Depot Maintenance
Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That Navy Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements Gao ID: GAO-10-585 June 11, 2010The Navy's depots provide critical maintenance support to operations around the world. The Department of Defense's (DOD) increased reliance on the private sector for depot maintenance support coupled with downsizing led to a deterioration of depots' capabilities and cost increases. In 2007, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed each service to submit a depot maintenance strategic plan and provided direction for the content of those plans. The 2007 U.S. Navy Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan contained a separate plan for each of five functional areas and an executive summary. GAO used qualitative content analyses to determine the extent to which two of the plans address (1) elements of a results-oriented management framework and (2) OSD's direction for the plan's content. GAO examined the plans for Navy aviation (NAVAIR) and ships (NAVSEA), which account for 94 percent of Navy depot workload.
While the Navy's plans for aviation and shipyard depot maintenance focus efforts on weapon system and equipment availability, they do not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework. GAO's prior work has shown that seven elements of a results-oriented management framework are critical for comprehensive strategic planning. The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans both fully address one of the elements by including mission statements that summarize their depots' major functions and operations, but the plans partially address or do not address the other six elements. For example, even though the plans describe goals for the depots' mission-related functions, they do not specify interim milestones or time frames for achieving the goals. Additionally, the plans include some measurable warfighter support metrics to gauge progress toward achieving the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans' long-term goals; however, the plans do not describe how these metrics directly correspond to each long-term goal, desired levels for each, or how they will be used to evaluate each goal. Further, the Navy does not have an integrated Navy-wide depot maintenance strategic plan, but instead uses an overarching executive summary that does not have clear linkages to the separate plans and has the weaknesses resulting from the separate plans' missing or limited information on some elements. The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans do not fully address these concerns because of weaknesses in oversight. Although OSD established an oversight body, which included senior representatives from OSD and the services, to review the services' plans, this body did not review the plans. Also, the Navy did not establish an oversight mechanism to review its plans. The plans' weaknesses may limit the Navy's ability to use its plan as a tool to meet future challenges effectively and efficiently. In addition, the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans are not fully responsive to OSD's direction to the services that was designed to provide the services with a framework to meet future challenges. OSD directed the services to address 10 specific issues in four general areas: logistics transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital investment. Both plans partially address 8 of these issues and do not address the remaining 2. For example, both plans discuss management approaches for integrating public- and private-sector depot sources, but the plans are silent with regard to integrating joint, interservice, or multinational depot capabilities. The plans do not discuss the methods for estimating the amount of workload or the projected effects on depot workload caused by weapon system retirements and locating weapon systems at specific installations. The plans do not fully respond to OSD's direction for the plans' content in part because of weaknesses in oversight in both OSD and the Navy. As a result, these weaknesses could additionally limit the Navy's efforts to posture and resource its depots to meet future maintenance challenges.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Jack E. Edwards Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-8246GAO-10-585, Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That Navy Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements
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Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2010:
Depot Maintenance:
Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That Navy Depots Can Meet
Future Maintenance Requirements:
GAO-10-585:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-585, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Navy‘s depots provide critical maintenance support to operations
around the world. The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) increased reliance
on the private sector for depot maintenance support coupled with
downsizing led to a deterioration of depots‘ capabilities and cost
increases. In 2007, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
directed each service to submit a depot maintenance strategic plan and
provided direction for the content of those plans. The 2007 U.S. Navy
Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan contained a separate plan for each of
five functional areas and an executive summary. GAO used qualitative
content analyses to determine the extent to which two of the plans
address (1) elements of a results-oriented management framework and
(2) OSD‘s direction for the plan‘s content. GAO examined the plans for
Navy aviation (NAVAIR) and ships (NAVSEA), which account for 94
percent of Navy depot workload.
What GAO Found:
While the Navy‘s plans for aviation and shipyard depot maintenance
focus efforts on weapon system and equipment availability, they do not
fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework.
GAO‘s prior work has shown that seven elements of a results-oriented
management framework are critical for comprehensive strategic
planning. The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans both fully address one of the
elements by including mission statements that summarize their depots‘
major functions and operations, but the plans partially address or do
not address the other six elements. For example, even though the plans
describe goals for the depots‘ mission-related functions, they do not
specify interim milestones or time frames for achieving the goals.
Additionally, the plans include some measurable warfighter support
metrics to gauge progress toward achieving the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans‘
long-term goals; however, the plans do not describe how these metrics
directly correspond to each long-term goal, desired levels for each,
or how they will be used to evaluate each goal. Further, the Navy does
not have an integrated Navy-wide depot maintenance strategic plan, but
instead uses an overarching executive summary that does not have clear
linkages to the separate plans and has the weaknesses resulting from
the separate plans‘ missing or limited information on some elements.
The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans do not fully address these concerns
because of weaknesses in oversight. Although OSD established an
oversight body, which included senior representatives from OSD and the
services, to review the services‘ plans, this body did not review the
plans. Also, the Navy did not establish an oversight mechanism to
review its plans. The plans‘ weaknesses may limit the Navy‘s ability
to use its plan as a tool to meet future challenges effectively and
efficiently.
In addition, the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans are not fully responsive to
OSD‘s direction to the services that was designed to provide the
services with a framework to meet future challenges. OSD directed the
services to address 10 specific issues in four general areas:
logistics transformation, core logistics capability assurance,
workforce revitalization, and capital investment. Both plans partially
address 8 of these issues and do not address the remaining 2. For
example, both plans discuss management approaches for integrating
public- and private-sector depot sources, but the plans are silent
with regard to integrating joint, interservice, or multinational depot
capabilities. The plans do not discuss the methods for estimating the
amount of workload or the projected effects on depot workload caused
by weapon system retirements and locating weapon systems at specific
installations. The plans do not fully respond to OSD‘s direction for
the plans‘ content in part because of weaknesses in oversight in both
OSD and the Navy. As a result, these weaknesses could additionally
limit the Navy‘s efforts to posture and resource its depots to meet
future maintenance challenges.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Navy revise its plans to fully address
all elements of the framework and all Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD [AT&L])–
directed issues, demonstrate linkages in future strategic plans, and
implement oversight procedures for reviewing future plan revisions and
plan implementation. DOD concurred with our recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-585] or key
components. For more information, contact Jack Edwards at (202) 512-
8246 or edwardsj@gao.gov.
[End of letter]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Do Not Fully Address All Elements of a Results-
Oriented Management Framework:
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Do Not Fully Respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s
Direction Designed to Meet Future Challenges:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: NAVAIR and NAVSEA Depots, Locations, Principal Work,
Workload, and Number of Civilian Personnel:
Table 2: The Extent to Which the NAVAIR and NAVSEA Depot Maintenance
Strategic Plans Address the Elements of a Results-Oriented Management
Framework:
Table 3: The Extent to Which the NAVAIR and NAVSEA Depot Maintenance
Strategic Plans Address OUSD (AT&L)'s Direction:
Table 4: Organizations Contacted to Obtain Information about the
Navy's Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan:
Abbreviations:
BRAC: Base Realignment and Closure Act:
DOD: Department of Defense:
NAVAIR: Naval Air systems Command:
NAVSEA: Naval Sea Systems Command:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
OUSD (AT&L): Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 11, 2010:
The Honorable Solomon Ortiz:
Chairman:
The Honorable J. Randy Forbes:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Readiness:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Navy's 11 maintenance depots provide equipment repair and
sustainment services that are critical to supporting ongoing
operations around the world. Prior to the onset of military operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense's (DOD) increased
reliance on the private sector for depot maintenance support--coupled
with declining budgets, downsizing, and consolidations as a result of
previous Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) decisions--led to a
decline in maintenance workloads for the depots and contributed to the
general deterioration of capabilities, reliability, and cost-
effectiveness of military depots. Downsizing efforts also affected the
depots' abilities to obtain investments in facilities, equipment, and
human capital to support their long-term viability and to ensure that
they remained a key resource for repair of new and modified systems.
In 2001, DOD identified performance-based logistics[Footnote 1] as its
preferred support strategy, further increasing reliance on contractors
to support many of its weapon systems.
In 2003 and again in 2006, the House Armed Services Committee
encouraged DOD to develop a comprehensive depot maintenance strategy.
[Footnote 2] In March 2007, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD [AT&L]) issued
DOD's depot maintenance strategic plan, which articulated the
department's strategy for posturing and resourcing the depots to meet
the national security and management challenges of the 21st century.
