSD officials, even though OSD is developing policy and
plans to prepare guidance for its overseas basing process, which DOD
refers to as global basing, OSD has no current plans to develop a
policy for the services' basing processes within the United States. As
a result, these officials acknowledged that there is no departmentwide
policy that provides direction to the military services on how
departmentwide issues, such as the potential sharing of DOD facilities
by the services and global basing and operations, should be considered
in evaluating domestic basing alternatives. Furthermore, the Secretary
of Defense has not sufficiently delegated to an office within OSD a
clear line of authority and responsibility for providing the guidance
and oversight of the services' domestic basing processes. Nonetheless,
officials from the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and
Environment told us that it is important for the military services to
consider any potential impacts that the services' basing decisions
could have on joint sharing of DOD facilities and global basing and
operations. However, these officials also stated that it is unclear to
what extent the services' basing processes include risk assessment
questions that take into consideration a cross-service perspective of
base planning to share DOD facilities jointly and any impacts that the
services' basing decisions within the United States may have on global
basing and operations.
OSD officials stated that DOD has recently taken steps toward
establishing an integrated process to assess and adjust global basing.
DOD established the Global Posture Executive Council, which is
responsible for facilitating global posture[Footnote 23] decisions and
overseeing the assessment and implementation of global posture plans.
In a July 2009 report, we identified a weakness in DOD's approach,
despite these positive steps.[Footnote 24] Specifically, as of July
2009 when we issued our report, DOD had not yet reported on global
posture matters in a comprehensive manner. In that report, DOD
concurred with our recommendations to (1) issue guidance establishing
a definition and common terms of reference for global defense posture;
(2) develop guidance requiring the geographic combatant commands to
establish an approach to monitor initiative implementation, assess
progress, and report on results; and (3) establish criteria and a
process for selecting and assigning lead service responsibilities for
future locations. OSD officials told us that since the services use
the same processes for making basing decisions both within the United
States and globally, OSD could similarly exercise management control
of the services' basing processes through its global defense posture
policy to oversee basing decisions within the United States, but had
not generally done so to date. In addition, these officials stated
that the global defense posture policy draft is expected in spring
2010; however, officials did not know when it would be formally
issued. Without implementing a DOD-wide policy that includes guidance
and oversight of the military services' basing processes and assigns
an OSD office with authority and responsibility for providing this
oversight, the Secretary of Defense lacks reasonable assurance that
DOD plans for sharing facilities among the services, possible impacts
on global basing and operations, or other departmentwide issues are
adequately considered by the services in their basing decision making.
Conclusions:
While the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force each have established
comprehensive basing processes for determining where to base its force
structure in the United States, the lack of completeness in two of the
Navy's five guidance documents and lack of clear linkage between its
multiple guidance documents may limit the understanding of its process
both internally and externally and the Navy's ability to implement its
process consistently. Without comprehensive basing processes with
detailed guidance and instructions, DOD may not have assurance that
the services' basing decisions are transparent, repeatable, and
defendable. Additionally, in light of the substantial costs and
potential strategic and socioeconomic impacts on DOD operations and
interests of the communities surrounding the bases that can result
from the services' basing decisions, it is important to include DOD-
wide considerations, such as joint use of facilities by the services
and global basing and operations, in the services' basing processes.
While DOD does exercise management control through its budget and
program reviews, the department may not have sufficient guidance and
oversight of the services' basing processes to ensure that
departmentwide priorities are fully considered in the services' basing
decisions.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the Navy's ability to make well-informed basing decisions
that are transparent, repeatable, and defendable, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the
following three actions to strengthen the Navy's guidance and
associated documentation for its basing decision process:
1. In its Strategic Laydown Flow Chart, clearly describe how risk is
evaluated.
2. In its Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart, clearly describe:
* how risk is evaluated and who conducts this analysis;
* how information flows within the organization;
* the means of communication with internal and external stakeholders;
* the areas of authority and responsibility and appropriate lines of
reporting;
* how documents and related records are to be properly maintained to
provide evidence that these activities were executed;
* how regular management and supervisory activities and other related
actions are performed during the normal course of this process; and:
* the organizational responsibilities for completing and coordinating
the dispersal process actions.
