Warfighter Support
Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress and Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan Gao ID: GAO-10-842T June 25, 2010In fiscal year 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that it spent $4 billion to move troops and materiel into Afghanistan, a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with few roads, no railway, and only four airports with paved runways over 3,000 meters. The terrain and weather in Afghanistan and surrounding countries pose further challenges to transporting supplies and equipment. In December 2009, the President announced that an additional 30,000 U.S. troops will be sent to Afghanistan by August 2010. Today's testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations drawn from ongoing work reviewing DOD's logistics efforts supporting operations in Afghanistan, including (1) the organizations involved and routes and methods used to transport supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan; (2) steps DOD has taken to improve its distribution process, based on lessons learned from prior operations; and (3) challenges affecting DOD's ability to distribute supplies and equipment within Afghanistan, and its efforts to mitigate them. In conducting its audit work, GAO examined DOD guidance and other documentation relating to the processes of transporting supplies and equipment to Afghanistan and met with various cognizant officials and commanders in the United States, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar.
Movement of supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan is a complex process involving many DOD organizations and using air, sea, and ground modes of transportation. DOD's ability to provide timely logistics support to units deploying to Afghanistan or already in theater depends on its ability to synchronize all of these activities into one seamless process. For example, U.S. Transportation Command manages air and surface transportation from the United States to and around the U.S. Central Command area of operations; U.S. Central Command's Deployment and Distribution Operations Center validates and directs air movements and monitors and directs surface movements within theater; the Air Force's Air Mobility Division assigns and directs aircraft to carry materiel within the theater; and the Army's 1st Theater Sustainment Command monitors strategic movements of materiel and directly influences movements into theater. Most cargo in theater is transported commercially by ship to Pakistan and then by contractor-operated trucks to Afghanistan, but high-priority and sensitive items are transported by U.S. military and commercial aircraft directly from the United States and other countries to logistics hubs in Afghanistan. DOD has taken some steps to improve its processes for distributing materiel to deployed forces based on lessons learned from prior operations. For example, in response to lessons learned from problems with keeping commanders informed about incoming materiel in Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Transportation Command established the Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, which now helps coordinate the movement of materiel and forces into the theater of operations. Also, since GAO reported in 2003 that radio frequency identification tags were not being effectively used to track materiel in transit to, within, and from Iraq, DOD developed policies and procedures to increase tag use on cargo traveling through the U.S. Central Command theater of operations, including Afghanistan. Challenges hindering DOD's ability to distribute needed supplies and equipment to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan include difficulties with transporting cargo through neighboring countries and around Afghanistan, limited airfield infrastructure, lack of full visibility over cargo movements, limited storage capacity at logistics hubs, difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and equipment, lack of coordination between U.S. and other coalition forces for delivery of supplies and equipment, and uncertain requirements and low transportation priority for contractors. DOD recognizes these challenges and has ongoing or planned efforts to mitigate some of them; however, some efforts involve long-term plans that will not be complete in time to support the ongoing troop increase. DOD is also working to address these challenges through planning conferences to synchronize the flow of forces into Afghanistan. At these conferences, DOD officials stressed the need to balance and coordinate multiple requirements in order to sustain current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, draw down forces and equipment in Iraq, and increase forces and equipment in Afghanistan.
GAO-10-842T, Warfighter Support: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress and Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House
of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 25, 2010:
Warfighter Support:
Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress and Challenges in
Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan:
Statement of William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
A classified version of this statement (GAO-10-462C) was delivered to
a closed session of the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives, on March 4, 2010.
GAO-10-842T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-842T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In fiscal year 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that it
spent $4 billion to move troops and materiel into Afghanistan, a
mountainous, arid, land-locked country with few roads, no railway, and
only four airports with paved runways over 3,000 meters. The terrain
and weather in Afghanistan and surrounding countries pose further
challenges to transporting supplies and equipment. In December 2009,
the President announced that an additional 30,000 U.S. troops will be
sent to Afghanistan by August 2010.
Today‘s testimony discusses GAO‘s preliminary observations drawn from
ongoing work reviewing DOD‘s logistics efforts supporting operations
in Afghanistan, including (1) the organizations involved and routes
and methods used to transport supplies and equipment into and around
Afghanistan; (2) steps DOD has taken to improve its distribution
process, based on lessons learned from prior operations; and
(3) challenges affecting DOD‘s ability to distribute supplies and
equipment within Afghanistan, and its efforts to mitigate them. In
conducting its audit work, GAO examined DOD guidance and other
documentation relating to the processes of transporting supplies and
equipment to Afghanistan and met with various cognizant officials and
commanders in the United States, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar.
What GAO Found:
Movement of supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan is a
complex process involving many DOD organizations and using air, sea,
and ground modes of transportation. DOD‘s ability to provide timely
logistics support to units deploying to Afghanistan or already in
theater depends on its ability to synchronize all of these activities
into one seamless process. For example, U.S. Transportation Command
manages air and surface transportation from the United States to and
around the U.S. Central Command area of operations; U.S. Central
Command‘s Deployment and Distribution Operations Center validates and
directs air movements and monitors and directs surface movements
within theater; the Air Force‘s Air Mobility Division assigns and
directs aircraft to carry materiel within the theater; and the Army‘s
1st Theater Sustainment Command monitors strategic movements of
materiel and directly influences movements into theater. Most cargo in
theater is transported commercially by ship to Pakistan and then by
contractor-operated trucks to Afghanistan, but high-priority and
sensitive items are transported by U.S. military and commercial
aircraft directly from the United States and other countries to
logistics hubs in Afghanistan.
DOD has taken some steps to improve its processes for distributing
materiel to deployed forces based on lessons learned from prior
operations. For example, in response to lessons learned from problems
with keeping commanders informed about incoming materiel in Operation
Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Transportation Command established the Central
Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, which now helps
coordinate the movement of materiel and forces into the theater of
operations. Also, since GAO reported in 2003 that radio frequency
identification tags were not being effectively used to track materiel
in transit to, within, and from Iraq, DOD developed policies and
procedures to increase tag use on cargo traveling through the U.S.
Central Command theater of operations, including Afghanistan.
Challenges hindering DOD‘s ability to distribute needed supplies and
equipment to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan include difficulties
with transporting cargo through neighboring countries and around
Afghanistan, limited airfield infrastructure, lack of full visibility
over cargo movements, limited storage capacity at logistics hubs,
difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and equipment, lack
of coordination between U.S. and other coalition forces for delivery
of supplies and equipment, and uncertain requirements and low
transportation priority for contractors. DOD recognizes these
challenges and has ongoing or planned efforts to mitigate some of
them; however, some efforts involve long-term plans that will not be
complete in time to support the ongoing troop increase. DOD is also
working to address these challenges through planning conferences to
synchronize the flow of forces into Afghanistan. At these conferences,
DOD officials stressed the need to balance and coordinate multiple
requirements in order to sustain current operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq, draw down forces and equipment in Iraq, and increase forces and
equipment in Afghanistan.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-842T] or key
components. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202)
512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to provide a statement discussing
Department of Defense (DOD) transportation and logistics issues in
Afghanistan. As of February 2010, approximately 79,000 U.S. troops
were deployed in Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2009, DOD reported that
it spent $4 billion to move troops and materiel into Afghanistan in
support of these operations: $2 billion for air transport, $120
million for sealift, and the balance for port handling and ground
transport. From February through August 2009, 16,000 troops and 5,300
tons of gear were flown into Afghanistan, while 750,000 square feet of
materiel--trucks and containers--were transported by sealift and then
trucks.
