Defense Infrastructure
Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth Gao ID: GAO-10-602 June 24, 2010The Army is concurrently implementing several major force structure and basing initiatives, including Base Realignment and Closure, Grow the Force, and Army Modularity. The resulting large increase in personnel associated with these initiatives at many installations has required and will continue to require significant facility planning and construction to meet needs. GAO was asked to (1) describe the Army's investment in domestic facilities to meet the needs associated with the initiatives; (2) determine the extent to which the Army's facility planning systems are complete, current, and accurate; and (3) assess whether stationing information has been provided to installations far enough in advance to permit facility planning and acquisition to accommodate arriving personnel. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant documentation; analyzed budget documents, information from Army planning systems, and facility criteria standards; visited installations; and interviewed relevant officials.
For fiscal years 2006 through 2015, the Army plans to have spent about $31 billion to meet domestic installation facility needs associated with the personnel increases resulting from several major force structure and infrastructure initiatives. This investment will reduce facility shortages at the affected installations, but some shortages will still exist for certain types of facilities, including tactical vehicle maintenance facilities and battalion and company headquarters. The Army estimates that it could cost an additional $19 billion to eliminate the shortages. Yet, without these buildings, the Army will continue to rely on legacy facilities that often do not meet current Army standards or use relocatable facilities. The Army plans to evaluate these requirements and priorities in preparing future budget requests. The systems used by the Army to determine the number, type, and size of facilities needed to accommodate forces stationed at domestic installations have not always produced reliable results for some types of facilities because the systems have often relied on data that are not complete, current, or accurate. GAO examined the criteria system for 62 essential facility types and found that the system did not include the Army's current standard design criteria for 51 of the 62 facilities. Without current criteria embedded into the facility planning systems, the systems cannot help planners accurately calculate facility requirements. Additionally, GAO found that the automated calculations that produce facility allowances--a baseline for determining facility requirements--were questionable in several cases, such as producing a requirement for 74 baseball fields for Fort Bragg. Moreover, because the information from the planning systems is used to identify facility shortages and support budget decisions, incomplete, out-of-date, or inaccurate data could adversely affect management decisions about the construction and renovation of facilities. The Army has not always provided installation planners with information on stationing actions far enough in advance to allow the installations to prepare the permanent facilities necessary for arriving personnel. Army guidance recommends 5 years' lead time for submitting stationing packages for approval that require new construction; however, the size of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has led to an increase in the movement of Army personnel, has made this difficult. For example, GAO found cases where installations were informed of stationing decisions with less than a year's notice, which installation officials said was far less time than needed to prepare the required facilities. As a result, new facilities have not always been available for arriving units and installations have had to employ interim measures, such as using relocatable facilities or using sustainment funds to build facilities, which, in turn, could result in needed sustainment work going unmet. GAO also found that installations were not always being notified when proposed stationing actions had been delayed or canceled, potentially leading to funds being wasted on unnecessary preparations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Brian J. Lepore Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-4523GAO-10-602, Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth
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Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2010:
Defense Infrastructure:
Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning Systems to Better Support
Installations Experiencing Significant Growth:
Defense Infrastructure:
GAO-10-602:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-602, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Army is concurrently implementing several major force structure
and basing initiatives, including Base Realignment and Closure, Grow
the Force, and Army Modularity. The resulting large increase in
personnel associated with these initiatives at many installations has
required and will continue to require significant facility planning
and construction to meet needs.
GAO was asked to (1) describe the Army‘s investment in domestic
facilities to meet the needs associated with the initiatives; (2)
determine the extent to which the Army‘s facility planning systems are
complete, current, and accurate; and (3) assess whether stationing
information has been provided to installations far enough in advance
to permit facility planning and acquisition to accommodate arriving
personnel. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant
documentation; analyzed budget documents, information from Army
planning systems, and facility criteria standards; visited
installations; and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found:
For fiscal years 2006 through 2015, the Army plans to have spent about
$31 billion to meet domestic installation facility needs associated
with the personnel increases resulting from several major force
structure and infrastructure initiatives. This investment will reduce
facility shortages at the affected installations, but some shortages
will still exist for certain types of facilities, including tactical
vehicle maintenance facilities and battalion and company headquarters.
The Army estimates that it could cost an additional $19 billion to
eliminate the shortages. Yet, without these buildings, the Army will
continue to rely on legacy facilities that often do not meet current
Army standards or use relocatable facilities. The Army plans to
evaluate these requirements and priorities in preparing future budget
requests.
The systems used by the Army to determine the number, type, and size
of facilities needed to accommodate forces stationed at domestic
installations have not always produced reliable results for some types
of facilities because the systems have often relied on data that are
not complete, current, or accurate. GAO examined the criteria system
for 62 essential facility types and found that the system did not
include the Army‘s current standard design criteria for 51 of the 62
facilities. Without current criteria embedded into the facility
planning systems, the systems cannot help planners accurately
calculate facility requirements. Additionally, GAO found that the
automated calculations that produce facility allowances”a baseline for
determining facility requirements”were questionable in several cases,
such as producing a requirement for 74 baseball fields for Fort Bragg.
Moreover, because the information from the planning systems is used to
identify facility shortages and support budget decisions, incomplete,
out-of-date, or inaccurate data could adversely affect management
decisions about the construction and renovation of facilities.
The Army has not always provided installation planners with
information on stationing actions far enough in advance to allow the
installations to prepare the permanent facilities necessary for
arriving personnel. Army guidance recommends 5 years‘ lead time for
submitting stationing packages for approval that require new
construction; however, the size of ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, which has led to an increase in the movement of Army
personnel, has made this difficult. For example, GAO found cases where
installations were informed of stationing decisions with less than a
year‘s notice, which installation officials said was far less time
than needed to prepare the required facilities. As a result, new
facilities have not always been available for arriving units and
installations have had to employ interim measures, such as using
relocatable facilities or using sustainment funds to build facilities,
which, in turn, could result in needed sustainment work going unmet.
GAO also found that installations were not always being notified when
proposed stationing actions had been delayed or canceled, potentially
leading to funds being wasted on unnecessary preparations.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending improvements to the Army‘s facility planning
systems and actions to improve communication and timeliness of
stationing information provided to affected installations. DOD
concurred with all of GAO‘s recommendations.
View GAO-10-602 or key components. For more information, contact Brian
Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Army Plans to Invest Billions in Facilities for the Various
Initiatives, but Billions More in Facility Shortages Will Exist for
Several More Years:
The Army's Complex Facility Planning Systems Rely on Some Data That
Are Not Complete, Current, or Accurate, Undermining Effective Decision
Making:
Lack of Timely Information within the Army's Stationing Process Has
Hampered Installations' Abilities to Meet Facility Requirements:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Impact of the Army's Infrastructure and Force Structure
Initiatives on Domestic Installations:
Table 2: Essential Facility Shortages at 48 Major Installations,
Fiscal Years 2010 and 2015:
Table 3: Differences between Selected Facility Allowances and
Requirements:
Table 4: Installations Included in Essential Facility Shortage and
Military Construction Budget Analyses:
Figures:
Figure 1: Top 20 Army Installations Expected to Experience Largest
Population Increases, Fiscal Years 2003 through 2016:
Figure 2: Types of Army Military Construction Projects Funded and
Planned to Be Funded, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2015:
Figure 3: Types of Army Military Construction Quality of Life Projects
Funded and Planned to Be Funded, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2015:
Figure 4: Army's Facility Planning Systems:
Figure 5: Army's Stationing Process:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 24, 2010:
The Honorable Solomon Ortiz:
Chairman:
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Army faces a significant challenge in meeting the facility needs
associated with large personnel increases at many domestic
installations that have resulted from the concurrent implementation of
several recent force structure and infrastructure initiatives.
Collectively, the simultaneous implementation of recommendations from
the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the redeployment
of U.S. forces from overseas locations back to the United States under
the Global Defense Posture and Realignment, a major Army
reorganization known as Army Modularity, force structure increases for
the Army under the Grow the Force initiative, and the drawdown of
forces from Iraq are generating large personnel increases at many
military installations within the United States. The Army's challenge
is to accurately identify the requirements for new or renovated
facilities at each of the installations gaining significant numbers of
soldiers as a result of these initiatives and then to ensure that the
required facility construction is completed in time to accommodate the
arrival of the soldiers and their families. Compounding the Army's
challenge to meeting facility requirements in a timely manner is the
evolving and changing nature of some of the Army's initiatives, such
as the recent decision to eliminate the establishment of three combat
brigade teams and the Quadrennial Defense Review decision to retain
four brigade combat teams in Europe instead of moving two of them back
to the United States pending a review of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's strategic concept and an accompanying U.S. assessment
of the U.S. European defense posture network. These decisions have
already caused the Army to reevaluate some of its facility
construction plans, and additional changes are likely to result from
future decisions in areas such as the Department of Defense's (DOD)
global posture reassessment.
Because of the significant growth that many installations will
experience as a result of the Army's concurrent implementation of the
aforementioned force structure and infrastructure initiatives, you
requested that we review the Army's facility planning systems to
assess the likelihood that the Army will successfully meet its
installation facility needs. Thus, this report's objectives were to
(1) describe the Army's investments in current and planned domestic
facilities to meet infrastructure requirements associated with the
initiatives; (2) determine the extent to which the Army's facility
planning systems are complete, current, and accurate; and (3) assess
whether the Army's stationing process provides information to
installations far enough in advance to permit facility planning and
acquisition to accommodate arriving personnel.
