Military Readiness
Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions for Ship Crewing Requirements and Training Gao ID: GAO-10-592 June 9, 2010Since 2000, the Navy has undertaken a number of initiatives to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs. For example, it has reduced crew sizes on some of its surface ships and has moved from instructor-led to more computer-based training. In House Report 111-166, which accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the House Armed Services Committee directed GAO to review the training, size, composition, and capabilities of the Navy's ship crews. This report assesses the extent to which the Navy (1) used valid assumptions and standards in determining crew sizes for cruisers and destroyers, and (2) has measured the impact of changes to its training programs, including on the time it takes personnel to achieve various qualifications. To do so, GAO analyzed Navy procedures for determining crew size compared to guidance, analyzed current Navy metrics to measure training impact, and interviewed relevant officials and conducted visits to 11 ships.
Since 2001, in an effort to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs, the Navy has reduced the requirements and size of crews for some types of ships. For example, from fiscal years 2001 to 2009, enlisted requirements declined by about 20 percent and crew sizes declined by about 16 percent on cruisers and destroyers. The Navy made these reductions based on an initiative it referred to as optimal manning as well as a decision to change certain standards it uses to translate estimated workload into workforce requirements. During pilot tests and the implementation of its optimal manning initiative, the Navy considered several elements, such as job task analysis and work studies, called for in its guidance. However, it analyzed only at-sea workload data because of a long-standing Navy assumption that at-sea workload exceeds in-port workload. While best practices require that valid and reliable data are used to assess workforce requirements, the Navy has not tested the validity of its assumption for excluding in-port data. Additionally, GAO was told by shipboard personnel that in-port workload has been increasing. Furthermore, when changing standards, such as increasing the standard workweek from 67 to 70 hours, the Navy did not conduct the types of analysis called for in its guidance to verify that these changes were warranted. Without performing additional analysis to determine that the assumption and standards it uses to determine personnel requirements are valid, the Navy cannot be assured that it has appropriately sized crews to maintain material readiness and accomplish necessary tasks aboard its ships. The Navy has made significant changes to its training programs and evaluated some aspects of these changes, specifically those related to cost and training time. However, it lacks outcome-based performance measures and complete data necessary to fully evaluate the impact changes to training have had on trainees' job performance and the time required for personnel to achieve various qualifications. For example, in 2003, the Navy replaced its 6-month division officer course with computer-based training and officials told GAO that this change has resulted in decreases in class length and saved the Navy about $50 million annually. While important, these input and output-based metrics do not enable the Navy to determine how its training programs are affecting the level of the trainees' job performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities once they report to their ships. The time it takes for personnel to achieve qualification standards is a potential metric the Navy could use to evaluate its training programs, however data on actual qualification times, while improving, are incomplete. GAO met with leaders from 11 different ships who told GAO that the sailors and officers taught using new methods such as computer-based training, required more on-the-job training when they arrived onboard than those who had previously received classroom instruction. They also noted that because of reductions in crew sizes, there are fewer personnel available to provide this on-the-job training. Without additional outcome-based performance measures to supplement its current metrics, the Navy cannot fully determine the effectiveness of the training changes it has implemented and whether further adjustments are necessary.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Sharon L. Pickup Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-9619GAO-10-592, Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions for Ship Crewing Requirements and Training
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2010:
Military Readiness:
Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions for Ship Crewing
Requirements and Training:
GAO-10-592:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-592, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2000, the Navy has undertaken a number of initiatives to achieve
greater efficiencies and reduce costs. For example, it has reduced
crew sizes on some of its surface ships and has moved from instructor-
led to more computer-based training. In House Report 111-166, which
accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, the House Armed Services Committee directed GAO to review the
training, size, composition, and capabilities of the Navy‘s ship
crews. This report assesses the extent to which the Navy (1) used
valid assumptions and standards in determining crew sizes for cruisers
and destroyers, and (2) has measured the impact of changes to its
training programs, including on the time it takes personnel to achieve
various qualifications. To do so, GAO analyzed Navy procedures for
determining crew size compared to guidance, analyzed current Navy
metrics to measure training impact, and interviewed relevant officials
and conducted visits to 11 ships.
What GAO Found:
Since 2001, in an effort to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce
costs, the Navy has reduced the requirements and size of crews for
some types of ships. For example, from fiscal years 2001 to 2009,
enlisted requirements declined by about 20 percent and crew sizes
declined by about 16 percent on cruisers and destroyers. The Navy made
these reductions based on an initiative it referred to as optimal
manning as well as a decision to change certain standards it uses to
translate estimated workload into workforce requirements. During pilot
tests and the implementation of its optimal manning initiative, the
Navy considered several elements, such as job task analysis and work
studies, called for in its guidance. However, it analyzed only at-sea
workload data because of a long-standing Navy assumption that at-sea
workload exceeds in-port workload. While best practices require that
valid and reliable data are used to assess workforce requirements, the
Navy has not tested the validity of its assumption for excluding in-
port data. Additionally, GAO was told by shipboard personnel that in-
port workload has been increasing. Furthermore, when changing
standards, such as increasing the standard workweek from 67 to 70
hours, the Navy did not conduct the types of analysis called for in
its guidance to verify that these changes were warranted. Without
performing additional analysis to determine that the assumption and
standards it uses to determine personnel requirements are valid, the
Navy cannot be assured that it has appropriately sized crews to
maintain material readiness and accomplish necessary tasks aboard its
ships.
The Navy has made significant changes to its training programs and
evaluated some aspects of these changes, specifically those related to
cost and training time. However, it lacks outcome-based performance
measures and complete data necessary to fully evaluate the impact
changes to training have had on trainees‘ job performance and the time
required for personnel to achieve various qualifications. For example,
in 2003, the Navy replaced its 6-month division officer course with
computer-based training and officials told GAO that this change has
resulted in decreases in class length and saved the Navy about $50
million annually. While important, these input and output-based
metrics do not enable the Navy to determine how its training programs
are affecting the level of the trainees‘ job performance, knowledge,
skills, and abilities once they report to their ships. The time it
takes for personnel to achieve qualification standards is a potential
metric the Navy could use to evaluate its training programs, however
data on actual qualification times, while improving, are incomplete.
GAO met with leaders from 11 different ships who told GAO that the
sailors and officers taught using new methods such as computer-based
training, required more on-the-job training when they arrived onboard
than those who had previously received classroom instruction. They
also noted that because of reductions in crew sizes, there are fewer
personnel available to provide this on-the-job training. Without
additional outcome-based performance measures to supplement its
current metrics, the Navy cannot fully determine the effectiveness of
the training changes it has implemented and whether further
adjustments are necessary.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Navy validate the underlying assumptions
and standards it uses to calculate workforce requirements, and as
necessary, based on this assessment, reevaluate its cruiser and
destroyer workload requirements. GAO is also recommending that the
Navy develop additional metrics to measure the effectiveness of Navy
training. DOD agreed with these recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-592] or key
components. For more information, contact Sharon L. Pickup at (202)
512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Navy Lacks a Firm Analytical Basis for Some of Its Reductions to
Cruiser and Destroyer Crew Sizes:
The Navy Has Evaluated Some Aspects of Its Training Changes but Lacks
Performance Measures and Data to Fully Evaluate the Impact of These
Changes:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Deployment of Individual Augmentees:
Appendix II: Distribution of Enlisted and Officer Pay Grades, Fiscal
Years 2001 to 2009:
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix IV: Requirements, Authorized Positions, and Current Onboard
Enlisted Personnel for Cruisers and Destroyers:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Changes in the Average Requirements, Authorized Positions,
and Current Onboard Personnel for Guided-Missile Cruisers and Guided-
Missile Destroyers from Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009:
Table 2: Guided-Missile Cruisers and Guided-Missile Destroyers Deemed
Unfit for Sustained Combat Operations, 2003 to 2009:
Table 3: Guided-Missile Cruisers and Guided-Missile Destroyers
Uploading Personnel Qualification Data, 2005 to 2009:
Table 4: Active Duty Individual Augmentees Deployed in Fiscal Years
2006 through 2009:
Table 5: Top Enlisted Occupational Fields of Individual Augmentees
Deployed from Cruisers and Destroyers during Fiscal Years 2006 through
2009:
Figures:
Figure 1: Navy Process for Determining Workforce Requirements,
Authorized Positions, and Personnel Levels:
Figure 2: Class A and B Mishaps for Guided-Missile Cruisers and Guided-
Missile Destroyers, 2001 to 2009:
Figure 3: Pay Grade Distribution of Individual Augmentees Who Were
Deployed from Cruisers and Destroyers during Fiscal Years 2006 through
2009:
Figure 4: Enlisted Pay Grade Distribution of Sailors on Guided-Missile
Cruisers, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009:
Figure 5: Enlisted Pay Grade Distribution of Sailors on Guided-Missile
Destroyers, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009:
Figure 6: Average Requirements, Authorized Positions, and Current
Onboard Enlisted Personnel for Guided-Missile Cruisers, Fiscal Years
2001 to 2009:
Figure 7: Average Requirements, Authorized Positions, and Current
Onboard Enlisted Personnel for Guided-Missile Destroyers, Fiscal Years
2001 to 2009:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 9, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
Since 2000, the Navy has undertaken a number of initiatives to achieve
greater efficiencies and reduce costs. For example, it has reduced the
workforce requirements for some of its ships and transitioned away
from instructor-led training programs to more computer-based training.
Specifically, in October 2001, the Navy initiated an effort referred
to as optimal manning to determine if it could reduce workload on
board selected surface ships while maintaining combat capability and
readiness. Based on the results of pilot tests on a guided-missile
cruiser and guided-missile destroyer, in March 2004, the Navy reduced
at-sea workload for these ship classes. At the same time the optimal
manning initiative was being tested and implemented, the Navy changed
several of the standards it uses to translate a ship's at-sea workload
into workforce requirements, including increasing the standard
workweek from 67 to 70 hours. The cumulative effect over time of the
optimal manning initiative and the changes to workload standards was a
reduction in the enlisted workforce requirements aboard cruisers and
destroyers, which in turn affected the sizes of these ships' crews.
This reduction in workforce requirements caused the number of
authorized enlisted positions[Footnote 1] on both cruisers and
destroyers to decline.
In an effort to reduce the cost and length of its off-ship training
programs, the Navy, in 2000, began a review of its training practices.
