Warfighter Support
Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans for and Manages Operational Contract Support Gao ID: GAO-10-829T June 29, 2010This testimony discusses the challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in institutionalizing operational contract support throughout the department. The institutionalization of operational contract support includes planning for the use of contractors, training of military personnel on the use of contractor support, accurately tracking contractor use, and establishing measures to ensure that contractors are accountable. For decades, DOD has relied on contractors to support contingency operations and has long considered them a part of the total force. For example, in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review the department reiterated that contractors were part of a total force that includes active and reserve military components, civilians and contractors. Additionally, in 2008 the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness testified that the structure of the U.S. military had been adapted to an environment in which contractors were an important part of the force. Further, an Army commission chaired by Dr. Jacques Gansler acknowledged that contractors were a significant part of the military's total force. While DOD joint guidance recognizes contractors as part of its total workforce, we have previously reported that DOD has not yet developed a strategy for determining the appropriate mix of contractor and government personnel. In addition, we recently testified that several long-standing challenges have hindered DOD's ability to manage and oversee contractors at deployed locations. For example, DOD has not followed long-standing planning guidance, ensured that there is an adequate number of contract oversight and management personnel, and comprehensively trained non-acquisition personnel, such as military commanders. Since 1992, we have designated DOD contract management as a high-risk area, in part due to concerns over the adequacy of the department's acquisition and contract oversight workforce. As we have previously testified, many of the long-standing problems we have identified regarding managing and overseeing contractor support to deployed forces stem from DOD's reluctance to plan for contractors as an integral part of the total force. We have also testified that DOD's long-standing problems in managing and overseeing contractors at deployed locations make it difficult for the department to ensure that it is getting the services it needs on time and at a fair and reasonable price. We have found numerous instances where poor oversight and management of contractors have led to negative monetary and operational outcomes. As a result, since the advent of our work on contractor support to deployed forces in 1997, we have made numerous recommendations to improve DOD's management of contractors in deployed locations. While DOD has taken some actions to address these challenges, it has not addressed all of them, as I will discuss in further detail. statement today will focus on the extent to which DOD has institutionalized operational contract support. This statement is based on recently published reports and testimonies that examined planning for operational contract support and the department's efforts to manage and oversee contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as our ongoing work involving operational contract support related issues in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In response to congressional direction and GAO recommendations, DOD has taken some actions to institutionalize operational contract support, such as establishing a focal point to lead the department's effort to improve contingency contractor management and oversight at deployed locations, issuing new guidance, and beginning to assess its reliance on contractors. However, DOD still faces challenges in eight areas related to operational contract support. 1) Developing guidance. DOD has yet to finalize joint policies required by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008. 2) Planning for contractors in ongoing operations. The department has not fully planned for the use of contractors in support of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, although some efforts are underway at the individual unit level. 3) Planning for contractors in future operations. DOD needs to take additional actions to improve its planning for operational contract support in future operations. For example, while DOD has started to institutionalize operational contract support into combatant commands' operation plans, it has not yet made significant progress. 4) Tracking contractor personnel. While DOD has developed a system to collect data on contractors deployed with U.S. forces, our reviews of this database have highlighted significant shortcomings in its implementation in Iraq and Afghanistan. 5) Providing oversight personnel. DOD continues to face challenges in providing an adequate number of personnel to oversee and manage contractors in contingency operations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 6) Training non-acquisition personnel. DOD faces challenges in ensuring that non-acquisition personnel, such as unit commanders, have been trained on how to work effectively with contractors in contingency operations. 7) Screening contractor personnel. DOD has yet to develop a departmentwide policy for screening the significant number of local and third-country national contractor personnel who support deployed U.S. forces. 8) Capturing lessons learned. DOD has not implemented previous GAO recommendations to develop a departmentwide lessons learned program to capture the department's institutional knowledge regarding all forms of contractor support to deployed forces in order to facilitate a more effective working relationship between contractors and the military. Given the contractor-related challenges DOD continues to face, a cultural change is necessary to integrate operational contract support throughout the department. Without such a change, DOD is likely to continue to face these challenges in ongoing and future contingency operations. DOD has acknowledged that operational contract support plays an integral role in contingency operations and that successful execution of operational contract support requires significant planning and management. While some efforts have been made within the department and the individual services to improve the planning for and management of contractors, these efforts do not fully work toward integrating operational contract support throughout DOD. As we have discussed, many of the operational contract support challenges the department continues to face are long-standing and while the department has acknowledged many of these challenges, and taken some actions, it has not systematically addressed them.
