Tactical Aircraft
DOD's Ability to Meet Future Requirements Is Uncertain, with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment Decisions Gao ID: GAO-10-789 July 29, 2010From 2011 through 2015, DOD plans to spend over $336 billion to operate, maintain, modernize, and recapitalize its tactical air forces. Since DOD projects tactical aircraft inventory shortfalls over the next 15 years, it must effectively balance resources between an increasingly expensive Joint Strike Fighter program and the need to keep its legacy aircraft viable. GAO was asked to assess DOD's tactical aircraft requirements, the extent to which plans for upgrading and retiring legacy aircraft and acquiring new aircraft are likely to meet the requirements, and how changes in strategic plans and threat assessments have affected requirements. GAO analyzed tactical aircraft requirement and inventory data, key plans and threat assessments.
DOD's current combined tactical aircraft requirement is around 3,240 aircraft. The requirement includes a mix of various types of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft. The Air Force requirement is 2,000 aircraft, and the combined Navy and Marine Corps requirement is about 1,240 aircraft. To achieve national security objectives, however, DOD not only needs the right quantity of aircraft to adequately equip each service's force structure, but must also have the right organization and mix of aircraft capabilities. The services have reduced required quantities by a combined total of around 900 aircraft since 2002. Service officials believe that the current numbers provide sufficient capabilities to carry out assigned missions with manageable risk, but are not at optimal levels. Although officials also stated that current requirements account for capabilities provided by other weapon systems, such as unmanned aircraft and bombers, it is unclear exactly how and to what extent. DOD expects to encounter shortfalls in both Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft inventories, but the timing and magnitude of these shortfalls largely depend on assumptions about Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) acquisitions and the viability of legacy aircraft. The JSF program has continued to experience cost and schedule problems and is in the process of being restructured. In addition, DOD's investments in legacy systems have generally been assigned lower priority in the budgeting process. As a result, many legacy aircraft systems are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as parts needed to support key subsystems age and become obsolete. The Navy and Air Force are exploring various options for closing their projected inventory shortfalls--including upgrading and extending the service lives of hundreds of legacy aircraft, and making modifications to how tactical air forces are used. Many of these options may be funded in future budgets and could cost billions of dollars. The services have not fully reconsidered tactical aircraft requirements in light of recent changes in strategic planning and threat assessments, but according to service officials, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) affirmed the existing force structure in the near-term, principally the next 5 years. Similarly, DOD's recent Aircraft Investment Plan, which was required by Congress, and fiscal year 2011 budget decisions did not directly affect tactical aircraft requirements, but did make some changes in near-term aircraft investments. The QDR reflected a change in how DOD views future national security challenges, examined expected challenges in various combinations, and recognized the need to plan for and acquire adaptive and agile systems, including unmanned aircraft. The department is still in the process of establishing the analytical foundation for its future requirements. Until requirements analyses and JSF restructuring are complete and capabilities provided by unmanned aircraft and bombers are more clearly accounted for, it will be difficult for DOD to make informed investments in legacy aircraft upgrades and modernizations, and new aircraft procurements. GAO suggests that Congress consider requiring that costs associated with modernizing and sustaining the legacy fleet be included in future investment plans, and recommends that DOD 1) better define requirements and the size and severity of projected shortfalls, 2) clearly articulate how systems like unmanned aircraft are accounted for, and 3) complete a comprehensive cost and benefit analysis of options for addressing expected shortfalls. DOD agreed with the second recommendation and partially agreed with the others, citing current and planned actions. GAO believes its recommendations remain valid.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Michael J. Sullivan Team: Government Accountability Office: Acquisition and Sourcing Management Phone: (937) 258-7915GAO-10-789, Tactical Aircraft: DOD's Ability to Meet Future Requirements Is Uncertain, with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment Decisions
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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2010:
Tactical Aircraft:
DOD's Ability to Meet Future Requirements Is Uncertain, with Key
Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment Decisions:
GAO-10-789:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-789, a report to the Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
From 2011 through 2015, DOD plans to spend over $336 billion to
operate, maintain, modernize, and recapitalize its tactical air
forces. Since DOD projects tactical aircraft inventory shortfalls over
the next 15 years, it must effectively balance resources between an
increasingly expensive Joint Strike Fighter program and the need to
keep its legacy aircraft viable.
