Environmental Satellites
Planning Required to Mitigate Near-term Risks and Ensure Long-term Continuity Gao ID: GAO-10-858T June 29, 2010Environmental satellites provide data used for weather forecasting, measuring variations in climate over time, and predicting space weather. Due to the continuing cost, schedule, and tri-agency management challenges of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)--a key satellite acquisition managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) decided in February 2010 to disband NPOESS and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD undertake separate acquisitions. GAO was asked to summarize its report being released today on plans for NOAA's and DOD's separate acquisitions and the key risks of the transition, as well as its recent work on federal efforts to establish long-term strategies for satellite-provided climate and space weather data.
OSTP's decision to disband NPOESS came at a time when the program's cost estimate had more than doubled--to over $15 billion, the launch date for a demonstration satellite had been delayed by over 5 years, and the tri-agency management structure had repeatedly proven to be ineffective. To implement the decision, NOAA and DOD have begun planning for separate acquisitions to replace NPOESS. NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new program--called the Joint Polar Satellite System--to meet the requirements of the afternoon NPOESS orbit. DOD expects to make final decisions on the spacecraft and sensors in August 2010. However, because neither agency has completed its plans, the impact of the decision to disband the program on the expected costs, schedules, and capabilities has not yet been determined. Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from NPOESS to their separate programs, including the loss of key staff and capabilities, delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the other agency's requirements, insufficient oversight of new program management, and cost growth resulting from contract and program changes. While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for their new programs, the development of key NPOESS components is continuing. However, the launch date of the demonstration satellite--to be used operationally to ensure climate and weather data continuity--has been delayed by 9 months, and the program has slowed down work on all development activities. Until the transition risks are effectively mitigated, and unless components are able to continue scheduled development, it is likely that launch dates will continue to be delayed. Further delays are likely to jeopardize the availability and continuity of critical weather and climate data. For over a decade, the climate community has clamored for a national interagency strategy that coordinates agency priorities, budgets, and schedules for environmental satellites over the long-term--and the governance structure to implement that strategy. While the federal government has taken several steps to ensure the provision of environmental data from satellites for both climate and space weather in the short term, federal efforts to ensure the long-term provision of these environmental measurements are still lacking. Specifically, although both the climate and space weather communities have recently drafted reports for OSTP containing recommendations for climate and space weather satellites, respectively, the climate report focuses only on short-term needs and does not include longer term priorities, nor does it include budgets or schedules. Further, OSTP does not have plans for finalizing or releasing either the climate or space weather reports. Until an interagency strategy for environmental observation is established, and a clear process for implementing it is in place, federal agencies will continue to procure their immediate priorities on an ad hoc basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to investments in earth observation may be lost, and our nation's ability to understand long-term climate changes may be limited. In its reports, GAO recommended that NOAA and DOD address key transition risks, and that the President's Assistant for Science and Technology implement interagency strategies for the long-term provision of environmental observations. NOAA and DOD agreed, while the Assistant's office neither agreed nor disagreed, but noted its plan to develop a strategy for earth observations.
GAO-10-858T, Environmental Satellites: Planning Required to Mitigate Near-term Risks and Ensure Long-term Continuity
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on
Science and Technology, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, June 29, 2010:
Environmental Satellites:
Planning Required to Mitigate Near-term Risks and Ensure Long-term
Continuity:
Statement of David A. Powner:
Director:
Information Technology Management Issues:
GAO-10-858T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-858T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Environmental satellites provide data used for weather forecasting,
measuring variations in climate over time, and predicting space
weather. Due to the continuing cost, schedule, and tri-agency
management challenges of the National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)”a key satellite acquisition
managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA),
the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA)”the White House's Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) decided in February 2010 to disband NPOESS
and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD undertake separate acquisitions.
GAO was asked to summarize its report being released today on plans
for NOAA's and DOD's separate acquisitions and the key risks of the
transition, as well as its recent work on federal efforts to establish
long-term strategies for satellite-provided climate and space weather
data.