Afghanistan has been described as the "harshest logistics environment
on earth." It is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with poorly
developed infrastructure, including few roads, no railway, and only
four airports with paved runways over 3,000 meters. The terrain and
weather in Afghanistan and surrounding countries pose further
challenges to transporting supplies and equipment. Roads are narrow
and often unpaved; some have one-way traffic alternating daily, and
some are treacherous mountain passes. Winter weather, avalanches, and
flooding often create obstacles and can cause delivery delays.
Additionally, DOD does not have access to suitable areas nearby for
staging and receiving equipment going into Afghanistan, such as those
it has in Kuwait for operations in Iraq. While DOD relies on a
combination of air and surface transportation modes to move supplies
and equipment into and around Afghanistan, these austere conditions
make airlift a vital part of this process.
On December 1, 2009, the President announced that an additional 30,000
U.S. troops would be sent to Afghanistan by August 31, 2010, with
drawdown efforts in Afghanistan to begin in July 2011. Simultaneously,
DOD plans to draw down forces and equipment from Iraq. From December
2009 through August 2010, approximately 48,000 troops, 20,000 pieces
of rolling stock, and 29,000 containers are planned to be pulled out
of Iraq. Consequently, DOD's logistics support system will have to
accommodate both operations, requiring extensive planning and
coordination. In February 2009, we testified that DOD's ability to
move equipment and materiel from Iraq may be constrained, affecting
its ability to quickly deploy these resources in Afghanistan or
elsewhere.[Footnote 1] Specifically, we reported that the limited
availability of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring countries
may diminish the speed at which equipment and materiel can be moved
out of Iraq. Further, we reported that the ability to transport
personnel and equipment into Afghanistan will likely be constrained by
the infrastructure issues and topography of Afghanistan.
My statement today reflects our preliminary observations drawn from
ongoing work reviewing DOD's logistics efforts supporting operations
in Afghanistan. Specifically, I will (1) describe the organizations
involved and the routes and methods used to transport supplies and
equipment into and around Afghanistan; (2) highlight some of the steps
DOD has taken to improve the distribution process based on lessons
learned from prior operations; and (3) address challenges that affect
DOD's ability to distribute supplies and equipment to forces within
Afghanistan, as well as DOD's efforts to mitigate these challenges.
These preliminary observations are based on the work we have performed
to date. In conducting our audit work, we examined agency guidance,
including DOD Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics (July 18, 2008),
which provides the doctrinal framework for how logistics are to be
delivered to support joint operations across the range of military
operations, and U.S. Central Command guidance on the use of supply
routes to Afghanistan. In addition, we reviewed other documentation
and briefings relating to, among other things, the processes of
transporting supplies and equipment to Afghanistan from various DOD
entities, plans for the ongoing troop increase, and assessments of
airfield capabilities. We also analyzed commanders' comments from
readiness reports prepared by 134 units deployed to Afghanistan as of
January 2010, and selected certain examples to highlight challenges
DOD faces with distributing supplies and equipment to forces within
Afghanistan. However, we were unable to conduct an independent
reliability assessment of the commanders' comment data from the
readiness reports. We met with officials from several DOD
organizations in the United States as well as the U.S. Central Command
theater of operations, including Kuwait, Qatar, and Afghanistan. In
the United States, we met with officials from U.S. Central Command,
U.S. Transportation Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, Surface
Deployment and Distribution Command, Air Mobility Command, and Air
Force Central Command. During our trip to the theater of operations in
December 2009, we met with officials from Army Central Command-
Forward, the Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations
Center, Defense Logistics Agency-Forward, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, the
Combined Joint Task Force-82, the Air Mobility Division, the 1st
Theater Sustainment Command, and the 143rd Expeditionary Sustainment
Command. We also attended U.S. Central Command-sponsored planning
conferences in support of the troop increase in Afghanistan and
drawdown of forces from Iraq. My statement is based on our reviews and
analysis of DOD guidance, processes, and plans, and on interviews GAO
staff members conducted with DOD officials in the United States,
Kuwait, Qatar, and Afghanistan. We conducted our work from August 2009
through March 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Summary:
Movement of materiel, such as supplies and equipment, into and around
Afghanistan is a complex process involving many DOD organizations and
utilizing air, sea, and ground modes of transportation over various
routes. DOD's ability to provide timely logistics support to units
deploying to Afghanistan or already in theater depends on its ability
to synchronize all of these activities into one seamless process.
Numerous organizations play a role in distributing materiel. For
example, U.S. Transportation Command manages air and surface
transportation from the United States to and around the U.S. Central
Command area of operations; the Central Command Deployment and
Distribution Operations Center validates and directs air movements,
and monitors and directs surface movements within theater; the Air
Force's Air Mobility Division assigns and directs aircraft to carry
materiel within theater; and the Army's 1st Theater Sustainment
Command monitors strategic movements of materiel and directly
influences movements into theater. There are also several means by
which supplies and equipment are delivered to units operating in
Afghanistan. While the majority of cargo in theater is transported
commercially by ship to Pakistan and then by contractor-operated
trucks to Afghanistan, many high-priority and sensitive items are
transported by U.S. military and commercial aircraft directly from the
United States and other countries to logistics hubs in Afghanistan.
DOD has taken some steps to improve its processes for distributing
materiel to deployed forces based on lessons learned from prior
operations. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, senior
commanders were unable to prioritize their needs and make decisions in
the early stages of the distribution process because they did not know
what materiel was being shipped to them, resulting in an overburdened
transportation and distribution system. In response, in January 2004,
U.S. Transportation Command established the Central Command Deployment
and Distribution Operations Center, in part to help coordinate the
movement of materiel and forces into the theater of operations. This
operations center enabled DOD to confirm the combatant commander's
deployment and distribution priorities and to synchronize the forces,
equipment, and supplies arriving in theater with critical theater lift
and theater infrastructure limitations. Additionally, since we
reported in 2003 that radio frequency identification (RFID) tags were
not being effectively used to track materiel in transit to, within,
and from Iraq, DOD has put additional policies and procedures in place
to increase the use of tags on cargo traveling through the U.S.
Central Command theater of operations, including Afghanistan.
Several challenges hinder DOD's ability to distribute needed supplies
and equipment to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan. These
challenges include:
* difficulties with transporting cargo through neighboring countries
and around Afghanistan;
* limited airfield infrastructure within Afghanistan;
* lack of full visibility over supply and equipment movements into and
around Afghanistan;
* limited storage capacity at logistics hubs in Afghanistan;
* difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and equipment in
Afghanistan;
* lack of coordination, as well as competing logistics priorities, in
a coalition environment; and:
* uncertain requirements and low transportation priority for
contractors.
DOD recognizes these distribution challenges and is working to address
them through various planning conferences to synchronize the flow of
forces into Afghanistan. Additionally, through these conferences, DOD
is working to balance and closely coordinate multiple requirements to
sustain current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, draw down forces
and equipment from Iraq, and increase forces and equipment in
Afghanistan. DOD has plans in place to deliver the troops, supplies,
and equipment to Afghanistan when required, but it acknowledges that
there is a high level of risk involved in executing these plans.