GAO was asked to assess DOD‘s tactical aircraft requirements, the
extent to which plans for upgrading and retiring legacy aircraft and
acquiring new aircraft are likely to meet the requirements, and how
changes in strategic plans and threat assessments have affected
requirements. GAO analyzed tactical aircraft requirement and inventory
data, key plans and threat assessments.
What GAO Found:
DOD‘s current combined tactical aircraft requirement is around 3,240
aircraft. The requirement includes a mix of various types of Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft.
The Air Force requirement is 2,000 aircraft, and the combined Navy and
Marine Corps requirement is about 1,240 aircraft. To achieve national
security objectives, however, DOD not only needs the right quantity of
aircraft to adequately equip each service‘s force structure, but must
also have the right organization and mix of aircraft capabilities. The
services have reduced required quantities by a combined total of
around 900 aircraft since 2002. Service officials believe that the
current numbers provide sufficient capabilities to carry out assigned
missions with manageable risk, but are not at optimal levels. Although
officials also stated that current requirements account for
capabilities provided by other weapon systems, such as unmanned
aircraft and bombers, it is unclear exactly how and to what extent.
DOD expects to encounter shortfalls in both Air Force and Navy
tactical aircraft inventories, but the timing and magnitude of these
shortfalls largely depend on assumptions about Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) acquisitions and the viability of legacy aircraft. The JSF
program has continued to experience cost and schedule problems and is
in the process of being restructured. In addition, DOD‘s investments
in legacy systems have generally been assigned lower priority in the
budgeting process. As a result, many legacy aircraft systems are
becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as parts needed to support
key subsystems age and become obsolete. The Navy and Air Force are
exploring various options for closing their projected inventory
shortfalls”including upgrading and extending the service lives of
hundreds of legacy aircraft, and making modifications to how tactical
air forces are used. Many of these options may be funded in future
budgets and could cost billions of dollars.
The services have not fully reconsidered tactical aircraft
requirements in light of recent changes in strategic planning and
threat assessments, but according to service officials, the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) affirmed the existing force structure
in the near-term, principally the next 5 years. Similarly, DOD‘s
recent Aircraft Investment Plan, which was required by Congress, and
fiscal year 2011 budget decisions did not directly affect tactical
aircraft requirements, but did make some changes in near-term aircraft
investments. The QDR reflected a change in how DOD views future
national security challenges, examined expected challenges in various
combinations, and recognized the need to plan for and acquire adaptive
and agile systems, including unmanned aircraft. The department is
still in the process of establishing the analytical foundation for its
future requirements. Until requirements analyses and JSF restructuring
are complete and capabilities provided by unmanned aircraft and
bombers are more clearly accounted for, it will be difficult for DOD
to make informed investments in legacy aircraft upgrades and
modernizations, and new aircraft procurements. In addition, without a
joint comprehensive analysis that compares and contrasts the costs and
benefits of various Air Force and Navy options for addressing
inventory shortfalls, it will be difficult to determine the best
approach to meeting requirements and mitigating shortfalls or
eliminating redundancies.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO suggests that Congress consider requiring that costs associated
with modernizing and sustaining the legacy fleet be included in future
investment plans, and recommends that DOD 1) better define
requirements and the size and severity of projected shortfalls, 2)
clearly articulate how systems like unmanned aircraft are accounted
for, and 3) complete a comprehensive cost and benefit analysis of
options for addressing expected shortfalls. DOD agreed with the second
recommendation and partially agreed with the others, citing current
and planned actions. GAO believes its recommendations remain valid.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-789] or key
components. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202)