In March 2007, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, within OUSD (AT&L), directed each of
the services to conduct strategic planning for depot maintenance and
submit plans that focus on achieving DOD's strategy.[Footnote 3] In
response, the Navy published its December 2007 U.S. Navy Depot
Maintenance Strategic Plan, which consists of an overarching executive
summary and the individual depot maintenance plans developed by the
following Navy commands and centers: (1) the Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA), (2) the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), (3) the Naval
Undersea Warfare Center, (4) the Naval Surface Warfare Center, and (5)
the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. According to Navy
officials, together these five documents and updates issued in 2009
collectively respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s direction. DOD's 2007 Depot
Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans also notes that the
services would update their depot maintenance strategic plans no later
than 6 months after the publication of an updated DOD depot
maintenance strategic plan, which will be published within 6 months of
the publication of the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report.[Footnote 4]
Our prior work has shown that organizations conducting strategic
planning--as the Navy is doing for its maintenance depots--need to
develop a comprehensive, results-oriented management framework to
remain operationally effective, efficient, and capable of meeting
future requirements.[Footnote 5] Such a framework includes seven
critical elements: a comprehensive mission statement; long-term goals;
strategies to achieve the goals; use of metrics to gauge progress;
identification of key external factors that could affect the
achievement of the goals; a discussion of how program evaluations will
be used; and stakeholder involvement in developing the plan. In its
March 2007 call for strategic plans, OUSD (AT&L) directed the services
to address many of these elements in their strategic plans. In
addition, OUSD (AT&L) directed the services to address 10 specific
issues in four general areas: logistics transformation, core logistics
capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital
investment. OUSD (AT&L) officials told us that the direction in these
four areas was designed to provide the services' plans with a
framework to meet future challenges.
In September 2009, we issued a report on the Army's and Marine Corps'
depot maintenance strategic plans.[Footnote 6] Subsequently, your
office asked us to review the Air Force's and Navy's depot maintenance
strategic plans to determine the extent to which the latter plans
provided a comprehensive strategy for meeting future requirements. In
May 2010, we issued a report on the Air Force depot maintenance
strategic plan.[Footnote 7] As agreed with your office, this report
addresses two questions: (1) To what extent does the Navy's depot
maintenance strategic plan address key elements of a results-oriented
management framework? and (2) To what extent does the Navy's depot
maintenance strategic plan address OUSD (AT&L)'s direction that was
designed to provide a framework for the services to meet future
challenges? The Related GAO Products section at the end of the report
lists additional publications on related topics.
We used the same set of methodological procedures to answer both
questions, and each type of procedure was performed simultaneously for
the two questions. Specifically, we reviewed the December 2007 U.S.
Navy Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan. Because the Navy does not have
a single Navy-wide plan, but rather a family of strategic planning
documents, we focused our review on plans developed by the two
commands whose maintenance depots collectively are responsible for 94
percent of the Navy's depot maintenance workload. The two plans are
NAVAIR's Naval Aviation Industrial Strategy and NAVSEA's Naval
Shipyard Business Plan. We reviewed the 2007 NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans
and their 2009 updates. We evaluated the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans using
qualitative content analyses to compare information from them against
criteria both from the seven elements of a results-oriented management
framework[Footnote 8] and the 10 issues listed in the OUSD (AT&L)
direction for depot maintenance strategic plans. To conduct these
analyses, we first developed a data-collection instrument that
incorporated these two types of criteria. One team member then
analyzed the plans using this instrument. To verify the preliminary
observations from this initial analysis, a second team member
concurrently conducted an independent analysis of the plans. We
compared the two sets of observations and discussed any differences.
We reconciled the differences with the assistance of analysts from the
team that was evaluating the Air Force depot maintenance strategic
plan. We met with Navy officials to confirm our understanding of the
plans and sought additional information where our preliminary analyses
revealed that one or both plans partially address or do not address
the criteria. We also interviewed and obtained documentary evidence
from relevant OUSD (AT&L) officials regarding its oversight of the
services' plans. Additionally, we interviewed depot leaders and
strategic planning personnel at three of the seven NAVAIR and NAVSEA
depots to obtain first-hand information on issues the depots face. We
also analyzed depot-level and servicewide depot maintenance data such
as workload, personnel, and depot capacity utilization and determined
that these data were sufficiently reliable for our report. More
detailed information on our scope and methodology is provided in
appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 through June 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Depot maintenance is the materiel maintenance or repair requiring the
overhaul, upgrading, or rebuilding of parts, assemblies, or
subassemblies, and the testing and reclamation of equipment,
regardless of the source of funds for the maintenance or repair or the
location at which the maintenance or repair is performed.[Footnote 9]
The Navy maintains 11 maintenance depots that are designed to retain,
at a minimum, a ready, controlled source of technical competence and
resources to meet military requirements. NAVAIR's three Fleet
Readiness Centers and NAVSEA's four Naval Shipyards work on a wide
range of weapon systems and military equipment. These Fleet Readiness
Centers and Naval Shipyards are responsible for over 94 percent of the
Navy's depot maintenance workload. Table 1 describes the location,
principal work, workload, and personnel for NAVAIR and NAVSEA depots.
[Footnote 10]
Table 1: NAVAIR and NAVSEA Depots, Locations, Principal Work,
Workload, and Number of Civilian Personnel:
Navy depot and location: NAVAIR: Fleet Readiness Center East; Cherry
Point, North Carolina;
Principal work: Marine Corps and multiservice aircraft, helicopter and
turbofan vectored engines, auxiliary power units, pressurization
units, and related components;
Fiscal year 2009: Workload (in millions of direct labor hours): 3.4;
Fiscal year 2009: Civilian personnel: 3,385.
Navy depot and location: NAVAIR: Fleet Readiness Center Southeast;
Jacksonville, Florida;
Principal work: Airframes; and propulsion, avionics, surveillance, and
countermeasure systems;
Fiscal year 2009: Workload (in millions of direct labor hours): 3.4;
Fiscal year 2009: Civilian personnel: 3,178.
Navy depot and location: NAVAIR: Fleet Readiness Center Southwest;
North Island, California;
Principal work: Navy and Marine Corps fixed-and rotary-wing airframes,
propulsion systems, avionics, command and control equipment, and early
warning and airborne battle-management systems;
Fiscal year 2009: Workload (in millions of direct labor hours): 3.2;
Fiscal year 2009: Civilian personnel: 2,664.
Navy depot and location: NAVSEA: Norfolk Naval Shipyard; Norfolk
Virginia;
Principal work: Nuclear refueling and defueling, nuclear submarines,
aircraft carriers, and surface combatants;
Fiscal year 2009: Workload (in millions of direct labor hours): 9.8;
Fiscal year 2009: Civilian personnel: 8,117.
Navy depot and location: NAVSEA: Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard;
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii;
Principal work: Nuclear refueling, and defueling, nuclear submarines,
surface combatants, and watercraft;
Fiscal year 2009: Workload (in millions of direct labor hours): 5.2;
Fiscal year 2009: Civilian personnel: 4,279.
Navy depot and location: NAVSEA: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard;
Kittery, Maine;
Principal work: Nuclear refueling nuclear submarines, and deep-
submergence vehicle maintenance;
Fiscal year 2009: Workload (in millions of direct labor hours): 5.4;
Fiscal year 2009: Civilian personnel: 4189.
Navy depot and location: NAVSEA: Puget Sound Naval Shipyard;
Bremerton, Washington;
Principal work: Nuclear refueling and defueling, nuclear submarines,
aircraft carriers, and ship recycling;
Fiscal year 2009: Workload (in millions of direct labor hours): 12.8;
Fiscal year 2009: Civilian personnel: 10,004.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
Note: Data are from the 2007 U.S. Navy Depot Maintenance Strategic
Plan and Navy budget documents.
[End of table]
Depot maintenance activities are complex and require deliberate
planning in order to efficiently and effectively meet future
requirements. Our prior work has shown that organizations, like Navy
depots, need sound strategic management planning in order to identify
and achieve long-range goals and objectives. We have identified
critical elements that should be incorporated into strategic plans to
establish a comprehensive, results-oriented management framework.
[Footnote 11] A results-oriented management framework provides an
approach whereby program effectiveness is measured in terms of
outcomes or impact, rather than outputs, such as activities and
processes. Approaches to such planning vary according to agency-
specific needs and missions, but our work suggests that, irrespective
of the context in which planning is done, such a strategic plan should
contain the following elements:[Footnote 12]
1. Mission statement: A statement that concisely summarizes what the
organization does, presenting the main purposes for all its major
functions and operations.
2. Long-term goals: A specific set of policy, programmatic, and
management goals for the programs and operations covered in the
strategic plan. The long-term goals should correspond to the purposes
set forth in the mission statement and develop with greater
specificity how an organization will carry out its mission.
3. Strategies to achieve the goals: A description of how the goals
contained in the strategic plan and performance plan are to be
achieved, including the operational processes; skills and technology;
and the human, capital, information, and other resources required to
meet these goals.
4. Use of metrics to gauge progress: A set of metrics that will be
applied to gauge progress toward attainment of each of the plan's long-
term goals.
5. External factors that could affect goals: Key factors external to
the organization and beyond its control that could significantly
affect the achievement of the long-term goals contained in the
strategic plan. These external factors can include economic,
demographic, social, technological, or environmental factors, as well
as conditions or events that would affect the organization's ability
to achieve its strategic goals.
6. Evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives:
Assessments, through objective measurement and systematic analysis, of
the manner and extent to which programs associated with the strategic
plan achieve their intended goals.
7. Stakeholder involvement: Consideration of the views and
suggestions--solicited during the development of the strategic plan--
of those entities potentially affected by or interested in the
organization's activities.
In addition to our work on strategic planning, recent legislation has
focused attention on DOD's and the military departments' maintenance
strategies and plans. The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009[Footnote 13]requires the Secretary of Defense to
contract for a study, that, among other things, will address DOD's and
the military departments' life-cycle maintenance strategies and
implementation plans on a variety of topics including: outcome-based
performance-management objectives, workload projection, workforce, and
capital-investment strategies. Additionally, the act requires that the
study examine "the relevant body of work performed by the Government
Accountability Office." OUSD (AT&L) officials told us that they expect
the final report from this study to be delivered to Congress in
December 2010.
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Do Not Fully Address All Elements of a Results-
Oriented Management Framework:
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Do Not Fully Address Elements of a Results-
Oriented Management Framework, and Linkages with Navy-wide Summary Are
Unclear:
While the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans focus their efforts on weapon system
and equipment availability, they do not fully address the elements of
a results-oriented management framework, and the two plans and the
Navy-wide executive summary are not clearly integrated. The NAVAIR
plan fully addresses one of the seven elements, partially addresses
five elements, and does not address one element that our prior work
has shown to be critical in developing a comprehensive strategic plan.
The NAVSEA plan fully addresses one of the seven elements, partially
addresses four elements, and does not address the remaining two
elements. Table 2 summarizes the extent to which both depot
maintenance strategic plans address the elements of a results-oriented
management framework. Additionally, the Navy does not have an
integrated servicewide plan with clear links across the command-level
plans and to the Navy-wide overarching executive summary. As a result
of these weaknesses, the Navy may be limited in its ability to use the
information in the plans as a servicewide decision-making tool to meet
future challenges.
Table 2: The Extent to Which the NAVAIR and NAVSEA Depot Maintenance
Strategic Plans Address the Elements of a Results-Oriented Management
Framework:
Elements: 1. Mission statement;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Addresses: The plan includes a results-oriented mission statement that
defines the NAVAIR mission and aligns with the DOD and Navy depot
maintenance mission statements. Specifically, the depots' overarching
purpose is to produce relevant quality aircraft, engines, components,
and support equipment to meet fleet demand and ensure fleet safety
with improved efficiency and reduced cost;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Addresses: The plan includes a results-oriented mission statement that
defines the NAVSEA mission and aligns with the DOD and Navy depot
maintenance mission statements. Specifically, the depots' overarching
purpose is to provide the capability on ships and weapons systems
required by Navy component commanders and combatant commanders.
Elements: 2. Long-term goals;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan identifies five goals: core sustaining
capability, optimization of the industrial base, logistics
transformation, workforce revitalization, and capital investment;
however, it does not specify the time frames for achieving these
goals. For example, while the NAVAIR plan identifies developing the
industrial capabilities to support future Naval Aviation requirements
as one of its industrial base optimization goals, it does not specify
interim goals and milestones or the time frame for achieving this goal;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: The plan identifies three goals: accomplish the
current readiness workload; sustain the capability and capacity for
future workload; and improve processes and systems to provide quality,
value, and operational availability to customers. However, it does not
specify the time frames for achieving these goals. For example, while
the NAVSEA plan identifies sustaining capability and capacity for
future workload as one of its sustaining future workload goals, it
does not specify the time frame for achieving this goal.
Elements: 3. Strategies to achieve the goals;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan generally discusses NAVAIR's strategies
to achieve its depot maintenance goals; however, it does not describe
the resources required to achieve the goals. For example, the plan
discusses a general strategy that involves processes for the
integration of depot and intermediate levels of repair, industrial and
maintenance program coordinators, and the infusion of new technologies
to transform NAVAIR maintenance processes. It does not, however,
describe the capital, personnel, or technologies needed to execute
this strategy;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: The plan generally discusses NAVSEA's strategies
to achieve its depot maintenance goals; however it does not describe
the resources required to achieve the goals. For example, the plan
discusses NAVSEA's Information Technology Modernization strategy to
provide the Naval Shipyards with information systems they need to
sustain future workloads. However, the plan does not describe the
capital, personnel, or technologies needed to execute the strategy.
Elements: 4. Use of metrics to gauge progress;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan includes some measurable warfighter-
support metrics that NAVAIR officials told us were intended to
indirectly gauge progress toward achieving each of the plan's long-
term goals. However, the plan does not describe how these metrics
directly correspond to each long-term goal, desired levels for each,
or how they will be used to evaluate each goal. For example, the
NAVAIR plan identifies flying-hour metrics, but the plan does not
directly link these metrics to any of the five long-term goals;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: The plan includes some measurable workload
metrics that NAVSEA officials told us were intended to indirectly
gauge progress toward achieving each of the plan's long-term goals;
however, the plan does not describe how these metrics directly
correspond to each long-term goal, the desired levels for each, or how
they will be used to evaluate each goal. For example, while the plan
identifies a metric for shipyard workload levels, it does not describe
how workload levels are calculated or how the metric gauges progress
toward any of the three long-term goals.
Elements: 5. Key external factors that could affect goals;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan broadly identifies two external factors
that could affect its successful implementation. Specifically, the
plan identifies changes in force structure and the ongoing conflicts
in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the plan does not discuss a method
for monitoring the environment for changes in these or other factors;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Does not address: The plan does not identify external factors that
could affect NAVSEA's ability to achieve program goals. External
factors may include economic, demographic, social, technological, or
environmental factors, as well as conditions or events that would
affect the organization's ability to achieve its strategic goals.
Additionally, the plan does not discuss a method for monitoring the
environment for changes in these or other factors.
Elements: 6. Evaluations of the plan to monitor goals and objectives;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Does not address: The plan does not describe program evaluations to
assess depot performance against the plan's goals and strategies even
though the plan indicates that NAVAIR must continuously validate and
update the plan to meet operational depot maintenance requirements.
For example, the plan does not describe the scope, methodology, or
schedule for evaluations;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Does not address: The plan does not describe program evaluations to
assess performance against the plan's goals and strategies, even
though the plan indicates that NAVSEA must continuously validate and
update the plan to meet operational depot maintenance requirements.
For example, the plan does not describe the scope, methodology, or
schedule for evaluations.
Elements: 7. Stakeholder involvement in developing the plan;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: We were told that many offices within NAVAIR
collaboratively developed its depot maintenance strategic plan;
however, depot officials indicated that they were not involved in some
aspects of the development of the plan, even though their depots must
carry out actions described in the plan. NAVAIR solicited input
primarily from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition; the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment; the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Fleet Readiness and
Logistics; and NAVAIR directorates and program executive offices;
Degree plan addresses element: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: Many offices within NAVSEA collaboratively
developed its depot maintenance strategic plan; however, depot
officials indicated that they were not involved in some aspects of the
development of the plan, even though their depots must carry out
actions described in the plan. NAVSEA officials told us they solicited
input primarily from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development and Acquisition; the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment; the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Fleet Readiness and
Logistics; the Atlantic and Pacific fleets; and NAVAIR directorates
and program executive offices.
Source: GAO analysis of NAVSEA and NAVAIR data.
Note: Among other things, the 2007 U.S. Navy Depot Maintenance
Strategic Plan contained NAVAIR's Naval Aviation Industrial Strategy
and NAVSEA's Naval Shipyard Business Plan. NAVAIR and NAVSEA also
published updates in 2009. We reviewed information from the 2007 and
2009 documents in our evaluation of the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans.
[End of table]
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Fully Address the Depot Maintenance Mission
Statement Element:
The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans' depot maintenance mission statements
fully address one of the seven elements of a results-oriented
management framework. NAVAIR's and NAVSEA's mission statements
summarize each command's overarching purpose and address its major
functions and operations. In prior reports on strategic planning, we
have noted that a mission statement is important because it provides
focus by explaining why an organization exists and what it does.
[Footnote 14] The overarching purpose of the NAVAIR depots is to
ensure that weapons systems and equipment are operational and
available to meet fleet demand at reduced costs. The overarching
purpose of the NAVSEA Naval Shipyards is to provide the capability on
ships and weapons systems required by Navy component commanders and
combatant commanders. Both mission statements are outcome-oriented and
correspond with the more general departmentwide mission statement in
DOD's Depot Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans, which
states that the mission of DOD depots is to meet the national security
and materiel readiness challenges of the 21st century.
NAVAIR Plan Partially Addresses Five Elements, and NAVSEA Plan
Partially Addresses Four Elements:
The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans each partially address four of the results-
oriented management framework elements: long-term goals, strategies to
achieve the goals, use of metrics to gauge progress, and stakeholder
involvement in developing the plan. The NAVAIR plan also partially
addresses a fifth area--external factors that could affect goals--that
the NAVSEA plan does not address.