What GAO Found:
OSTP's decision to disband NPOESS came at a time when the program's
cost estimate had more than doubled”to over $15 billion, the launch
date for a demonstration satellite had been delayed by over 5 years,
and the tri-agency management structure had repeatedly proven to be
ineffective. To implement the decision, NOAA and DOD have begun
planning for separate acquisitions to replace NPOESS. NOAA has
developed preliminary plans for its new program”called the Joint Polar
Satellite System”to meet the requirements of the afternoon NPOESS
orbit. DOD expects to make final decisions on the spacecraft and
sensors in August 2010. However, because neither agency has completed
its plans, the impact of the decision to disband the program on the
expected costs, schedules, and capabilities has not yet been
determined. Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in
transitioning from NPOESS to their separate programs, including the
loss of key staff and capabilities, delays in negotiating contract
changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for
the other agency's requirements, insufficient oversight of new program
management, and cost growth resulting from contract and program
changes. While NOAA and DOD are establishing plans for their new
programs, the development of key NPOESS components is continuing.
However, the launch date of the demonstration satellite”to be used
operationally to ensure climate and weather data continuity”has been
delayed by 9 months, and the program has slowed down work on all
development activities. Until the transition risks are effectively
mitigated, and unless components are able to continue scheduled
development, it is likely that launch dates will continue to be
delayed. Further delays are likely to jeopardize the availability and
continuity of critical weather and climate data.
For over a decade, the climate community has clamored for a national
interagency strategy that coordinates agency priorities, budgets, and
schedules for environmental satellites over the long-term”and the
governance structure to implement that strategy. While the federal
government has taken several steps to ensure the provision of
environmental data from satellites for both climate and space weather
in the short term, federal efforts to ensure the long-term provision
of these environmental measurements are still lacking. Specifically,
although both the climate and space weather communities have recently
drafted reports for OSTP containing recommendations for climate and
space weather satellites, respectively, the climate report focuses
only on short-term needs and does not include longer term priorities,
nor does it include budgets or schedules. Further, OSTP does not have
plans for finalizing or releasing either the climate or space weather
reports. Until an interagency strategy for environmental observation
is established, and a clear process for implementing it is in place,
federal agencies will continue to procure their immediate priorities
on an ad hoc basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to
investments in earth observation may be lost, and our nation's ability
to understand long-term climate changes may be limited.
What GAO Recommends:
In its reports, GAO recommended that NOAA and DOD address key
transition risks, and that the President's Assistant for Science and
Technology implement interagency strategies for the long-term
provision of environmental observations. NOAA and DOD agreed, while
the Assistant's office neither agreed nor disagreed, but noted its
plan to develop a strategy for earth observations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-858T] or key
components. For more information, contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-
9286 or pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on
efforts to disband the National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and federal planning to ensure
long-term environmental monitoring from satellites. NPOESS was planned
to be a state-of-the-art, environment-monitoring satellite system that
would replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental satellite
systems. Managed jointly by the Department of Commerce's National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of
Defense (DOD)/U.S. Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the program was considered critical to the
nation's needs through the year 2026. However, to address continuing
cost, schedule, management, and technical challenges, the White
House's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) decided in
February 2010 to disband the NPOESS acquisition and, instead, to have
NOAA and DOD undertake separate acquisitions. As requested, this
statement summarizes our report being released today on plans for
NOAA's and DOD's separate acquisitions and the key risks of
transitioning from NPOESS to these new programs, as well as our recent
work on federal efforts to establish long-term strategies for
satellite-provided climate and space weather data. [Footnote 1]
In preparing this testimony, we relied on the work supporting the
corresponding reports. Those reports contain detailed overviews of our
scope and methodology. All of our work for the reports was performed
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Since the 1960s, the United States has used satellites to observe the
earth and its land, oceans, atmosphere, and space environments.
Satellites provide a global perspective of the environment and allow
observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable or unsuitable
for measurements. Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne
observing systems, satellites have become an indispensable part of
measuring and forecasting weather and climate. For example, satellites
provide the graphical images used to identify current weather
patterns, as well as the data that go into numerical weather
prediction models. These models are used to forecast weather 1 to 2
weeks in advance and to issue warnings about severe weather, including
the path and intensity of hurricanes. Satellite data are also used to
warn infrastructure owners when increased solar activity is expected
to affect key assets, including communication satellites or the
electric power grid. When collected over time, satellite data can also
be used to observe climate change”the trends and changes in the
earth's climate. For example, these data are used to monitor and
project seasonal, annual, and decadal changes in the earth's
temperature, vegetation coverage, and ozone coverage.
Satellite-provided Environmental Data for Climate and Space Weather:
One key subset of satellite-provided data is climate data. These data
are used in combination with ground and ocean observing systems to
understand seasonal, annual, and decadal variations in the climate.