To address these objectives, we reviewed the Army's stationing, force
structure, and construction plans for the initiatives and analyzed
military construction budget documents for fiscal years 2006 through
2015 to determine what the Army has spent and plans to spend on
constructing facilities in support of the initiatives. Further, we
compared these military construction budget data to facility
requirements data, in order to determine the extent to which
investments will reduce shortages in essential facilities and to
determine the cost that will remain beyond 2015 to address the
shortages. We performed this analysis for 48 Installation Management
Command installations, including all of the top 20 growth
installations and 83 essential facilities, which were labeled
essential by the Army, and we grouped them into 17 essential facility
groups. To identify the types of projects the Army was funding, we
analyzed the Army's military construction budgets and budget
projections from fiscal years 2006 through 2015 for the same subset of
installations and facilities. In addition to these analyses, we
obtained and reviewed the garrison commanders' facility condition
reports to obtain examples of installations that have facility
shortages. To determine the extent to which the Army's facility
planning systems are complete, current, and accurate, we analyzed the
data contained in the Army's installation population, facility
requirements, and facility design criteria systems. To determine
whether information about stationing actions is being provided to
installations sufficiently in advance to allow them to prepare
facilities to accommodate arriving personnel, we analyzed data from
the Army Stationing and Installation Plan, Campaign Plan, and
stationing packages and compared these plans to the Army's military
construction plans. We visited four installations that were
experiencing significant growth, were affected by recent force
structure decisions, or both, and we visited the Installation
Management Command's West and Southeast headquarters. During each
visit, we were briefed on the installations' and regions' master
plans, and we interviewed directors or garrison commanders, as well as
master planning and public works personnel, to discuss any challenges
they had experienced in providing facilities and any mitigation
efforts that were planned or under way. We also interviewed officials
from Headquarters, Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff
for Installation Management; Headquarters, Installation Management
Command; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of
Staff program office (G-3/5/7), to obtain information regarding the
Army's military construction, facility planning systems, and
stationing processes. Although we did not independently validate the
budget, construction, stationing, and facility planning data provided
by the Army, we discussed with officials the steps they had taken to
ensure reasonable accuracy of the data. We determined the data to be
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2009 through June 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions base on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further details on our
scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.
Background:
As summarized in table 1, the Army is currently implementing several
major force structure and infrastructure initiatives that collectively
result in a large number of personnel movements and changes in the
size and shape of the Army's domestic installation infrastructure.
Table 1: Impact of the Army's Infrastructure and Force Structure
Initiatives on Domestic Installations:
Initiative: BRAC 2005;
Summary: Potentially closes 13 active Army installations and realigns
50 active Army installations;
Impact on domestic installations: Results in significant personnel
movement between installations, requiring additional facilities at
certain installations.
Initiative: Grow the Force;
Summary: Adds about 65,000 active Army soldiers to Army's permanent
end strength;
Impact on domestic installations: Increases the population of several
installations, requiring facilities to support the additional soldiers.
Initiative: Army Modularity;
Summary: Converts some Army units to brigade combat teams;
Impact on domestic installations: Results in a need for different and
increased facilities to support the transformed units.
Initiative: Global Defense Posture and Realignment;
Summary: Relocates about 44,500 Army soldiers from foreign to domestic
installations;
Impact on domestic installations: Increases the population of several
installations, requiring facilities to support the relocated soldiers.
Initiative: Iraq drawdown;
Summary: Relocates many troops from Iraq to domestic installations,
although some of this may be offset by some troops deploying to
Afghanistan;
Impact on domestic installations: Compounds the challenge of ensuring
that adequate facilities are available when needed to support the four
major basing and force structure initiatives.
Sources: DOD and Army documents.
[End of table]
As a result of the initiatives, many installations will experience
significant population growth, which results in the need for new or
renovated facilities to accommodate the additional soldiers and their
families. Figure 1 identifies the Army installations expected to
experience the largest population growth for fiscal years 2003 through
2016.[Footnote 1]
Figure 1: Top 20 Army Installations Expected to Experience Largest
Population Increases, Fiscal Years 2003 through 2016:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map]
Ft. Bliss, Texas: 26,777;
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia: 21,158;
Ft. Bragg, North Carolina: 19,587;
Ft. Lewis, Washington: 18,768;
Ft. Benning: Georgia: 14,819;
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama: 12,588;
Ft. Sam Houston, Texas: 12,533;
Ft. Carson, Colorado: 11,709;
Ft. Hood, Texas: 11,262;
Ft. Riley, Kansas: 11,188;
Ft. Meade, Maryland: 10,901;
Ft. Lee, Virginia: 9,614;
Ft. Drum, New York: 7,277;
Ft. Stewart, Georgia: 6,393;
Ft. Jackson, South Carolina: 6,233;
Ft. Campbell, Kentucky: 5,574;
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland: 5,284;
Schofield Barracks Military Reservation, Hawaii: 4,893;
Presidio of Monterey, California: 4,799;
Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri: 4,699.
Source: GAO analysis of Army Stationing and Installation Plan Total
Base Population, January 2010 (data); Map Info (map).
[End of figure]
Organizations Involved in Determining Army Facility Requirements:
Determining installation facility requirements involves several Army
offices and organizations with differing levels of roles and
responsibilities.
* At the garrison level, installation planners develop a real property
master plan, which captures the short-and long-term facility needs of
the garrison, as well as a prioritized list of facility requirements.
The senior mission commander of each garrison reviews the master plan
and priority list before submitting these documents to the regional
Installation Management Command.
* Installation Management Command regions serve as advocates for the
garrison commanders' facility requirements and associated resource
needs for installations in their regions.
* Installation Management Command Headquarters consolidates the
project priority lists from the regions and forwards them to the
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management for
consideration in the military construction budget. Installation
Management Command Headquarters is also responsible for ensuring the
implementation of the Army's master planning policies and guidance,
and may review certain facility planning documentation, such as
installation master plans.
* The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation
Management is responsible for programming, budgeting, and distributing
funds; tracking resources; and monitoring program performance for all
existing and future facility master planning and associated policies,
programs, systems, and initiatives Army-wide. Specifically, this
office reviews the prioritized lists of facility requirements received
from the various Army commands as part of the prioritization of
facility requirements Army-wide.
* The Army Deputy Chief of Staff program office (G-3/5/7) collaborates
with other Army Headquarters' staff, primarily those in the Office of
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, to
prioritize and validate requirements in the various Army commands'
priority lists for use in resource management decision making
processes. Together with the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Installation Management, the program office processes and
coordinates stationing actions with military construction plans.
Planning Systems Used by Army in Determining Facility Requirements:
The Army uses several management systems to determine facility
requirements and make military construction budget decisions.
* The Real Property Planning and Analysis System is the primary, Army-
wide system used to determine the amount of facilities needed on an
installation in accordance with the unit of measure of each facility
type.
* The Army Stationing and Installation Population database is the
Army's official source for installation population. It provides
installation population data to the Real Property Planning and
Analysis System.
* The Army Criteria Tracking System is the official Army repository
for facility space planning criteria. These criteria are used by the
Real Property Planning and Analysis System to generate facility
allowances.[Footnote 2]
* The Installation Status Report is a real-time decision support tool
used by Army leadership to identify the quantity and quality of
facilities. The Real Property Planning and Analysis System provides
data to this system.
Prior GAO Reports:
Since 1997, we have identified management of DOD support
infrastructure as a high-risk area, because infrastructure costs have
affected the department's ability to devote funds to other, more
critical programs and needs. In a January 2009 update to our high-risk
series, we noted that although DOD has made progress in managing its
support infrastructure in recent years, a number of challenges remain
in managing its portfolio of facilities and reducing unneeded
infrastructure while providing the facilities needed to support
several simultaneous force structure initiatives.[Footnote 3] Further,
we noted that because of these issues, DOD's management of support
infrastructure remains a high-risk area. This report is one in a
series of GAO products that addresses emerging issues associated with
the implementation of the BRAC 2005 round recommendations, overseas
rebasing, Army Modularity, the Army Grow the Force initiative, and
DOD's military construction program in general. For example, in
February 2004, we found that while DOD had taken a number of steps to
enhance the management of the military construction program,
opportunities existed for further improvements. Among other things, we
recommended that DOD develop a mechanism for periodically reassessing
construction priorities so that facilities with potential operational
and quality of life impacts are given appropriate consideration during
the budget process.[Footnote 4] DOD agreed and subsequently took steps
to provide a more consistent approach to managing facilities and
planning construction projects and costs. Additionally, in September
2007, we reported that several complex implementation challenges
arising from the growth of personnel assigned to many installations as
a result of BRAC, Global Defense Posture and Realignment, and force
modularity actions raised questions about the Army's ability to
provide needed infrastructure to support incoming personnel at its
growth bases and that some nearby communities had found it difficult
to fully identify needed infrastructure and associated costs, because
of the evolving nature of the Army's plans.[Footnote 5] In January
2009, we reported that although DOD had made progress in implementing
BRAC, it still faced challenges in its ability to provide facilities
in time to meet the BRAC statutory deadline of September 15, 2011.