3. Describe the link between Navy's five guidance documents--the Chief
of Naval Operations Instruction: Navy Organization Change Manual;
Strategic Laydown Flow Chart; Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart; the
Secretary of the Navy Instruction: Environmental Planning for
Department of the Navy Actions; and the Chief of Naval Operations
Instruction: Environmental Readiness Program Manual--used to implement
the Navy's overall basing decision process.
We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following
two actions:
* Identify a lead office within OSD best suited for the authority and
responsibility for providing oversight of the services' domestic
basing decision processes.
* Establish guidance for the services to ensure that they fully
consider joint use of DOD facilities, impacts to global operations,
and other departmentwide initiatives during the course of their basing
processes.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Officials from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, the
Office of the Secretary of Navy (Installations and Environment), and
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Information, Plans, and
Strategy) provided oral comments on a draft of this report. In the
comments, DOD concurred with two, partially concurred with two, and
nonconcurred with one of our recommended actions. DOD also provided an
opinion on text contained in appendix II, which summarized the Navy's
decision to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport,
Florida.
Specifically, DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary
of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to clearly describe how
risk is evaluated in the Navy's Strategic Laydown Flow Chart. DOD
stated that our report identified a seam between existing Secretary of
the Navy instructions, which generally deal with how to conduct
homeport analysis, such as Environmental Impact Studies and National
Environmental Policy Act compliance, and existing Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations guidance. However, DOD does not identify any
actions it plans to take to implement what we recommended.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to clearly describe in the
Navy's Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart several areas of considerations,
such as how risk is evaluated and who conducts this analysis, how
information flows within the organization, and the means of
communication with internal and external stakeholders. DOD stated that
factors involved in homeport decisions are codified and implemented by
the Navy Organization Change Manual. However, the Navy Organization
Change Manual currently addresses none of the elements of our
recommendation with regard to the Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart
process and instead provides guidance only for the strategic laydown
process. Regarding the Strategic and Force Structure Planning
assessment, DOD also acknowledges that providing specific guidance and
reference to the above-recommended considerations in a Secretary of
the Navy or Chief of Naval Operations instruction would likely improve
the overall clarity of homeporting decisions. Nonetheless, DOD does
not identify any actions that the Navy plans to take to implement our
recommendation.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to describe the link between its five
guidance documents--the Chief of Naval Operations Organization Change
Manual; Strategic Laydown Flow Chart; Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart;
the Secretary of the Navy's environmental planning document; and the
Chief of Naval Operations environmental planning document--used to
implement the Navy's overall basing decision process. DOD agreed that
a linkage between the Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the
Navy guidance documents is necessary in order to better streamline and
designate responsibilities for strategic homeporting decisions.
However, DOD's comment addresses only three of the relevant documents
and omits discussing linkages with the other two. We continue to
believe that the explicit connection between all five guidance
documents is needed to ensure that stakeholders have a complete
understanding of the process used to make basing decisions.
Furthermore, the Navy did not indicate what actions it plans to take
to implement our recommendation or the timeframe for doing so.
DOD nonconcurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
identify a lead office within OSD best suited for the authority and
responsibility for providing oversight of the services' domestic
basing decision processes. DOD asserted that the Secretary of Defense
has adequate oversight of the services' domestic basing decision
processes through the budget review and Global Posture Executive
Council. However, if DOD relies on the budget process, OSD may lack
reasonable assurance that it can effectively influence domestic basing
decisions because OSD may not have been a stakeholder in the services'
basing decision during the planning and budgeting phases of the
decision. Moreover, as our report clearly states, OSD told us that it
has not used the Global Posture Executive Council for conducting
oversight, raising questions about how a process not used for OSD
oversight will assist OSD in actually exercising oversight. Our
recommendation was intended to fortify OSD management oversight of the
services' basing decision processes and we continue to believe that a
lead office should be designated within OSD that could provide the
necessary proactive management oversight and guidance over service
basing processes and decisions.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense establish guidance for the services to ensure that they fully
consider joint use of DOD facilities, impacts to global operations,
and other departmentwide initiatives during the course of their basing
decision processes. DOD stated that the Secretary of Defense provides
guidance on joint use of DOD facilities through several means,
including the Quadrennial Defense Review and the program review. In
addition, DOD stated that the department will periodically review and
revise this guidance as appropriate to ensure that consideration and
application of joint-use principles and cross-service impacts are
institutionalized. Even though OSD may issue guidance on joint use of
DOD facilities through these means, the Quadrennial Defense Review is
intended to occur only every 4 years, which does not provide timely
information regarding departmentwide initiatives since the initiatives
do not necessarily only occur at 4-year intervals. Moreover, DOD did
not explain how the program review is useful in influencing service
basing decisions. While DOD did state that it would periodically
review and revise guidance, DOD did not identify guidance to be
reviewed and revised.