Based on this review, it began making changes that included using new
technologies to conduct training and improving and aligning training
organizations. For example, the Navy began using more computer-based
training to provide entry-level knowledge and skills to junior
sailors. It also replaced the 6-month division officer course[Footnote
2] at the Surface Warfare Officers School with computer-based, self-
paced training that junior officers were to complete after they
reported aboard their ships. Additionally, in 2003 the Navy revamped
its education and training organizations. This included establishing
the Naval Personnel Development Command and 14 learning centers to
standardize the Navy's approach to developing and delivering training.
While the Navy has been adjusting crew sizes and training, several
other factors have placed demands on ship crews. For example, the Navy
has provided personnel, both officer and enlisted, to help the Army
and Marine Corps with staffing demands of ongoing operations. While
most of these personnel, referred to as individual augmentees, have
been deployed from shore duty assignments--or between their
traditional Navy sea and shore rotational assignments--some are drawn
directly from cruisers or destroyers. Most individual augmentees were
initially deployed for 6 to 12 months, but more recently they have
been deployed for 9 to 12 months or longer in support of ongoing
operations. Additionally, shipboard personnel told us that the
antiterrorism force protection workload has increased for ships in
port as the Navy has adopted more stringent standards associated with
guarding its ships. The Navy has also made changes to its shore
intermediate maintenance activities that have reduced the capacity of
these activities to assist ships with maintenance and repair tasks.
In view of these changes, the House Armed Services Committee, in a
report[Footnote 3] accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010,[Footnote 4] directed that GAO conduct a review
of the training, size, composition, and capabilities of the Navy's
ship crews. Our objectives were to evaluate (1) the extent to which
the Navy used valid assumptions and standards in determining crew
sizes for cruisers and destroyers and (2) the extent to which the Navy
has measured the impact of changes to its training programs, including
the effect on qualification time.[Footnote 5] As specified in the
committee's report, we are also providing information on the
deployment of individual augmentees (see appendix I) and changes in
rank and rate distributions that have occurred on cruisers and
destroyers since 2001 (see appendix II).[Footnote 6]
To address our first objective, we analyzed Navy policies and
procedures for determining crew sizes as well as various studies and
reports on the Navy's optimal manning initiative and the manpower
requirements process for surface ships. We also interviewed officials
from multiple Navy offices and met with personnel on board four Navy
cruisers, six destroyers, and one frigate to discuss crew size,
workload, and watchstanding requirements. In addition, we analyzed
Navy data to determine changes in workforce requirements, authorized
positions, and current onboard personnel levels for cruisers and
destroyers from fiscal years 2001 to 2009. To determine what if any
impact changes in crew size were having on the material conditions or
operations of these ships, we examined the results of cruiser and
destroyer inspections conducted by the Navy's Board of Inspection and
Survey and Navy mishap data to assess whether there were any
discernible trends over this period. To address our second objective,
we reviewed relevant Navy instructions on training, studies on the
Navy's Revolution in Training initiatives, and prior GAO work on
assessing strategic training and development efforts. We also
interviewed Navy training officials to discuss how the Navy has
measured the impact of its changes to its training programs.
Furthermore, we met with ship personnel to obtain their views on how
the implementation of new training practices has affected shipboard
performance. In addition, we analyzed personnel qualification data and
the extent that ships are reporting these data.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 to June 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional
details on our scope and methodology are in appendix III.
Background:
The Navy uses a four-step process and considers various factors in
crewing its ships. First, it determines the workload of its ships.
Second, it loads workload data into its Manpower Requirements System
model to generate workforce requirements. Third, it determines the
proportion of its requirements it can fund and then determines the
number of authorized positions for each ship. Finally, it assigns
individual personnel to its ships.[Footnote 7] Figure 1 shows the four-
step process that generates workforce requirements and authorized
positions and distributes personnel.
Figure 1: Navy Process for Determining Workforce Requirements,
Authorized Positions, and Personnel Levels:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Navy Process to Determine Enlisted Personnel Level for Ships:
Step 1: Conduct at-sea workload analysis;
At-sea workload data.
Step 2: Load data into Manpower Requirements System model;
Workforce requirements.
Step 3: Apply available funding;
Authorized positions.
Step 4: Distribute available personnel;
Current onboard personnel.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation.
[End of figure]
To determine the workload aboard a ship, the Navy Manpower Analysis
Center sends analysts to ships to assess the tasks that must be
accomplished and determine who should accomplish them. When
determining workload, analysts consider various Navy standards and
guidance with a focus on the ship's required operational capability
and projected operating environment. The analysts base their
assessments on the amount of work necessary to accomplish the ship's
missions while at sea.[Footnote 8]
The Navy Manpower Analysis Center converts the workload information
its analysts collect into workforce requirements using a computer
model called the Naval Manpower Requirements System. This model
contains a number of different standards to calculate workforce
requirements, with the goal of identifying the most efficient mix of
personnel to accomplish the required workload. A key standard used in
this model is the Navy Standard Workweek, which is the number of hours
per week available to accomplish required workload. The Navy Standard
Workweek is used for planning purposes, is not restrictive or binding
on commanders or commanding officers in establishing working hours,
and is not intended to reflect the limits of personnel endurance. In
February 2002, the Navy increased the Navy Standard Workweek from 67
to 70 hours. At the same time, it reduced other standards used in the
model, such as the Productivity and Make Ready/Put Away Allowances.
[Footnote 9] These changes to the standards used by the model led to a
reduction in the model's output--the ship's workforce requirements--
for any given ship's workload information. While these changes
affected enlisted workforce requirements, they did not affect those
for officers since officer workforce requirements are not based on
workload analysis.
After the Navy determines the workforce requirements for its ships, it
estimates the level of funding that may be available to fill those
requirements. When the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education) determines that a
requirement can be funded, the Navy then refers to that requirement as
an authorized billet (i.e., position) that can be filled.
The Navy's Distribution Office fills the authorized positions with
personnel. Distribution Office officials consider several factors as
they assign personnel to authorized positions. These factors include
the skills required by the position, personnel preferences, deployment
schedules, and the "distributable" inventory of personnel--the number
of personnel available to be assigned to ships. This inventory is
limited not only by personnel levels but also by factors such as the
servicemembers' health and administrative statuses. Because the
inventory of personnel available for assignment is generally less than
the number of authorized positions, ships generally do not receive
personnel for all of their authorized positions.
In October 2001, under an initiative referred to as optimal manning,
the Navy directed pilot projects aboard a cruiser and a destroyer to
determine if workload, while a ship is at sea, could be reduced by
changing watchstanding requirements and more effectively using
technology on board these ships.[Footnote 10] Based on the results,
the Navy made certain adjustments; for example, it eliminated the port
and starboard lookouts under typical at-sea conditions. In addition,
it combined a number of watchstations, so tasks that had previously
been the responsibility of several personnel were now consolidated
into a single watchstation. The reduced at-sea workloads were then
loaded into the Naval Manpower Requirements System model, which
resulted in reduced workforce requirements. The Navy subsequently
reduced authorized positions and actual personnel levels aboard its
cruisers and destroyers.
The Navy uses both formal off-ship training programs and on-the-job
training to improve the knowledge and skill levels its personnel have
in their respective occupational specialties or jobs[Footnote 11] and
to provide the knowledge and skills necessary for personnel to qualify
to stand various watches, which may or may not relate directly to
their occupational specialties. In 2000, the Chief of Naval Operations
initiated a review of the Navy's entire training system, including its
organizational structure, curriculum development, and execution. As a
result of this review and subsequent studies, the Navy made a number
of changes to its training structure and programs. For example, it
replaced some classes that were formerly led by instructors with
computer-based training. It also established the Naval Education and
Training Command in March 2003 to focus on education and training
policy and strategy development. From 2003 to 2004, it created
learning and support centers to administer training and education
programs at the fleet level. These centers were functionally organized
around enlisted ratings and mission areas. According to Navy
officials, in 2008, the centers were aligned under the Naval Education
and Training Command.
The Navy Lacks a Firm Analytical Basis for Some of Its Reductions to
Cruiser and Destroyer Crew Sizes:
Since 2001, the Navy has reduced the requirements and actual numbers
of enlisted personnel aboard its guided-missile cruisers and guided-
missile destroyers. The Navy made these adjustments based on its
optimal manning initiative as well as a decision to change certain
standards it uses to translate estimated workload into workforce
requirements. In performing the analysis to support these reductions,
the Navy considered various factors and made various assumptions but
did not always address the elements called for in Navy guidance and
best practices. Additionally, we were told by shipboard personnel that
in-port workload is increasing, which raises questions about the
Navy's assumption that workload while a ship is underway exceeds in-
port workload.
Requirements, Authorized Positions, and Current Onboard Personnel Have
Decreased since 2001:
In October 2001, the Navy initiated its optimal manning initiative by
conducting pilot projects on a cruiser and a destroyer to determine if
it could reduce their workloads while maintaining combat capability
and readiness. Based on the results of these projects, the Navy, in
March 2004, implemented the optimal manning initiative on its cruisers
and destroyers. At the same time the optimal manning initiative was
being tested and implemented, the Navy changed several of the
standards it uses to translate a ship's workload into workforce
requirements, including increasing the standard workweek from 67 to 70
hours. The cumulative effect of both the optimal manning initiative
and the changes to workload standards reduced the average enlisted
workforce requirements aboard cruisers by 21 percent and aboard
destroyers by 20 percent from fiscal years 2001 to 2009. Because of
this decrease in workforce requirements, the number of authorized
positions and current onboard enlisted sailors also decreased over
this period, with the average number of enlisted personnel listed as
current onboard cruisers decreasing by 15 percent and destroyers
decreasing by 17 percent.[Footnote 12] During this time, the number of
officers on these ships has experienced little change; therefore, we
focused our analysis on the changes to enlisted personnel.
Table 1 shows the changes in average workforce requirements,
authorized positions, and current onboard enlisted personnel for
cruisers and destroyers from fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
Table 1: Changes in the Average Requirements, Authorized Positions,
and Current Onboard Personnel for Guided-Missile Cruisers and Guided-
Missile Destroyers from Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009:
Average enlisted requirements;
Cruiser: 2001: 383;
Cruiser: 2009: 301;
Cruiser: Average decrease: 82;
Cruiser: Percentage decrease: 21%;
Destroyer: 2001: 324;
Destroyer: 2009: 259;
Destroyer: Average decrease: 65;
Destroyer: Percentage decrease: 20%.
