Military Base Realignments and Closures
DOD Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs Gao ID: GAO-10-725R July 21, 2010The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is the fifth such round undertaken by DOD since 1988 and is the biggest, most complex, and costliest BRAC round ever. With this BRAC round, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to execute hundreds of BRAC actions affecting over 800 defense locations, relocate over 123,000 personnel, and spend over $35 billion--an unprecedented amount, given that DOD has spent nearly $26 billion to implement the four previous BRAC rounds combined when all relevant BRAC actions have been completed. As with prior BRAC rounds, DOD is required to implement the BRAC Commission's 2005 recommendations within 6 years of their approval by the President and transmittal to Congress. Unlike with prior BRAC rounds, DOD is implementing the BRAC 2005 round during a time of conflict and significant increases to the defense budget to support ongoing contingency operations. Compounding this challenge, DOD is also implementing other extensive worldwide transformation initiatives such as the permanent relocation of about 70,000 military personnel to the United States from overseas; transformation of the Army's force structure from an organization based on divisions to more rapidly deployable, combat brigade-based units; an increase in the active-duty end strength of the Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 members; and the drawdown of combat forces from Iraq while simultaneously increasing the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. All of these initiatives are exerting an unusually high demand on DOD's domestic facility infrastructure to accommodate new forces and existing forces being deployed or redeployed. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) at the outset of BRAC 2005 indicated its intent to reshape DOD's installations and realign DOD forces to meet defense needs for the next 20 years. Moreover, both DOD and the BRAC Commission reported that their primary consideration in making recommendations for the BRAC 2005 round was military value. As such, as opposed to simply closing bases, many of the BRAC 2005 recommendations involve complex realignments, such as designating where military forces returning to the United States from overseas bases would be located; establishing joint military medical centers; creating joint bases; and reconfiguring the defense supply, storage, and distribution network. The BRAC statute requires DOD to complete all BRAC 2005 closures and realignments by September 15, 2011. As we reported in January 2009, DOD expects almost half of the 800 defense locations implementing BRAC recommendations to complete their actions in 2011, with 230 of these 400 locations anticipating completion within the last 2 weeks before the statutory deadline. At the time of this report, DOD had only 14 months remaining until the The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed the Comptroller General to monitor the implementation of recommendations for the 2005 round of closures and realignments of military installations made pursuant to section 2914 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. We prepared this report, our fourth, in response to the mandate, to assess (1) the challenges, if any, DOD faces in implementing BRAC recommendations and (2) DOD's efforts to mitigate any challenges and the extent to which any costs related to those mitigation efforts are being reported as BRAC implementation costs.
DOD is implementing 182 BRAC recommendations for this BRAC round, but several logistical, human capital, and other implementation challenges remain. First, many locations are scheduled to complete the construction, relocation, personnel, and other actions needed to implement the recommendations within months of--and, in some cases, on--the deadline leaving little or no margin for slippage to finish constructing buildings and to move or hire the needed personnel. As of March 2010, DOD had 57 construction projects scheduled to be completed within 3 months of the statutory deadline, representing about 30 recommendations. Second, some DOD locations that involve the most costly and complex recommendations have encountered delays in awarding some construction contracts as well as experienced additional delays in the expected completion of construction. Third, DOD must synchronize the relocation of approximately 123,000 personnel with the availability of about $25 billion in new construction or renovation of facilities. Fourth, delays in interdependent recommendations are likely to have a cascading effect on the timely completion of related recommendations. These challenges have continued since our last report on BRAC implementation challenges, especially contracting and construction delays, which have further squeezed an already tight time line. The potential loss of intellectual capital is complicated by various community effects of BRAC implementation growth, such as transportation, housing, schooling, and availability of medical care. DOD is mitigating some BRAC implementation challenges, which is adding to implementation costs; however, DOD is not reporting all of these additional costs. To enhance its role in managing logistical challenges that could affect DOD's ability to achieve BRAC implementation by the statutory deadline, the military services are working with their leadership to develop solutions. Further, the military services and defense agencies are providing periodic briefings for BRAC recommendations exceeding $100 million in implementation costs, or that have significant concerns such as cost overruns or construction delays to the OSD Basing Directorate. For other BRAC recommendations, DOD is still weighing options, such as moving temporarily into different buildings while construction and renovations are completed, referred to as swing space, or accelerating the pace of construction to complete permanent facilities by the deadline, potentially incurring additional expenses. The DOD Financial Management Regulation requires the services and defense agencies to accurately capture BRAC-related costs in the annual BRAC budget justification materials submitted to Congress. Since DOD's recent fiscal year 2011 BRAC budget request--which was the final annual request for funds for the BRAC account before the statutory deadline for completion of closures and realignments--has already been submitted to Congress, such additional costs in our view may have to be funded from outside the BRAC account. However, we found that DOD's reported costs funded outside the BRAC account are not complete because the Army has not reported to Congress some of these costs as BRAC costs. Thus, OSD officials do not have full visibility over the extent of these costs funded from outside the BRAC account, given that the services prepare their own BRAC budget justification material. Until the Secretary of Defense ensures that all BRAC-related costs are captured and reported to Congress, neither congressional decision makers nor those within OSD who are charged with overseeing BRAC implementation will have a complete picture of the cost of implementing the 2005 BRAC round.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Brian J. Lepore Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-4523GAO-10-725R, Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs
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GAO-10-725R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 21, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps
to Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional
Costs:
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is the fifth such
round undertaken by DOD since 1988 and is the biggest, most complex,
and costliest BRAC round ever. With this BRAC round, the Department of
Defense (DOD) plans to execute hundreds of BRAC actions affecting over
800 defense locations, relocate over 123,000 personnel, and spend over
$35 billion--an unprecedented amount, given that DOD has spent nearly
$26 billion[Footnote 1] to implement the four previous BRAC rounds
combined when all relevant BRAC actions have been completed. As with
prior BRAC rounds, DOD is required to implement the BRAC Commission's
2005 recommendations within 6 years of their approval by the President
and transmittal to Congress.[Footnote 2] Unlike with prior BRAC
rounds, DOD is implementing the BRAC 2005 round during a time of
conflict and significant increases to the defense budget to support
ongoing contingency operations. Compounding this challenge, DOD is
also implementing other extensive worldwide transformation initiatives
such as the permanent relocation of about 70,000 military personnel
[Footnote 3] to the United States from overseas; transformation of the
Army's force structure from an organization based on divisions to more
rapidly deployable, combat brigade-based units; an increase in the
active-duty end strength of the Army and Marine Corps by 92,000
members;[Footnote 4] and the drawdown of combat forces from Iraq while
simultaneously increasing the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.