DOD additionally provided a comment on the text related to the Navy's
decision to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport,
Florida, which is summarized in appendix II. In regard to our
statement in the report that "the Department of the Navy made its
recent decision to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at
Naval Station Mayport using its strategic laydown and strategic
dispersal processes and its environmental planning guidance
documents," DOD stated that while many of the principles for strategic
laydown were used in making the Mayport decision, the decision
preceded the 2007 Navy Organization Change Manual, which describes the
current laydown goals. DOD stated that prior to 2007 the Navy
conducted a strategic laydown that determined the East Coast-West
Coast split of forces by platform type, but not the dispersal of
specific ships to specific locations. However, a senior Navy official
within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Information,
Plans, and Strategy) clarified to us that the decision did go through
the strategic laydown process existing at the time and through the
strategic dispersal process as the current concept was being developed
when Navy made its decision. Consequently, we revised our appendix to
clarify that the Navy used the strategic laydown process existing at
the time the Mayport decision was in the process of being made.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretaries of the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. The report also is
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions, please contact me at (202)
512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact point for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the services have comprehensive
basing decision processes in place that are designed to result in well-
informed basing decisions within the United States (50 states and the
District of Columbia) that are not made under the base realignment and
closure (BRAC) legislation, we identified and examined the military
service guidance, policies, instructions, regulations, and orders
relevant to making basing decisions. We also identified other
appropriate Department of Defense (DOD) documents, such as the 2001,
2006, and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, DOD's 2008 and 2009
Strategic Management Plans, and 2007 Defense Installations Strategic
Plan. In addition, to identify their participation in the services'
basing decision processes, we interviewed officials from the offices
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment; the Joint
Staff; U.S. Joint Forces Command; U.S. Northern Command; U.S. Southern
Command; U.S. Army Pacific Command; the offices of the Chief of Staff
of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force; U.S. Fleet Forces Command;
and Air Combat Command. We documented each process and then discussed
each respective service's process with officials from the offices of
the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant
of the Marine Corps, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force to confirm
our understanding of the service's basing process. We used the
services' guidance documents and other pertinent documents, interviews
with the service officials, and officials' comments regarding our
analyses of the services' processes to determine the extent to which
the services have comprehensive basing decision processes in place
that are designed to result in well-informed basing decisions within
the United States that are not made under BRAC legislation.
To establish criteria to use in assessing each service's current
basing process, we developed an assessment tool to identify the key
elements, factors, and management control standards of a basing
decision process that would be comprehensive and ensure that the
basing decisions are transparent, repeatable, and defendable. In
developing this assessment tool, we conducted a literature search to
identify relevant standards for criteria and planning processes in
prior GAO reports on relevant subject areas, including results-
oriented government, resource decisions, internal control, military
force structure issues, defense management challenges, and BRAC
legislation. Furthermore, as part of our review, we considered the
factors included in the House Committee on Armed Services' report on
H.R. 2647[Footnote 25]--on changes to military force structure,
strategic imperative and risk assessment, cost, input from combatant
commanders, and environmental and socioeconomic impacts. Based on our
research, we identified four key elements for the assessment tool: (1)
strategic and force structure planning, (2) infrastructure analysis,
(3) implementation considerations, and (4) authority for making the
basing decision. In addition, we identified management control as part
of our evaluation tool. We also determined factors within each key
element and the standards within management control that were
necessary evaluation criteria in our assessment tool.[Footnote 26] To
determine the completeness and reasonableness of our assessment tool,
we developed and distributed a structured data collection instrument
to officials within the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and
Environment and to service officials in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air Force headquarters to obtain their comments. We held
discussions with these officials to reach agreement on the key
elements, factors within each element, and management control
standards that were in our assessment tool. Based on the results of
the data collection instrument and our follow-on discussions with DOD
and service officials, we finalized our assessment tool.
