Defense Management
U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation Gao ID: GAO-10-801 July 28, 2010U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has been cited as having mature interagency processes and coordinating mechanisms. As evidenced by the earthquakes that shook Haiti in January 2010, the challenges that SOUTHCOM faces require coordinated efforts from U.S. government agencies, international partners, and nongovernmental and private organizations. This report (1) assesses the extent that SOUTHCOM exhibits key attributes that enhance and sustain collaboration with interagency and other stakeholders and (2) evaluates SOUTHCOM's approach for developing an organizational structure that facilitates interagency collaboration and positions the command to conduct a full range of missions. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed SOUTHCOM documents, conducted interviews with the command and a number of its partners, and visited three U.S. embassies in the Caribbean and Central and South America.
SOUTHCOM demonstrates a number of key practices that enhance and sustain collaboration with interagency and other stakeholders toward achieving security and stability in the region. SOUTHCOM coordinated with interagency partners to develop mutually reinforcing strategies, including its 2009 Theater Campaign Plan and its 2020 Command Strategy. In addition, SOUTHCOM focuses on leveraging the capabilities of various partners, including interagency and international partners, and nongovernmental and private organizations. For example, at SOUTHCOM's Joint Interagency Task Force South, resources are leveraged from the Department of Defense, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and partner nations to disrupt illicit trafficking activities. During humanitarian assistance activities, SOUTHCOM has leveraged regional knowledge and activity expertise with nongovernmental and private organizations. Further, SOUTHCOM has established several means to enhance and sustain collaboration between the command and its partners. For example, SOUTHCOM has established a Partnering Directorate that provides full-time outreach, coordination, and support to interagency and other stakeholders. Moreover, information is frequently shared with partners through databases, conferences, and the sharing of lessons learned. Underlying these key practices is sustained leadership, which has been a key enabler for enhancing and sustaining collaboration with partners. While SOUTHCOM developed an organizational structure designed to facilitate interagency collaboration, the scale of the Haiti earthquake disaster challenged the command's ability to support the relief effort. In 2008, SOUTHCOM developed an organizational structure to facilitate collaboration with interagency and other stakeholders, which included a civilian deputy to the commander, interagency representatives embedded in key leadership positions, and a directorate focused on sustaining partnerships. However, SOUTHCOM's support to the disaster relief efforts in Haiti revealed weaknesses in this structure that initially hindered its efforts to conduct a large scale military operation. Specifically, the structure lacked a division to address planning for operations occurring over 30 days to 1 year in duration. In addition, the command's logistics function was suboptimized and had difficulty providing supply and engineering support to the relief effort. Moreover, SOUTHCOM had not identified the personnel augmentation required for a large contingency nor had it developed a plan to integrate personnel into its existing structure. To address these weaknesses, the commander returned SOUTHCOM to a traditional joint staff structure, while retaining elements from the 2008 reorganization. Combatant commands need to be organized and manned to meet their daily mission requirements and be prepared to respond to a wide range of contingencies, including large scale disaster relief operations. Ensuring better alignment of its organizational structure and manpower to its identified mission requirements, and the development of personnel augmentation plans may enhance SOUTHCOM's ability to conduct the full range of missions that may be required in the region. GAO recommends that SOUTHCOM (1) revise its Organization and Functions Manual to align structure and manpower to meet approved missions; and (2) identify personnel augmentation requirements for a range of contingency operations, develop plans to obtain personnel, and exercise and assess these plans. DOD concurred with our recommendations and stated it is addressing these issues as quickly as possible.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: John H. Pendleton Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (404) 679-1816GAO-10-801, Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2010:
Defense Management:
U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its
Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large
Military Operation:
GAO-10-801:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-801, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has been cited as having mature
interagency processes and coordinating mechanisms. As evidenced by the
earthquakes that shook Haiti in January 2010, the challenges that
SOUTHCOM faces require coordinated efforts from U.S. government
agencies, international partners, and nongovernmental and private
organizations. This report (1) assesses the extent that SOUTHCOM
exhibits key attributes that enhance and sustain collaboration with
interagency and other stakeholders and (2) evaluates SOUTHCOM‘s
approach for developing an organizational structure that facilitates
interagency collaboration and positions the command to conduct a full
range of missions. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed SOUTHCOM
documents, conducted interviews with the command and a number of its
partners, and visited three U.S. embassies in the Caribbean and
Central and South America.
What GAO Found:
SOUTHCOM demonstrates a number of key practices that enhance and
sustain collaboration with interagency and other stakeholders toward
achieving security and stability in the region. SOUTHCOM coordinated
with interagency partners to develop mutually reinforcing strategies,
including its 2009 Theater Campaign Plan and its 2020 Command
Strategy. In addition, SOUTHCOM focuses on leveraging the capabilities
of various partners, including interagency and international partners,
and nongovernmental and private organizations. For example, at SOUTHCOM‘
s Joint Interagency Task Force South, resources are leveraged from the
Department of Defense, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies,
and partner nations to disrupt illicit trafficking activities. During
humanitarian assistance activities, SOUTHCOM has leveraged regional
knowledge and activity expertise with nongovernmental and private
organizations. Further, SOUTHCOM has established several means to
enhance and sustain collaboration between the command and its
partners. For example, SOUTHCOM has established a Partnering
Directorate that provides full-time outreach, coordination, and
support to interagency and other stakeholders. Moreover, information
is frequently shared with partners through databases, conferences, and
the sharing of lessons learned. Underlying these key practices is
sustained leadership, which has been a key enabler for enhancing and
sustaining collaboration with partners.
While SOUTHCOM developed an organizational structure designed to
facilitate interagency collaboration, the scale of the Haiti
earthquake disaster challenged the command‘s ability to support the
relief effort. In 2008, SOUTHCOM developed an organizational structure
to facilitate collaboration with interagency and other stakeholders,
which included a civilian deputy to the commander, interagency
representatives embedded in key leadership positions, and a
directorate focused on sustaining partnerships. However, SOUTHCOM‘s
support to the disaster relief efforts in Haiti revealed weaknesses in
this structure that initially hindered its efforts to conduct a large
scale military operation. Specifically, the structure lacked a
division to address planning for operations occurring over 30 days to
1 year in duration. In addition, the command‘s logistics function was
suboptimized and had difficulty providing supply and engineering
support to the relief effort. Moreover, SOUTHCOM had not identified
the personnel augmentation required for a large contingency nor had it
developed a plan to integrate personnel into its existing structure.
To address these weaknesses, the commander returned SOUTHCOM to a
traditional joint staff structure, while retaining elements from the
2008 reorganization. Combatant commands need to be organized and
manned to meet their daily mission requirements and be prepared to
respond to a wide range of contingencies, including large scale
disaster relief operations. Ensuring better alignment of its
organizational structure and manpower to its identified mission
requirements, and the development of personnel augmentation plans may
enhance SOUTHCOM‘s ability to conduct the full range of missions that
may be required in the region.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that SOUTHCOM (1) revise its Organization and Functions
Manual to align structure and manpower to meet approved missions; and
(2) identify personnel augmentation requirements for a range of
contingency operations, develop plans to obtain personnel, and
exercise and assess these plans. DOD concurred with our
recommendations and stated it is addressing these issues as quickly as
possible.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-801] or key
components. For more information, contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-
3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
SOUTHCOM Demonstrates Practices That Enhance and Sustain Collaboration:
SOUTHCOM Developed a Command Organizational Structure Designed to
Facilitate Interagency Collaboration, but the Haiti Relief Effort
Challenged the Command:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Joint Interagency Task Force South:
Appendix II: Continuing Promise:
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Reported Number of Full-Time Interagency Partner
Representatives Embedded at SOUTHCOM as of July 2010:
Table 2: Continuing Promise Mission Deployment Dates, Countries
Visited and Reported Patients Treated:
Table 3: Nongovernmental Organizations Involved in the 2009 Continuing
Promise Mission:
Table 4: Agencies Interviewed During our Review:
Figures:
Figure 1: Locations of SOUTHCOM and Its Command Components:
Figure 2: SOUTHCOM Received Inputs from Several Partners during
Development of the 2009 Theater Campaign Plan:
Figure 3: JIATF South and Interagency Participation during the
Disruption of Illicit Trafficking Activities:
Figure 4: USNS Comfort during the Continuing Promise Mission.
Figure 5: SOUTHCOM's Organizational Structure after 2008
Transformation:
Figure 6: Reported Buildup of Military Forces Supporting Relief
Efforts in Haiti as Part of Operation Unified Response:
Figure 7: SOUTHCOM's Organizational Structure Adopted during Operation
Unified Response:
Figure 8: JIATF South Interdiction Targets:
Figure 9: Locations Visited by USNS Comfort during Continuing Promise
2009:
Figure 10: USNS Comfort Activities during Continuing Promise 2009:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
SOUTHCOM: U.S. Southern Command:
JIATF South: Joint Interagency Task Force South:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 28, 2010:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) operates in the Americas and the
Caribbean, areas primarily affected by challenges such as corruption,
crime, transnational terrorism, natural disasters, and poverty that
impact the security and stability of the region.[Footnote 1] As
evidenced by the devastating earthquakes that shook Haiti in January
2010, these threats require coordinated efforts from U.S. government
agencies, international partners, and nongovernmental and private
organizations, often with the U.S. military in a supporting role. In
recent years, in an effort to better support security and stability in
the region, SOUTHCOM has sought to evolve to become a more interagency-
oriented command, recognizing that many of the challenges it faces
cross role and mission lines of various U.S. government agencies. In
2008, SOUTHCOM was reorganized in part to focus on collaboration with
interagency and other stakeholders and, by 2009, observers were citing
the command as having mature interagency planning processes and
coordinating mechanisms.[Footnote 2]
SOUTHCOM's evolution reflects a growing recognition of the limits of
traditional military power and the need to adjust the military's
approach. Challenges to national security have expanded significantly
from the state-based threats of the Cold War era to include
unconventional, diffuse, and ambiguous threats from nonstate actors
that arise from multiple sources. The interrelated nature of these
threats makes it difficult, if not impossible, for any one agency to
effectively address them alone.[Footnote 3] As the Department of
Defense (DOD) further develops the military capability and capacity to
address these challenges, it must develop the institutional capability
and flexibility to respond alongside interdepartmental,
nongovernmental and international partners, effectively leveraging
existing resources in a resource constrained environment. DOD's
geographic combatant commands, like SOUTHCOM, will need to play
pivotal roles in this effort since they engage in the day-to-day
missions of building partner nation military capabilities as well as
conducting humanitarian assistance projects in various countries, and
are responsible for conducting large military operations, such as
peacekeeping efforts, noncombatant evacuation operations, and support
to international disaster relief efforts.