All of these initiatives are exerting an unusually high demand on
DOD's domestic facility infrastructure to accommodate new forces and
existing forces being deployed or redeployed.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) at the outset of BRAC
2005 indicated its intent to reshape DOD's installations and realign
DOD forces to meet defense needs for the next 20 years. Moreover, both
DOD and the BRAC Commission reported that their primary consideration
in making recommendations for the BRAC 2005 round was military value.
[Footnote 5] As such, as opposed to simply closing bases, many of the
BRAC 2005 recommendations involve complex realignments, such as
designating where military forces returning to the United States from
overseas bases would be located; establishing joint military medical
centers; creating joint bases; and reconfiguring the defense supply,
storage, and distribution network.
The BRAC statute requires DOD to complete all BRAC 2005 closures and
realignments by September 15, 2011.[Footnote 6] As we reported in
January 2009,[Footnote 7] DOD expects almost half of the 800 defense
locations implementing BRAC recommendations to complete their actions
in 2011, with 230 of these 400 locations anticipating completion
within the last 2 weeks before the statutory deadline. At the time of
this report, DOD had only 14 months remaining until the deadline.
Under the BRAC statute, a BRAC 2005 account is established for DOD to
use in funding the implementation of BRAC 2005 recommendations. DOD's
most recent budget request, the final request to fund the 2005 BRAC
account before the statutory deadline for completion of closures and
realignments, was for fiscal year 2011, and was submitted to Congress
as part of the President's budget in February 2010.[Footnote 8] DOD
may also fund certain 2005 BRAC-related costs to complete actions
needed to implement the recommendations from outside the BRAC account
and has established procedures and a format for reporting these costs
in its annual BRAC budget justification materials to Congress.
The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008[Footnote 9] directed
the Comptroller General to monitor the implementation of
recommendations for the 2005 round of closures and realignments of
military installations made pursuant to section 2914 of the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.[Footnote 10] We prepared
this report, our fourth, in response to the mandate, to assess (1) the
challenges, if any, DOD faces in implementing BRAC recommendations and
(2) DOD's efforts to mitigate any challenges and the extent to which
any costs related to those mitigation efforts are being reported as
BRAC implementation costs.
To address these objectives, we assessed relevant documentation
including DOD business plans, briefings on BRAC implementation status,
and budget justification materials submitted to Congress. We focused
most of our work on recommendations that have significant actions such
as major construction projects and movements of personnel scheduled to
occur within 3 months of the statutory deadline, or are incurring
additional costs because of various mitigation measures to facilitate
completion of the recommendation by the statutory deadline. We also
interviewed officials in the Basing Directorate within the Office of
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment)
responsible for overseeing BRAC implementation, as well as associated
BRAC implementation offices in the Army, Navy, and Air Force and
various defense agencies. More information on our scope and
methodology can be found in enclosure I.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2009 to July 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
DOD is implementing 182 BRAC recommendations for this BRAC round, but
several logistical, human capital, and other implementation challenges
remain. First, many locations are scheduled to complete the
construction, relocation, personnel, and other actions needed to
implement the recommendations within months of--and, in some cases,
on--the deadline leaving little or no margin for slippage to finish
constructing buildings and to move or hire the needed personnel. As of
March 2010, DOD had 57 construction projects scheduled to be completed
within 3 months of the statutory deadline, representing about 30
recommendations. Second, some DOD locations that involve the most
costly and complex recommendations have encountered delays in awarding
some construction contracts as well as experienced additional delays
in the expected completion of construction. Third, DOD must
synchronize the relocation of approximately 123,000 personnel with the
availability of about $25 billion in new construction or renovation of
facilities. Fourth, delays in interdependent recommendations are
likely to have a cascading effect on the timely completion of related
recommendations. These challenges have continued since our last report
on BRAC implementation challenges,[Footnote 11] especially contracting
and construction delays, which have further squeezed an already tight
time line. Furthermore, some DOD organizations that are realigning
their missions to other installations face human capital challenges,
such as the potential loss of intellectual capital if civilian
personnel with unique skills or abilities choose not to relocate and
DOD is unable to replace enough of their critical skills to avoid an
adverse impact on mission performance or capabilities. This challenge
is further complicated by various community effects of BRAC
implementation growth, such as transportation, housing, schooling, and
availability of medical care.
DOD is mitigating some BRAC implementation challenges, which is adding
to implementation costs; however, DOD is not reporting all of these
additional costs. To enhance its role in managing logistical
challenges that could affect DOD's ability to achieve BRAC
implementation by the statutory deadline, the military services are
working with their leadership to develop solutions. For example, the
Army has briefed its Vice Chief of Staff at least four times since
2008 on BRAC implementation challenges. Further, the military services
and defense agencies are providing periodic briefings for BRAC
recommendations exceeding $100 million in implementation costs, or
that have significant concerns such as cost overruns or construction
delays to the OSD Basing Directorate. For other BRAC recommendations,
DOD is still weighing options, such as moving temporarily into
different buildings while construction and renovations are completed,
referred to as swing space, or accelerating the pace of construction
to complete permanent facilities by the deadline, potentially
incurring additional expenses. In addition, Army officials are
mitigating some human-capital-related challenges by recruiting new
personnel and offering financial incentives to civilian employees to
relocate, again potentially incurring additional expenses. Swing space
facilities, hiring or relocation financial incentives, and other
mitigation actions may lead to additional costs, although some of
these costs are not being reported in the services' BRAC budget
materials provided to Congress. The DOD Financial Management
Regulation requires the services and defense agencies to accurately
capture BRAC-related costs in the annual BRAC budget justification
materials submitted to Congress.[Footnote 12] Since DOD's recent
fiscal year 2011 BRAC budget request--which was the final annual
request for funds for the BRAC account before the statutory deadline
for completion of closures and realignments--has already been
submitted to Congress, such additional costs in our view may have to
be funded from outside the BRAC account. However, we found that DOD's
reported costs funded outside the BRAC account are not complete
because the Army has not reported to Congress some of these costs as
BRAC costs. Thus, OSD officials do not have full visibility over the
extent of these costs funded from outside the BRAC account, given that
the services prepare their own BRAC budget justification material.