Our analyst team was assigned to assess and evaluate the four
services' basing decision processes, one service per team analyst.
Using the assessment tool, we reviewed and assessed each of the
processes used by the services to make basing decisions within the
United States that was not made under the BRAC legislation. Each team
analyst examined the collective evidence concerning his or her
service's basing decision process, which was found either in a service
regulation, instruction, order, or other documents. Using the
service's regulation, instruction, or order; other pertinent
documents; and discussions with service officials, each team analyst
applied professional judgment to determine if the service's process
included a step (or multiple steps) that satisfied the defined factors
within each of the key elements. We assigned a rating to each process
based on the extent to which the service incorporated factors and
standards within the key elements and management control,
respectively, that our tool identified as necessary for a process to
be comprehensive and its decisions to be transparent, repeatable, and
defendable. Based on the extent that these factors and standards were
incorporated in the service's process, we assigned one of three
possible ratings to each element: (1) incorporates to a large extent,
(2) incorporates to some extent, or (3) incorporates to a little or no
extent. According to our methodology, we assigned a rating of
"incorporates to a large extent" when a factor showed sufficient,
specific, and detailed support, as noted in the services' basing
guidance document(s) or during discussions with agency officials on
whether the factor was carried out during the basing process. If the
process addressed some of the factors within the key elements to some
degree, but not completely, we assigned a rating of "incorporates to
some extent," and if the evidence showed that the factors were not
included, we assigned a rating of "incorporates to little or no
extent." We used the same rating system for the presence of management
control standards throughout a service's basing process. If a team
analyst could not clearly determine the extent to which a service's
process satisfied the criteria for a factor, the factor was rated as
"unclear." This same methodology was also applied to the five
standards for management control.
After each team analyst completed the evaluation and assessment of his
or her service's basing decision process, the evaluation was validated
by discussion with the whole team in a group setting. Because we
developed the key elements, factors within the elements, and
management control standards, as noted in our assessment tool, with
input and guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
and the services, we also provided the services an opportunity to
review and comment on our analysis of their respective processes
against our assessment tool. After receiving comments from each
service through a structured data collection instrument, including
clarifying information to resolve any ratings of "unclear," the team
updated the ratings as necessary. In addition, to determine whether
the ratings were accurate, the team analysts performed in-depth
reviews of each other's evaluations of the services' basing decision
processes.
After rating each factor within each key element and the management
control standards, each team analyst then analyzed and determined the
summary for each key element and for management control. Because each
individual factor and the management control activities were
considered to be necessary for a process to be transparent,
repeatable, and defendable, the factors and the management control
standards were weighted equally. The summary of our rating describes
the extent to which the service's process incorporates the key
elements or management control standards in figure 1 in the report.
To determine the extent to which the Secretary of Defense exercises
management control, such as providing DOD-wide guidance and oversight
of the services' basing decision processes, we reviewed DOD and
military service guidance, policies, instructions, regulations, and
orders and relevant law to identify whether an office within OSD has
been clearly assigned a role and responsibilities over the services'
basing processes. We reviewed the 2007 Defense Installations Strategic
Plan, which was developed by the office of the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Installations and Environment to determine DOD's
strategic goals for its installations. We also reviewed our prior
report on global defense posture and the recommendations made in that
report to improve the global defense posture policy. We also
interviewed officials from the offices of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment to obtain their perspectives on how DOD
exercises management control, such as oversight to coordinate and
facilitate basing decisions across the services. In addition, we
interviewed military service officials regarding OSD guidance provided
to them during the services' basing decision processes.