With regard to the long-term goals, while both plans identify some
strategic goals that generally relate to mission statements, they do
not specify time frames for achieving any of these goals. For example,
the NAVAIR plan listed five goals, including the goal to optimize the
industrial base; however, it does not describe what aspects of the
industrial base require adjustments or specify the milestones or time
frames for achieving this goal. Similarly, the NAVSEA plan identifies
three strategic goals. For example, the plan identifies the goal of
enhancing ship operational availability by minimizing maintenance
time, but the plan does not discuss the time frames, numbers and types
of ships that will undergo maintenance, or the level of availability
anticipated.
Both plans partially address strategies to achieve the goals. For
example, to realize the goal of logistics transformation, NAVAIR has
adopted a strategy that includes initiatives for the integration of
depot and intermediate levels of repair, industrial and maintenance
program coordinators, and the infusion of technologies into
maintenance processes. Similarly, the NAVSEA plan identifies multiple
key strategic investment areas to achieve its goals, such as the
Information Technology Modernization Plan to provide the Naval
Shipyards with the information systems they need to meet their
mission. However, neither plan describes the capital, personnel, or
technology resources needed to facilitate implementation of the
strategies.
Regarding metrics to gauge progress, the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans
partially address this element. Officials for each command indicated
that the metrics listed in their plan are intended to "indirectly"
gauge progress toward achieving the plan's long-term goals. The NAVAIR
plan includes measurable warfighter support metrics such as "cycle
time" (the amount of time from when the need of repair is identified
to when the component such as an engine is reinstalled on the aircraft
or restocked on a shelf) and "time on wing" (the amount of time a
component is operational on the aircraft). The NAVSEA plan also
generally describes some metrics such as shipyard workload levels.
However, the plans do not describe how these metrics correspond to
each long-term goal, the desired level for each metric, or how the
metrics will be used to evaluate each goal.
For the stakeholder-involvement element, NAVAIR and NAVSEA involved
many relevant stakeholders in the development of their respective
plans, but neither command involved depot officials directly in all
aspects of its strategic planning process. NAVAIR and NAVSEA developed
their plans primarily by using inputs from directorates and program
executive offices within the commands and the following Navy-wide
stakeholders:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development and Acquisition;
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and
Environment; and:
* Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Fleet Readiness
and Logistics.
In our interviews with NAVAIR and NAVSEA depot officials, they said
they were not directly involved in the plans' development, even though
their depots would be directly affected by the plans. For example,
NAVAIR and NAVSEA depot officials indicated that they had limited or
no involvement in the development of their plans.
Regarding external factors that could affect the goals, the NAVAIR
plan partially addresses this element, but the NAVSEA plan did not
address the element. The plan identifies ongoing conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq and changes in NAVAIR's force structure as some
of the key external factors, but it does not describe how these
factors can affect the plan. Also, our report that identified the
elements of a results-oriented management framework for strategic
planning noted a wide range of key external factors to consider, such
as economic, demographic, social, and environmental factors.[Footnote
15] In contrast, the NAVSEA plan does not identify any key external
factors that could affect execution of that plan.
NAVSEA Plan Does Not Address Two Elements, and NAVAIR Plan Does Not
Address One Element:
As cited above, the NAVSEA plan does not address any key external
factors; and neither the NAVAIR nor the NAVSEA plan provides
information on how the command intends to evaluate the execution of
its plan. For example, neither describes the scope, methodology, or
schedule for the evaluations that will be needed to provide reliable
data on goal attainment. Also, neither plan identifies how the command
will monitor and use the results of such evaluations to adjust the
plan's long-term goals and strategies to achieve desired levels of
performance. Both plans do, however, indicate that the commands must
continuously validate and update their depot maintenance strategic
plans to meet operational depot maintenance requirements.
The Navy Does Not Have an Integrated Servicewide Plan for Depot
Maintenance:
The Navy does not have an integrated depot maintenance strategic plan
that clearly links the elements of the commands' plans with the
servicewide executive summary. As mentioned previously, the Navy-wide
plan consists of an executive summary and five separate plans. OUSD
(AT&L) instructed each service to publish its depot maintenance
strategic plan in a single depot maintenance-specific document or as
an integral part of one or more documents having a broader scope.
Linkage of information between the executive summary and one or more
of the plans, as well as linkage of information from the various
plans, was sometimes unclear. For example, the executive summary
identifies four "outcome metrics"--material availability, material
reliability, mean down time, and ownership costs--to be used across
all fleet and aviation depot maintenance activities. While the NAVAIR
plan identifies metrics, the links between those metrics and the four
Navy-wide outcome metrics were not specified. We could not determine
if all four of the Navy-wide metrics were addressed, at least
indirectly, by the metrics in the NAVAIR plan. Similarly, the
commonalities or linkages among the plans were sometimes not evident.
For example, the NAVAIR plan identifies optimizing the industrial base
as one of its long-term strategic goals, but the NAVSEA plan is silent
about this goal.
Navy officials told us that they did not publish a single plan because
Navy commands and activities have different missions, capabilities,
and maintenance processes. They acknowledged that the linkages among
the plans and with the executive summary could have been more clearly
established, and they said they will address these weaknesses in
future plan updates. The limited integration across the separate plans
and the executive summary could have negative effects such as making
it difficult to (1) recognize areas where each plan does not address
key Navy-wide concerns and (2) use the separate plans efficiently and
effectively for servicewide decision making.
OUSD (AT&L) and the Navy Did Not Use Effective Oversight Mechanisms to
Systematically Evaluate the Plan:
OUSD (AT&L) Did Not Use an Effective Oversight Mechanism to
Systematically Evaluate the Plan:
OUSD (AT&L) did not use an effective oversight mechanism to
systematically evaluate the NAVAIR and NAVSEA's plans to determine
whether they fully address all needed elements. DOD's Depot
Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans states that the Depot
Maintenance Working Integrated Process Team[Footnote 16] would monitor
the development and subsequent execution of the services' depot
maintenance strategic plans on a continuing basis. However, that team
did not review any of the services' plans, according to OUSD (AT&L)
and Navy officials.
OUSD (AT&L) officials representing the Assistant Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Maintenance Policy and Programs told us that,
in practice, the Integrated Process Team did not assume responsibility
for oversight of the plan but instead monitored selected issues (such
as the implementation of some specific process-improvement
initiatives) that the services' plans describe. The Maintenance Policy
and Programs officials told us that they reviewed the NAVAIR and
NAVSEA plans through a process consisting of informal meetings and
conversations with service representatives. They told us that, through
their review, they found that the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans were a "good
first start" but did not address all needed elements. However, Navy
officials told us that they were not informed that the plans did not
fully address elements of a results-oriented management framework nor
were they asked to revise the plans. They also said that they did not
receive any comments from OUSD (AT&L) about linkages among the plans
and with the executive summary. Additionally, Maintenance Policy and
Programs officials were unable to provide us with documentation of
their review of the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans.
In addition to reporting similar results in our review of Air Force
depot maintenance planning, we recommended, among other things, that
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics address this oversight concern. Specifically, we recommended
that the Under Secretary develop and implement procedures to review
revisions of the depot maintenance strategic plan to ensure that they
fully address all key elements of a results-oriented management
framework, explicitly address any OUSD (AT&L) direction for the plans,
and periodically assess progress and corrective actions to the extent
needed in meeting the plans' goals.
The Navy Lacked an Effective Oversight Mechanism to Systematically
Evaluate the NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans:
At the time NAVAIR and NAVSEA developed their plans, the Navy lacked
an effective oversight mechanism to help ensure that the plans fully
address the elements of a results-oriented management framework.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations officials responsible for the
Navy's strategic planning documents, including the NAVAIR and NAVSEA
plans, did not review the plans to ensure that the documents fully
address the elements of a results-oriented management framework.
Furthermore, the Chief of Naval Operations officials did not provide
direction to NAVAIR and NAVSEA regarding strategic planning elements
that should be incorporated in their respective plans. Moreover, while
Chief of Naval Operations officials told us that they conduct periodic
reviews of depot maintenance programs and that these reviews help
provide oversight of the plans' implementation, these reviews do not
systematically assess the progress in achieving the plans' long-term
goals.
While Navy officials responsible for the plans acknowledged some of
the plans' weaknesses, they told us that they believe the plans more
fully address the results-oriented management framework elements than
our analysis reflects. These officials stated that (1) although the
plans do not address some elements explicitly, the elements are
implied in the plans' discussion of various initiatives and processes,
and (2) experienced professionals involved in Navy depot maintenance
would be able to recognize these elements. However, because the plans
do not explicitly address these elements, they may not be clear to
individuals not involved or less involved in developing the plans.