[Footnote 6]
The Army Plans to Invest Billions in Facilities for the Various
Initiatives, but Billions More in Facility Shortages Will Exist for
Several More Years:
For fiscal years 2006 through 2015, the Army plans to have invested
about $31 billion to meet facility needs associated with the various
force structure and infrastructure initiatives. This investment will
reduce facility shortages at many affected installations, but some
shortages will still exist for certain types of facilities, including
tactical vehicle maintenance facilities and battalion and company
headquarters. The Army estimates that it could cost about an
additional $19 billion to eliminate the shortages.
The Army Plans to Invest Billions in Facilities for the Various
Initiatives:
The Army has invested about $22.5 billion in military construction
during fiscal years 2006 through 2010 to build facilities that support
the various initiatives and plans to invest about an additional $8.5
billion for fiscal years 2011 through 2015 to continue to build
facilities in support of the initiatives.[Footnote 7] Of this combined
$31 billion military construction current and planned investment,
about $14 billion is to support BRAC, about $1 billion is to support
Global Defense Posture and Realignment, about $8 billion is for Army
Modularity facilities support, and about $8 billion is for Grow the
Force, according to Army budget figures.[Footnote 8] Army officials
stated that the majority of their military construction investments
from fiscal years 2006 through 2010 were targeted at building
facilities to meet the infrastructure demands generated by various
initiatives, such as BRAC, Army Modularity, and Grow the Force.
However, as these construction projects to support the initiatives
reach their completion dates, officials said the Army plans to
transition its priorities for investing military construction funds
from building strictly in support of the initiatives toward having
more discretion to build many deferred housing and quality of life
projects. Our analysis of the Army's military construction budget
shows that from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, the Army placed an
emphasis on funding housing and projects that met operational and
training needs, such as headquarters and general instruction
facilities for brigade combat teams and their support units. According
to Army officials, during this time span, quality of life facilities,
such as churches, fitness centers, and recreation centers, were
labeled noncritical projects and many projects were moved into future
years on the construction timeline. For example, as seen in figure 2,
although there were some quality of life projects funded in fiscal
years 2006 and 2007, there are no quality of life projects scheduled
to be funded during fiscal years 2010 and 2011.[Footnote 9]
Figure 2: Types of Army Military Construction Projects Funded and
Planned to Be Funded, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2015:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Administrative: 2;
Housing: 15;
Maintenance and production: 3;
Operational and training: 4;
Quality of life: 2.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Administrative: 1;
Housing: 16;
Maintenance and production: 1;
Operational and training: 7;
Quality of life: 8.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Administrative: 1;
Housing: 11;
Maintenance and production: 1;
Operational and training: 6.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Housing: 13;
Maintenance and production: 10;
Operational and training: 27;
Quality of life: 7.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Housing: 8;
Maintenance and production: 7;
Operational and training: 13.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Administrative: 3;
Housing: 16;
Maintenance and production: 11;
Operational and training: 25;
Supply: 3.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Housing: 16;
Maintenance and production: 12;
Operational and training: 13;
Quality of life: 9.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Administrative: 2;
Housing: 22;
Maintenance and production: 10;
Operational and training: 10;
Quality of life: 15;
Supply: 2.
Fiscal year: 2014;
Housing: 8;
Maintenance and production: 3;
Operational and training: 9;
Quality of life: 6.
Fiscal year: 2015;
Housing: 8;
Maintenance and production: 2;
Operational and training: 5.
Source: GAO analysis of Army military construction budgets, fiscal
years 2006 through 2015.
[End of figure]
Further, our analysis of the Army's military construction budgets for
quality of life facilities shows that from fiscal years 2006 through
2009, the Army focused primarily on constructing child development
centers and that it planned to fund several physical fitness centers
and religious facilities during fiscal years 2012 through 2014. See
figure 3.[Footnote 10]
Figure 3: Types of Army Military Construction Quality of Life Projects
Funded and Planned to Be Funded, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2015:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Child development centers: 1;
Physical fitness centers: 1;
Religious facilities: 0.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Child development centers: 8;
Physical fitness centers: 0;
Religious facilities: 0.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Child development centers: 0;
Physical fitness centers: 0;
Religious facilities: 0.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Child development centers: 4;
Physical fitness centers: 2;
Religious facilities: 1.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Child development centers: 0;
Physical fitness centers: 0;
Religious facilities: 0.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Child development centers: 0;
Physical fitness centers: 0;
Religious facilities: 0.
Fiscal year: 2012v
Child development centers: 2;
Physical fitness centers: 4;
Religious facilities: 3.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Child development centers: 1;
Physical fitness centers: 8;
Religious facilities: 6.
Fiscal year: 2014;
Child development centers: 1;
Physical fitness centers: 2;
Religious facilities: 3.
Fiscal year: 2015;
Child development centers: 0;
Physical fitness centers: 0;
Religious facilities: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of Army military construction budgets, fiscal
years 2006 through 2015.
[End of figure]
Part of the Army's total $31 billion military construction planned
investment includes about $2 billion that the Army retained from
funding that the Army explains was originally requested for the
construction of brigade facilities for three new brigade combat teams
that were canceled in June 2009. An army analysis showed that the
majority of the planned brigade complex construction projects were
still needed to replace undersized or older facilities at the three
installations where the brigade combat teams were originally going to
be established. Specifically, the Army explains that Congress
permitted it to keep about $2 billion of the $2.7 billion in military
construction funding, and the Army is using about $482 million at Fort
Stewart to replace relocatable facilities and about $108 million at
Fort Carson and $1.4 billion at Fort Bliss to replace undersized
legacy facilities. According to Army officials, with the completion of
these projects, the Army will be able to cancel future plans to
request funds for new facilities to replace some of the relocatable
facilities and legacy facilities at these installations. Furthermore,
according to Army officials, one of the three brigade complex projects
had already been contracted at Fort Bliss. As a result, according to
the officials, the Army could have had to pay certain costs if it had
terminated the construction because the contract for the complex was
part of a multi-brigade team complex contract.
In addition, the Army received about $180 million in military
construction funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009. The Army plans to use $80 million of these funds to construct
seven child development centers, which will further address facility
shortages in this essential facility category. The remaining $100
million will be used to construct two warrior in transition complexes,
which are facilities intended to temporarily house soldiers while they
are recuperating from injuries sustained during their service in
combat.
Although the Army's Significant Investments Will Reduce Facility
Shortages, Billions More in Facility Shortages Will Exist for Several
More Years:
These military construction investments, if funded and implemented as
planned, will enable the Army to reduce essential facility shortages
at major Installation Management Command installations by 30 and 12
percent, but some shortages will still remain. For example, with its
investments, the Army will reduce its shortage of brigade headquarters
from 1,352,425 square feet in fiscal 2010 to 714,024 square feet in
fiscal year 2015--a reduction of 638,401 square feet, or 47 percent.
According to our analysis of Army facility data for 17 facility groups
and 48 major installations, including all 20 top growth installations,
the Army will make some progress in reducing the amount of facility
shortages in several areas, such as permanent party barracks, brigade
headquarters, and general instructional buildings, and for certain
quality of life facilities, such as child development centers and
physical fitness facilities. Table 2 shows the planned impact of the
Army's military construction investments in reducing essential
facility shortages for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2015 and the
Army's projected cost to eliminate projected facility shortages beyond
2015.[Footnote 11]
Table 2: Essential Facility Shortages at 48 Major Installations,
Fiscal Years 2010 and 2015 (Dollars in millions):
Measured in square feet:
Tactical vehicle maintenance;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 9,188,019;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 3,538,566;
Projected shortage reduction: 5,649,452;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 61;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $1,236.
Organizational classroom;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 1,048,149;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 865,247;
Projected shortage reduction: 182,902;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 17;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $232.
Brigade headquarters;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 1,352,425;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 714,024;
Projected shortage reduction: 638,401;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 47;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $318.
Battalion headquarters;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 2,201,254;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 1,191,519;
Projected shortage reduction: 1,009,735;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 46;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $453.
Company headquarters;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 24,746,183;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 14,400,449;
Projected shortage reduction: 10,345,734;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 42;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $3,928.
Religious/religious education;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 2,318,802;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 2,027,141;
Projected shortage reduction: 291,661;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 13;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $849.
Physical fitness center;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 1,905,105;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 1,441,886;
Projected shortage reduction: 463,219;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 24;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $565.
Administrative;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 6,094,997;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 5,758,340;
Projected shortage reduction: 336,657;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 6;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $1,878.
Aircraft maintenance;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 1,806,313;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 1,318,778;
Projected shortage reduction: 487,535;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 27;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $617.
Child development center;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 1,355,358;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 1,042,519;
Projected shortage reduction: 312,839;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 23;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $411.
Post vehicle maintenance;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 441,974;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 456,276;
Projected shortage reduction: -14,302;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): -3;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $152.
General instruction;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 3,509,519;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 1,967,250;
Projected shortage reduction: 1,542,269;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 44;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $660.
