Depot Maintenance
Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That Air Force Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements Gao ID: GAO-10-526 May 14, 2010The Air Force's maintenance depots provide critical support to ongoing operations around the world. Previously, the Department of Defense's (DOD) increased reliance on the private sector for depot maintenance support, coupled with downsizing, led to a general deterioration in the capabilities, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of the military services' depots. In March 2007, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) directed each service to submit a depot maintenance strategic plan and provided direction for the content of those plans. The Air Force issued two documents in response to this direction--a Strategy and a Master Plan. GAO used qualitative content analyses to determine the extent to which the Air Force's collective plan addresses (1) key elements of a results-oriented management framework and (2) OUSD's (AT&L) direction for the plan's content.
While the Air Force plan focuses efforts on weapon system and equipment operational availability, it does not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework, nor does it clearly link information between the plan's two component documents. GAO's prior work has shown that seven elements of a results-oriented management framework are critical for comprehensive strategic planning. The plan fully addresses one of these elements by including a mission statement that summarizes the Air Force depots' major functions and operations, but it partially addresses or does not address the remaining six elements. For example, while the plan describes goals for the depots' mission-related functions, it does not provide time frames to achieve them. Additionally, the plan does not discuss any factors beyond the Air Force's control that could affect its ability to achieve the plan's goals nor does it identify how the Air Force will evaluate its programs and use the results of such evaluations to adjust the plan's long-term goals and strategies to achieve desired levels of performance. Moreover, the content of the plan's two component documents are not clearly linked to one another. For example, the goals listed in the Strategy are not clearly repeated in the Master Plan, and the Master Plan includes goals that are unrelated to depot maintenance. Nor does the Master Plan clearly align its content to the five long-term goals described in the Strategy. The plan does not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework and the plan's two documents are not clearly linked to one another in part because of weaknesses in oversight. Specifically, although OUSD (AT&L) established an oversight body, which included senior representatives from OUSD (AT&L) and the services, to review the services' plans, this body did not review the plan. Also, the Air Force did not establish an oversight mechanism to review its plan. The plan's weaknesses may limit the Air Force's ability to use its plan as a tool to meet future challenges. In addition, the Air Force plan is not fully responsive to OUSD's (AT&L) direction to the services that was designed to provide the services with a framework to meet future challenges. OUSD (AT&L) directed the services to address 10 specific issues in four general areas: logistics transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital investment. The plan partially addresses 8 of these issues and does not address the remaining two. For example, while the plan notes that the Air Force is partnering with local universities and technical schools to provide training to reengineer existing employees' skills, the plan does not address Air Force actions to identify new and emerging skill requirements, as directed. Furthermore, the plan does not discuss any benchmarks to evaluate the adequacy of investment funding, as directed. As discussed for the elements of a results-oriented management framework, the plan does not fully respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s direction for the plan's content in part because of weaknesses in oversight in both OUSD (AT&L) and the Air Force. The plan's shortcomings may limit the Air Force's assurance that its depots are postured and resourced to meet future maintenance challenges.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Jack E. Edwards Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-8246GAO-10-526, Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That Air Force Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements
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Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2010:
Depot Maintenance:
Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That Air Force Depots Can
Meet Future Maintenance Requirements:
GAO-10-526:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-526, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Air Force‘s maintenance depots provide critical support to ongoing
operations around the world. Previously, the Department of Defense‘s
(DOD) increased reliance on the private sector for depot maintenance
support, coupled with downsizing, led to a general deterioration in
the capabilities, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of the military
services‘ depots. In March 2007, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L))
directed each service to submit a depot maintenance strategic plan and
provided direction for the content of those plans. The Air Force
issued two documents in response to this direction”a Strategy and a
Master Plan. GAO used qualitative content analyses to determine the
extent to which the Air Force‘s collective plan addresses (1) key
elements of a results-oriented management framework and (2) OUSD‘s
(AT&L) direction for the plan‘s content.
What GAO Found:
While the Air Force plan focuses efforts on weapon system and
equipment operational availability, it does not fully address the
elements of a results-oriented management framework, nor does it
clearly link information between the plan‘s two component documents. GAO
‘s prior work has shown that seven elements of a results-oriented
management framework are critical for comprehensive strategic
planning. The plan fully addresses one of these elements by including
a mission statement that summarizes the Air Force depots‘ major
functions and operations, but it partially addresses or does not
address the remaining six elements. For example, while the plan
describes goals for the depots‘ mission-related functions, it does not
provide time frames to achieve them. Additionally, the plan does not
discuss any factors beyond the Air Force‘s control that could affect
its ability to achieve the plan‘s goals nor does it identify how the
Air Force will evaluate its programs and use the results of such
evaluations to adjust the plan‘s long-term goals and strategies to
achieve desired levels of performance. Moreover, the content of the
plan‘s two component documents are not clearly linked to one another.
For example, the goals listed in the Strategy are not clearly repeated
in the Master Plan, and the Master Plan includes goals that are unrelated
to depot maintenance. Nor does the Master Plan clearly align its
content to the five long-term goals described in the Strategy. The
plan does not fully address the elements of a results-oriented
management framework and the plan‘s two documents are not clearly
linked to one another in part because of weaknesses in oversight.
Specifically, although OUSD (AT&L) established an oversight body,
which included senior representatives from OUSD (AT&L) and the
services, to review the services‘ plans, this body did not review the
plan. Also, the Air Force did not establish an oversight mechanism to
review its plan. The plan‘s weaknesses may limit the Air Force‘s
ability to use its plan as a tool to meet future challenges.
In addition, the Air Force plan is not fully responsive to OUSD‘s
(AT&L) direction to the services that was designed to provide the
services with a framework to meet future challenges. OUSD (AT&L)
directed the services to address 10 specific issues in four general
areas: logistics transformation, core logistics capability assurance,
workforce revitalization, and capital investment. The plan partially
addresses 8 of these issues and does not address the remaining two.
For example, while the plan notes that the Air Force is partnering
with local universities and technical schools to provide training to
reengineer existing employees‘ skills, the plan does not address Air
Force actions to identify new and emerging skill requirements, as
directed. Furthermore, the plan does not discuss any benchmarks to
evaluate the adequacy of investment funding, as directed. As discussed
for the elements of a results-oriented management framework, the plan
does not fully respond to OUSD (AT&L)‘s direction for the plan‘s
content in part because of weaknesses in oversight in both OUSD (AT&L)
and the Air Force. The plan‘s shortcomings may limit the Air Force‘s
assurance that its depots are postured and resourced to meet future
maintenance challenges.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Air Force revise its plan to fully and
explicitly address all elements of a results-oriented management
framework, show clear linkages between the two components of the plan,
and fully and explicitly address OUSD (AT&L) direction; and both OUSD
(AT&L) and the Air Force develop and implement oversight procedures to
review revisions of the plan. DOD concurred with our recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-526] or key
components. For more information, contact Jack Edwards at (202) 512-
8246 or edwardsj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Plan Does Not Fully Address All Elements of a Results-Oriented
Management Framework:
The Plan Does Not Fully Respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s Direction Designed to
Meet Future Challenges:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Air Force Depots, Locations, Principal Work, Workload, and
Number of Personnel:
Table 2: The Extent to Which the Air Force's Depot Maintenance
Strategic Plan Addresses the Elements of a Results-Oriented Management
Framework:
Table 3: The Extent to Which the Air Force's Depot Maintenance
Strategic Plan Addresses OUSD (AT&L)'s Direction:
Table 4: Organizations Contacted to Obtain Information Related to the
Air Force's Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 14, 2010:
The Honorable Solomon Ortiz:
Chairman:
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Air Force's three maintenance depots provide equipment repair and
sustainment services that are critical to supporting ongoing
operations around the world. Prior to the onset of military operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense's (DOD) increased
reliance on the private sector for depot maintenance support--coupled
with declining budgets, downsizing, and consolidations as a result of
previous Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) decisions--led to a
decline in maintenance workloads for the depots and contributed to the
general deterioration of capabilities, reliability, and cost-
effectiveness of military depots. Downsizing efforts also affected the
depots' abilities to obtain investments in facilities, equipment, and
human capital to support their long-term viability and to ensure that
they remained a key resource for repair of new and modified systems.