In our review of the Air Force depot maintenance plan, we reported
similar oversight challenges for that service and recommended that the
Secretary of the Air Force take actions to strengthen its oversight of
the plans. The recommended actions to improve the Air Force's
oversight parallel those listed previously in this report for the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
[Footnote 17]
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Do Not Fully Respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s
Direction Designed to Meet Future Challenges:
While the NAVAIR and NAVSEA depot maintenance strategic plans describe
many initiatives and programs important to the NAVAIR and NAVSEA
depots, they are not fully responsive to OUSD (AT&L)'s direction to
the services that was designed to provide the services with a
framework to meet future challenges. Specifically, the plans do not
fully address logistics transformation, core logistics capability
assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital investment--the four
areas that OUSD (AT&L) directed each service, at a minimum, to include
in its plan. Within these four general areas are 10 issues that OUSD
(AT&L) also identified. The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans each partially
address 8 issues and do not address the remaining 2. Table 3
summarizes our evaluation of the extent to which the NAVAIR and NAVSEA
plans address each of the 10 issues.
Table 3: The Extent to Which the NAVAIR and NAVSEA Depot Maintenance
Strategic Plans Address OUSD (AT&L)'s Direction:
Logistics transformation:
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issue: 1. Future roles and capabilities
envisioned for the depots and how these capabilities will be
quantified and measured;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan notes that the role of the depots is to
establish and sustain capabilities to support future weapon system
requirements, but the plan does not define these projected future
capabilities (e.g., maintenance, repair, and overhaul) or discuss how
these capabilities will be quantified or measured;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: The plan notes that the role of the Naval
Shipyards is to provide the capability on ships and weapons systems
required by Navy component commanders and combatant commanders, but
the discussion is limited to workforce capabilities and does not
describe other capabilities (e.g., maintenance, repair, and overhaul)
that NAVSEA envisions for the shipyards, or how those capabilities
would be quantified or measured.
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issue: 2. Actions being taken to transform depots
into the envisioned future capability;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan mentions capability and capacity
measurement, but only in the context that this is a framework NAVAIR
plans to develop. Under the future capabilities and readiness goal,
the plan identifies the need to develop enterprisewide capability and
capacity baselines and tools to plan and analyze capability and
capacity so that NAVAIR can optimize delivery of products to meet
warfighter requirements. However, the plan does not identify the
resources required to develop a baseline, nor the method and time
frame for doing so;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: The plan refers to a continuous process-
improvement program but does not discuss the specific actions and
associated time frames to transform the shipyards to the envisioned
future capabilities. For example, the plan notes that one of the goals
of a continuous process-improvement program is to increase workforce
efficiencies; however, the plan does not identify actions to achieve
the efficiencies that will assist with the transformation.
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issue: 3. Management approaches for integrating
various depot capabilities, including public-and private-sector
sources, joint, interservice, and multinational capabilities;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan discusses management approaches for
integrating public-and private-sector depot sources. For example, the
plan notes that one way of maximizing support for the warfighter is by
exploring opportunities provided through public-private partnerships.
However, the plan is silent with regard to joint, interservice, and
multinational capabilities;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: The plan discusses management approaches for
integrating public-and private-sector depot sources. For example, the
plan discusses several actions, such as reassigning intermediate-level
workload at regional maintenance centers and intermediate maintenance
facilities to public and private shipyards, that NAVSEA could take to
mitigate fluctuations in projected public shipyard workload. However,
the plan is silent with regard to joint, interservice, and
multinational capabilities.
Core logistics capability assurance:
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issue: 4. Actions being taken or contemplated to
(a) identify core requirements at program initiation, (b) ensure that
depot source of repair decisions are identified upon program
initiation, (c) encourage the formation of public-private
partnerships, and (d) identify and rectify core capability
deficiencies;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan partially addresses three of the four
types of actions. For example, the plan states that NAVAIR will
support the warfighter by exploring opportunities to provide labor
through commercial partnerships; yet, the plan does not identify these
opportunities nor discuss how these opportunities would affect core
workload and requirements;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: The plan partially addresses two of the four
types of actions. For example, the plan cites a "One Shipyard" concept
that includes sharing of resources among public shipyards and
partnering with private shipyards, yet the plan does not provide
details on how NAVSEA may encourage the formation of these
partnerships.
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issue: 5. Methods used for workload estimating
and projected effects of weapon system retirements and bed-down (i.e.,
the act or process of locating a weapon system at a particular base);
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan: Does
not address: The plan does not discuss the methods for estimating the
amount of workload, nor does the plan discuss the projected effects of
weapon system retirements and bed-down on depot workloads;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan: Does
not address: The plan does not discuss the methods for estimating the
amount of workload, nor does the plan discuss the projected effects of
weapon system retirements and bed-down on depot workloads.
Workforce revitalization:
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issue: 6. Reengineering strategies: Actions being
taken to identify new skill requirements and reengineer existing
employees' skills to satisfy new capability requirements;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan discusses the Qualified and Proficient
Technician Training program that is designed to provide existing
employees new and enhanced skills, but it does not discuss NAVAIR-wide
or depot-specific actions to identify emerging skill requirements;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: The plan notes that new weapon systems and
modifications will result in new workforce skill requirements, but it
does not discuss NAVSEA-wide or depot-specific actions to identify
these emerging skill requirements and the reengineering needed to
enable existing employees to gain the emerging skills.
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issue: 7. Replenishment requirements: Methods
used for forecasting workforce replenishment requirements, including
data on projected annual losses due to retirements and projected
annual new hire requirements;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan discusses a Workload Shaping model that
includes forecasts of attrition rates, but it does not describe the
methods used for forecasting projected losses (e.g., by specialty and
by year);
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: The plan discusses using shipyard demographic
data to forecast future workforce attrition rates, but it does not
describe the methods used for forecasting projected losses (e.g., by
specialty and by year).
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issue: 8. Replenishment strategies: Management
approach for developing and implementing replenishment strategies,
including a description of the actions being used to recruit and train
new employees;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan notes recruitment actions such as hiring
entry-level engineers and production workers, but it does not discuss
a comprehensive management approach for recruiting and training new
employees;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: The plan notes recruitment actions such as hiring
at least 100 apprentice employees at each Navy Shipyard each year, but
it does not discuss a comprehensive management approach for recruiting
and training new employees.
Capital investment:
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issue: 9. Benchmarks used for evaluating the
adequacy of investment funding and the basis for selecting the
benchmark;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan: Does
not address: The plan does not discuss any benchmark for evaluating
the adequacy of investment funding or the basis for selecting the
benchmark;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan: Does
not address: The plan does not discuss any benchmark for evaluating
the adequacy of investment funding or the basis for selecting the
benchmark. While the plan states that NAVSEA will continue making an
annual capital investment of at least 6 percent of revenue, it does
not identify how NAVSEA will evaluate the adequacy of this investment.
OUSD (AT&L)-directed issues: 10. Methods for quantifying current
capabilities, current and projected deficiencies, and the capabilities
that planned investment will provide, including the method for
prioritizing needed investments and quantitative data on projected
funding for facilities and equipment;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVAIR plan:
Partially addresses: The plan discusses several factors that affect
capital-investment planning, such as environmental safety and security
and customer priorities. However, it does not describe a method for
prioritizing needed investments nor the quantitative data that can be
used to project the level of funding needed for facilities and
equipment;
Degree plan addresses issues: Overview and examples: NAVSEA plan:
Partially addresses: The plan identifies the amounts of funding needed
for current and future military construction, but it does not describe
a method for prioritizing these investments.
Source: GAO analysis of NAVSEA and NAVAIR data.
Note: Among other things, the 2007 U.S. Navy Depot Maintenance
Strategic Plan contained NAVAIR's Naval Aviation Industrial Strategy
and NAVSEA's Naval Shipyard Business Plan. NAVAIR and NAVSEA also
published updates in 2009. We reviewed information from the 2007 and
2009 documents in our evaluation of the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans.
[End of table]
As discussed for the elements of a results-oriented management
framework, OUSD (AT&L) and the Navy did not identify missing or
partially addressed issues because neither used effective oversight to
help ensure that OUSD (AT&L)'s direction for developing the plan was
carried out. Among other things, DOD's Depot Maintenance Strategy and
Implementation Plans states that the DOD strategy will ensure that DOD
is postured to meet the national security and materiel readiness
challenges of the 21st century. However, at present, information
missing from the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans may limit the service's
assurance that its depots are postured and resourced to meet future
maintenance requirements.
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Partially Address the Three Logistics
Transformation Issues:
The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans partially address each of the three
logistics transformation issues that OUSD (AT&L) directed the services
to discuss in their plans. In this area, OUSD (AT&L) directed the
services to discuss the future roles and capabilities of the depots,
transformation actions, and approaches for integrating various depot
capabilities in their plans.