Many DOD Organizations Are Involved in Distributing Supplies and
Equipment by Various Routes and Methods into and around Afghanistan:
Distribution of materiel, such as supplies and equipment, into and
around Afghanistan is a complex process involving many DOD
organizations and utilizing both surface and air modes of
transportation over various routes. DOD's ability to provide timely
logistics support to units deploying to Afghanistan or already in
theater depends on its ability to synchronize these activities into
one seamless process. According to joint doctrine, distribution is the
operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic
system to deliver the "right things" to the "right place" at the
"right time" to support the joint force.[Footnote 2] As the list below
indicates, numerous organizations play an integral role in ensuring
the delivery of materiel to support operations in Afghanistan:
* U.S. Transportation Command is designated as the distribution
process owner for DOD. As such, it coordinates transportation programs
for all organizations involved in moving supplies and equipment into
Afghanistan for DOD. It relies on its military service components--Air
Mobility Command (Air Force), Military Sealift Command (Navy), and
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (Army)--to provide
mobility assets, such as aircraft, ships, and trucks, and to execute
the movement of materiel. In addition, U.S. Transportation Command
collaborates with the combatant commanders, military services, defense
agencies, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff to
develop and implement distribution process improvements.
* U.S. Forces-Afghanistan establishes priorities for movement of
materiel for the Afghanistan theater.
* Joint Sustainment Command-Afghanistan provides command and control
of logistics efforts within Afghanistan to execute U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan priorities, including assisting with materiel reception
and movement and with asset visibility.
* Army Central Command's 1st Theater Sustainment Command provides
command and control of logistics efforts within the U.S. Central
Command area of operations by monitoring strategic movements of
materiel and directly influencing movements into theater.
* Air Force Central Command's Air Mobility Division plans,
coordinates, tasks, and executes the movement of materiel using air
assets within theater.
* The Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center
bridges the gap between strategic and theater distribution by
validating and directing air movements and monitoring and directing
surface movements within theater.
A combination of surface and air transportation modes are used to move
supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan. According to U.S.
Transportation Command officials, most supplies and equipment bound
for Afghanistan are transported along surface modes, with the
remaining supplies and equipment transported using airlift. The main
surface route uses commercial ships to transport cargo to the seaport
of Karachi, Pakistan, from which it is trucked by contractors into
Afghanistan. Typically, materiel that crosses the northern border at
Torkham is destined for the logistics hub at Bagram, while materiel
that crosses the southern border at Chaman is destined for the
Kandahar logistics hub. The distances from the port of Karachi to
Bagram and Kandahar are approximately 1,210 miles and 690 miles,
respectively. Unit equipment--such as specific vehicles and materiel
owned by the unit and brought from home stations--and sustainment
materiel--such as food, water, construction materials, parts, and fuel
that are requisitioned by units already deployed--are transported
through Pakistan.
In May 2009, DOD began using an alternative surface route, known as
the Northern Distribution Network, which relies on contracted ships,
railways, and trucks to transport nonlethal sustainment items like
construction materiel through western European and central Asian
countries into Afghanistan. The cargo, originating in the United
States and northern Europe, falls in with the normal flow of commerce
that travels along several routes within the Northern Distribution
Network. There are two main routes within this network: one starts at
the Latvian port of Riga or the Estonian port of Tallinn and connects
with Afghanistan via Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; the second
route starts at the Georgian port of Poti, bypasses Russia, and
reaches Afghanistan through the terrains of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
and Uzbekistan. U.S. Transportation Command is currently considering
the development of additional Northern Distribution Network routes to
transport materiel into Afghanistan.
Currently, the surface routes through Pakistan are used to a greater
extent than those of the Northern Distribution Network because the
latter is a less mature surface route and the Pakistani ground routes
entail fewer limitations on the types of cargo that can be
transported. For example, U.S. Transportation Command reported that
from May through November 2009, more than 4,700 20-foot-equivalent
units were transported into Afghanistan by way of the Northern
Distribution Network, but more than 21,500 20-foot-equivalent units
were transported using the Pakistani surface routes.[Footnote 3] The
Northern Distribution Network could, however, support the movement of
significantly more cargo, with a maximum capacity estimated at around
4,000 20-foot-equivalent units per month.
Military and commercial airlift are used to transport high-priority
supplies and equipment, as well as sensitive items, such as weapon
systems and ammunition, into and around Afghanistan. According to U.S.
Forces-Afghanistan, as of December 2009, there were 24 airfields in
Afghanistan, 4 of which could support C-5 aircraft and 6 of which
could support C-17 aircraft. These aircraft are used to move large
quantities of supplies and equipment. Cargo flown into Afghanistan is
typically flown to a logistics hub, such as Bagram or Kandahar, that
is capable of supporting most types of aircraft. According to Air
Mobility Command data, during fiscal years 2008 and 2009,
approximately 81,600 and 170,000 short tons of cargo, respectively,
were flown into Afghanistan.[Footnote 4]
Supplies and equipment shipped to the logistics hubs may subsequently
be transported to units operating at other forward operating bases or
combat outposts using a combination of surface and air transportation
modes. Within Afghanistan, cargo is moved to forward operating bases
primarily by means of contractor-operated trucks, though military
trucking assets are used in some instances. High-priority and
sensitive materiel, such as ammunition, that needs to be transported
by air is loaded onto smaller aircraft and flown to a forward
operating base or air-dropped to units throughout the country.
DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Improve the Distribution Process Based on
Lessons Learned:
DOD has taken some steps to improve its processes for distributing
materiel to deployed forces based on lessons learned from prior
operations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. We reported in August
2005 that two DOD initiatives for improving supply distribution
operations--the establishment of the Central Command Deployment and
Distribution Operations Center and the use of pure packing (that is,
consolidation of cargo for shipment to a single user) for air
shipments--were successful enough to warrant application to future
operations.[Footnote 5] In conducting our ongoing work reviewing DOD's
logistics efforts supporting operations in Afghanistan, we found that
these initiatives continue to benefit supply distribution efforts in
support of operations in Afghanistan. According to officials, both
these initiatives have helped improve the flow of supplies into and
around the Afghanistan theater of operations.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, senior commanders were unable to
prioritize their needs and make decisions in the early stages of the
distribution process because they did not know what materiel was being
shipped to them, resulting in an overburdened transportation and
distribution system. To address these issues, in January 2004, U.S.
Transportation Command established the Central Command Deployment and
Distribution Operations Center, in part to help coordinate the
movement of materiel and forces into the theater of operations,
including both Iraq and Afghanistan, by confirming the combatant
commander's deployment and distribution priorities and by
synchronizing the forces, equipment, and supplies arriving in theater
with critical theater lift and theater infrastructure limitations.
Based on the success of the Central Command Deployment and
Distribution Operations Center, DOD created similar deployment and
distribution operations centers within each of the geographic
combatant commands.[Footnote 6]
Pure packing has similarly improved DOD's efficiency. During the early
stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the use of mixed pallets of cargo
created inefficiencies because they had to be unpacked, sorted, and
repacked in the theater of operations before they were shipped
forward, thus lengthening the time it took to deliver supplies to
troops. To avoid these extra processes, in January 2004, U.S. Central
Command requested that all air shipments entering its area of
responsibility be pure packed, meaning that all cargo in a pallet is
addressed to the same customer location. To maximize pallet and
aircraft utilization, cargo awaiting shipment can be held for up to 5
days for the Army and up to 3 days for the Marine Corps. Cargo is
palletized either when it reaches 120 hours of port hold time or when
enough cargo is available to fill a pallet, based on size or weight
limits. As we reported in April 2005, the use of pure packing
potentially leads to longer processing times at the originating aerial
ports, but it reduces customer wait time in theater, thus providing a
significant advantage.[Footnote 7]
DOD has also established policies and procedures to increase the use
of RFID tags to improve in-transit visibility over cargo.[Footnote 8]
In December 2003, we reported that DOD did not have adequate
visibility over all supplies and equipment transported to, within, and
from the theater of operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom, in part
because RFID tags were not being used in a uniform and consistent
manner.[Footnote 9] In July 2004, DOD issued policy directing all DOD
components to use RFID tags on all cargo shipments moving to, from, or
between overseas locations. Additionally, U.S. Central Command policy
states that RFID tags must be attached to all unit and sustainment
cargo transported to, within, and from U.S. Central Command's theater
of operations. U.S. Central Command issued further guidance requiring
RFID tags with intrusion-detection capabilities to be affixed to
containers carrying unit equipment along the Pakistani ground routes.