Until the Secretary of Defense ensures that all BRAC-related costs are
captured and reported to Congress, neither congressional decision
makers nor those within OSD who are charged with overseeing BRAC
implementation will have a complete picture of the cost of
implementing the 2005 BRAC round.
This report contains a recommendation to enhance OSD's reporting of
BRAC implementation costs and increase visibility of added costs
incurred because of recent efforts to address various implementation
challenges. In providing written comments on a draft of this report,
the department concurred with the findings of our report and noted
that it was in the process of drafting new guidance that would direct
the services and defense agencies to provide a full accounting of BRAC
costs inside and outside of the BRAC account. DOD's written comments
are reprinted in enclosure II. DOD also provided technical comments,
which we have incorporated into this report as appropriate.
Background:
DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is currently
implementing its fifth round.[Footnote 13] In May 2005, the Secretary
of Defense made public more than 200 recommendations for consideration
by the BRAC Commission. Ultimately, the Commission forwarded 182
recommendations to the President for approval. After the BRAC
Commission's submission, the President was required to review and
prepare a report approving or disapproving the Commission's
recommendations by September 23, 2005. On September 15, 2005, the
President approved and forwarded the recommendations to Congress,
which had 45 legislative days or until the adjournment of Congress,
whichever came first, to enact a joint resolution disapproving of the
recommendations on an all-or-none basis; otherwise, the
recommendations became binding. The recommendations became binding
because Congress had not disapproved them by November 9, 2005. The
BRAC statute requires DOD to complete recommendations for closing or
realigning bases made in the BRAC 2005 round within a 6-year time
frame ending September 15, 2011, 6 years from the date the President
submitted to Congress his approval of the recommendations.
In making its 2005 realignment and closure proposals, DOD applied
legally mandated selection criteria that included military value as
the primary consideration, as well as expected costs and savings,
economic impact to local communities, community support
infrastructure, and environmental impact. Military value--which
includes such considerations as an installation's current and future
mission capabilities, condition, ability to accommodate future needs,
and cost of operations--was the primary criteria for making
recommendations as mandated by BRAC law and as reported by both DOD
and the Commission. Additionally, in establishing goals for the 2005
BRAC round, the Secretary of Defense, in a November 15, 2002,
memorandum initiating the round, expressed his interest in (1)
reducing excess infrastructure, which diverts scarce resources from
overall defense capability, and producing savings; (2) transforming
DOD by aligning the infrastructure with the defense strategy; and (3)
fostering jointness by examining and implementing opportunities for
greater jointness across DOD.
The 2005 round is unlike previous BRAC rounds because of OSD's
emphasis on transformation and jointness, rather than just reducing
excess infrastructure. For example, as part of the Army's efforts to
transform its forces, it included actions to relocate forces overseas
to domestic installations, which were part of its larger review of
bases worldwide. The 2005 round also differs from previous BRAC rounds
in terms of the number of closure and realignment actions. While the
number of major closures and realignments is a little greater than in
individual previous rounds, the number of minor closures and
realignments is significantly greater than those in all previous
rounds combined.[Footnote 14] DOD plans to execute over 800 closure
and realignment actions as part of the 2005 BRAC round, which is more
than double the number of actions completed in the prior four rounds
combined. The large increase in the number of minor closures and
realignments is primarily attributable to the more than 500 actions
involving the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, representing over
60 percent of the BRAC actions.
For the BRAC 2005 round, the OSD Basing Directorate--under the
oversight of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Environment) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics)--has monitored the services' and defense
agencies' implementation progress and facilitated the resolution of
any challenges that may impair the successful implementation of the
recommendations within the 6-year completion period. To facilitate its
oversight role, OSD required the military departments and certain
defense agencies to submit a detailed business plan for each of their
recommendations. These business plans, which are to be updated every 6
months, include information such as a list of all actions needed to
implement each recommendation, schedules for personnel movements
between installations, updated cost and savings estimates based on
updated information, and implementation completion time frames.
DOD may fund certain 2005 BRAC-related costs to complete actions
needed to implement the recommendations from outside the BRAC account
and has established procedures and a format for reporting these costs
in its annual BRAC budget justification materials to Congress. The
military services and defense agencies develop requirements for
executing their BRAC 2005 actions. These requirements form the basis
for each organization's budget request. The requirements and
supporting documentation are provided to each service's or agency's
BRAC Program Management Office, which verifies the requirements. As
part of obtaining funding to implement the requirements, the services
prepare their own BRAC budget justification materials. As part of
DOD's annual budget request, the department submits to Congress an
estimate of the total expenditures expected by each base closure and
realignment recommendation. Also in these cost estimates is a
reporting section, known as funded outside the account, for the
services and defense agencies to include BRAC-related costs that they
fund from other accounts in their respective budgets such as from the
Operation and Maintenance or Military Personnel accounts.
Although DOD Plans to Meet the BRAC Statutory Completion Deadline,
Challenges Remain:
DOD has made progress but it continues to face various logistical,
human capital, and other implementation challenges. Many DOD locations
are scheduled to complete actions to implement the recommendations
within months of the deadline, leaving little or no margin for
slippage to finish constructing buildings and to move or hire the
needed personnel. Moreover, some DOD organizations that are realigning
their missions to other installations face human capital challenges,
such as the potential loss of intellectual capital if civilian
personnel with unique skills or abilities choose not to relocate and
DOD is unable to replace enough of their critical skills in a timely
manner to avoid an adverse impact on mission performance or
capabilities.
DOD Has Made Progress, but Challenges Remain:
In March 2010, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Environment) testified[Footnote 15] before Congress that DOD had
completed 28 of the 182 recommendations in this BRAC round and expects
to complete the remaining 154 on time. However, the Deputy Under
Secretary also testified that DOD is closely monitoring 6 BRAC
recommendations that it deems as being of particular concern. Although
not stated in the testimony, these 6 recommendations follow.
* Close Fort McPherson, Georgia, to relocate U.S. Army Forces Command
and U.S. Army Reserve Command Headquarters mission from Fort McPherson
to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and other realignments.
* Realign San Antonio Regional Medical Center, Texas, to relocate the
inpatient medical function from Lackland Air Force Base to Brooke Army
Medical Center; and consolidate enlisted medical training from other
U.S. locations to Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
* Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., to
relocate various medical services and functions to Bethesda, Maryland
and Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
* Collocate miscellaneous defense agencies and various OSD offices
from various leased locations to a new subinstallation of Fort
Belvoir, Virginia.