In 2001, DOD identified performance-based logistics[Footnote 1] as its
preferred support strategy, further increasing reliance on contractors
to support many of its weapon systems.
In 2003 and again in 2006, the House Armed Services Committee
encouraged DOD to develop a comprehensive depot maintenance strategy.
[Footnote 2] In March 2007, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) issued
DOD's depot maintenance strategic plan, which articulated the
department's strategy for posturing and resourcing the depots to meet
the national security and materiel readiness challenges of the 21st
century. In March 2007, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, within OUSD (AT&L),
directed each of the services to conduct strategic planning for depot
maintenance and submit plans that focus on achieving DOD's strategy.
[Footnote 3] In response, the Air Force published its Air Force Depot
Maintenance Strategic Plan, known as the Strategy, in April 2008. In
addition, it published the Air Force Depot Maintenance Master Plan,
known as the Master Plan, in March 2009. According to Air Force
officials, these two documents collectively respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s
direction. DOD's 2007 Depot Maintenance Strategy and Implementation
Plans also noted that the services would update their depot
maintenance strategic plans no later than 6 months after the
publication of an updated DOD depot maintenance strategic plan, which
will be published within 6 months of the publication of the February
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report.[Footnote 4]
Our prior work has shown that organizations conducting strategic
planning need to develop a comprehensive, results-oriented management
framework to provide an approach whereby program effectiveness is
measured in terms of outcomes or impact, rather than outputs, such as
activities and processes.[Footnote 5] Such a framework includes seven
critical elements: a comprehensive mission statement; long-term goals;
strategies to achieve the goals; use of metrics to gauge progress;
identification of key external factors that could affect the
achievement of the goals; a description of how program evaluations
will be used; and stakeholder involvement in developing the plan. In
its March 2007 call for strategic plans, OUSD (AT&L) directed the
services to address many of these same elements in their strategic
plans. In addition, OUSD (AT&L) directed the services to address 10
specific issues in four general areas: logistics transformation, core
logistics capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital
investment. OUSD (AT&L) officials told us that the direction in these
four areas was designed to provide the services' plans with a
framework to meet future challenges.
In September 2009, we issued a report on the Army's and Marine Corps'
depot maintenance strategic plans.[Footnote 6] Subsequently, your
office asked us to review the Air Force's and Navy's depot maintenance
strategic plans to determine the extent to which these plans provide a
comprehensive strategy for meeting future requirements. As agreed with
your office, this report addresses two questions on the Air Force's
strategic plan for depot maintenance: (1) To what extent does the Air
Force's strategic plan for depot maintenance address key elements of a
results-oriented management framework? and (2) To what extent does the
Air Force's depot maintenance strategic plan address OUSD (AT&L)'s
direction that was designed to provide a framework for the services to
meet future challenges? We are issuing a separate report on the Navy
depot maintenance strategic plan. The Related GAO Products section at
the end of the report lists additional publications on related topics.
We used the same set of methodological procedures to answer both
questions, and each type of procedure was performed simultaneously for
the two questions. Specifically, we reviewed the Air Force's depot
maintenance strategic plan, which is composed of the Strategy and
Master Plan. We evaluated the Air Force's plan using qualitative
content analyses to compare information in it against criteria from
the seven elements of a results-oriented management framework[Footnote
7] and the 10 issues listed in the OUSD (AT&L) direction for depot
maintenance strategic plans. To conduct these analyses, we first
developed a data collection instrument that incorporated these two
types of criteria. One team member then analyzed the plan using this
instrument. To verify preliminary observations from this initial
analysis, a second team member concurrently conducted an independent
analysis of the plan. We compared the two sets of observations and
discussed any differences. We reconciled the differences with the
assistance of analysts from the team that was evaluating the Navy
depot maintenance strategic plan. We met with Air Force officials to
confirm our understanding of the plan and sought additional
information where our preliminary analyses revealed that the plan
partially addresses or does not address criteria. We also interviewed
and obtained documentary evidence from relevant OUSD (AT&L) officials
on its oversight of the services' plans. Additionally, we interviewed
depot leaders and strategic planning personnel during site visits at
two of the three Air Force depots to obtain first-hand information on
issues the depots face. We also obtained data on workload and
personnel from the Air Force and determined that these data were
sufficiently reliable for our report. More detailed information on our
scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 through May 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based of our audit objectives.
Background:
Depot maintenance is the materiel maintenance or repair requiring
overhauling, upgrading, or rebuilding of parts, assemblies, or
subassemblies, and the testing and reclamation of equipment,
regardless of the source of funds for the maintenance or repair or the
location at which the maintenance or repair is performed.[Footnote 8]
The Air Force maintains three depots that are designed to retain, at a
minimum, a ready, controlled source of technical competence and
resources to meet military requirements. These depots work on a wide
range of weapon systems and military equipment. Table 1 describes the
location, principal work, workload, and number of personnel for each
depot.
Table 1: Air Force Depots, Locations, Principal Work, Workload, and
Number of Personnel:
Depot location: Hill Air Force Base, Ogden, Utah;
Principal work: aircraft and major commodities: A-10, C-130, F-16;
Landing gear, hydraulics, missiles, and software;
Fiscal year 2010 workload estimates (in customer orders in billions of
dollars): $1.38;
Estimated number of personnel: 7,082.
Depot location: Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma;
Principal work: aircraft and major commodities: KC-135, B-1, B-52, E-3;
Engines, software, and instruments;
Fiscal year 2010 workload estimates (in customer orders in billions of
dollars): $2.46;
Estimated number of personnel: 7,508.
Depot location: Robins Air Force Base, Warner Robins, Georgia;
Principal work: aircraft and major commodities: F-15, C-5, C-130, C-17;
Avionics, electronic warfare, software;
Fiscal year 2010 workload estimates (in customer orders in billions of
dollars): $1.47;
Estimated number of personnel: 7,473.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
[End of table]
Depot maintenance activities are complex and require deliberate
planning in order to efficiently and effectively meet future
requirements. Our prior work has shown that organizations need
effective strategic management planning in order to identify and
achieve long-term goals.[Footnote 9] We have identified key elements
that should be incorporated into strategic plans to help establish a
comprehensive, results-oriented management framework:[Footnote 10]
1. Mission statement: A statement that concisely summarizes what the
organization does, presenting the main purposes for all its major
functions and operations.
2. Long-term goals: A specific set of policy, programmatic, and
management goals for the programs and operations covered in the
strategic plan. The long-term goals should correspond to the purposes
set forth in the mission statement and develop with greater
specificity how an organization will carry out its mission.