Some interrogators have been installed within Pakistan to obtain
electronic information from RFID tags as privately contracted trucks
transporting DOD cargo pass by. Officials told us that as a result of
these policies and procedures, the use of RFID tags and DOD's
visibility over cargo have increased significantly since early
operations began in Iraq. However, we have found that DOD's visibility
over surface movements of supplies and equipment into and around
Afghanistan remains limited, as is discussed below.
Several Challenges Hinder DOD's Ability to Distribute Supplies and
Equipment to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan:
Based on our preliminary observations, we note several challenges that
hinder DOD's ability to distribute needed supplies and equipment to
U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan. These challenges include:
* difficulties with transporting cargo through neighboring countries
and around Afghanistan;
* limited airfield infrastructure within Afghanistan;
* lack of full visibility over supply and equipment movements into and
around Afghanistan;
* limited storage capacity at logistics hubs in Afghanistan;
* difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and equipment in
Afghanistan;
* lack of coordination, as well as competing logistics priorities, in
a coalition environment; and:
* uncertain requirements and low transportation priority for
contractors.
DOD has ongoing or planned efforts to help mitigate some of these
challenges. In addition, DOD is working to address these challenges
through planning conferences to synchronize the flow of forces into
Afghanistan. While some of DOD's efforts will promptly improve its
ability to efficiently distribute supplies and equipment to U.S.
forces in Afghanistan, other efforts involve long-term plans that will
not be completed in time to support the ongoing troop increase that is
scheduled to occur by August 2010.
Transporting Cargo through Neighboring Countries and within
Afghanistan Poses Special Difficulties:
The supply routes through Pakistan, along the Northern Distribution
Network, and around Afghanistan each present unique difficulties in
transporting supplies and equipment. DOD's ability to support both
current operations and the ongoing troop increase in Afghanistan is
challenged by restrictions on the number of trucks allowed to cross
into Afghanistan daily. Because no U.S. military transportation units
operate in Pakistan, DOD must rely solely on private contractors to
transport supplies and equipment along ground routes through the
country and to provide security of the cargo while in transit.
Privately contracted trucks can transport cargo through Pakistan via
two routes: the northern, which crosses into Afghanistan at the border
town of Torkham, and the southern, which crosses at the border town of
Chaman. While Pakistan does not limit the number of trucks that cross
the border at Torkham, it does limit the number allowed to cross at
Chaman to 100 total per day. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and Surface
Deployment and Distribution Command officials told us that they
requested greater security at the Chaman border crossing after
insurgent attacks occurred near the border crossing in 2009. In
response, restrictions were placed on the number of trucks allowed to
cross per day at Chaman, which include trucks transporting cargo in
support of U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan. Officials added that
there is often a backlog of trucks waiting to cross at the Chaman
border because of the restrictions. As a result, these backlogged
trucks may sometimes be unable to deliver their cargo and subsequently
return to the port of Karachi to pick up additional supplies and
equipment in a timely manner. The U.S. government is currently
negotiating with the Pakistani government to increase the flow of
trucks through the Chaman border crossing.
The restrictions at the Chaman border crossing and the resulting
impact on the number of available trucks in Pakistan help contribute
to a regular backlog of cargo at the port of Karachi. According to
Army Central Command, nearly half of the cargo waiting to be picked up
at Karachi resides there for several weeks. Officials stated that unit
equipment arriving at Karachi often receives the highest
transportation priority. While unit equipment is essential for U.S.
forces to conduct their mission, sustainment items are also necessary,
as they enable forces to maintain and prolong their operations. If
sustainment and other types of cargo become backlogged at Karachi,
U.S. forces may not receive the supplies and equipment they need in a
timely manner to complete or sustain their mission. According to U.S.
Transportation Command, two methods for mitigating the effects of
backlogs at the port of Karachi are prioritizing cargo flow and
increasing the amount of supplies kept on hand in Afghanistan.
Limitations on what items can be transported through Pakistan and the
amount of damage sustained by cargo transiting through Pakistan also
can delay the delivery of necessary supplies and equipment to U.S.
forces in Afghanistan. Private trucking contractors do not transport
sensitive equipment on the Pakistani ground routes. Instead, such
equipment must be flown into Afghanistan and then be installed onto
the vehicles in Regional Command-East. Additionally, according to Army
Central Command, approximately 80 percent of cargo transiting through
Pakistan arrives in Afghanistan with some level of damage, which,
officials noted, can occur because of a number of factors, including
poor roads, rough terrain, extreme weather, or insurgent and other
individual attacks. For example, U.S. military vehicles may arrive
with missing or damaged engines, slashed fuel lines and empty fuel
tanks, broken mirrors or windows, and deflated tires, according to
Army officials. The additional time needed to repair equipment
arriving in Afghanistan further delays delivery to U.S. forces.
A small percentage of cargo transported along the Pakistani ground
routes is pilfered by insurgents and other individuals, but the exact
amount of pilferage is difficult to determine because of limitations
in the way it is reported.[Footnote 10]According to DOD officials,
approximately 1 percent of cargo transported on the Pakistani ground
routes is pilfered. While the percentage may be relatively small,
officials stated that it represents a significant loss of money to DOD
and a potential risk to the warfighter until replacements for the
pilfered items can be requisitioned and delivered. Because of the lack
of U.S. military transportation units operating in Pakistan, DOD
cannot immediately address pilferage when and where it occurs in
Pakistan. In cases where active RFID tags are damaged or removed when
the cargo is pilfered, officials stated that DOD can attempt to
determine the approximate area where the pilferage took place based on
the last RFID tag signal obtained by an interrogator inside Pakistan.
Additionally, some RFID tags have intrusion-detection capabilities
that provide information on when and where the cargo has been broken
into. With this information, DOD can negotiate with the private
trucking contractors to avoid transporting cargo through locations
inside Pakistan where equipment may be more susceptible to pilfering.
The Northern Distribution Network is an important alternative to the
surface routes through Pakistan, but several logistical and cargo
clearance challenges exist that could limit the amount of cargo
transported on its routes. For example, Northern Distribution Network
route transit times, on average, exceed the Pakistani surface route
transit times. Cargo transiting along the northern route takes
approximately 86 days to travel from the source of supply in the
United States or northern Europe to its destination in Afghanistan,
and the southern route takes approximately 92 days. Comparatively, it
takes only about 72 days to transport cargo along the Pakistani
surface routes. Additionally, DOD and its contractors must request and
obtain clearance before cargo can transit through Uzbekistan, a
process that should take 20 days to complete. This has been shortened
from 30 days to 20 days, and according to U.S. Transportation Command
officials, they are working to make this delay shorter. Given the long
lead times to deliver cargo and the 20-day notice needed to ship cargo
through Uzbekistan, DOD must plan well in advance to ensure that the
necessary supplies and equipment arrive in Afghanistan when they are
needed to support the warfighter. Furthermore, there are restrictions
on the types of cargo that can be transported through the countries
along the Northern Distribution Network. Specifically, only nonlethal
supplies and equipment can be shipped on the Northern Distribution
Network, and DOD primarily transports nonlethal sustainment supplies
on the route. These restrictions constrain DOD's ability to transport
certain classes of supply or types of equipment on the Northern
Distribution Network as an alternative to the more expensive airlift
or the limited capacity of the Pakistani surface routes.