The two plans generally discuss the future roles of their depots, but
the plans do not discuss projected future capabilities of the depots
or how those capabilities will be measured. The NAVAIR plan states the
general role of the Fleet Readiness Centers is to establish and
sustain capabilities to support future weapon systems, and the NAVSEA
plan states that Naval Shipyards' role is to provide the capability on
ships and weapon systems required by Navy component commanders and
combatant commanders. However, the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans have a
limited discussion on projected future capabilities despite changes to
the Navy's force structure. For example, the February 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report noted that the integration of the Navy's and
Marine Corps' tactical aircraft would result in reducing the
procurement of 500 Navy tactical aircraft. This report also mentioned
that four of the Navy's oldest nuclear ballistic missile submarines
would reenter service after being converted into guided-missile and
special-operations platforms. NAVAIR officials told us that they did
not consider the effect these force structure changes would have on
the strategic plan when it was being developed. In addition, these
officials said that they will consider any effects the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review Report would have on the plan when it is
next updated.[Footnote 18]
Additionally, the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans partially address actions
they are taking to transform their depots. For example, under its
future capabilities and readiness goal, the NAVAIR plan discusses
developing capability and capacity baselines and tools so NAVAIR can
improve the delivery of products to meet warfighter requirements.
However, the plan does not identify the resources, methodology, and
time frame required to develop the baselines and tools. The NAVSEA
plan notes that one of the goals of the command's continuous process-
improvement program is to increase workforce efficiencies, but the
plan does not describe these efficiencies or the specific actions and
time frames to achieve them.
Moreover, the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans partially address the management
approach for integrating various depot maintenance capabilities,
including public-and private-sector sources as well as joint,
interservice, and multinational capabilities. Both plans discuss a
management approach for integrating public-and private-sector depot
sources. For example, the NAVAIR plan notes that one way of maximizing
support for the warfighter is by exploring opportunities provided
through public-private partnerships. In addition, the NAVSEA plan
notes that workload fluctuations at public shipyards can be mitigated
by reassigning some intermediate-level work at regional maintenance
centers and facilities to public-and private-sector shipyards.
However, both plans are silent with regard to a management approach
for integrating joint, interservice, and multinational capabilities.
Because the plans do not discuss their approaches for integrating
these other three types of capabilities, it is unclear if NAVAIR and
NAVSEA are positioned to reduce redundancies and take advantage of
potential cost-saving measures.
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Partially Address One of the Core Logistics
Capability-Assurance Issues and Do Not Address the Other:
The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans partially address one core logistics
capability-assurance issue and do not address one issue. For the issue
that both plans partially address, OUSD (AT&L) directed the services
to address four types of actions being taken or contemplated: NAVAIR's
plan contains information on three of the four types of actions, and
NAVSEA's plan contains information on two of the four.
* Identify core requirements at program initiation. The NAVAIR plan
notes that industrial and maintenance coordinators work with weapon
acquisition program offices to identify core requirements during the
acquisition process, including program initiation. The NAVSEA plan
does not have a discussion regarding identifying core requirements.
* Ensure that depot source of repair decisions are made upon program
initiation. Neither plan discusses actions that the command would take
to ensure that depot source of repair decisions for new systems are
made upon program initiation.
* Encourage the formation of public-private partnerships. Both plans
describe actions to encourage the formation of public-private
partnerships. For example, the NAVAIR plan states that the command
will support opportunities to provide labor through commercial
partnerships, but the plan does not identify these opportunities. The
NAVSEA plan discusses the "One Shipyard" concept that includes the
sharing of resources among public shipyards and partnering with
private shipyards, but it does not provide details on how NAVSEA may
encourage the formation of partnerships.
* Identify and rectify core capability deficiencies. Both plans
describe actions to address deficiencies, but neither describes how
the deficiencies will be identified. For example, the NAVAIR plan
notes that the command will establish strong liaison between the
maintenance activities and the acquisition community. The NAVSEA plan
notes that core requirement levels will be sustained, in part, by
reducing the total workforce by 20 percent or 22,000 employees.
For the second of the two core logistics capability-assurance issues,
neither plan discusses the OUSD (AT&L) direction to address the
projected effects of weapon system retirements and bed-down (i.e., the
act or process of locating a weapon system at a particular base) and
retirements, despite changes to the Navy's force structure for
aircraft and ships, as mentioned previously. In addition, the methods
for estimating depot workload are not addressed in the NAVAIR and
NAVSEA plans. In contrast, we reported DOD's method of compiling and
internally reporting core requirements and associated workloads for
2007 did not reveal core capability shortfalls, even though the
services--including the Navy--had identified shortfalls in specific
equipment/technology categories.[Footnote 19]
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Partially Address Each of the Three Workforce
Revitalization Issues:
The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans both partially address each of the three
OUSD (AT&L)-directed workforce revitalization issues: reengineering
strategies, replenishment requirements, and replenishment strategies.
Regarding the workforce reengineering strategies issue, the NAVAIR
plan discusses the Qualified and Proficient Technician Training
program that is designed to provide existing employees new and
enhanced skills, and the NAVSEA plan notes that new weapon systems and
technology modifications will require new workforce skill
requirements. However, neither plan discusses commandwide or depot-
specific actions to identify emerging skill requirements. Also, the
NAVSEA plan does not discuss the reengineering needed to enable
existing employees to gain the emerging skills.
Regarding workforce replenishment requirements, both plans include
some information on forecasts of future workforce levels. For example,
the NAVAIR plan mentions its Workload Shaping model that includes
forecasts of workforce attrition rate. While the NAVSEA plan discusses
using shipyard demographics data to forecast future workforce
attrition rates and an annual 5 percent attrition rate for the
workforce, it does not provide details regarding attrition effects on
more specific groups such as blue-and white-collar workers. In
addition, both plans do not describe the methods used for forecasting
projected losses (e.g., by specialty and by year), even though the
OUSD (AT&L) direction explicitly called for discussion of those
methods.
To address the workforce replenishment strategy issue, both plans
provide examples of recruiting actions, but they have limited
information on training--a second part of the OUSD (AT&L)-directed
issue. The NAVAIR plan briefly mentions hiring entry-level engineers
and production workers. Similarly, the NAVSEA plan talks about hiring
100 apprentice employees at each Naval Shipyard each year. In addition
to having few details on the cited hiring plans, neither plan
discusses a comprehensive management approach for the recruitment and
training.
The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans' limited and missing information for the
three issues in the workforce revitalization area is noteworthy in the
contexts of our previous findings on the DOD depot maintenance
workforce and information in the OUSD (AT&L)'s document directing the
services to provide the plans. In 2003, we reported that DOD faced
significant management challenges in succession planning to maintain a
skilled workforce at its depot maintenance facilities.[Footnote 20]
Among other challenges, we reported that relatively high numbers of
civilian workers at maintenance depots were nearing retirement age.
DOD's Depot Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans makes a
similar point. It states that DOD's depot maintenance community, like
the rest of the federal government, faces increasing numbers of
retirements as the "baby boom" generation reaches retirement
eligibility. It goes on to state that the retirement-eligible
population within the depot maintenance workforce and forecasted
annual retirements are expected to increase annually for the remainder
of the decade. This dynamic--coupled with the highly skilled nature of
some depot maintenance work and the length of time required to train
new employees--creates hiring, training, and retention challenges.
Without a discussion that acknowledges these and other such workforce
challenges, it is unclear how well NAVAIR and NAVSEA are positioned to
address the challenges that their depots face.
NAVAIR and NAVSEA Plans Address One Capital-Investment Issue but Do
Not Address the Other:
The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans partially address the capital-investment
issue of quantifying current capabilities but do not address the other
issue--capital-investment benchmarks. Neither the benchmarks for
evaluating the adequacy of investment funding nor NAVAIR's and
NAVSEA's basis for selecting the benchmarks are in the plans despite
OUSD (AT&L)'s direction to address these concerns. Even though neither
plan addresses capital-investment benchmarks, the NAVSEA plan notes
that the command intends to continue making an annual capital
investment of at least 6 percent of revenue, as required by law, to
sustain depot infrastructure requirements.[Footnote 21] An OUSD (AT&L)
official mentioned that NAVSEA's citing of the 6 percent capital
investment should be seen as addressing the benchmark issue. While the
NAVAIR plan did not mention the 6 percent requirement, NAVAIR
officials told us they intend to continue making capital investments
of at least this amount.
The NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans partially address the issues pertaining to
the methods for quantitatively articulating these capital-investment
concerns: current capabilities, current and projected deficiencies,
and the capabilities that planned investment will provide. While the
NAVAIR plan notes that its capital investments are prioritized in
order to support naval aviation requirements, the NAVSEA plan
discusses investments in the context of supporting shipyard
operations. Both plans discuss an infrastructure-investment
prioritization process but do not describe the method for prioritizing
needed investments. In addition, the NAVAIR and NAVSEA plans do not
present quantitative data on the projected funding (or shortfalls) for
facilities and equipment, despite both plans noting infrastructure
shortfalls and funding limitations. Modernizing and refurbishing their
facilities is an essential step for optimizing their operating
efficiencies. Key steps in modernizing facilities are articulating
investment priorities, quantifying shortfalls, and discussing how
these shortfalls may affect accomplishing strategic goals.