To assist in Congress's continuing oversight of interagency
collaboration issues, this report assesses SOUTHCOM's efforts to
enhance and sustain collaboration with interagency and other
stakeholders and evaluates its approach for developing an
organizational structure that facilitates interagency collaboration
and positions the command to conduct a full range of missions.
To conduct our work, we obtained and reviewed a wide range of DOD,
SOUTHCOM, and interagency partner documents to include strategies,
plans, policies, directives, after-action assessments, and other
documentation detailing interagency collaboration at the geographic
combatant command level. In addition, we interviewed officials at many
agencies including DOD, the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the Department of Homeland Security, and
the Department of Justice to gain their perspectives on SOUTHCOM's
collaborative efforts. To assess SOUTHCOM's efforts to collaborate
with interagency and other stakeholders, we identified best practices
to enhance and sustain collaboration with interagency and other
stakeholders in prior GAO reports;[Footnote 4] and to determine the
extent that SOUTHCOM demonstrated these practices, we interviewed DOD
officials; interviewed SOUTHCOM and embedded interagency partner
officials at SOUTHCOM's headquarters in Miami, Florida in June 2009;
and interviewed officials from a number of SOUTHCOM's interagency
partners in Washington, D.C. to gain their perspectives on SOUTHCOM's
efforts. We also interviewed officials at SOUTHCOM's Joint Interagency
Task Force South (JIATF South) in Key West, Florida in August 2009;
observed a humanitarian and civic assistance mission--the 2009
Continuing Promise--in Nicaragua in July 2009; and attended mission
planning sessions in Jacksonville, Florida, in October 2009 and Panama
City, Panama, in December 2009, during which we interviewed U.S.
government, international partner, and nongovernmental organization
officials.[Footnote 5] We also visited U.S. embassies in Panama,
Colombia, and the Dominican Republic in December of 2009, interviewing
U.S. government and international partner nation officials to obtain
their views on SOUTHCOM's collaborative efforts. To evaluate
SOUTHCOM's efforts to develop an organizational structure that
facilitates interagency collaboration and positions the command to
conduct a full range of missions, we identified DOD's guidance for the
organization of a combatant command as outlined in DOD joint
publications, instructions and other documents, and analyzed
SOUTHCOM's strategic documents, policies, guidance, and directives
outlining the command's mission, organizational structure, and staff
functions. We interviewed SOUTHCOM and interagency partner officials
from the command's existing organizational structure in Miami,
Florida, in June 2009 and reviewed and analyzed documentation
regarding SOUTHCOM's 2008 organizational structure changes. We also
conducted follow-up meetings with SOUTHCOM officials in Miami, Florida
in April 2010 to obtain information on the effectiveness of the
command's organizational structure in supporting international
disaster relief efforts following the January 2010 earthquake in
Haiti. More details about our scope and methodology are included in
appendix III.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 through July 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
To perform its military missions around the world, DOD operates
geographic combatant commands that conduct activities within assigned
areas of responsibility.[Footnote 6] SOUTHCOM, based in Miami,
Florida, has an area of responsibility encompassing the land mass of
Latin America south of Mexico, including 31 countries and 10
territories, and the waters adjacent to Central and South America, the
Caribbean Sea, and portions of both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
[Footnote 7] SOUTHCOM headquarters is comprised of about 800 military
and civilian personnel representing the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, Coast Guard, and several DOD agencies. The military services
provide SOUTHCOM with component commands which, along with its special
operations component, three joint task forces,[Footnote 8] three
forward operating locations,[Footnote 9] and 24 security cooperation
offices[Footnote 10] perform SOUTHCOM missions and security
cooperation activities throughout its area of responsibility. Figure 1
shows the locations of SOUTHCOM and its command components.
Figure 1: Locations of SOUTHCOM and Its Command Components:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of SOUTHCOM]
The following locations are depicted on the map:
U.S. Southern Command: Miami, Florid:
800 DOD personnel.
U.S. Air Forces Southern: Tuscon, Arizona:
384 DOD personnel.
U.S. Army South: San Antonio, Texas:
795 DOD personnel.
U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command: Mayport, Florida:
152 DOD personnel.
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South: Miami, Florida:
67 DOD personnel.
U.S. Special Operations Command South: Homestead, Florida:
152 DOD personnel.
Joint Interagency Task Force South: Key West, Florida:
512 DOD personnel.
Joint Task Force Bravo: Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras:
628 DOD personnel.
Joint Task Force Guantanamo: U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba:
1,726 DOD personnel.
SOUTHCOM Forward Operating Location: Comalapa, El Salvador.
SOUTHCOM Forward Operating Locations: Aruba; Curacao, Netherlands
Antilles.
Source: SOUTHCOM, Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Primarily as a result of the commander's assessment of the regional
security environment--which indicated growing challenges such as narco-
trafficking and other illicit trafficking activities, organized crime,
and gangs, exacerbated by conditions of poverty, income inequality,
and social exclusion--in October 2006, at the direction of SOUTHCOM's
combatant commander, plans were drafted for reorganization of the
command into a more interagency-oriented organization. These
challenges were viewed by SOUTHCOM as transnational and crossing roles
and mission lines of various U.S. government departments and agencies.
A new organizational structure was designed that, according to
SOUTHCOM, would allow the command to collaborate proactively with U.S.
government agencies and partner nations in the region, and improve
collective responses to regional and transnational security
challenges. In September 2007, the Secretary of Defense authorized
[Footnote 11] SOUTHCOM's reorganization to a more interagency-oriented
organization and in October 2007, the reorganization was added to the
list of DOD's top 25 transformation priorities.[Footnote 12]
SOUTHCOM's new organizational structure was provisionally adopted in
May 2008 and fully implemented in October 2008. U.S. Africa Command,
which became fully operational in 2008, is another geographical
combatant command that is working toward a more interagency-oriented
focus.[Footnote 13]
SOUTHCOM Demonstrates Practices That Enhance and Sustain Collaboration:
SOUTHCOM demonstrates a number of key practices that enhance and
sustain collaboration with interagency and other stakeholders toward
achieving security and stability in the region. These practices
include: establishing mutually reinforcing strategies with partners,
leveraging capabilities, and establishing means to operate across
multiple agencies and organizations. For example, the command has
defined and established a directorate to develop compatible policies
and procedures that facilitate collaboration across agencies and
organizations, and put in place mechanisms to share information with
interagency and other stakeholders regularly and frequently.
Underlying these practices has been leadership, which has been a key
enabler for enhancing and sustaining collaboration with partners.
SOUTHCOM Has Worked with Interagency Partners to Develop Mutually
Reinforcing Strategies:
SOUTHCOM coordinated with interagency partners to develop mutually
reinforcing strategies including its 2009 Theater Campaign Plan and
its 2020 Command Strategy, and provided inputs to State Department's
regional strategic plans. Based on our prior work, developing mutually
reinforcing strategies helps align activities, core processes, and
resources to achieve common outcomes. SOUTHCOM's efforts to develop
mutually reinforcing strategies have helped to align resources and
activities of SOUTHCOM and federal agencies to achieve broad U.S.
objectives and helped to ensure there was no duplication of efforts.
SOUTHCOM coordinated the development of its 2009 Theater Campaign
Plan, which lays out the command's theater priorities and guides its
resource allocations, with over 10 U.S. government departments,
agencies, and offices, to include the Departments of State, Homeland
Security, Justice, the Treasury, Commerce, and Transportation, and the
Office of Director of National Intelligence. Figure 2 provides the
complete list of departments, agencies, and offices involved in
developing the 2009 Theater Campaign Plan. DOD's 2008 Guidance for
Employment of the Force required both SOUTHCOM and U.S. Africa
Command, as prototype test cases, to seek broader involvement from
other departments in drafting their theater campaign and contingency
plans. To meet this requirement, SOUTHCOM held a series of meetings
with interagency officials that focused on involving and gathering
inputs from interagency partners for its Theater Campaign Plan.
According to both SOUTHCOM and interagency partners, this coordination
has helped SOUTHCOM understand the diverse missions of its interagency
partners and better align activities and resources in the region.
During these meetings, SOUTHCOM was able to identify resources to
leverage by identifying which partners were best positioned to have
the greatest effect on a specific objective and by identifying
specific programs, activities, and operations that other interagency
partners engage in that include similar objectives. As a result of
this effort, SOUTHCOM's 2009 Theater Campaign Plan includes 30 theater
objectives, of which 22 are led by interagency partners with SOUTHCOM
in a support role.
Figure 2: SOUTHCOM Received Inputs from Several Partners during
Development of the 2009 Theater Campaign Plan:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
2009 Theater Campaign Plan: Input received from:
* Department of Commerce;
* Department of Energy;
* Department of Homeland Security;
* Department of Justice;
* Department of State;
* Department of Transportation;
* Department of the Treasury;
* Environmental Protection Agency;
* Office of Director of National Intelligence;
* U.S. Agency for International Development.
Source: Joint Operational War Plans Division, Joint Staff.
