Military Training
Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges to Address Projected Future Requirements Gao ID: GAO-10-720 July 16, 2010The Army's and Marine Corps' major training facilities--Army and Marine Corps combat training centers and Army mobilization training centers--have focused on training units for counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As troop levels decrease in Iraq and increase in Afghanistan, larger numbers of forces will be training for Afghanistan. To meet future requirements, the services plan to adjust training to train forces on a fuller range of missions. The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed GAO to report on any challenges the Department of Defense faces as it adjusts training capacities. GAO assessed the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have (1) made adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger deployments to Afghanistan; and (2) developed plans to adjust training capacity to meet future requirements. GAO analyzed service training guidance, future training requirements, and related plans, and interviewed headquarters officials and personnel from the services' major training facilities.
Due to similarities in training requirements, the Army and Marine Corps did not need to make significant adjustments at their major training facilities to support the shift in operational priority from Iraq to Afghanistan. While the Army had to adapt training scenarios to more closely resemble the operating environment in Afghanistan, it did not have to adjust trainers, training ranges, and mock towns and villages as these are the same regardless of whether forces are preparing for missions in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Since the summer of 2009, the Marine Corps had withdrawn most of its forces from Iraq and shifted the focus of training at its combat training center to exclusively train forces for missions in Afghanistan. Like the Army, the Marine Corps noted that, because of similarities in training requirements, it had to make few adjustments beyond changing some cultural role players and signs in mock towns and villages to support its shift in focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. The Army and Marine Corps face several challenges as they plan to broaden the scope and size of training rotations to meet future training requirements. The Army projects capacity shortfalls at its combat training centers as it seeks to train brigade combat teams to meet future requirements for both ongoing operations and full-spectrum operations--offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The Army has identified the need to conduct 36 to 37 annual training rotations for its brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2011; the centers can currently conduct 28 rotations a year. The Army is developing an exportable capability, expected to increase its capacity by 6 rotations each year when it reaches full operational capability in 2013. However, this will not be sufficient to meet the total projected requirements. To address the gap, the Army plans to give priority to deploying units. The Army has not completed an assessment to determine its full range of options for meeting future brigade combat team training requirements, or the risks associated with not conducting the desired number of training rotations. The Army's force generation model calls for smaller reserve-component units to train for both ongoing and full-spectrum operations, but the Army has not finalized its training strategy for these reserve-component forces. The Army has identified training requirements and locations where deploying forces will train for ongoing operations, but it has not determined where or when it will train its reserve-component contingency forces for full spectrum operations. The Army has the capacity to train 86,000 reserve-component personnel at its seven mobilization training centers each year. It is also conducting enhanced training at other locations, which could expand capacity. Until the Army finalizes its reserve-component training strategy it will not be able to determine whether it can leverage existing resources to meet future training requirements, or whether any excess reserve-component training capacity exists. In the future, the Marine Corps plans to expand training to allow larger numbers of forces to train together, but it lacks sufficient space at its combat training center. It is considering alternatives for acquiring land, ranging in size from approximately 131,000 to 200,000 acres, and expects to reach a decision by fiscal year 2012. GAO recommends the Army develop a risk-assessment and mitigation plan to address gaps in training capacity, and assess how it can maximize existing resources to conduct reserve-component training called for under its force generation model. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Sharon L. Pickup Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-9619GAO-10-720, Military Training: Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges to Address Projected Future Requirements
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-720
entitled 'Military Training: Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges to
Address Projected Future Requirements' which was released on July 16,
2010.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2010:
Military Training:
Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges to Address Projected Future
Requirements:
GAO-10-720:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-720, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Army‘s and Marine Corps‘ major training facilities”Army and Marine
Corps combat training centers and Army mobilization training centers”
have focused on training units for counterinsurgency missions in Iraq
and Afghanistan. As troop levels decrease in Iraq and increase in
Afghanistan, larger numbers of forces will be training for
Afghanistan. To meet future requirements, the services plan to adjust
training to train forces on a fuller range of missions. The House
report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
directed GAO to report on any challenges the Department of Defense
faces as it adjusts training capacities. GAO assessed the extent to
which the Army and Marine Corps have (1) made adjustments at their
major training facilities to support larger deployments to
Afghanistan; and (2) developed plans to adjust training capacity to
meet future requirements. GAO analyzed service training guidance,
future training requirements, and related plans, and interviewed
headquarters officials and personnel from the services‘ major training
facilities.
What GAO Found:
Due to similarities in training requirements, the Army and Marine
Corps did not need to make significant adjustments at their major
training facilities to support the shift in operational priority from
Iraq to Afghanistan. While the Army had to adapt training scenarios to
more closely resemble the operating environment in Afghanistan, it did
not have to adjust trainers, training ranges, and mock towns and
villages as these are the same regardless of whether forces are
preparing for missions in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Since the summer
of 2009, the Marine Corps had withdrawn most of its forces from Iraq
and shifted the focus of training at its combat training center to
exclusively train forces for missions in Afghanistan. Like the Army,
the Marine Corps noted that, because of similarities in training
requirements, it had to make few adjustments beyond changing some
cultural role players and signs in mock towns and villages to support
its shift in focus from Iraq to Afghanistan.
The Army and Marine Corps face several challenges as they plan to
broaden the scope and size of training rotations to meet future
training requirements. The Army projects capacity shortfalls at its
combat training centers as it seeks to train brigade combat teams to
meet future requirements for both ongoing operations and full-spectrum
operations”offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The Army
has identified the need to conduct 36 to 37 annual training rotations
for its brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2011; the centers can
currently conduct 28 rotations a year. The Army is developing an
exportable capability, expected to increase its capacity by 6
rotations each year when it reaches full operational capability in
2013. However, this will not be sufficient to meet the total projected
requirements. To address the gap, the Army plans to give priority to
deploying units. The Army has not completed an assessment to determine
its full range of options for meeting future brigade combat team
training requirements, or the risks associated with not conducting the
desired number of training rotations. The Army‘s force generation
model calls for smaller reserve-component units to train for both
ongoing and full-spectrum operations, but the Army has not finalized
its training strategy for these reserve-component forces. The Army has
identified training requirements and locations where deploying forces
will train for ongoing operations, but it has not determined where or
when it will train its reserve-component contingency forces for full
spectrum operations. The Army has the capacity to train 86,000 reserve-
component personnel at its seven mobilization training centers each
year. It is also conducting enhanced training at other locations,
which could expand capacity. Until the Army finalizes its reserve-
component training strategy it will not be able to determine whether
it can leverage existing resources to meet future training
requirements, or whether any excess reserve-component training
capacity exists. In the future, the Marine Corps plans to expand
training to allow larger numbers of forces to train together, but it
lacks sufficient space at its combat training center. It is
considering alternatives for acquiring land, ranging in size from
approximately 131,000 to 200,000 acres, and expects to reach a
decision by fiscal year 2012.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends the Army develop a risk-assessment and mitigation plan
to address gaps in training capacity, and assess how it can maximize
existing resources to conduct reserve-component training called for
under its force generation model. DOD generally agreed with our
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-720] or key
components. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-
9619 or PickupS@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Army's and Marine Corps' Major Training Facilities Require Few
Adjustments to Support Force Increase in Afghanistan:
The Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges in Adjusting Training
Capacity to Meet Their Identified Future Requirements:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Current Training Capacity at the Army's Major Training
Facilities:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Current and Potential Army Maneuver CTC Training Rotation
Requirements Based on Force Generation Cycle:
Table 2: Organizations Interviewed during Our Review:
Table 3: Training Conducted at the Army's Maneuver CTCs:
Table 4: Training Conducted at the Army's Mobilization Training
Centers for the Reserve and National Guard:
Figure:
Figure 1: Phases of ARFORGEN:
Abbreviations:
ARFORGEN: Army Force Generation:
CTC: Combat Training Center:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 16, 2010:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Since 2003, the Army and Marine Corps have focused much of their
training on preparing forces for counterinsurgency missions in Iraq
and Afghanistan, training larger numbers of forces for Iraq. However,
with the drawdown in Iraq and increase in troop levels in Afghanistan,
the services are beginning to train more forces to deploy to
Afghanistan. The high pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and
focus on counterinsurgency missions has affected the Army and Marine
Corps' ability to train their forces for a fuller range of missions at
their major training facilities--the Army's and Marine Corps' Combat
Training Centers (CTC) and the Army's mobilization training centers
for the Reserve and National Guard. Recognizing the uncertainty of
future conflicts and the need for forces to have a broader range of
skills, the Army and Marine Corps are beginning to make plans to
adjust the training capacity[Footnote 1]--such as the number of
rotations[Footnote 2] and related support--at their major training
facilities to train forces for a fuller range of missions.
The House Armed Services Committee report to the Fiscal Year 2010
National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report on a number
of military readiness issues, including any challenges DOD faces in
adjusting training capacity and scope to support larger deployments to
Afghanistan while still preparing forces for deployments to Iraq.