3. Strategies to achieve the goals: A description of how the goals
contained in the strategic plan are to be achieved, including the
operational processes; skills and technology; and the human, capital,
information, and other resources required to meet these goals.
4. Use of metrics to gauge progress: A set of metrics that will be
applied to gauge progress toward attainment of each of the plan's long-
term goals.
5. Key external factors that could affect goals: Key factors external
to the organization and beyond its control that could significantly
affect the achievement of the long-term goals contained in the
strategic plan. These external factors can include economic,
demographic, social, technological, or environmental factors, as well
as conditions or events that would affect the organization's ability
to achieve its goals.
6. Program evaluations: Assessments, through objective measurement and
systematic analysis, of the manner and extent to which programs
associated with the strategic plan achieve their intended goals.
7. Stakeholder involvement in developing the plan: Consideration of
the views and suggestions--solicited during the development of the
strategic plan--of those entities affected by or interested in the
organization's activities.
In addition to our work on strategic planning, recent legislation has
focused attention on DOD's and the military departments' maintenance
strategies and plans. The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009[Footnote 11] requires the Secretary of Defense to
contract for a study, which among other things, will address DOD's and
the military departments' life-cycle maintenance strategies and
implementation plans on a variety of topics including: outcome-based
performance management objectives, workload projection, workforce, and
capital investment strategies. Additionally, the act requires that the
study examine "the relevant body of work performed by the Government
Accountability Office." OUSD (AT&L) officials told us that they expect
the final report from this study to be delivered to Congress in
December 2010.
The Plan Does Not Fully Address All Elements of a Results-Oriented
Management Framework:
Air Force Plan Does Not Fully Address Elements of a Results-Oriented
Management Framework and Lacks Clear Linkages in Planning Documents:
While the Air Force plan focuses Air Force efforts on weapon system
and equipment operational availability, it does not fully address the
elements of a results-oriented management framework, nor does it
clearly link information between the two planning documents. The Air
Force plan fully addresses one of the seven elements, partially
addresses four elements, and does not address the remaining two
elements that our prior work has shown to be critical in a
comprehensive strategic plan.[Footnote 12] Table 2 summarizes the
extent to which the Air Force's depot maintenance strategic plan
addresses the elements of a results-oriented management framework.
Additionally, the plan's documents are not clearly linked to one
another and the relationship between corresponding sets of information
in the documents is sometimes not transparent. As a result of these
weaknesses, the Air Force's ability to use its plan as a decision-
making tool to meet future challenges may be limited.
Table 2: The Extent to Which the Air Force's Depot Maintenance
Strategic Plan Addresses the Elements of a Results-Oriented Management
Framework:
Elements: 1. Mission statement;
Degree plan addresses element: overview and examples:
Addresses: The plan includes a results-oriented mission statement that
covers at least a 5-year time frame. The mission statement says that
the Air Force's overarching mission for its depots is to "ensure that
the Air Force weapon systems and equipment are operational and
available to support the Air Force's mission."
Elements: 2. Long-term goals;
Degree plan addresses element: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: The plan identifies five goals related to the
depots' industrial base, workforce, facilities, partnering agreements,
and transformation efforts; however, it does not specify the time
frames for achieving these goals. For example, while the Air Force
plan identifies maintaining a highly qualified, technically competent,
and professional workforce in the future as one of its depot
maintenance goals, it does not specify interim goals or the time frame
for achieving this goal.
Elements: 3. Strategies to achieve the goals;
Degree plan addresses element: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: The plan generally discusses the Air Force's
strategies to achieve its depot maintenance goals; however, it does
not fully describe the resources required to achieve the goals. For
example, the plan discusses a general strategy that involves processes
for mission assignment, strategic source of repair, depot source of
repair, and core capability determination in order to ensure a
responsive organic industrial base. It does not, however, fully
describe the resources such as capital, the number and mix of military
and civilian personnel, and emerging technologies required to execute
this strategy.
Elements: 4. Use of metrics to gauge progress;
Degree plan addresses element: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: The plan includes measurable life-cycle
performance metrics that Air Force officials told us were intended to
indirectly gauge progress toward achieving each of the plan's long-
term goals; however, the plan does not describe how these metrics
directly correspond to each long-term goal, desired levels for each,
or how they will be used to evaluate each goal. For example, while the
plan identifies metrics to assess overall depot performance such as
the quality defect rate, it does not describe how the measurement of
the quality defect rate would be applied to gauge progress toward any
long-term goal.
Elements: 5. Key external factors that could affect goals;
Degree plan addresses element: overview and examples:
Does not address: The plan does not identify any key external factors
beyond the Air Force's control that could affect its ability to
achieve its goals. In contrast, Air Force officials have acknowledged
elsewhere external factors that could affect depot maintenance. In
2007, for example, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force
discussed in a congressional hearing the harsh environments in which
the Air Force is currently operating, including the heat and sand in
the deserts of Iraq.
Elements: 6. Program evaluations;
Degree plan addresses element: overview and examples:
Does not address: The plan does not describe program evaluations the
Air Force may use to assess performance against the plan's goals and
strategies. Previously, we reported that program evaluations are
important because they help to ensure the validity and reasonableness
of goals and strategies, identify factors likely to affect
performance, and identify appropriate strategies to meet unmet goals.
Elements: 7. Stakeholder involvement in developing the plan;
Degree plan addresses element: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: Many offices within the Air Force collaboratively
developed its depot maintenance strategic plan; however, depots
officials indicated that they were not involved in all aspects of the
development of the plan, even though their depots must carry out
actions described in the plan. Stakeholder input was solicited
primarily from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Installations, Environment, and Logistics; the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; the Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Logistics,
Installations and Mission Support; and the Air Force Materiel Command.
Source: GAO analysis of the Air Force plan.
Note: The Air Force published its Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan and
its Depot Maintenance Master Plan in response to OUSD (AT&L)'s
direction to the services. Accordingly, we analyzed both documents in
our evaluation of the Air Force plan.
[End of table]
The Plan Fully Addresses One Element: Depot Maintenance Mission:
The plan's depot maintenance mission statement fully addresses one of
seven elements of a results-oriented management framework. The
comprehensive mission statement summarizes the Air Force depots'
overarching purpose and addresses their major functions and
operations. In prior reports on strategic planning, we have noted that
a mission statement is important because it provides focus by
explaining why an organization exists and what it does.[Footnote 13]
The Air Force depots' overarching purpose, as identified in the plan,
is to "ensure that Air Force weapon systems and equipment are
operational and available to support the Air Force's mission." This
mission statement is results-oriented and corresponds with the more
general department-wide mission statement in DOD's Depot Maintenance
Strategy and Implementation Plans, which states that the mission of
DOD depots is to meet the national security and materiel readiness
challenges of the 21st century.
The Plan Partially Addresses Four Elements: Goals, Strategies,
Metrics, and Stakeholder Involvement:
The Air Force's plan partially addresses four of the results-oriented
management framework elements: long-term goals; strategies to achieve
the goals; use of metrics to gauge progress; and stakeholder
involvement in developing the plan. With regard to the long-term
goals, the plan includes five:
* maintain a responsive organic industrial base,
* ensure a highly qualified, technically competent, and professional
workforce,
* provide facilities necessary to support existing and projected depot
maintenance workloads,
* maintain robust public-and private-sector capabilities by leveraging
partnering, and:
* transform depot processes through continuous process improvement and
logistics transformation.