Average enlisted authorized positions;
Cruiser: 2001: 345;
Cruiser: 2009: 295;
Cruiser: Average decrease: 50;
Cruiser: Percentage decrease: 14%;
Destroyer: 2001: 292;
Destroyer: 2009: 251;
Destroyer: Average decrease: 41;
Destroyer: Percentage decrease: 14%.
Average enlisted current onboard personnel[A];
Cruiser: 2001: 342;
Cruiser: 2009: 291;
Cruiser: Average decrease: 51;
Cruiser: Percentage decrease: 15%;
Destroyer: 2001: 290;
Destroyer: 2009: 240;
Destroyer: Average decrease: 50;
Destroyer: Percentage decrease: 17%.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[A] Current onboard personnel is the number of personnel assigned to a
particular ship and is not necessarily representative of the number of
personnel actually present on board because of a variety of factors.
[End of table]
Appendix IV contains additional details about changes in the workforce
requirements, authorized positions, and current onboard enlisted
personnel for cruisers and destroyers from fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
Some of the Navy's Crew Size Reductions Were Supported by Analysis
While Others Were Not:
The Navy's Total Force Manpower Policies Procedures Instruction
[Footnote 13] requires, among other things, that the workforce
requirements determination process methodology be based on data
obtained through engineering studies, industry standards, technical
and operational evaluations, job task analysis, work study, activity
sampling, wartime tasking identified in operational instructions, or
through application of staffing standards. Additionally, we have
identified valid and reliable data as a critical component in
assessing an agency's workforce requirements as a human capital
management best practice.[Footnote 14]
While Optimal Manning Reductions Were Based on Analysis They Also
Relied on an Untested Assumption:
In performing the analysis to support its optimal manning initiative,
the Navy considered several of the elements called for in the
guidelines set forth in the Navy's Total Force Manpower Policies
Procedures instruction and human capital best practices. For example,
beginning in October 2001, it conducted pilot tests to reduce the at-
sea workload on the guided-missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay and guided-
missile destroyer USS Milius. These tests consisted of job task
analysis and work studies to verify that proposed reductions to crew
size under this initiative would not negatively affect the
capabilities of these ships. Based on the results of the pilot tests
and consultations with shipboard personnel, the Navy directed that the
lessons learned from these tests be applied to other surface ships in
2004. Based on these reductions in at-sea workload, the workforce
requirements for cruisers and destroyers decreased.
In assessing workload as part of the optimal manning initiative, the
Navy used its long-held assumption that at-sea workload exceeds in-
port workload requirements. Although in-port workload has varied over
time, the Navy has not collected information to estimate such changes
and determine whether it should adjust its assumption. However,
shipboard personnel we interviewed consistently told us that in-port
workload was increasing, which raises questions about the Navy's
assumption that workload while a ship is underway exceeds in-port
workload. Specifically, we conducted interviews with senior personnel,
including the commanding officer, executive officer, department heads,
division officers, and senior enlisted personnel, on board 11 ships--
four guided-missile cruisers, six guided-missile destroyers, and one
guided-missile frigate. Personnel aboard these ships consistently told
us that in-port workload was increasing primarily because of the
increases in antiterrorism force protection requirements and the
decrease in the size and function of shore intermediate maintenance
activities. Specifically, we were told the following:
* Antiterrorism force protection workload has been increasing, and
imposes additional training and qualification requirements beyond the
increased watchstanding requirements.[Footnote 15] However, because
the antiterrorism force protection watches--and the related required
training and weapon qualifications--occur in port, the Navy does not
calculate this workload when considering what the workforce
requirement for a ship should be.
* Assistance and support available to the ships from the shore
intermediate maintenance activities has decreased.[Footnote 16]
Personnel said that because the number of personnel working at these
activities has decreased, some of the workload that the activities
previously accomplished was transferred to the ship crews, thus
increasing a ship's in-port workload.
Some personnel also noted other factors that affect a ship's ability
to meet in-port workload requirements. For example, while in port,
crew members can be temporarily pulled off their ships to support
other waterfront requirements, such as helping other ships to prepare
for inspections or conduct local operations. Additionally, the number
of crew members available to do work on a ship is generally lower in
port than when the ship is at sea because personnel complete many of
their off-ship training requirements while they are in port, and
personnel generally take their earned leave while their ships are in
port. As a result of these factors, the ships may have fewer personnel
to perform the in-port workload.
Changes to Standards in the Manpower Requirements System Model Are Not
Based on Navy's Required Analysis:
In addition to decreasing the workload entered into its Manpower
Requirements System model as a result of the optimal manning
initiative, the Navy changed some of the standards this model uses to
translate workload into workforce requirements. In February 2002, the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Total Force Programming,
Manpower and Information Resources Division, directed the Navy
Manpower Analysis Center to change some of the standards in the model
in order to decrease workforce requirements. The Navy Manpower
Analysis Center increased the Navy Standard Workweek from 67 to 70
hours, decreased the Make Ready/Put Away Allowance from 30 to 15
percent and decreased the Productivity Allowance from a uniform 20
percent to a floating range from 2 to 8 percent. Each of these changes
led to a reduction in the model's output, which is workforce
requirements.
During our review, we found no evidence that the input changes to the
Navy's Manpower Requirements System model were based on the type of
analysis required in the Navy's Total Force Manpower Policies
Procedures Instruction and human capital best practices. For example,
when decreasing the Productivity Allowance, the Navy did not conduct
the type of analysis called for in its instruction, such as job task
analysis or engineering studies, to verify this change. Rather,
according to Navy officials, the standards were changed in order to
decrease workforce requirements to the level of authorized positions
at the time. They said that workforce requirements for cruisers and
destroyers were overstated as these ships had historically functioned
with crew sizes smaller than their calculated workforce requirements.
Additionally, Navy officials said that a 2001 study by the Center for
Naval Analyses found that the current workweek, which at the time was
67 hours, could be increased. However, in analyzing this study we
found that the study was based on workload data from a single ship,
and the study's authors had stated that the study should not be used
to expand the standard workweek for other ships.[Footnote 17]
In a 2005 report, the Naval Audit Service also found that these
changes were not based on verifiable analysis or data.[Footnote 18] In
response to that report, the Office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education) stated
that it had requested funding for the Center for Naval Analyses to
conduct a formal study of the Navy Standard Workweek in fiscal year
2006; however, as of April 2010 we found no evidence that this study
was conducted. By changing the standards in its model without the
analysis required by its instruction, the Navy lacks assurance that
the requirements generated by the model are reliable and accurate.
Without performing additional analysis to determine that the factors
and assumptions it uses to determine personnel requirements are valid,
the Navy cannot be assured that it has appropriately sized ship crews.
Overall Impact of Reduced Crew Sizes on the Capabilities and Condition
of Ships Is Unclear:
While the Navy's efforts to achieve efficiencies are important given
growing compensation costs, personnel aboard the ships we visited told
us that they believe the reductions in crew size have been detrimental
to both the capabilities and condition of the ships. For example, many
shipboard personnel cited changes in the way their ships prepared for
material inspections as examples of the impacts of decreased crew
sizes. Specifically, they said that their ships were no longer capable
of preparing for inspections by the Navy's independent Board of
Inspection and Survey (INSURV) without outside help. INSURV conducts
material inspections of Navy ships every 5 years. Shipboard personnel
and shore-based Navy officials knowledgeable about these inspections
told us that prior to reductions in crew size, cruisers and destroyers
would typically prepare for these inspections with just the crew on
board the ships. However, they said the crew size of these ships is
now insufficient to prepare the ships; therefore personnel from other
ships and shore establishments supplement the ship crews in conducting
maintenance and preservation tasks to prepare the ships to be
inspected. In addition, the shipboard personnel we spoke with said
that they thought the reductions in crew sizes were negatively
affecting the ships' material condition and could ultimately lead to
an increase in ship mishaps.
In our analysis of the results of the INSURV inspections, we did not
find any specific trend showing a decline in the material condition of
ships. However, it is unclear in what way the results of these
inspections may be affected by the outside support these ships' crew
members told us they were receiving. As part of its inspection
process, INSURV identifies and reports material conditions that
substantially reduce a ship's fitness for naval service and its
ability to perform its primary and secondary missions. If INSURV
determines that the results of its inspection of a particular ship
call into question that ship's ability to conduct prompt and sustained
combat operations, it classifies that ship as unfit for sustained
combat operations and includes this classification in its report on
the ship's inspection. Table 2 shows the numbers of cruisers and
destroyers inspected since 2003, the first year data were available on
the classification of ships as fit or unfit.
Table 2: Guided-Missile Cruisers and Guided-Missile Destroyers Deemed
Unfit for Sustained Combat Operations, 2003 to 2009:
Ships inspected;
2003: 12;
2004: 10;
2005: 9;
2006: 11;
2007: 17;
2008: 17;
2009: 9.
Ships unfit;
2003: 1;
2004: 0;
2005: 0;
2006: 0;
2007: 0;
2008: 3;
2009: 3.
Source: GAO analysis of INSURV data.
[End of table]
Regarding ship inspections, as shown in table 2, only one cruiser or
destroyer was deemed unfit for sustained combat operations by INSURV
from 2003 to 2007, while in both 2008 and 2009 three ships were
determined to be unfit. Because of the relatively small number of
inspections each year, it is not possible to draw the conclusion that
the last 2 years represents a trend in fitness of these ships.
However, several Navy officials told us they believe that reductions
in crew sizes were having a detrimental effect on the condition of
these ships.
Regarding ship mishaps, we examined the number of class A and B
mishaps from 2001 to 2009 for cruisers and destroyers and did not find
a definitive trend in the number of mishaps.[Footnote 19] We did not
evaluate the circumstances of each reported mishap. Class A and B
mishaps are the most severe type of mishaps, with class A representing
serious personal injury or material damage of at least $1 million, and
class B mishaps representing at least $200,000 in damage. The results
of this analysis are shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Class A and B Mishaps for Guided-Missile Cruisers and Guided-
Missile Destroyers, 2001 to 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2001;
Class A: 1;
Class B: 0.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Class A: 2;
Class B: 1.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Class A: 1;
Class B: 2.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Class A: 1;
Class B: 4.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Class A: 3;
Class B: 3.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Class A: 3;
Class B: 4.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Class A: 0;
Class B: 3.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Class A: 0;
Class B: 3.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Class A: 3;
Class B: 4.
Source: GAO analysis of data from the Naval Safety Center.
[End of figure]
Based on the relatively small number of mishaps that occur each year,
we were unable to identify a trend in the results.