[Footnote 3] In April 2010, we issued a report on the consistency of
combat skills training provided to Army and Marine Corps support
forces,[Footnote 4] and will report separately on other issues called
for in the House report. For this report we evaluated (1) the extent
to which the Army and Marine Corps have made adjustments at their
major training facilities to support larger deployments to Afghanistan
while still preparing forces for deployments to Iraq, and (2) the
extent to which the Army and the Marine Corps have developed plans to
adjust training capacity to meet future training requirements.
To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have made
adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger
deployments to Afghanistan--while still preparing forces for
deployments to Iraq--we reviewed Army and Marine Corps training policy
and guidance, and we interviewed headquarters service officials to
discuss these documents. In focusing our review, we also identified
the Army's and Marine Corps' major predeployment training facilities;
specifically the locations at which these services are conducting
final mission-rehearsal exercises that include live-fire training for
units deploying in support of current operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.[Footnote 5] For the Army we focused on active and
National Guard brigade combat teams, which prepare and train for
deployment at the Army's maneuver CTCs. In addition, we focused on the
Army's mobilization training centers, where National Guard brigade
combat teams that will be split into smaller units in theater conduct
training.[Footnote 6] Because smaller-sized reserve-component units
also conduct predeployment training at the Army's mobilization
training centers for the Reserve and National Guard, we included these
units in the scope of this review.[Footnote 7] We did not include
active component units that do not train at maneuver CTCs since these
units generally train at different locations--their home stations
where they have training facilities and support. For the Marine Corps
we focused on units training for deployment at its only CTC, at
Twentynine Palms, California.
We obtained and reviewed information from the Army's and Marine Corps'
major training facilities on the training they conducted in fiscal
year 2009 and fiscal year 2010, through April. We interviewed
officials at the selected locations of the services' major training
facilities and at the installations where the Army's mobilization
training centers for the Reserve and National Guard are located to
discuss adjustments that they made to support larger deployment to
Afghanistan while still training for operations in Iraq. Specifically,
we held discussions with officials from all four of the Army's CTCs;
the Marine Corps' only CTC, the Air Ground Combat Center, located at
Twentynine Palms, California; and officials from the Army's seven
mobilization training centers for the Reserve and National Guard where
the Army currently conducts training and plans to conduct training in
the future.[Footnote 8] To determine the extent to which the Army and
the Marine Corps have developed plans to adjust training capacity, we
reviewed training guidance and strategies that provided information
about future training requirements for the services, including the
Army's force generation annex to its campaign plan and the Marine
Corps' expeditionary brigade training requirements. We interviewed
Army and Marine Corps officials to discuss the future training
requirements and the available capacity at their major training
facilities. We also examined existing Army and Marine Corps plans and
strategies to adjust capacity to meet future training requirements. We
did not evaluate the effectiveness of the training programs conducted
at these locations.
We assessed the reliability of the data presented in this report.
Specifically, with regard to capacity--the maximum number of training
rotations that can be conducted, or people that can be trained, on a
sustainable basis--we interviewed officials and obtained data from the
Army's and Marine Corps' headquarters organizations. In addition, we
interviewed officials and obtained data from the major training
facilities to verify that these data were consistent with the data
provided by the headquarters organizations. We found the data to be
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to May 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional
details on our scope and methodology are in appendix I.
Background:
Types of Army and Marine Corps Training:
During initial entry training, recruits are trained on service tasks
and skills, including basic military tactics, weapons training, and
marksmanship. In addition, the services have annual training
requirements that are focused on tasks such as crew-served weapons
training, reacting to chemical and biological attacks, and offensive
and defensive tactics. Prior to deploying overseas, units must also
complete a set of service-directed predeployment training
requirements, including a mission-rehearsal exercise.
Army Force Generation:
The Army's Force Generation model (ARFORGEN) is a cyclical unit-
readiness model that affects the types of training that units conduct
during each phase. Through ARFORGEN, the Army builds the readiness of
units as they move through three phases: Reset, Train/Ready, and
Available. The Army uses these phases, which are described in figure
1, to prioritize resources and coordinate training, personnel, and
equipment.
Figure 1: Phases of ARFORGEN:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Train/Ready:
Units build increased readiness. Deploying forces train for their
operational mission; contingency forces, those without an operational
mission, train for full-spectrum operations. Active units may be
deployed; reserve-component units may be mobilized.
Available:
Units may or may not deploy. Units that do not deploy may conduct
training or exercises; some units may remain in the phase as
contingency forces. Deployed units will return to Reset upon
redeployment; units that do not deploy will return to Reset after 12
months.
Reset:
Active and reserve-component units remain in this phase for a minimum6
and 12 months, respectively. Activities include: family reintegration,
block leave, and individual and institutional training.
Source: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 1, units entering the Available phase may or may
not be deployed to conduct operational missions; units that are
deployed in support of operations are known as deployed forces. Units
in the Available phase that are not deployed are known as contingency
forces. These units may conduct training or exercises with other
services, governmental agencies, or military security forces from
other nations. If units are deployed, they will return to the Reset
phase upon redeployment--regardless of the length of deployment. If
they are not deployed, units will return to the Reset phase after 12
months. There are no prescribed time lengths for one complete ARFORGEN
cycle because the length of the cycle is driven by the length of
active-component deployments, and reserve-component mobilizations.
While current deployments are typically 12 months long, the Army has
also used deployments of varying lengths, including 6 and 15 months,
to support its ongoing operations. For the Army's active-component
forces the ARFORGEN cycle is three times as long as its deployments,
and for its reserve-component forces the cycle is five times as long
as its mobilizations.
Army's and Marine Corps' Major Training Facilities and Approaches to
Training:
The Army maintains four CTCs: the Battle Command Training Program,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the National Training Center, Fort Irwin,
California; the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana;
and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany. The
Battle Command Training Program trains the command element of a unit.
[Footnote 9] The National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training
Center, and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, collectively
referred to as the maneuver CTCs, train brigade combat teams--
approximately 5,000 servicemembers--during rotations that last for 18
to 25 days.
Since 2003, the Army's maneuver CTCs have been conducting mission-
rehearsal exercises for units prior to their deployments. Each
training rotation is designed to challenge units and their leaders
with the opportunity to face a well-trained opposing force, provide in-
depth analyses of performance to units and their leaders, and create a
realistic training environment, intended to closely parallel actual
warfare, including live-fire training. Training rotations at the
maneuver CTCs also include force-on-force training in a live, virtual,
and constructive environment. As noted in appendix II, the Army's
maneuver CTCs can conduct 28 training rotations annually for brigade
combat teams. In addition to a brigade combat team, a CTC training
rotation may also include Army support units and personnel or
capabilities from other services and agencies.
In addition to the maneuver CTCs, the Army has seven mobilization
training centers for the Reserve and National Guard that are operated
by First Army--which is responsible for training mobilized reservists--
that conduct predeployment training. This training ranges from 15 to
60 days for reserve-component units varying in size from small
detachments--1 or 2 people--to brigade combat teams. Prior to
deployment, units conduct mobilization and collective training at the
Army's mobilization training centers for the Reserve and National
Guard: Fort Dix, New Jersey; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Fort Knox,
Kentucky; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Stewart, Georgia; Camp
Shelby, Mississippi; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort McCoy,
Wisconsin; Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and Fort Lewis, Washington.[Footnote
10]
Before 2008, all deploying brigade combat teams conducted training at
an Army maneuver CTC prior to deployment. However, in 2008, due to the
high operational tempos from the force increase in Iraq, and finite
training capacities, the Army determined that reserve-component
brigade combat teams that would be split into smaller units and
assigned other missions, such as security forces, would conduct
training at the Army's mobilization training centers. The brigade
combat teams that would control battle space in theater, both active
and reserve component, would conduct training at the maneuver CTCs.
We reported in July 2009 that capacity constraints had limited reserve-
component access to facilities at certain Army mobilization training
centers because they also were being used by active-component forces.
[Footnote 11] Around that time, First Army began to consolidate the
Army's mobilization training centers for the Reserve and National
Guard from 11 to 7. Specifically, First Army is retaining the
locations that are owned by the reserve component or which have a
dedicated training area for mobilizing reservists. These mobilization
training centers will concentrate their efforts on training specific
mission sets required for current operations while maintaining
flexibility to support other missions in the future. As shown in
appendix II, in fiscal year 2009, approximately 89,000 servicemembers
were trained at the Army's mobilization training centers for the
Reserve and National Guard.
The Marine Corps is organized into Marine Air-Ground Task Forces--
which include headquarters, ground combat, logistics combat, and
aviation combat elements--that train, exercise, and deploy as fully
integrated combined-arms teams. At the Marine Corps' CTC, the Air
Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California, battalion-sized
units participate in a 28-day exercise that immerses units in an
environment that is continuously updated and is designed to replicate
the current operational conditions using mock urban villages, cultural
role players, and equipment that will be employed in Afghanistan. The
exercise includes two infantry battalions, a combat logistics
battalion, and an aviation combat element in a single rotation that
prepares Marines for the tactics and procedures they are expected to
employ in Afghanistan. In addition, the Marine Corps will occasionally
incorporate units from other services, such as the Air Force and Navy,
and other nations to enhance the training experience.
The Marine Corps can conduct 6 training rotations per year at
Twentynine Palms; in fiscal year 2009 it trained approximately 23,000
servicemembers. As of April 2010, the Marine Corps has trained
approximately 9,800 servicemembers in support of missions in
Afghanistan.