While the plan includes these goals, it does not specify interim
goals, and it does not specify the time frames for monitoring and
achieving the long-term goals. For example, the plan discusses the
goal of leveraging public-private partnerships to maintain robust
public-and private-sector relationships and ensure access to
complementary dual depot maintenance capabilities; however, it does
not identify interim goals or time frames for achieving this
partnering goal.
Similarly, the plan discusses the Air Force's strategies to achieve
its five long-term goals, but does not address the resources that will
be needed to achieve them. For example, the plan identifies a strategy
to achieve its infrastructure goal. Specifically, the plan states that
the Air Force will make capital investments in its depots in order to
provide them with the state of the art, environmentally compliant,
efficiently configured, and properly equipped facilities to support
existing and projected depot maintenance workload. However, needed
resources--such as capital, equipment, and technology--are not
specified to facilitate implementation of this strategy.
While the plan includes some metrics, it does not discuss any metrics
that directly assess the degree to which the depots are achieving the
plan's goals. The plan discusses general life-cycle performance
metrics to assess overall depot performance. Air Force officials told
us that these metrics indirectly gauge progress toward achieving each
of the plan's five long-term goals. For example, the plan discusses a
quality defect rate metric, which measures the variance between
quality deficiency reports and the quality defect rate standard, but
the plan does not describe how the depots would measure or use the
metric to gauge progress toward achieving one or more of the plan's
long-term goals. Air Force officials explained that a performance
problem indicated by any of its metrics would lead the Air Force to
monitor overall performance and then identify the relevant area (e.g.,
workforce) contributing to the problem. These officials told us that
the Air Force would then adjust performance in the relevant area to
achieve the corresponding goal. However, this indirect process is not
discussed in the plan. Moreover, the plan does not discuss the desired
levels for each of these metrics.
While the Air Force involved many relevant stakeholders in the
development of its depot maintenance strategic plan, it did not
involve depot officials directly in all aspects of the process. The
Air Force developed its plan primarily by using inputs from the
following stakeholders:
* the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Installations, Environment, and Logistics;
* the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition;
* the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for
Logistics, Installations and Mission Support; and:
* Air Force Materiel Command.
Air Force depot officials said they were not involved in all aspects
of the development of the plan, even though their depots are directly
affected by the plan. For example, depot officials indicated that they
had limited or no involvement in the development of the Strategy.
The Plan Does Not Address Two Elements: Key External Factors and
Program Evaluations:
The Air Force's plan does not address two of the results-oriented
management framework elements: key external factors and program
evaluations. The plan does not identify any key factors external to
the Air Force and beyond its control that could significantly affect
the achievement of its five long-term goals. Our prior work on
developing a results-oriented management framework reported that
external economic, demographic, social, technical, or environmental
factors may influence whether an organization achieves its goals.
[Footnote 14] Moreover, we noted that a strategic plan should describe
each such factor and indicate how it could affect achievement of the
plan's goals. Even though the Air Force plan did not describe any such
factors, Air Force officials have acknowledged elsewhere external
factors that could affect depot maintenance. For example, in 2007, the
Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force described the harsh
environments the Air Force is currently operating in--including the
heat and sand in Iraq's deserts--during testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee. Further, obtaining technical data rights
from private-sector manufacturers is another example of external
factors not identified in the plan that could affect depot
maintenance.[Footnote 15] Depot officials told us that technical data
are sometimes not directly available to the depots and that without
them their work is more challenging.
Similarly, the plan does not identify how the Air Force will evaluate
its programs and use the results of these evaluations to adjust the
plan's long-term goals and strategies to achieve desired levels of
performance. The plan indicates that the Air Force must continuously
validate and update its depot maintenance strategic plan to meet
operational depot maintenance requirements; however, the plan does not
describe the method to conduct this process.
The Lack of Clear Linkage in the Plan's Two Documents May Limit the
Plan's Usefulness:
The content of the Air Force depot maintenance Strategy and Master
Plan are not clearly linked to one another, which may make the
collective plan difficult to use as a decision-making tool. OUSD
(AT&L) instructed each service to publish its depot maintenance
strategic plan in a single depot maintenance-specific document or as
an integral part of one or more documents having a broader scope. Air
Force officials told us that they intended the Strategy to provide the
strategic vision for Air Force depot maintenance and the Master Plan
to complement the Strategy by providing the details for executing the
strategic vision.
We found that the linkage of information in the plan's two documents
was not always clear. For example, the goals listed in the Strategy
are not clearly repeated in the Master Plan, and the Master Plan
includes goals that are unrelated to depot maintenance. For example,
one goal the Master Plan includes is to improve the strategic
acquisition of capabilities to ensure warfighters have the weapons and
equipment needed to defend the United States. In addition, the Master
Plan does not clearly align its content to the five long-term goals
described in the Strategy. Although a table in an appendix to the
Master Plan provides some information indicating how the content of
the Strategy and Master Plan are aligned, the appendix does not
clarify how the two documents are linked to one another or how they
are used as a collective plan. An Air Force official acknowledged the
weaknesses in the linkages between the plan's two documents and said
that they intend to ensure effective alignment of the plan's documents
in future versions of the plan.
Additionally, Air Force officials told us that they chose not to
include information in the plan that was already contained in external
documents. For example, they told us that other Air Force documents
(such as Air Force budget documents and the servicewide strategic
plan) address key external factors that could affect the achievement
of the plan's goals. The Air Force plan, however, does not refer to
these external documents. Without clear linkages between the two
primary planning documents and other related documents, the Air Force
may have limited utility of its plan as a decision-making tool to meet
future challenges.
OUSD (AT&L) and the Air Force Did Not Use Effective Oversight
Mechanisms to Systematically Evaluate the Plan:
OUSD (AT&L) Did Not Employ an Effective Oversight Mechanism to
Evaluate the Plan:
OUSD (AT&L) did not use an effective oversight mechanism to
systematically evaluate the Air Force's plan to determine whether it
fully addresses all needed elements. DOD's Depot Maintenance Strategy
and Implementation Plans states that the Depot Maintenance Working
Integrated Process Team[Footnote 16] would monitor the development and
subsequent execution of the services' depot maintenance strategic
plans on a continuing basis. However, that team did not review any of
the services' plans. OUSD (AT&L) officials representing the Assistant
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Maintenance Policy and Programs
told us that, in practice, the Integrated Process Team did not assume
responsibility for oversight of the plan, but instead monitored
selected issues that the services' plans describe, such as the
implementation of some specific process improvement initiatives. The
Maintenance Policy and Programs officials told us that they reviewed
the Air Force plan through a process consisting of informal meetings
and conversations with service representatives. These OUSD (AT&L)
officials told us that, through their review, they found that the Air
Force plan was a "good first start" but did not address all needed
elements. However, Air Force officials told us that they were not
informed that the plan did not fully address elements of a results-
oriented management framework nor were they asked to revise the plan.
Additionally, Maintenance Policy and Programs officials were unable to
provide us with documentation of their review of the Air Force plan.
The Air Force Lacked an Effective Oversight Mechanism to
Systematically Evaluate the Plan:
At the time the Air Force developed its plan, it lacked an effective
oversight mechanism to help ensure that its plan fully addresses the
elements of a results-oriented management framework and that the
plan's two documents are clearly linked to one another. Air Force
headquarters officials responsible for the plan did not review the
Strategy or the Master Plan to ensure that these documents fully
address the elements of a results-oriented management framework.