Applied instructional;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 3,014,688;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 2,618,099;
Projected shortage reduction: 396,589;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 13;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $1,008.
Supply/storage;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 16,949,122;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 15,446,363;
Projected shortage reduction: 1,502,759;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 9;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $2,655.
Total;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 75,931,908;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 52,786,457;
Projected shortage reduction: 23,145,450;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 30;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $14,962;
Measured in spaces:
Advanced individual training barracks (beds);
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 41,536;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 43,548;
Projected shortage reduction: -2,012;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): -5;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $3,857.
Basic training barracks (beds);
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 5,559;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 3,122;
Projected shortage reduction: 2,437;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 44;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $119.
Permanent party barracks (rooms);
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 10,107;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 3,519;
Projected shortage reduction: 6,588;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 65;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: 395.
Total;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: 57,202;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: 50,189;
Projected shortage reduction: 7,013;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 12;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: 4,371.
Total reduction and total cost for all essential facilities;
Facility shortage in fiscal year 2010: N/A;
Projected facility shortage in fiscal year 2015: N/A;
Projected shortage reduction: N/A;
Projected shortage reduction (percentage): 12 and 30;
Army's estimated cost to eliminate projected facility shortage in
fiscal year 2015: $19,333.
Source: GAO analysis of Army's Real Property Planning and Analysis
System data, April 2010.
Notes: Religious facilities are not included in the Army's list of
essential facility groups, but we included them as they were described
during our site visits as important to quality of life. Facility
shortages for post vehicle maintenance and advanced individual
training barracks increased because requirements for these facilities
outpaced the Army's ability to fund these types of projects in its
military construction budget.
[End of table]
Some of the facility shortages that are projected to remain after
fiscal year 2015 include those for tactical vehicle maintenance
buildings, classrooms, headquarters buildings, religious facilities,
and physical fitness centers. Without these buildings, the Army will
continue to rely on legacy facilities, which do not all meet Army
standards, or will use movable facilities, referred to as relocatable
facilities, intended as temporary measures. Specific examples of
remaining shortages follow.
* Tactical vehicle maintenance facilities: Fort Sam Houston, Texas;
Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Jackson, South Carolina; and Fort
Leonard Wood, Missouri, will have less than 65 percent of their
reported tactical vehicle maintenance facility requirements in fiscal
year 2015. Smaller shortages will still exist in fiscal year 2015 at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Knox, Kentucky; and Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii, among others. In addition, even though units at many
installations are adapting by using legacy facilities, these legacy
facilities in many cases are 20 to 40 years old and do not support new
Army Modularity requirements. For example, at Fort Lewis, Washington,
the bay doors of the legacy maintenance facilities occupied by the
Stryker brigades are not wide enough for the Strykers to enter; as a
result, soldiers have to perform maintenance outside in sometimes
inclement weather. Additionally, at Fort Bragg, the 82nd Airborne
Division operates out of extremely cramped maintenance facilities
built in the 1950s; these facilities lack sufficient bay space. At
Fort Stewart, Georgia, none of the legacy maintenance facilities
satisfies current mission requirements, as they were constructed prior
to Army transformation and designed for a different force structure,
according to Fort Stewart officials. At Fort Riley, Kansas, in several
cases two battalions share a single battalion complex, and many
maintenance facilities do not meet current Army standards, according
to the Army. As a result, vehicle maintenance services are conducted
outdoors in sometimes severe Kansas weather, because bay space and
overhead lift capability are inadequate. According to the garrison
commander, these conditions adversely affect unit maintenance and
overall unit readiness.
* Classrooms: Some shortages will continue to exist in fiscal year
2015 at Fort Polk, Louisiana; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Campbell,
Kentucky; Fort Stewart; and Fort Drum, New York, among others. At Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, the garrison commander commented that there is an
overall lack of training/instruction facilities and that classroom
space is at full capacity as a result of the increased training needs
brought on by combined contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
* Headquarters facilities: In fiscal year 2015, Fort Huachuca; Fort
Irwin, California; and Fort Sam Houston will have less than half of
their reported brigade headquarters requirements, and Fort Benning,
Georgia; Fort Jackson; and Fort Hood will all have less than half of
their reported company headquarters requirement. Additionally, smaller
shortages in some types of headquarters facilities will still exist in
fiscal year 2015 at Fort Bragg; Fort Carson, Colorado; and Fort Riley,
among others. As a result of these shortages, some units have turned
supply areas into operational administration and training room space
and use external containers for storing supplies.
* Religious facilities: Fort Bragg; Fort Carson; Fort Gordon, Georgia;
and Fort Stewart will have less than 50 percent of their reported
religious facility requirements in fiscal year 2015. At Fort Gordon,
the religious education center is housed in 12 separate, dispersed
buildings to accommodate the required number of classes. These
buildings are not located near any of the installation's chapel
facilities, which, according to the garrison commander, deters the
participation of chapel congregants. Although the garrison has
developed a project to redress this issue and has submitted it for
funding, the project remains unfunded.
* Physical fitness centers: Fort Jackson and Fort Irwin will have less
than half of their reported physical fitness center requirements in
fiscal year 2015. Additionally, smaller shortages for physical fitness
facilities will still exist in fiscal year 2015 at Fort Bragg, Fort
Carson, Fort Stewart, Fort Polk, Fort Bliss, Fort Lewis, and Fort
Knox, among others. At Fort Bliss, in an effort to address the
shortage of fitness centers, soldiers have improvised by fabricating
wood sit-up and pull-up bars in areas near soldier housing facilities.
The Army's Complex Facility Planning Systems Rely on Some Data That
Are Not Complete, Current, or Accurate, Undermining Effective Decision
Making:
The Army's facility planning systems are made up of several complex
databases that determine the number, type, and size of facilities
needed to accommodate forces stationed at domestic installations.
However, these systems have not always produced reliable results for
some types of facilities because the systems have often relied on data
that are not complete, current, or accurate, which could adversely
affect management decisions made about the construction and renovation
of facilities.
The Army's Facility Planning Systems Are Complex:
The Army's facility planning systems are complex and comprise several
databases that provide information used to generate facility
requirements that ultimately influence budgetary decisions. To build
facility requirements, Army guidance calls for its planners to use an
Army-wide facility planning system known as the Real Property Planning
and Analysis System, which uses information on the type of units and
number of personnel and Army space planning criteria to determine the
amount of facilities needed to accommodate forces stationed at an
installation.[Footnote 12] The Real Property Planning and Analysis
System uses a formula, based on Army facility design criteria
contained in the Army Criteria Tracking System, to determine the
amount of space needed for each type of facility. The formula depends
on installation population and force structure data from the Army's
official database of installation populations, known as the Army
Stationing and Installation Plan. The Real Property Planning and
Analysis System uses the population information from this database and
the criteria information from the Army Criteria Tracking System to
determine the appropriate amount of facilities needed to accommodate
the units stationed at the installation.[Footnote 13] Information from
the Real Property Planning and Analysis System is then used to inform
the Installation Status Report, which is a high-level decision
management tool used by Army leadership to identify the quantity and
quality of facilities and make budgetary decisions. The Assistant
Chief of Staff for Installation Management has a role in maintaining
and operating all four systems. Figure 4 shows the relationship among
these databases.
Figure 4: Army's Facility Planning Systems:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Military construction budget:
Base operations budget:
Both result from: Installation Status Report.
Installation Status Report: generated from:
RPLANS ” Real Property Planning and Analysis System:
* Facility allowances;
* Facility requirements;
* Facilities on-hand;
* Facility shortages.
RPLANS ” Real Property Planning and Analysis System: generated from:
* ASIP ” Army Stationing and Installation Plan (population);
* ACTS ” Army Criteria Tracking System (Criteria);
* Other Army data sources (Real property assets, manpower, and
equipment).
Source: GAO analysis of Army documents on facility planning and
military construction.
[End of figure]
As figure 4 shows, the Army Stationing and Installation Plan feeds
population data into the Real Property Planning and Analysis System,
and this then helps form the basis for planning and programming of
real property and other base operations resources. The Army Stationing
and Installation Plan is the only consolidated source that shows the
total authorized planning populations for Army installations. It
produces a report showing authorized planning populations of all
units, activities, students, and other tenants at Army installations
over the current fiscal year and the next 6 fiscal years, as data are
updated. In previous years, these data were updated only annually or
semiannually; however, in 2007, the Army implemented quarterly data
updates. Installation officials told us that these quarterly updates
have been a great improvement and have enhanced their facility
planning, as planners now have access to more current installation
population data.
Army officials told us that although the Army Stationing and
Installation Plan has always contained data on contractors, the data
were limited and did not fully capture the number of contractors
actually working on the installation, contributing to facility
shortfalls because the full scope of contractor facility requirements
did not appear in the Real Property Planning and Analysis System. To
help alleviate this problem, in 2009 the Army developed a contractor
module in the Army Stationing and Installation Plan to improve
contractor reporting. According to the Army, the data in this module
are more comprehensive than those previously entered in the Army
Stationing and Installation Plan. The new module allows entries for
supported and hiring units, so that contractors can be linked to the
units that support them. According to the Army, this allows the Army
Stationing and Installation Plan to reflect a unit's total impact,
including the contractor population, which in turn allows the Real
Property Planning and Analysis System to generate facility allowances
for contractor populations.