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Current Tactical Aircraft Requirements Are Lower than Previously
Stated, and Service Officials Believe Risk Has Increased:
DOD Expects to Encounter Tactical Aircraft Shortfalls, but Options for
Minimizing These Shortfalls May Exist:
Services Have Not Considered Future Requirements in Light of Recent
Strategic Planning and Threat Assessment Changes:
Conclusions:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Tactical Air Forces Funding, Fiscal Years 2011 through
2015:
Appendix III: Summary of Tactical Aircraft Systems Ongoing and Future
Efforts:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Of Defense:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Legacy and New Tactical Aircraft Inventories and Planned
Replacement Systems:
Table 2: Comparison of Procuring New F/A-18E/F Aircraft and Extending
the Service Life of Legacy Aircraft:
Table 3: F-35 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Table 4: F-22 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Table 5: A-10 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Table 6: F-16 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Table 7: F-15 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Table 8: MQ-9 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Table 9: F/A-18E/F Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Table 10: F/A-18 A/B/C/D Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Table 11: EA-18G Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Table 12: EA-6B Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Table 13: AV-8B Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Figures:
Figure 1: Approximate Change in Required Tactical Aircraft Quantities,
Fiscal Years 2002 to 2010:
Figure 2: Air Force Tactical Aircraft Requirements versus Projected
Tactical Aircraft Inventory, 2011 through 2030:
Figure 3: Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aircraft Requirements versus
Projected Tactical Aircraft Inventory, 2011 through 2030:
Figure 4: New Tactical Aircraft Procurements between 1997 and 2035:
Figure 5: F-35 Lightning II, Joint Strike Fighter:
Figure 6: F-22A Raptor:
Figure 7: A-10 Thunderbolt II:
Figure 8: F-16 Fighting Falcon:
Figure 9: F-15C/D Eagle:
Figure 10: F-15E Strike Eagle:
Figure 11: MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System:
Figure 12: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet:
Figure 13: F/A-18A-D Hornet:
Figure 14: EA-18G Growler:
Figure 15: EA-6B Prowler:
Figure 16: AV-8B Harrier:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 29, 2010:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to invest over $336 billion to
operate, maintain, modernize, and recapitalize its tactical air forces
during fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Tactical aircraft--fixed-wing
fighter and attack planes--provide air-to-air, air-to-ground, and
electronic warfare capabilities that are vital to the success of
combat operations and homeland defense. Most of the department's
current tactical aircraft were purchased in the 1970s and 1980s and
are reaching the end of their expected service lives. The Air Force
and Navy project that DOD's tactical aircraft inventories will soon
drop below required levels and shortfalls will persist for years.
These projected shortfalls present a formidable challenge as DOD must
effectively balance scarce resources between the increasingly more
expensive Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program and the need to invest in
keeping its legacy aircraft viable for longer periods of time than
originally expected.
Despite DOD's long-standing plan to recapitalize its aging tactical
aircraft fleet, we found in 2007 that the department did not have a
comprehensive, integrated investment strategy for identifying joint
priorities, critical capability gaps, and allocating scarce
resources.[Footnote 1] Since the issuance of that 2007 report, several
new developments and a changing threat environment have again raised
questions about requirements and the direction of DOD's plans for
recapitalizing its fleet of tactical aircraft. As a result, the House
Armed Services Committee asked GAO to (1) identify DOD's current
tactical aircraft requirements, (2) determine the extent to which
DOD's plans for upgrading and retiring legacy aircraft and for
acquiring new aircraft are likely to meet its current requirements,
and (3) assess how changes in DOD's strategic planning and threat
assessments, as reported in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
and recent investment decisions have impacted tactical aircraft
requirements. The committee also requested an update on the cost and
schedule status of DOD's tactical aircraft programs.