Capital investment in DOD depots has been an issue of concern in our
prior work. For example, in 2001, we reported that capital investments
in depot facilities and plant equipment had declined sharply in the
mid-1990s as a result of defense downsizing, depot closures and
consolidations, and DOD's plan to increase its reliance on the private
sector for logistics support of new weapon systems.[Footnote 22] As a
result of DOD's lack of capital investment, its depots did not keep up
with the latest technologies. In subsequent years, funding levels
increased as the services recognized the need to modernize their
depots. As with any business, modernizing and refurbishing plant and
equipment for optimal operating efficiency, as well as acquiring new
capabilities and cutting-edge technologies linked to new workloads,
are important to the future viability of the military depots. An
incomplete discussion of capital investment could negatively limit
Navy decision makers' ability to purchase depot infrastructure,
equipment, and process improvements.
Conclusions:
OUSD (AT&L) officials told us that the primary intent of OUSD (AT&L)'s
direction was to provide a framework for the services to meet
challenges in the future and that the issues identified in the four
areas specified in the direction were designed to address those
challenges. Further, DOD's Depot Maintenance Strategy and
Implementation Plans states that (1) each service will conduct depot
maintenance strategic planning that focuses on achieving the DOD depot
maintenance strategy and (2) the DOD strategy will ensure that DOD is
postured to meet the national security and materiel readiness
challenges of the 21st century. However, NAVAIR's and NAVSEA's plans
do not provide a comprehensive, results-oriented management framework
to efficiently and effectively guide the Navy's future actions, nor do
they fully respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s direction that was designed to
provide a framework for the services to overcome four general areas of
future challenges. Furthermore, focusing on the development of
separate command-level plans and an executive summary, rather than a
single Navy-wide plan, may have made it more difficult to determine
where additional information was needed to address the elements and
issues at the servicewide level. Another primary reason for not
correcting weaknesses in the plans is that OUSD (AT&L) and Navy do not
have effective oversight mechanisms in place to promptly identify the
weaknesses, communicate weaknesses to the plan developers, monitor the
revision of the plans to ensure that the weaknesses have been
addressed, and determine whether goals are being achieved. These
weaknesses in content, linkage, and oversight resulted in a missed
opportunity to identify a more complete Navy-wide vision for the
effective and efficient operation of its depots in the future. For
example, had NAVSEA and NAVAIR identified and implemented a systematic
program evaluation and a thorough set of metrics to directly assess
goal achievement, they and the Navy overall would have additional
tools for reacting in a timely manner to potential issues and
challenges in executing the strategies. Most importantly, integration
of the plans could have resulted in the Navy having more assurance
that its depots are viably positioned and have the maintenance
workforce, equipment, facilities, and funds they need to meet current
and future requirements. On a closing note, we previously made a
recommendation to OUSD (AT&L) to develop and implement procedures to
(1) review revisions of the depot maintenance strategic plan to ensure
they fully address all key elements of a results-oriented management
framework, (2) explicitly address any OUSD (AT&L) direction for the
plans, and (3) periodically assess progress and corrective actions to
the extent needed in meeting the plans' goals. We reassert the need
for DOD to implement that recommendation.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To provide greater assurance that Navy depots will be postured and
resourced to meet future maintenance requirements, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the
following four actions to revise the Navy's depot maintenance
strategic plan:
* Fully and explicitly address all elements needed for a comprehensive
results-oriented management framework, including those elements that
we have identified as partially addressed or not addressed in the
current plan.
* Demonstrate clear linkages among plans should the Navy continue to
submit individual depot maintenance strategic plans instead of a
single Navy-wide plan.
* Fully and explicitly address the four critical areas of logistics
transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce
revitalization, and capital investment, consistent with OUSD (AT&L)
criteria.
* Develop and implement procedures to review revisions of the depot
maintenance strategic plan to ensure they fully address all key
elements of a results-oriented management framework, explicitly
address any OUSD (AT&L) direction for the plans, and periodically
assess progress and corrective actions to the extent needed in meeting
the plans' goals.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
four recommendations to provide greater assurance that Navy depots
will be postured and resourced to meet future maintenance
requirements. DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix II.
The department concurred with our recommendation to direct the
Secretary of the Navy to revise the Navy's depot maintenance strategic
plan to fully and explicitly address all elements needed for a
comprehensive results-oriented management framework. DOD stated that
it will direct the Navy and the other services to more clearly address
all elements needed for a results-oriented strategy in the next OUSD
(AT&L) request to the services to update their depot maintenance
strategic plans. DOD noted that the updates are expected in early
2011, after completion of the mandated future depot capability study.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation to direct the Secretary of
the Navy to revise the Navy's depot maintenance strategic plan to
demonstrate clear linkages among the plans, should the Navy continue
to submit individual depot maintenance plans instead of a single Navy-
wide plan. In its response, DOD stated that it will direct the Navy
and the other services to more clearly demonstrate the linkages of
their depot maintenance strategies to the DOD depot maintenance
strategic plan in the next OUSD (AT&L) request to the services to
update their depot maintenance strategic plans.
The department also concurred with our recommendation to direct the
Secretary of the Navy to revise the Navy's depot maintenance strategic
plan to fully and explicitly address OUSD (AT&L)'s direction that
provides a framework for the services to address the four critical
areas of logistics transformation, core capability assurance,
workforce revitalization, and capital investment, consistent with OUSD
(AT&L) criteria. DOD stated that it will direct the Navy and the other
services to explicitly address the OUSD (AT&L) direction for depot
maintenance strategic planning in the next OUSD (AT&L) request to the
services to update their depot maintenance strategic plans.
Additionally, DOD concurred with our recommendation to direct the
Secretary of the Navy to revise the Navy's depot maintenance strategic
plan to develop and implement procedures to review revisions of the
depot maintenance strategic plan to ensure they fully address all key
elements of a results-oriented management framework, explicitly
address any OUSD (AT&L) direction for the plans, and periodically
assess progress and corrective actions to the extent needed in meeting
the plans' goals. In its response, DOD stated that it will direct the
services to explicitly address the procedures noted in our
recommendation. DOD also said that OUSD (AT&L) would further develop a
process to periodically assess progress and corrective actions to
ensure the services are meeting OUSD (AT&L) and service plans' goals.
DOD also provided technical comments that we have incorporated into
this report where applicable.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA). In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-
8246 or edwardsj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Staff members who made key contributions to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Jack E. Edwards:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In this report, we address two questions: (1) To what extent does the
Navy's depot maintenance strategic plan address key elements of a
results-oriented management framework? and (2) To what extent does the
Navy's depot maintenance strategic plan address Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics' (OUSD
[AT&L]) direction that was designed to provide a framework for the
services to meet future challenges? Because Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) are collectively
responsible for 94 percent of the Navy's depot maintenance workload,
we focused the scope of our review on NAVAIR's Naval Aviation
Industrial Strategy, NAVSEA's Naval Shipyard Business Plan, and the
2009 update that each command provided.[Footnote 23]
We used the same set of methodological procedures to answer both
questions, and each type of procedure was performed simultaneously for
the two questions. To understand the context of our analysis, we first
reviewed relevant laws; Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy
instructions governing depot maintenance; and depot maintenance-
related reports issued by agencies and organizations such as GAO, DOD,
the Logistics Management Institute, and RAND. We then used qualitative
content analyses to compare the Navy plans against criteria from the
seven elements of a results-oriented management framework and the 10
issues listed in the OUSD (AT&L) direction for depot maintenance
strategic plans. To conduct these analyses, we first developed a data-
collection instrument that incorporated these two types of criteria.
One team member then analyzed the plans using this instrument. To
verify preliminary observations from this initial analysis, a second
team member concurrently conducted an independent analysis of the
plans. We compared observations of the two analysts and discussed any
differences. We reconciled the differences with the assistance of
analysts from the team that was evaluating the Air Force depot
maintenance strategic plans. We subsequently met with Navy officials
to confirm our understanding of the plans and sought additional
information where our preliminary analyses revealed that the plans
partially address or do not address the criteria. We also interviewed
and obtained documentary evidence from relevant OUSD (AT&L) officials
regarding the office's oversight of the services' plans. Additionally,
we interviewed depot leaders and strategic planning personnel at four
NAVAIR and NAVSEA depots to obtain first-hand information on issues
the depots face. We also obtained data on workload and personnel from
the Navy and determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for
our report.
The organizations and installations where we visited and conducted
interviews are listed in table 4.
Table 4: Organizations Contacted to Obtain Information about the
Navy's Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan:
DOD:
Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Maintenance Policy and Programs, Arlington, Virginia.
Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Materiel
Readiness, Arlington, Virginia.
Joint Depot Maintenance Activities Group, Columbus, Ohio.
Navy:
Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Arlington, Virginia.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Arlington, Virginia.
Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland.
Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.
Fleet Readiness Center Southeast, Jacksonville, Florida.
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
Other:
The Logistics Management Institute, McLean, Virginia.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 through June 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
report.