GAO-10-829T, Warfighter Support: Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans for and Manages Operational Contract Support
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, June 29, 2010:
Warfighter Support:
Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans for and Manages
Operational Contract Support:
Statement of William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-10-829T:
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges the Department
of Defense (DOD) faces in institutionalizing operational contract
support throughout the department. The institutionalization of
operational contract support includes planning for the use of
contractors, training of military personnel on the use of contractor
support, accurately tracking contractor use, and establishing measures
to ensure that contractors are accountable. For decades, DOD has
relied on contractors to support contingency operations and has long
considered them a part of the total force. For example, in its 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review the department reiterated that contractors
were part of a total force that includes active and reserve military
components, civilians and contractors. Additionally, in 2008 the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness
testified that the structure of the U.S. military had been adapted to
an environment in which contractors were an important part of the
force. Further, an Army commission chaired by Dr. Jacques Gansler
acknowledged that contractors were a significant part of the
military's total force.[Footnote 1]
While DOD joint guidance recognizes contractors as part of its total
workforce, we have previously reported that DOD has not yet developed
a strategy for determining the appropriate mix of contractor and
government personnel.[Footnote 2] In addition, we recently testified
that several long-standing challenges have hindered DOD's ability to
manage and oversee contractors at deployed locations. [Footnote 3] For
example, DOD has not followed long-standing planning guidance, ensured
that there is an adequate number of contract oversight and management
personnel, and comprehensively trained non-acquisition personnel, such
as military commanders. Since 1992, we have designated DOD contract
management as a high-risk area, in part due to concerns over the
adequacy of the department's acquisition and contract oversight
workforce.[Footnote 4] As we have previously testified, many of the
long-standing problems we have identified regarding managing and
overseeing contractor support to deployed forces stem from DOD's
reluctance to plan for contractors as an integral part of the total
force.[Footnote 5] We have also testified that DOD's long-standing
problems in managing and overseeing contractors at deployed locations
make it difficult for the department to ensure that it is getting the
services it needs on time and at a fair and reasonable price. We have
found numerous instances where poor oversight and management of
contractors have led to negative monetary and operational outcomes. As
a result, since the advent of our work on contractor support to
deployed forces in 1997,[Footnote 6] we have made numerous
recommendations to improve DOD's management of contractors in deployed
locations. While DOD has taken some actions to address these
challenges, it has not addressed all of them, as I will discuss in
further detail.
My statement today will focus on the extent to which DOD has
institutionalized operational contract support. My statement is based
on recently published reports and testimonies that examined planning
for operational contract support and the department's efforts to
manage and oversee contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as our
ongoing work involving operational contract support related issues in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Our work was conducted in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.[Footnote 7]
Background:
The U.S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and
services to deployed U.S. forces. However, the scale of contractor
support DOD relies on today has increased considerably from what DOD
relied on during previous military operations. In Iraq and Afghanistan
contractor personnel now outnumber deployed troops. For example,
according to DOD, as of March 2010, there were more than 95,000 DOD
contractor personnel operating in Iraq and more than 112,000 DOD
contractor personnel operating in Afghanistan. While the number of
troops fluctuates based on the drawdown in Iraq and the troop increase
in Afghanistan, as of June 2010 there were approximately 88,000 troops
in Iraq and DOD estimates that the number of troops in Afghanistan
will increase to 98,000 by the end of fiscal year 2010. DOD
anticipates that the number of contractor personnel will grow in
Afghanistan as the department increases its troop presence in that
country. However, these numbers do not reflect the thousands of
contractor personnel located in Kuwait and elsewhere who support
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By way of contrast, an estimated
9,200 contractor personnel supported military operations in the 1991
Gulf War.
Furthermore, the composition of the contractor workforce in Iraq and
Afghanistan differs. For example, in Iraq the majority of contractor
personnel are U.S. citizens or third-country nationals (82 percent),
whereas in Afghanistan the majority of contractor personnel are local
Afghan nationals (70 percent). The difference becomes even more
apparent when looking at the subset of private security contractor
personnel who perform personal security, convoy security, and static
security missions. In Iraq, 90 percent of private security contractors
are U.S. citizens or third-country nationals, whereas in Afghanistan
93 percent of private security contractors are Afghans. Today,
contractors located throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia
provide U.S. forces with such services as linguist support, equipment
maintenance, and support for base operations and security. Contractors
are an integral part of DOD's operations, and DOD officials have
stated that without a significant increase in the department's
civilian and military workforce, DOD is likely to continue to rely on
contractors both in the United States and overseas in support of
future deployments.
DOD defines operational contract support as the process of planning
for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial
sources in support of joint operations along with the associated
contractor management functions. According to DOD joint guidance,
successful operational contract support is the ability to orchestrate
and synchronize the provision of integrated contracted support and
management of contractor personnel providing that support to the joint
force in a designated operational area.
DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Institutionalize Operational Contract
Support, though Challenges Remain:
In response to congressional direction and GAO recommendations, DOD
has taken some actions to institutionalize operational contract
support, such as establishing a focal point to lead the department's
effort to improve contingency contractor management and oversight at
deployed locations, issuing new guidance, and beginning to assess its
reliance on contractors. However, DOD still faces challenges in eight
areas related to operational contract support.
(1) Developing guidance. DOD has yet to finalize joint policies
required by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Acts for
Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008.[Footnote 8]
(2) Planning for contractors in ongoing operations. The department has
not fully planned for the use of contractors in support of ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, although some efforts are underway
at the individual unit level.
(3) Planning for contractors in future operations. DOD needs to take
additional actions to improve its planning for operational contract
support in future operations. For example, while DOD has started to
institutionalize operational contract support into combatant commands'
operation plans, it has not yet made significant progress.
(4) Tracking contractor personnel. While DOD has developed a system to
collect data on contractors deployed with U.S. forces, our reviews of
this database have highlighted significant shortcomings in its
implementation in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(5) Providing oversight personnel. DOD continues to face challenges in
providing an adequate number of personnel to oversee and manage
contractors in contingency operations, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
(6) Training non-acquisition personnel. DOD faces challenges in
ensuring that non-acquisition personnel, such as unit commanders, have
been trained on how to work effectively with contractors in
contingency operations.