To address the request for information about the approach used by the
Navy in making its decision to establish a homeport for a nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier at Mayport, Florida, we reviewed key Navy and
DOD strategy and planning documents, including reports of the
Quadrennial Defense Reviews of 2001, 2006, and 2010; the Navy's 2007 A
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower; and relevant Navy
instructions and documents. In addition, we reviewed relevant law and
legislative history concerning homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier at Mayport and examined a 1992 Navy report to Congress and a
March 1997 Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
discussing the facility upgrades required to homeport a nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier at Mayport. Furthermore, we reviewed the
November 2008 Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed
Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport,
Florida, and the January 2009 Navy Record of Decision for Homeporting
of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, Florida. To
identify and obtain an understanding of the decision process followed
by the Navy, we interviewed officials from the offices of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Installations and Environment), and Chief of Naval Operations; the
Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; U.S. Fleet Forces
Command; Naval Facilities Engineering Command Southeast; and Naval
Station Mayport. We visited facilities and interviewed officials at
Naval Station Mayport, Florida, to understand the extent of the
potential upgrades required to support homeporting a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier. We also visited Naval Air Station North Island,
California, to observe and discuss with Navy officials the
infrastructure upgrades made to increase its capabilities and
capacities to berth and homeport nuclear-powered aircraft carriers on
the West Coast and to increase our understanding of the potential
scope of upgrades that would be needed at Naval Station Mayport. In
addition, we interviewed OSD officials involved in the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review to assess Navy's decision to homeport a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in the broad context of future
threats, future Navy force structure, and likely cost-effectiveness.
(Appendix II provides a summary of the Navy's decision to homeport a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport, Florida,
and information on DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review of the Navy's
decision.)
We conducted our performance audit from July 2009 through May 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Summary of the Navy's Decision to Homeport a Nuclear-
Powered Aircraft Carrier at Mayport, Florida:
The Navy Has Considered Homeporting a Carrier at Mayport, Florida, for
Two Decades:
The possibility of homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at
Naval Station Mayport was considered by Congress as early as 1990 in
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, which
required the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a plan to
upgrade Naval Station Mayport capability to enable the station to
service nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and otherwise to serve as a
homeport for these carriers.[Footnote 27] Since that time, provisions
of other National Defense Authorization Acts have required, among
other things, that the Secretary of the Navy (1) submit to the
congressional defense committees a report on the Navy's plan for
developing a second East Coast homeport for nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers and (2) begin design activities for such military
construction projects as may be necessary to make Mayport capable of
serving as a homeport for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.[Footnote
28] In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1993 included a congressional finding that Naval Station Mayport
ought to be the second East Coast homeport for nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers when an additional homeport was needed.[Footnote 29]
The Navy has been reporting to Congress, since the late 1990s on the
development of plans for making Naval Station Mayport a potential
homeport for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. In addition, in March
1997, the Navy released a programmatic environmental impact statement.
[Footnote 30] In 2001, the Quadrennial Defense Review called for the
Navy to provide more warfighting assets more quickly to multiple
locations. In order to meet this new demand, the Navy made its
preliminary decision to homeport additional fleet surface ships at
Naval Station Mayport. As a result, the Navy prepared an environmental
impact statement to evaluate a broad range of strategic homeport and
dispersal options for Atlantic Fleet surface ships at this location
and finalized its final environment impact statement.[Footnote 31] On
January 14, 2009, the Navy issued its record of decision to homeport a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport, Florida.
[Footnote 32]
The Process the Navy Used to Make Its Decision to Homeport a Nuclear-
Powered Aircraft Carrier at Mayport:
According to Navy officials, the Department of the Navy made its
recent decision to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at
Naval Station Mayport using its strategic laydown and strategic
dispersal processes and its environmental planning guidance documents.
In addition, the Navy stated in its record of decision that the most
critical considerations in making the decision were the environmental
impacts, recurring and nonrecurring costs associated with changes in
surface ship homeporting options, and strategic dispersal
considerations. However, according to its record of decision, the need
to develop a hedge against the potentially crippling results of a
catastrophic event was ultimately the determining factor in the Navy's
decision to establish a second nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
homeport on the East Coast of the United States at Mayport.
The Navy has historically had multiple aircraft carrier homeports on
each coast. Currently, the Navy has three nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier homeports on the West Coast--Bremerton and Everett,
Washington, and San Diego, California--and one East Coast carrier
homeport in the Hampton Roads area, which includes Norfolk and Newport
News, Virginia.[Footnote 33] According to Navy officials,[Footnote 34]
the Navy used elements of its strategic laydown process existing at
the time the Mayport decision was in the process of being made to
apportion the fleet to the Pacific (West) Coast, to the Atlantic
(East) Coast based on its force structure analysis. According to
officials, the process relies on several documents, including
conventional campaign plans; homeland defense requirements; the
Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower, Navy 2030 Ashore
Vision; the 2001 and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Global
Maritime Posture. Based on these strategic laydown analyses, the Navy
developed a baseline for the total Navy force structure to try to
optimize the sourcing of forces based on the speed of response, the
maritime strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Review direction.