Satellites provide land observations such as measurements of soil
moisture, changes in how land is used, and vegetation growth; ocean
observations such as sea levels, sea surface temperature, and ocean
color; and atmospheric observations such as greenhouse gas levels
(e.g., carbon dioxide), aerosol and dust particles, and moisture
concentration. When these data are obtained over long periods of time,
scientists are able to use them to determine short- and long-term
trends in how the earth's systems work and how they work together. For
example, climate measurements have allowed scientists to better
understand the effect of deforestation on how the earth absorbs heat,
retains rainwater, and absorbs greenhouse gases. Scientists also use
climate data to help predict climate cycles that affect the weather,
such as El Nino, and to develop global estimates of food crop
production for a particular year or season.
Another subset of satellite-provided environmental information is
space weather data. Satellite-provided observations of space weather
generally describe changes in solar activity in the space environment.
Just as scientists use observations of weather that occurs on the
earth's surface and in its atmosphere to develop forecasts, scientists
and researchers use space weather observations to detect and forecast
solar storms that may be potentially harmful to society.
Coordination and Oversight of Satellite-Provided Environmental
Observations:
NASA, NOAA, and DOD all have responsibilities for acquiring,
processing, and disseminating environmental data and information from
research or operational satellites. In addition to these agencies,
there are two interagency organizations”the U.S. Group on Earth
Observations (USGEO) and the U.S. Global Change Research Program
(USGCRP)”that are primarily responsible for coordinating federal
efforts with respect to observations of the earth's environment. The
National Space Weather Program serves as the coordinating body for
space weather. USGEO and USGCRP report to the Executive Office of the
President through the National Science and Technology Council's
Committee on Environment and Natural Resources, while the National
Space Weather Program coordinates its activities through NOAA's Office
of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology.
The Executive Office of the President provides oversight for federal
space-based environmental observation. Within the Executive Office of
the President, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Council on
Environmental Quality carry out these governance responsibilities. In
addition, the National Science and Technology Council and its
Committee on Environment and Natural Resources provide the Executive
Office of the President with executive-level coordination and advice.
[Footnote 2]
The NPOESS Program: Inception, Challenges, and Divergence:
Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate
operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is
managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force.[Footnote 3] Currently,
there is one operational POES satellite and two operational DMSP
satellites that are positioned so that they cross the equator in the
early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon. In addition, the
government is also relying on a European satellite, called the
Meteorological Operational (MetOp) satellite.[Footnote 4] Together,
they ensure that, for any region of the earth, the data provided to
users are generally no more than 6 hours old.
With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the
two satellite programs into a single satellite program”NPOESS”capable
of satisfying both civilian and military requirements.[Footnote 5] To
manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency
Integrated Program Office, with NOAA responsible for overall program
management for the converged system and for satellite operations; the
Air Force responsible for acquisition; and NASA responsible for
facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies
into the converged system.
Since the program's inception, NPOESS costs have grown by over $8
billion, and launch schedules have been delayed by over 5 years. In
addition, as a result of a 2006 restructuring of the program, the
agencies reduced the program's functionality by decreasing the number
of originally planned satellites, orbits, and instruments. The
restructuring also led agency executives to mitigate potential data
gaps by deciding to use a planned demonstration satellite, called the
NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite, as an operational
satellite providing climate and weather data. Even after this
restructuring, however, the program continued to encounter technical
issues, management challenges, schedule delays, and further cost
increases. To address these issues, in recent years we have made a
series of recommendations to, among other things, improve executive-
level oversight and develop realistic time frames for revising cost
and schedule baselines.[Footnote 6]
In August 2009, the Executive Office of the President formed a task
force, led by OSTP, to investigate the management and acquisition
options that would improve the NPOESS program. As a result of this
review, the Director of OSTP announced in February 2010 that NOAA and
DOD will no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system;
instead, each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite system.
Specifically, NOAA is to be responsible for the afternoon orbit and
the observations planned for the first and third NPOESS satellites.
DOD is to be responsible for the early-morning orbit and the
observations planned for the second and fourth NPOESS satellites. The
partnership with the European satellite agencies for the midmorning
orbit is to continue as planned.