[End of figure]
In addition to the Theater Campaign Plan, SOUTHCOM is coordinating
with interagency partners on its command strategy and provides inputs
to Department of State's strategic plans. For SOUTHCOM's 2020 Command
Strategy, which is currently in development, the command conducted a 3-
day conference to gather inputs from interagency partners. During this
conference, SOUTHCOM provided an overview of the strategy, and
gathered perspectives on SOUTHCOM's assessment of challenges in the
region and the command's strategic objectives. SOUTHCOM also provides
inputs to Department of State's Mission Strategic and Resource Plans
through its security cooperation offices located in U.S. embassies
within its area of responsibility.[Footnote 14] For example, the
security cooperation office in Colombia represents SOUTHCOM's
interests during the drafting of the Department of State's Mission
Strategic and Resource Plan for Colombia. According to both SOUTHCOM
and interagency partners we spoke with, this coordination has helped
ensure that SOUTHCOM and interagency partner strategic goals were
mutually reinforcing and has helped align activities and resources in
achieving broad U.S. objectives. Specifically, SOUTHCOM's goals to
provide tactical, operational, and strategic support to Colombia's
counter-narcotics efforts align with the Department of State's goals
to provide counter narcotics training and technical assistance,
ensuring unity of effort.
SOUTHCOM Leverages the Capabilities of Various Partners to Address
Needs:
SOUTHCOM focuses on leveraging the capabilities of various partners,
including interagency partners, international partners, and
nongovernmental and private organizations to address challenges in the
region. Our prior work has shown that organizations can obtain
additional benefits by identifying and addressing needs by leveraging
the resources and capacities of collaborating organizations that would
not be available if the organizations were working separately.
Specifically for SOUTHCOM, the command engages with partners to
leverage capabilities such as personnel and assets, differing legal
authorities, differing jurisdictions, and regional and activity
expertise from partners to achieve missions.
SOUTHCOM's JIATF South Leverages Personnel, Assets, Intelligence, and
Authorities to Support the Disruption of Illicit Trafficking:
JIATF South, a national task force under the command and control of
SOUTHCOM, has the primary mission of detection, monitoring, and
interdiction support to disrupt illicit trafficking[Footnote 15] and
narco-terrorist activities that threaten the United States and
international partner nations within its operating area. To achieve
its goals, JIATF South leverages the resources and capabilities of
U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and international
partner nations, to include personnel, assets, authorities, and
intelligence. JIATF South recognizes that the disruption of illicit
trafficking activities could not be successful without the involvement
of interagency and other stakeholders, and every target that the
national task force pursues requires a high level of interagency
collaboration. According to JIATF South officials, it has taken the
national task force over 20 years to achieve the level of interagency
integration and synchronization that now exists to conduct
international drug disruption operations.[Footnote 16] The disruption
of illicit trafficking activities (shown in figure 3) requires
different capabilities possessed by individual partners to accomplish
the mission. These include: (1) sharing of intelligence information
among U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and
international partner nations to cue illicit trafficking events; (2)
detection and sorting of the traffickers using DOD, U.S. Coast Guard,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection and international partner nation
assets; (3) monitoring of the event and achieving localized domain
awareness through a combination of intelligence and maritime and
aerial assets; (4) assignment of operational capabilities from DOD,
U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Drug Enforcement
Administration, and international partner nations to intercept the
traffickers; and (5) support to interdiction and jurisdiction by
leveraging law enforcement authorities, capabilities, and
international agreements. While DOD has the responsibility for
detection and monitoring of air and sea illegal drug activity into the
United States, it must rely on interagency and international partners
to provide the authority and jurisdiction to interdict illicit
trafficking activities, unless otherwise authorized or permitted by
law. See appendix I for a further description of JIATF South.
Figure 3: JIATF South and Interagency Participation during the
Disruption of Illicit Trafficking Activities:
[Refer to PDF for image: 5 photographs with descriptive text]
Intelligence:
Information is received at JIATF South about an illicit trafficking
event.
Detection:
At JIATF South the information is verified and the target is
prioritized based on the accuracy of information received, the level
of confidence of the location of the target, and the proximity of
assets to intercept the target.
Monitoring:
JIATF South continues to monitor the target through intelligence, and
maritime and aerial assets.
Interception:
Maritime and aerial assets from agencies such as U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, and DOD vessels with U.S. Coast
Guard Law Enforcement Detachments on board or international partner
nation assets are assigned to intercept the target.
Interdiction:
The interdictions–boarding, search and seizures, and arrests–are led
and conducted by U.S. law enforcement agencies, U.S. Coast Guard, or
U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments onboard DOD vessels, or
international partner nation assets, with the appropriate authority
and jurisdiction.
Source: GAO analysis of JIATF South information.
[End of figure]
The collaboration at JIATF South between DOD, interagency partners,
and international partners provides benefits that complement each
other. JIATF South identifies needs for capabilities, authorities, and
jurisdiction, and which agencies with complementary missions can
provide the necessary assistance. For example, while JIATF South's
mission is to detect and monitor illicit trafficking, the U.S. Coast
Guard's mission includes conducting maritime law enforcement, and each
agency's unique authority, jurisdiction, and expertise can compliment
each other in achieving a shared mission, such as countering illicit
trafficking. However, JIATF South still faces challenges to leveraging
resources because JIATF South, interagency partners, and international
partners have differing missions, priorities, and cultures. For
example, while one of the primary objectives of the Drug Enforcement
Administration is the disruption and dismantling of drug trafficking
organizations, it may have cases where the agency would prefer to
allow a target suspected of carrying illegal drugs to be unhindered
but monitored in transit, in order to gain more information about a
drug organization as a whole, while JIATF South would have a higher
priority in removing the flow of drugs toward the United States.
JIATF South has been able to overcome collaboration challenges because
it emphasizes mutual benefits by leveraging of resources--every
participating organization gains in the process. Moreover, the
national task force has a focused mission that requires interagency
collaboration to be successful. According to a Drug Enforcement
Administration official, JIATF South provides significant support to
its organization in conducting its mission and it is valuable to have
an agent at the task force to coordinate efforts. JIATF South
officials, including interagency partners, told us that being part of
JIATF South provides mutual benefits. For example, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation provides JIATF South with information from its
sources and in return, the bureau receives information to support its
cases and access to tracking capabilities. In addition, according to
embedded interagency officials at JIATF South, the use of formal
memoranda of understanding at the national task force is unnecessary
because the benefits derived from the collaboration provides a strong
incentive to maintain continued participation and the lack of
memoranda of understanding provides flexibility within operations,
which is preferred by most embedded interagency officials.
SOUTHCOM Leverages Regional Knowledge and Activity Expertise with
Interagency and Other Stakeholders during Humanitarian Assistance
Activities:
By working side-by-side with interagency partners, nongovernmental
organizations, private organizations, and international partners
during humanitarian assistance activities, SOUTHCOM is able to learn
from these partners given their knowledge of the regions and expertise
on activities that may be beneficial to address challenges in the
region. These organizations share common interests with SOUTHCOM in
humanitarian assistance and can expand the command's capacity to
enhance security and stability in the region. For example, interagency
partners and nongovernmental organizations can provide resources to
sustain projects that SOUTHCOM initiates or provide follow-up care
after health-related humanitarian assistance missions. In one case,
SOUTHCOM built a school in Nicaragua, thus accomplishing its training
mission, and an international nongovernmental organization provided
books and desks in order to make the school sustainable, furthering
the overall mission. In addition, the nongovernmental and private
organizations' missions and goals can be furthered by coordination
with the command, making the interactions mutually beneficial. For
example, Project Hope, an international nongovernmental organization,
furthers its goal to provide humanitarian assistance and health-
related education by having a role in SOUTHCOM's humanitarian and
civic assistance missions.
SOUTHCOM integrates interagency and other stakeholders with compatible
goals and complementary capabilities into its humanitarian assistance
activities, allowing all participants to achieve their goals. A
primary example of this integration is the Continuing Promise mission,
a humanitarian and civic assistance operation to train U.S. military
and international partner forces' medical personnel and civil
construction engineers, while providing services to communities in the
region. Figure 4 displays the USNS Comfort during the 2009 Continuing
Promise mission.
* During the 2009 mission, interagency partners, nongovernmental
organizations, and international partners provided donations of goods
for the mission, volunteered during the mission deployment, and filled
vital medical capacities for the mission. U.S. Public Health Service
officers filled 49 critical medical, engineering and environmental
health positions, while nongovernmental organizations filled 97 vital
medical positions that could not be filled by the military for the
2009 mission. According to SOUTHCOM, with the addition of
nongovernmental medical personnel, the command increased its ability
to provide medical services by a reported 25 percent more primary care
patient treatments, 50 percent more surgical procedures, 33 percent
more optometry and eyeglasses services, and 25 percent more outpatient
care.
* For the 2010 Continuing Promise mission, interagency and other
stakeholders provided expertise during planning conferences on various
aspects of the mission. For example, during the first planning
conference for the 2010 Continuing Promise mission, when DOD officials
expressed difficulties in finding adequate translators during
deployment site visits, one nongovernmental organization offered to
organize translators with local language capabilities at each site,
filling an essential gap. In addition, SOUTHCOM and its components met
with international partner nations to coordinate access to potential
sites for on-ground clinics and gather their feedback on the public
health needs of the potential site areas. See appendix II for more
details on the Continuing Promise mission.
Figure 4: USNS Comfort during the Continuing Promise Mission.
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: SOUTHCOM.
[End of figure]
SOUTHCOM Has Established Several Means to Collaborate with Diverse
Agencies and Organizations:
SOUTHCOM has established several means--including developing a
directorate to facilitate collaboration with partners and sharing
information frequently with partners through databases, conferences,
and sharing lessons learned--to enhance collaboration between the
command and its partners. Our prior work has shown that the means to
operate across multiple agencies and organizations--such as compatible
policies and procedures that facilitate collaboration across agencies
and mechanisms to share information frequently--enhances and sustains
collaboration among federal agencies.[Footnote 17]
Partnering Directorate Provides Outreach, Coordination, and Support to
Interagency and Other Stakeholders:
SOUTHCOM has established a Partnering Directorate within the command,
with 16 authorized staff, that provides full-time outreach,
coordination, and support to its interagency partners, international
partners, nongovernmental organizations, and private organizations.