* Collocate miscellaneous Army leased sites in the National Capital
Region to Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
* Relocate medical command headquarters to collocate these commands to
a single contiguous site in the National Capital Region.
Three of the 6 BRAC recommendations that DOD identified as of
particular concern involve Fort Belvoir, Virginia, which is affected
by 14 separate BRAC recommendations. DOD plans to realign
approximately 19,300 military and civilian personnel to Fort Belvoir
by the statutory deadline. Specifically, the implementation of those
14 recommendations includes 20 separate construction projects at an
estimated construction cost of $4 billion to build nearly 6.2 million
square feet of building space and 7 million square feet of parking
space. Many of the implementation challenges we discuss in this report
are occurring at Fort Belvoir.
Compressed Schedule Leaves Little Margin for Delays:
Our work continues to show that many DOD locations were scheduled to
complete actions to implement their recommendations close to--and, in
some cases, on--the deadline. In March 2010, DOD identified 30 BRAC
recommendations that had 57 construction projects scheduled for
completion within 3 months of the September 15, 2011, deadline. To
establish the San Antonio Regional Medical Center and realign enlisted
medical training to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for example, there
remains little time in the schedule for delays without jeopardizing
the likelihood of meeting the deadline. As part of this
recommendation, DOD is realigning the inpatient medical function from
Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, to Brooke Army Medical Center at Fort
Sam Houston. However, an official in charge of the San Antonio Joint
Program Office, which was established to help implement the BRAC
decisions affecting San Antonio, told us in February 2010 that delays
due to a bid protest on a project before construction began and the
discovery of unexploded ordnance and fossils during construction have
delayed the project by 6 months, leaving little extra time in the
implementation schedule to meet the statutory deadline. Another
recommendation with very compressed schedules is the closure of
various leased locations in the National Capital Region for the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and realigning the workload to
Fort Belvoir, Virginia. A DOD official told us in June 2010 that there
continues to be a minimal margin for any delays in the construction
schedule for the agency's new $1.5 billion building and that any
disruptions could adversely affect the complex construction schedule
needed to move about 8,500 personnel into the new building by the
statutory deadline.
Delays in Both Awarding Contracts and Construction Have Affected
Implementation Schedules:
Some DOD locations have already encountered delays in their
implementation schedules due largely to delays in awarding some
construction and renovation contracts as well as delays in
construction of these projects, many of which involve the most costly
and complex BRAC recommendations. For example, DOD delayed and
modified the implementation of the BRAC recommendation to relocate
miscellaneous defense agencies and OSD agencies to Fort Belvoir,
Virginia, after the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 directed DOD to expand its consideration of other possible sites.
[Footnote 16] Consequently, Fort Belvoir did not annex the Mark
Center, in Alexandria, Virginia, until 2008, a delay of over a year
from the original completion schedule. Defense officials responsible
for implementing this recommendation told us that although the delay
might result in DOD taking possession of the building complex on the
last day of the statutory implementation period, as of May 2010, it
was examining options such as working with the building contractor to
allow some of the expected 6,400 employees to move into the building
earlier when work space becomes available, since it is unlikely all
employees can move into the building by the statutory deadline.
Fort Benning, Georgia, has also experienced delays in awarding
contracts related to the recommendation to establish the Maneuver
Center of Excellence.[Footnote 17] According to Army briefing
documents on the status of BRAC implementation, ensuring that
establishing the Maneuver Center will not harm the habitat of the red-
cockaded woodpecker, an endangered species resident at Fort Benning,
has resulted in delays on two projects to comply with environmental
regulations. Status reports for these two projects stated that the
Army had to redesign both, which caused the award for one to slip by
about 6 months and the expected completion of the construction on the
second project to slip by about 16 months. In addition, other delays
in awarding contracts at Fort Benning have resulted in 40 percent of
the students from the Armor School (2,787 training slots) delaying
their moves from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Fort Benning until the last
half of fiscal year 2011. According to Army Training and Doctrine
Command officials, there is no time left in the schedule for further
delays and any other delays could cause the Army to develop work-
arounds to continue maneuver training while construction is completed.
The BRAC recommendation to collocate the military services' medical
command headquarters has also experienced contracting delays. In March
2008, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics) assigned responsibility for this recommendation to TRICARE
Management Activity. At the same time, the Under Secretary directed
that the activity pursue an option to lease workspace. According to
DOD officials, however, such a lease would require congressional
preapproval and an OSD Basing Directorate official told us that as of
June 2010 this approval was moving though Congress.
Further, the implementation of a number of recommendations has been
affected by construction delays. For example, at Fort Jackson, South
Carolina, the Army is in the process of implementing a recommendation
to establish a Single Drill Sergeant School. The Army awarded the
contract for the school building in March 2008, but renovations had
not yet begun as of April 2010, because of concerns about moisture in
the walls of the building. An April 2010 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
report noted that the contract was behind schedule and that the delays
are now due to major water infiltration. An Army Installation Command
official told us the drill school was being housed in swing space
until the permanent building is available. Also, the recommendation to
close Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, which includes relocating the U.S.
Military Academy Preparatory School to West Point, New York, home to
the U.S. Military Academy, has experienced delays. Currently, the Army
expects to finish building its new facilities in the summer of 2012,
nearly a year after the end of the statutory implementation period.
The construction completion date for some facilities has slipped due
to problems with site selection, plan approval, and environmental and
contracting procedures. The Army intends to have the U.S. Military
Academy Preparatory School share academic and sports facilities of the
U.S. Military Academy until permanent Preparatory School facilities
are completed.
Installations Face Challenges Synchronizing Personnel Movements with
Construction Schedules:
DOD must synchronize the relocation of approximately 123,000 personnel
with the availability of about $25 billion in new construction or
renovation of facilities. Also, other DOD initiatives outside BRAC
will complicate the synchronizing of schedules for the movement of
personnel and equipment associated with BRAC. Specifically, the Army
and Marine Corps have been increasing the size of their active-duty
force by about 92,000. In addition, the repositioning of forces
stationed in Europe and the Army's ongoing reorganization to become a
more modular, brigade-based force have caused other movements and
relocations that have to be integrated with the BRAC implementation
schedules. The military is also drawing down the level of troops in
Iraq and returning some of these forces to U.S.
installations.[Footnote 18] The actions required to simultaneously
implement these initiatives with BRAC further complicate the
integration of moving schedules for personnel and equipment and raise
the level of risk for further schedule disruptions.