To conduct our work, we drew extensively on other GAO work related to
tactical aircraft requirements and force planning and reviewed the
analyses and assessments of other government agencies and non-
governmental organizations. We reviewed documents on Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps tactical aircraft requirements and met with
knowledgeable officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) and the military services to discuss the processes and data used
to determine the requirements. We discussed the extent to which
unmanned aircraft, bombers, and other systems providing similar
warfighting capabilities were factored into the requirements. We
collected tactical aircraft inventory projections from the military
services and compared that data with the requirements to determine the
extent to which DOD's projected force structure would meet the
established requirements. We identified and analyzed various factors
impacting future inventory levels and assessed several inventory
management and acquisition options, some of which the services are
considering. We reviewed the National Defense Strategy, National
Military Strategy, the 2010 QDR, previous QDR reports, OSD's recent
Aircraft Investment Plan Fiscal Years 2011-2040, and other strategic
planning and threat assessment documents to identify recent changes in
defense threat assessments and planning factors. We met with OSD and
service officials to discuss how those changes have impacted or could
impact tactical aircraft requirements. We also assessed the cost,
schedule, and performance status of selected legacy and new tactical
aircraft programs, and met with program officials in each program
office. Appendix I contains more details on our engagement's scope and
methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2009 to July 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Tactical air forces are critical to achieving and maintaining air
dominance during combat operations. These forces include Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft with air-
to-air, air-to-ground, and electronic warfare missions, along with
related equipment and support activities. These aircraft operate
during the first days of a conflict to penetrate enemy air space,
defeat air defenses, and achieve air dominance, allowing follow-on
ground, air, and naval forces freedom to operate within the battle
space. Once air dominance is established, tactical aircraft continue
to strike ground targets for the remainder of the conflict. Some
tactical aircraft are also essential to protecting the homeland by
responding to potential airborne and ground based threats. DOD plans
to spend about $67 billion annually, on average, over the next 5 years
to operate, maintain, modernize, and recapitalize its tactical air
forces (see appendix II).
DOD's current tactical aircraft fleet is comprised of both legacy and
new aircraft. The legacy forces include Air Force F-16, F-15, and A-10
systems and Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18A-D, EA-6B, and AV-8B
aircraft. Most of these aircraft were purchased in the 1970's and
1980's and are more than 20 years old on average. DOD is
recapitalizing this aging legacy fleet by acquiring and fielding new
aircraft, namely the Air Force's F-22A, the Navy's F/A-18E/F and EA-
18G, and the joint service F-35 JSF. While many F-22A, F/A-18E/F, and
EA-18G aircraft have been purchased and placed into the inventory, the
JSF, DOD's largest acquisition program, is still in development and
has been beset by significant delays and problems. The JSF is being
developed in three variants and is expected to replace most of the
legacy fleets. The Air Force variant, a conventional takeoff and
landing aircraft, is intended to replace the F-16 and A-10 and
complement the F-22A. The Navy's carrier-capable version is intended
to replace the F/A-18C/D aircraft and complement the F/A-18E/F. The
Marine Corps is acquiring a short takeoff and vertical landing variant
to replace its F/A-18, EA-6B, and AV-8B fleets. DOD expects to procure
nearly 2,500 JSF aircraft over the next 25 years to replace similar
numbers of legacy aircraft but, to date, has only taken delivery of a
few test aircraft. Table 1 contains data regarding the number of each
legacy and new tactical aircraft system in DOD's inventory as well as
the average age and replacement system for each one.
Table 1: Legacy and New Tactical Aircraft Inventories and Planned
Replacement Systems:
Legacy system: F-16 Fighting Falcon;
Service: Air Force;
Total inventory: 1,135;
Average age (years): 20;
Replacement system: JSF.
Legacy system: F-15A-D Eagle;
Service: Air Force;
Total inventory: 379;
Average age (years): 26[A];
Replacement system: F-22.
Legacy system: F-15E Strike Eagle;
Service: Air Force;
Total inventory: 223;
Average age (years): 18;
Replacement system: TBD[B].