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Logistics And Materiel Readiness:
3500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3500:
May 23 2010:
Mr. Jack E. Edwards:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Edwards:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GA0-10-585, "Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning
Needed to Ensure That Navy Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance
Requirements," dated April 27, 2010 (GAO Code 351381).
The Department concurs with all four recommendations and appreciates
the opportunity to comment on the GAO Draft Report. (Attached)
My point of contact in this matter is Mr. Hal Amerau. He can be
reached at (703) 697-1903.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
[Illegible] for:
Alan F. Estevez:
Principal Deputy:
Attachment: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report ” Dated April 27, 2010:
GAO-10-585 (GAO Code 351381):
"Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed To Ensure That
Navy Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise the Navy's Depot
Maintenance Strategic Plan to fully and explicitly address all
elements needed for a comprehensive results-oriented management
framework, including those elements that we have identified as
partially addressed or not addressed in the current plan. (See page
28/GAO Draft Report.)
DOD Response: Concur with comment. Rather than revise the FY08 Navy
Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan, the Navy and the other Services will
be directed to more clearly address all elements needed for a results-
oriented strategy in the next OUSD (AT&L) request for Service updates
to their Depot Maintenance Strategic Plans. This update is expected in
early 2011 after completion of the FY09 National Defense Authorization
Act, Section 322 Future Depot Capability Study.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise the Navy's Depot
Maintenance Strategic Plan to demonstrate clear linkages among plans
should the Navy continue to submit individual depot maintenance
strategic plans instead of a single Navy-wide plan. (See page 28/GAO
Draft Report.)
DOD Response: Concur with comment. Rather than revise the FY08 Navy
Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan, the Navy and the other Services will
be directed to more clearly demonstrate the linkages of their depot
maintenance strategies to the DOD Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan in
the next OUSD (AT&L) request for Service updates to their Depot
Maintenance Strategic Plans. This update is expected in early 2011
after completion of the FY09 National Defense Authorization Act,
Section 322 Future Depot Capability Study.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise the Navy's Depot
Maintenance Strategic Plan to fully and explicitly address the four
critical areas of logistics transformation, core capability assurance,
workforce revitalization, and capital investment, consistent with OUSD
(AT&L) criteria. (See page 28/GAO Draft Report.)
DOD Response: Concur with comment Rather than revise the FY08 Navy
Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan, the Navy and the other Services will
be directed to explicitly address the OUSD (AT&L) direction and
framework in the next OUSD (AT&L) request for Service updates to their
Depot Maintenance Strategic Plans. This update is expected in early
2011 after completion of the FY09 National Defense Authorization Act,
Section 322 Future Depot Capability Study.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise the Navy's depot
maintenance strategic plan to develop and implement procedures to
review revisions of the depot maintenance strategic plan to ensure
they fully address all key elements of a result-oriented management
framework, explicitly address any OUSD (AT&L) direction for the plans,
and periodically assess progress and corrective actions to the extent
needed in meeting the plans' goals. (See page 28/GAO Draft Report.)
DOD Response: Concur. The next OUSD (AT&L) request for Service updates
to their Depot Maintenance Strategic plans is expected in early 2011
after completion of the FY09 National Defense Authorization Act,
Section 322 Future Depot Capability Study. In that update request the
Services will be directed to explicitly address the procedures noted
in the recommendation. Additionally, a process will be developed by
OUSD (AT&L) to periodically assess progress and corrective actions to
ensure the Services are meeting OUSD (AT&L) and Service plans' goals.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jack E. Edwards, (202) 512-8246 or edwardsj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Key contributors to this report were Sandra B. Burrell, Assistant
Director; Allen Westheimer; Steve Boyles; Ron La Due Lake; Joanne
Landesman; Cristina M. Ruggiero-Mendoza; Michael Willems; and
Elizabeth Wood.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That
Air Force Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-526]. Washington, D.C.: May 14,
2010.
Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Ensure That
Army and Marine Corps Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-865]. Washington, D.C.:
September 17, 2009.
Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Identify and Establish Core
Capability at Military Depots. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-83]. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2009.
Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Provide More Consistent Funding
Allocation Data to Congress. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-126]. Washington, D.C.: November
30, 2006.
Depot Maintenance: DOD's Report to Congress on Its Public-Private
Partnerships at Its Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence
(CITEs) Is Not Complete and Additional Information Would Be Useful.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-902R]. Washington,
D.C.: July 1, 2008.
Depot Maintenance: Issues and Options for Reporting on Military
Depots. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-761R].
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2008.
DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help
Ensure Viability of DOD's Civilian Industrial Workforce. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-472]. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2003.
Defense Maintenance: Sustaining Readiness Support Capabilities
Requires a Comprehensive Plan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-533T]. Washington, D.C.: March 23,
2001.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Performance-based logistics refers to the purchase of performance
outcomes, such as the availability of functioning weapon systems,
through long-term support arrangements rather than the purchase of
individual elements of support--such as parts, repairs, and
engineering support.
[2] H.R. Rep. No. 108-106 (2003), p. 304; H.R. Rep. No. 109-452
(2006), pp. 296-297.
[3] OUSD (AT&L) outlined the military services' depot maintenance
strategic planning responsibilities in its report to Congress. See
DOD, Depot Maintenance Strategy and Implementation Plans, (Washington,
D.C.: March 2007), pp. I-21 through I-24. This document established
OUSD (AT&L) criteria for the services' strategic plans.
[4] DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: February
2010).
[5] GAO, Managing for Results: Critical Issues for Improving Federal
Agencies' Strategic Plans, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-180] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
16, 1997).
[6] GAO, Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to
Ensure That Army and Marine Corps Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance
Requirements, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-865]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009).
[7] GAO, Depot Maintenance: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to
Ensure That Air Force Depots Can Meet Future Maintenance Requirements,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-526] (Washington, D.C.:
May 14, 2010).
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-180].
[9] 10 U.S.C. § 2460. Depot-level maintenance and repair also includes
all aspects of software maintenance classified by DOD as of July 1,
1995, as depot-level maintenance and repair, and interim contractor
support or contractor logistics support, to the extent that such
support is for depot maintenance. Depot-level maintenance and repair
does not include the procurement of major modifications or upgrades of
weapon systems that are designed to improve program performance or the
nuclear refueling of an aircraft carrier; however, a major upgrade
program covered by this exception could continue to be performed by
private-or public-sector activities. Depot-level maintenance also does
not include the procurement of parts for safety modifications, but
does include the installation of parts for that purpose.
[10] The Navy's other four maintenance depots are two naval warfare
centers: Naval Surface Warfare Center and Naval Undersea Warfare
Center; and two space and naval warfare systems centers: Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Center, Charleston and San Diego.
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-180].
[12] OUSD (AT&L) directed each of the services to include many of
these same elements in its depot maintenance plan. Specifically, OUSD
(AT&L) directed the services to include a comprehensive mission
statement; general goals and objectives; a description of how the
goals and objectives are to be achieved; the metrics that will be
applied to gauge progress toward attainment of each of the goals and
objectives; an identification of those key factors external to the
military services and beyond their control that could significantly
affect the achievement of the general goals and objectives; and a
description of the program evaluations used in establishing,
monitoring, or revising general goals and objectives.
[13] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 322 (2008).
[14] GAO, The Results Act: Observations on DOD's Draft Strategic Plan,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-219R]
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 1997).
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-180].
[16] The Depot Maintenance Working Integrated Process Team is a group
overseen by the Materiel Readiness Senior Steering Group, which
consisted of senior representatives from OUSD (AT&L), the Joint Staff,
the services, and the Defense Logistics Agency. It was replaced by the
Maintenance Executive Steering Committee in December 2008. The
Maintenance Executive Steering Committee consists of senior
maintenance and logistics representatives from throughout DOD and is
intended to serve as a mechanism for the coordinated review of DOD
maintenance policies, systems, programs, and activities.
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-526].
[18] DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. (Washington, D.C.:
February 2010)
[19] GAO, Depot Maintenance: Actions Needed to Identify and Establish
Core Capability at Military Depots, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-83] (Washington, D.C.: May 14,
2009).
[20] GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning Needed
to Help Ensure Viability of DOD's Civilian Industrial Workforce,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-472] (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 30, 2003).
[21] Section 2476 of Title 10 requires that each fiscal year the
Secretary of each military department shall invest in the capital
budgets of certain "covered depots" of that department a total amount
equal to not less than 6 percent of the average total combined
workload funded at all of the depots of that military department for
the 3 preceding fiscal years. Section 101(a)(8) of Title 10 defines
the term "military departments" as the Department of the Army,
Department of the Navy, and Department of the Air Force.
[22] GAO, Defense Maintenance: Sustaining Readiness Support
Capabilities Requires a Comprehensive Plan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-533T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23,
2001).
[23] The Navy's 2007 U.S. Navy Depot Maintenance Strategic Plan also
contained an executive summary and a plan for each of three other
commands: the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Naval Surface Warfare
Center, and the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.
[End of section]
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