Delays in Interdependent Recommendations Could Have a Cascading Effect
on DOD's Ability to Complete BRAC by the Deadline:
Some BRAC locations are unable to begin renovation of buildings slated
to house realigning organizations until current tenants of these
buildings vacate, a situation that has delayed the beginning of
construction or renovation of needed buildings. Thus, any delays in
interdependent recommendations could have a cascading effect on the
timely completion of related recommendations. For example, Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland, as we have previously reported,[Footnote 19]
is part of the BRAC recommendation to close Fort Monmouth, New Jersey,
by relocating personnel from the Army's Communications-Electronics
Life Cycle Management Command to Aberdeen. Army officials originally
planned to renovate an existing facility at Aberdeen to house some of
the employees relocating from Fort Monmouth. The existing facility was
occupied by a training activity that is scheduled to relocate to Fort
Lee, Virginia, through another BRAC action. However, delays in
completing new facilities at Fort Lee delayed the relocation of the
training activity, which in turn delayed the renovation of the
Aberdeen facilities. As a result, to ensure that the employees from
Fort Monmouth can relocate on time, the Army is building a new
facility at Aberdeen at an additional cost of $17 million. Also, at
Fort Belvoir, Virginia, tenants departing Fort Belvoir as part of a
different BRAC recommendation are experiencing construction delays at
their new location, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, thus delaying final
moves. As a result, the renovation of the space expected to be vacated
at Fort Belvoir has been delayed, consequently holding up the ability
of the new occupants to move in. Officials stated that the Army was
deciding on whether to use swing space facilities at Redstone to house
the incoming Fort Belvoir tenants, which may increase costs.
Human Capital Challenges Could Affect Some Mission Capabilities:
Another concern that some relocating organizations are facing is the
potential loss of a skilled workforce if civilian personnel with
unique skills or abilities choose not to relocate, especially those
requiring extensive education, training, and experience.
Some BRAC officials we spoke with suggested that when a function
transfers to a nearby location, the number of employees that remain in
their jobs is high, while relocations to more distant or isolated
locations result in the need to hire more new employees to replace
those who do not relocate. Officials from the military services told
us that a number of critical positions may be vacant at the end of the
implementation period if DOD is unable to adequately replace staff
that choose not to move to the new location. For example, officials
responsible for implementing several Army recommendations have
expressed the loss of intellectual capital as one of their most
important issues in status briefings to the Vice Chief of Staff of the
Army. In an April 2010 briefing, Army officials cited five Army
commands relocating their headquarters as of concern--Army Materiel
Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, U.S.
Army Reserve Command, and the First Army. These officials also said
that a risk exists of an adverse impact on mission performance or
capabilities and that vacancies in critical, high-skill positions have
the potential to degrade the level of support these commands can
provide to ongoing military operations as well as the regular
functions performed by these commands.
Similarly, we have previously reported on the challenges DOD will
encounter in reconstituting the highly technical workforce relocating
from Fort Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground.[Footnote 20] Other BRAC
2005 recommendations contain similar challenges. For example, Navy
officials told us that very few employees have committed to moving to
Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, California, and the Navy has
over 1,000 positions to fill to reconstitute the necessary workforce
at the new location. In addition, the relative isolation and distance
from urban centers may make it more difficult for the Navy to persuade
current employees to relocate and could also make hiring more
difficult. In San Antonio, the ability of DOD to attract medical
personnel to staff the larger renovated hospital on Fort Sam Houston,
Texas, is a continuing concern to DOD managers. The specialized nature
of the jobs to be filled and the slowness of the DOD Civilian
Personnel System to hire have caused concern and uncertainty,
according to an official with the San Antonio Joint Program Office.
Another challenge to successful BRAC implementation, which could
exacerbate the human capital challenges, is the impact of BRAC
recommendations on the communities adjacent to affected installations,
especially those that are expecting large growth in personnel numbers.
We have previously reported that communities surrounding DOD
installations experiencing substantial growth had identified the need
for roads, additional school capacity, and affordable housing as their
primary challenges.[Footnote 21] Based on our most recent analysis of
22 communities that DOD's Office of Economic Adjustment has identified
as being substantially and seriously affected by DOD-related growth,
[Footnote 22] we found that overall, those communities identified
transportation, education, and health services as their top growth-
management issues. For example, the communities surrounding Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, believe that transportation systems require
significant improvements to support BRAC actions, and many of the
needed transportation projects currently lack state funding. In
addition, Fairfax County, Virginia, public school officials believe
they lack adequate elementary school capacity to support the expected
personnel increases at Fort Belvoir. Housing demands and air quality
issues due to additional traffic congestion were also cited as
community challenges by Fairfax County officials. Another example is
Montgomery County, Maryland, home of the BRAC-created Walter Reed
National Military Medical Center. County officials expect significant
impacts on the county's transportation infrastructure due to the
increases in personnel and visitors to the expanded medical facilities.
DOD Is Addressing Some Implementation Challenges; However, These
Actions May Increase Costs:
The military services are addressing various logistical challenges
that could affect DOD's ability to complete actions to implement their
recommendations by the statutory deadline. In addition, DOD is
planning on various mitigating actions to be able to provide for
buildings and move or hire the needed personnel by the deadline. These
plans, such as providing swing space facilities to move temporarily
into different buildings while construction and renovations are being
completed, and hiring or relocation financial incentives, and other
mitigation actions may lead to additional costs. However, the Army is
not reporting some of these mitigation costs that it is funding
outside the BRAC account in its BRAC budget materials provided to
Congress, thus hindering OSD's full visibility over these
implementation costs.
DOD Is Taking Steps to Address Logistical Challenges to Implement BRAC
by the Deadline:
To ensure that senior leadership is apprised of significant issues
affecting the implementation of BRAC recommendations by September 15,
2011, OSD is requiring the military services and defense agencies to
provide it periodic implementation status briefings for
recommendations exceeding $100 million in implementation costs.
Officials may also discuss recommendations that have significant
concerns such as cost overruns or schedule delays. In addition, the
military services brief their senior leadership regularly to ensure
that significant implementation issues requiring management attention
are identified early, according to military service officials. The
Army has held four BRAC-specific briefings for the Army Vice Chief of
Staff since 2008 to ensure that Army leadership is aware of
implementation issues that require senior management attention. The
briefings to OSD and the services' leadership also provide information
on mitigation strategies that are being developed to address
implementation challenges.