(7) Screening contractor personnel. DOD has yet to develop a
departmentwide policy for screening the significant number of local
and third-country national contractor personnel who support deployed
U.S. forces.
(8) Capturing lessons learned. DOD has not implemented previous GAO
recommendations to develop a departmentwide lessons learned program to
capture the department's institutional knowledge regarding all forms
of contractor support to deployed forces in order to facilitate a more
effective working relationship between contractors and the military.
Given the contractor-related challenges DOD continues to face, a
cultural change is necessary to integrate operational contract support
throughout the department. Without such a change, DOD is likely to
continue to face these challenges in ongoing and future contingency
operations.
Some Departmentwide Steps Taken to Institutionalize Operational
Contract Support:
In October 2006, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics
and Materiel Readiness established the Office of the Assistant Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) to act as a focal point
for leading DOD's efforts to improve contingency contractor management
and oversight at deployed locations. Among the office's
accomplishments is the establishment of a community of practice for
operational contract support comprising of subject matter experts from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the
services. In March 2010 the office issued an Operational Contract
Support Concept of Operations, and it has provided the geographic
combatant commanders with operational contract support planners to
assist them in meeting contract planning requirements.
To provide additional assistance to deployed forces, the department
and the Army introduced several handbooks and other guidance to
improve contracting and contract management in deployed locations. For
example:
* In 2007 the department introduced the Joint Contingency Contracting
Handbook, Contingency Contracting: A Joint Handbook for the 21st
Century, which provides tools, templates, and training that enable a
contingency contracting officer to be effective in any contracting
environment. The handbook is currently being updated and the
department expects the revised edition to be issued in July 2010.
* In 2008 the Army issued the Deployed Contracting Officer's
Representative Handbook. This handbook provides the basic tools and
knowledge to use in conjunction with formal contracting officer's
representative (COR) training and was designed to address the
realities that CORs face when operating outside the United States in a
contingency operation.
* Additionally, in October 2008, the department issued Joint
Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support, which establishes
doctrine and provides standardized guidance for, and information on,
planning, conducting, and assessing operational contract support
integration, contractor management functions, and contracting command
and control organizational options in support of joint operations.
[Footnote 9]
Finally, in 2008, the Joint Staff (J-4, Logistics), at the direction
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, undertook a study to
determine how much the department relied on contractors in Iraq. The
intent of the study was to (1) better understand contracted
capabilities in Iraq, to determine areas of high reliance or
dependence; (2) determine where the department is most reliant, and in
some cases dependent, on contractor support; and (3) guide the
development of future contingency planning and force development. The
Joint Staff's initial findings suggest that in Iraq the department was
highly dependent on contractors in four of the nine joint capability
areas, including Logistics.[Footnote 10] For example, the study showed
that in the third quarter of fiscal year 2008, over 150,000
contractors were providing logistical support, while slightly more
than 31,000 military personnel were providing similar support. Having
determined the level of dependency and reliance on contractors in
Iraq, the Joint Staff plans to examine ways to improve operational
contract support planning, including the development of tools, rules,
and refinements to the existing planning process.
In addition, in July 2009, DOD provided Congress with a report
containing an inventory of contracts for fiscal year 2008, including
but not limited to service contracts supporting contingency
operations.[Footnote 11] According to Army officials, the Army is
using information derived from this effort to help inform discussions
on the appropriate mix of DOD civilian, military and contractor
personnel in future contingency operations. However, DOD has
acknowledged and we have reported limitations associated with the
methodologies used to develop this initial inventory.[Footnote 12]
Operational Contract Support Guidance Has Not Been Finalized:
DOD has developed some policies and guidance as described above, but
has not finalized other key operational contract support guidance
directed by Congress. In 2006, Congress amended title 10 of the United
States Code by adding section 2333, which directed the Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, to develop joint policies by April 2008 for requirements
definition, contingency program management, and contingency
contracting during combat and postconflict operations.[Footnote 13] In
January 2008, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 amended section 2333 by adding a new subsection directing that
these joint policies also provide for training of military personnel
outside the acquisition workforce who are expected to have acquisition
responsibility, including oversight duties associated with contracts
or contractors, during combat operations, postconflict operations, and
contingency operations.[Footnote 14] In 2008 we reported that DOD was
developing an Expeditionary Contracting Policy to address the
requirement to develop a joint policy on contingency contracting.
[Footnote 15] In addition, we reported that DOD was revising the
October 2005 version of DOD Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel
Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces, to strengthen the
department's joint policies and guidance on requirements definition;
program management, including the oversight of contractor personnel
supporting a contingency operation; and training. As of June 2010, the
department has yet to issue either of these documents. According to
the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support), the
revisions to DOD Instruction 3020.41 have been held up in the review
process. Further, the department has determined that it will not issue
the Expeditionary Contracting Policy because the practitioners do not
believe a joint policy is necessary.
Identifying and Planning for Operational Contract Support Requirements
in Current Operations:
DOD guidance highlights the need to plan for operational contract
support early in an operation's planning process, in part because of
the challenges associated with using contractors in contingencies.
These challenges include overseeing and managing contractors in
contingency operations. However, in previous reports and testimonies
we have noted that DOD has not followed long-standing guidance on
planning for operational contract support. Our work continues to show
that DOD has not fully planned for the use of contractors in support
of ongoing contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, although
some efforts are under way at the individual unit level.