Shipboard personnel aboard destroyers also told us that prior to
reductions in crew sizes, their ships were able to simultaneously
operate two replenishment stations while underway but now the ships
are only able to operate one station at a time. This means the
dangerous underway replenishment evolution, where ships operate side
by side while supplies are transferred from one ship to the other, now
takes longer to complete.
The Navy Has Evaluated Some Aspects of Its Training Changes but Lacks
Performance Measures and Data to Fully Evaluate the Impact of These
Changes:
The Navy has made significant changes to its training programs and has
evaluated some aspects of these changes, specifically, those related
to cost and training time, but lacks the performance measures and data
necessary to fully evaluate the impact changes to training have had on
trainees' job performance and the time required for personnel to
achieve various qualifications.
Since 2003, the Navy Has Made Significant Changes to Its Training
Programs:
The Navy has made a number of changes to its off-ship training
programs, including replacing many formerly instructor-led and lab-
based classes with computer-based training. For example, in January
2003, the Navy eliminated the 6-month division officer course, held in
Newport, Rhode Island, and replaced it with the current Surface
Warfare Officers School-at-Sea course, which consists of six computer
discs that junior officers are required to complete after they report
to their first ships. After completing the computer-based training
program and certain on-the-job training and watchstanding
qualifications, junior officers report to the Surface Warfare Officers
School in Rhode Island for 3 weeks of advanced proficiency training.
After this training, they return to their ships where they may receive
additional training before being tested for qualification as surface
warfare officers.[Footnote 20] The Navy's shift to computer-focused
training was intended to reduce both training cost and training time
before on-ship duty. Prior to the 2003 changes, instructors for the 6-
month division officer course taught fundamental skills such as
navigation, communication, maintenance, ship handling, and
engineering, and students received hands-on training with simulators
and patrol craft. The course also included classified instruction on
U.S. and enemy radar, sonar, and weapons characteristics. Upon
completion of the course, officers reported to their ships for
additional, on-the-job training before they were tested for
qualification as surface warfare officers.
In addition, the Center for Naval Engineering made changes to training
for enlisted sailors, including changes to basic engineering training.
According to Navy officials, prior to 2004, engineering courses were
taught in eight separate schools based on the occupational specialty
of the enlisted sailor. The instruction largely was instructor-led
training held in a classroom or lab. In August 2004, this classroom-
based training was replaced by the basic engineering common core, a
general course integrating training from eight separate engineering
schools. This course uses a blended learning approach with both self-
paced computer-based training and instructor-led training in the
classroom.
Navy Lacks Performance Measures to Fully Evaluate the Impact of Its
Training Programs:
The Navy has evaluated the impact that its changes to training
programs have had on the length and cost of training, but it lacks a
broader range of performance measures needed to evaluate the impact on
other key aspects, such as the trainees' job performance. Our prior
work[Footnote 21] shows that it is important for agencies to
incorporate performance measures that can be used to demonstrate the
contributions training programs make to improve results. By
incorporating valid measures of effectiveness into training and
development programs, agencies can better ensure that they adequately
address training objectives and thereby increase the likelihood that
desired changes will occur in the target population's skills,
knowledge, abilities, attitudes, or behaviors.
In evaluating its training programs, the Navy has, for the most part,
developed and applied input-and output-based metrics, such as the
number of individuals trained, training hours per individual, and
training cost per individual. For example, Navy training officials we
spoke with stated that the changes to training have resulted in
improvements such as decreases in class length and overall training
cost. In addition, officials from the Surface Warfare Officers School
said that changing the traditional methods of training for new
officers from an on-site to a computer-based training program reduced
the time it took for new officers to achieve their surface warfare
officer qualification, both in terms of reducing time spent in
training and on board their ships before qualifying.[Footnote 22]
Officials also estimated that since implementing these new methods of
training for surface warfare officers, the Navy has saved about $50
million annually. Similarly, officials at the Center for Naval
Engineering told us that the shift to the basic engineer common core
reduced training time. Based on our analysis of data provided by the
center, we estimate that the average time to complete the course
decreased by 29 percent, from an average of 101 to 71 days,[Footnote
23] compared to the previous curriculum.
While important, these metrics do not enable the Navy to determine how
its training programs are affecting key aspects, such as the trainees'
job performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities once they report to
their ships. For example, the Navy could measure the ability of
personnel to perform the tasks expected of them once they report to
their ships or the amount and types of on-the-job training required
for personnel to perform required tasks. While the Navy did initiate a
pilot study to measure trainees' knowledge levels, officials told us
that this study was only done once. To conduct this study, the Center
for Naval Engineering divided a group of engineering students into two
groups. One group received training via the traditional curriculum and
the other group received the new curriculum. After completing their
training, students from both groups were given a test administered by
the Navy's Afloat Training Group to determine their knowledge
retention. The test results showed that students taught under the new
curriculum had a higher level of knowledge retention than their
counterparts. While this type of test is an example of a potential
performance measure the Navy could use to assess training performance,
it was a onetime study and did not measure knowledge retention at
additional intervals after sailors reported to their ships.
Navy officials told us that the Navy would like to measure the quality
of the instruction and its impact on job performance, knowledge,
skills, and abilities by observing students when they report to ships
and measuring to what extent they are able to use their training.
However, they noted that such an evaluation would be difficult and
require participation from not only the Navy training program but also
operating forces. An official with the Assessment Branch of the Navy
Education and Training Command told us that while the command is in
the process of identifying potential performance metrics for measuring
the quality of instruction and its impact on job performance, this
effort is in a preliminary stage, and the official could not estimate
when these metrics would be developed or implemented.[Footnote 24]
Without performance measures in place, the Navy cannot fully determine
the effectiveness of training changes it has already implemented and
is not positioned to determine whether any adjustments need to be made.
During the course of our review, we met with leadership personnel from
11 different ships who generally expressed similar opinions concerning
the impact of training changes on crew performance aboard their ships.
[Footnote 25] Many of these leaders said that those sailors and
officers who did not receive classroom instruction but instead were
taught using new methods, such as computer-based training, required
more on-the-job training when they arrived on board than those who had
received classroom instruction. In addition, many of the leaders noted
that as crew sizes have decreased, it has become more difficult to
provide the on-the-job training these newer crew members need to
accomplish their duties. One officer equated personnel receiving
computer-based training instead of traditional classroom training to
searching the Internet to learn how to fix a car versus learning on an
actual car. He said that people are not really learning how to use the
equipment because they do not touch it. Many of the senior enlisted
personnel we spoke with said that because of declines in the knowledge
and abilities of junior sailors who had completed computer-based
training, they themselves were now directly supervising or actually
completing work that junior sailors were previously able to do
independently.
To help mitigate the perceived lack of basic knowledge of new officers
who had not gone through the 6-month classroom-based division officer
course, personnel on one ship told us that they created an on board
classroom. The commanding officer told us that he created this program
because he recognized the knowledge gap of junior officers when they
arrived on board. The program consisted of new officers spending
several days with various members of the crew and learning various
skills, which the commanding officer said had previously been taught
during the 6-month division officer course. In addition, because of a
perceived lack of knowledge of junior officers, in 2008 the Commander
Naval Surface Forces instructed the Navy's Afloat Training Groups to
develop and implement a 3-week surface warfare officer introduction
course to supplement the computer-based training. This course is
taught in San Diego, California; Norfolk, Virginia; Mayport, Florida;
Everett, Washington; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and Yokosuka, Japan, and
uses both lectures and simulator training to provide junior officers
with the basic knowledge and skills they need on their assigned ships.
The instructors for these courses are volunteers from both the Navy's
Afloat Training Groups as well as senior officers from ships in these
areas.
The opinions we heard from shipboard personnel were echoed in findings
of a 2009 report on computer-based training by the Naval Inspector
General. According to the official responsible for this report, it was
prompted by the results of a survey that the Naval Inspector General
conducted of civilian and military Navy personnel in 2007 and 2008.
One of the primary concerns of Navy personnel, according to this
survey, was a declining level of knowledge of sailors reporting to
their ships after completing computer-based training. The Inspector
General's office interviewed officials at various levels in the Navy's
training infrastructure, including officials at a number of schools as
well as the fleet level to gather a cross section of opinions from
these groups. Focus groups were conducted with personnel at various
naval stations both inside and outside the contiguous United States.
The review looked at both the enlisted and officer training. One of
the key findings of this study was that speed of completion is the
prime motivational factor, with the reward for timely completion being
a priority for moving to the next stage of promotion. The study also
found that shipboard personnel reported that the use of computer-based
training resulted in more on board training in basic knowledge,
skills, and abilities than was necessary before the implementation of
computer-based training. Additionally, the inspection team was unable
to find a valid metric with which to compare the occupational
specialty knowledge obtained under computer-based training to the
knowledge obtained under the traditional training system, and
recommended that the Navy establish a training evaluation model to
measure the outcome and effectiveness of training on sailor
performance in the fleet.
The Navy Currently Lacks Complete Data to Track Personnel
Qualification Times:
While the Navy is taking steps to improve the completeness of its
personnel qualification data, such as the time it takes for officers
to achieve their surface warfare officer qualification, it currently
lacks complete data with which to track changes in these times. The
time required for personnel to achieve watchstation and warfare
qualifications is a potential metric the Navy could use to measure the
effects of changes of its training programs. Personnel qualification
standards are an integral part of a ship's training program. They
describe the minimum knowledge and skills individuals must demonstrate
prior to standing watches, maintaining equipment, or performing other
specific duties. To assign qualification standards to shipboard
personnel and track their progress, the Navy uses the Relational
Administrative Data Management system. However, our assessment of the
system's 2005 through 2009 data found that the data were incomplete.
For example, we found that many cruisers and destroyers did not report
the qualification data monthly as required by a Navy instruction and
some of these ships did not report the data at all. Navy Instruction
3502.1D[Footnote 26] states that all ships equipped with the
Relational Administrative Data Management system should, by the 10th
day of every month, upload personnel qualification data from the
system manually into the Navy's official repository for individual
skills training called the Navy Training Management and Planning
System. To determine the completeness of available personnel
qualification data, we compared the actual number of data uploads to
the potential number of uploads. The potential number of uploads in a
given year equals 12 times the number of ships that have the
Relational Administrative Data Management system because each ship is
supposed to upload data once a month. Table 3 shows that the upload
rate among cruisers and destroyers was only 6 percent in 2005 but was
69 percent by 2009.