Agencies Have Started Planning Separate Acquisitions, but the Impact
of This Approach Is Not Known and Key Risks and Challenges Remain:
NOAA has developed preliminary plans for its new satellite acquisition
program”called the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS)”to meet the
requirements of the afternoon NPOESS orbit. Specifically, NOAA plans
to acquire two satellites; the plans call for the first JPSS satellite
to be available for launch in 2014, and the second JPSS satellite to
be available for launch in 2018.[Footnote 7] NOAA will also provide
the ground systems for both the JPSS and DOD programs. NOAA is also
planning technical changes to the satellites, including using a
smaller spacecraft than the one planned for NPOESS and removing
sensors that were planned for the NPOESS satellites in the afternoon
orbit.[Footnote 8] In addition, NOAA plans to transfer the management
of acquisition from the NPOESS program office to NASA's Goddard Space
Flight Center, so that it can be co-located at a space system
acquisition center as advocated by an independent review team. NOAA
has developed a team to lead the transition from NPOESS to JPSS, and
plans to begin transitioning in July and complete the transition plan”
including cost and schedule estimates”by the end of September.
DOD is at an earlier stage in its planning process, in part because it
has more time before the first satellite in the morning orbit is
needed. DOD officials are currently developing plans”including costs,
schedules, and risks”for their new program, called the Defense Weather
Satellite System. DOD expects to make final decisions on the
spacecraft, sensors, procurement strategy, and staffing in August
2010, and begin the program immediately.[Footnote 9]
Because neither agency has finalized plans for its acquisition, the
full impact of OSTP's decision on the expected cost, schedule, and
capabilities is unknown.
* Cost: NOAA anticipates that the JPSS program will cost approximately
$11.9 billion to complete through 2024.[Footnote 10] Although this
estimated cost is less than the current baseline and recent estimates
for the NPOESS program, DOD will still need to fund and develop
satellites to meet the requirements for the early morning orbit.
[Footnote 11] DOD's initial estimates are for its new program to cost
almost $5 billion through fiscal year 2015.[Footnote 12] Thus, the
cost of the two acquisitions will likely exceed the baselined life-
cycle cost of the NPOESS program.
* Schedule: Neither NOAA nor DOD has finalized plans that show the
full impact of the restructuring on the schedule for satellite
development. We have previously reported that restructuring a program
like NPOESS could take significant time to accomplish, due in part to
the time taken revising, renegotiating, or developing important
acquisition documents, including contracts and interagency agreements.
[Footnote 13] With important decisions and negotiations still pending,
it is likely that the expected launch date of the first JPSS satellite
will be delayed.
* Capabilities: Neither agency has made final decisions on the full
set of sensors”or which satellites will accommodate them”for their
respective satellite programs. Until those decisions are made, it will
not be possible to determine the capabilities that these satellites
will provide and their associated costs.
Timely decisions on cost, schedule, and capabilities would allow both
acquisitions to move forward and satellite data users to start
planning for any data shortfalls they may experience. Until DOD and
NOAA finalize their plans, it is not clear whether the new
acquisitions will meet the requirements of both civilian and military
users.
Key Transition Risks and Continuing Development Challenges Threaten
Satellite Data Continuity:
Moving forward, the agencies face key risks in transitioning from
NPOESS to their new programs, including loss of key staff and
capabilities, delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing
new program offices, failure to support the other agency's
requirements, insufficient oversight of new program management, and
potential cost growth from contract terminations and other program
changes.
* Loss of key staff and capabilities: The NPOESS program office is
composed of NOAA, NASA, Air Force, and contractor staff with knowledge
and experience in the status, risks, and lessons learned from the
NPOESS program. This knowledge will be critical to moving the program
forward both during and after the transition period. However, within
the past year, the program office has lost its Program Executive
Officer, Deputy Program Executive Officer, and System Program Director”
the top three individuals who oversee day-to-day operations. Thus,
final critical decisions on work slow downs and priorities will be
made by a new Program Executive Officer, who has only overseen the
program for a few weeks. In addition, program office staff have
already begun leaving”or looking for other employment”due to the
uncertainties about the future of the program office. Unless NOAA and
DOD are proactive in retaining these staff, the new program may waste
valuable time if staff must relearn program details and may repeat
mistakes made and lose lessons learned by prior program staff.
* Delays in negotiating contract changes and establishing new
programs: According to NOAA officials, the plan for JPSS may require
negotiations with contractors and between contractors and their
subcontractors. In addition, both NOAA and DOD will need to establish
and fully staff program offices to facilitate and manage the
transition and new programs. Until decisions are made on how the
program is to proceed with contract changes and terminations, the
contractors and program office cannot implement the chosen solution,
and some decisions, such as how to hold schedule slips to a minimum,
could become much more difficult.