Furthermore, the Air Force headquarters officials did not provide
direction to the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC)--the office
responsible for the Master Plan--on strategic planning elements that
should be incorporated in the Master Plan. Also, AFMC officials told
us that they received no instruction to submit the Master Plan to
another Air Force office or other oversight body for review. Since the
development of the current plan, the Air Force developed the Depot
Maintenance Strategic Planning Integrated Process Team in June 2008 to
improve its future depot maintenance strategic plans. According to the
team's charter, this process will be used to validate and update the
depot maintenance strategic plan and help align the Strategy and
Master Plan with one another and with DOD's Depot Maintenance Strategy
and Implementation Plans. Moreover, while the Air Force conducts
monthly reviews of depot maintenance programs and they told us that
these reviews help provide oversight of the plan's implementation,
these reviews do not assess the progress in achieving the plan's long-
term goals.
While Air Force officials responsible for the plan acknowledged some
of the plan's incomplete information, they told us that they believe
the plan more fully addresses the results-oriented management
framework elements than our analysis reflects. According to these
officials, although the plan does not address some elements
explicitly, they are implied in the plan's discussion of various
initiatives and processes and experienced professionals involved in
Air Force depot maintenance would be able to recognize these elements.
However, because the plan does not explicitly address these elements,
they may not be clear to individuals not involved in developing the
plan.
The Plan Does Not Fully Respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s Direction Designed to
Meet Future Challenges:
While the Air Force depot maintenance strategic plan describes many
initiatives and programs important to the Air Force depots, it is not
fully responsive to OUSD (AT&L)'s direction to the services that was
designed to provide the services with a framework to meet future
challenges. Specifically, the plan does not fully address logistics
transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce
revitalization, and capital investment--the four areas that OUSD
(AT&L) directed each service, at a minimum, to include in its plan.
Within these four general areas are 10 issues that OUSD (AT&L) also
identified. The Air Force's plan partially addresses 8 and does not
address the remaining 2. Table 3 summarizes our evaluation of the
extent to which the Air Force plan addresses each of the 10 issues.
Table 3: The Extent to Which the Air Force's Depot Maintenance
Strategic Plan Addresses OUSD (AT&L)'s Direction:
Logistics transformation:
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issues: 1. Future roles and capabilities
envisioned for the depots and how these capabilities will be
quantified and measured;
Degree plan addresses issues: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: The plan notes that the future role of the depots
will continue to be ensuring that Air Force weapon systems are
operational and available to support the Air Force's missions, but the
plan does not describe the future capabilities (e.g., maintenance,
repair, overhaul) the Air Force envisions for the depots or how those
capabilities would be quantified or measured.
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issues: 2. Actions being taken to transform
depots into the envisioned future capability;
Degree plan addresses issues: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: The plan discusses continuous process improvement
initiatives, such as the High Velocity Maintenance program, but it
does not identify changes (e.g., to the structure or organization of
the depots) that would be necessary to carry out these transformations.
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issues: 3. Management approaches for integrating
various depot capabilities, including public-and private-sector
sources, joint, inter-service, and multinational capabilities;
Degree plan addresses issues: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: The plan describes management approaches for
integrating public-and private-sector depot sources, but not for
integrating joint, inter-service, and multinational capabilities. For
public-and private-sector sources, the plan states that partnering
with the private sector to ensure access to complementary or dual
depot maintenance capabilities is an integral element of the Air Force
depot strategy.
Core logistics capability assurance:
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issues: 4. Actions being taken or contemplated to
(1) identify core requirements upon program initiation, (2) ensure
that depot source of repair decisions are made upon program
initiation, (3) encourage the formation of public-private
partnerships, and (4) identify and rectify core capabilities
deficiencies;
Degree plan addresses issues: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: The plan addresses three of the four elements of
this issue. For example, to describe actions to identify core
requirements, the plan states that the Air Force uses the biennial
core computation process to generate core requirements. However, the
plan does not address actions to rectify core capability deficiencies.
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issues: 5. Methods used for workload estimating
and projected effects of weapon system retirements and bed-down (i.e.,
the act or process of locating aircraft at a particular base);
Degree plan addresses issues: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: The plan describes a process in which Air Force
organizations, such as the Centralized Asset Management Office,
provide input into the workload review process and that the workload
review process determines future depot workload. However, the plan
does not discuss the projected effects of weapon system retirements,
despite Air Force plans to substantially reduce its fleet of older
fighter aircraft, such as the F-15 and F-16.
Workforce revitalization:
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issues: 6. Reengineering strategies: Actions
being taken to identify new skill requirements and reengineer existing
employees' skills to satisfy new capability requirements;
Degree plan addresses issues: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: The plan notes that the Air Force is partnering
with local universities and technical schools to provide training to
reengineer existing employees' skills, but it does not address Air
Force actions to identify new and emerging skill requirements.
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issues: 7. Replenishment requirements: Methods
used for forecasting workforce replenishment requirements, including
data on projected annual losses due to retirements and projected
annual new hire requirements;
Degree plan addresses issues: overview and examples:
Does not address: The plan does not discuss the methods the Air Force
uses to forecast the number of depot employees it will need to replace
in the near and longer term. Additionally, the plan does not include
data on the Air Force's projected annual personnel losses or the
associated new hire requirements.
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issues: 8. Replenishment strategies: Management
approach for developing and implementing replenishment strategies,
including a description of the actions being used to recruit and train
new employees;
Degree plan addresses issues: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: The plan discusses actions the depots are now
taking to train employees. For example, the plan discusses a
university and vocational school partnership to train some depot
employees. However, the plan does not articulate any new Air Force-
wide approach to recruit or replenish its depot employees.
Capital investment:
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issues: 9. Benchmarks used for evaluating the
adequacy of investment funding and the basis for selecting the
benchmark;
Degree plan addresses issues: overview and examples:
Does not address: The plan does not discuss any benchmarks for
evaluating the adequacy of investment funding or the basis for
selecting the benchmarks. While the plan states that the Air Force
will continue making an annual capital investment of at least 6
percent of revenue to sustain its infrastructure, it does not discuss
whether this level of investment is sufficient.
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issues: 10. Methods for quantifying current
capabilities, current and projected deficiencies, and the capabilities
that planned investment will provide, including the method for
prioritizing needed investments and quantitative data on projected
funding for facilities and equipment;
Degree plan addresses issues: overview and examples:
Partially addresses: The plan states that the Air Force targets its
investments to the highest priority needs to support the warfighter.
While the plan also discusses an infrastructure investment
prioritization process, it does not describe the method for
prioritizing needed investments. Similarly, the plan states that the
Air Force invests in facility restorations and modernizations and
discusses the Capital Purchase program for equipment, restoration, and
modernization programs for facilities, transformation initiatives, and
military construction. However, the plan does not present quantitative
data on the projected funding (or shortfalls) for facilities and
equipment.
Source: GAO analysis of the Air Force plan.
Note: The Air Force published its Strategy and its Master Plan in
response to OUSD (AT&L)'s direction to the services. Accordingly, we
analyzed both documents in our evaluation of the Air Force plan.
[End of table]
As discussed for the elements of a results-oriented management
framework, OUSD (AT&L) and the Air Force did not identify missing or
partially addressed issues because neither used effective oversight to
help ensure that OUSD (AT&L)'s direction for developing the plan was
carried out. Among other things, DOD's Depot Maintenance Strategy and
Implementation Plans states that the DOD strategy will ensure that DOD
is postured to meet the national security and materiel readiness
challenges of the 21st century. However, at present, information
missing from the Air Force plan may limit the service's assurance that
its depots are postured and resourced to meet future maintenance
requirements.