The Army Is Planning to Use Swing Space Facilities to Mitigate Some
Construction Delays:
The Army has recognized that permanent buildings will not be ready at
some locations by the statutory deadline for some BRAC
recommendations. As a result, some Army installations are planning to
rely on swing space facilities to move relocating organizations
temporarily into different buildings while construction and
renovations are completed because permanent facilities may not be
ready by the deadline, or because some parts of an organization are
moving in phases to maintain the continuity of operations during the
relocation, and thus moving earlier than expected. At the same time,
relying on swing space facilities is adding to BRAC implementation
costs at some installations such as at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Other installations that might use swing space facilities include Fort
Belvoir, Virginia; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; and
the U.S. Military Academy, New York.
To relocate personnel associated with two BRAC recommendations--
realigning Army leased office space, and as part of Fort Monmouth's
closing and relocating some employees to Fort Belvoir--OSD and the
Army are both reexamining the cost feasibility of building permanent
facilities on an accelerated schedule, versus the cost of acquiring
swing space to have facilities available by the statutory September
2011 deadline. At the time of our review, it was still unclear whether
the Army would be able to construct permanent buildings at Fort
Belvoir by the deadline. In April 2010, DOD decided to build permanent
facilities at Fort Belvoir at a projected cost of $122 million.
According to a data sheet the services use to state project
requirements and justifications in support of funding requests for
military construction dated April 22, 2010, this construction project
will provide about 185,770 square feet of general and secure
administrative space, a parking garage, and surface parking for three
Army organizations relocating to Fort Belvoir from leased facilities
in the National Capital Region. The data sheet shows that the contract
award date is scheduled for September 2010, with completion of
construction slated for June 2011. However, until the contract is
actually awarded, the construction schedule will remain tentative. As
of July 2010, the project was still in the final design stage, and the
Army was developing the request for proposals. The current schedule
indicates that the Army will have to complete construction, outfit the
facility, and move the three organizations into the new facilities
within a 12-month period. With such a compressed schedule, any
disruptions or delays could still require the Army to consider the use
of swing space at Fort Belvoir to meet the implementation deadline.
Two examples of other installations that are using or planning to use
swing space facilities to house relocating employees follow.
* Fort Bragg, North Carolina--Close Fort McPherson, Georgia. As part
of this recommendation, Headquarters U.S. Army Forces Command and
Headquarters U.S. Army Reserve Command are relocating to Fort Bragg,
North Carolina. According to Forces Command officials, the two
commands will begin relocating their employees in a series of six
phased moves in an effort to maintain continuity of operations during
the relocation. However, the permanent building will not be ready
until June 2011, while the first three phases of relocating employees
are scheduled to begin arriving before then, in March 2011. These
employees will be temporarily housed in renovated buildings, such as
an old elementary school on base, and newly constructed warehouses, at
an estimated additional cost of about $35 million. The Army plans to
relocate the last three phases of employee moves to Fort Bragg
directly into the permanent headquarters building. Army officials also
noted that the renovated facilities would provide a long-term benefit
for the installation as they will be used for other purposes after the
BRAC 2005 moves are completed.
* U.S. Military Academy, New York--Close Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
The U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School is being relocated to the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York as one of the actions
under this recommendation. However, the Army's current plan for
implementing this relocation provides one barracks, the dining
facility, and one athletic field by June 2011, which would allow the
Preparatory School to move to the Academy. According to an Army
briefing on implementation status, the single barracks, athletic
field, and dining facility meet the BRAC requirement, as the mission
will have been relocated, although the other construction projects to
house the Preparatory School will not be completed until summer 2012,
nearly a year after the end of the statutory implementation period.
The Army intends to have the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School
share the academic and sports facilities of the U.S. Military Academy
until some portions of the Preparatory School are completed in January
2012, with the remaining portions scheduled to be completed by the
summer of 2012.
Organizations Are Making Efforts to Mitigate Potential Loss of Human
Capital and Retain Mission Capability:
Several of the organizations concerned about the loss of their skilled
workforce and the consequent impact on mission performance are
mitigating these challenges, which is adding to BRAC implementation
costs. For example, officials at the Army's Forces Command told us
that they are concerned about the possible loss of skilled personnel
and the consequent potential effects on continuity of operations
during the relocation from Fort McPherson, Georgia, to Fort Bragg,
North Carolina. Thus, the Command is guaranteeing a home sale if
relocating employees are unable to sell their home, and offering a 25
percent relocation bonus to civilian employees. The Command has also
approved house hunting trips to the Fort Bragg area for up to 10 days,
and employees will be given 5 duty days to move.
The Navy is conducting similar efforts to recruit the skilled
workforce needed for the implementation of the BRAC recommendation to
create a Naval Integration Weapons and Armaments Research,
Development, and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation Center at Naval Air
Weapons Station China Lake, California. According to Navy officials,
the Navy is using several approaches to filling vacancies at China
Lake including hiring bonuses, referral bonuses for employees who
recommend successful applicants, increasing the Navy's presence at job
fairs, advertising on billboards, and targeting areas of the country
with concentrations of corporate layoffs.
Army Has Not Reported Some BRAC Costs to Congress:
Acquiring swing space facilities and providing hiring or relocation
incentives to attract personnel and other mitigation actions may lead
to additional costs although some of these costs are not being
reported in the services' BRAC budget materials provided to Congress.
Since the fiscal year 2011 BRAC budget, which is the final annual
budget request to fund BRAC 2005 implementation costs through the
statutory completion date, has already been submitted to Congress, any
additional costs in our view may have to be funded from outside the
BRAC account.[Footnote 23] As part of each annual budget request, the
BRAC statute requires DOD to submit to Congress an estimate of the
total expenditures to fund the implementation of each base closure or
realignment action. Also, as part of obtaining funding to implement
BRAC 2005, the services prepare their own BRAC justification materials
submitted to Congress. The DOD Financial Management Regulation
requires the military services and defense agencies to accurately
capture BRAC-related costs to be reported in the annual BRAC budget
justification materials submitted to Congress.[Footnote 24] In
addition, the conference report to the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required the department to submit a
comprehensive accounting of the funding required to ensure
implementation of the final recommendations by September 2011.
[Footnote 25] However, BRAC budget justification materials submitted
to Congress since fiscal year 2006 do not contain complete information
on costs to implement BRAC recommendations that have been funded from
outside the BRAC 2005 account.