* Failure to support the other agency's requirements: As a joint
program, NPOESS was expected to fulfill many military, civilian, and
research requirements for environmental data. However, because the
requirements of NOAA and DOD are different, the agencies may develop
programs that meet their own needs but not the other's. If the
agencies cannot find a way to build a partnership that facilitates
both efficient and effective decision-making on data continuity needs,
the needs of both agencies may not be adequately incorporated into the
new programs.
* Insufficient oversight of new program management: Under its new JPSS
program, NOAA plans to transfer parts of the NPOESS program to NASA,
but it has not yet defined how it will oversee NASA's efforts. We have
reported that NASA has consistently underestimated time and cost and
has not adequately managed risk factors such as contractor
performance. Because of these issues, we listed NASA's acquisition
management as a high-risk area in 1990, and it remains a high-risk
area today.[Footnote 14] NOAA officials reported that they are
developing a management control plan with NASA and intend to perform
an independent review of this plan when it is completed. They could
not provide a time frame for its completion. Without strong NOAA
oversight of NASA's management of program components, JPSS may
continue to face the same cost, schedule, and contract management
challenges as the NPOESS program.
* Cost growth resulting from contract and program changes: Because
neither acquisition has fully developed plans for their respective
programs, it is unclear whether contracts will need to be fully or
partially terminated, and what the terminations and other program
changes could ultimately cost. We have previously reported that if the
government decides to terminate a contract for convenience, it must
compensate the contractor”in the form of a termination settlement”for
the work it has performed.[Footnote 15] However, a settlement only
addresses the government's obligation under a terminated contract, and
there may be additional costs. For example, additional costs could
result from awarding a new contract to replace a terminated contract.
Until NOAA and DOD make decisions and plans for their programs, the
full cost of contract and program changes will be unknown.
NOAA, NASA, and DOD acknowledge that there are risks associated with
the transition to new programs, but they have not yet established
plans to mitigate these risks.
While NOAA and DOD are developing plans for their new programs, the
development of key NPOESS components is continuing. In recent months,
the program completed the development of the critical imaging sensor,
called the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), and
delivered it to NASA for integration onto the NPP satellite. Four of
the five sensors intended for NPP are now on the spacecraft. In
addition, the program continues to work on components of the first and
second NPOESS satellites, which are to be transferred to NOAA and DOD
to become part of their respective follow-on programs. However, the
expected launch date of the NPP satellite has been delayed by 9 months
(moving the launch date to September 2011 or later), due to technical
issues in the development of the NPP sensor that has not yet been
integrated. In addition, the development of the VIIRS sensor for the
first NPOESS or JPSS satellite is experiencing significant cost
overruns. Further, the program is slowing down and may need to stop
work on key components because of potential contract liabilities and
funding constraints, but it has not developed a prioritized list on
what to stop first.
Until the transition risks are effectively mitigated, and unless
selected components are able to continue scheduled development, the
launches of NPP and the first NOAA and DOD satellites could be further
delayed. Further launch delays are likely to jeopardize the
availability and continuity of weather and climate data. For example,
the POES satellite currently in the afternoon orbit is expected to
reach the end of its lifespan at the end of 2012. If NPP is delayed,
there could be a gap in polar satellite observations in the afternoon
orbit. Similarly, a delay in the launch of the first JPSS satellite
may lead to a gap in satellite data after NPP reaches the end of its
lifespan.
Federal Efforts to Ensure the Long-term Provision of Environmental
Data from Satellites Are Lacking:
For over a decade, the climate community has clamored for an
interagency strategy to coordinate agency priorities, budgets, and
schedules for environmental satellites over the long term”and the
governance structure to implement that strategy. Specifically, in
1999, the National Research Council reported on the need for a
comprehensive long-term earth observation strategy and, in 2000, for
an effective governance structure that would balance interagency
issues and provide authority and accountability for implementing the
strategy.[Footnote 16] The National Research Council and others have
repeated these concerns in multiple reports since then, including
after the agencies responsible for NPOESS canceled key climate and
space weather sensors from the program in 2006.[Footnote 17]
Similarly, in 1999, the Administrators of NOAA and NASA wrote letters
to OSTP noting the need for an interagency strategy and the means to
implement it.