Legacy system: A-10 Thunderbolt II;
Service: Air Force;
Total inventory: 356;
Average age (years): 28;
Replacement system: JSF.
Legacy system: F/A-18A-D Hornet;
Service: Navy/Marine Corps;
Total inventory: 635;
Average age (years): 19;
Replacement system: F/A-18E/F and JSF.
Legacy system: AV-8B Harrier;
Service: Marine Corps;
Total inventory: 146;
Average age (years): 14;
Replacement system: JSF.
Legacy system: EA-6B Prowler;
Service: Navy/Marine Corps;
Total inventory: 94;
Average age (years): 26;
Replacement system: EA-18G.
New system: F-22A Raptor;
Service: Air Force;
Total inventory: 157;
Average age (years): 3;
Replacement system: TBD.
New system: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet;
Service: Navy;
Total inventory: 393;
Average age (years): 5;
Replacement system: TBD.
New system: EA-18G Growler;
Service: Navy;
Total inventory: 22;
Average age (years): 1;
Replacement system: TBD[C].
Total combined inventory:
Total inventory: 3,540.
Source: DOD data; GAO analysis and presentation.
[A] Average age and replacement system reflect F-15C/D aircraft only.
[B] The Air Force plans to keep F-15E aircraft in the active inventory
through at least 2030; no replacement system has been identified.
[C] The Navy has not officially determined the system to replace the
EA-18G, but for inventory planning purposes, the Navy was directed to
project the procurement of additional JSF aircraft to recapitalize the
EA-18G fleet.
[End of table]
Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve tactical aircraft comprise
roughly 40 percent of the Air Force's overall tactical aircraft
inventory and are generally the oldest aircraft in the inventory. The
Air Guard plays a large role in the air defense of the United States.
As a result, on an annual basis the Guard performs more than 60
percent of the Air Force's air intercept missions and more than 90
percent of the ground alert missions. The Air Force Reserve Command
provides a strategic reserve for the active duty Air Force, and its
tactical aircraft are fully integrated with the active duty force. The
Reserve Command operates four fighter and attack squadrons--made up of
90 combat ready aircraft--as well as eight associate squadrons that
they share with the active duty Air Force. Going forward, the Guard
and Reserves expect to have their tactical aircraft fleets
recapitalized with newer F-16s and potentially F-22s from the active
duty Air Force as the JSF is fielded. Both the Guard and Reserves
expect to receive JSF aircraft as well.
Current Tactical Aircraft Requirements Are Lower than Previously
Stated, and Service Officials Believe Risk Has Increased:
DOD's combined total tactical aircraft requirement is around 3,240
aircraft. The requirement includes a mix of various types of Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft.
To achieve national security objectives, DOD not only needs to possess
the right quantity of aircraft to adequately equip each service's
force structure, but must also have the right mix and organization of
aircraft with various capabilities. The services have reduced their
inventory requirements by around 900 since 2002, to levels that
service officials believe represent increased, yet manageable, risk.
They emphasize that while the current quantities represent sufficient
capabilities to carry out most assigned missions, they are not
optimal. Officials also stated that current requirements account for
capabilities provided by other weapon systems, such as unmanned
aircraft and bombers, but it is unclear exactly how and to what extent.
Current Requirements Represent What Service Officials Believe Are
Moderate yet Manageable Risks:
The Air Force has determined that it requires a total inventory of
2,000 tactical aircraft with varying capabilities in order to meet
current demands, address the most likely future demands, and protect
against unanticipated contingencies. Similarly, the Department of the
Navy has determined that it needs a total inventory of approximately
1,240 tactical aircraft--820 for the Navy, and 420 for the Marine
Corps.[Footnote 2] Within their total inventory requirements, each
service has identified specific quantities and mixes of aircraft
needed to perform various functions, such as supporting a range of
wartime missions, training, testing, and maintenance. According to
service officials, the requirements are set at levels that ensure the
availability of sufficient numbers and types of aircraft to support
each function, with emphasis on having adequate numbers ready and able
to support various possible wartime missions.