Private trucking contractors operating under the Afghan Host Nation
Trucking Contract carry the majority of U.S. supplies and equipment
within Afghanistan, but officials told us that limitations on the
available number of contractors and reliable trucks may impede DOD's
ability to support the ongoing troop increase. Officials stated that
approximately 90 percent of cargo is transported within Afghanistan by
private contractors, and the remaining 10 percent by U.S. military
trucks. In addition to affecting the time it takes to transport cargo
to the warfighter, officials believe that limited contractor
availability affects the quality of service. Contractors in
Afghanistan may have little incentive to offer superior performance
when they can expect to continue receiving contracts because of the
high demand and limited supply of host nation trucking contractors.
Additionally, officials told us that some privately contracted trucks
may be unable to safely transport cargo because they are either in too
poor a condition to operate or do not have the capability to transport
the type or size of cargo. In cases where the contracted trucks are
unable to provide adequate transportation, DOD must find an
alternative method to deliver the cargo to its destination--for
example, by using a different private contractor or by transporting
the cargo on a U.S. military truck. Identifying an alternate mode of
transportation could delay the delivery of needed supplies and
equipment to U.S. forces. According to Army logistics officials in
Afghanistan, DOD is in the process of increasing the number of
contractors performing under the Afghan Host Nation Trucking Contract
operating in southern and western Afghanistan.
Attacks on cargo being transported through Pakistan and Afghanistan
can also hinder DOD's ability to provide supplies and equipment to
U.S. forces in Afghanistan. As noted above, DOD relies on private
contractors to transport all cargo through Pakistan and most of the
cargo transported through Afghanistan. There is no U.S. military-
provided security for the transport of the cargo; shipping contractors
provide their own security. Trucks moving along the ground routes
through Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as those stopped at
terminals and border crossings, can be targets for attack. For
example, for 2 consecutive days in March 2009, militants attacked two
truck terminals in Peshawar, Pakistan, damaging or destroying 31
vehicles and trailers. Our previous work found that DOD reported that
in June 2008 alone, 44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were lost
because of attacks or other events.[Footnote 11]
Limited Airfield Infrastructure within Afghanistan Constrains the
Movement of Supplies and Equipment:
Limited airfield infrastructure and capability within Afghanistan
constitutes one of the most difficult challenges DOD faces as it
deploys and sustains the increasing number of U.S. forces in the
country, according to numerous DOD officials we interviewed. DOD
airlifts into Afghanistan a significant amount of cargo, including
high-priority items as well as sensitive equipment that cannot be
transported through Pakistan or on the Northern Distribution Network.
However, the small number of airfields in Afghanistan and the limited
types of aircraft that can land at these airfields may constrain DOD's
ability to deliver certain supplies and equipment within expected time
frames. Bagram Airfield, Kandahar Airfield, and Bastion Airfield are
the three primary airfield hubs in Afghanistan capable of handling
large volumes of cargo and a variety of different types of aircraft.
Bagram and Kandahar have the capability to land large C-5 and C-17
aircraft as well as the smaller C-130 aircraft, while Bastion can land
C-17s and C-130s. DOD often relies on large aircraft, such as the C-
17, to fly supplies and equipment directly from the United States,
Kuwait, Qatar, and other major distribution points into Afghanistan,
but it is limited to the small number of airfields where these
aircraft can land. Instead of flying directly to a smaller airfield, a
large aircraft must first land at an airfield hub, where its cargo is
unloaded, reloaded onto a smaller aircraft, such as the C-130, and
then flown to the smaller airfield. This process takes considerably
more time than flying directly to the final destination and, as a
result, may delay the delivery of supplies and equipment to the
warfighter. Officials stated that the situation will likely grow more
challenging as the demand for cargo increases along with the
additional U.S. forces arriving in Afghanistan. According to U.S.
Transportation Command, there are projects under way or that have been
completed to expand airfield capacity in Afghanistan. For example,
officials at Kandahar Airfield are planning to build ramp space that
can park an additional two C-5 and eight C-130 aircraft. However,
other planned or ongoing projects to expand airfield capacity will not
be completed in time to support the ongoing troop increase, according
to Air Force officials.
Airfields also have only limited space available for aircraft to park
after landing, and sometimes reach capacity. For example, Bagram has
the capacity to park up to one C-5 equivalent and four C-17
equivalents at the same time. Additionally, officials stated that the
current number of aerial port workers and quantity of materiel-
handling equipment at the airfields in Afghanistan may be insufficient
to keep pace with the increased amounts of cargo being flown into the
country to support the ongoing troop increase. The number of aerial
port workers and quantity of materiel-handling equipment at the
airfield determine how quickly parked aircraft can be unloaded, have
their cargo processed, and be serviced and refueled in order to depart
the airfield and allow additional incoming aircraft to land. Ideally,
airfields would have the capability to unload, process, and service
and refuel all of the aircraft parked at the airfield at the same
time, but this is not always the case. For example, Bagram has the
capability to work on up to one C-5 equivalent and three C-17
equivalents at a time, even though it has capacity to park one
additional C-17. Consequently, aircraft that land and park at an
airfield with limited aerial port worker and materiel-handling
equipment availability may not have their cargo unloaded immediately
upon arrival, resulting in delayed delivery of the airlifted supplies
and equipment. Furthermore, aircraft waiting to be unloaded are unable
to depart the airfield and pick up cargo elsewhere, thus potentially
delaying the delivery of that cargo as well. According to DOD, it has
sent additional aerial port workers and materiel-handling equipment to
Bastion and Mazar-e-Sharif, and additional port workers have been
requested for Bagram, Farah, Shindand, and Kabul. However, we have not
been able to evaluate the impact on cargo processing and aircraft
servicing times at these locations.
Restrictions at airfields outside Afghanistan and competing demands
for available landing times in Afghanistan may also affect the
delivery of supplies and equipment to U.S. forces. Because of their
limited capability to park and unload aircraft, airfields must closely
manage the number of aircraft that land each day in order to avoid
exceeding capacity on the ground, and aircraft bound for Afghanistan
must ensure that they have available time and space to land at the
airfield prior to departing from their originating locations. In some
cases, aircraft may not be able to land in Afghanistan during an
available time because they are restricted from departing their
original locations. For example, officials stated that aircraft
departing from Ramstein Air Base in Germany cannot fly during certain
hours of the day because of host nation policy--even though, in order
to arrive at Bagram during certain available landing-time windows, it
would be necessary for aircraft to depart Ramstein during prohibited
flying hours. As a result, aircraft must postpone their departure from
Ramstein and coordinate another available landing time at Bagram that
can be reached by departing Ramstein during normal flying hours.
Consequently, delivery of an aircraft's cargo to the warfighter may be
delayed, and the aircraft is not being fully utilized while it
forfeits an available landing window and waits on the ground for a new
departure time. An additional difficulty is the competition for
available landing times in Afghanistan among U.S. and coalition
airlift, passenger and cargo airlift, and inter-and intra-theater
airlift. These numerous competing priorities cannot all be met
simultaneously, which may result in delaying the delivery of U.S. or
coalition cargo or personnel to Afghanistan. According to U.S. Central
Command, to mitigate the effects of competing priorities, DOD is
coordinating with coalition forces to establish a regional airspace
control management organization that will manage landing slot times at
airfields in Afghanistan.