Specifically, we found that DOD's reported costs funded outside the
BRAC 2005 account are not complete because the Army has not reported
to Congress some costs that Army officials acknowledge are BRAC-
related. An Army official told us that some mitigation strategies,
such as offering financial incentives to relocating civilian personnel
were not reported as BRAC-related costs. In addition, U.S. Army Forces
Command officials told us that about $13 million in estimated BRAC-
related expenses to renovate buildings that will be used as swing
space facilities at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for relocated U.S.
Army Forces Command personnel are being funded with amounts
appropriated from the Recovery Act[Footnote 26] and from the Army's
Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization account funds, yet these
estimated additional costs are not being captured as a BRAC cost.
Further, a BRAC October 2009 status briefing to the Army's Vice Chief
of Staff noted that some requirements related to BRAC implementation,
such as program management, split operations, and personnel costs for
contractors, and overtime compensation to handle BRAC workload surge
are funded outside the BRAC account. Without information about other
known BRAC costs that the services have funded from outside the
account, the OSD Basing Office will not have full visibility over
measures the services are funding to meet the BRAC deadline and
mitigate implementation challenges. Moreover, until the Secretary of
Defense ensures that all BRAC-related costs are captured and reported,
neither congressional decision makers nor those within OSD who are
charged with overseeing BRAC implementation will have a complete
picture of the costs to implement the 2005 BRAC round.
Conclusions:
Although only 14 months remain to complete actions to implement the
recommendations before the September 2011 statutory completion
deadline, much work remains to be done to finish construction projects
and relocate civilian personnel, or to take mitigation steps such as
obtaining swing space facilities or hiring new personnel. Until the
military services determine what options they will choose to mitigate
those challenges, the full cost of implementing some of the BRAC
recommendations will remain uncertain. Since the final annual budget
request to fund the BRAC account has already been submitted, any
additional funds the services might need to implement the
recommendations by September 2011 may be funded from outside the BRAC
account. Although the services will continue to submit BRAC
justification materials to Congress after the implementation period in
future fiscal years for certain costs such as environmental
restoration, unless the services and other components also report BRAC
implementation costs that have been funded from outside the BRAC
account, those implementation costs will not be transparent, even to
OSD. In addition, Congress will lack visibility over the total cost to
implement the 2005 BRAC round.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To enhance OSD's reporting of BRAC implementation costs and increase
visibility of added costs due to recent efforts to address various
implementing challenges, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics), in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), to take steps to capture and appropriately report to
Congress any BRAC-related implementation costs that are funded from
outside the BRAC account.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of our report, DOD concurred with our
recommendation and stated that understanding the full cost of BRAC is
important and acknowledged that such reporting is required by the
Department's Financial Management Regulation. DOD noted that it is in
the process of drafting new BRAC guidance that, among other items,
will direct the services and defense agencies to provide a final
accounting for all BRAC costs (both inside and outside of the
account). DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated
as appropriate. DOD's written comments are reprinted in enclosure II.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force; Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director,
Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4523 or by e-mail at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
are on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report include Laura Talbott, Assistant
Director; Vijay Barnabas; John Beauchamp; Susan Ditto; Brandon Jones;
Gregory Marchand; Robert Poetta; and Charles Perdue.
Signed by:
Brian J. Lepore, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tim Johnson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans' Affairs, and Related
Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Chet Edwards:
Chairman:
The Honorable Zach Wamp:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Military Construction,
Veterans' Affairs, and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure 1: Scope and Methodology:
We reviewed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's
(BRAC) 182 recommendations to realign and close military bases as
presented in its September 2005 report to the President. Given the
unprecedented number of BRAC 2005 closures and realignments, we
generally focused our analysis on those recommendations that the
Department of Defense (DOD) either expects to cost the most, or has
scheduled to be completed very close to the statutory deadline. We
reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed officials in the
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Environment) and associated BRAC offices, commands, and defense
agencies that were implementing some of the most complex or most
costly BRAC realignments or closures to obtain the perspective of
officials directly involved in BRAC implementation planning and
execution.
To assess the challenges DOD faces that might affect the
implementation of the BRAC recommendations by the September 15, 2011,
statutory completion deadline, its efforts to mitigate those
challenges, and whether the cost of the mitigating solutions are fully
captured in BRAC budget justification requests, we reviewed relevant
documentation including BRAC business plans, DOD and service briefings
on BRAC implementation status, prior GAO reports, and the applicable
DOD Financial Management Regulation. We discussed BRAC construction
completion time frames with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers because
of its major role in planning and executing military construction
projects. We reviewed the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense November 21, 2008, memorandum to the services and defense
agencies responsible for implementing BRAC recommendations and
assessed the Office's requirements for briefings on the status of BRAC
implementation.
To obtain the perspective of installation and command officials, and
headquarters officials directly involved in BRAC implementation
planning and execution, we visited or contacted various installations,
commands, defense agencies, or headquarters because they were among
the closures or realignments that DOD projected to have significant
costs and to obtain a command-level perspective about BRAC
implementation challenges. We also selected some of these
installations or commands because they were responsible for
implementing recommendations with a significant number of actions such
as the completion of construction and movement of personnel expected
to occur near the statutory deadline. At these locations, we discussed
the specific challenges associated with implementing BRAC
recommendations and solutions proposed. Installations, commands,
defense agencies, and headquarters we visited or contacted follow.
* Air Force BRAC Program Management Office, Crystal City, Virginia.
* Army Base Realignment and Closure Division, Crystal City, Virginia.
* Army Installation Command Headquarters, Crystal City, Virginia.
* Army Installation Management Command Northeast Region, Fort Monroe,
Virginia.
* Army Installation Management Command Southeast Region, Fort
McPherson, Georgia.
* Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.
* Army Operations, Contingency Plans and Mobilization (G3), Arlington,
Virginia.
* Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.
* Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
* Missile Defense Agency, Arlington, Virginia.
* Navy BRAC Program Management Office, Crystal City, Virginia.
* Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Environment), Basing Directorate, Washington, D.C.
* San Antonio Integration Office, San Antonio,Texas.
* TRICARE Management Activity, Falls Church, Virginia.
* U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C.
* Washington Headquarters Service, Crystal City, Virginia.
Overall, we determined that the data for this report were sufficiently
reliable for identifying broad implementation challenges. We conducted
this performance audit from November 2009 to July 2010 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a responsible basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our report objectives. We believe the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Enclosure 2: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
July 16 2010:
Mr. Brian Lepore:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Lepore:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-10-725R/351412, "Military Base Realignments and Closures:
DoD Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Challenges to Meet BRAC Deadline But
Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs," dated June 7, 2010.