While progress has been made in developing near-term interagency
plans, this initiative is languishing without a firm completion date,
and federal efforts to establish and implement a strategy for the long-
term provision of satellite data are insufficient. Specifically, in
2005, the National Science and Technology Council's Committee on
Environment and Natural Resources established USGEO to develop an
earth observation strategy and coordinate its implementation. Since
that time, USGEO assessed current and evolving requirements, evaluated
them to determine investment priorities, and drafted the Strategic
Assessment Report”a report delineating near-term opportunities and
priorities for earth observation from both space and ground. According
to agency officials, this report is the first in a planned series, and
it was approved by OSTP and multiple federal agencies in May 2009.
However, OSTP has not yet forwarded the draft to the Committee on
Environment and Natural Resources and the President's National Science
and Technology Council because it is reconsidering whether to revise
or move forward with the plan. USGEO officials could not provide a
schedule for completing this near-term interagency plan.
This draft report is an important first step in developing a national
strategy for earth observations, but it is not sufficient to ensure
the long-term provision of data vital to understanding the climate.
The draft report integrates different agencies' requirements and
proposes continuing or improving earth observations in 17 separate
areas, using both satellite and land-based measuring systems. However,
the report does not include costs, schedules, or plans for the long-
term provision of satellite data. While the report does note the
importance of continuing certain near-term plans for sensors, it does
not make recommendations for what to do over the long term.
In addition, the federal government lacks a clear process for
implementing an interagency strategy. Key offices within the Executive
Office of the President with responsibilities for environmental
observations, including OSTP and the Council for Environmental
Quality, have not established processes or time frames for
implementing an interagency strategy”including steps for working with
OMB to ensure that agencies' annual budgets are aligned with the
interagency strategy. As a result, even if an interagency strategy was
finalized, it is not clear how OSTP and OMB would ensure that the
responsibilities identified in the interagency strategy are consistent
with agency plans and are funded within agency budgets.
Until an interagency strategy for earth observation is established,
and a clear process for implementing it is in place, federal agencies
will continue to procure their immediate priorities on an ad hoc
basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to investments
in earth observation may be lost, and the continuity of key
measurements may be jeopardized. This will hinder our nation's ability
to understand long-term climate changes.
Federal Agencies Lack a Strategy for the Long-term Provision of Space
Weather Data:
While key federal agencies have taken steps to plan for continued
space weather observations in the near term, they lack a strategy for
the long-term provision of space weather data. Similar to maintaining
satellite-provided climate observations, maintaining space weather
observations over the long term is important. The National Space
Weather Program, the interagency coordinating body for the United
States space weather community, has repeatedly recommended taking
action to sustain the space weather observation infrastructure on a
long-term basis.
Agencies participating in the National Space Weather Program have
taken short-term actions that may help alleviate near-term gaps in
space weather observations, but OSTP has not approved or released two
reports that are expected to establish plans for obtaining space
weather observations over the long term. Specifically, NOAA and DOD
are seeking to replace key experimental space-observing satellites.
[Footnote 18] Further, the National Space Weather Program recently
developed two reports at the request of OSTP documenting specific
recommendations for the future of space weather, one on what to do
about a critical NASA space weather satellite, called the Advanced
Composition Explorer, and the other on the replacement of the space
weather capabilities removed from the NPOESS program. The program
submitted the reports in October and November of 2009, respectively.
However, OSTP officials do not have a schedule for approving or
releasing the reports.
While the agencies' short-term actions and the pending reports hold
promise, federal agencies do not currently have a comprehensive
interagency strategy for the long-term provision of space weather
data. Until OSTP releases the reports, it will not be clear whether
they provide a clear strategy to ensure the long-term provision of
space weather data”or whether the current efforts are simply ad hoc
attempts to ensure short-term data continuity. Without a comprehensive
long-term strategy for the provision of space weather data, agencies
may make ad hoc decisions to ensure continuity in the near term and
risk making inefficient decisions on key investments.
Implementation of Recommendations Could Help Ensure Near- and Long-
Term Satellite Continuity:
In the report being released today, we are making recommendations to
ensure that the transition from NPOESS to its successor programs is
efficiently and effectively managed.[Footnote 19] Among other things,
we are recommending that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce
direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to expedite
decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of their
planned programs; direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to
develop plans to address key transition risks, including the loss of
skilled staff, delays in contract negotiations and setting up new
program offices, loss of support for the other agency's requirements,
and oversight of new program management; and direct the NPOESS program
office to develop priorities for work slowdown and stoppage to allow
the activities that are most important to maintaining launch schedules
to continue.