The Plan Partially Addresses the Three Logistics Transformation Issues:
The Air Force plan partially addresses each of the three logistics
transformation issues that OUSD (AT&L) directed the services to
discuss in their plans. In this area, OUSD (AT&L) directed the
services to discuss the future roles and capabilities of the depots,
transformation actions, and approaches for integrating various depot
capabilities in their plans.
The plan generally discusses the future roles of the depots, but it
does not discuss projected future capabilities of the Air Force depots
or how those capabilities will be measured. The plan states that the
general role of the depots is to ensure Air Force weapon systems and
equipment are operational and available to support the Air Force's
missions. However, the plan is silent on the depots' future
capabilities despite changes that DOD had planned to make to the Air
Force's force structure. For example, the February 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report noted that DOD had planned to reduce the number
of Air Force B-52 aircraft by about 40 percent to 56.[Footnote 17]
Additionally, the plan partially addresses actions the Air Force is
taking to transform its depots. For example, the plan discusses
continuous process improvement initiatives such as the High Velocity
Maintenance program, in which the Air Force expects to schedule depot
maintenance for aircraft more frequently but for shorter periods.
However, the plan does not discuss how the Air Force intends to change
the structure or organization of its depots to transform them to
achieve the Air Force vision of the depots' future capabilities.
Moreover, the plan partially addresses the management approach for
integrating various depot maintenance capabilities, including public-
and private-sector sources, as well as joint, inter-service, and
multinational capabilities. To address public-and private-sector
sources, the plan states that partnering with the private-sector to
ensure access to complementary or dual depot maintenance capabilities
is an integral element of the Air Force strategy. However, the plan
does not discuss the management approach for integrating joint, inter-
service, or multinational capabilities. Because the plan does not
discuss the approach for integrating these capabilities, it is unclear
if the Air Force is positioned to reduce redundancies and take
advantage of potential cost-saving measures.
The Plan Partially Addresses Both Core Logistics Capability Assurance
Issues:
The Air Force plan partially addresses both core logistics capability
assurance issues. For one of the two issues, the plan partially
addresses the OUSD (AT&L) direction to discuss actions taken or
contemplated to (1) identify core requirements upon program
initiation, (2) ensure that depot source of repair decisions are made
upon program initiation, (3) encourage the formation of public-private
partnerships, and (4) identify and rectify core capability
deficiencies. The plan describes tools the Air Force uses to identify
core requirements including processes, models, and guidance.[Footnote
18] For example, the plan states that the Air Force uses the biennial
core computation process and other tools to generate Air Force core
requirements. To address OUSD (AT&L)'s direction to discuss depot
source of repair decisions, the plan states that the Air Force uses
the strategic source of repair process, the source of repair
assignment process, and the depot maintenance inter-service processes.
[Footnote 19] The plan also discusses public-private partnerships and
states that AFMC and the depots intend to develop a standard process
for public-private partnerships to ensure compliance with DOD and Air
Force directives on public-private partnerships.[Footnote 20] To
address OUSD (AT&L) direction to discuss actions to identify and
rectify core deficiencies, the plan notes that if core target
shortfalls exist, the depots will provide plans to mitigate the risk
but, the plan does not explain how the Air Force will do so.
Furthermore, the plan does not discuss concerns we have previously
reported on DOD's biennial core computation process. For example, we
reported in 2009 that the Air Force used a method for calculating core
capability deficiencies that differed from the method used by the
other services and that officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense said that the Air Force approach was not appropriate.[Footnote
21]
For the second of the two core logistics capability assurance issues,
estimating depot workload is partially addressed in the Air Force
plan. To address the depot maintenance workload estimating portion of
this issue, the plan describes a process in which Air Force
organizations, such as the Centralized Asset Management Office,
provide input into the workload review process. The plan goes on to
state that the workload review process determines future depot
workload. However, the Air Force plan does not discuss the OUSD (AT&L)
direction to address the projected effects of weapon system
retirements or bed-down (i.e., the act or process of locating aircraft
at a particular base). However, the Air Force plans to substantially
reduce some portions of its fleet. In May 2009, the Air Force
announced that it would accelerate the retirement of 249 older
aircraft, including 112 F-15s and 134 F-16s. While these retirements
will affect the workload at the Air Force depots at Warner-Robins,
Georgia, and Ogden, Utah, the Master Plan issued 2 months earlier does
not include any information on the planned changes. Moreover, the plan
does not discuss new aircraft that will replace those being retired,
the future workload estimates associated with any potential
replacement aircraft, or the processes that will be used to determine
which facilities will obtain any new work.
The Plan Partially Addresses Two of the Workforce Revitalization
Issues but It Does Not Address the Third Issue in This Area:
The Air Force plan partially addresses both reengineering and
replenishment strategies but does not contain information on the OUSD
(AT&L)-directed workforce replenishment requirements. Regarding the
reengineering strategies issue, the plan discusses actions the Air
Force is taking to reengineer its existing employees' skills to
satisfy new capability requirements, but it does not discuss actions
the service is taking to identify new skill requirements. To address
reengineering existing employees' skills, the plan indicates that the
depots are partnering with local universities and technical schools to
provide training. However, it does not directly address the Air Force
actions to identify new skill requirements. Instead of providing
details on new skill requirements, the plan makes a general statement
that the Air Force's workforce skill capabilities are continuously
assessed to determine future training and skill requirements.
Likewise, it is silent on specific actions the Air Force is taking to
carry out this assessment.
The plan does not discuss the method the Air Force will use to
forecast workforce replenishment requirements, nor the quantitative
data needed to project annual hires as well as losses due to
retirements and other reasons. Although the plan discusses a manpower
and capability program that determines the required personnel for
future work, the plan does not follow the OUSD (AT&L) direction to
discuss the methods or sources of quantitative data the Air Force uses
to determine turnover and the timing of the turnover.
To address the replenishment strategies issues, the plan describes
actions the Air Force is taking to train employees, but it does not
discuss how the Air Force is recruiting new employees, nor does it
discuss a comprehensive management approach for establishing and
implementing an employee replenishment strategy. The plan discusses,
for example, a university and vocational school partnership program to
train depot employees. However, it is silent on the Air Force's
recruiting methods (e.g., for hard to fill types of positions) and any
servicewide employee replenishment strategy.
The Air Force plan's limited and missing information for the three
issues in the workforce revitalization area is noteworthy in the
context of our previous findings on the DOD depot maintenance
workforce and in the context of information in the OUSD (AT&L)'s
document directing the services to provide the plans. In 2003, we
reported that DOD faced significant management challenges in
succession planning to maintain a skilled workforce at its depot
maintenance facilities.[Footnote 22] Among other challenges, we
reported that relatively high numbers of civilian workers at
maintenance depots were nearing retirement age. DOD's Depot
Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans makes a similar point.
It states that DOD's depot maintenance community, like the rest of the
federal government, faces increasing numbers of retirements as the
"baby boom" generation reaches retirement eligibility. It goes on to
state that the retirement-eligible population within the depot
maintenance workforce and forecasted annual retirements are expected
to increase annually for the remainder of the decade. This dynamic--
coupled with the highly skilled nature of some depot maintenance work
and the length of time required to train new employees--creates
hiring, training, and retention challenges. Without a discussion that
acknowledges these and other such workforce challenges, it is unclear
how well the Air Force is positioned to optimally address the
challenges that its depots face.