This directorate provides the means for partners to interface with the
command and its components, and is responsible for integrating
partners into exercises and operations. For example, an agency or
nongovernmental organization interacts with the Partnering Directorate
to become a part of the Continuing Promise mission. According to
SOUTHCOM officials, the Partnering Directorate focuses on developing
relationships that are mutually beneficial to the command and the
interagency and other stakeholders, determines the extent of existing
coordination, and possible areas of enhanced collaboration.
The Partnering Directorate provides the means to work between SOUTHCOM
and interagency partners through its Integration Division and between
SOUTHCOM and nongovernmental and private organizations through its
Private-Public Cooperation Division. The Integration Division
incorporates interagency partners into SOUTHCOM's planning,
operations, and exercises, and has the role of embedding interagency
representatives into the command. SOUTHCOM officials and interagency
officials told us that there are several benefits to embedding
interagency representatives such as increased communication and a
better understanding of each agency's missions, roles, and
responsibilities. As of July 2010, SOUTHCOM reported having 20
embedded interagency officials as shown in table 1. Decisions to embed
interagency representatives are done on a case-by-case basis, with
most agencies sending a short term representative to SOUTHCOM to
discuss needs, roles, and responsibilities and to assess whether a
full-time detail would be mutually beneficial. Agencies that we spoke
with, including U.S. Agency for International Development and the
Department of State, told us that having embedded representatives at
SOUTHCOM increases the communication between the agencies and helps
inform the agencies of each others' plans and activities. For some
interagency partners, embedding a representative at SOUTHCOM may not
always be the best option for facilitating collaboration since many
agencies have limited personnel and resources. SOUTHCOM and
interagency partners may create other means to collaborate effectively
based on these agencies' individual requirements and resources. For
example, while a Department of the Treasury official decided not to
embed a full-time official at the command after a short term detail,
the agency and SOUTHCOM decided that providing a local representative
with access to the command and establishing a memorandum of
understanding would improve communication and coordination.
Table 1: Reported Number of Full-Time Interagency Partner
Representatives Embedded at SOUTHCOM Headquarters as of July 2010:
Interagency partners with SOUTHCOM-embedded representatives:
Department of State:
Number representatives embedded: 5;
U.S. Agency for International Development:
Number representatives embedded: 3;
Department of Homeland Security:
Number representatives embedded: 5;
Department of Justice:
Number representatives embedded: 4;
Office of the Director of National Intelligence:
Number representatives embedded: 3;
Total:
Number representatives embedded: 20.
Source: SOUTHCOM.
[End of table]
The Partnering Directorate's Public-Private Cooperation Division
provides a way for SOUTHCOM to engage with the public and private
sectors. For example, according to SOUTHCOM, Food for the Poor, the
largest nongovernmental organization working in Latin America, reached
out to SOUTHCOM to collaborate on humanitarian assistance activities.
The Public-Private Cooperation Division serves as a coordinating unit
between nongovernmental and private organizations, with the Division
providing information to organizations on activities and conferences,
and connecting the organizations with SOUTHCOM's components for
activities. Since the establishment of the Public-Private Cooperation
Division in the Partnering Directorate, nongovernmental and private
organization participation has increased in some activities. For
example, in the 2007 Continuing Promise mission there were three
nongovernmental organizations participating, but the 2009 mission had
over twenty nongovernmental organizations participating. Private
organizations also share their expertise and perspectives through the
Public-Private Cooperation Division. For example, the Business
Executives for National Security, a nonpartisan organization through
which senior business executives aim to enhance the region's security,
shared their perspectives in March 2009 on how SOUTHCOM could better
plan for activities that address security challenges in the region.
While SOUTHCOM has created the means to interact with nongovernmental
and private organizations and these interactions have increased, the
command also recognizes that barriers exist to working with these
organizations. These barriers can be at the strategic level, where
nongovernmental and private organizations may have differing
perspectives on why and how assistance should be provided in the
region. These differences can range from the varying terminology used
to describe missions to the concern that nongovernmental and private
organizations are not understood or fully appreciated. In addition,
DOD's lack of fully developed policy and procedure for partnering with
these organizations can increase these differences. For example,
unclear understandings of nongovernmental and private organization
roles when working with DOD may exist during the execution of the
different types of missions. Having identified this as a potential
issue, SOUTHCOM is in the process of developing two handbooks that
will guide these interactions and provide guidance on how SOUTHCOM can
better interact with nongovernmental and private organizations. One
handbook, which is currently in draft and expected to be completed by
September 2010, will be provided to SOUTHCOM's components and the
other handbook, which is also in draft and expected to be completed by
September 2010, will be provided to nongovernmental and private
organizations that participate in SOUTHCOM activities.
Information Is Frequently Shared with Partners through Databases,
Conferences, and Sharing Lessons Learned:
SOUTHCOM also provides mechanisms for stakeholders to access and share
information. Based on our prior work, the frequent sharing of
information among partners enhances and sustains collaborative
efforts, and is a crucial tool for maintaining national security.
Specifically, the use of compatible databases to provide information
among partners is a means that facilitates working across agency
boundaries. SOUTHCOM utilizes the Theater Security Cooperation
Management Information System, which is an internet-based program that
provides an integrated map of activities that are occurring across the
region, providing a mechanism to coordinate activities. SOUTHCOM has
given access to the system to interagency partners, including
Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and
Department of Justice, to encourage them to input their own activities
and to increase their awareness of SOUTHCOM activities. For example,
during our review of the system, we observed that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation had entered its own activities into the system. In
addition, SOUTHCOM created an automated tool in 2008 to use during
exercises and operations, such as humanitarian assistance and civic
assistance missions, to vet classified and unclassified information
within short periods of time to be able to share the information with
nongovernmental organizations and international partners.[Footnote 18]
This tool increases the command's ability to share intelligence
information properly and quickly with partners, improving the
collaboration to achieve shared goals.
By sharing information routinely with its interagency partners,
international partners, and nongovernmental organizations, SOUTHCOM is
building and maintaining relationships that are important in
accomplishing shared missions. According to interagency officials
embedded in SOUTHCOM, SOUTHCOM's constant sharing of information
builds a culture of trust and transparency and helps the command and
partners understand and overcome cultural differences in their
agencies. For example, SOUTHCOM incorporates embedded interagency
partner representatives into regular meetings at the command, and
provides the agency representatives an opportunity to discuss what
their agencies are doing in the region. More specifically, during
weekly senior management meetings, intelligence agency and law
enforcement representatives may share information on cases that are
being conducted in the region and discuss potential areas for
collaboration.
While interagency partner representatives embedded in the command and
those on temporary assignment to the command maintain routine
communication with SOUTHCOM, the command also maintains communication
with other federal government agencies in close proximity to SOUTHCOM
by granting them access to its facilities, allowing other government
officials to gain some of the benefits of having a presence at the
command without committing staff on a full-time basis. For example,
the local Miami Border Patrol is provided identification badges which
allow access into SOUTHCOM's headquarters building, although these
personnel are located at another site. The command also embeds
international liaisons from eight countries within the command, which
facilitates the sharing of information to integrate planning efforts
and coordinate exercises in the region.[Footnote 19]
Another mechanism SOUTHCOM uses to share information with interagency
partners, international partners, and nongovernmental organizations,
is hosting conferences with partners in which perspectives from many
agencies, international partners, and nongovernmental organizations
are discussed and incorporated appropriately. For example, in 2009
SOUTHCOM coordinated with the Department of State to host a conference
on migrant camps, and invited relevant nongovernmental organizations
to the conference. SOUTHCOM's components also host conferences to
share information. For example, SOUTHCOM's JIATF South sponsors a
semiannual counter narcoterrorism conference and invites interagency
partners, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, and U.S. embassy officials from the Americas
and Caribbean.
Finally, SOUTHCOM shares information by consistently collecting and
sharing lessons learned at the command level and for the activities
conducted. SOUTHCOM solicits and collects lessons learned from DOD and
from interagency partners, international partners, and nongovernmental
and private organizations involved in activities. For example, during
the Continuing Promise mission, lessons learned were collected from
DOD participants, interagency and international partners, and
nongovernmental organization participants. The lessons learned that
are collected are shared at SOUTHCOM, including its components, and
with its partners and then used to implement changes in future
missions. For example, lessons learned from the prior Continuing
Promise missions were shared with participants and appropriate changes
were considered during the planning phase for the 2010 mission.
Specifically, participants in the 2009 Continuing Promise mission
identified, as a lesson learned, that early host nation participation
was critical in the initial planning of the deployment. This lesson
learned was incorporated into the 2010 planning of the Continuing
Promise mission when U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command decided to
hold planning meetings with countries involved in the 2010 mission
prior to site selection.
Leadership and Strategic Communication Essential in Furthering Key
Practices:
Underlying these key practices is sustained leadership, which has been
a key enabler for enhancing and sustaining collaboration with
partners. Our prior work has shown that committed and sustained
leadership by those involved in collaborative efforts from all levels
of the organization is needed to overcome the many barriers to working
across agency boundaries.[Footnote 20] SOUTHCOM's leadership has
focused on building relationships of trust, open dialogue, and
transparency with partners. According to interagency partners we spoke
with, leadership at SOUTHCOM has been important in building
relationships among agencies. While SOUTHCOM has encountered some
resistance to its collaboration efforts, it has overcome much of this
resistance by building relationships, providing information on the
command's activities, and discussing the overall benefits of the
interactions for the region.
SOUTHCOM's leadership also focuses on strategic communication to
emphasize its role in supporting interagency, international, and
nongovernmental and private organization partners in the region.
Leadership at SOUTHCOM has set the tone for a culture that is more
collaborative in nature, and has communicated this throughout the
command and to key interagency and other stakeholders. This strategic
communication includes a mission and vision that incorporate
interagency collaboration, and strategic goals that emphasize unity of
mission with other partners. Furthermore, SOUTHCOM has focused on
strategic communication to emphasize that its main role is defense and
that it has a supporting role in diplomacy and development in the
region. The command has also utilized various social media to
communicate its actions including a Facebook page, YouTube page, and
Twitter feed. Moreover, SOUTHCOM often communicates that relationships
must be mutually beneficial and interagency participation in SOUTHCOM-
led activities must be relevant for other stakeholders involved.