The Army's Facility Planning Systems Have Relied on Some Data That Are
Not Complete, Current, or Accurate:
Although the Army has taken some steps to improve its facility
planning systems, our analysis of criteria in the Army Criteria
Tracking System and requirements in the Real Property Planning and
Analysis System showed that some of the data are missing, out of date,
or inaccurate. To illustrate, we compared the Army's list of 62
facility types for which standard designs were created to the
corresponding facility design criteria in the Army Criteria Tracking
System, to determine the extent to which the Army Criteria Tracking
System was being updated with the new standard designs.[Footnote 14]
Although an Army regulation requires that facility master plans be
updated as changes occur, we found that out of 62 facility types, 4
were missing entirely from the Army Criteria Tracking System. For
example, criteria for supply-support activities--facilities needed to
store brigade combat teams' supplies and equipment--were not in the
criteria system and facilities subsequently were not constructed.
Installation officials told us that in their absence units were using
either tarped, tented, or open-sided facilities intended for other
uses, potentially exposing equipment to weather damage leading to
potentially unnecessarily increasing repair expenses. Our analysis
further showed that out of the 58 remaining facility types that were
in the Army Criteria Tracking System, 47 did not have the updated
standard criteria. For example, the standard design for child
development centers for infants and toddlers had been finalized in
March 2008, but the criteria in the criteria system showed that the
last design update had occurred in 2007. Without the latest,
standardized Army-wide criteria embedded in the facility planning
systems, there is a risk that facility planners will not be using the
most recent criteria to calculate requirements and that facilities
will not be planned to meet the latest standards or actually built in
the case of the supply-support activities.
To gain further insight into the extent to which the Army's facility
planning systems are complete, current, and accurate, we performed
another analysis that compared facility allowances with facility
requirements for all 287 facility types in the Real Property Planning
and Analysis System. Facility allowances are computer-generated
estimates based purely on facility design criteria and installation
population. Allowances provide installation master planners a baseline
for determining facility requirements. Requirements are refined
allowances adjusted to meet the needs of individual installations, as
determined by installation master planners. Requirements reflect
factors unique to a given unit or installation, such as special unit
missions, personnel, and equipment that may not be captured in the
automated allowance calculation. As a result, slight differences
between allowances and requirements are to be expected. For example,
general-purpose administrative space allowances are calculated by the
number of personnel requiring general administrative space, multiplied
by 162 gross square feet. However, this calculation does not take into
consideration unique or installation-specific special space
requirements, such as rooms for handling classified information or
space to accommodate tenants or contractors in accordance with a
contract or agreement. As a result, installation planners will need to
manually adjust the allowance to reflect the actual general-purpose
administrative space requirements of units on their specific
installation. As shown in table 3, however, our analysis showed that
there were large differences for several types of facilities,
including enclosed storage, administrative, and general instruction
facilities.
Table 3: Differences between Selected Facility Allowances and
Requirements:
Measured in millions of square feet:
Facility type: Enclosed storage installation;
Allowance: 7;
Requirement: 28;
Difference: 21.
Facility type: Administrative;
Allowance: 18;
Requirement: 39;
Difference: 21.
Facility type: General instruction;
Allowance: 5;
Requirement: 12;
Difference: 7.
Facility type: Aircraft maintenance;
Allowance: 9;
Requirement: 15;
Difference: 6.
Facility type: Unit storage;
Allowance: 7;
Requirement: 10;
Difference: 3.
Facility type: Annual training officer's quarters;
Allowance: 13;
Requirement: 15;
Difference: 2.
Facility type: Basic training barracks;
Allowance: 10;
Requirement: 9;
Difference: 1.
Measured in millions of square yards:
Facility type: Runways, fixed wing;
Allowance: 1;
Requirement: 8;
Difference: 7.
Measured in single units (each):
Facility type: Baseball fields;
Allowance: 831;
Requirement: 776;
Difference: 55.
Facility type: Outdoor pools;
Allowance: 375;
Requirement: 312;
Difference: 63.
Facility type: Softball fields;
Allowance: 1,417;
Requirement: 1,281;
Difference: 136.
Source: GAO analysis of Real Property Planning and Analysis System
data, April 2010.
Note: Data for allowances, requirements, and differences are for all
Army installations worldwide.
[End of table]
Large differences between allowances and requirements, such as those
shown in table 3, may indicate that the formula used to determine the
allowance for a facility type is out of date or inaccurate, resulting
in facility data that do not reflect what installations really need
and increase the risk that the Army may be planning for facilities
that do not meet the latest standards. While this analysis provides
some insight into systemic discrepancies--highlighting areas that
collectively appear to be out of sync--significant issues are
particularly noticeable at the individual installation level. For
example, the computer-driven allowance for the number of baseball
fields needed is 74 at Fort Bragg. However, installation officials
told us that this is not a realistic requirement and that they would
never request funding for that number of baseball fields for the
installation. Although all installations have an opportunity to review
allowances and provide edits that more accurately reflect the
installation requirement, according to Army headquarters officials, no
edits were received for baseball fields at Fort Bragg. According to
these same officials, such reviews and input from installations would
help to identify criteria for facilities such as the ones we
highlighted that may need updating. Officials told us that they are
aware that some of the facility criteria in the Army Criteria Tracking
System may cause the Real Property Planning and Analysis System to
produce unrealistic allowances for some types of facilities, but that
they are normally not made aware of these kinds of discrepancies
unless someone notifies them, as there is no routine process or
established guidance requiring that criteria in the criteria system be
reviewed, updated, or validated on a recurring basis. While officials
acknowledged that some of the allowances may be inaccurate and should
be reevaluated to be more useful, they said that allowances only
provide a starting point to build facility requirements and those
projects submitted for budget requests are based on refined
requirements.
In addition, during our site visits, installation officials told us
that their planners do not use the Real Property Planning and Analysis
System for determining range and medical facility requirements.
Officials told us that although the Real Property Planning and
Analysis System generates data for ranges and medical requirements,
its formulas and criteria do not generate realistic requirements,
hence planners had decided to avoid using it to determine range and
medical facility needs. Instead, installation planners use the Army
Range Requirements Model to determine range requirements and the Army
Health Facility Planning Agency's system to determine medical facility
requirements. However, neither of these systems is linked to the Real
Property Planning and Analysis System, the primary system for
determining facility requirements, and officials told us that there is
no guidance requiring them to be linked. Without input from these two
other systems, the Real Property Planning and Analysis System will not
accurately represent requirements for ranges and medical facilities,
potentially leading to budget requests based on inaccurate
requirements. In addition, with two sets of data available--one set in
the Army Range Requirements Model and the Army Health Facility
Planning Agency's system and another in the Real Property Planning and
Analysis System--there is a potential for installation planners to be
confused about which are the correct medical and range requirements.
Lack of Timely Information within the Army's Stationing Process Has
Hampered Installations' Abilities to Meet Facility Requirements:
The Army's stationing process involves many functional areas and
therefore requires close coordination and information sharing.
Installations are prescribed a key role in this coordination and in
the planning for and successful implementation of stationing actions.
However, the Army's process for providing installations information on
stationing actions does not always allow installations sufficient time
to accommodate all newly arriving units with permanent facilities. As
a result, needed facilities have not always been available for
arriving units and installations have had to employ certain interim
measures to accommodate the units.
The Army's Stationing Process Requires Close Coordination and
Information Sharing among Various Army Stakeholders:
The Army's stationing process involves close coordination and
information sharing among the Army Deputy Chief of Staff program
office (G-3/5/7), the Army's Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Installation Management, the Installation Management Command, and
individual installations. Specifically, Army Regulation 5-10
establishes policy, procedures, and responsibilities for stationing
actions.[Footnote 15] Army officials informed us that the Army
currently uses a draft revised version of this regulation rather than
the official version from March 2001. Accordingly, we used the draft
version of the regulation for our assessment as well. As per the
regulation, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff program office (G-3/5/7) is
the official clearinghouse and processing approval authority for some
proposed stationing actions for active forces relocating to or from
Army installations. Once a proposed stationing action is identified,
the respective Army command or Army service component command is to
begin coordinating the proposed action with the gaining and losing
installations. This includes ensuring that the gaining installation
can adequately support both its currently assigned force structure and
the additional force structure associated with the proposed stationing
action. To do this, the commands and reporting units work with the
Army Installation Management Command, the Army's Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, and the various
installations. Together, these organizations conduct an analysis of
the proposed stationing action that includes proposals, findings, and
recommendations. This analysis is forwarded through the appropriate
staff levels to decision makers in the form of a stationing package. A
stationing package provides assurance to the Army leadership that all
the requirements related to a stationing action have been
accomplished. The purpose of the stationing process is to obtain
complete coordination of and approval for stationing units in support
of operational requirements. Additionally, the Army draft regulation
states that wherever possible, standard Army databases and management
information systems must be used, to include the Army Stationing and
Installation Plan, the Real Property Planning and Analysis System, and
the Installation Status Report. Ideally, according to officials,
stationing actions should be inputted into the Army Stationing and
Installation Plan at the same time the Army Deputy Chief of Staff
program office (G-3/5/7) approves it for processing and a stationing
package is developed. Additionally, the Army Stationing and
Installation Plan should be updated to reflect any changes to the
proposed stationing action as a result of installation input. Figure 5
shows the complexity of the stationing process and the various offices
involved in it.