Prior Work:
We have previously reported on the Army's approach to training and
mobilizing its reserve component.[Footnote 12] In July 2009, we
reported that although the Army was exploring and had several
initiatives underway to address training constraints, it had not
identified the total requirements with its reserve-component training
strategy. We recommended that the Army determine the range of
resources and support that are necessary to fully implement its
reserve-component training strategy. DOD partially agreed with our
recommendation, however, as of May 2010, the Army had not identified
the total requirements to fully implement its reserve-component
training strategy.
Army's and Marine Corps' Major Training Facilities Require Few
Adjustments to Support Force Increase in Afghanistan:
The Army and Marine Corps have shifted their operational priority from
Iraq to Afghanistan; however, few adjustments were required at the
Army's major training facilities for a number of reasons, including
the similarities in the Army's training requirements for both
operations. In addition, since summer 2009, the Marine Corps has been
preparing most of its forces for missions in Afghanistan at its CTC at
Twentynine Palms.
Similarities in Army Predeployment Requirements and Related Support
Result in Few Needed Changes at the Army's Major Training Facilities:
Initially, the Army published separate predeployment training guidance
for forces deploying in support of operations in Iraq and operations
in Afghanistan. However, in September 2007, the guidance was combined
into one document[Footnote 13] because there were only small
differences in the required training tasks for the two
operations.[Footnote 14] Because of the similarities in requirements,
the Army has had to make few adjustments at its major training
facilities to support the increase in forces deploying to Afghanistan.
For example, maneuver CTCs have continued to train the same types of
units--brigade combat teams--as the Army has increased its forces in
Afghanistan and reduced its forces in Iraq. The Army's maneuver CTC
and mobilization training centers for the Reserve and National Guard,
which have dedicated opposing forces[Footnote 15] and trainers, use
these same groups to train and prepare forces for missions in either
Iraq or Afghanistan. These major training facilities also use the same
training ranges, mock towns and villages, and instrumentation to train
for both operations. Officials noted that they do not change much of
the physical appearance of the training area except for village names
and signs within the mock towns and villages to ensure that the proper
language is displayed.
While the equipment used in training varies somewhat for forces
deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, according to officials, these
differences have required only minimal adjustments and have not
affected the mission-rehearsal exercises or number of training
rotations being conducted. For example, the types of Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected vehicles that troops train on may vary due to the
differing terrain between the two operations. In Afghanistan units use
a lighter-weight all-terrain-capable version of the Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected vehicles better suited for the uneven terrain and
subpar road conditions, whereas in Iraq units use a heavier version of
the vehicles. According to Army officials, the maneuver CTCs currently
do not have the number of all-terrain-capable Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicles that they prefer for enhancing collective training;
the majority of these vehicles currently are being deployed to
Afghanistan. Therefore, the available vehicles are primarily being
used at the maneuver CTCs to support individual training tasks
required prior to deploying for operations in Afghanistan. As we
previously reported, in instances when units lack the equipment to
train on a task prior to deployment, they are supposed to receive the
required training after they deploy.[Footnote 16]
Army officials stated that the biggest change in adapting from Iraq to
Afghanistan is in the training scenarios that are used during the
rotations. For example, forces deploying to both Iraq and Afghanistan
are provided training on counter-improvised explosive devices;
however, differences in how the devices are being used in the two
countries result in slightly different training scenarios. Although
the development of the initial training scenarios for Afghanistan took
several months, once the scenarios are developed, they can be tailored
for each unit 180 days prior to the unit arriving at one of the Army's
major training facilities. In addition, officials noted that the types
of cultural role players participating in these scenarios were also
different. For example, regarding languages for Iraq, role players in
training scenarios speak Arabic; for Afghanistan, they speak Dari and
Pashtu.
Few Adjustments Required at the Marine Corps Training Facility:
From 2003 to 2009, the Marine Corps had a significant number of forces
in Iraq. With the drawdown of forces in Iraq, however, the Marine
Corps has shifted its focus to missions in Afghanistan; as of the
summer of 2009, the Marine Corps was conducting limited training for
missions in Iraq at its CTC at Twentynine Palms.
Like the Army, the Marine Corps, because of similarities in training
requirements, had to make few adjustments at Twentynine Palms to
support its shift in focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. For example, the
Marine Corps uses the same training ranges, trainers, and mock towns
and villages as it did when training forces for Iraq. However some
modifications, such as changes to the signs in the mock towns and
villages and the addition of Afghan role players, have been made to
better replicate the current environment.
The Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges in Adjusting Training
Capacity to Meet Their Identified Future Requirements:
The Army and Marine Corps face challenges as they look to broaden the
scope and size of their training rotations in the future. The Army
projects capacity shortfalls at its maneuver CTCs to meet its
identified future requirements to train brigade combat teams for both
continuing operations and a broader range of offensive, defensive, and
stability operations. Further, the Army has not developed a plan to
use its existing training capacity to meet these full-spectrum
training requirements for its smaller reserve-component units. In
addition, the Marine Corps estimates that it does not have sufficient
training capacity to meet future large-scale training requirements at
its major training facility; however, it is pursuing a land
acquisition to meet its requirements.
The Army Has Identified the Need for Extra Capacity by Fiscal Year
2011:
As outlined in the Army Training Strategy,[Footnote 17] the ARFORGEN
process calls for brigade combat teams to conduct training rotations
at the maneuver CTCs.[Footnote 18] To support this process, the Army
has identified the need to conduct 36 to 37 brigade combat team
rotations annually. Seventy-two of the Army's 73 brigade combat teams
will conduct their rotations at the maneuver CTCs.[Footnote 19] The
timing of units' rotations will depend on many factors, including
their component and location.
Specifically, the ARFORGEN process calls for most of the Army's active
component brigade combat teams to conduct two maneuver CTC rotations
during each ARFORGEN cycle. The first rotation will occur following
the Reset phase and units will focus on their core missions by
conducting full-spectrum operations training that includes offensive,
defensive, and stability operations or homeland operations. The second
rotation will occur at the end of the unit's Train/Ready phase and
will focus on either the unit's deployment mission--if the unit has
been designated for deployment--or on its core missions if the unit
has not been scheduled to deploy and has instead been designated as a
contingency force.
The ARFORGEN process calls for reserve-component brigade combat teams
to conduct one maneuver CTC rotation during their ARFORGEN cycle. Due
to their part-time status following deployments, Army National Guard
brigade combat teams will go into the Reset pool for 12 months--twice
as long as active brigade combat teams. As units move into the
available pool after completing the Train/Ready phase of ARFORGEN,
they will conduct a maneuver CTC rotation. If the unit is scheduled to
deploy, its rotation will focus on the deployed mission. If the unit
is designated a contingency force, its rotation will focus primarily
on full-spectrum operations.
Under ARFORGEN, forward-deployed brigade combat teams in Europe, with
ready access to the maneuver CTC in Germany, will conduct a CTC
rotation every year regardless of which phase of the ARFORGEN cycle
the unit is in. The brigade combat team in Korea, which is thousands
of miles from the nearest maneuver CTC, will not conduct a maneuver
CTC rotation and will conduct all of its training in Korea.
Based on its projected tempo of operations in fiscal year 2011--12-
month deployments and goals of 1:2 active component and 1:4 reserve
component time-deployed to time-at-home ratios--the Army has
identified the need to conduct 36 to 37 training rotations, as
displayed in table 1. In addition, the table highlights--under
different deployment scenarios--the effect that the ARFORGEN model's
inputs can have on the number of maneuver CTC rotations that are
needed. Specifically, table 1 shows different deployment periods,
ranging from 6 to 15 months,[Footnote 20] and the number of maneuver
CTC rotations required for each example. The examples in table 1 are
meant to be illustrative; we did not reach any conclusions regarding
these scenarios and recognize that the Army must consider many factors
in determining the length of deployments.
Table 1: Current and Potential Army Maneuver CTC Training Rotation
Requirements Based on Force Generation Cycle:
Active component:
Active-component ratio, time-deployed to time-at-home;
Goal: 12-month deployment: 1:2;
Example A: 12-month deployment: 1:3;
Example B: 6-month deployment: 1:3;
Example C: 15-month deployment[A]: 1:3.
Length of complete active-component ARFORGEN cycle (years);
Goal: 12-month deployment: 3;
Example A: 12-month deployment: 4;
Example B: 6-month deployment: 2;
Example C: 15-month deployment[A]: 5.
Active-component rotations in ARFORGEN cycle (40 brigade combat teams,
2 rotations per cycle);
Goal: 12-month deployment: 80;
Example A: 12-month deployment: 80;
Example B: 6-month deployment: 80;
Example C: 15-month deployment[A]: 80.
Number of active-component rotations required per year (cycle
rotations/length of cycle);
Goal: 12-month deployment: 27;
Example A: 12-month deployment: 20;
Example B: 6-month deployment: 40;
Example C: 15-month deployment[A]: 16.
Reserve component:
Reserve-component ratio, time-deployed to time-at-home;
Goal: 12-month deployment: 1:4;
Example A: 12-month deployment: 1:5;
Example B: 6-month deployment: 1:5;
Example C: 15-month deployment[A]: 1:5.