Underscoring all of this is the command's continued focus on
maintaining relationships with partners to address challenges in the
region.
SOUTHCOM Developed a Command Organizational Structure Designed to
Facilitate Interagency Collaboration, but the Haiti Relief Effort
Challenged the Command:
While SOUTHCOM developed a command organizational structure designed
to facilitate interagency collaboration, the scale of the Haiti
earthquake disaster challenged the command's ability to support the
relief effort. Combatant commands need to be organized and manned to
meet their daily mission requirements[Footnote 21] and be prepared to
respond to a wide range of contingencies, including large-scale
disaster relief operations. However, SOUTHCOM's nontraditional
combatant command structure created difficulties in responding to the
crisis and in augmenting military personnel during its initial
response.
SOUTHCOM's Command Structure Reorganized in 2008 to Facilitate
Collaboration:
As part of the 2008 reorganization, SOUTHCOM developed a directorate
organizational structure to facilitate collaboration with interagency
and other stakeholders, which included a civilian deputy to the
commander, interagency representatives embedded directly into key
senior leadership positions, and a directorate, the Partnering
Directorate, focused on improving and sustaining partnerships.
According to a DOD directive and Joint Staff publications, combatant
commanders are given the authority and latitude to establish the staff
organization they deem necessary to carry out assigned missions,
duties and responsibilities.[Footnote 22] Once the command has defined
its missions, tasks and functions, as assigned by higher authority, it
then develops an Organization and Functions Manual, which documents
the organizational structure and serves as the basis for determining
the manpower requirements necessary to carry out these missions.
According to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction, the
requirements are to be stated in terms of the minimum manning required
to accomplish approved missions, and should be based on the average
workload of the command expected for at least the next 3 years.
Temporary changes in workload and short duration missions should be
supported through solutions such as personnel augmentation.[Footnote
23] According to DOD's Unified Command Plan, SOUTHCOM is responsible
for planning and conducting a wide range of missions and contingency
operations, such as disaster relief operations as directed.[Footnote
24]
SOUTHCOM's reorganization was focused on addressing its daily mission
requirements, which included addressing challenges that impacted the
security and stability in the region and required interagency
solutions. In order to support interagency solutions, SOUTHCOM
developed an organizational structure that transitioned the command
out of the traditional joint staff organizational structure[Footnote
25] to a staff structure with three mission directorates and three
functional directorates. The three mission directorates--Security and
Intelligence, Stability, and Partnering--each focused on achieving one
of the hemispheric goals included within SOUTHCOM's Command Strategy
2016.[Footnote 26] Three enabling or functional directorates were also
created: Policy and Strategy, Resources and Assessments, and
Enterprise Support (see figure 5). Under this organizational
structure, SOUTHCOM split and merged various aspects of the
traditional joint staff organizational structure to fit into the six
directorates. For example, intelligence and operations, traditionally
separate directorates, were combined and incorporated under the new
Security and Intelligence Directorate. Moreover, the new Stability
Directorate combined several aspects from the traditional joint staff
organizational structure to be under one directorate, to include parts
of intelligence, operations, planning, as well as training and
readiness. According to SOUTHCOM, the creation of this directorate
organization structure improved their ability to work with interagency
and other stakeholders to address challenges in the region.
Figure 5: SOUTHCOM's Organizational Structure after 2008
Transformation:
[Refer to PDF for image: Organizational chart]
Top level:
Commander;
- Command action Group.
Second level, reporting to Commander:
Military Deputy Commander;
Civilian Deputy to the Commander.
Third level, reporting to Commander:
Chief of Staff;
- Standing Joint Force Headquarters.
Fourth level, reporting to Chief of Staff:
Policy and Strategy Directorate;
Resources and Assessment;
Security and Intelligence Directorate;
Stability Directorate;
Enterprise Directorate;
Partnering Directorate.
Source: SOUTHCOM.
[End of figure]
In addition, SOUTHCOM added elements to its organizational structure
that furthered the command's ability to collaborate with interagency
and other stakeholders. The organizational structure SOUTHCOM
developed included two deputies to the commander--a military deputy
commander as well as a civilian deputy to the commander. The military
deputy commander is able to exercise military command authorities when
required, with duties to include serving as acting commander whenever
necessary, overseeing the development of contingency plans, and
engaging the Joint Staff, the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and the U.S. Coast Guard, as required. The civilian deputy to
the commander--a senior foreign service officer with the rank of
Minister Counselor from Department of State--advises the Commander on
a range of foreign policy issues and also serves as primary liaison
with the Department of State and all U.S. Chiefs of Mission and
embassy personnel in the region.[Footnote 27] The civilian deputy to
the commander's duties include overseeing the development of the
command's regional strategy and furthering interagency and public-
private sector engagement. Several interagency partner representatives
were also embedded directly into key senior leadership positions
within the organizational structure, serving dual roles--one for
SOUTHCOM and one for their parent agency. For example, the Partnering
Directorate included two senior interagency partner representatives--a
Department of State Senior Foreign Service Officer and a U.S. Agency
for International Development Senior Development Advisor--serving in
command leadership positions. The Department of State Senior Foreign
Service Officer serves as a midlevel foreign policy advisor, while
filling the dual role as deputy of the Partnering Directorate.
[Footnote 28] The U.S. Agency for International Development Senior
Development Advisor, who advises the command during interactions with
the U.S. Agency for International Development and ensures SOUTHCOM's
activities are consistent with the U.S. Agency for International
Development's developmental goals, also serves as Director of Regional
Issues division in the Partnering Directorate.[Footnote 29] In this
role, he examines the regional issues that may undermine stability and
security, such as rule of law, environment and energy, finance and
trade, infrastructure and social issues. He manages a staff of both
civilian and military personnel.
Further, as described earlier, SOUTHCOM also created a Partnering
Directorate focused on improving partnership opportunities with other
U.S. government agencies, non-governmental and private organizations,
and international partners in an effort to foster "whole of
government" solutions to challenges in the region. According to
SOUTHCOM officials, the concept for the Partnering Directorate was
modeled on the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, first formed in
2002 to enhance interagency coordination and unity of effort in the
war on terrorism.[Footnote 30] In 2006, the existing combatant
commander expanded on the Joint Interagency Coordination Group,
creating specific divisions for interagency coordination and public-
private partnership. These two divisions were combined, along with the
command elements handling development, into the Partnering Directorate
as part of the 2008 reorganization of SOUTHCOM.
Several other combatant commands have also developed organizational
models designed to improve interagency collaboration. For example,
U.S. Northern Command uses a traditional joint staff organizational
structure on a day-to-day basis that includes an interagency
coordination directorate the command established to facilitate and
focus on building effective, durable, and lasting relationships
between the command and federal (DOD and non-DOD), state, local,
tribal, nongovernmental, commercial and private sector, and
international governments, departments, organizations, and agencies.
U.S. Africa Command, DOD's newest geographic combatant command, is
organized in a directorate structure similar to SOUTHCOM, with seven
directorates that combine complementary functions of a traditional
staff organization, with structural modifications to accommodate
interagency partners. U.S. Africa Command's seven directorates
include: Resources; Operations and Logistics; Joint Force Development
and Readiness; Strategy, Plans and Programs; Intelligence and
Knowledge Development; Outreach; and Command, Control, Communications,
and Computer Systems.
SOUTHCOM's Disaster Relief Efforts in Haiti Revealed Weaknesses in Its
Organizational Structure and the Lack of Augmentation Planning:
While SOUTHCOM and its interagency partners told us that this
organizational structure improved the command's ability to work with
partners in the region, SOUTHCOM's support to the disaster relief
efforts in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti, named Operation
Unified Response, revealed weaknesses in the command's organizational
structure and a lack of augmentation planning that initially hindered
its efforts.[Footnote 31] Operation Unified Response, according to
SOUTHCOM officials, was the largest disaster relief effort DOD has
ever conducted, far larger than was anticipated or planned for by
SOUTHCOM, requiring 24-hour, 7-days-per-week operations. Figure 6
shows the buildup of military forces supporting international disaster
relief efforts in Haiti as part of Operation Unified Response, which
SOUTHCOM reported peaked at more than 20,000 personnel.
Figure 6: Reported Buildup of Military Forces Supporting Relief
Efforts in Haiti as Part of Operation Unified Response:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Date: January 16;
Number of personnel: 5,040.
Date: January 17;
Number of personnel: 6,038.
Date: January 18;
Number of personnel: 11,706.
Date: January 19;
Number of personnel: 11,524.
Date: January 20;
Number of personnel: 12,963.
Date: January 21;
Number of personnel: 13,101.
Date: January 22;
Number of personnel: 13,656.
Date: January 23;
Number of personnel: 18,163.
Date: January 24;
Number of personnel: 17,850.
Date: January 25;
Number of personnel: 18,346.
Date: January 26;
Number of personnel: 18,325.
Date: January 27;
Number of personnel: 19,732.
Date: January 28;
Number of personnel: 20,934.
Date: January 29;
Number of personnel: 20,413.
Date: January 30;
Number of personnel: 20,320.
Date: January 31;
Number of personnel: 20,448.
Source: SOUTHCOM.
[End of figure]
When the earthquake struck Haiti, SOUTHCOM's directorate
organizational structure had been untested in a major crisis and the
command was not fully prepared to carry out a large scale military
operation, such as Operation Unified Response. SOUTHCOM was organized
and manned to meet its day-to-day missions, such as building partner
nation military capabilities and conducting humanitarian assistance
projects to address challenges in the region. While a combatant
command should be organized and manned to meet its daily mission
requirements, it must also be prepared to respond to a wide range of
contingencies identified in DOD's Unified Command Plan, including
disaster relief operations, when directed by higher authority.
However, SOUTHCOM's directorate organizational structure had
weaknesses that hindered its initial response to the Haiti earthquake.