Figure 5: Army's Stationing Process:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Strategies:
Army Command Plan;
Total Army Analysis;
Quadrennial Defense Review.
Initiatives:
Global Defense Posture and Realignment;
Modularity;
Grow the Force;
BRAC.
Army commands:
Forces Command;
Training and Doctrine Command;
Army Materiel Command;
Other.
Stationing packages:
Army headquarters:
G-3/5/7.
Army installations:
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management;
Installation Management Command Headquarters;
Installation Management Command regions;
Installations.
Source: GAO analysis of Army stationing regulations and guidance.
[End of figure]
Installations Do Not Always Receive Timely Stationing Information:
The Army's process for providing installations information on
stationing actions does not always allow installations sufficient time
to accommodate all newly arriving units with permanent facilities.
Stationing involves many functional areas and therefore requires
extensive coordination. An Army regulation prescribes a key role for
installations in the planning for and successful implementation of
stationing actions. The primary mechanism for informing an
installation of a proposed stationing action and obtaining its input
is the development and processing of a stationing package.
Installations provide vital information regarding facility
availability for these packages, and the Army regulation prescribes
various timelines that could affect the timing of this input.
According to Army officials, for stationing actions that will require
new military construction, an installation should receive a package 5
years ahead of when troops and family members will arrive, to coincide
with the normal military construction timeline and to provide time for
the installation to obtain the necessary funding to build the needed
facilities.
However, officials at several installations we visited told us that
they have received stationing packages requiring new construction with
only 1 year of advanced planning time available and some packages in
the same year as the stationing action. In some cases, units have even
arrived at an installation before the package is developed and
facility requirements are identified. For example, during our visit to
Fort Stewart in December 2009, officials told us that they had just
received a stationing package for an engineering unit slated to arrive
there in April 2010, which will not give them enough time to program
and build permanent facilities for the unit. Indeed, Fort Stewart
officials told us that since 2006 there have been approximately 15
unit arrivals requiring a total of $131 million in new construction,
where the time between the installation's receipt of the stationing
package and the units' actual arrival did not provide the installation
enough time to program and construct the facilities. According to Fort
Stewart officials, all future stationing actions to the installation
will require new military construction to accommodate arriving
personnel. Similarly, during our visit to Fort Drum, officials told us
of several instances where they had only 6 months' notice from when
they received a stationing package for an arriving unit to when that
unit was slated to arrive at the installation. Although situations
like these can be partly attributed to factors such as the length and
size of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have led to
an increase in the movement of Army personnel and units, Army
officials also cited some other reasons. Specifically, these officials
told us that many times situations like these are occurring because
some Army commands that traditionally have not conducted many
stationing actions are now having to manage significant relocations of
units from some installations to other Army installations and
consequently develop stationing packages because of Army
transformation. As a result, some Army personnel responsible for
preparing stationing packages are either not familiar with the
stationing package time guidelines or do not know the proper way to
develop a package. According to these officials, more training is
needed to show the importance of timely stationing packages and how to
correctly develop a package.
Another explanation offered by these officials is that the large
number of stationing packages being processed is delaying the delivery
of stationing packages to installations, and no abbreviated procedures
exist to shorten the process for quick turnaround stationing
decisions. Even though many of the units associated with these
stationing issues are smaller combat service and combat service
support units, rather than larger brigade combat teams, officials told
us that the timeliness of stationing packages for these smaller units
is still problematic. Many installations have minimal space left
available that can be developed because of continued growth. Officials
told us that as a result, even small unit moves can have a big impact
on an installation's master planning--especially if neither permanent
nor relocatable facilities are available. According to installation
officials, a package or at least some other type of stationing
information is needed even for small units as early in the stationing
process as possible, so that installation input can be obtained and
any space or facility issues can be resolved before the unit arrives.
A second point of concern raised by installation officials was that
even when they do receive a stationing package and provide input, in
many cases they are not notified of subsequent changes to the
decision, such as unit arrival dates being canceled, expedited, or
delayed. Although stationing guidance directs that there be
coordination during the development of a stationing package, there is
no specific guidance for communicating subsequent stationing action
changes; as a result, subsequent changes to stationing actions are not
always being communicated to installations or are not being
communicated in a timely manner. For example, Fort Bragg officials
stated that they are not getting notification of changes from the
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management or
the Installation Management Command when stationing packages are
submitted to G-3/5/7 for final approval; this complicates the
installation planner's ability to properly plan for unit arrivals.
Further, Installation Management Command Southeast officials told us
that they are not receiving notification when proposed stationing
actions to which installations provided input are subsequently delayed
or canceled. This could lead to the wasting of scarce resources as
installations continue to plan for units that will be arriving at a
later date or not at all.
The lack of timely information concerning stationing actions
complicates an installation's master planner's ability to provide
facilities for arriving personnel. As a result, some installations
have not had permanent facilities available for newly arriving units.
For example, at Hunter Army Airfield on Fort Stewart new permanent
facilities are still not available for the combat aviation brigade
established there in 2006. Although according to the Army's military
construction plans, some of the construction is funded, the funded
portion of the facilities is not slated to be finished until 2015 and
2016. Similarly, at Fort Riley, although some of the new facilities
for the combat aviation brigade that relocated there from Fort Carson
in 2009 are funded, construction for them is not expected to be
finished until 2013. The aircraft hangar and vehicle maintenance shop
for the brigade remains unfunded. And at Fort Drum, construction for
new permanent facilities for the combat aviation brigade that
converted from a light to medium brigade on March 16, 2010, is not
expected to start until 2013 and will not be completed until 2014 at
the earliest. Because permanent facilities are not always available
for these and other arriving units, the Army has employed several
interim measures, as described below.
* Relocatable facilities: As we reported in 2009, the Army continues
to use relocatable facilities extensively at several installations to
provide facilities for incoming troops.[Footnote 16] In some cases,
relocatable facilities are being used as barracks and at some
installations they are being used longer than anticipated. Indeed,
during our visit to Fort Drum, officials told us they were considering
requesting that some of their relocatable facilities be reclassified
into real property so that they could keep them indefinitely to help
address facility shortages. According to the Army, it has invested
over $2 billion in relocatable facilities and will continue to use
them until permanent construction for all units is complete. Some
officials told us that they might need to be used until 2016 or beyond.
* Hot bunking/duffle bag drag: The Army is using a complex rotation
process of placing new units into facilities vacated by deployed
units. However, according to officials, the use of facilities vacated
by deployed units requires multiple moves, as units now occupying the
facilities will have to move once the other units return from
deployment. According to officials, this reduces capacity, creates
challenges for meeting unit reset timelines, and complicates life
cycle upgrades to the facilities. For example, Fort Stewart officials
told us that an engineer battalion relocated there in March 2010 and
that there were no permanent facilities available for it. Officials
said they were particularly concerned about the maintenance facilities
and barracks for the battalion and, as a result, developed military
construction projects for them that they plan to submit during the
next budget cycle. These officials told us that in the interim their
mitigation strategy has been to have the battalion occupy facilities
that are currently vacant because of deployments but added that this
will force multiple unit moves and incur additional costs, which in
their view will degrade the unit's overall operational readiness.
According to Fort Stewart officials, in 2008 one such "duffle bag
drag" move cycle resulted in 4,000 productive man-hours lost, at a
cost of approximately $156,000, and increased unit reset time by 20
days because of the added cost and work hours needed to move the units
to different buildings. In addition, officials told us that
deployments are the primary reason they are able to accommodate the
multitude of stationing actions occurring right now and that if there
were no deployments then the Army would have to slow its growth and
transformation. Some officials told us that the return of forces from
Iraq will only exacerbate facility shortage problems at those
installations currently using facilities that are available to "at
home" units only because of deployments.
* Reduced authorized space for unit operations facilities: The Army
has reduced the acceptable authorized space standard for all company,
brigade, and battalion headquarters facilities Army-wide by 50
percent, resulting in many units having to cope with cramped,
overcrowded facilities.
* Outside leases: The Army is leasing an abandoned Kmart store outside
of Fort Sam Houston as a temporary home for the Installation
Management Command Headquarters while its facilities are being built.