On December 1, 2009, the President announced that an additional 30,000
U.S. troops would be sent to Afghanistan to assist in the ongoing
operations there, and the Congressional Research Service has estimated
that from 26,000 to 56,000 additional contractors may be needed to
support the additional troops. Despite the additional contractors who
will be needed to support the troop increase, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
(USFOR-A),[Footnote 16] with the exception of planning for the
increased use of the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP),[Footnote 17] was engaged in very little planning for
contractors. We did, however, identify several individual unit efforts
to plan for contractors.
For example, we found some planning being done by U.S. military
officials at Regional Command-East. According to planners from
Regional Command-East, the command had identified the types of units
that are being deployed to its operational area of Afghanistan and was
coordinating with similar units already in Afghanistan to determine
what types of contract support the units relied on. Furthermore,
according to operational contract support personnel associated with a
Marine Expeditionary Force getting ready to deploy to Afghanistan, the
staff offices within the Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters
organization were directed to identify force structure gaps that could
be filled by contractors prior to deployment and begin contracting for
those services. For example, one section responsible for civil affairs
identified the need to supplement its staff with contractors
possessing engineering expertise because the needed engineers were not
available from the Navy.
Additionally, in April 2010 we reported that while U.S. Forces-Iraq
(USF-I)[Footnote 18] had taken steps to identify all the LOGCAP
support it needed for the drawdown, it had not identified the other
contracted support it may need to support the drawdown.[Footnote 19]
We reported that according to DOD joint guidance and Army regulations,
personnel who plan, support, and execute military operations must also
determine the contracted support needed to accomplish their missions.
Such personnel include combat force commanders, base commanders, and
logistics personnel. In particular, these personnel are responsible
for determining the best approach to accomplish their assigned tasks
and--if the approach includes contractors--for identifying the types
and levels of contracted support needed. As we reported in April 2010,
Multi-National Force-Iraq's (MNF-I) May 2009 drawdown plan delegated
the responsibility for determining contract support requirements to
contracting agencies, such as the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/
Afghanistan, rather than to operational personnel. However, Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan officials told us that they could
not determine the theaterwide levels of contracted services required,
or plan for reductions based on those needs, because they lack
sufficient, relevant information on future requirements for contracted
services--information that should have been provided by operational
personnel. For example, according to MNF-I documentation, during an
October 2009 meeting between operational personnel and contracting
officials, MNF-I reiterated that the levels of contracted service
ultimately needed in Iraq during the drawdown were unknown. This is
consistent with an overarching weakness identified by a Joint Staff
task force, which noted limited, if any, visibility of contractor
support and plans and a lack of requirements definition. As a result,
rather than relying on information based on operationally driven
requirements for contracted services, MNF-I planned for, and USF-I is
subsequently tracking, the reduction of contracted support in Iraq by
using historical ratios of contractor personnel to servicemembers in
Iraq. Such ratios may not accurately reflect the levels of contracted
support needed during the drawdown.
In our April 2010 report we recommended, among other things, that DOD
direct the appropriate authorities to ensure that joint doctrine
regarding operational planning for contract support is followed and
that operational personnel identify contract support requirements in a
timely manner to avoid potential waste and abuse and facilitate the
continuity of services. DOD concurred with this recommendation and
noted that it recognized that improvements could be made to DOD's
planning for contractor support and stated that the Joint Staff is
working to improve strategic guidance, processes, and tools available
to plan for contracted support through the Chairman's Operational
Contract Support Task Force. DOD also commented that it recognized the
need for better synchronization between operational needs and
contractor activities and, to that end, U.S. Central Command has taken
steps to increase visibility and synchronization of operational
contract support through initiatives such creating the Joint Theater
Support Contracting Command, instituting a Joint Contracting Support
Board, and collaborating with the Joint Staff to improve guidance.
Also, in our April report, we recommended that DOD direct the
appropriate authorities to conduct an analysis of the benefits, costs,
and risks of transitioning from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV and other
service contracts in Iraq under current withdrawal timelines to
determine the most efficient and effective means for providing
essential services during the drawdown. DOD concurred with this
recommendation and as of May of this year, has canceled the transition
from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV for base life support in Iraq due partly
to concerns about the interruption of essential services. The decision
to continue LOGCAP III rather than transition to LOGCAP IV for base
life support services was based on three main factors: input from
military commanders in Iraq, the projected cost of the transition, and
contractor performance. Commanders in Iraq had raised concerns that a
transition from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV would strain logistics and
transportation assets in Iraq at the same time that a massive
withdrawal of U.S. forces, weapons, and equipment is under way.
In the past, we have repeatedly reported on DOD's failure to fully
plan for contract support and the impact that this can have on
operations. Several units that recently returned from Afghanistan
discussed how a lack of planning for contract support resulted in
service shortages and diminished operational capability. For example,
officials from several battalions told us that when they arrived at
locations that were intended to be their combat outposts, they found
the area largely unprepared, including a lack of housing, heating,
washing machines, showers and food. These bases were too small or too
remote to be serviced by LOGCAP, and therefore the units had to make
their own contract support arrangements through the appropriate
regional contracting command to build, equip and maintain their bases.