Specifically, the command structure lacked a division to address
planning for future operations, which, according to SOUTHCOM
officials, is necessary to establish proper planning cycles and
divisions of labor, and to develop the necessary guiding documents for
operations occurring over 30 days to one year in duration.[Footnote
32] Moreover, SOUTHCOM had suboptimized some core functions that were
necessary to respond to large scale contingencies. For example,
SOUTHCOM's logistics function was suboptimized because it was placed
under Enterprise Support in the organizational structure rather than
being its own core function. As a result, the command had difficulty
planning for the magnitude of logistics support required during the
Haiti relief effort including supply, maintenance, deployment
distribution, health support, engineering, logistics services, and
contract support. Further, the command had difficulty communicating
with its components, joint task forces, and security cooperation
offices in theater because the command's organizational structure was
organized into mission and functional directorates, while its
components, such as Joint Task Force Haiti, were organized in
traditional joint staff directorate structures.[Footnote 33]
In addition, SOUTHCOM had not developed an augmentation plan for
military personnel for a large contingency such as Operation Unified
Response. To support short duration missions and contingencies, a
combatant command is responsible for identifying and validating the
personnel augmentation required and submitting these requirements to
its military service component commands to fill.[Footnote 34] Further,
we believe the command should exercise and assess these types of
augmentation plans in order to be fully prepared to meet their
assigned missions. Given the extent of the earthquake disaster, the
command did not have the military personnel to support the relief
effort. According to SOUTHCOM officials, the command was staffed at
about 85 percent of its authorized staffing level of 960 military and
civilian personnel, and did not have the necessary personnel depth to
support a large scale military operation. While augmentation was
required, the command had not identified the military personnel
augmentation requirements necessary for a large contingency and had
not developed a plan to integrate military augmentee personnel into
the existing directorate structure. In addition, the augmenting
military personnel were not familiar with SOUTHCOM's directorate
structure and did not initially understand where they could best be
utilized because many of the traditional joint staff functions were
divided among SOUTHCOM's directorates. Ultimately, SOUTHCOM received
over 500 augmentees to provide additional capability to its existing
command staff of approximately 800 personnel, including an entire
staff office from U.S. Northern Command, filling vital gaps in
SOUTHCOM's ability to support operations in Haiti. However, according
to SOUTHCOM officials, the command was able to integrate interagency
and international partners into the relief efforts without difficulty
because the Partnering Directorate had already established
relationships with the partners. Specifically, 40 augmentees from
seven agencies and four international organizations were integrated
into the planning and operations of the command.
As a result of these challenges, SOUTHCOM's combatant commander made a
decision within the first week of the Haiti disaster to return the
command to a traditional joint staff organizational structure to
address the weaknesses. SOUTHCOM's revised organizational structure is
shown in figure 7. This organizational structure provided the command
with the capabilities to better conduct Operation Unified Response by
establishing the future operations division, elevating various
functions such as logistics, and improving communications between the
command and its DOD stakeholders. However, the command has retained
some elements from the 2008 reorganization that enhance interagency
collaboration. For example, the Partnering Directorate, the position
of civilian deputy to the commander, and the interagency partner
representatives serving dual roles have been retained. According to
SOUTHCOM officials, the command plans to remain in this traditional
joint staff structure for the foreseeable future and has received
approval from the Secretary of Defense. However, some SOUTHCOM
officials expressed concerns the command was directing its manpower
resources toward a contingency-based organizational structure, the
skill sets of which would only be utilized every 4 to 5 years when
responding to a major crisis such as Operation Unified Response.
Officials further stated that large disaster relief efforts requiring
DOD support, such as those required during the Haiti response, rarely
occur and are not the focus of the work in SOUTHCOM's area of
responsibility the majority of the time.
Figure 7: SOUTHCOM's Organizational Structure Adopted during Operation
Unified Response:
[Refer to PDF for image: Organizational chart]
Top level:
Commander;
- Command Select Special Staff.
Second level, reporting to Commander:
Military Deputy Commander;
Civilian Deputy to the Commander and Foreign Policy Advisor.
Third level, reporting to Commander:
Chief of Staff;
- Standing Joint Force Headquarters.
Fourth level, reporting to Chief of Staff:
J1: Manpower and Personnel; J2: Intelligence;
J3: Operations;
J4: Logistics;
J5: Plans, Policy and Strategy;
J6: Communications;
J7: Training, Exercises and Engagement;
J8: Resources and Assessments;
J9: Partnering.
Source: SOUTHCOM.
[End of figure]
Moreover, according to SOUTHCOM officials, the command is working to
revise its Organization and Functions Manual to align manpower
resources to its identified mission requirements and is creating
personnel augmentation plans to respond to small, medium, and large
contingencies. The last time SOUTHCOM updated its Organization and
Functions Manual was January 2009, and it has not been updated to
reflect SOUTHCOM's current joint staff organizational structure, as
well as its revised mission and strategic objectives. The manual
serves as the basis for determining manpower requirements necessary to
perform assigned missions and is to be updated and submitted annually
to the Joint Staff. Ensuring better alignment of SOUTHCOM's
organizational structure and manpower to its identified mission
requirements; and the development of augmentation plans for a range of
contingencies, such as those as large as Operation Unified Response,
may enhance the command's ability to conduct the full range of
missions that may be required in the region.
Conclusions:
Modern national security challenges require collaborative efforts
among U.S. government agencies, international partners, and
nongovernmental and private organizations. The Americas and the
Caribbean are areas that face these types of challenges and ultimately
require partnerships with various interagency and other stakeholders
to ensure security and stability throughout the region. SOUTHCOM has
taken significant steps in building these partnerships through its key
practices that enhance and sustain collaboration. However, the command
faces challenges preparing for divergent needs of its potential
missions, which range from conducting military-focused operations to
supporting efforts to enhance regional security and cooperation. The
command must have an organizational structure that is not only
prepared for military contingencies, but can also be effective in
supporting interagency and other stakeholders in meeting challenges
such as corruption, crime, and poverty. While the command has made
recent changes to its organizational structure to better enable it to
conduct military contingency operations, it will be unable to
determine the most effective organizational structure until it aligns
its structure and manpower resources in its Organization and Functions
Manual to its identified mission requirements, and develops personnel
augmentation plans necessary to respond to a wide range of contingency
operations, including disaster relief operations, when directed by
higher authority. As SOUTHCOM continues to further its interagency
missions and partnership capacities, it is vital that as a geographic
combatant command, it continues to maintain its capability to meet its
military operational demands as they arise.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve SOUTHCOM's ability to conduct the full range of military
missions that may be required in the region, while balancing its
efforts to support interagency and other stakeholders in enhancing
regional security and cooperation, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Southern Command to take the
following two actions:
1. Revise SOUTHCOM's Organization and Functions Manual to align
organizational structure and manpower resources to meet approved
missions, to include both daily mission and contingency operation
requirements; and:
2. Identify personnel augmentation requirements for a range of
contingency operations, develop plans to obtain these personnel when
needed, and exercise and assess these augmentation plans.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
our recommendations that DOD direct SOUTHCOM to revise its
Organization and Functions Manual to meet approved missions and
identify personnel augmentation requirements for a range of
contingency operations. In its response, DOD also stated it is
addressing these issues as quickly as possible to ensure readiness for
future contingencies. DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix
IV. Technical comments were provided separately and incorporated as
appropriate. The Department of State, U.S. Agency for International
Development, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland
Security did not provide written comments on our draft report.
In its response, DOD stated that SOUTHCOM has sought to become a
center of excellence in interagency partnering and has actively shared
its experience and contacts with other geographic combatant commands.
In our report, we acknowledge that SOUTHCOM has taken significant
steps in building partnerships with interagency and other stakeholders
and agree that the command demonstrates a number of key practices that
enhance and sustain collaboration with these partners. Given the
challenges of corruption, crime, illicit trafficking, and poverty
facing the Americas and Caribbean, we believe collaboration will
continue to be critical to ensuring security and stability throughout
the region. As SOUTHCOM continues its efforts, we encourage the
command to continue to share its experiences and lessons learned with
DOD and its interagency partners, as we noted in our report, in an
effort to continue to improve whole of government efforts in
addressing challenges in the region.
DOD further stated that SOUTHCOM has already begun addressing the
organizational issues identified during the Haiti disaster response
effort, modifying its staff structure and comprehensively reviewing
its allocation of personnel to meet mission requirements. While DOD
did indicate it was addressing these issues as quickly as possible, it
did not provide specific timelines for when SOUTHCOM would have a
revised Organization and Functions Manual aligning manpower resources
to the command's identified mission requirements and have personnel
augmentation plans to respond to small, medium, and large
contingencies. Since both the Organizations and Functions Manual as
well as the personnel augmentation plans are important to ensuring the
command's ability to conduct the full range of missions that may be
required in the region, we believe DOD and SOUTHCOM should establish
specific timelines for implementing our recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate
congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report
also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Joint Interagency Task Force South:
Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) is a national task
force under the command and control of U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM), which according to JIATF South officials, was established
by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, as part of the National
Interdiction Command and Control Plan. The national task force has the
primary mission of detection, monitoring, and interdiction support to
disrupt illicit trafficking, to include narcotics trafficking, in the
Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific. JIATF South's
joint operating area consists of 42 million square miles, crossing 5
combatant commanders' boundaries, 3 U.S. Coast Guard districts, 15
interagency partners' areas of operations, and 30 independent nations
and 11 territories.[Footnote 35] The national task force detects,
monitors, and provides interdiction support to a range of suspect
modes of transport such as small civil aircraft, business-type
aircraft, fishing vessels, go-fast boats,[Footnote 36] cargo vessels,
and self-propelled semi-submersibles.[Footnote 37] Figure 8 displays
examples of JIATF South's interdiction targets. According to JIATF
South officials, in 2009, the task force contributed to the removal of
234 metric tons of cocaine worth a reported $4.5 billion, and is the
lead cocaine interdiction supporting agency in the world.