* Use of sustainment funds: Fort Stewart officials told us that
because of insufficient notice, they have had to use $745,000 of their
sustainment funds to construct a motor pool for one unit and $236,000
of sustainment funds to construct a parking lot for another unit
recently stationed there. Such actions could further increase the
backlog of deferred sustainment projects that we reported on Army-wide
in 2009.[Footnote 17]
Conclusions:
The pace of growth associated with the Army's simultaneous
implementation of several force structure and infrastructure
initiatives has required the Army to employ a range of strategies to
provide facilities in a timely manner. Accurate facility planning data
are critical if the Army is to be able to match the pace of its
military construction with the pace of this growth. However, some of
the data in the Army's facility planning systems are incomplete, out
of date, or inaccurate. Incomplete, out-of-date, or inaccurate
facility planning data undermine effective management decision making
about the construction and renovation of facilities, and if projects
are constructed that do not meet the latest design standards and, as a
result, require costly retrofitting, funds could be wasted. Army
planners and resource programmers use the facility planning systems to
identify support requirements for the Army installations and excesses
and shortages of facilities, and this information is used to support
funding decisions. For example, new construction might be started in
response to reported shortages. Managers need reliable data to make
accurate decisions about future resource allocations. Accurate,
timely, and complete installation data improve credibility with Army
leadership and Congress. However, unless the Army develops guidance
that requires its facility criteria system to be updated as changes to
facility design criteria occur and develops policies and procedures
for linking its official facility planning systems to other facility
planning databases, such as the ones for range and medical facilities,
there is increased risk that Army facility planners will be using
outdated or inaccurate facility criteria and requirements data, making
poorly informed facility funding decisions, and potentially building
facilities that do not fully meet unit requirements and subsequently
require costly retrofitting.
Because construction of facilities is a process that requires ample
lead time, the Army stationing regulation prescribes specific
timelines and procedures for obtaining installation input into
proposed stationing actions in order for installations to provide
timely infrastructure support. However, the Army has not always
provided installations with timely information on stationing actions
because of numerous factors, such as the length and size of ongoing
operations, which has led to an increase in the movement of Army
personnel and units, and as a result, installations' abilities to
effectively develop plans to meet their facility requirements have
been hindered. Although high-level Army or DOD staffs and senior
decision makers have approval authority on stationing actions, the
installation's role is critical for thorough planning and analysis
and, ultimately, the successful execution of stationing actions. The
installations are the platforms from which these stationing actions
are initiated and executed. As the Army brings more troops back to the
United States, the level of installation response becomes more
critical. However, without developing a mechanism to more readily and
quickly share stationing information with installations and enhancing
communication with installations regarding changes to stationing
actions, the Army faces increased risk that more units will not have
permanent facilities available to them when they arrive at certain
installations.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the accuracy and completeness of the Army's Real Property
Planning and Analysis System as a tool for generating facility
requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Army to take the following two actions.
* Develop and implement guidance that requires the Army Criteria
Tracking System to be updated as changes to facility design criteria
are made.
* Develop and implement policies and procedures for linking other
systems, such as the Army Range Requirements Model and the Army Health
Planning Agency's system, to the Real Property Planning and Analysis
System in order to eliminate any potential confusion as to the correct
range and medical facility requirements.
To improve installations' abilities to develop and implement plans to
meet their facility requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following two
actions.
* Develop a streamlined mechanism to expedite the flow of stationing
information to installations.
* Modify existing guidance to enhance communication between decision
makers and installations so that installation facility planners are
notified when stationing actions are changed.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all
four of our recommendations related to improvements in the Army's
facility planning systems and stationing process. DOD's written
comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical
comments that we have incorporated into this report where applicable.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of the
Army to develop and implement guidance that requires the Army Criteria
Tracking System to be updated as changes to facility design criteria
are made, stating that the Army has already taken action to enhance
the accuracy of its planning systems to better respond to changing
requirements. However, in its official response to us, the department
provided neither specific details regarding the actions it had already
taken nor any specific timelines for taking future action to develop
and implement guidance that requires the Army Criteria Tracking System
to be updated as changes to facility design criteria are made, as we
recommended.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of
the Army to develop and implement policies and procedures for linking
other facility planning systems, such as the Army Range Requirements
Model and the Army Health Planning Agency's system, to the Real
Property Planning and Analysis System. Although the department stated
that linking the systems would require resolving numerous data
management and mapping issues, in technical comments, DOD stated that
it plans to partly address our recommendation by fielding a
comprehensive range planning tool called the Range Complex Master
Planning Tool. Further, the department said that the Army is
developing range facility planning training materials targeted at Army
Range management professionals using the Range Officer Professional
Development courseware. Although these are positive steps, DOD did not
indicate when the Army was going to link the Real Property Planning
and Analysis System to this new system or the other systems, as we
recommended.
The department also concurred with our recommendation to direct the
Secretary of the Army to develop a streamlined mechanism to expedite
the flow of stationing information to installations, stating that the
Army has already initiated improvements in its process and is
evaluating additional streamlining measures. The department did not
provide details regarding the improvements it had already made or the
additional measures it is evaluating to develop a mechanism that
expedites the flow of stationing information to installations, as we
recommended.
Finally, regarding our recommendation to direct the Secretary of the
Army to modify existing guidance to enhance communication between
decision makers and installations, DOD concurred. In its response, DOD
stated that the Army has already initiated improvements in its
communication process, but DOD did not provide any information as to
the nature of the improvements. DOD stated that it is evaluating
additional measures to ensure that data integrity and transparency are
achieved. Nonetheless, DOD provided no information showing that
modifications to guidance had been made or are planned that would
enhance communication so that the installation facility planners are
notified when stationing actions are changed, as we recommended.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army.
The report also is available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine how the Army's current and planned investments will meet
infrastructure requirements, we analyzed budget documents from fiscal
year 2006 through fiscal year 2015 to determine what the Army has
spent and plans to spend on constructing facilities in support of the
initiatives. Specifically, we analyzed the President's Budget for Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and for the active Army's military
construction from fiscal years 2006 through 2010 and the President's
Budget Estimation Submission for fiscal year 2011, which together
include budget data on military construction projects from fiscal
years 2006 through 2015 for the Grow the Force, Global Defense Posture
and Realignment, and Army Modularity initiatives. We included National
Guard and Army Reserve projects in our base BRAC calculations.
Additionally, we included domestic and overseas projects and planning
and design funding associated with the initiatives in our scope and
eliminated any projects that appeared on multiple budgets to ensure
there would be no double counting. To determine the amount of funding
for each initiative, we categorized each project according to its
management decision package designation, since each initiative had its
own designation. To determine to what extent the Army's investments
will reduce shortages in essential facilities from fiscal years 2009
through 2015 and the cost of the shortages that will remain beyond
fiscal year 2015, we analyzed data from the Army's Real Property
Planning and Analysis System. We performed this analysis for 48
Installation Management Command installations, including all of the
top 20 growth installations, and distilled it into 17 facility groups
containing over 80 facility types, which were labeled by the Army as
essential. See table 4 for a list of installations included in this
analysis.
Table 4: Installations Included in Essential Facility Shortage and
Military Construction Budget Analyses:
1. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.
2. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
3. Fort AP Hill, Virginia.
4. Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
5. Fort Drum, New York.
6. Fort Eustis, Virginia.
7. Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.
8. Fort Hamilton, New York.
9. Fort Lee, Virginia.
10. Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
11. Fort Monroe, Virginia.
12. Fort Myer, Virginia.
13. Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey.
14. West Point Military Reservation, New York.
15. Detroit Arsenal, Michigan.
16. Dugway Proving Ground, Utah.
17. Fort Carson, Colorado.
18. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
19. Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
20. Fort Lewis, Washington.
21. Fort Riley, Kansas.
22. Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois.
23. Fort Greely, Alaska.
24. Fort Richardson, Alaska.
25: Fort Shafter, Hawaii.
26. Fort Wainwright, Alaska.
27. Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
28. Fort Benning, Georgia.
29. Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
30. Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
31. Fort Gordon, Georgia.
32. Fort Jackson, South Carolina.
33. Fort Knox, Kentucky.
34. Fort McPherson, Georgia.
35. Fort Rucker, Alabama.
36. Fort Stewart, Georgia.
37. Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.
38. U.S. Army Garrison Miami, Florida.
39. Fort Bliss, Texas.
40. Fort Hood, Texas.
41. Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
42. Fort Polk, Louisiana.
43. Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
44. Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
45. National Training Center and Fort Irwin, California.
46. Presidio of Monterey, California.
47. White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.
48. Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We added add two facility types to the Army's list of essential
facilities--religious facilities and religious education facilities--
and excluded family housing as most of the Army's family housing is
now privatized. For the trend analysis of military construction and
quality of life projects, we analyzed the President's Budget for the
active Army's military construction from fiscal years 2006 through
2010 and the President's Budget Estimation Submission for fiscal year
2011. For projects in fiscal years 2006 through 2010, we counted a
project as starting in that year if the year listed for the project
matched the year on the source budget. For example, if a project was
scheduled for fiscal year 2007 on the 2007 President's Budget, then we
counted that project as starting in 2007. We performed this analysis
on the same 48 installations listed in table 4 and essential facility
groups as in the previous analysis; however, we condensed the facility
groups from 17 into 6 based on the categorization listed in Department
of the Army Pamphlet 415-28, Guide to Army Real Property Category
Codes. Finally, to provide insight into the results of these analyses,
we obtained and reviewed the garrison commanders' facility condition
reports from the Army's Installation Status Report database to obtain
examples of installations that have facility shortages. We also
interviewed officials from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Installations and Environment); Headquarters, Department of
the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation
Management; Headquarters, Installation Management Command; and
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff program
office (G-3/5/7), to gain insight into the Army's military
construction budgeting process.