The Plan Partially Addresses One Capital Investment Issue but Does Not
Address the Other:
The Air Force plan partially addresses the capital investment issue of
quantifying current capabilities but does not address the other issue--
capital investment benchmarks. Neither the benchmarks for evaluating
the adequacy of investment funding nor the Air Force's basis for
selecting the benchmarks are in the Air Force's plan despite OUSD
(AT&L)'s direction to address this issue. Even though the plan does
not address benchmarks, it notes that the Air Force intends to
continue making an annual capital investment of at least 6 percent of
revenue, as required by law, to sustain depot infrastructure
requirements.[Footnote 23] Moreover, an OUSD (AT&L) official mentioned
that the Air Force's citing of the 6 percent capital investment should
be seen as addressing the benchmark issue.
The plan partially addresses the issues pertaining to the methods for
quantitatively articulating these concerns: current capabilities,
current and projected deficiencies, and the capabilities that planned
investment will provide. The plan notes that the Air Force targets its
investments to the highest priority needs to support the warfighter.
While the plan also discusses an infrastructure investment
prioritization process, it does not describe the method for
prioritizing needed investments. Similarly, the plan notes that the
Air Force invests in facility restorations and modernizations and
discusses the Capital Purchase Program for equipment, restoration, and
modernization programs for facilities, transformation initiatives, and
military construction. However, the plan does not present quantitative
data on the projected funding (or shortfalls) for facilities and
equipment.
Capital investment in DOD depots has been an issue of concern in our
prior work. For example, in 2001, we reported that capital investments
in depot plant equipment had declined sharply in the mid-1990s as a
result of defense downsizing and depot closures and
consolidations.[Footnote 24] As a result of DOD's lack of capital
investment, its depots did not keep up with the latest technologies.
In subsequent years, funding levels increased as the services
recognized the need to modernize their depots.
Conclusions:
OUSD (AT&L) officials told us that the primary intent of the OUSD
(AT&L)'s direction was to provide a framework for the services to meet
challenges in the future and that the issues identified in the four
areas specified in the direction were designed to address those
challenges. Further, DOD's Depot Maintenance Strategy and
Implementation Plans states that each service will conduct depot
maintenance strategic planning that focuses on achieving the DOD depot
maintenance strategy and that the DOD strategy will ensure that DOD is
postured to meet the national security and materiel readiness
challenges of the 21st century. However, the Air Force's plan does not
provide a comprehensive, results-oriented management framework to
efficiently and effectively inform the Air Force's future decisions,
nor does it fully respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s direction that was designed
to provide a framework for the services to overcome four general areas
of future challenges. Furthermore, the limited linkage of information
in the Air Force's two planning documents may reduce the utility of
the plan as a decision-making tool to meet future challenges. A
primary reason for not fully addressing these framework elements and
linkages in the plan was that OUSD (AT&L) and the Air Force did not
have effective oversight mechanisms in place to promptly identify the
incomplete information, communicate such findings to the plan
developers, and monitor the revision of the plan to ensure that the
limitations had been addressed. These concerns about the content,
linkage, and oversight resulted in a plan that missed an opportunity
to identify a more complete Air Force vision for the effective and
efficient operation of its depots in the future. For example, had the
Air Force identified and implemented systematic program evaluation and
a thorough set of metrics to directly assess goal achievement, it
would have additional tools for reacting in a timely manner to
findings from the ongoing congressionally mandated study on depot
capabilities. Most importantly, a comprehensive plan could have
resulted in the Air Force having more assurance that its depots are
viably positioned and have the maintenance workforce, equipment,
facilities, and funds they need to meet current and future
requirements.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To provide greater assurance that Air Force depots will be postured
and resourced to meet future maintenance requirements, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to
take the following three actions to revise the Air Force's depot
maintenance strategic plan:
* Fully and explicitly address all elements needed for a comprehensive
results-oriented management framework, including those elements that
we have identified as partially addressed or not addressed in the
current plan.
* Demonstrate clear linkages among the depot maintenance strategic
plan's component documents, should the Air Force decide to publish its
revised plan in multiple documents.
* Fully and explicitly address OUSD (AT&L)'s direction that provides a
framework for the services to meet future depot maintenance challenges.
To strengthen the oversight mechanism for depot maintenance strategic
planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and
the Secretary of the Air Force to develop and implement procedures to
review revisions of the depot maintenance strategic plan to ensure
they fully address all key elements of a results-oriented management
framework, explicitly address any OUSD (AT&L) direction for the plans,
and periodically assess progress and corrective actions to the extent
needed in meeting the plans' goals.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
four recommendations to provide greater assurance that Air Force
depots will be postured and resourced to meet future maintenance
requirements.
The department concurred with our recommendation to direct the
Secretary of the Air Force to revise the Air Force's depot maintenance
strategic plan to fully and explicitly address all elements needed for
a comprehensive results-oriented management framework. DOD stated that
it will direct the Air Force and the other services to more clearly
address all elements needed for a results-oriented strategy in the
next OUSD (AT&L) request to services to update their depot maintenance
strategic plans.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of
the Air Force to revise the Air Force's depot maintenance strategic
plan to demonstrate clear linkages among the plan's component
documents, should the Air Force decide to publish its revised plan in
multiple documents. In its response, DOD stated that it will direct
the Air Force and the other services to more clearly demonstrate the
linkages of the Air Force plan to the DOD depot maintenance strategic
plan in the next OUSD (AT&L) request to the services to update their
depot maintenance strategic plans. While the department concurred with
our recommendation, it did not discuss directing the Air Force to more
clearly demonstrate linkages among the Air Force plan's component
documents, which was the focus of our recommendation. Therefore, DOD
may need to take further action to explicitly direct the Secretary of
the Air Force to more clearly demonstrate linkages among the Air Force
plan's component documents, should the Air Force decide to publish its
revised plan in multiple documents.
The department also concurred with our recommendation to direct the
Secretary of the Air Force to revise the Air Force's depot maintenance
strategic plan to fully and explicitly address OUSD's (AT&L) direction
that provides a framework for the services to meet future depot
maintenance challenges. DOD stated that it will direct the Air Force
and the other services to explicitly address the OUSD (AT&L) direction
for depot maintenance strategic planning in the next OUSD (AT&L)
request to the services to update to their depot maintenance strategic
plans.
Additionally, DOD concurred with our recommendation to direct the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
and the Secretary of the Air Force to develop and implement procedures
to review revisions of the depot maintenance strategic plan to ensure
they fully address all key elements of a results-oriented management
framework, explicitly address any OUSD (AT&L) direction for the plans,
and periodically assess progress and corrective actions to the extent
needed in meeting the plan's goals. In its response, DOD stated that
it will direct the Air Force and the other services to explicitly
address the procedures noted in our recommendation. DOD also said that
OUSD (AT&L) would further develop a process to periodically assess
progress and corrective actions to ensure the Air Force and the other
services are meeting OUSD (AT&L) and their own plan's goals.
DOD also provided technical comments that we have incorporated into
this report where applicable.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of the Air Force. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
call me at (202) 512-8246 or edwardsj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Jack E. Edwards:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In this report, we addressed two questions: (1) To what extent does
the Air Force's depot maintenance strategic plan address key elements
of a results-oriented management framework? and (2) To what extent
does the Air Force's depot maintenance strategic plan address
direction from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) that was
designed to provide a framework for the services to meet future
challenges? We limited the scope of our analysis to the current Air
Force depot maintenance strategic plan, which includes both the April
2008 Air Force Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan and the March 2009 Air
Force Depot Maintenance Master Plan.