Table 3: Guided-Missile Cruisers and Guided-Missile Destroyers
Uploading Personnel Qualification Data, 2005 to 2009:
Cruisers and destroyers: Ships with the Relational Administrative Data
Management system;
2005: 57;
2006: 67;
2007[A]: 71;
2008: 74;
2009: 75.
Cruisers and destroyers: Potential updates;
2005: 684;
2006: 804;
2007[A]: 852;
2008: 888;
2009: 900.
Cruisers and destroyers: Actual updates;
2005: 41;
2006: 150;
2007[A]: 374;
2008: 601;
2009: 625.
Cruisers and destroyers: Upload rate;
2005: 6%;
2006: 19%;
2007[A]: 44%;
2008: 68%;
2009: 69%.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[A] The Navy made a small change in policy in 2007 that reinforced the
importance of ships uploading qualification data; this could be one
reason that the upload rate is higher in later years and makes
comparisons of rates before and after 2007 difficult.
[End of table]
Although rates of reporting are now higher than in 2005, the rate of
reporting is still too low for us to use the data to make conclusions
about qualification times. In addition, we were told that the Navy
lacks baseline qualification data from the years prior to when it made
changes to its training programs. Therefore, we cannot evaluate
whether changes to these formal off-ship training programs have
affected personnel qualification times.
To facilitate ships' reporting of the data, the Navy developed new
software that automatically transfers the qualification data from the
Relational Administrative Data Management system into the Navy
Training Management and Planning System. As of March 31, 2010, this
new software was installed on 2 of the Navy's 22 cruisers and on 9 of
its 57 destroyers. According to Navy officials responsible for this
program, the Navy plans to install the new release on its remaining
cruisers and destroyers by fiscal year 2018.
A Navy working group also found similar issues with the personnel
qualification standards data. In October 2006, the Commander, Naval
Surface Forces Surface Warfare Enterprise, chartered the Train Through
Qualification working group to research training and qualification
processes to identify constraints and define barriers preventing the
delivery of qualified or nearly qualified sailors to their ships. As a
part of its review, the working group attempted to evaluate the amount
of time it took for individuals to qualify for specific watchstations.
However, the working group determined that the quantity of the data
was insufficient to establish the time it took for a watchstander to
qualify. According to the working group, having complete data is
important for the working group to make appropriate and effective
recommendations. Because it did not see any improvements in the data
over time, the working group suspended its efforts in December 2009.
Conclusions:
To achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs, the Navy, among
other things, has taken steps to reduce the size of the crews on its
guided-missile cruisers and guided-missile destroyers and changed its
approach to training sailors and surface warfare officers. While
achieving efficiencies is very important, particularly given the
growing costs to compensate personnel, the Navy must still ensure that
it can perform its mission safely and maintain adequate readiness. In
performing the analysis to support these reductions, the Navy
considered some factors and made various assumptions, but in some
cases did not address other key elements called for in its guidance
and best practices for determining workforce requirements. Without
undertaking certain types of analysis--such as job task analysis and
engineering studies--or testing the validity of its long-standing
assumptions, such as whether at-sea workload exceeds in-port workload,
the Navy will not have all the information it needs to measure the
workload of its ships and translate that workload into workforce
requirements. Without performing additional analysis to determine that
the standards and assumptions it uses to determine personnel
requirements are valid, the Navy cannot be assured that its ship crews
are appropriately sized to accomplish necessary tasks and maintain the
material readiness of ships both at sea and in port on a daily basis.
Additionally, while the Navy was reducing the size of its crews, it
changed its approach to training sailors and surface warfare officers
by replacing some instructor-led training classes with computer-based
training. While the Navy has metrics showing that some of these
changes have reduced costs and training time, it lacks outcome-based
performance measures to determine the effectiveness of the revised
training in terms of trainees' job performance, knowledge, skills, or
abilities. Without outcome-based performance measures in place to
measure the effectiveness of training programs, it is unclear what the
effect has been. Overall, without an analysis of assumptions and
standards used to reduce ship crew sizes--and without outcome-based
performance metrics to evaluate the impact of training program changes-
-the Navy cannot be assured that the sizes of its ship crews are
sufficient to operate and maintain its ships and cannot fully
determine the effectiveness of the training changes it has implemented
and whether further adjustments are necessary.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the analytic basis of the Navy's workforce requirements
determination process, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy
direct the Chief of Naval Operations to take the following two actions:
* Conduct an assessment to validate the underlying assumptions and
standards used to calculate shipboard workforce requirements,
including the relative magnitude of in-port and at-sea requirements,
the Navy Standard Workweek, and its associated Productivity and Make
Ready/Put Away Allowances, while taking into account various other
factors that can affect ships' crews, such as the availability of
shore support.
* Review the results of this comprehensive assessment and determine
whether it is necessary to adjust the personnel requirements for the
Navy's cruisers and destroyers.
To better gauge the impact of changes to the Navy's training programs,
we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy direct the Chief of Naval
Operations to develop metrics to be used to measure the impact of
training, such as the impact on job performance, knowledge, skills,
and abilities as they relate to occupational and watchstanding
proficiency.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of the
Navy concurred with our recommendations and identified several actions
it plans to implement them. Concerning our recommendation to conduct
an assessment to validate the underlying assumptions and standards
used to calculate shipboard workforce requirements, the Navy agreed to
conduct a study and stated that such a study to validate the standards
used to calculate workforce requirements, including the Navy Standard
Workweek and Make Ready/Put Away Allowances, will provide additional
rigor to its current methodologies. Additionally, the Navy agreed to
examine some of the tenets of its optimal manning initiative with
respect to anticipated, but not achieved, workload reductions.
Concerning our recommendation to develop metrics to measure the impact
of training on job performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities as
they relate to occupational and watchstanding proficiency, the Navy
stated that it would leverage existing Surface Force efforts to
measure the impact of training. Specifically, the Navy detailed the
process it uses to report training readiness information by ship into
the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy. While these actions
provide the chain of command with information on training readiness
once personnel are aboard ship, they do not provide specific
information about the impact of off-ship training. Given that the Navy
has made a number of changes in its off-ship training programs and
that many of the shipboard personnel we interviewed had concerns about
the effectiveness of current training programs, it is important for
the Navy to determine the impact of its training changes. Additional
metrics could be used to identify training areas that could be
improved. Therefore, while the Navy should continue collecting and
using the metrics it outlined in its comments on this report, it is
important for the Navy to develop or identify specific metrics it can
use to measure the impact of training at an individual level. The full
text of DOD's written comments is reprinted in appendix V.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate
congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report
also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Deployment of Individual Augmentees:
Military operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism,
particularly those in Iraq and Afghanistan, have challenged the
ability of the Army and Marine Corps to provide needed ground forces.
To help mitigate these challenges, the Navy has provided personnel,
known as individual augmentees, to fill or augment units and
organizations that support missions such as maritime and port
security, civil affairs, airlift support, and detainee operations.
U.S. Fleet Forces Command is responsible for administering the Navy's
individual augmentee program.
According to the Navy, at any given time, active duty personnel make
up about half of the Navy's individual augmentee force while the other
half are mobilized reserve personnel. According to data provided by
the Navy, about 37,000[Footnote 27] active duty personnel were
deployed as individual augmentees from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal
year 2009.[Footnote 28] The Navy selects active duty personnel to fill
individual augmentee assignments through one of two processes. In the
first, the Individual Augmentee Manpower Management Assignment
process, personnel already assigned to a command are deployed to carry
out their individual augmentee assignments, while they remain assigned
to their current commands. They then return to their assigned commands
after completing their individual augmentee assignments, which can
last from a few months to a year or more. The individual augmentee
assignments generally occur on relatively short notice and can be
disruptive for both the personnel and their commands. In June 2007,
the Navy also began using a second process, the Global War on
Terrorism Support Assignment process, to provide more predictability
for sailors, their families, and Navy commands. Under this process,
personnel can negotiate for an individual augmentee assignment when
they are between their traditional Navy sea and shore rotational
assignments. The personnel detach from their current commands while
carrying out the individual augmentee assignments and transfer to
their next permanent change of station assignments upon completion of
the individual augmentee assignments. These individual augmentee
assignments vary in length, but the standard duration is from 8 to 14
months.
Our analysis of data provided by the Navy found that from fiscal year
2006 through fiscal year 2009, about 31,000 active duty personnel (84
percent) were deployed using the Individual Augmentee Manpower
Management Assignment process and about 6,000 active duty personnel
(16 percent) were deployed using the Global War on Terrorism Support
Assignment process. During this time period, of the about 31,000
personnel deployed as individual augmentees under the Individual
Augmentee Manpower Management Assignment process, almost 24,000 (76
percent) came from shore commands and about 7,500 (24 percent) came
from sea units, such as ships. About 1,200 (16 percent) of the 7,500
personnel coming from ships were deployed from guided-missile cruisers
and guided-missile destroyers. Table 4 shows the numbers of individual
augmentees deployed in fiscal years 2006 through 2009.
Table 4: Active Duty Individual Augmentees Deployed in Fiscal Years
2006 through 2009:
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number deployed: 5,323;
Deployed under Global War on Terrorism Support Assignment process: 0;
Deployed from shore commands under Individual Augmentee Manpower
Management Assignment process: 3,891;
Deployed from sea units under Individual Augmentee Manpower Management
Assignment process: 1,432;
Deployed from cruisers and destroyers: 123.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number deployed: 10,901;
Deployed under Global War on Terrorism Support Assignment process: 16;
Deployed from shore commands under Individual Augmentee Manpower
Management Assignment process: 8,827;
Deployed from sea units under Individual Augmentee Manpower Management
Assignment process: 2,058;
Deployed from cruisers and destroyers: 319.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Number deployed: 10,650;
Deployed under Global War on Terrorism Support Assignment process:
2,151;
Deployed from shore commands under Individual Augmentee Manpower
Management Assignment process: 6,150;
Deployed from sea units under Individual Augmentee Manpower Management
Assignment process: 2,349;
Deployed from cruisers and destroyers: 426.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Number deployed: 10,491;
Deployed under Global War on Terrorism Support Assignment process:
3,702;
Deployed from shore commands under Individual Augmentee Manpower
Management Assignment process: 4,957;
Deployed from sea units under Individual Augmentee Manpower Management
Assignment process: 1,832;
Deployed from cruisers and destroyers: 356.