Using the output from the strategic laydown process, Navy officials
said that they performed its strategic dispersal process, which
allowed the Navy to further assess and determine the distribution of
the fleet by homeport based on strategic requirements and the ability
to balance operational, fiscal, and infrastructure factors. Based on
its analysis, the Navy decided to establish a second East Coast
homeport for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Navy officials said
that the Navy worked on the assumption that it would not establish a
new carrier homeport but upgrade an existing carrier homeport to
support nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Navy officials said that
Naval Station Mayport was the best option because it was an existing
conventional carrier homeport with underutilized facilities since the
USS John F. Kennedy was retired in 2007.
According to Navy officials, the Navy used its strategic dispersal
process to evaluate key operational factors, such as response time to
combatant commands, transit times to deployment areas and training,
geographic location of air wings, historic aircraft carrier loading,
physical pier capacity, transit times for pier side to open ocean,
antiterrorism and force protection, and mitigation of natural and man-
made risks for both the Hampton Roads area and Naval Station Mayport.
For example, the Navy believes the following constitute risk factors
associated with the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier consolidation in
Hampton Roads: (1) singular homeport, maintenance, and support
location; (2) all of the Atlantic Fleet nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier trained crews, associated community support infrastructure,
and nuclear carrier support facilities within a 15 nautical mile
radius; (3) single 32 nautical mile access channel with two major
choke points (bridges); (4) approximately 3-hour transit time from
carrier piers to open ocean; and (5) the planned significant increase
in commercial shipping volume because of the planned Craney Island
upgrades. Furthermore, the Navy used the U.S. Coast Guard's Port
Threat Assessments for the Coast Guard Sectors of Hampton Roads and
Mayport, which determined that the overall threat level for Hampton
Roads is moderate, while the overall threat level for Mayport is low.
According to the threat assessments, a moderate threat level indicates
a potential threat exists against the port and that one or more groups
have either the intention or capability to employ large casualty-
production attacks or cause denial of commercial, military, and
passenger vessel access to the port, while a low threat level
indicates that little or no information exists on one or more groups
with a capability or intention to damage the port.
Navy officials also identified the following benefits associated with
homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station
Mayport:
* the shortest access to the Atlantic Ocean of any current Navy
homeport,
* additional dispersed controlled industrial facility and nuclear
maintenance capabilities,
* physical separation of East Coast nuclear-powered aircraft carriers,
* physical separation between piers and shipping lanes,
* smaller commercial shipping traffic volume, and:
* strategic and operational flexibility.
Using the Navy's environmental planning guidance documents, officials
from the Navy's Fleet Forces Command completed a final environmental
impact statement in November 2008, in accordance with the National
Environmental Policy Act, to evaluate a broad range of strategic
homeport and dispersal options for Atlantic Fleet surface ships at
Naval Station Mayport. Several analyses were conducted of geology and
soils, wetlands and floodplains, water resources, air quality, noise,
biological resources, cultural resources, hazardous and toxic
substances and waste, and environmental health and safety. These
analyses also included a summary of the environmental impacts and
mitigation measures. As part of the environmental impact statement,
cost estimates were also developed. The Navy's environmental analysis
included consultations with regulatory agencies, such as the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service,
regarding impacts to endangered and threatened species, and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency
regarding dredging operations and the in-water disposal of dredged
materials. In addition, public awareness and participation were
integral components of the environmental impact statement process. The
Navy took steps to provide members of the public, state agencies, and
federal agencies with the opportunity to help define the scope of the
Navy's analysis as well as examine and consider the studies undertaken
by the Navy. Fleet Forces Command prepared the National Environmental
Policy Act documentation and supporting studies that defined the
proposed action and range of alternatives and identified the potential
mitigation options.
The Navy's final environmental impact statement for Mayport assessed
the impacts of 13 alternatives, including the no action alternative:
* Alternative 1: Cruiser homeport, destroyer homeport, or both.
* Alternative 2: Amphibious Assault Ship homeport.