Limited Visibility over Surface Movements of Materiel May Hinder DOD's
Ability to Efficiently Manage the Flow of Materiel:
DOD's visibility over surface movements of supplies and equipment into
and around Afghanistan is limited, and this limitation may hinder its
ability to effectively manage the flow of supplies and equipment into
the logistics hubs and forward operating bases. Although requirements
are in place and methods are being used to maintain some visibility
over the contractors and shipments while in transit, DOD lacks full
visibility over surface movements of cargo because of a lack of timely
and accurate information on the location and status of materiel and
transportation assets in transit. According to DOD policies,
components must ensure that all shipments moving to, from, or between
overseas locations, which would include shipping transit points and
theater, are tagged to provide global in-transit visibility. In-
transit visibility is provided using various methods, including active
RFID tags attached to cargo containers or pallets, satellite tracking
devices on trucks, and contractor reports.
While visibility has been more consistently maintained on cargo
transported via airlift, challenges remain with meeting requirements
for visibility of surface-moved cargo. Because there are no U.S.
military transportation units operating in the countries along the
surface routes to Afghanistan, DOD must rely solely on in-transit
visibility tools like RFID tags. However, these tools are not always
effective in providing adequate visibility. For example, visibility
over cargo being transported to Afghanistan along the Northern
Distribution Network is limited because agreements with some
countries, such as Russia and Uzbekistan, prevent the use of in-
transit visibility systems like RFID technology along the routes,
according to officials. Therefore, DOD must rely on reports provided
by the contracted carriers to track and obtain information about cargo
location. According to Central Command Deployment and Distribution
Operations Center officials, there are challenges with getting
carriers to submit accurate shipment reports in a timely manner. If
carriers do not submit their shipment data to DOD, or if there is a
delay in report receipt, DOD's visibility of cargo as it moves along
the Northern Distribution Network may be limited.
With regard to cargo transported through Pakistan, visibility exists
at the seaport of Karachi, where cargo is unloaded from ships and
loaded onto contractors' trucks for surface movement through Pakistan
and into Afghanistan. While satellite technology is used to track unit
equipment, RFID technology is used to maintain visibility over both
unit and sustainment cargo. However, visibility provided by RFID tags
becomes more sporadic once cargo moves out of the port and along the
ground routes. RFID interrogators throughout Pakistan can provide DOD
with the cargo's RFID data and location if a truck passes within range
of the interrogator. However, only a small number of these
interrogators are along the ground routes between the port of Karachi
and the borders with Afghanistan.[Footnote 12] Furthermore, since no
requirements exist regarding the routes that drivers must take to the
border crossings, a truck's route may not fall within range of an RFID
interrogator until it arrives at one of the border crossings into
Afghanistan. In addition, occasional errors in data downloaded onto
the tags may cause erroneous information about the cargo to be
reported to DOD. For example, data on a pallet's interim transit
location may be incorrectly recorded as its final destination on the
RFID tag. To mitigate these issues with electronic data tracking, DOD
uses contract personnel to provide reports about shipments in transit
through Pakistan. Contractors stationed at various points on the
Pakistani routes provide real-time locality information on trucks
transporting U.S. cargo that pass them. Officials reported that this
has helped DOD collect more accurate information about asset locations
and incidents along the routes. However, depending on the route taken,
drivers may not always pass contractors' stations, and information
about a truck and its cargo may not be available until the truck
arrives at the Afghan border crossing.
Visibility over shipments of supplies and equipment is also limited
within Afghanistan. Although policies are in place to maintain
visibility of materiel being transported, they have not been fully
implemented. DOD's ability to track cargo locations using RFID
technology is limited in Afghanistan because of a limited number of
interrogators. Officials stated that to increase visibility over cargo
transported within Afghanistan, all trucks that provide services under
the Afghan Host Nation Trucking Contract are required to use satellite-
based, location-tracking technology to track their movements over
ground routes. However, officials told us that most host nation truck
drivers in Afghanistan are deterred from using the required tracking
system by concerns that insurgents may be able to track their
locations and target their trucks. As a result, they disable the
technology while transporting cargo. Officials noted that the
percentage of truck drivers who comply with the requirement to use the
tracking technology has increased over time, and they expect it will
continue to rise as the drivers become more educated about the
contract requirement and the system's benefits.
The lack of visibility over supplies and equipment transiting into and
around Afghanistan causes inefficient management of the flow of
incoming trucks to logistics hubs and forward operating bases. This
may result in backlogs of trucks trying to access the bases and delays
in customer receipt of cargo. Without adequate visibility, the arrival
of trucks delivering cargo to bases cannot be effectively metered by
DOD or contractors, resulting in long wait times at base entry control
points. Because of space constraints, only a certain number of trucks
can be allowed on a base at a time. If the available space is filled
with incoming trucks, trucks awaiting entry onto the base must wait
outside the base until space is available for them to enter. Officials
stated that backlogs at Kandahar have resulted in drivers waiting up
to 20 days to access the base. Even when a truck accesses the base,
the lack of visibility over materiel being transported may continue to
cause delays in the delivery of supplies and equipment. Because of
minimal visibility over cargo location, customers awaiting delivery of
a shipment may not be aware that their cargo has arrived at a base,
which may cause delays in pickup of the cargo. At the logistics hub in
Kandahar, if the customer is unable to retrieve the cargo in a timely
manner--usually within hours--the driver must exit the base and repeat
the entry process until there is room to unload cargo and the customer
is available to receive it.
Storage Capacity at Logistics Hubs in Afghanistan Is Limited and
Sometimes Not Sufficient to Manage the Movement of Supplies and
Equipment:
Storage capacity at the primary logistics hubs is limited, and at
times it is insufficient to manage the volume of inbound and outbound
supplies and equipment moving into and around Afghanistan. While some
mitigation plans are being implemented or are already in place to
alleviate challenges with storage capacity and improve the flow of
cargo, officials anticipate that there may be an ongoing lack of
storage capacity as the number of troops deployed to Afghanistan and
operations tempo continue to increase. For example, the confined
operating space within the storage area at Bagram Airfield slows down
the speed at which cargo can be processed. According to officials,
outbound cargo storage yards at the base were temporarily shut down
approximately 20 times for about 24 hours each time during periods of
high operations tempo in the past year, because they could not receive
outbound cargo until existing cargo was shipped out. Additionally,
officials noted that cargo storage space at the Bagram logistics hub
has decreased because of competing needs of expanding operations--for
example, there is a need for more mail storage, and more airlift
operations have required additional parking for aircraft. The limited
storage space must further be shared among multiple coalition forces
at some logistics hubs, creating competition for storage capacity and
materiel-handling equipment. For example, at Kandahar, officials
estimated that multiple coalition nations, such as the United States,
Germany, and Great Britain, are sharing approximately 2 acres of
storage space for cargo transitioning into and out of the base via
air, causing some strain at times. Much of the unused surface area at
Kandahar is uncleared terrain, making it unfeasible for storing cargo.
Additionally, officials said that many units lack the appropriate
materiel-handling equipment needed to move and store pallets and
containers in and around the unfinished surfaces of Kandahar. These
officials reported that as a result, they must share equipment, such
as all-terrain forklifts, with other units and contractors, thereby
further diminishing timely materiel-handling capability. Consequently,
the limited availability of storage space, infrastructure, and
materiel-handling equipment at the logistics hubs may hinder DOD's
ability to manage the flow of supplies and equipment associated with
the ongoing troop increase.