Length of complete reserve-component ARFORGEN cycle (years);
Goal: 12-month deployment: 5;
Example A: 12-month deployment: 6;
Example B: 6-month deployment: 3;
Example C: 15-month deployment[A]: 6.
Reserve-component rotations in ARFORGEN cycle (28 brigade combat
teams, 1 rotation per cycle);
Goal: 12-month deployment: 28;
Example A: 12-month deployment: 28;
Example B: 6-month deployment: 28;
Example C: 15-month deployment[A]: 28.
Number of reserve-component rotations required per year (cycle
rotations/length of cycle);
Goal: 12-month deployment: 5-6;
Example A: 12-month deployment: 4-5;
Example B: 6-month deployment: 9-10;
Example C: 15-month deployment[A]: 4-5.
Brigade combat teams outside of the United States:
4 active-component brigade combat teams, Europe (1 rotation per year);
Goal: 12-month deployment: 4;
Example A: 12-month deployment: 4;
Example B: 6-month deployment: 4;
Example C: 15-month deployment[A]: 4.
1 active-component brigade combat team, Korea[B];
Goal: 12-month deployment: 0;
Example A: 12-month deployment: 0;
Example B: 6-month deployment: 0;
Example C: 15-month deployment[A]: 0.
Total rotations required annually for 73 Army brigade combat teams;
Goal: 12-month deployment: 36-37;
Example A: 12-month deployment: 28-29;
Example B: 6-month deployment: 53-54;
Example C: 15-month deployment[A]: 24-25.
Source: Department of the Army.
[A] Due to the 12-month mobilization policy, the ARFORGEN cycle for
the reserve component will remain 60 months.
[B] The brigade combat team in Korea will not conduct a maneuver CTC
rotation; it will conduct all of its training in Korea.
[End of table]
As shown in table 1, adjusting either the deployment length or time-
deployed to time-at-home ratios can affect the required number of
maneuver CTC rotations. Army officials have stated that while the
current goal is time-deployed to time-at-home ratios of 1:2 for the
active component and 1:4 for the reserve component, the Army would
like to eventually get to a ratio of 1:3 for the active component and
1:5 for the reserve component. Example A in table 1 shows that if
deployments remained constant at 12 months but the Army was able to
achieve the desired longer times at home it would reduce its required
CTC rotations to 28 or 29 each year. Examples B and C are presented
simply to illustrate the effect of various deployment lengths, which
the Army has used in the past, on the number of required training
rotations.
The Army's maneuver CTCs cannot fully support the number of rotations
called for by ARFORGEN--36 to 37 rotations.[Footnote 21] As of May
2010, the Army's maneuver CTCs can currently conduct 28 brigade combat
team training rotations per year--the National Training Center can
conduct 10 rotations, the Joint Readiness Training Center can conduct
10 rotations, and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center can conduct
8 rotations. However, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center's role
in Europe is not limited to providing maneuver CTC rotations to U.S.
Army brigade combat teams; the Joint Multinational Readiness Center is
currently using 4 of its 8 annual training rotations to train
multinational partners. Unless the Joint Multinational Readiness
Center uses its entire capability--to conduct 8 annual training
rotations--to train U.S. Army brigade combat teams, the Army will
train less than 28 brigade combat teams each year.
According to Army officials at the maneuver CTCs, the maneuver CTCs
could surge to conduct up to 32 rotations in one year but this level
is not sustainable for an extended period because it does not provide
enough time between rotations to properly maintain equipment and
vehicles.[Footnote 22] Further, the trainers--both observer
controller/trainers and opposing forces, who normally work 7 days per
week when units are conducting their 18-to-25-day maneuver CTC
rotations--do not have enough time to recover between rotations.
Planned Exportable Training Capabilities Would Add Flexibility and
Capacity, but Would Not Fully Address Projected Capacity Shortfalls:
According to the Army Training Strategy,[Footnote 23] one of the
Army's goals is to develop sufficient maneuver CTC capacity to support
the ARFORGEN training cycle for deploying and contingency brigade
combat teams by the end of fiscal year 2012. To better meet the Army's
demand for maneuver CTC rotations and to generate trained and ready
forces to conduct full-spectrum operations, the Army has developed an
Exportable Training Capability at the Joint Multinational Readiness
Center and is developing an Exportable Training Capability at the
National Training Center. The Exportable Training Capabilities, which
are mobile units of trainers and equipment, will travel to any of 15
designated training areas. Plans call for this training to be focused
on full-spectrum operations for brigade combat teams as they
transition from the Reset to the Train/Ready phase of ARFORGEN.
The Exportable Training Capability Operational and Organizational Plan
Coordinating Draft, dated February 28, 2007, states that the
exportable capability training is better than the training a unit
could conduct at home station without external support, although not
as robust as the training conducted at the static maneuver CTC
locations. For example, the Exportable Training Capability cannot
provide an in-depth level of after-action reporting, and it will not
conduct live-fire exercises. In addition, while the maneuver CTCs have
a robust, dedicated opposing force that is used during training, the
Exportable Training Capabilities will rely on other units to provide a
portion of the opposing force resources. According to this same draft
operational and organizational plan, in the event of a surge the
Exportable Training Capability must be prepared to conduct mission-
rehearsal exercises in support of deploying units.
The Army initially planned to develop three Exportable Training
Capabilities--one at the National Training Center, one at the Joint
Readiness Training Center, and one at the Joint Multinational
Readiness Training Center. However, due to personnel constraints, the
Army was only able to develop the Exportable Training Capabilities at
the Joint Multinational Readiness Center and the National Training
Center. The Army designated the Joint Multinational Readiness Center
as a dual-mission Exportable Training Capability because it already
had employed its mobile capability to a limited extent into Eastern
Europe to conduct training with multinational partners and had the
necessary capabilities to perform as a mobile capability. In March of
2009 the Joint Multinational Readiness Center-Exportable Training
Capability deployed to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and conducted a
"proof of principle" for this concept by conducting a training
rotation for a brigade combat team from the 82nd Airborne Division.
With this deployment, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center-
Exportable Training Capability demonstrated that it has increased
flexibility, which could be used to help the Army conduct 28 U.S. Army
brigade combat team rotations by conducting its normal 4 rotations at
Hohenfels, Germany, for the brigade combat teams in Europe and by
deploying to the United States to conduct four additional rotations
for Army brigade combat teams.
The Exportable Training Capability at the National Training Center
would increase the Army's training rotation capacity for brigade
combat teams and is expected to conduct exportable training at one of
the designated training areas at the same time that training is being
conducted at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. At full
capability, this training capability is expected to be able to conduct
6 rotations annually, which would increase the annual maneuver CTC
training capacity from 28 to 34 rotations. The National Training
Center's Exportable Training Capability was initially scheduled to
reach its full operational capability in 2010, but, as we reported in
2007, the Army was unable to meet its timelines due to personnel
shortfalls caused by the Army's current commitments to ongoing
operations.[Footnote 24] The Army currently is projecting that its
National Training Center-Exportable Training Capability will reach its
initial operating capability in fiscal year 2012 and full operating
capability in fiscal year 2013.
If the Army is to reach its new goal for full operating capability in
fiscal year 2013, it will need to fill about 300 military positions
that are required for the National Training Center-Exportable Training
Capability. To prepare for the initial training event in October 2011,
the Army needs to fill 30 critical personnel positions in the
operations group--which includes planners for the exportable
capability--by September 2010. As of April 2010, the Army had filled
13 of these critical positions. The remaining 17 positions are for mid-
level officers, who are in short supply throughout the entire Army and
in the Army's maneuver CTCs' existing operations groups. According to
Army officials, if all 30 of the critical personnel positions are not
filled by September 2010, the Army will potentially miss its
operational timeline for conducting its initial training rotation,
which has already slipped once. Officials at the maneuver CTCs noted
that they expect to see an improvement in the filling of these
positions with a recent transfer of responsibility for the operations
groups from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to U.S. Army
Forces Command but still expressed concerns about whether they would
meet the September 2010 deadline for filling the 30 critical personnel
positions.[Footnote 25] These officials said they eventually expect to
see improvements in the filling of these positions with the continued
drawdown in Iraq and the increased time at home of servicemembers.
To meet its goal of conducting 6 training rotations, the Exportable
Training Capability at the National Training Center will also have to
overcome a number of support challenges. For example, the exportable
capability will have to rely on the designated training areas for
support. Specifically, the training areas will have to fund the
initial start-up costs for facilities or support infrastructure
required by the Exportable Training Capability. Further, the
designated training areas will have to provide administrative support,
and the unit conducting training may have to provide trainers for the
exportable capability.
Even if the Army is able to use the Exportable Training Capabilities
as projected and conduct 34 training rotations of various levels each
year beginning in fiscal year 2013, the Army projects that it will
fall short of the 36 to 37 rotations it expects to need to train
brigade combat teams. To help address its training capacity
shortfalls, the Army has developed a list that prioritizes the
scheduling of units training at its maneuver CTCs. The list assigns
first priority to deploying units, followed by the global response
force/CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-
yield explosives) consequence-management reaction force. Lower
priority is assigned to units conducting full-spectrum operations
mission-essential tasks and security forces.