Fiscal year: Total;
Number deployed: 37,365;
Deployed under Global War on Terrorism Support Assignment process:
5,869;
Deployed from shore commands under Individual Augmentee Manpower
Management Assignment process: 23,825;
Deployed from sea units under Individual Augmentee Manpower Management
Assignment process: 7,671;
Deployed from cruisers and destroyers: 1,224.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[End of table]
Of the 1,224 personnel deployed from cruisers and destroyers, the
majority (about 1,100) were enlisted sailors and the remainder (about
115) were officers. Compared to the total number of sailors serving on
these ships, the number of enlisted sailors deployed as individual
augmentees is a relatively small percentage. For example, during
fiscal year 2009 about 2 percent of the total current onboard enlisted
personnel for cruisers were deployed as individual augmentees, while
1.6 percent were deployed from destroyers.[Footnote 29]
Our analysis also found that enlisted sailors, especially petty
officers, constituted most of the individual augmentees deployed from
cruisers and destroyers. Of the officers deployed as individual
augmentees, most were junior grade. Figure 3 shows the distribution of
enlisted personnel and officers deployed as individual augmentees from
cruisers and destroyers during fiscal years 2006 through 2009.
[Footnote 30]
Figure 3: Pay Grade Distribution of Individual Augmentees Who Were
Deployed from Cruisers and Destroyers during Fiscal Years 2006 through
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Pay grade: E1;
Number of personnel: 3.
Pay grade: E2;
Number of personnel: 16.
Pay grade: E3;
Number of personnel: 151.
Pay grade: E4;
Number of personnel: 332.
Pay grade: E5;
Number of personnel: 310.
Pay grade: E6;
Number of personnel: 231.
Pay grade: E7;
Number of personnel: 55.
Pay grade: E8;
Number of personnel: 4.
Pay grade: O1;
Number of personnel: 2.
Pay grade: O2;
Number of personnel: 56.
Pay grade: O3;
Number of personnel: 46.
Pay grade: O4;
Number of personnel: 10.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[End of figure]
As part of our analysis, we examined whether particular occupational
fields on cruisers and destroyers were in higher demand than others
for the individual augmentee program. Table 5 lists the top job titles
and descriptions of the individual augmentees deployed from cruisers
and destroyers during fiscal years 2006 through 2009. Overall,
personnel from the nine occupational fields listed in the table made
up 72 percent or 795 of the 1,102 enlisted individual augmentees
deployed from cruisers and destroyers. Among the enlisted occupational
fields, we found that information systems technicians topped the list
for filling individual augmentee assignments.
Table 5: Top Enlisted Occupational Fields of Individual Augmentees
Deployed from Cruisers and Destroyers during Fiscal Years 2006 through
2009:
Occupational field: Information systems technician;
Number of individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and destroyers:
FY 2006: 15;
FY 2007: 55;
FY 2008: 85;
FY 2009: 29;
Total: 184;
Job description: Monitors and maintains radio frequency communication
systems; provides message handling, and storage and retrieval of
messages at sea and ashore.
Occupational field: Operations specialist;
Number of individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and destroyers:
FY 2006: 8;
FY 2007: 25;
FY 2008: 53;
FY 2009: 45;
Total: 131;
Job description: Maintains displays of strategic and tactical
information; operates surveillance radars.
Occupational field: Fire controlman;
Number of individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and destroyers:
FY 2006: 5;
FY 2007: 38;
FY 2008: 31;
FY 2009: 28;
Total: 102;
Job description: Operates and maintains combat and weapons direction
systems, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile systems, and
gun fire control systems.
Occupational field: Sonar technician (Surface);
Number of individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and destroyers:
FY 2006: 4;
FY 2007: 17;
FY 2008: 24;
FY 2009: 30;
Total: 75;
Job description: Operates surface sonar and other oceanographic
systems as well as surface ship underwater fire control systems;
performs maintenance on surface sonar equipment.
Occupational field: Electronics technician (Surface);
Number of individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and destroyers:
FY 2006: 3;
FY 2007: 18;
FY 2008: 20;
FY 2009: 30;
Total: 71;
Job description: Operates and performs maintenance on electronic
equipment used for communication, detection, and tracking and on
general purpose test equipment, personal computers, and auxiliary
equipment.
Occupational field: Gunner's mate;
Number of individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and destroyers:
FY 2006: 7;
FY 2007: 17;
FY 2008: 24;
FY 2009: 14;
Total: 62;
Job description: Operates and maintains guided-missile launching
systems, torpedo launching/handling systems, rocket launchers, gun
mounts and other ordnance systems and equipment.
Occupational field: Yeoman;
Number of individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and destroyers:
FY 2006: 5;
FY 2007: 14;
FY 2008: 22;
FY 2009: 16;
Total: 57;
Job description: Performs clerical and personnel security and general
administrative duties, including routing correspondence and reports
and maintaining records, publications, and service records.
Occupational field: Storekeeper;
Number of individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and destroyers:
FY 2006: 9;
FY 2007: 21;
FY 2008: 25;
FY 2009: 2;
Total: 57;
Job description: Orders, receives, inspects, and issues materials and
cargo and maintains required records.
Occupational field: Culinary specialist;
Number of individual augmentees deployed from cruisers and destroyers:
FY 2006: 3;
FY 2007: 1;
FY 2008: 21;
FY 2009: 31;
Total: 56;
Job description: Operates and manages Navy messes (dining facilities),
at sea and ashore.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[End of table]
To obtain information on the deployment of individual augmentees, we
discussed this topic during our ship visits, which covered four
cruisers, six destroyers, and one frigate. During our visits,
shipboard personnel acknowledged that while the number of individual
augmentees deployed from their ships was relatively small, as a
percentage of the overall size of the crews, individual augmentee
assignments result in staffing losses that ships do not receive
additional personnel to fill. They also noted that returning
individual augmentees cannot be required to immediately deploy with
the ship because Navy policy requires that, subject to certain
exceptions, they receive a period of "dwell-time" between deployments.
Because of the Navy's reductions in crew sizes on cruisers and
destroyers, shipboard personnel said that every sailor on board is
essential to the operation of a ship and the loss of even one
crewmember to an individual augmentee assignment can be detrimental to
a ship's ability to carry out its mission. Also, they said that the
situation is compounded when the individual augmentee is a middle-to
senior-level crew member who normally mentors, coaches, and trains
junior staff. Personnel on board the ships we visited said that having
fewer sailors means more work for those on board, which can lower
morale and quality of life, and that some duties such as ship
maintenance, may be delayed or may not get done for an indefinite
period.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Distribution of Enlisted and Officer Pay Grades, Fiscal
Years 2001 to 2009:
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report[Footnote 31]
accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010,[Footnote 32] directed GAO to compare shipboard rank/rate
distributions over time and analyze underlying reasons for any changes
and their impact on ship capabilities for selected ship types.
[Footnote 33] For this review, we focused on guided-missile cruisers
and guided-missile destroyers. In our analysis of the rank
distribution for officers and rate distribution for enlisted sailors,
we did not find a major change in this distribution from fiscal years
2001 to 2009.
Figure 4 shows the distribution in terms of percentages of enlisted
sailors[Footnote 34] on cruisers from fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
Figure 4: Enlisted Pay Grade Distribution of Sailors on Guided-Missile
Cruisers, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2001;
E-1 to E-3: 29%;
E-4 to E-6: 64%;
E-7 to E-9: 7%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
E-1 to E-3: 27%;
E-4 to E-6: 66%;
E-7 to E-9: 8%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
E-1 to E-3: 24%;
E-4 to E-6: 68%;
E-7 to E-9: 8%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
E-1 to E-3: 24%;
E-4 to E-6: 68%;
E-7 to E-9: 8%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
E-1 to E-3: 27%;
E-4 to E-6: 65%;
E-7 to E-9: 9%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
E-1 to E-3: 27%;
E-4 to E-6: 64%;
E-7 to E-9: 9%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
E-1 to E-3: 29%;
E-4 to E-6: 62%;
E-7 to E-9: 10%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
E-1 to E-3: 28%;
E-4 to E-6: 63%;
E-7 to E-9: 9%.
Fiscal year: 2009;
E-1 to E-3: 26%;
E-4 to E-6: 65%;
E-7 to E-9: 9%.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
Note: Percentages are based on the Navy's current onboard figures.
Current onboard personnel is the number of personnel assigned to a
particular ship and is not necessarily representative of the number of
personnel actually present on board because of a variety of factors,
including personnel absent from the ship because of training, medical
restrictions, or being deployed as individual augmentees.
[End of figure]
As demonstrated in figure 4, the breakdown among the general
categories of enlisted pay grades--general rates (E-1 to E-3), petty
officers (E-4 to E-6), and chief petty officers (E-7 to E-9)--on
cruisers showed only slight variations from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal
year 2009.
The rate distribution for enlisted sailors on destroyers was similar
to the distribution on cruisers--displaying only relatively minor
changes from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2009. Specifically,
figure 5 shows the distribution in terms of percentages of enlisted
sailors on destroyers from fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
Figure 5: Enlisted Pay Grade Distribution of Sailors on Guided-Missile
Destroyers, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2001;
E-1 to E-3: 26%;
E-4 to E-6: 66%;
E-7 to E-9: 8%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
E-1 to E-3: 25%;
E-4 to E-6: 67%;
E-7 to E-9: 8%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
E-1 to E-3: 25%;
E-4 to E-6: 67%;
E-7 to E-9: 8%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
E-1 to E-3: 24%;
E-4 to E-6: 69%;
E-7 to E-9: 8%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
E-1 to E-3: 25%;
E-4 to E-6: 66%;
E-7 to E-9: 9%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
E-1 to E-3: 25%;
E-4 to E-6: 65%;
E-7 to E-9: 9%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
E-1 to E-3: 26%;
E-4 to E-6: 64%;
E-7 to E-9: 10%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
E-1 to E-3: 24%;
E-4 to E-6: 66%;
E-7 to E-9: 10%.
Fiscal year: 2009;
E-1 to E-3: 24%;
E-4 to E-6: 66%;
E-7 to E-9: 10%.
[End of figure]
Note: Percentages are based on the Navy's current onboard figures.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which the Navy used valid assumptions and
standards in determining crew sizes for cruisers and destroyers, we
analyzed various Navy documents and instructions related to
determining crew sizes, including Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations Instruction 1000.16K, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies
Procedures in order to identify the steps required in the Navy's
process to determine crew sizes.[Footnote 35] We reviewed relevant
prior GAO work on human capital management,[Footnote 36] as well as
various studies and reports from research organizations about the
Navy's process to crew its ships. We analyzed reports from the Naval
Audit Service about the Navy's optimal manning initiative and manpower
requirements process for surface ships for information about the ship
crewing process.