We used the same set of methodological procedures to answer both
questions and each type of procedure was performed simultaneously for
the two questions. For our analysis, we first reviewed relevant laws;
Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force regulations governing depot
maintenance; and depot maintenance-related reports issued by agencies
and organizations including GAO, DOD, the Logistics Management
Institute, and RAND. We then used qualitative content analyses to
compare the Air Force plan against criteria from the seven elements of
a results-oriented management framework and the 10 issues listed in
the OUSD (AT&L) direction for depot maintenance strategic plans. To
conduct these analyses, we first developed a data collection
instrument that incorporated these two types of criteria. One team
member then analyzed the plan using this instrument. To verify
preliminary observations from this initial analysis, a second team
member concurrently conducted an independent analysis of the plan. We
compared observations of the two analysts and discussed any
differences. We reconciled the differences with the assistance of
analysts from the team that was evaluating the Navy depot maintenance
strategic plan. We subsequently met with Air Force officials to
confirm our understanding of the plan and sought additional
information where our preliminary analyses revealed that the plan
partially addresses or does not address the criteria. We also
interviewed and obtained documentary evidence from relevant OUSD
(AT&L) officials regarding its oversight of the services' plans. We
additionally interviewed depot leaders and strategic planning
personnel during site visits at two of the three Air Force depots to
obtain first-hand information on issues the depots face. We also
obtained data on workload and personnel from the Air Force and
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our report.
The organizations we interviewed are listed in table 4.
Table 4: Organizations Contacted to Obtain Information Related to the
Air Force's Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan:
DOD:
* Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Maintenance Policy and Programs, Arlington, Virginia.
* Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Materiel Readiness, Arlington, Virginia.
Air Force:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Installations, Environment, and Logistics, Arlington, Virginia.
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Logistics,
Installations and Mission Support, Arlington, Virginia.
* Air Force Materiel Command, Columbus, Ohio.
* Ogden Air Logistics Center, Ogden, Utah.
* Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
Other:
* Joint Depot Maintenance Activities Group, Columbus, Ohio.
* The Logistics Management Institute, Fairfax, Virginia.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 through May 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jack E. Edwards, (202) 512-8246 or edwardsj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Key contributors to this report were Sandra B. Burrell, Assistant
Director; James P. Klein; Ron La Due Lake; Joanne Landesman; Brian
Mazanec; Michael Willems; and Elizabeth Wood.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That
Army and Marine Corps Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-865]. Washington, D.C.:
September 17, 2009.
Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Identify and Establish Core
Capability at Military Depots. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-83]. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2009.
Depot Maintenance: DOD's Report to Congress on Its Public-Private
Partnerships at Its Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence
(CITEs) Is Not Complete and Additional Information Would Be Useful.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-902R]. Washington,
D.C.: July 1, 2008.
Depot Maintenance: Issues and Options for Reporting on Military
Depots. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-761R].
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2008.
Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Provide More Consistent Funding
Allocation Data to Congress. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-126]. Washington, D.C.: November
30, 2006.
DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help
Ensure Viability of DOD's Civilian Industrial Workforce. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-472]. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Performance-based logistics refers to the purchase of performance
outcomes, such as the availability of functioning weapon systems,
through long-term support arrangements rather than the purchase of
individual elements of support--such as parts, repairs, and
engineering services.
[2] H.R. Rept. No. 108-106, p. 304 (2003); H.R. Rept. No. 109-452, p.
296 (2006).
[3] OUSD (AT&L) outlined the military services' depot maintenance
strategic planning responsibilities in its Report to Congress. See
DOD, Depot Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans, part I-22
through I-24 (Washington, D.C., March 2007). This document established
OUSD (AT&L) criteria for the services' strategic plans.
[4] DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2010).
[5] GAO, Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to
Ensure That Army and Marine Corps Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance
Requirements, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-865]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009).
[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-865].
[7] GAO, Managing for Results: Critical Issues for Improving Federal
Agencies' Strategic Plans, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-180] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
16, 1997).
[8] 10 U.S.C. § 2460. Depot-level maintenance and repair also includes
all aspects of software maintenance classified by DOD as of July 1,
1995, as depot-level maintenance and repair, and interim contractor
support or contractor logistics support, to the extent that such
support is for depot maintenance. Depot-level maintenance and repair
does not include the procurement of major modifications or upgrades of
weapon systems that are designed to improve program performance or the
nuclear refueling of an aircraft carrier; however, a major upgrade
program covered by this exception could continue to be performed by
private-or public-sector activities. Depot-level maintenance also does
not include the procurement of parts for safety modifications, but
does include the installation of parts for that purpose.
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-180].
[10] OUSD (AT&L) directed each of the services to include many of
these same elements in their depot maintenance plan. Specifically,
OUSD (AT&L) directed the services to include a comprehensive mission
statement; general goals and objectives; a description of how the
goals and objectives are to be achieved; the metrics that will be
applied to gauge progress toward attainment of each of the goals and
objectives; an identification of those key factors external to the
military service and beyond its control that could significantly
affect the achievement of the general goals and objectives; and a
description of the program evaluations used in establishing,
monitoring, or revising the general goals and objectives.
[11] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 322 (2008).
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-865].
[13] GAO, Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to
Facilitate Congressional Review, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.16] (Washington, D.C.: May
1997).
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.16].
[15] Technical data is recorded information used to define a design
and to produce, support, maintain, or operate an item.
[16] The Depot Maintenance Working Integrated Process Team is overseen
by the Materiel Readiness Senior Steering Group, which consisted of
senior representatives from OUSD (AT&L), the Joint Staff, the
services, and the Defense Logistics Agency. It was replaced by the
Maintenance Executive Steering Committee in December 2008. The
Maintenance Executive Steering Committee consists of senior
maintenance and logistics representatives throughout DOD and is
intended to serve as a mechanism for the coordinated review of DOD
maintenance policies, systems, programs, and activities.
[17] DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006).
[18] Under 10 U.S.C. § 2464, DOD is required to identify and maintain
within government-owned and operated facilities a core logistics
capability, including the equipment, personnel, and technical
competence required to maintain weapon systems identified as necessary
for national defense emergencies and contingencies.
[19] Depot source of repair is the process the department uses to
select the most appropriate source for noncore depot maintenance
repair. In making these decisions, DOD considers whether contractors
or government personnel should perform the maintenance and how a
service might obtain depot maintenance support from other services.
[20] Public-private partnerships for depot-level maintenance are
cooperative arrangements between a depot-level maintenance activity
and one or more private-sector entities to perform DOD or defense-
related work, to utilize DOD depot facilities and equipment, or both.
[21] GAO, Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Identify and Establish
Core Capability at Military Depots, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-83] (Washington, D.C.: May 14,
2009).
[22] GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning Needed
to Help Ensure Viability of DOD's Civilian Industrial Workforce,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-472] (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 30, 2003).
[23] Section 2476 of Title 10 requires that each fiscal year the
Secretary of each military department invest in the capital budgets of
certain "covered depots" of that department a total amount equal to at
least 6 percent of the average total combined workload funded at all
of the depots of that military department for the 3 preceding fiscal
years.
[24] GAO, Defense Maintenance: Sustaining Readiness Support
Capabilities Requires a Comprehensive Plan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-533T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23,
2001).
[End of section]
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