DOD is developing plans to expand storage capacity at logistics hubs
in order to better manage the flow of incoming supplies and equipment
and to efficiently distribute cargo to support the warfighter.
However, these plans will not be completed in time to support the
ongoing troop increase because of the logistical challenges of base
expansion. Officials told us that there are many time-consuming steps
in the expansion process: they must determine the owners of the land
around the base, acquire the neighboring real estate, clear away mines
in the surrounding areas, and obtain the supplies needed to complete
the expansion. While DOD has begun to implement plans to mitigate
challenges, officials stated that there are no "perfect solutions" to
recurrent storage problems at the supply hubs. They anticipate that
storage issues will continue, and significant improvement may not be
realized as troops continue to deploy to Afghanistan and military
operations continue to expand. For example, at Bagram, aerial port
personnel have built structures that enable them to double-stack
pallets of incoming cargo, and they have stored their flatbed trucks
on the flight line in order to make more room for storing supplies and
equipment in the cargo receiving and shipping yards. However,
officials told us that storage capacity for both inbound and outbound
cargo in Bagram's storage yards remains limited. At Kandahar,
officials said there are plans to establish a logistics base adjacent
to the main base. In the first phase of the base's two-phase
development, U.S. forces will use interim storage yards for incoming
cargo containers and vehicles, and a transshipment yard for U.S. cargo
flowing through Kandahar on its way to another forward operating base.
At the transshipment yard, truck drivers will unload cargo so it can
be readied for movement to its final destination, thus eliminating the
in-gating and customer pickup process at Kandahar, which can take many
days. According to officials, phase one of the logistics base
development is scheduled to be operational in April 2010, and the
construction of the entire forward operating base is scheduled for
completion in summer 2010. Officials stated that this expansion will
help alleviate storage issues at Kandahar, allowing the United States
to better prioritize cargo shipments and improve DOD's ability to
quickly issue supplies and equipment to the warfighter. These
officials noted, however, that the logistics base will not yet be
fully operational during the height of the troop increase.
DOD Has Experienced Difficulties in Synchronizing the Arrival of Units
and Equipment in Afghanistan:
DOD experienced difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and
their equipment in Afghanistan during the previous troop increase in
2009, and the synchronization of units and equipment will likely
continue to be a challenge during the ongoing troop increase. Units
arriving in Afghanistan typically receive the equipment they need to
perform their mission from three primary sources: unit-owned
equipment, such as individual weaponry that is either brought with
them or shipped separately from their home stations; theater-provided
equipment, such as retrograde equipment from Iraq; and new production
equipment, such as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain
Vehicle. DOD's complex task is to synchronize the arrival of units
with the availability of their equipment, regardless of the source, to
enable them to perform their mission as quickly as possible. However,
according to Joint Sustainment Command-Afghanistan, the 2009 troop
increase resulted in significant backlogs of equipment transported on
the Pakistani surface routes and by airlift, leaving some units in
southern Afghanistan waiting for as long as several months to receive
the theater-provided equipment necessary to conduct their mission. As
of December 2009, no unit deployed to southern Afghanistan during the
troop increase in the spring and summer of 2009 had yet received all
of the theater-provided equipment it was suppose to be issued.
Additionally, officials stated that DOD underestimated the amount of
time required to install vehicles with sensitive items and ensure that
they received necessary maintenance prior to their being delivered to
the warfighter. As a result, some U.S. forces arrived at their forward
operating base or combat outpost without the vehicles necessary to
perform their mission.
Given the numerous challenges we have identified in delivering
supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, we believe that
DOD will likely face the same difficulties in synchronizing the
arrival of units and equipment during the ongoing troop increase. For
example, one unit deployed in Afghanistan reported in a January 2010
readiness report that it did not receive all of its equipment from its
home station and had to perform an upcoming mission despite not having
all military equipment available. Another reported that it lacked
mission-essential equipment, such as bomb-disabling robots that were
vital to protect soldiers from improvised explosive devices they
encountered while conducting their mission. Another unit reported that
it had arrived in theater in December 2009 and was still awaiting
provision of theater-provided equipment as of January 2010. While DOD
has taken steps to improve the synchronization of units and their
equipment during the ongoing troop increase, at the time of our
review, these steps were just being implemented and we were therefore
unable to evaluate their effectiveness.
Lack of Coordination and Competing Logistics Priorities in a Coalition
Environment May Delay the Delivery of Supplies and Equipment to U.S.
Forces in Afghanistan:
At bases throughout Afghanistan, a lack of centralized coordination
coupled with different and competing demands and priorities between
U.S. and coalition forces may delay the delivery of supplies and
equipment to U.S. forces. Additionally, limited processing and cargo-
receiving capabilities may delay the delivery of supplies and
equipment to U.S. forces. As aircraft carrying supplies and equipment
land at coalition airfields, or host nation trucks arrive at entry
control points with shipments for multiple coalition forces, logistics
personnel at those locations have a limited ability to manage and
prioritize the flow of all troops' cargo. Specifically, officials at
Kandahar told us that they had waited for days to receive shipments of
priority materiel that were waiting outside the base to be processed
for entry onto the base, along with other coalition forces' cargo,
because the coalition commander of Kandahar would not allow the U.S.
forces' cargo to be prioritized to enter first at the control point.
However, the officials noted that the planned construction of a U.S.
logistics base adjacent to the existing coalition-run base will
improve DOD's ability to manage and prioritize the flow of supplies
and equipment and store cargo at Kandahar.
In addition, coalition forces compete for limited amounts of materiel-
handing equipment and storage facilities. Officials stated that when
materiel-handling equipment, such as forklifts, is unavailable or
unserviceable, coalition forces have to share what limited equipment
is available to conduct supply operations. Because units sometimes
have to wait to use the available materiel-handling equipment, supply
delivery to U.S. troops may be delayed. Officials did note that
efforts to share space have improved over the past year, indicating
that coalition forces are better coordinating their operations to
fulfill the mission in Afghanistan. However, there is the potential
for a future increase in the number of coalition forces in
Afghanistan, which could exacerbate the challenges we have identified.
Uncertain Requirements and Low Transportation Priority for Contractors
Create Additional Challenges:
DOD's reliance on contractors to support its operations in Afghanistan
creates additional challenges with regard to the distribution of
supplies and equipment, as well as movement of contractor personnel.
Contractors have become an indispensable part of the force, performing
a variety of functions in Afghanistan, such as communication services,
provision of interpreters who accompany military patrols, base
operations support (e.g., food and housing), weapons systems
maintenance, and intelligence analysis. DOD estimated that about
104,000 contractor personnel were supporting operations in Afghanistan
as of September 2009. Further, DOD anticipates that this number will
grow as it increases troop presence in Afghanistan. As we have
previously reported, troop increases typically include increases in
contractor personnel to provide support.[Footnote 13]
These contractors in Afghanistan rely on the same distribution routes
and methods as do the military forces to deliver the supplies and
equipment they need to perform their mission and sustain their
operations. However, DOD's ability to manage the flow of materiel for
contractors and military personnel into logistics hubs and forward
operating bases, and balance the use of limited transportation assets
and storage capacity between contractors and military personnel, may
be hampered by its lack of good information on the number of current
contractors and lack of good planning for the coming increase in both
contractors and their requirements. These requirements include
contractor access to materiel-handling equipment and storage space for
the supplies and equipment contractors need to perform their mission
as well as for life support, such as housing and food. Since 2003, we
have reported that DOD lacked reliable data on the number of
contractor personnel providing services in environments such as
Afghanistan, and our work has found that DOD's current system for
collecting data on contractor personnel in Afghanistan does not
provide accurate data.[Footnote 14] Further, during our December 2009
trip to Afghanistan, we found that there was only limited planning
being done with regard to contracts or contractors. Specifically, we
found that with the exception of planning for the increased use of the
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan had not
begun to consider the full range of contractor services that might be
needed to support the planned increase of U.S. forces.[Footnote 15]
More importantly, the command appeared to be unaware of its
responsibility to determine contracted support requirements or develop
the contract management and support plans required by guidance.