However, the Army has not assessed the risks associated with its
inability to conduct the desired number of brigade combat team
training rotations and has not developed a mitigation plan that
identifies a full range of available options for addressing the risks
of not conducting the desired numbers of rotations, within its current
resource levels. Without such a plan, the Army's brigade combat teams
face uncertainties concerning their ability to conduct CTC rotations
or receive support from the Exportable Training Capability and will
need to conduct some type of alternative training.
The Army Continues to Develop Its Training Needs for the Reserve
Component to Support ARFORGEN:
In recent years, the Army has relied heavily on its reserve-component
forces[Footnote 26] to meet operational demands in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As described in the 2010 Army Posture Statement, as the
Army looks to the future it must retrain soldiers, leaders, and units
to build critical skills necessary to operate across the full spectrum
of operations.[Footnote 27] Further, the Army expects that its units
will be prepared through the ARFORGEN model to support both the
current operation and a broader range of missions that could arise
outside of the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
As we have previously reported, agencies need to consider how their
training strategy works in conjunction with other already-established
program initiatives and develop mechanisms that effectively limit
unnecessary overlap and duplication of effort to enhance the execution
of that training strategy.[Footnote 28] Furthermore, in the Army
Training Strategy, the Army indicated that the service should, to the
extent possible, leverage existing training resources and use
innovative training methods to reduce overhead.[Footnote 29] It will
also enable the reserve component to establish a training strategy
that increases premobilization readiness, and provide for seamless
transition from premobilization to postmobilization and the
flexibility to provide training to contingency forces within the
ARFORGEN cycle.
In preparation for their deployments, the Army currently trains its
smaller reserve-component units at its mobilization training centers.
As the Army plans to meet its future requirements, its plans call for
continuing to train its smaller reserve-component forces at its seven
mobilization training centers. Prior to attending training at the
mobilization training centers these smaller units may receive training
at the Army Reserve's Combat Support Training Center, located at Fort
Hunter Liggett, California, or with the Army National Guard's
exportable training capability that it refers to as the Home Station
Culminating Training Event.[Footnote 30]
While the Army has identified its training requirements for its
smaller reserve-component units that are scheduled to deploy in
support of ongoing operations, the Army is still refining the training
requirements for its smaller reserve-component units that will serve
as contingency forces. Although the Army's ARFORGEN requirements call
for these units to be trained to operate across the full-spectrum of
operations, the Army has not decided where these smaller units will
conduct their collective training exercises in support of ARFORGEN.
However, the Army has existing training locations that could be
utilized to provide this training. For example, a recent First Army
preliminary review indicates that it can train and support
approximately 86,000 reserve-component servicemembers annually at the
seven mobilization training centers. In addition to the Army's
mobilization training centers, the Army could also utilize the
training capacity at the Army National Guard's Home Station
Culminating Training Event or the Army Reserve's Combat Support
Training Center. These training venues provide units with external
equipment, resources, and trainers at a level above what normally
could be provided at the units' home stations. In addition, these
training venues make available the external support that assists units
with their ability to conduct training for both current and full-
spectrum operations.
As of April 2010 the Army had not finalized its training strategy,
including where its smaller contingency forces will conduct training.
Furthermore, the Army lacks a complete assessment that outlines how
its existing training capacity can best support its smaller units.
Without a complete assessment, the Army will be unable to determine if
it can leverage its existing training capacity to meet its future
training requirements for its smaller units or whether any excess
reserve-component training capacity exists.
The Marine Corps Is Reviewing Options to Acquire More Land at
Twentynine Palms to Meet Its Future Training Requirement:
Currently, the Marine Corps trains its forces at Twentynine Palms
before they deploy to Afghanistan. However, Marine Corps officials,
citing lessons from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and themes
outlined in the 2008 Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025,[Footnote
31] identified the need to train Marine Expeditionary Brigades, about
15,000 Marines, as an integrated combat team in large-scale training
exercises.[Footnote 32] The Marines currently lack the training
capacity to conduct this training.
In 2004, at the request of the Marine Corps, the Center for Naval
Analyses conducted a study to identify expeditionary brigade training
requirements and the region that could best support these
requirements.[Footnote 33] The study reviewed three regions: the
Southwestern United States, which includes the Twentynine Palms
training facility, the Middle Atlantic Coast, and the north coast of
the Gulf of Mexico.[Footnote 34] The study's authors concluded that
while all three locations could support some form of Marine
Expeditionary Brigade-level, live-fire and maneuver training, there
was no Department of Defense range that could provide sufficient space
for Marine Expeditionary Brigades to conduct sustained combined-arms,
live-fire and maneuver training. They further concluded that the
Southwestern United States provided the best training area for an
expeditionary training brigade but found that this level of training
could only be fully conducted with an expansion of the training ranges
and airspace at Twentynine Palms.
In 2006, the Marine Corps validated the need for a large-scale Marine
Expeditionary Brigade training exercise and approved the need for a
training area and facility to conduct realistic training for all
elements of the expeditionary brigade. In 2009, the Marine Corps
validated training objectives for the exercise and established a
minimum threshold that all training has to meet. These requirements
call for at least two battalion task forces to converge on a single
objective.
After receiving approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
to pursue the establishment of airspace and land acquisition at
Twentynine Palms, the Marine Corps identified six alternatives that,
at a minimum, meet the training threshold. The six alternatives for
land acquisition range in size from approximately 131,000 to 200,000
acres. In addition, the Marine Corps has also identified a "no-action
alternative" which would provide no additional land or airspace in
support of the new training requirement. According to officials, if
the Marine Corps is not able to acquire land, the threshold level of
training will still be met and it will train the 15,000 person
expeditionary brigade, although the entire brigade will not be
physically located at Twentynine Palms during the training. The Marine
Corps is currently conducting its environmental impact assessment and
expects to release its preferred alternative for land acquisition by
fiscal year 2012.
Conclusions:
While the operational shift from Iraq to Afghanistan has not required
many adjustments at the Army's and Marine Corps' major training
facilities, both services face challenges for the future. The Marine
Corps is pursuing options for acquiring land to support a recent
increased requirement to train about 15,000 Marines as an integrated
combat team in large-scale exercises. The Army is projecting a
capacity shortfall as it seeks to expand the training for brigade
combat teams at its maneuver CTCs. To address this capacity shortfall,
the Army is developing exportable training capabilities, but personnel
shortages could delay efforts to achieve full operational capability
by 2013. The Army has not completed an assessment to determine its
full range of options for meeting its future brigade combat team
requirements or the risks associated with not conducting the desired
number of training rotations. Until the Army develops a plan that
examines all the options for meeting its brigade combat team training
requirements or mitigating its capacity shortfalls, it will not be
able to fully implement ARFORGEN. Further, the Army's brigade combat
teams face uncertainties concerning their ability to conduct CTC
rotations or receive support from the Exportable Training Capability
and may need to conduct some type of alternative training. In
addition, while the Army has identified its training requirements and
locations for its smaller reserve-component units that will be
deploying for ongoing operations, it has not finalized the training
requirements for its smaller reserve-component units that will serve
as contingency forces, including where or when these contingency
forces should be trained. As a result, the Army does not know if its
existing training capacity can support these smaller units as they
transition though the ARFORGEN training cycle to meet future training
requirements. Until the Army finalizes its reserve-component training
strategy it will not be able to determine whether it can leverage
existing capacities to meet future reserve-component training
requirements, or whether any excess reserve-component training
capacity exists.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two
actions:
* To address the challenges associated with training its brigade
combat teams for both ongoing operations and a fuller range of
missions, direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a
plan to evaluate the full range of available options for training its
brigade combat teams; assess the risks of not conducting the desired
number of training rotations; and determine how, if necessary, risks
will be mitigated.
* To maximize the use of existing resources, direct the Secretary of
the Army to finalize the training requirements for smaller reserve-
component units that will act as contingency forces under its Army
Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. The completed training requirements
should identify when smaller units' training should occur and include
an analysis of existing Army training capacity to determine whether
any excess capacity exists. Specifically, the analysis should weigh
the costs and benefits of using the training capacity that currently
exists at the Army's mobilization training centers in conjunction with
or as alternatives to its other efforts, such as the home station
culminating training events.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or
partially concurred with our recommendations. Specifically, DOD
partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to address the challenges
associated with training its brigade combat teams for both ongoing
operations and a fuller range of missions by developing and
implementing a plan to evaluate the full range of available options
for training its brigade combat teams; assessing the risks of not
conducting the desired number of training rotations; and determining
how, if necessary, risks will be mitigated. In its comments, DOD
recognized its shortfall in maneuver Combat Training Center (CTC)
capacity to execute its brigade combat team training strategy and meet
global force requirements. DOD stated that in January 2010, the Army
initiated a Collective Training Comprehensive Review to identify and
evaluate brigade combat team training options with a specific focus on
the roles and requirements between home stations and CTCs in the
training strategy. DOD noted that it will discuss the review's
findings and recommendations during an upcoming Army Training and
Leader Development Conference, and develop consensus on future
adjustments to the training strategy or CTC Program based on
acceptable levels of risk. DOD further noted that the Army agrees a
risk and mitigation plan is required to address CTC capacity
shortfalls. However, it believed that including table 1 in the report,
which describes the current and potential Army maneuver CTC training
rotation requirements under various deployment scenarios, was
inappropriate. Specifically, DOD believed including the table suggests
that the Army should mitigate CTC capacity shortfalls with longer
deployments. While it noted that longer deployments would mitigate
shortfalls, the Army must consider other factors, including stress on
the force. We agree that the Army must consider a number of factors,
including deployment length and deployment to time-at-home ratios, to
identify the training capacity required at its CTCs. By including the
table we are not suggesting that the Army increase deployment lengths.