* Alternative 3: Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier capable.
* Alternative 4: Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier homeport.
* Alternative 5: Amphibious Ready Group homeport.
* Alternatives 6-12: Seven different combinations of the first four
alternatives.
* Alternative 13: No action. No additional fleet surface ships would
be homeported at Naval Station Mayport, and Mayport would retain the
ability to berth a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in a limited
fashion.
The 13 alternatives evaluated a broad range of options for homeporting
surface ships at Navy Station Mayport, such as permanent assignment of
various types of surface ships and personnel. In addition,
Alternatives 3 and 4 differ because a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
capable alternative provides for port services--loading and unloading
cargo and sailors and access without restrictions for visits up to 63
days per year. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier homeport would
permanently assign a carrier and its personnel to Naval Station
Mayport, which would provide facilities to perform depot-level
maintenance at that location.
In the final environmental impact statement, the Navy identified
alternative 4 as the preferred alternative; which involves homeporting
one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport and
includes dredging, infrastructure and wharf improvements, on-station
road and parking improvements, and construction of nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier propulsion plant maintenance facilities. Other
factors that influenced the selection of alternative 4 as the
preferred alternative included impact analyses in the environmental
impact statement and estimated costs of implementation, including
military construction costs and other operation and sustainment costs.
For example, the Navy's analysis showed that there are no
environmental impacts associated with homeporting a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier at Naval Station Mayport that cannot be appropriately
addressed or mitigated, including impacts to endangered species, such
as the Florida manatee and sea turtles. In addition, the Navy reported
that the projected recurring and nonrecurring costs for the preferred
alternative are less than 10 percent of the cost of a single nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier and less than 1 percent of the cost of the
Department of the Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier assets. The
Navy believes that homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at
Naval Station Mayport is a way to provide additional security for the
carrier and enhance deployment capability. In November 2008, the Navy
made its final environmental impact statement available, and the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment) signed
the Navy's formal record of decision on January 14, 2009, to homeport
a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport.
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review of the Navy's Decision:
After the Navy decided to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, the Secretary of Defense announced
that he would review the Navy's decision as part of DOD's 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review. The Secretary of Defense directed the
Quadrennial Defense Review working group to assess the Navy's Mayport
decision. According to OSD officials, the Navy provided supporting
documentation regarding its decision to the working group, which used
this information in conducting its analysis.
In conducting its review, the Quadrennial Defense Review working group
assessed the Navy's decision against nine implementation criteria: (1)
execution of current or planned operations, (2) operational
flexibility, (3) operational management of the force, (4)
institutional provisions of the force, (5) organizational friction,
(6) execution of future missions successfully against an array of
future challenges, (7) consideration of the whole of government
programs and initiatives, (8) international relations, and (9)
environmental concerns. In addition, OSD officials stated that the
working group assessed transit times for a nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier to leave both the Norfolk and Mayport ports and arrive in the
Atlantic Ocean.
As a part of the working group's review, officials in DOD's Office of
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation stated that they evaluated the
reasonableness of the Navy's cost estimate to establish a homeport for
a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport. Specifically, the
officials said that they reviewed and assessed the military personnel,
operations and maintenance, and military construction costs associated
with the Navy's decision and found that the Navy's cost estimates were
reasonable. For example, OSD officials stated that the working group
was provided the following dollar amounts--a onetime cost of $565
million to build the necessary infrastructure at Mayport and $25
million as the recurring cost for operations and maintenance for
homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft at Mayport. In addition, the
officials said that the working group used these analyses and cost
estimates to brief the Secretary of Defense on its results. The
February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review report reiterated the Navy's
decision that homeporting an East Coast carrier in Mayport would
contribute to mitigating the risk of a terrorist attack, accident, or
natural disaster.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] We use "force structure" to mean military equipment (numbers,
size, and composition of the units that constitute U.S. defense
forces, e.g., divisions, ships, and air wings) and military personnel.
[2] Congress authorized the 2005 round of the BRAC process with the
passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 3001 (2001), which extended the authority
of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-510, Title XXIX (1990), with some modifications. Under the BRAC
process, the Secretary of Defense must follow specific legislative
requirements in making recommendations to realign or close military
installations.
[3] H.R. Rep. No. 111-166, at 537-538.