[Footnote 16] However, we did find some planning being done by U.S.
military officials at Regional Command-East. According to planners
from Regional Command-East, the command had identified the types of
units that were deploying to its operational area in Afghanistan and
was coordinating with similar units already in Afghanistan to
determine what types of contract support the units relied on.
Nonetheless, without a complete picture of the number of contractors
in Afghanistan and their materiel requirements, DOD may not be in a
position to effectively manage the flow of military and contractor
cargo to ensure that all materiel is delivered to the right locations
at the right time to enable both military units and contractors to
perform their missions.
Another challenge with regard to contractors is the timely movement of
their people and supplies around Afghanistan. When traveling around
Afghanistan, contractor personnel and their equipment are given a low
priority for air transportation as compared with military personnel
and materiel, and that prioritization can affect the contractors'
ability to perform their contracts. Contractor personnel have
difficulty obtaining military airlift within Afghanistan, and they
spend lengthy amounts of time in passenger terminals hoping to catch
the first available flight. For example, according to contractor
personnel we spoke with, they fly military airlift at the lowest
priority for seats on flights. A letter from a military commander is
needed in order to fly with a higher priority--and obtaining one takes
considerable time and effort. According to these contractor personnel,
the time they spend waiting in passenger terminals can cost the U.S.
government both in money paid and lost productivity. Officials from
several contractors told us that they factor additional personnel into
their workforce structures because of the difficulties in getting
people to and from their work sites. The difficulty in moving
contractor personnel and equipment may be compounded when the troop
increase begins. While some efforts are under way to improve key
infrastructure, such as passenger terminals, it may still take time to
complete these projects. Currently, the passenger terminals in key
airlift hubs such as Kandahar and Bagram are very small, and
passengers may experience long wait times between their arrival in the
terminal and boarding their flights. Without a rapid expansion of
these facilities, it is likely that this overcrowding will be
compounded by the troop increase. During our visit we spoke with
multiple people, including military and contractor personnel, who had
waited anywhere from a few days to a week to board a flight.
DOD Planning Efforts Include Consideration of These Distribution
Challenges:
In addition to the efforts described above to mitigate each of the
challenges we have identified, DOD is also working to address them
through planning conferences intended to synchronize the flow of
forces into Afghanistan. For example, in December 2009 and January
2010, U.S. Central Command sponsored two conferences to (1) identify
units and equipment available to deploy in support of the troop
increase; (2) address ways in which distribution challenges could be
overcome in order to deploy the troops and their required supplies and
equipment by August 31, 2010; and (3) plan for the simultaneous
drawdown of forces and equipment from Iraq. Officials from key
organizations across DOD, including U.S. Transportation Command, U.S.
Forces-Afghanistan, U.S. Forces-Iraq, and Army Central Command,
attended both conferences. Throughout both conferences, DOD officials
stressed the need to balance and closely coordinate multiple
requirements in order to sustain current operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq, draw down forces and equipment from Iraq, and increase forces
and equipment in Afghanistan.
Despite the challenges we have identified in this testimony, DOD has
plans in place to deliver the troops, supplies, and equipment to
Afghanistan when required. However, at the January 2010 planning
conference, DOD officials acknowledged that there is a high level of
risk involved in executing the plans for supporting the ongoing troop
increase, but they assume that improvements to the distribution
process will be made that address the challenges we have identified.
DOD's transportation feasibility analysis indicated that it will be
possible to execute both the ongoing troop increase in Afghanistan and
the drawdown from Iraq within the planned time frames, but this
analysis assumes that several distribution efficiencies will be
achieved.
Concluding Observations:
Because of the unique challenges of Afghanistan, the movement of
supplies and equipment in support of operations there is likely to be
one of the most complex logistics operations the U.S. military has
undergone in recent history. The challenges are daunting, and the
transportation system is heavily strained in maintaining current
operations. Now, with the addition of 30,000 more U.S. troops on the
horizon, coupled with an increase in contractors and a potential
increase in coalition forces, these challenges will only be magnified,
and a system that is struggling to keep pace with current operations
could be further strained. It will, therefore, be critical for DOD to
develop adequate contingency plans to mitigate the effects of these
and other unforeseen challenges, and to react quickly to overcome
significant problems as they occur. Failure to effectively manage the
flow of materiel could delay combat units' receipt of the critical
items they need to perform their mission, and costly backlogs of cargo
could accumulate throughout the supply system, risking loss of
accountability and control over billions of dollars in assets. We
expect to report more fully on these and other issues at a later date.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information about this statement, please contact William
M. Solis at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions
to this statement include Cary Russell, Assistant Director; Vincent
Balloon; John Bumgarner; Carole Coffey; Melissa Hermes; Lisa McMillen;
Geoffrey Peck; Bethann Ritter; Michael Shaughnessy; Sarah Simon;
Angela Watson; Cheryl Weissman; Stephen Woods; and Delia Zee.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and
Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and
Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-380T]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2009).
[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics
(July 18, 2008).
[3] Twenty-foot-equivalent units are a standard unit of measurement
for cargo capacity. One 20-foot--equivalent unit equals a standard
container measuring approximately 20 feet long and 8 feet wide.
[4] A short ton is equivalent to 2,000 pounds.
[5] GAO, Defense Logistics: DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply
Distribution Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain
These Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-775]
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2005).
[6] For additional information on the joint deployment distribution
operations centers within other geographic combatant commands, see
GAO, Defense Logistics: Efforts to Improve Distribution and Supply
Support for Joint Military Operations Could Benefit from a Coordinated
Management Approach, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-807] (Washington, D.C.: June 29,
2007).
[7] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-275] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8,
2005).
[8] RFID technology is used on containers and major pieces of
equipment for tracking shipments and their contents while they are in
transit over long distances. Active RFID tags have transmitters that
transmit information through radio signals that are read
electronically. In addition, the tags hold relatively large amounts of
data, so they are capable of storing detailed manifest and
transportation data.
[9] GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the
Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-305R] (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003).
[10] There is a process whereby units can report pilfered cargo using
a form; however, officials told us that units do not always file a
formal report because of the level of effort involved. Sometimes units
will informally report pilferage to Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command by phone or e-mail, and sometimes pilferage may
go unreported. As a result, officials told us that they calculate the
percentage of cargo pilfered using both formal and informal reports,
which may not account for all pilferage because not all incidents are
reported.
[11] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Increase Attention on Fuel
Demand Management at Forward-Deployed Locations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-300] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.20,
2009).
[12] Most interrogators in Pakistan are located either at the port of
Karachi or along the border with Afghanistan.
[13] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive
Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and
Oversight, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-572T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008).
[14] GAO, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to
Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-695] (Washington, D.C.:
June 24, 2003) and Defense Acquisitions: Further Actions Needed to
Address Weaknesses in DOD's Management of Professional and Management
Support Contracts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-39]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2009).
[15] The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, commonly referred to as
LOGCAP, provides worldwide logistics and base and life support
services in contingency environments such as Afghanistan.
[16] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-10, Operational
Contract Support (Oct. 17, 2008).
[End of section]
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