Rather, as noted in the report, the table is presented to illustrate
the effect of various deployment lengths, which the Army has used in
the past, on the number of required training rotations. However, in
light of DOD's comments, we have clarified the text further to
emphasize that the table is illustrative and does not reach any
conclusions on any of these scenarios.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to finalize the training
requirements for smaller reserve-component units that will act as
contingency forces under its Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model.
DOD noted that the Army is currently addressing these issues and has
been executing a number of mitigating efforts to address training
challenges, such as the Collective Training Comprehensive Review,
which is intended to review all Army collective training requirements
and analyze capacity to determine how best to maximize home-station
and the CTCs' abilities for all Army components. DOD further stated
that the Army is reviewing the training requirements and readiness
goals that units are expected to accomplish as they move through the
ARFORGEN cycle. DOD noted that the Army has just completed the
staffing process for a new Army regulation on ARFORGEN, AR 525-XX,
which establishes a cyclic process to generate trained, ready units
for full-spectrum operations. This Army regulation is supported by AR
350-xx, Reserve Component Training under ARFORGEN, which is under
staff review and will address the reserve-component specific issues
associated with executing full-spectrum operations training under
ARFORGEN. Further, DOD noted that the Army is working with the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the
National Guard Bureau, and the U.S. Army Reserve Command to address
specific issues related to operationalizing the reserve component,
such as contiguous training policies and the best use of all Army
training capacity. Additionally, DOD stated that the Army has
validated the Army National Guard's Exportable Combat Training
Capability, which provides home station culminating training events
for all types of units, and the Army Reserve's Combat Support Training
Center, which is executed at three Army Reserve sites.
The full text of DOD's written comments is reprinted in appendix III.
We are also sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense.
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Sharon L. Pickup, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have made
adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger
deployments to Afghanistan while still preparing forces for
deployments to Iraq, we reviewed Army and Marine Corps training
policies and guidance, such as Army regulation 350-50, Combat Training
Center Program, the Army's Combat Training Center Master Plan, and the
Marine Corps' OIF/OEF Predeployment Training Continuum, and Marine
Corps Order 3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process. In
addition, we interviewed officials at the Department of the Army-
Training Directorate; U.S. Army Forces Command; U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command; First U.S. Army; U.S. Army National Guard; U.S. Army
Reserve Command; Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations-Ground
Combat Element Branch; Marine Corps Training and Education Command;
Marine Forces Command; and Marine Forces Reserve regarding adjustments
that were required at the Army and Marine Corps major training
facilities to support deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. We also
reviewed the U.S. Army Forces Command's Predeployment Training
Guidance for Follow-on Forces Deploying in Support of Southwest Asia,
which outlines the training requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan, to
identify differences in training requirements between Iraq and
Afghanistan, and interviewed Army officials to discuss these
documents. We obtained and reviewed information from the Army's and
Marine Corps' major training facilities on the training they conducted
in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010, through April. We also
interviewed officials at the training facilities, and for the Army's
mobilization training centers for the Reserve and National Guard, on
the installations where the training facilities are located, to
discuss how they are currently using their training facilities to
train for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, we held
discussion with officials from all four of the Army's Combat Training
Centers (CTC)--Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas; National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California; Joint
Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Joint
Multinational Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany. While we met with
officials from all four CTCs, we only included the three maneuver CTCs
in the scope of our review, as they conduct live-fire training
exercises; the fourth CTC, Battle Command Training Program, was
designed to train the command element and not the entire unit, and
focuses on computer-assisted training exercises. We also held
discussions with officials from the Marine Corps' training facility at
Twentynine Palms, California, and officials from the Army's seven
mobilization training centers for the Reserve and National Guard at
which the Army currently conducts training and plans to conduct
training in the future, including Army Support Activity-Dix (formerly
known as Fort Dix), Camp Atterbury, Fort Knox, Camp Shelby, Fort Hood,
Fort Bliss, and Joint Base Lewis-McChord (formerly known as Fort
Lewis).
In focusing our review, we also identified the Army's and Marine
Corps' major predeployment training facilities; specifically the
locations at which these services are conducting final mission-
rehearsal exercises that include live-fire training for units
deploying in support of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[Footnote 35] For the Army we focused on active and National Guard
brigade combat teams, which prepare and train for deployment at the
Army's maneuver CTCs. In addition, we focused on the Army's
mobilization training centers, where National Guard brigade combat
teams that will be split into smaller units in theater conduct
training.[Footnote 36] Because smaller-sized reserve-component units
also conduct predeployment training at the Army's mobilization
training centers, we included these units in the scope of this review.
We did not include active-component units that do not train at CTCs,
since these units generally train at different locations--their home
stations where they have required training facilities and support. For
the Marine Corps we focused on units training for deployment at
Twentynine Palms, California, its only CTC.
To determine the extent to which the Army and the Marine Corps have
developed plans to adjust training capacity, we reviewed service
documentation regarding future training needs, to include the 2009
Army Campaign Plan, 2010 Army Posture Statement, 2010 National Guard
Posture Statement, 2010 Army Reserve Posture Statement, the Marine
Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, and the 2009-2015 Marine Corps Service
Campaign Plan. To further determine the Army's future training
capacity requirements at its CTCs we reviewed and assessed Army
guidance for the CTCs to include the 2008 and 2010 Combat Training
Center Master Plans, the 2010 Headquarters Department of the Army
Execution Order for the Establishment of the Exportable Training
Capability, and the 2010 Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command
regarding the transfer of the National Training Center and Joint
Readiness Training Center Operations Groups. We also obtained and
reviewed guidance regarding the Army's future training requirements
for smaller units to include the 2009 Army Training Strategy, the 2009
ARFORGEN Training Support for an Operational Reserve (Coordinating
Draft), First Army Command Training Guidance for Fiscal Years 2009 and
2010, and the 2008 First Army Operations Order, which provides command
guidance for mobilization, training, validation, and deployment. In
addition, we reviewed Marine Corps guidance regarding its expanded
training requirements at Twentynine Palms, including the 2010 Marine
Corps Force Generation Process, 2009 Marine Expeditionary Brigade
Objective and Threshold Training Requirements, the Marine Corps Vision
and Strategy 2025, the 2009-2015 Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan,
and the 2004 Marine Corps Expeditionary Brigade Exercise Study by the
Center for Naval Analysis.
In addition, we reviewed Department of Army information outlining the
number of training rotations that the Army will need at its maneuver
CTCs to support its identified Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
requirements for 72 brigade combat teams based on a time-deployed to
time-at-home ratio of 1:2 for the active-component brigade combat
teams and 1:4 for the reserve-component brigade combat teams. To
determine the number of rotations needed under the Army's ARFORGEN
model portraying a lower deployment demand of 1:3 time-deployed to
time-at-home ratio for active-component brigade combat teams and 1:5
for reserve-component brigade combat teams, we applied the Department
of Army's data regarding total rotations required under the ARFORGEN
cycle. Based on the time-deployed to time-at-home ratio of 1:3 and 1:5
for active-and reserve-component brigade combat teams, respectively,
we determined that a total of 28-29 training rotations would be
required annually. We developed an additional ARFORGEN model scenario
based on deployments of 6 months--similar to how the Army deployed in
support of missions before September 2001--but still maintained a time-
deployed to time-at-home ratio of 1:3 for the active component and 1:5
for the reserve component. The total number of required rotations
under this ARFORGEN cycle would increase to 53-54 annually.
To assess the extent to which challenges existed for the Army in
meeting its future training requirements for brigade combat teams, we
compared the total number of training rotations that the Army can
conduct annually at its maneuver CTCs to the desired number of
rotations it would conduct under its force generation cycle--ARFORGEN.
The Army has identified a rotation shortage and developed plans to
mitigate this shortage through its Exportable Training Capability.
However, in examining the Exportable Training Capability we found that
the Army would still have a shortage of training rotations to meet the
future training requirements called for in the Army's Force Generation
model. We interviewed officials with the Department of the Army, the
Combat Training Center Directorate, U.S. Army Forces Command, the
Army's three maneuver CTCs, and the Exportable Training Capability at
the National Training Center regarding the likelihood of this
capability meeting its current timelines and milestones and the
availability of risk assessments or plans to assist the Army in
conducting its desired number of training rotations in the future. In
addition, to determine if the Army's reserve component faced
challenges in meeting its future training requirements as prescribed
in the ARFORGEN model, we interviewed officials within the Department
of the Army, U.S. Army Forces Command, First Army, the Army National
Guard Bureau, and U.S. Army Reserve Command to determine if there is
an Army policy identifying when and where the training of reserve-
component contingency forces would occur within the ARFORGEN model.