We also calculated whether workforce requirements and authorized
positions had changed from fiscal years 2001 to 2009 by analyzing data
provided by the Navy from its Total Force Manpower Management System
for cruisers and destroyers. To calculate whether the number of
enlisted personnel designated as current onboard personnel for
cruisers and destroyers had changed from fiscal years 2001 to 2009, we
analyzed data provided by the Navy from its Navy Manpower Program and
Budget System.[Footnote 37] We averaged the workforce requirements,
authorized positions, and current onboard data across each ship type
for each fiscal year to find an average value.
To assess the extent to which the Navy has measured the impact of
changes to its training programs, including qualification times, we
reviewed prior GAO work on assessing strategic training and
development efforts. We also reviewed Navy instructions on surface
force training, personnel qualification standards, and Navy training
system requirements, acquisition, and management. To assess the extent
to which the Navy is tracking performance measures, we interviewed
Navy training officials and ship personnel to obtain their views on
how the implementation of new training practices has affected
shipboard performance. To assess changes in training times and the
cost of training related to occupational specialties, we analyzed data
and interviewed individuals from the Center for Naval Engineering
located in Norfolk, Virginia and the Surface Warfare Officers School
located in Newport, Rhode Island. Furthermore, we reviewed reports
from the Naval Inspector General, the Center for Naval Analyses, LMI,
and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower,
Personnel, Training and Education) to gain insights about the
Revolution in Training.
In addition, we obtained and analyzed personnel qualification
standards data that are recorded in the Relational Administrative Data
Management system on board ships from the Naval Education and Training
Professional Development and Technology Center. To determine the
percentage of guided-missile cruisers and guided-missile destroyers
that were uploading their data into the Navy Training Management and
Planning System on a monthly basis as required, we compared the total
number of times cruisers and destroyers uploaded the data to the total
number of times these ships should have uploaded the data (i.e., once
a month or 12 times per year) for calendar years 2005 through 2009. We
also interviewed officials from the Navy's Train Through Qualification
working group responsible for assessing sailor training and
qualification processes to discuss their findings. Based on our
analysis and discussions with the working group officials, we
determined that the personnel qualification standards data were not
reliable for evaluating whether changes to formal off-ship training
programs have affected personnel qualification times because they were
not complete.
In the course of our work, we interviewed officials from the following
organizations and offices:
* Aegis Training and Readiness Center:
* Afloat Training Group, Pacific:
* Center for Naval Engineering:
* Commander, Naval Surface Forces:
* Cruiser Class Squadron:
* Destroyer Class Squadron:
* Naval Education and Training Command:
* Naval Education and Training Professional Development and Technology
Center:
* Naval Inspector General's Office:
* Naval Postgraduate School:
* Naval Safety Center:
* Navy Manpower Analysis Center:
* Navy Personnel Command, Bureau of Naval Personnel:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel,
Training and Education):
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness:
* Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Atlantic:
* Surface Warfare Officers School:
* Train Through Qualification working group:
* U.S. Fleet Forces Command:
We also met with personnel on board four Navy cruisers, six
destroyers, and one frigate. Specifically, we visited the USS Leyte
Gulf (CG-55), USS San Jacinto (CG-56), USS Normandy (CG-60), USS
Monterey (CG-61), USS Benfold (DDG-65), USS Milius (DDG-69), USS
Bulkeley (DDG-84), USS Shoup (DDG-86), USS Momsen (DDG-92), USS
Stockdale (DDG-106), and USS Vandegrift (FFG-48). We conducted
interviews with senior personnel on board these ships, including the
commanding officer, executive officer, department heads, division
officers, and senior enlisted personnel.
Because ship personnel told us that they believed reduced crew sizes
affected the ships' material condition and could lead to mishaps, we
analyzed inspection and mishap data. Specifically, we analyzed the
results of the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV)
inspections for cruisers and destroyers from fiscal year 2001 to
fiscal year 2009. The number of categories INSURV evaluates ships
across has increased since 2001; therefore, we compared inspection
results across the 17 categories, which have consistently been
measured since 2001. We averaged the results of the ships inspected
each year by category and classified the average score as red, yellow,
or green based on the standards INSURV uses in its inspections. We
compared the proportion of inspection categories receiving red,
yellow, or green scores each fiscal year to assess whether there was a
discernible trend in the inspection results over this period. We also
obtained mishap data from the Naval Safety Center. We requested data
for class A, B, and C mishaps, as these are the types of mishaps that
ships are required to report to the Safety Center through the Navy's
Web Enabled Safety System. We compared the number of mishaps, by class
that had occurred in each fiscal year from 2001 to 2009, which was the
last full year available for analysis, to assess whether there was a
discernible trend in mishaps over this period. We reported on the
number of A and B mishaps, as these are the most severe types of
mishaps in terms of personal injury and material damage.
To assess the extent to which the Navy's support for individual
augmentees and training and transition teams has affected the levels
and composition of shipboard manning, we reviewed the Navy's policies
regarding the sourcing and assignment of individual augmentees. In
addition, we obtained and analyzed data from the Navy Personnel
Command on the number of active duty sailors deployed as individual
augmentees from fiscal years 2006 through 2009,[Footnote 38] which
included sailors deployed on training and transition teams. Officials
from the command stated that although the data are neither complete
nor completely accurate, they represent the Navy's best available data
on individual augmentees. Using these data, we analyzed the rates and
ranks of the sailors deployed as individual augmentees from Navy
cruisers and destroyers to determine if there were any trends over
this period. We also looked at whether particular occupational fields
on cruisers and destroyers, such as information systems technicians or
fire controlmen, had sailors deployed as individual augmentees more
often than other occupational fields.[Footnote 39] To gain additional
insight into the impact individual augmentees have had on shipboard
manning, we interviewed officials from U.S. Fleet Forces Command; the
Office of the Commander, Naval Surface Forces; and personnel on board
four Navy cruisers, six destroyers, and one frigate.
To calculate whether the rank/rate distribution had changed from
fiscal years 2001 to 2009, we analyzed the current onboard data for
enlisted personnel and requirements data for officers.[Footnote 40] We
used the current onboard data for enlisted personnel provided by the
Navy to analyze whether the rate distribution had changed over this
period because the workforce requirements for enlisted personnel
decreased by about 20 percent for cruisers and destroyers. This
decrease caused the authorized positions and current onboard enlisted
personnel levels to decrease by lesser amounts. We used the
requirements data for officers because workforce requirements for
officers on these two ship classes have experienced little change over
this time period, and therefore we had no indication that there was
any corresponding change to the level of authorized positions or
current onboard personnel.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 through June 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Requirements, Authorized Positions, and Current Onboard
Enlisted Personnel for Cruisers and Destroyers:
Since 2001, in an effort to reduce costs and increase efficiencies,
the Navy has reduced the requirements and actual numbers of enlisted
personnel aboard its guided-missile cruisers and guided-missile
destroyers. Figure 6 shows the average changes in workforce
requirements, authorized positions[Footnote 41], and current onboard
[Footnote 42] enlisted personnel for cruisers from fiscal years 2001
to 2009.
Figure 6: Average Requirements, Authorized Positions, and Current
Onboard Enlisted Personnel for Guided-Missile Cruisers, Fiscal Years
2001 to 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2001;
Average enlisted requirements: 383;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 345;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 342.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Average enlisted requirements: 383;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 343;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 347.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Average enlisted requirements: 354;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 338;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 352.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Average enlisted requirements: 308;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 308;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 347.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Average enlisted requirements: 307;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 307;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 328.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Average enlisted requirements: 303;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 302;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 322.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Average enlisted requirements: 303;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 302;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 310.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Average enlisted requirements: 303;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 299;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 306.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Average enlisted requirements: 301;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 295;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 291.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[End of figure]
Figure 6 shows that between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, the enlisted
requirements and level of authorized positions decreased. The average
number of enlisted sailors listed as currently on board these ships
did not decline as rapidly as requirements and authorized positions
since 2002, because sailors were not removed from the ships after the
decrease in authorized positions. Instead, a Navy official told us
that the Navy just waited for sailors to rotate off the ships and did
not replace them. As a result, current onboard numbers continued to
decline from 2003 through 2008, and in 2009, current onboard numbers
dropped below requirements and authorized positions.
Figure 7 shows the average change in workforce requirements,
authorized positions, and current onboard enlisted personnel for
destroyers from fiscal years 2001 to 2009.
Figure 7: Average Requirements, Authorized Positions, and Current
Onboard Enlisted Personnel for Guided-Missile Destroyers, Fiscal Years
2001 to 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2001;
Average enlisted requirements: 324;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 292;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 290.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Average enlisted requirements: 323;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 292;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 294.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Average enlisted requirements: 318;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 296;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 305.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Average enlisted requirements: 290;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 285;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 307.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Average enlisted requirements: 280;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 273;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 292.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Average enlisted requirements: 274;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 264;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 284.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Average enlisted requirements: 264;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 249;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 262.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Average enlisted requirements: 258;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 248;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 247.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Average enlisted requirements: 259;
Average enlisted authorized positions: 251;
Average enlisted current onboard personnel: 240.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
[End of figure]
Figure 7 shows that between fiscal years 2003 and 2008, the number of
enlisted requirements and authorized positions has declined, while the
average number of enlisted sailors listed as current onboard has
declined since fiscal year 2004.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Personnel And Readiness:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
June 2, 2010:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear. Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft GAO
report, GAO-10-592, "Military Readiness": Navy Needs to Reassess Its
Metrics & Assumptions for Ship Crewing Requirements and Training,
dated April 30, 2010 (GAO Code 351348)."
We concur with the recommendations in the draft report. The Department
is encouraged that the draft report cites the efforts the Navy has
made to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs.
Thank you for working with the Department to improve the information
flow between our organizations and to assist us in carrying out our
missions. The Department looks forward to continued collaboration with
the GAO.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. Additional comments are provided as an enclosure to this
letter. My point of contact for this effort is Ms. Karen Croom, (703)
614-5258.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Rich Robbins:
Director:
Requirements & Program and Budget Coordination:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report ” Dated April 30, 2010:
GAO Code 351348/GAO-10-592:
"Military Readiness: Navy Needs to Reassess Its Metrics and Assumptions
for Ship Crewing Requirements and Training"
Department Of The Navy Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Navy direct
the Chief of Naval Operations to:
* Conduct an assessment to validate the underlying assumptions and
standards used to calculate shipboard workforce requirements,
including the relative magnitude of in-port and at-sea requirements,
the Navy Standard Workweek and its associated Productivity and Make
Ready/Put Away Allowances, while taking into account various factors
that can affect ships' crews, such as the availability of shore
support.