To assess the accuracy and completeness of information used in the
Army's facility planning system, we were granted access to and
analyzed the data in the Army Stationing and Installation Plan, the
Real Property Planning and Analysis System, and the Army Criteria
Tracking System that are used by planners to identify facility
requirements and make budget decisions. To further assess these
systems, we compared the 62 Army of Corps of Engineers facility
standard designs currently completed to the information contained in
the Army's Criteria Tracking System to determine the extent to which
the criteria system contained the latest facility design criteria. To
gain further insight into the extent to which the Army's facility
planning systems are complete, current, and accurate, we performed a
second analysis that compared the allowances to requirements for all
287 facility types in Army's Real Property Planning and Analysis
System to determine the extent of differences. We also interviewed
officials from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment); Headquarters, Department of the Army,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management;
Headquarters, Installation Management Command; and Headquarters,
Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff program office
(G-3/5/7), to obtain information regarding the Army's facility
planning system.
To discuss the Army stationing process and determine whether
information is being provided to installations in time to allow them
to prepare facilities to meet stationing requirements, we analyzed
data from the Army's Stationing and Installation Plan, Campaign Plan,
and stationing packages, and we compared these to Army's military
construction plans. Additionally, we obtained and analyzed each of the
Army's rehearsal of concept drill briefs conducted for various
installations and several senior stationing review group briefs from
the last 2 years to identify any potential implementation issues
associated with the various initiatives. Rehearsal of concept drills
are Army headquarters-level, installation-specific exercises conducted
to identify and address any synchronization issues associated with the
implementation of the various initiatives. The senior stationing
review group is a monthly meeting chaired by the Army Vice Chief of
Staff conducted as part of the Army's overall military construction
budget process where issues associated with the Army-wide
implementation of the initiatives are surfaced and mitigated. Further,
in conducting our review, we visited four installations, Fort Bliss,
Texas; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Drum, New York; and Fort Stewart,
Georgia, that were either experiencing significant growth, were
affected by recent force structure decisions, or both. We also visited
Installation Management Command West at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and
Installation Management Command Southeast at Fort McPherson, Georgia.
During each visit, we were briefed on the installations' and regions'
master plans and interviewed directors or base commanders as well as
master planning and public works personnel to discuss any challenges
experienced in providing facilities and any mitigation efforts planned
or under way. We also interviewed officials from the Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment);
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Installation Management; Headquarters, Installation
Management Command; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy
Chief of Staff program office (G-3/5/7), to obtain information
regarding the Army's stationing process. Although we did not
independently validate the budget, construction, stationing, and
facility planning data provided by the Army, we discussed with
officials steps they have taken to ensure reasonable accuracy of the
data. As such, we determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2009 through June 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, Dc 20301-3000:
June 17, 2010:
Mr. Brian J. Lepore:
Director. Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Lepore:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-10-602, "Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its
Facility Planning Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing
Significant Growth," dated May 12, 2010 (GAO Code 351350). Specific
comments are enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Dorothy Robyn:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense:
(Installations and Environment):
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report ” Dated May 12,2010:
GAO Code 351350/GA0-10-602:
"Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning
Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant
Growth"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement guidance
that requires the Army Criteria Tracking System to be updated as
changes to facility design criteria are made.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. The Army has already taken action to
enhance the accuracy of its planning systems to better respond to
changing requirements.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement policies and
procedures for linking other systems. such as the Army Range
Requirements Model and the Army Health Planning Agency's System, to
the Real Property Planning and Analysis System in order to eliminate
any confusion as to the correct medical and range facility
requirements.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. This will require resolving numerous data
management and mapping issues, but should reduce or eliminate
confusion.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a streamlined mechanism to
expedite the flow of stationing information to installations.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. The Army has already initiated improvements
in its process and is evaluating additional streamlining measures.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to modify existing guidance to
enhance communication between decisionmakers and installations so that
the installation facility planners are notified when stationing
actions are changed.
DOD Response: DoD concurs. The Army has already initiated improvements
in its communication process and is evaluating additional measures to
ensure data integrity and transparency are achieved.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant
Director; Hiwotte Amare; Shawn Arbogast; Cynthia Grant; Shelby Kain;
Joanne Landesman; Oscar Mardis; Crystal Robinson; and Michael
Shaughnessy made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Determine and Use the Most
Economical Building Materials and Methods When Acquiring New Permanent
Facilities. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-436].
Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2010.
Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Ability to Manage,
Assess, and Report on Global Defense Posture Initiatives. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-706R]. Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2009.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Improve Oversight of Relocatable
Facilities and Develop a Strategy for Managing Their Use across the
Military Services. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-585]. Washington, D.C.: June 12,
2009.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support
Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of
Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-336]. Washington, D.C.: March 30,
2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in
Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently Updating
Savings Estimates. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-217]. Washington, D.C.: January 30,
2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271]. Washington, D.C.: January
2009.
Defense Infrastructure: Army's Approach for Acquiring Land Is Not
Guided by Up-to-Date Strategic Plan or Always Communicated
Effectively. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-32].
Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2009.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665]. Washington, D.C.:
June 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Continued Management Attention Is Needed to
Support Installation Facilities and Operations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-502]. Washington, D.C.: April 24,
2008.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road
Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-602R]. Washington, D.C.: April 1,
2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Army and Marine Corps Grow the Force
Construction Projects Generally Support the Initiative. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-375]. Washington, D.C.: March 6,
2008.
Force Structure --Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow
the Force Initiative Funding Plan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-354R]. Washington, D.C.: January
18, 2008.
Force Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the
Army's Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve
Accountability for Results. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-145]. Washington, D.C.: December
14, 2007.
Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial
Personnel Growth. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1007]. Washington, D.C.: September
13, 2007.
Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are
Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture
Restructuring. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-852].
Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.
Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and
Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-556]. Washington, D.C.: June 15,
2005.
Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military
Construction Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-288]. Washington, D.C.: February
24, 2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] We began our analysis in 2003, 1 year before the start of Army
Modularity, so that we could compare populations before and after the
implementation of the initiatives.
[2] According to the Army, this system will be subsumed under the Web-
based Real Property Planning and Analysis System and will no longer be
referred to as the Army Criteria Tracking System but rather the Army
Space Planning Criteria.
[3] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2009).
[4] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the
Military Construction Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-288] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24,
2004).
[5] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for
Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army Installations
Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1007] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13,
2007).
[6] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges
in Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently
Updating Savings Estimates, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-217] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30,
2009).
[7] These estimates do not include $180 million appropriated for Army
Military Construction in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009.
[8] Army calculations for BRAC include Army Reserve and National Guard
military construction, while other initiative calculations do not.
[9] These figures do not include seven child development centers that
are planned to be built with funds received from the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
[10] These figures do not include seven child development centers that
are planned to be built with funds received from the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
[11] To calculate facility shortages, the Army compares installation
facility requirements to current and planned inventory. It did not use
facility allowances to calculate shortages. The difference between
requirements and allowances are that the allowances are the computer-
generated needs based solely on standardized criteria and requirements
are the refined allowances that have been adjusted to meet the needs
of individual installations. According to Army officials, refined
facility requirements are a more accurate picture of facility needs
than the computer-generated allowances and are what they used to guide
their investment and budget request decisions. To estimate the cost to
eliminate the projected facility shortage, we used the Army's nominal
dollar per square foot estimate and not actual construction
programming documents, which would provide more accurate
representations of actual costs. As a result, the actual amount of
additional investment needed is likely to be more than $19 billion.
[12] Army Regulation 210-20, Real Property Master Planning for Army
Installations, governs the process for real property master planning
in the Army. In addition to prescribing roles, responsibilities, and
procedures related to real property planning, this regulation requires
the use of the Real Property Planning and Analysis System for
generating facility allowances and requirements.
[13] In addition, other Army management systems, such as the Army
Headquarters Installation Information System, Structure and Manpower
Allocation System, and Authorization Document System, feed real
property asset, manpower, and unit equipment data into the Real
Property Planning and Analysis System.
[14] In 2006, the Army adopted a strategy, known as military
construction transformation, which included numerous changes to its
traditional practices that were designed to reduce facility
acquisition costs and construction timelines. Among the changes was
the development of standard designs for common facility types. So far,
the Army Corps of Engineers has developed 44 standard facility designs
that encompass 62 different types of facilities. See GAO, Defense
Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Determine and Use the Most Economical
Building Materials and Methods When Acquiring New Permanent
Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-436]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2010).
[15] The primary focus of Army Regulation 5-10 is permanent stationing
in the continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, and the Trust
Territories; permanent stationing from a location within the
continental United States to a location outside the continental United
States; and permanent stationing from a location outside the
continental United States to a location within. It does not apply to a
variety of stationing actions, including those specifically mandated
by law (as well as actions specifically directed by BRAC), units
returning to the continental United States in accordance with
applicable emergency provisions in the execution of contingency plans
or for other reasons of national security, temporary unit relocation
because of approved construction or renovation of current facilities,
or other specified actions. Nevertheless, the regulation indicates
that the same planning methodology should be followed whenever a
stationing action is being considered, regardless of the source or
purpose of the action. See Army Regulation 5-10, Stationing (DRAFT), §
1-5(d) and (e).
[16] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Improve Oversight of
Relocatable Facilities and Develop a Strategy for Managing Their Use
across the Military Services, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-585] (Washington, D.C.: June 12,
2009).
[17] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review
Support Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress
of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-336] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30,
2009).
[End of section]
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