Further, we interviewed officials to determine the availability of
existing Army resources, including the Army's mobilization training
centers for the Reserve and National Guard, to support future
requirements. In addition, we reviewed First Army's preliminary review
detailing the availability of the Army's mobilization training centers
to conduct training for contingency forces. We interviewed Marine
Corps officials within the Marine Corps Training and Education Command
to discuss their recently established training requirement;
specifically to discuss the lessons learned that prompted this
requirement. Further, we interviewed officials at Marine Corps Forces
Command; Marine Corps Plans, Policies, and Operations; and the Marine
Corps Air Ground Task Force to obtain further information regarding
future training requirements and training capacity at Twentynine
Palms. We also reviewed documents, such as the Marine Corps 2010
Proposed Land Acquisition and Airspace Establishment in Support of
Large Scale Marine Air Ground Task Force Live Fire and Maneuver
Training public information briefing, to obtain information regarding
the Marine Corps land-acquisition timelines and alternatives to meet
its new training requirement.
We assessed the reliability of the data presented in this report.
Specifically, with regard to capacity--the maximum number of training
rotations that can be conducted, or people that can be trained, on a
sustainable basis--we interviewed officials and obtained data from the
Army's and Marine Corps' headquarters organizations. In addition, we
interviewed officials and obtained data from the major training
facilities to verify that these data were consistent with the data
provided by the headquarters organizations. We found the data to be
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
In conducting this work, we contacted appropriate officials at the
organizations outlined in table 2.
Table 2: Organizations Interviewed during Our Review:
Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness),
Arlington, Virginia.
* Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness, Arlington, VA.
U.S. Army:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Arlington, Virginia.
* U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia.
* U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.
* Joint Multinational Training Command, Grafenwoehr, Germany.
* U.S. Army Europe, Heidelberg, Germany.
* Army National Guard, Arlington, Virginia.
* U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia.
* First Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia.
* U.S. Army Installation Management Command, Alexandria, Virginia.
* Combat Training Center Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
* Battle Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
* National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.
* Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana.
* Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany.
* Army Support Activity Dix (formerly knows as Fort Dix), New Jersey.
* Camp Atterbury, Indiana.
* Fort Knox, Kentucky.
* Camp Shelby, Mississippi.
* Fort Hood, Texas.
* Fort Bliss, Texas.
* Joint Base Lewis-McChord (formerly known as Fort Lewis), Washington.
U.S. Marine Corps:
* Headquarters Marine Corps, Plans, Policies, and Operations,
Arlington, Virginia.
* Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia.
* Marine Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia.
* Marine Forces Reserve Command, New Orleans, Louisiana.
* Marine Corps Center for Lesson Learned, Quantico, Virginia.
* Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force Training Command, Twentynine
Palms, California.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 to May 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Current Training Capacity at the Army's Major Training
Facilities:
As noted in table 3 below, in fiscal year 2009, the Army conducted 28
rotations, training over 120,000 people, at its three maneuver Combat
Training Centers (CTC). Specifically, the National Training Center
conducted 10 training rotations at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint
Readiness Training Center conducted 10 training rotations at Fort
Polk, Louisiana; and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center
conducted 8 rotations which were split between its permanent
Hohenfels, Germany, location and unit home-station locations.
Table 3: Training Conducted at the Army's Maneuver CTCs:
Maneuver Combat Training Center (CTC): National Training Center;
Location: Fort Irwin, California;
Focus: Brigade combat team operations in mid-to high-intensity
conflicts;
Length of training rotation (days): 18-22;
Annual number of training rotations conducted: 10;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009) (in thousands):
50;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2010) (in
thousands)[A]: 21.
Maneuver Combat Training Center (CTC): Joint Readiness Training Center;
Location: Fort Polk, Louisiana;
Focus: Brigade combat team operations from low-to high-intensity
conflicts;
Length of training rotation (days): 21;
Annual number of training rotations conducted: 10;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009) (in thousands):
50;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2010) (in
thousands)[A]: 20.
Maneuver Combat Training Center (CTC): Joint Multinational Readiness
Center;
Location: Hohenfels, Germany, or unit home-station locations;
Focus: Brigade combat team operations from low-to high-intensity
conflicts;
Length of training rotation (days): 25;
Annual number of training rotations conducted: 8;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009) (in thousands):
21;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2010) (in
thousands)[A]: 14.
Maneuver Combat Training Center (CTC): Total;
Annual number of training rotations conducted: 28;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009) (in thousands):
121;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2010) (in
thousands)[A]: 55.
Source: GAO Analysis of Army data:
[A] Fiscal year 2010 data is partial and covers training carried out
from October 2009 to April 2010.
[End of table]
As shown below in table 4, in fiscal year 2009, the Army's
mobilization training centers for the Reserve and National Guard
trained nearly 89,000 servicemembers for deployment.
Table 4: Training Conducted at the Army's Mobilization Training
Centers for the Reserve and National Guard:
Location: Army Support Activity-Dix,[A] New Jersey;
Primary mission trained: Civil affairs, psychological operations;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009): 10,980;
Annual number of forces trained (fiscal year 2010): 5,493.
Location: Fort Knox, Kentucky[B];
Primary mission trained: [Empty];
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009): 0;
Annual number of forces trained (fiscal year 2010): 0.
Location: Camp Atterbury, Indiana[C];
Primary mission trained: Kosovo forces, provincial reconstruction
teams;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009): 9,744;
Annual number of forces trained (fiscal year 2010): 6,187.
Location: Camp Shelby, Mississippi;
Primary mission trained: Brigade combat teams;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009): 16,112;
Annual number of forces trained (fiscal year 2010): 7,066.
Location: Fort Hood, Texas;
Primary mission trained: Sustainment, aviation;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009): 7,728;
Annual number of forces trained (fiscal year 2010): 4,499.
Location: Fort Bliss, Texas;
Primary mission trained: Detainee operations, military police;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009): 7,678;
Annual number of forces trained (fiscal year 2010): 7,120.
Location: Joint Base Lewis-McChord,[D] Washington;
Primary mission trained: Medical, multinational force and observers;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009): 8,800;
Annual number of forces trained (fiscal year 2010): 4,079.
Location: Fort McCoy, Wisconsin;
Primary mission trained: Engineering, finance;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009): 16,010;
Annual number of forces trained (fiscal year 2010): 4,196.
Location: Fort Stewart, Georgia;
Primary mission trained: Brigade combat teams;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009): 6,605;
Annual number of forces trained (fiscal year 2010): 0[E].
Location: Fort Sill, Oklahoma;
Primary mission trained: Aviation;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009): 5,306;
Annual number of forces trained (fiscal year 2010): 2,249.
Location: Total;
Annual number of personnel trained (fiscal year 2009): 88,963;
Annual number of forces trained (fiscal year 2010): 40,899.
Source: First Army.
[A] Army Support Activity Dix was formerly known as Fort Dix.
[B] As of April 2010, Fort Knox had not begun conducting training
rotations for operations.
[C] Reserve-component mobilization training centers that train brigade
combat teams.
[D] Joint Base Lewis-McChord was formerly known as Fort Lewis.
[E] Reserve-component mobilization training was not conducted at Fort
Stewart in fiscal year 2010.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this
report.
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Personnel And Readiness:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
July 2, 2010:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Pickup:
This is the Department of Defense Response to the Government
Accountability Office Draft Report, GA0-10-720, "Military Training:
Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges to Address Projected Future
Requirements, dated May 28, 2010 (GAO code 351387)." We thank you for
the opportunity to comment. Regarding the recommendations, we
partially concur with recommendation 1 and concur with recommendation
2. Elaboration on these positions is in the enclosure appended to this
letter.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Samuel D. Kleinman:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Readiness:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated May 28, 2010:
GAO-10-720 (GAO Code 351387):
"Military Training: Army And Marine Corps Face Challenges To Address
Projected Future Requirements"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a plan to
evaluate the full range of available options for training its brigade
combat teams; assess the risks of not conducting the desired number of
training rotations, and determine how, if necessary, risks will be
mitigated. (See page 24/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Partially Concur.
(1) The DoD recognizes its shortfall in maneuver CTC capacity to
execute our BCT training strategy and meet global force requirements.
In January 2010, the Army initiated a Collective Training
Comprehensive Review to identify and evaluate BCT training options
with a specific focus on the roles and requirements between home
stations and CTCs in the training strategy. We will discuss the
Collective Training Comprehensive Review's findings and
recommendations during our Army Training and Leader Development
Conference from 13-14 July 2010, and develop consensus on future
adjustments to our training strategy or CTC Program based on
acceptable levels of risk. The GAO report already highlights how the
Army is currently mitigating the maneuver CTC capacity shortfall using
scheduling priority on page 19.