* Review the results of this comprehensive assessment and determine
whether it is necessary to adjust the personnel requirements for the
Navy's cruisers and destroyers.
DON Response: The Department of the Navy concurs with the
recommendations as stated in the draft GAO Report dated 30 April,
2010. The Navy agrees that a study to validate the standards used to
calculate workforce requirements to include the Navy Standard Workweek
and Make Ready/Put Away Allowances will provide additional rigor to
current methodologies. In particular, the Navy recommends the initial
study focus on a Navy Standard Workweek as applied to cruisers and
destroyers. Additionally, trainee and trainer workload must be
properly accounted for in the Standard Workweek review to reflect
changes in the way the Navy delivers training to include Computer
Based Training and On the Job Training (OJT) models. Unfunded shore
support /maintenance workload should not be addressed in this study -
only workload that is required to be conducted by ship force. Finally,
Navy analysis has indicated that some tenants of Optimal Manning
should be examined with respect to anticipated, but not achieved,
workload reductions.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Navy direct
the Chief of Naval Operations to develop metrics to be used to measure
the impact of training on job performance, knowledge, skills, and
abilities as they relate to occupational and watchstanding proficiency.
DON Response: The Department of Navy concurs with the recommendations
as stated in the draft GAO Report dated 30 April, 2010. This metric
development will leverage existing Surface Force efforts to measure
the impact of training on job performance, knowledge, skills, and
abilities as they relate to occupational and watchstanding proficiency.
Ships operate in an environment of continuous training and continuous
certification/proficiency. The Surface Force Training Manual (SFTM)
specifies certification requirements for Required Operational
Capability/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) mission areas
applicable to each ship. The training readiness of each ship's crew is
measured against Continuous Certification Requirements (CCR). Data
cards, based on Navy Tactical Tasks (NTA) derived from required
knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA), provide the data points
measured under each CCR. Data card evaluation results are entered into
the Training and Operational Readiness Information Services (TORTS)
data base, which directly feeds the Defense Readiness Reporting System-
Navy (DRRS-N), thereby providing the chain of command a continuous
training readiness assessment of each operational command.
Additionally, the Afloat Training Groups administer Level of Knowledge
(LOK) examinations to shipboard watchstanders during their assessment
of the ships' training readiness during the Basic Phase of training
and periodically during sustainment assessment verifications.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this
report were Michael Ferren (Assistant Director), Elizabeth Deyo, Mary
Jo LaCasse, Tamiya Lunsford, Richard Powelson, Steven Putansu, Jerry
Sandau, Grant Sutton, and Ben Thompson.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Navy refers to funded manpower requirements as authorized
positions or authorizations.
[2] This course was taught at the Surface Warfare Officers School,
located in Newport, Rhode Island, and prepared officers to serve at
sea and provided professional education and training in support of
surface Navy requirements.
[3] H.R. Rep. No. 111-166, at 297-298 (2009).
[4] Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009).
[5] Qualification time is the time it takes an individual to achieve
and demonstrate the minimum knowledge and skills necessary to stand
watch, maintain equipment, or perform other specific duties aboard a
ship.
[6] Rate is the term used by the Navy to specify enlisted pay grade,
while rank is used to describe officer pay grade. Rating is used to
describe occupational specialty, such as boatswain's mates, fire
controlmen, or gas turbine systems technicians.
[7] The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel,
Training and Education) is responsible for the first three steps of
the process.
[8] The analysts assess the workload for two at sea readiness
conditions--condition I and condition III--and determine which
workload is greater. Condition I is commonly referred to as general
quarters and requires a ship to be battle ready and able to perform
all offensive and defensive functions simultaneously for a maximum of
24 hours. Condition III requires a ship to staff its systems to a
level sufficient to counter possible threats while forward deployed or
during periods of increased tension or war.
[9] Productivity Allowance is the percentage applied to basic
productive work requirements to reflect delays from fatigue,
environmental effects, personal needs, and unavoidable interruptions,
increasing time required for work to be accomplished. Make Ready/Put
Away Allowance refers to steps required in obtaining and returning
necessary instruction manuals, tools, and materials and transit to and
from the work area.
[10] The Navy has a number of positions that must be filled in order
to maintain the safety and security of its ships. These positions are
referred to as watchstations and Navy personnel fill these positions
on a rotational basis, typically standing watch for 4 to 6 hours at a
time. The numbers and types of watches vary depending on whether the
ship is underway or in port. For example, a ship that is in port will
require more security watchstanders while a ship that is underway will
require navigation watchstanders who are not needed in port.
[11] An occupational specialty identifies an individual position or
group of closely related positions by service on the basis of the
duties involved. The Navy divides its occupational specialties into
ratings for enlisted personnel and designators for officers.
[12] Current onboard personnel is the number of personnel assigned to
a particular ship and is not necessarily representative of the number
of personnel actually present on board because of a variety of
factors, including personnel absent from the ship because of training,
medical restrictions, or being deployed as individual augmentees.
[13] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1000.16K,
Navy Total Force Manpower Policies Procedures (Aug. 22, 2007).
[14] GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP] (Washington, D.C.: March
2002).
[15] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3300.2B, Department of the Navy
Antiterrorism Program (Dec. 28, 2005), provides guidance and
information to reduce the vulnerability of Department of Navy military
and civilian personnel, family members, select contractors, resources,
facilities, and ships to terrorist acts. Because local commanders are
responsible for implementing the requirements of this program, the
workload requirements of the program may vary with a ship's location
and the current threat level.
[16] The Navy's shore intermediate maintenance activities perform a
variety of maintenance and repair functions that are not feasible or
practicable for ships to accomplish because of time or personnel
constraints. In 2004, the Navy combined the shore intermediate
maintenance activities with several other organizations into seven
regional maintenance centers. The size of these centers, in terms of
personnel has declined since that time, and shipboard personnel we
interviewed said that these centers offer fewer services than the
shore intermediate maintenance centers previously had.
[17] Center for Naval Analyses, The Navy Standard Workweek: A
Preliminary Assessment (Alexandria, Va., January 2001).
[18] Naval Audit Service, Navy Manpower Requirement Process - Surface
Ships, N2005-0055 (Washington, D.C., Aug. 26, 2005).
[19] As of the end of fiscal year 2009, there were 22 active guided-
missile cruisers and 55 active guided-missile destroyers.
[20] The surface warfare officer qualification is one of the lengthy
warfare qualifications that officers can achieve in the Navy. Other
warfare officer qualifications include submariner, pilot, and naval
flight officer qualifications. The Navy also has enlisted surface,
submariner, and aviation warfare qualifications.
[21] GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G] (Washington, D.C.: March
2004).
[22] The decrease in qualification time was based on a single
historical comparison of qualification times, as opposed to a
continuously tracked performance measure.
[23] This figure is based on GAO analysis of data provided by the
Center for Naval Engineering comparing average training days from
fiscal years 2003 and 2004 with figures from fiscal year 2009. Totals
may not add due to rounding.
[24] The Navy Education and Training Command consists of 14 learning
centers and 3 training centers located across the United States. Their
role is to educate and train those who serve by providing the tools
and opportunities, to ensure fleet readiness and mission
accomplishment. Officials in the Navy Education and Training Command
report directly to the Chief of Naval Operations.
[25] These leadership personnel included commanding officers,
executive officers, department heads, division officers, and senior
enlisted personnel.
[26] Commander Naval Surface Forces Instruction 3502.1D, Surface Force
Training Manual (July 1, 2007).
[27] This number includes individuals deployed on training and
transition teams such as provincial reconstruction teams and embedded
training teams. According to officials at U.S. Fleet Forces Command,
Navy support for these teams has been declining as U.S. Special
Operations Command and the Army are taking back these missions.
[28] According to Navy Personnel Command officials, the data the
command provided to GAO are neither complete nor completely accurate,
but they represent the Navy's best available data on individual
augmentee deployments. Prior to March 2005, the Navy did not have a
centralized process in place to track individual augmentee
deployments, and therefore it could not provide data for all of fiscal
year 2005 and prior years.
[29] Current onboard personnel is the number of personnel assigned to
a particular ship and is not necessarily representative of the number
of personnel actually present on board because of a variety of
factors, including personnel absent from the ship because of training,
medical restrictions, or being deployed as individual augmentees. In
2009, 6,407 enlisted personnel were listed as current onboard cruisers
and 13,208 were listed as current onboard destroyers.
[30] Warrant officers are not shown because there were fewer than 10
deployed as individual augmentees from cruisers and destroyers over
this period.
[31] H.R. Rep. No. 111-166, at 297-298 (2009).
[32] Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009).
[33] Rate is the term used by the Navy to specify enlisted pay grade,
while rank is used to describe officer pay grade. In this appendix, we
use the term pay grade to include both rate and rank.
[34] The Manual of Navy Enlisted Manpower and Personnel
Classifications and Occupational Standards, April 2009, divides
enlisted rates into three groups: E-1 through E-3 (general rates), E-4
through E-6 (petty officers), and E-7 through E-9 (chief petty
officers).
[35] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1000.16K,
Navy Total Force Manpower Policies Procedures (Aug. 22, 2007).
[36] GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15,
2002).
[37] Current onboard personnel is the number of personnel assigned to
a particular ship and is not necessarily representative of the number
of personnel actually present on board because of a variety of
factors, including personnel absent from the ship because of training,
medical restrictions, or being deployed as individual augmentees.
[38] We did not use fiscal year 2005 and 2010 data provided by the
Navy because they were partial year data and thus were incomplete.
According to Navy officials, information prior to March 2005 was not
reliable because there was no centralized order-writing process in
place to track individual augmentee deployments.
[39] Occupational field or specialty identifies an individual position
or group of closely related positions by service on the basis of the
duties involved. The Navy divides its occupational specialties into
ratings for enlisted personnel and designators for officers.
[40] Rate is the term used by the Navy to specify enlisted pay grade,
while rank is used to describe officer pay grade.
[41] The Navy refers to funded requirements as authorized positions or
authorizations.
[42] Current onboard personnel is the number of personnel assigned to
a particular ship and is not necessarily representative of the number
of personnel actually present on board because of a variety of
factors, including personnel absent from the ship because of training,
medical restrictions, or being deployed as individual augmentees.
[End of section]
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