Figure 8: JIATF South Interdiction Targets:
[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photographs]
Examples of the types of vessels that are suspected of trafficking
drugs.
Source: JIATF South.
[End of figure]
While the national task force has the responsibility for the detection
and monitoring of suspect air and maritime drug activity in its joint
operating area, it also serves to integrate and synchronize
interagency counter drug operations. JIATF South embeds non-Department
of Defense (DOD) personnel throughout its organization to better
integrate DOD, U.S. law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and
international partners into these operations. For example, the
national task force's Director is a rear admiral from the U.S. Coast
Guard, while the Vice Director is from U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. According to JIATF South officials, most of the non-DOD
embedded personnel do not operate under memoranda of understanding,
which permits greater flexibility in defining embedded personnel roles
and responsibilities, thereby allowing more mutually beneficial
relationships.[Footnote 38] JIATF South officials further stated that
it is a continued mutually beneficial relationship which determines
the length of stay for embedded personnel. Key elements within JIATF
South are its Tactical Analysis Teams and intelligence liaisons, which
support the flow of information between the U.S. law enforcement
agencies and international partners in the joint operating area and
the task force. The Tactical Analysis Teams and intelligence liaisons
are placed in key locations in North, Central, and South America,
Western Europe, and West Africa. These Tactical Analysis Teams and
intelligence liaisons consist of one to two members co-located within
the U.S. embassies or missions, are proficient in the local language,
and serve between 2 and 5 years in country. They are often co-located
with officials from the Drug Enforcement Administration at the U.S.
embassy to further enhance information sharing between law enforcement
assets in country and interdiction assets in the field.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Continuing Promise:
The Continuing Promise mission is an annual humanitarian and civic
assistance operation in the Caribbean, Central and South America led
by U.S. Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) Navy component, U.S. Naval
Forces Southern Command. The mission provides training to U.S.
military personnel and international partner nation forces while
providing free medical care to communities with limited access to
medical treatment, construction and engineering services, and
donations and support to selected nations. It is executed in
collaboration with other interagency partners, such as the U.S. Public
Health Service Commissioned Corps, as well as nongovernmental
organizations and other international partners. Specifically:
* Training. The mission provides U.S. military personnel and
international partner nation forces with training on using medical
capabilities and conducting construction and engineering services and
projects. The mission also provides training on how to plan and
coordinate a broad spectrum of humanitarian assistance and disaster
response missions.
* Medical care. The mission includes general surgeries, basic medical
evaluation and treatment, preventive medicine treatment, dental
screenings and treatment, optometry screenings, eyewear distribution,
veterinary services, and public health training. Follow-up treatments
are arranged with local medical professionals.
* Construction and engineering services. The mission includes civic
action programs designed to assist each participating nation in
providing local communities with a range of construction capabilities,
such as building repairs and improvements, new small construction
projects, utility system repairs and construction/technical
assistance, pier repair, drainage projects, and trenching.
* Donations and support. The mission delivers donated food and medical
supplies to selected countries.
As of June 2010, SOUTHCOM had conducted or scheduled four Continuing
Promise missions. Table 2 identifies prior and future Continuing
Promise mission ships, deployment dates, countries visited, and
reported numbers of patients treated for those missions completed.
Table 2: Continuing Promise Mission Deployment Dates, Countries
Visited and Reported Patients Treated:
Ship: USNS Comfort;
Deployment dates: June to October 2007;
Countries visited: Belize, Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and
Suriname;
Patients treated: 98,658.
Ship: USS Boxer and USS Kearsarge;
Deployment dates: April to November 2008;
Countries visited: El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, Peru, Nicaragua,
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana;
Patients treated: 71,000.
Ship: USNS Comfort;
Deployment dates: April to July 2009;
Countries visited: Haiti, Dominican Republic, Antigua, Panama,
Colombia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua;
Patients treated: 100,049.
Ship: USS Iwo Jima;
Deployment dates: July to November 2010;
Countries visited: Haiti, Colombia, Panama, Suriname, Guyana,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica;
Patients treated: To be determined upon completion of the mission.
Source: SOUTHCOM:
Note: Patients treated include the number of basic medical evaluations
and treatments provided during the deployment. It does not include
general surgeries, preventive medicine treatment, dental screenings
and treatment, optometry screenings, eyewear distribution, veterinary
services, and public health training.
[End of table]
In July 2009, we observed the Continuing Promise mission while it was
deployed in Nicaragua. During this visit, we observed the mission
onboard the USNS Comfort and in two mission medical sites in
Chinandega and Somotillo, Nicaragua. Deployed with the mission, in
addition to DOD personnel, were U.S. Public Health Service medical,
engineering, and environmental health officers, volunteers from
various nongovernmental organizations and international partner nation
medical professionals from Antigua and Barbuda, Brazil, Canada,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Haiti, the Netherlands,
Nicaragua, and Panama. Figure 9 lists the locations visited by USNS
Comfort during Continuing Promise 2009, while figure 10 displays USNS
Comfort activities during the mission.
Figure 9: Locations Visited by USNS Comfort during Continuing Promise
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of Central America and the
Caribbean]
Locations visited are depicted:
Port Au Prince, Haiti;
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic;
St. John‘s, Antigua;
Colon, Panama;
Turnaco, Colombia;
La Union, El Salvador;
Corinto, Nicaragua.
Source: SOUTHCOM, Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Figure 10: USNS Comfort Activities during Continuing Promise 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: 3 captioned photographs]
Surgeries are performed onboard the Continuing Promise during the 2009
mission;
Dentists work on a patient during the Continuing Promise mission;
Canadian military personnel are involved in the Continuing Promise
mission.
Source: SOUTHCOM.
[End of figure]
In October 2009, we observed the initial planning conference for the
2010 Continuing Promise mission. Table 3 lists the nongovernmental
organizations involved in the 2009 Continuing Promise mission.
Table 3: Nongovernmental Organizations Involved in the 2009 Continuing
Promise Mission:
2009 Continuing Promise Mission Nongovernmental Participants:
Agua Viva;
Alliance for Rabies Control;
FACE;
Food for the Poor;
Haiti Resource Development Foundation;
Hugs Across America;
International Aid;
Kazoobie Kazoos;
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints;
Lions Club;
Nour International Relief Aid Foundation;
Operation Smile;
Project Handclasp;
Project HOPE;
Rochester Medical Missions;
Rotary International;
The Wheelchair Foundation;
University of California, San Diego Pre-Dental Society;
Islamic Relief, USA.
Source: SOUTHCOM.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Scope and Methodology:
To conduct our work, we obtained and reviewed a wide range of
Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and
interagency partner documents, to include strategies, plans, polices,
directives, after-action assessments and other documentation detailing
interagency collaboration at the geographic combatant command level.
In addition, we interviewed officials at many agencies including DOD,
the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department
of Justice to gain their perspectives on SOUTHCOM's collaborative
efforts (see table 4). We selected these agencies to interview because
they were identified by either SOUTHCOM documents or officials as
playing key collaborative roles in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility.
To complement our broader view of collaboration effort at the command
level, we identified two areas of collaboration to observe in further
detail: illicit trafficking interdiction efforts and humanitarian
assistance efforts. We chose these two areas based on our review of
SOUTHCOM strategic objectives and based on the large involvement of
U.S. government agencies, international partners, and nongovernmental
and private organizations in these efforts and the timeliness of some
of these efforts to our review. We supplemented our review with
additional information regarding collaboration highlighted by
SOUTHCOM, SOUTHCOM's components, DOD, Department of State, the U.S.
Agency for International Development, Department of Homeland Security,
and Department of Justice officials.
Table 4: Agencies Interviewed During our Review:
Name of agency: Department of Defense;
Office visited during our review:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership
Strategy and Stability Operations;
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics and Global Threats;
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western
Hemisphere Affairs;
* Defense Security Cooperation Agency;
* U.S. Navy:
- Office of the Chief of Naval Operations;
- Center for Naval Analyses;
* Joint Staff:
- Directorate of Operational Plans and Joint Force Development;
- Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy;
* U.S. Southern Command, Headquarters;
* Joint Interagency Task Force South.
Name of agency: Department of State;
Office visited during our review:
* Bureau of Political-Military Affairs;
* Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs;
* Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
Name of agency: U.S. Agency for International Development;
Office visited during our review:
* Office of Military Affairs;
* Office of Regional Sustainable Development, Bureau for Latin America
and the Caribbean;
* Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
Name of agency: Department of Homeland Security;
Office visited during our review:
* U.S. Coast Guard;
* U.S. Customs and Border Protection;
* U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
* Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Name of agency: Department of Justice;
Office visited during our review:
* Federal Bureau of Investigation;
* Drug Enforcement Administration.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To assess SOUTHCOM's efforts to enhance and sustain collaboration with
interagency and other stakeholders, we identified best practices in
prior GAO reports, and to determine the extent that SOUTHCOM
demonstrated these practices, we interviewed DOD and interagency
partner officials and reviewed related documents.[Footnote 39]
Specifically, we interviewed SOUTHCOM officials and embedded
interagency staff from the Department of State and U.S. Agency for
International Development at SOUTHCOM's headquarters in Miami,
Florida, in June 2009 to obtain their views on SOUTHCOM's
collaborative efforts. In addition, we interviewed and gathered
documentation from a number of SOUTHCOM's interagency partners in
Washington, D.C., including officials from DOD, the Department of
State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department
of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice to gain their
perspectives on SOUTHCOM's collaborative efforts. We interviewed
officials at Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West, Florida
in August 2009 and reviewed documentation including guidance, plans,
and interdiction reports detailing the task forces' efforts. We also
observed a humanitarian and civic assistance mission-the 2009
Continuing Promise-in Nicaragua in July 2009, and attended mission
planning sessions in Jacksonville, Florida, in October 2009 and Panama
City, Panama, in December 2009, during which we interviewed U.S.
government, international partner, and nongovernmental organization
officials involved in planning and executing the mission.