(2) Again, the Army concurs that a risk assessment and mitigation plan
is required to address CTC capacity shortfalls. However, the inclusion
of Table 1 (page 14) is inappropriate. Table 1 correlates longer BCT
Boots-On-Ground (BOG) lengths with decreased CTC capacity
requirements. The inclusion of this table suggests that the Army
should mitigate CTC capacity shortfalls by requiring units to deploy
for longer periods of time. Using longer BOG lengths would mitigate
CTC capacity shortfalls, but the Army has to consider many other
factors, including stress on the force, in any decision that alters
BOG lengths. The Army non-concurs with Table 1 and requests that it be
deleted. Omitting Table 1 will allow the Army to develop a more
independent, objective, and realistic mitigation plan to address CTC
capacity shortfalls.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to finalize the training requirements
for smaller reserve component units that will act as contingency
forces under its Army Force Generation model. The completed training
requirements should identify when smaller units' training should occur
and include an analysis of existing Army training capacity to
determine whether any excess capacity exits. Specifically, the
analysis should weigh the costs and benefits of using the training
capacity that currently exists at the Army's mobilization training
centers in conjunction with or as alternatives to its other efforts,
such as the home station culminating training events. (See page 25/GAO
Draft Report.)
DoD Response: Concur.
(1) The Army is currently addressing these issues and has been
executing number of mitigating efforts to address training challenges.
The CSA has directed FORSCOM to conduct a Collective Training
Comprehensive Review (CTCR) for the purpose of establishing a
collective training enterprise nested under the Army readiness
enterprise. The CTCR is looking at all Army collective training
requirements and analyzing capacity in a holistic process to determine
how best to maximize home station and the CTCs abilities for all Army
components.
(2) The training requirements for all units are under review and
pending completion through the development of "Doctrinal Training
Templates". All Army units execute training based upon full spectrum
operations (FSO) focused missions. FORSCOM is currently the lead
agency in conducting the review and approval process for FSO doctrinal
training templates for Army MTOE units. Training templates outline the
major training events for all Army units throughout the ARFORGEN cycle
while the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) provide the training
tasks to execute to meet assigned mission requirements. Doctrinal
training templates establish "aim points" of readiness goals that
units are expected to accomplish as they move through the ARFORGEN
cycle.
(3). HQDA has just completed the staffing process for AR 525-XX
"ARFORGEN" a new Army regulation that establishes a cyclic process to
generate trained, ready units for full spectrum operations. AR 525-XX
is supported by AR 350-XX "Reserve Component Training under ARFORGEN"
(this AR is under staff review and will address the reserve component
specific issues associated with executing FSO training under
ARFORGEN). HQDA, FORSCOM and the RC will establish a single integrated
training Plan (STIP) RC ARFORGEN training model approach that will be
managed by FORSCOM through their training resources synchronization
conference (TRCS) process in order to holistically synchronize all RC
requirements with all available Army capacity.
(4) HQDA is working with Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower
and Reserve Affairs (ASA ”M&RA), the National Guard Bureau, and the
U.S. Army Reserve Command to address specific issues related to
operationalizing the RC, such as contiguous training policies and best
use of all Army training capacity. These efforts support the FORSCOM
CTCR and HQDA drafting of AR 350-XX.
(5) The Army has validated the ARNG eXportable Combat Training
Capability (XCTC) and the USARC Combat Support Training Capability
(CSTC). XCTC provides home station culminating training events for all
types of units according their respective the doctrinal training
templates. XCTC can be executed at over 31 ARNG training sites
depending upon the size of the units trained and CSTC is executed at 3
USAR sites.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Sharon Pickup, (202) 512-9619, pickups@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this
report were Michael Ferren (Assistant Director), Jerome Brown, Susan
Ditto, Kenya Jones, Lonnie McAllister, Richard Powelson, Terry
Richardson, Michael Silver, and Nicole Volchko.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Army's and Marine Corps' CTCs measure capacity by the number
of training rotations that are conducted; the Army's mobilization
training centers for the Reserve and National Guard measure capacity
by the number of people that are trained. For the purpose of this
report, we are defining training capacity as the maximum number of
training rotations that can be conducted, or people that can be
trained, on a sustainable basis.
[2] Training exercises, or rotations, at the Army's CTCs last for 18
to 25 days; training at the Army's mobilization training centers for
the Reserve and National Guard lasts for 15 to 60 days, depending on
the unit's mission. In the Marine Corps, training rotations last for
28 days.
[3] H.R. Rep. No. 111-166, at 293-94 (2009).
[4] GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to Further Improve the
Consistency of Combat Skills Training Provided to Army and Marine
Corps Support Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-465] (Washington, D.C.: Apr.16,
2010).
[5] Mission-rehearsal exercises are the final collective-training
event that units conduct prior to deployment.
[6] The U.S. Army Reserve does not have brigade combat teams.
[7] For the purpose of this review, we are referring to the reserve-
component forces that conduct training at the Army's mobilization
training centers, which range in size from two-person detachments to
brigade combat teams that are split up in theater, as smaller units.
[8] In the past, the Army has used four additional mobilization
training centers for predeployment training: Fort Bragg, Fort McCoy,
Fort Sill, and Fort Stewart.
[9] The Battle Command Training Program is not a maneuver CTC; it
focuses on computer-assisted training exercises. Therefore, we did not
include it in the scope of this review.
[10] In fiscal year 2009, the Army was still training deploying
reserve-component forces at Fort McCoy, Fort Stewart, and Fort Sill.
[11] GAO, Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach to
Training and Mobilizing Reserve Component Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-720] (Washington, D.C.: July 17,
2009).
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-720].
[13] U.S. Army Forces Command, Pre-deployment Training Guidance for
Follow-on Forces Deploying In Support Of Southwest Asia (Oct. 27,
2009).
[14] Training requirements for overseas operations are constantly
being generated, in part through lessons learned obtained in theater
and after-action reports developed during and after deployment.
[15] The role of the opposing force is to replicate the threat in the
contemporary operating environment. While the mobilization training
centers for the Reserve and National Guard have a dedicated cadre for
the opposing force, they do not have specific authorizations for these
positions.
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-465].
[17] Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/
5/7, Army Training Strategy (Nov. 10, 2009).
[18] Modular combat brigades will have one of three standard designs--
heavy brigade, infantry brigade, or Stryker brigade. The Army plans to
have reconfigured its total force into the modular design, at which
time it will have 73 modular brigade combat teams--45 in the active
component and 28 in the Army National Guard.
[19] U.S. Forces Korea brigade combat team does not receive a maneuver
CTC rotation; therefore, the Army does not include this unit when
identifying the required annual number of CTC rotations.
[20] While current deployments are typically 12 months long, the Army
has also used deployments of varying lengths, including 6 and 15
months, to support its ongoing operations.
[21] GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the
Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address
Implementation Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-936] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6,
2010).
[22] Army officials said that, if necessary to support a short-term
surge, the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training
Center could both conduct 11 rotations in a year. They also expect the
Joint Multinational Readiness Center to be able to conduct 10
rotations, if necessary to support a surge requirement, but they noted
that the Joint Multinational Readiness Center has never actually
conducted 10 rotations.
[23] Department of the Army, Army Training Strategy.
[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-936]. At the time,
Army officials stated that the personnel needed to fill key positions
were not available because of the increase in the length of combat
tours, the number of brigade combat teams needed to support the 2007
surge to Iraq, the increase in the number of brigade combat teams, and
the need for advisors for Afghan and Iraqi forces.
[25] In October 2009, the Army Chief of Staff approved the transfer of
responsibilities for the National Training Center and the Joint
Readiness Training Center observer controller/trainers from U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command to U.S. Army Forces Command. U.S. Army
Europe retained responsibility for the observer controller/trainers at
the Joint Multinational Readiness Center.
[26] Army National Guard brigade combat teams that deploy for brigade
combat team missions conduct their predeployment training at the
Army's maneuver CTCs. Other reserve component units, including Army
National Guard brigade combat teams that are split up to perform other
missions in theater, conduct their predeployment training at the
Army's mobilization training centers. Throughout this report we refer
to the units that train at the mobilization training centers as
smaller reserve-component units.
[27] Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh and Chief of Staff of the
Army General George W. Casey Jr., statement to the Committees and
Subcommittees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives
(February 2010).
[28] GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G] (March 2004).
[29] Department of the Army, Army Training Strategy.
[30] In 2009, the Army National Guard renamed its Exportable Combat
Training Capability the Home Station Culminating Training Event.
[31] The 2008 Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 provides direction
for the Marine Corps to meet the challenges of an uncertain security
environment.
[32] In general, the Marine Expeditionary Brigade is made up of three
battalion task forces--a logistics element, an aviation combat
element, and a command element. It is employed for mid-sized to
smaller contingencies and is capable of responding to the full range
of crises, from humanitarian assistance to forcible entry.
[33] Center for Naval Analysis, MEB Training Exercise Study: Final
Report (December 2004).
[34] In addition to Twentynine Palms, the Southwest training area
includes Camp Pendleton and the Yuma Training Range Complex; the
Middle Atlantic Coast includes the area around Camp Lejune and Cherry
Point, North Carolina; and the Gulf of Mexico training area is located
around Eglin Major Test Range and Facility Base on the north coast of
the Gulf.
[35] Mission-rehearsal exercises are the final collective training
event units conduct prior to deployment.
[36] The U.S. Army Reserve does not have brigade combat teams.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