Because the units were unaware they would have to take on this
responsibility prior to deploying, they did not plan for and allocate
adequate personnel to handle the extensive contract management and
oversight duties associated with building and maintaining their combat
outpost. As a result, these units had to take military personnel away
from their primary missions in order to handle these contract
management duties. Other units faced different challenges as a result
of a lack of planning for contract support. For example, another unit
that recently returned from Afghanistan stated that the lack of
planning for an increased requirement for linguists due to increased
troop levels led to shortages that resulted in the delaying of some
operations.
Limited Progress Integrating Contractors into Combatant Commands'
Operation Plans:
DOD guidance recognizes the need to include the role of contractors in
its operation plans. For example, joint guidance indicates that
military commanders must ensure that requisite contract planning and
guidance are in place for any operations where significant reliance on
contractors is anticipated, and planning for contractors should be at
a level of detail on par with that for military forces. To provide
greater details on contract services needed to support an operation
and the capabilities that contractors would bring, DOD's guidance for
contingency planning was revised in February 2006 to require planners
to include an operational contract support annex--known as Annex W--in
the combatant commands' most detailed operation plans, if applicable
to the plan.[Footnote 20] In addition, joint guidance gives the
combatant commanders the discretion to require Annex Ws for
additional, less detailed plans. Incorporating operational contract
support into these types of plans represents a critical opportunity to
plan for the use of contractors at the strategic and tactical levels.
Although DOD guidance has called for the integration of an operational
contract support annex--Annex W--into certain combatant command
operation plans since February 2006, the department has made limited
progress in meeting this requirement. We reported in March 2010 that
while planners identified 89 plans that may require an Annex W, only
four operation plans with Annex Ws had been approved by the Secretary
of Defense or his designee, and planners had drafted Annex Ws for an
additional 30 plans.[Footnote 21] According to combatant command
officials, most of the draft Annex Ws developed restated broad
language from existing DOD guidance on the use of contractors to
support deployed forces, and they included few details on the types of
contractors needed to execute a given plan, despite guidance requiring
Annex Ws to list contracts likely to be used in theater. As a result,
DOD risks not fully understanding the extent to which it will be
relying on contractors to support combat operations and being
unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight of
deployed contractor personnel. Moreover, the combatant commanders are
missing a chance to fully evaluate their overall requirements for
reliance on contractors.
Data Collected by DOD's System to Track Contractor Personnel in Iraq
and Afghanistan Are Unreliable:
In January 2007, DOD designated the Synchronized Pre-deployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT) as its primary system for collecting data
on contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces, and it directed the
use of a contract clause that requires contractor firms to enter
personnel data for contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan into
this system.[Footnote 22] In July 2008, DOD signed a memorandum of
understanding with the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) in which the three agencies
agreed to track information on contracts meeting specified thresholds
performed in Iraq or Afghanistan and the personnel working on those
contracts.[Footnote 23] Although the SPOT database is designed to
provide accountability of all U.S., local, and third-country national
contractor personnel by name; a summary of the services being
provided; and information on government-provided support, our reviews
of SPOT have highlighted shortcomings in DOD's implementation of the
system in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 24] For example, we found
that as a result of diverse interpretations by DOD officials as to
which contractor personnel should be entered into the system, the
information in SPOT does not present an accurate picture of the total
number of contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. While one of
the functions of SPOT is to generate letters of authorization,
[Footnote 25] not all contractor personnel in Iraq, particularly local
nationals, need such letters, and agency officials informed us that
such personnel were not being entered into SPOT. Similarly, officials
at one contracting office in Afghanistan stated that the need for a
letter of authorization determined whether someone was entered into
SPOT, resulting in Afghans not being entered. Additionally, tracking
local nationals in SPOT presents particular challenges because their
numbers tend to fluctuate because of the use of day laborers and
because local firms do not always keep track of the individuals
working on their projects.[Footnote 26]
We made several recommendations to DOD, State, and USAID in October
2009 to better ensure consistency in requirements for data entry in
SPOT and to ensure that the use and reporting capabilities of SPOT are
fulfilling statutory requirements among other things.[Footnote 27]
DOD, State, and USAID agreed that coordination among the three
agencies is important, but DOD and State disagreed that they needed a
new plan to address the issues we identified. They cited their ongoing
coordination efforts and anticipated upgrades to SPOT as sufficient.
However, we believe continued coordination among the three agencies is
important as they attempt to obtain greater visibility into their
reliance on contractors, grantees, and cooperative agreement
recipients in dynamic and complex environments. Otherwise, the
agencies not only risk not collecting the information they need but
also risk collecting detailed data they will not use.
Lack of Adequate Numbers of Contract Oversight and Management
Personnel in Deployed Locations:
One important aspect of operational contract support is the oversight
of contracts--which can refer to contract administration functions,
quality assurance surveillance, corrective action, property
administration, and past performance evaluation. Our work has found,
however, that DOD frequently did not have a sufficient number of
trained contracting and oversight personnel to effectively manage and
oversee its contracts. While several individual organizations or
services within DOD have taken actions to help mitigate the problem of
not having enough personnel to oversee and manage contractors in
Afghanistan and Iraq, these efforts have been driven by individual
services and units and are not part of a systematic approach by DOD.
Ultimately, the responsibility for contract oversight rests with the
contracting officer, who has the responsibility for ensuring that
contractors meet the requirements as set forth in the contract.