Nongovernmental organizations we spoke with included Rotary
International, Project HOPE, University of California, San Diego Pre-
Dental Society, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and
Inter Action. We also visited the U.S. embassies in Panama, Colombia,
and the Dominican Republic in December of 2009, interviewing U.S.
government and international partner nation officials to obtain their
views on SOUTHCOM's collaborative efforts. Each country we visited had
been visited during the 2009 Continuing Promise mission, supported
SOUTHCOM's illicit trafficking interdiction efforts, and represented a
different region within SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility: Panama in
Central America; Colombia in South America; and Dominican Republic in
the Caribbean.
To evaluate SOUTHCOM's efforts to develop an organizational structure
that facilitates interagency collaboration and positions the command
to conduct a full range of military missions, we identified DOD's
guidance for the organization of a combatant command as outlined in
DOD joint publications, instructions and other documents, and analyzed
SOUTHCOM's strategic documents, policies, guidance and directives
outlining the command's mission, organizational structure, and staff
functions. We interviewed SOUTHCOM and interagency partner officials
from each directorate within the organizational structure in Miami,
Florida, in June 2009 and reviewed and analyzed documentation
regarding SOUTHCOM's 2008 organizational structure changes. We also
conducted follow-up meetings with SOUTHCOM officials in Miami, Florida
in April 2010 to obtain information on the effectiveness of the
command's organizational structure in supporting international
disaster relief efforts following the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti.
We conducted our review from April 2009 through July 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Department Of Defense:
United States Southern Command:
Office Of The Commander:
Commander:
3511 N.W. 91st Avenue
Doral, Florida 33172
16 July 2010:
Mr. John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report GA0-10-801, "U.S. Southern
Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Response
Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation," dated July
2010 (GAO Code 351338).
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report and commends the thorough and balanced professionalism of the
GAO Team throughout the more than year-long assessment period.
The Department concurs with the GAO's two recommendations and is
addressing these issues as quickly as possible to ensure readiness for
future contingencies. The scale of the Haiti disaster would have
challenged the response capabilities of any organization; U.S.
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), with assistance from DoD and
interagency partners, adapted quickly to the task and helped avert
even greater suffering and loss of life in Haiti.
USSOUTHCOM has aggressively tackled organizational issues identified
during the Haiti disaster response effort, modifying its staff
structure and comprehensively reviewing its allocation of personnel to
meet mission requirements.
USSOUTHCOM's ability to respond to the crisis quickly was in part a
byproduct of close, collaborative relationships developed with a range
of U.S. Government interagency partners over many years. USSOUTHCOM
has striven to become a center of excellence in interagency partnering
and has actively shared its experience and contacts with the other
geographic combatant commands.
Thank you again for the opportunity to demonstrate USSOUTHCOM's
interagency capabilities and the constructive recommendations that
will help the Command remain responsive to national security needs in
its area of responsibility. Our point of contact for this matter is
Mr. Todd Harvey, Director, J9 (Partnering) at 305-437-3660 or
thomas.harvey@hq.southcom.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Douglas M. Fraser:
General, USAF:
Combatant Commander:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director;
Richard Geiger; Mae Jones; Arthur Lord; Jennifer Neer; Steven Putansu;
Michael Shaughnessy; and Amie Steele made major contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] SOUTHCOM is one of the six geographic combatant commands included
within the Department of Defense.
[2] We use the term "other stakeholders" in this report to refer to
international partners and nongovernmental and private organizations.
[3] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce,
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2009).
[4] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP], GAO,
Results Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: October 21,
2005), and GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to
Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C. July 2,
2003).
[5] Humanitarian and civic assistance missions provide training to
U.S. military personnel and international partner nation forces, while
providing humanitarian assistance, such as medical, dental, and
veterinary care and engineering projects to communities in need.
[6] Geographic combatant commands are responsible for a conducting a
variety of missions to include support to stability, security,
transition and reconstruction operations; disaster relief; and
humanitarian assistance, as directed.
[7] U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions within the
Caribbean are the responsibility of U.S. Northern Command (i.e.,
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
[8] SOUTHCOM operates three joint task forces. JIATF South, located in
Key West, Florida, serves as the catalyst for integrated and
synchronized interagency counter-drug operations and is responsible
for the detection and monitoring of suspect air and maritime drug
activity in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern
Pacific. Joint Task Force Bravo, located at Soto Cano Air Base,
Honduras, operates a forward, all-weather day and night airbase. The
task force organizes multilateral exercises and supports, in
cooperation with partner nations, humanitarian and civic assistance,
counter-drug, contingency and disaster relief operations in Central
America. Joint Task Force Guantanamo, located at U.S. Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, conducts detention and interrogation operations
in support of the war on terrorism, coordinates and implements
detainee screening operations, and supports law enforcement and war
crimes investigations as well as the military commissions for detained
enemy combatants. The task force is also prepared to support mass
migration operations.
[9] SOUTHCOM's three forward operating locations in Comalapa, El
Salvador, Aruba, and Curacao, Netherlands Antilles, allow U.S. and
partner nation aircraft to use existing airfields in support of the
region's multinational counter-drug effort. According to SOUTHCOM,
these locations are the result of cooperative, long-term agreements
between the U.S. and the host nations.
[10] SOUTHCOM maintains security assistance offices in Argentina,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Suriname, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Panama,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
[11] Information on SOUTHCOM's reorganization can be found in the
command's written response to a House Armed Services Committee report,
H.R. Rep. No. 110-652, at 409-410 (2008).
[12] Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, DOD
Transformation Priorities (Oct. 24, 2007).
[13] See GAO, Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and
Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-794] (Washington, D.C.:
July 28, 2010).
[14] Department of State's Mission Strategic and Resource Plans,
formerly the Mission Strategic Plan, is a strategic document created
by each U.S. embassy and consulate detailing (1) the mission's highest
foreign policy and management priorities; (2) the goals it wants to
achieve; (3) resources required to achieve those goals; and (4) how it
plans to measure progress and results.
[15] Illicit trafficking includes narcotics trafficking, weapons
trafficking, human trafficking, and money laundering.
[16] JIATF South was originally established in 1989 as Joint Task
Force-4 when DOD was identified as the single lead agency of the
federal government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and
maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. See National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No.
101-189, § 1202(a)(1) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 124). In
1994, the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan created a
national task force, JIATF South, which fully integrated the military,
law enforcement, and intelligence agencies.
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[18] The Foreign Disclosure Tool allows information to be shared
properly and quickly among stakeholders.
[19] The international liaisons at SOUTHCOM include representatives
from eight countries--Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay.
[20] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[21] For purposes of this report, we use the term daily mission
requirements to refer to the average workload expected to occur on day-
to-day basis for the next 3 years.
[22] Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the
Department of Defense and Its Major Components (Nov. 21, 2003); Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the
United States (Mar. 20, 2009); and Joint Forces Staff College
Publication 1, Joint Staff Officers Guide 2000.
[23] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01, Joint
Manpower and Personnel Program (Dec. 28, 2004).
[24] Department of Defense, Unified Command Plan (Dec. 17, 2008).
[25] The traditional joint staff headquarters organization generally
includes directorates for manpower and personnel (J1), intelligence
(J2), operations (J3), logistics (J4), plans (J5), communications
system (J6), as well as additional directorates as deemed necessary.
[26] The command strategy, formally updated every two years, provides
overarching guidance for SOUTHCOM. The hemispheric goals of SOUTHCOM's
Command Strategy 2016 were to ensure security, enhance stability, and
enable prosperity. It also had one governmental goal--to transform the
enterprise. These objectives were subsequently modified in SOUTHCOM's
2018 Command Strategy to ensure security, enhance stability, enable
partnerships, and evolve the enterprise.
[27] U.S. Chiefs of Mission are the principal officers in charge of
U.S. diplomatic missions and U.S. offices abroad.
[28] Foreign Policy Advisors are senior Department of State officers
within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of the
Coordinator for Foreign Policy Advisors, detailed as personal advisors
to U.S. military commanders to provide policy support regarding the
diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders' military
responsibilities.
[29] According to U.S. Agency for International Development, Senior
Development Advisors operate under memoranda of understanding with six
of DOD's combatant commands--U.S. Special Operations Command,
SOUTHCOM, U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific
Command, and U.S. Africa Command--serving as advisors to the combatant
commanders. DOD has provided corresponding military representatives to
the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Military
Affairs to improve day-to-day coordination and promote synchronization
of efforts.
[30] Joint Interagency Coordination Group is a full-time,
multifunctional advisory element of the combatant commander's staff
that facilitates information sharing throughout the interagency
community. It comprises mostly civilian personnel with strong
interagency experience who formulate, articulate, advocate, and
implement the combatant commander's policies, priorities, programs,
and procedures for interagency engagement.
[31] SOUTHCOM's mission to support the federal government's disaster
relief efforts in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti, named
Operation Unified Response, is in support of the U.S. Agency for
International Development, which provides foreign disaster assistance
and coordinates the U.S. government response to disasters abroad.
[32] According to Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning
(Dec. 26, 2006), as an operation progresses planning generally occurs
in three distinct but overlapping timeframes: future plans, or long
term planning; future operations or near term planning; and current
operations or current operations planning.
[33] Joint Task Force-Haiti was established to support Operation
Unified Response.
[34] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint
Operations (Oct. 16, 2006) provides doctrine for planning,
coordinating, and providing personnel support to joint operations, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1301.01C, Individual
Augmentation Procedures (Jan. 1, 2004), provides guidance for
assigning individual augmentation to meet the combatant commanders'
temporary duty requirements.
[35] JIATF South's joint operating area covers the boundaries of
SOUTHCOM, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Pacific
Command and U.S. European Command.
[36] A go-fast boat is designed with a long narrow platform and a
planing hull to enable it to reach high speeds and avoid interception.
[37] A self-propelled semi-submersible is a vessel similar to a
submarine that rides low in the water to avoid detection.
[38] The Department of State Political Advisor assigned to JIATF South
stated that his position operates under a memorandum of understanding.
[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]; GAO,
Results Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: October 21,
2005); and GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to
Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C. July 2,
2003).
[End of section]
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