In written comments on the NPOESS report, both NOAA and DOD agreed
with our recommendations and identified plans to implement them. In
addition, NASA made comments on two of our findings. For example, NASA
commented on our finding that NOAA would need to provide enhanced
oversight of NASA's management of the JPSS program. NASA officials
asserted that the proper basis for comparison should not be their
leading-edge research missions, but, instead, should be their
operational environmental satellite programs. However, the JPSS
program does include leading-edge sensor technologies, and the
complexity of these sensor technologies has been a key reason for the
cost growth and schedule delays experienced to date on the NPOESS
program. Thus, it will be important for both NOAA and NASA to ensure
that the subcontractors are adequately managed so that technical,
cost, and schedule issues are minimized or mitigated. The full text of
the three agencies' comments and our evaluation of those comments are
provided in the accompanying report.
In the report issued in April, we made recommendations to improve long-
term planning for environmental satellites.[Footnote 20] Specifically,
we recommended that the Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology, in collaboration with key Executive Office of the
President entities (including the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, the Office of Management and Budget, the Council on
Environmental Quality, and the National Science and Technology
Council) establish a deadline to complete and release three key
reports on environmental observations. We also recommended that the
Assistant to the President direct USGEO to establish an interagency
strategy to address the long-term provision of environmental
observations from satellites that includes costs and schedules for the
satellites, as well as a plan for the relevant agencies' future
budgets, and establish an ongoing process, with timelines, for
obtaining approval of the interagency strategy and aligning it with
agency plans and annual budgets.
When asked to comment on our report, the Executive Office of the
President did not agree or disagree with our recommendations; however,
officials noted that OSTP is currently revising USGEO's Strategic
Assessment Report to update information on launch schedules and on the
availability of certain measurements that have changed since
completion of the report a year ago. In crafting this strategy, it
will be important for OSTP to address long-term interagency needs and
to work with OMB to ensure that the long-term plans are aligned with
individual agencies' plans and budgets. If the plan does not include
these elements, individual agencies will continue to address only
their most pressing priorities, other agencies' needs may be ignored,
and the government may lose the ability to effectively and efficiently
address its earth observation needs.
In summary, at the end of this fiscal year, the federal government
will have spent 16 years and almost $6 billion to combine two legacy
satellite programs into one, yet will not have launched a single
satellite. Faced with expected cost growth exceeding $8 billion,
schedule delays of over 5 years, and continuing tri-agency management
challenges, a task force led by the President's Office of Science and
Technology Policy decided to disband NPOESS so that NOAA and DOD could
pursue separate satellite acquisitions. While the two agencies are
scrambling to develop plans for their respective programs, it is not
yet clear what the programs will deliver, when, and at what cost, but
it is very likely that they will cost more than the existing NPOESS
baseline and recent program office estimates. Timely decisions on
cost, schedule, and capabilities are needed to allow both acquisitions
to move forward. In addition, the agencies face a number of transition
risks, but neither agency has developed plans to mitigate these risks.
Meanwhile, the NPOESS program is continuing to develop components of
the NPP satellite and components of the first two satellites. However,
program officials reported that they have slowed all development work,
and may need to stop work on these deliverables. Slowing or stopping
work could further delay the satellites' launches, but the program has
not developed a prioritized list of what to stop first to mitigate
impacts on satellite launches. Until it does so, there may be an
increased risk of gaps in satellite data.
Although initial steps have been taken to ensure the short-term
continuity of key climate and space weather measurements from
satellites, the federal government has not taken the necessary steps
to ensure the long-term sustainment of these critical measurements.
For example, NOAA recently removed sensors from JPSS that were
originally planned for the NPOESS satellites in the afternoon orbit,
but it is unclear how this will affect other agencies and programs.
Until an interagency strategy for earth observation is established,
and a clear process for implementing it is in place, federal agencies
will continue to procure their immediate priorities on an ad hoc
basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to investments
in earth observation may be lost, and the continuity of key
measurements may be lost. This will hinder our nation's ability to
understand long-term climate changes and risk our ability to measure,
predict, and mitigate the effects of space weather.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony,
please contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or at
pownerd@gao.gov. Other key contributors include Colleen Phillips,
Assistant Director, Kate Agatone; Franklin Jackson; Kathleen S.