Frequently, however, contracting officers are not located in the
contingency area or at the installations where the services are being
provided. As a result, contracting officers appoint contract monitors,
known as CORs, who are responsible for providing much of the day-to-
day oversight of a contract during a contingency operation. CORs are
typically drawn from units receiving contractor-provided services and
are not normally contracting specialists. [Footnote 28] Often their
service as CORs is an additional duty. They cannot direct the
contractor by making commitments or changes that affect price,
quality, quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the
contract. Instead, they act as the eyes and ears of the contracting
officer and serve as the liaison between the contractor and the
contracting officer.
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement requires that
CORs be qualified by training and experience commensurate with the
responsibilities to be delegated to them; however, we have reported in
the past that individuals have been deployed without knowing that they
would be assigned as CORs, thus precluding their ability to take COR
training prior to deployment. This can be a problem because although
the courses are offered online, there is limited Internet connectivity
in theater--particularly in Afghanistan. During our recent visits with
deployed and recently returned units,[Footnote 29] we found that units
continue to deploy to Afghanistan without designating CORs beforehand.
As a result, the personnel assigned to serve as CORs have to take the
required training after arriving in theater, which provides technical
challenges. Several recently returned units told us that it could take
days to complete the 2-hour online training because of poor Internet
connectivity in Afghanistan.
We also found that although CORs and other oversight personnel are
responsible for assisting in the technical monitoring or
administration of a contract, these oversight personnel often lack the
technical knowledge and training needed to effectively oversee certain
contracts. Several units that have recently returned from Afghanistan
told us that CORs with no engineering background are often asked to
oversee construction projects. These CORs are unable to ensure that
the buildings and projects they oversee meet the technical
specifications required in the drawing plans. An additional
complication is that the plans are not always provided in English for
the CORs or in the appropriate local language (Dari or Pashto) for the
Afghan contractors.
Some steps have been taken to address these challenges. For example,
the Army issued an execution order on CORs in December 2009, in which
the Army Chief of Staff directed the commanders of deploying units to
coordinate with the units they will replace in theater to determine
the number of CORs they will need to designate prior to deployment.
The order states that if the commander is unable to determine specific
COR requirements, each deploying brigade must identify and train 80
COR candidates. In addition, the Army order directs the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command to develop training scenarios and
include COR contract oversight scenarios in mission rehearsal
exercises by March 30, 2010. The order also directed the Training and
Doctrine Command to ensure that contingency contracting
responsibilities are included in appropriate professional military
education courses.
In addition, a deploying Marine Expeditionary Force has created an
operational contracting support cell within the logistics element of
its command headquarters. The members of the cell will assist
subordinate units with contracting oversight and guidance on policy,
and they will act as contracting liaisons to the Joint Contracting
Command-Iraq/Afghanistan and as conduits to the regional contracting
commands should any issues arise. The Marines were prompted to set up
this cell by lessons learned from their deployment to Operation Iraqi
Freedom, where problems arose as a result of a lack of expertise and
personnel to help oversee and manage contractors. In addition, the
Marine Expeditionary Force trained approximately 100 Marines as CORs
prior to its deployment to Afghanistan this spring. While not all
these personnel have been designated as CORs for the upcoming
deployment, all could be called upon to serve as CORs should the need
arise.
While we recognize the efforts DOD has under way to develop long-term
plans intended to address its personnel shortages, many of the
problems we have identified in the past continue. In previous reports
we have recommended that DOD develop strategies to address its
oversight problems, and noted that unless DOD takes steps to address
its current shortages, the department will continue to be at risk with
regard to its assurance that contractors are providing their required
services in an effective and efficient manner.
Training of Non-Acquisition Personnel to Provide Contract Oversight
and Management:
Currently, military commanders and other unit leaders are not required
to complete operational contract support training prior to deployment.
[Footnote 30] We have previously reported on the potential issues that
can arise when commanders are unaware of their responsibility toward
contractors and are unclear about the difference between command
authority and contract authority.
During our December 2009 trip to Afghanistan and in conversations with
personnel from recently redeployed units, we continued to find that
some commanders had to be advised by contract oversight personnel that
they had to provide certain support, such as housing, force
protection, and meals to the contractors they were overseeing, and
concerns were raised about the potential risk of military commanders
directing contractors to perform work outside the scope of the
contract--something commanders lack the authority to do.[Footnote 31]
In addition, officials within several units we spoke with that have
just redeployed from Afghanistan told us that lack of knowledge about
contracting resulted in the failure to include the right mix of
personnel in their manpower planning document. This led to shortfalls
in critical oversight areas, such as in the badging and screening
office for contractor employees coming on base. Units that had
recently returned from Afghanistan whose personnel we spoke with also
did not anticipate the sheer volume of contractors and the time and
manpower they would need to devote to properly process and oversee
these contractor personnel. This led to the use of soldiers and
Marines to perform contract-related duties such as escort duty, which
had not been adequately planned for prior to deployment.
Contractors in contingency operations are integrated into a wide
spectrum of activities and support a diverse range of military
functions and operations that are not confined to the logistics world,
and therefore all military personnel should be aware of contractors
and how to work with them. We have previously recommended that DOD
develop training standards for the services to integrate basic
familiarity with contractor support to deployed forces into their
professional military education to ensure that military commanders and
other senior leaders who may deploy to locations with contractor
support have the knowledge and skills needed to effectively manage
contractors. DOD concurred with this recommendation and recognizes the
need for broad training for non-acquisition personnel in order for
them to understand the basics regarding contractor personnel. However,
as DOD reported in November of 2009, the effort to incorporate
operational contract support into professional military education was
still ongoing. We continue to believe that integrating operational
contract support into professional military education is an important
step in institutionalizing the concept throughout DOD.