When determining requirements, the services consider the overall size
of the force required to equip their force structures and meet
operational demands (quantity), and the types of systems that are
needed (capabilities). Consideration of these two factors means that
the services must not only maintain adequate numbers of aircraft, but
also must maintain the right mix and organization of systems. The Air
Force structure has 10 air and space expeditionary forces (AEF), each
of which is capable of responding quickly to national security needs
with a tailored and sustainable force. Air Force plans indicate that
the 2,000 tactical aircraft the service believes it requires will be
divided roughly equally among the AEFs.[Footnote 3] Similarly, the
Department of the Navy shapes its tactical air force to fill 10 Navy
carrier air wings[Footnote 4] and 6 Marine Aircraft Groups.[Footnote
5] Navy officials point out that factors such as the number of
locations around the world in which the Navy must station aircraft
carriers and the established strategic guidance and force planning
constructs must also be considered when determining the Navy's overall
tactical aircraft requirements. Of the current Navy requirement for
1,240 aircraft, 820 are expected to support carrier air wings and 420
are expected to support Marine Air Groups.
Officials in both services believe that while required quantities have
been reduced by a combined total of around 900 aircraft since 2002,
the increased risk is manageable and the forces still represent
sufficient capabilities to carry out assigned missions in most cases.
For example, the Air Force has reduced its required number of tactical
aircraft from about 2,500 total aircraft in 2002, to 2,000 currently.
This includes a recent reduction in 2009 of 250 aircraft that
officials believe increases risk, but will allow the service to
redistribute about $3.5 billion over 6 years to modernize and support
a smaller, but more capable force. Similarly, the Department of the
Navy announced a Tactical Aviation Integration Plan in fiscal year
2002, in which the Navy and Marine Corps agreed that they could
successfully achieve their missions with fewer aircraft and units by
operating as an integrated force. The Navy assumed that it would be
able to perform missions more efficiently with the more advanced
aircraft, namely F/A-18E/F and the JSF, and, as a result, was able to
reduce its overall requirement by 497 tactical aircraft, from 1,637 to
1,140 (the Navy subsequently increased the requirement by 100 aircraft
to the current total of 1,240). At the same time, the Navy reduced the
number of required aircraft per carrier air wing from 46 to 44. Navy
requirements officials told us that having 44 aircraft per air wing
puts the Navy's ability to accomplish its missions at moderate risk,
but emphasized that they believe that the risk is manageable.
Figure 1: Approximate Change in Required Tactical Aircraft Quantities,
Fiscal Years 2002 to 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Approximate total aircraft:
Requirement as of 2002: 4,150;
Requirement as of 2010: 3,240;
Difference: 910.
Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).
[End of figure]
Because DOD anticipates that advances in technology will make future
threats increasingly more difficult to counter, Navy and Air Force
tactical aircraft requirements are comprised of a mix of both legacy
aircraft with some upgraded capabilities and new, more advanced
aircraft. The most advanced aircraft--the F-22A and the JSF, known as
"fifth generation" aircraft--possess capabilities, such as low
observable characteristics (stealth), data fusion from multiple
sources, and advanced electronics and communications systems that the
services believe are essential to conducting operations in the more
advanced threat environments of the future. As a result, fifth
generation aircraft are expected to make up larger portions of the
services' tactical aircraft inventories over time. By around 2025, the
Marine Corps expects its entire tactical aircraft fleet to be
comprised of a single fifth generation aircraft--the Short Takeoff and
Vertical Landing variant of the JSF. In that same time frame, the Air
Force expects more than half of its tactical aircraft force to be
comprised of fifth generation aircraft--that is, F-22A and JSF. The
Navy's carrier air wings are expected to be made up of the carrier
variant of the JSF and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.