Lovett; Lee McCracken; and John Ockay.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act
Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and
Climate Data, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-558]
(Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010), and Environmental Satellites:
Strategy Needed to Sustain Critical Climate and Space Weather
Measurements, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-456]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2010).
[2] The Council on Environmental Quality coordinates federal
environmental efforts; the National Science and Technology Council
coordinates science and technological policies and sets national goals
for investments in those areas, and the Committee on Environment and
Natural Resources provides advice on federal research and development
efforts in the area of environment and natural resources.
[3] NOAA provides command and control for both the POES and DMSP
satellites after they are in orbit.
[4] The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological
Satellites' MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting
satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp satellites are
planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. The first of these
satellites was launched in 2006 and is currently operational.
[5] Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994.
[6] GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs
Increasing and Data Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-
agency Decision Making, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-564] (Washington, D.C.: June 17,
2009); Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition
Faces Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate
Data Continuity, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-518]
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2008); and Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is Under Way, but Technical
Challenges and Risks Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-498] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27,
2007).
[7] NOAA officials noted that these dates could change as transition
plans are developed.
[8] NOAA officials are currently revisiting plans for the Space
Environment Monitor, which collects data to predict the effects of
space weather on technological systems, and the Microwave
Imager/Sounder, which collects microwave images and data needed for
measurements such as rain rate and soil moisture. Although they plan
to launch the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Suite, NOAA
officials have not yet made a decision on which satellite will host
the sensor.
[9] DOD had originally planned to make decisions on the spacecraft and
sensors in June and October 2010, respectively, but revised the dates
for these decisions in late June 2010.
[10] This estimate includes approximately $2.9 billion in NOAA funds
spent on NPOESS through fiscal year 2010, but does not include
approximately $2.9 billion that DOD has spent through fiscal year 2010
on NPOESS. NOAA officials also reported that the JPSS cost estimate is
at a higher confidence level than the previous NPOESS life-cycle cost
estimates.
[11] Although the program baseline is currently $13.95 billion, we
estimated in June 2009 that this cost could grow by about $1 billion.
In addition, officials from the Executive Office of the President
stated that they reviewed life-cycle cost estimates from DOD and the
NPOESS program office of $15.1 billion and $16.45 billion,
respectively.
[12] This estimate includes approximately $2.9 billion in DOD funds
spent on NPOESS through fiscal year 2010. It is not a life-cycle cost
estimate and could change as DOD completes its requirements review and
analysis of alternatives for its new program. DOD has not yet
developed a life-cycle cost estimate.
[13] GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost
Increases Trigger Review and Place Program's Direction on Hold,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-573T] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006).
[14] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January
2009).
[15] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Termination Costs Are Generally Not a
Compelling Reason to Continue Programs or Contracts That Otherwise
Warrant Ending, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-379]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2008).
[16] National Research Council, Climate Research Committee, Adequacy
of Climate Observing Systems (Washington, D.C.: 1999); National
Research Council, Space Studies Board: Committee on Earth Studies,
Issues in the Integration of Research and Operational Satellite
Systems for Climate Research: Part I. Science and Design (Washington,
D.C.: 2000).
[17] For example, see: National Research Council, Committee on a
Strategy to Mitigate the Impact of Sensor Descopes and Demanifests on
the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft, Ensuring the Climate Record from the
NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft: Elements of a Strategy to Recover
Measurement Capabilities Lost in Program Restructuring, (Washington,
D.C.: 2008); National Research Council, Committee on Earth Science and
Applications from Space: A Community Assessment and Strategy for the
Future, Earth Science and Applications from Space: National
Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: 2007);
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Wigbels, Lyn et.al.),
Earth Observations and Global Change: Why? Where Are We? What Next?: A
Report of CSIS Space Initiatives (Washington, D.C.: July 2008).
[18] NOAA has requested funding in fiscal year 2011 to refurbish
NASA's Deep Space Climate Observatory spacecraft to replace the
experimental Advanced Composition Explorer spacecraft and has
requested funding to replace its Constellation Observing System for
Meteorology, Ionosphere, and Climate. DOD has begun efforts to develop
a replacement for its experimental Communication/Navigation Outage
Forecasting System satellite, which is designed to sense space weather
that affects how the Global Positioning System, high frequency radio,
and other communications devices work in low latitude areas.
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-558].
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-456].
[End of section]
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