Screening and Providing Badges to Contractors:
In Iraq and Afghanistan, military commanders and other military
officials have expressed concerns about the security risks that
contractor personnel, particularly third-country and local nationals,
pose to U.S. forces because of limitations in the background screening
process. In 2006, we first reported on the challenges that DOD faced
in ensuring that contractor personnel had been thoroughly screened and
vetted.[Footnote 32] In July 2009, we reported that DOD had not
developed departmentwide procedures to screen local national and third-
country national contractor personnel in part because two offices
within the department---those of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics--could not agree on the level of detail that
should be included in background screening for third-country and local
national employees and therefore lacked assurance that all contractor
personnel were properly screened.[Footnote 33] As a result, we
recommended that the Secretary of Defense designate a focal point at a
sufficiently senior level and possessing the necessary authority to
ensure that the appropriate offices in DOD coordinate, develop, and
implement policies and procedures to conduct and adjudicate background
screenings in a timely manner. DOD partially concurred with our
recommendation and responded that the Office of the Assistant Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) has been given
responsibility for monitoring the registration, processing, and
accounting of private security contractor personnel in the area of
contingency operations. We noted that while we did not dispute this
office's role, we did not believe it was the correct office to resolve
disagreements among the offices responsible for developing DOD's
background screening policy. DOD has still not developed a
departmentwide policy on how to screen local national and third-
country national contractor personnel, and as a result it continues to
face challenges in conducting background screening of these personnel.
As we reported in July 2009, absent a DOD-wide policy, commanders
develop their own standards and processes to ensure that contractor
personnel have been screened.
In Iraq, USF-I, the U.S.-led military organization responsible for
conducting the war in Iraq, has a commandwide policy for screening and
badging contractors. However, in Afghanistan, USFOR-A has not
established a commandwide policy for screening and badging
contractors. Instead, we found that each base develops its own
background screening and base access procedures, resulting in a
variety of different procedures. The lack of guidance also affects the
ability of force protection officials to determine the sufficiency of
their background screening procedures. For example, at one base, force
protection officials told us that while they require contractor
personnel to provide valid background screenings from their home
countries, they had not received guidance on how to interpret those
screenings, and did not know whether the screenings they received were
valid. Officials stated that they rely on a biometric system, also
used in Iraq, to screen local and third-country national contractor
personnel. However, as we have previously reported, the name checks
and biometric data collection associated with issuing badges rely
primarily upon U.S.-based databases of criminal and terrorist
information and background checks that rely on U.S.-based databases,
such as the biometric system used in Iraq and Afghanistan, may not be
effective in screening foreign nationals who have not lived or
traveled to the United States.[Footnote 34] As we concluded in July
2009, without a coordinated DOD-wide effort to develop and implement
standardized policies and procedures to ensure that contractor
personnel--particularly local nationals and third-country nationals--
have been screened, DOD cannot be assured that it has taken all
reasonable steps to thoroughly screen contractor personnel and
minimize any risks to the military posed by these personnel.
Collecting and Distributing Lessons Learned:
Although DOD has policy requiring the collection and distribution of
lessons learned to the maximum extent possible, we found in our
previous work that no procedures were in place to ensure that lessons
learned are collected and shared. Many issues that we continue to
report result from the failure to share lessons learned from previous
deployments.
The lack of a lessons learned program means that the knowledge that is
gained by a currently or previously deployed unit is not fully
leveraged to DOD's advantage. Personnel we spoke to from units that
were deployed or had just returned from deployment told us that they
left for their deployment not knowing the extent to which they would
have to rely on contractors or how to staff their manpower planning
document and, as a result, were short handed in several critical
oversight areas and had to use troops to perform functions other than
their primary duties.
We have previously recommended developing a departmentwide lessons
learned program to capture the experiences of military units that have
used logistics support contracts and establishing a focal point within
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, to lead and coordinate the implementation of
the departmentwide lessons learned program to collect and distribute
the department's institutional knowledge regarding all forms of
contractor support to deployed forces. DOD concurred with this
recommendation but as of November 2009 these efforts were still
ongoing. Implementing these recommendations would facilitate a more
effective working relationship between contractors and the military.
Concluding Observations:
DOD has acknowledged that operational contract support plays an
integral role in contingency operations and that successful execution
of operational contract support requires significant planning and
management. While some efforts have been made within the department
and the individual services to improve the planning for and management
of contractors, these efforts do not fully work toward integrating
operational contract support throughout DOD. As we have discussed,
many of the operational contract support challenges the department
continues to face are long-standing and while the department has
acknowledged many of these challenges, and taken some actions, it has
not systematically addressed them.