[4] The Army's regulation and the Air Force's instruction regarding
basing were being updated during our review; we used both the old and
new versions.
[5] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[6] The five standards of internal control are control environment,
risk assessment, control activities, information and communications,
and monitoring.
[7] The Department of the Navy includes the operating forces of the
Marine Corps. 10 U.S.C. § 5061(4).
[8] 10 U.S.C. § 3013(b), (c); § 5013(b), (c); § 8013(b), (c); and §
113(b). This authority is also subject to the assignment of forces to
the combatant commands. See § 162.
[9] See 10 U.S.C. § 162(a); see also § 3013(b), (c), (g); § 5013(b),
(c), (g); § 8013(b), (c), (g); Department of Defense Directive 5100.1,
Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components (Aug.
1, 2002).
[10] 10 U.S.C. § 113(b).
[11] 10 U.S.C. § 113(d).
[12] 10 U.S.C. § 131(a).
[13] 10 U.S.C. § 133(b)(3).
[14] 10 U.S.C. § 118.
[15] The Navy's five guidance documents: (1) Chief of Naval Operations
Instruction 5400.44: Navy Organization Change Manual (Oct. 5, 2007);
(2) Strategic Laydown Flow Chart; (3) Strategic Dispersal Flow Chart;
(4) Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 5090.1C: Environmental
Readiness Program Manual (Oct. 30, 2007); and (5) Secretary of the
Navy Instruction 5090.6A: Environmental Planning for Department of the
Navy Actions (Apr. 26, 2004). Navy officials stated that the flow
charts are guiding documents. We are using the term guidance to
describe all of the Navy's documents to implement its basing process.
[16] In assessing military value, DOD components typically identify
multiple attributes, facets, or evaluative components related to each
military value criteria, then identify a number of qualitative metrics
and numerous questions to collect data to support the overall military
value analysis.
[17] The five standards of internal control are control environment,
risk assessment, control activities, information and communications,
and monitoring.
[18] Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provides
that risk assessment is the identification and analysis of relevant
risks associated with achieving agency objectives, and the specific
risk analysis methodology used can vary by agency because of
differences in agencies' missions and the difficulty in qualitatively
and quantitatively assigning risk levels. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[20] The Army and Air Force had prior versions of their regulation and
instruction, respectively, for basing, but these documents were
currently under revision at the time of our review. We used both the
old and new versions and held discussions with service officials
regarding the revisions. The Navy and Marine Corps have current
versions of their basing guidance documents.
[21] DOD components include Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and
Defense Agencies.
[22] Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (February
2010).
[23] Realigning the U.S. overseas posture involves closing obsolete
and redundant bases, constructing new facilities costing billions of
dollars, and ensuring that other needed infrastructure is in place to
support realigned forces and missions.
[24] GAO, Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Ability to
Manage, Assess, and Report on Global Defense Posture Initiatives,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-706R] (Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2009).
[25] H.R. Rep. No. 111-166, at 537-538.
[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[27] Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 1423 (1990).
[28] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L.
No. 102-484, § 1011(b) (1992), and National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 2206(a) (1994). However,
Congress explicitly indicated that the provision in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 should not be
interpreted as authorizing the Secretary to actually proceed with the
construction of facilities specifically designed to make Mayport
capable of serving as a homeport. The design activities were to begin
at the conclusion of a facilities study and programmatic environmental
impact study.
[29] Pub. L. No.102-484, § 1011(a)(3).
[30] Department of the Navy, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement for Facilities Development Necessary to Support Potential
Aircraft Carrier Homeporting at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, March
1997.
[31] On November 21, 2008, the Navy released the Notice of
Availability of the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the
Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station
Mayport, Florida.
[32] Department of the Navy, Record of Decision for Homeporting of
Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL (Jan. 14, 2009),
available at [hyperlink, http://www.mayporthomeportingeis.com]. The
decision was signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Installations and Environment).
[33] In the Pacific, the Navy also forward deploys a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier at Yokosuka, Japan.
[34] Officials within the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations (Information, Plans and Strategy) provided GAO with the
information in regard to the Navy's decision to homeport a nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier at Mayport. Unless information is attributed
to a different Navy organization, these Navy officials provided us
with the information described in this appendix.
[End of section]
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