The Department appreciates the report's recognition of our commitment
to meeting the BRAC September 15, 2011, implementation deadline. The
report accurately describes the emphasis placed on oversight by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, including periodic briefings for
recommendations and required semi-annual business plan updates.
The Department concurs with the GAO's recommendation that the
Department should capture all BRAC-related implementation costs funded
from outside the BRAC account. While the Department's Financial
Management Regulation already requires DoD components to report costs
funded outside the account, my staff is in the process of
drafting new BRAC guidance that among other items will direct the
Components to provide a final accounting for all BRAC costs (both
inside and outside of the account). Understanding the full cost of
BRAC is important. That said, it is likely that the costs funded
outside of the BRAC account will prove to be relatively small in
relationship to DoD's $35B BRAC investment.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Dorothy Robyn:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment):
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning
Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant
Growth, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-602].
Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have
Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year
2009. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-98R]. Washington,
D.C.: November 13, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of
Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are
Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-750]. Washington, D.C.: September
9, 2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings
Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply-
Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-703]. Washington, D.C.: July 9,
2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in
Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently Updating
Savings Estimates. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-217]. Washington, D.C.: January 30,
2009.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to
Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1010R]. Washington, D.C.: August
13, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665]. Washington, D.C.:
June 17, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road
Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-602R]. Washington, D.C.: April 1,
2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Army and Marine Corps Grow the Force
Construction Projects Generally Support the Initiative. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-375]. Washington, D.C.: March 6,
2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower
Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC
Recommendations. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-315].
Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.
Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations
Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-244R]. Washington, D.C.: January
18, 2008.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have
Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-341T]. Washington, D.C.: December
12, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased
and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-159]. Washington, D.C.: December
11, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating,
Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute
of Pathology. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-20].
Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.
Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage,
and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics
Agency. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-121R].
Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] This dollar amount is based on DOD's fiscal year 2011 budget
submission to Congress to pay for continuing implementation of
recommendations from prior BRAC rounds (BRAC 1988, 1991, 1993, and
1995). This amount does not include other costs associated with BRAC
such as costs to complete environmental cleanup at BRAC bases in
future years and costs incurred by other DOD and federal agencies to
provide assistance to communities and individuals affected by BRAC.
DOD's budget submission is reported in current dollars (i.e., includes
projected inflation).
[2] BRAC legislation (Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX (1990)), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX (2001) provided for an
independent commission to review the Secretary of Defense's
realignment and closure recommendations and the commission had the
authority to change these recommendations if it determined that the
Secretary deviated substantially from the legally mandated selection
criteria. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
(referred to in this report as the BRAC Commission) presented its list
of final recommendations to the President, who approved them in their
entirety. The President subsequently forwarded these BRAC
recommendations to Congress, and they became effective on November 9,
2005.
[3] The relocation of about 15,000 U.S. military personnel from
various overseas locations back to the United States is included in
the BRAC 2005 recommendations. DOD plans to relocate approximately
55,000 additional military personnel in realignment actions not
directly related to BRAC.
[4] The Army is increasing its active-duty end strength by 65,000, and
the Marine Corps is increasing its active-duty end strength by 27,000.
[5] Military value refers to one of the BRAC selection criteria, which
also include such considerations as an installation's current and
future mission capabilities, condition, ability to accommodate future
needs, and cost of operations. Military value was a priority
consideration in prior BRAC rounds, along with costs and savings,
economic impact on communities, and other concerns. DOD adopted
similar criteria, establishing military value as a priority
consideration for the 2005 BRAC round and cost and savings as a
secondary consideration, which Congress subsequently enacted into law
in the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 2832 (2004) (amending Pub. L. No.
101-510, § 2913 (1990)).
[6] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L.
No. 101-510, Title XXIX (1990), as amended by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX
(2001).
[7] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges
in Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently
Updating Savings Estimates, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-217] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30,
2009).
[8] According to DOD officials, funds in the 2005 BRAC account will
remain available after September 15, 2011, for environmental
restoration, property management and disposal, and other caretaker
costs at closed or realigned installations.
[9] Pub. L. No. 110-181 (2008).
[10] H.R. Rep. No. 110-146 at 514 (May 11, 2007).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-217].
[12] DOD Financial Management Regulation, 7000.14R, vol. 2B, ch. 7,
Base Realignment and Closure Appropriations (September 2008).
[13] The first round in 1988 was authorized by the Defense
Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-526, Title II (1988) (as amended). Subsequently, additional
BRAC rounds were completed in 1991, 1993, and 1995 as authorized by
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
510, Title XXIX (1990) (as amended). The latest round--BRAC 2005--was
authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX (2001).
[14] DOD defines major closures as installations recommended for
closure with plant replacement value exceeding $100 million and major
realignments as installations losing more than 400 military and
civilian personnel. Minor closures and realignments are those closures
and realignments that do not meet the definitions above.
[15] Statement of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Environment) before the House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related
Agencies (Mar. 17, 2010).
[16] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-181, § 2708 (2008).
[17] BRAC 2005 recommended the creation of Army training centers of
excellence, requiring consolidation of some training staff and
facilities. One such planned center of excellence--the Army Maneuver
Center at Fort Benning, Georgia--is to be created through the
consolidation of the Armor School and Center (currently located at
Fort Knox, Kentucky) with the Infantry School and Center at Fort
Benning. This consolidation is expected to lead to personnel movements
from Fort Knox to Fort Benning.
[18] See GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its
Facility Planning Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing
Significant Growth, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-602] (Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2010) for more information on Army facility requirements to support
these initiatives.
[19] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing
Plans to Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain, GAO-08-1010R
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2008).
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1010R].
[21] GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help
Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-665] (Washington, D.C.:
June 17, 2008).
[22] The 22 growth communities provided feedback to the Office of
Economic Adjustment during a Defense Community Conference in November
2009. The community information does not necessarily represent
information from, or the views of, the Office of Economic Adjustment
and DOD.
[23] While the budget request for fiscal year 2011is the final request
for funding during the statutory 6-year implementation period for BRAC
2005, DOD officials have stated that they will continue submitting
budget requests and justification materials for BRAC 2005-related
expenses in future years.
[24] DOD Financial Management Regulation, 7000.14R, vol. 2B, ch. 7,
Base Realignment and Closure Appropriations (September 2008).
[25] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-181, § 2706 (2008).
[26] American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5
(2009).
[End of section]
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