Looking toward the future, the challenges we have discussed
demonstrate the need for DOD to consider how it currently uses
contractors in contingency operations, how it will use contractors to
support future operations, and the impact that providing management
and oversight of these contractors has on the operational
effectiveness of deployed units. These considerations would also help
shift the department's culture as it relates to operational contract
support. As DOD doctrine recognizes, operational contract support is
more than just logistical support. Therefore, it is important that a
significant culture change occur, one that emphasizes operational
contract support throughout all aspects of the department, including
planning, training, and personnel requirements. It is especially
important that these concepts be institutionalized among those serving
in leadership positions, including officers, noncommissioned officers,
and civilians. Only when DOD has established its future vision for the
use and role of contractors supporting deployed forces and fully
institutionalizes the concepts of operational contract support can it
effectively address its long-term capability to oversee and manage
those contractors.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer
any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information about this statement, please contact William
M. Solis at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key
contributions to this statement are Carole F. Coffey, Assistant
Director; James A. Reynolds, Assistant Director; Vincent Balloon;
Melissa L. Hermes; Charles Perdue; Michael Shaughnessy; Cheryl
Weissman; and Natasha Wilder.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program
Management in Expeditionary Operations (Washington, D.C. September
2007).
[2] GAO, Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management of
Contractors Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in Iraq and
Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-357]
(Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2010).
[3] GAO, Warfighter Support: Continued Actions Needed by DOD to
Improve and Institutionalize Contractor Support in Contingency
Operations, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-551T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2010).
[4] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January 22,
2009).
[5] GAO, Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and
Other Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Oversight and Management of
Contractors in Future Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-436T] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24,
2008).
[6] GAO, Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-63] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
11, 1997).
[7] Generally accepted government auditing standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based
on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained
provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives.
[8] John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 854 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §
2333); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-181, § 849 (2008).
[9] Joint Publication 4-10 expressly does not pertain to contracting
support of routine, recurring (i.e., noncontingency) DOD operations.
[10] Joint capability areas are collections of like DOD capabilities
functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy
development, investment decision making, capability portfolio
management, and capabilities-based force development and operational
planning.
[11] Section 2330a of title 10 of the United States Code, as amended
by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,
requires DOD to submit an annual inventory of the activities performed
pursuant to contracts for services for or on behalf of DOD during the
preceding fiscal year. These inventories are to contain a number of
different elements for the service contracts listed, including
information on the functions and missions performed by the contractor,
the funding source for the contract, and the number of full-time
contractor employees or its equivalent working under the contract.
[12] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Observations on the Department of
Defense Service Contract Inventories for Fiscal Year 2008, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-350R] (Washington, D.C.: January
29, 2010).
[13] John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 854 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2333).
[14] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-181, § 849 (2008).
[15] GAO, Contract Management: DOD Developed Draft Guidance for
Operational Contract Support but Has Not Met All Legislative
Requirements, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-114R]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2008)
[16] USFOR-A, is the headquarters for U.S. forces operating in
Afghanistan and was established in October 2008.
[17] LOGCAP provides worldwide logistics and base and life support
services in contingency environments and provides the majority of base
and life support services to U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[18] MNF-I and its subordinate headquarters merged into a single
headquarters, USF-I, in January 2010. Documents obtained and
discussions held prior to January 2010 will be attributed to MNF-I or
one of its subordinate commands as appropriate. Discussions held and
documents obtained after January 2010 will be attributed to USF-I.
[19] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the
Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376] (Washington, D.C.: April 19,
2010).
[20] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.03B, Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning
Formats (Feb. 28, 2006), superseded by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Manual 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
(JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats (Aug. 17, 2007).
[21] GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for
Using Contractors to Support Future Military Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-472] (Washington, D.C. Mar. 30,
2010).
[22] This guidance was implemented in DFARS clause 252.225-7040(g),
which specifies that contractors are to enter information into SPOT
for all personnel authorized to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces during
contingency operations and certain other actions outside the United
States. Class Deviation 2007-O0010 (Oct. 17, 2007) provided a new
clause for contracts with performance in the U.S. Central Command area
of responsibility that were not already covered by DFARS clause
252.225-7040. However, the class deviation excluded contracts that did
not exceed $25,000 and had a period of performance of less than 30
days.
[23] Section 861 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008 directed the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State,
and the USAID Administrator to enter into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) related to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The law specified a number of matters to be covered in the MOU,
including the identification of common databases to serve as
repositories of information on contract and contractor personnel. Pub.
L. No. 110-181, § 861 (2008).
[24] GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Face Challenges in Tracking
Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Agreements, and Associated Personnel,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-509T] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 23, 2010); Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID
Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and
Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1] (Washington, D.C.: October 1,
2009); and Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts
and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19] (Washington, D.C: October 1,
2008).
[25] A letter of authorization is a document issued by a government
contracting officer or designee that authorizes contractor personnel
to travel to, from, and within a designated area and identifies any
additional authorizations, privileges, or government support the
contractor is entitled to under the contract. Contractor personnel
need SPOT-generated letters of authorization, among other things, to
enter Iraq, receive military identification cards, travel on U.S.
military aircraft, or, for security contractors, receive approval to
carry weapons.
[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-509T].
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1].
[28] We recently reported that DOD also makes extensive use of
contractors to help perform contract and grant administration
functions in Iraq and Afghanistan. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-357].
[29] We spoke with officials from a variety of military units,
including officials at the headquarters element and at the brigade and
battalion levels.
[30] While DOD does not require military commanders to take
operational contract support courses, Joint Forces Command has two
operational contract support courses available online and other
courses are available through the Defense Acquisition University and
the Army.
[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-551T].
[32] GAO, Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor
Employees Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information,
but U.S. Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risk Contractors May Pose,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-999R] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 22, 2006).
[33] GAO, Contingency Contract Management: DOD Needs to Develop and
Finalize Background Screening and Other Standards for Private Security
Contractors, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-351]
(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2009).
[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-999R].
[End of section]
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