Unmanned Aircraft and Other Types of Systems Are Considered during
Requirements Analysis, but It Is Unclear How and to What Extent:
DOD officials believe that they adequately considered capabilities
provided by other systems including unmanned aircraft and bombers when
determining their current tactical aircraft requirements. While OSD
and Air Force officials note that the capabilities of other systems
are routinely considered as part of the requirements determination
process, significant increases of hundreds of unmanned aircraft
capable of striking ground targets expected to enter DOD's inventory
over the next 10 years do not appear to have directly impacted
tactical aircraft requirements. This is due, in large part, to the
fact that a primary driver in Air Force requirements is the ability to
operate in anti-access and contested environments and unmanned
aircraft are limited to operating in permissive environments.
Therefore, they are not viewed as replacements for manned tactical
aircraft, but instead as complementary capabilities that enable
tactical aircraft to perform their missions more efficiently.
Similarly, bomber aircraft play a critical role in striking ground
targets. Although, Air Force officials emphasize that bomber aircraft
are integral to force structure analyses and directly impact the
number of fighter aircraft required, it is not clear how or to what
extent.
Unmanned aircraft have proven to be highly valuable because they
possess characteristics that many manned aircraft do not, such as the
ability to fly for long-duration missions and provide a sustained
presence over the battlefield or to perform "dull, dirty, and
dangerous" missions. However, Air Force officials point out that
current unmanned aircraft systems with ground strike capabilities--
specifically the MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1 Predator--do not possess other
performance capabilities needed to replace manned tactical aircraft
such as the F-16 or F-15. They note, for example, that the MQ-9 Reaper
does not have the speed or self-protection capabilities of legacy
aircraft, nor the stealth characteristics of new systems, needed to
effectively operate in areas protected by advanced air defense radars.
Furthermore, the satellite communications used to operate unmanned
aircraft are susceptible to interruption which could compromise
mission success and endanger lives. Air Force officials indicated that
without "guaranteed, uninterrupted communications" and other
technology advancements, unmanned systems cannot be considered viable
replacements for manned aircraft. Therefore, OSD's recent direction to
increase the total number of MQ-9 Reaper combat air patrols[Footnote
6] from 50 to 65, and procure an additional 74 Reapers from 2011 to
2015, did not result in a related decrease in the Air Force's total
inventory requirement of 2,000 aircraft.
Air Force officials also noted that the service's tactical aircraft
requirements assume that a new bomber, intended for long range strike
missions, will be available within the next two decades. Given
expected improvements in technology and more adaptive, agile assets,
some service officials expect that future bombers or long-range strike
assets, whether manned or unmanned, will need to be directly
considered part of the tactical aircraft requirement. Air Force
officials emphasize that if a new bomber is not available, a complete
reassessment of the force structure will be required, a reassessment
that could potentially result in an increase in tactical aircraft
requirements. According to OSD officials, a new bomber will not likely
be available before 2020, and in addition to bombers, the department
is exploring other options for performing strike missions, including
unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles.
The Navy's tactical aircraft requirement is also not affected by
increases in unmanned aircraft procurement. However, the Navy has been
working on developing and demonstrating technologies for a future
carrier-based unmanned aircraft system that could be used to replace
manned strike fighters. The technologies are still maturing, but the
Naval Aviation Vision (January 2010) acknowledges the strong
possibility that the Navy will eventually replace some of its carrier-
based manned strike fighter aircraft--F/A-18E/F systems in particular--
with unmanned systems. However, no definitive unmanned aircraft
requirements have been established, and no official development
program has been initiated.
DOD Expects to Encounter Tactical Aircraft Shortfalls, but Options for
Minimizing These Shortfalls May Exist:
DOD expects to encounter shortfalls in both Air Force and Navy
tactical aircraft inventories, but the timing and magnitude of these
shortfalls largely depend on assumptions about JSF acquisitions and
the viability of legacy aircraft. For example, when the Air Force
assumed a higher production rate for the JSF--which now appears to be
optimistic--the peak of the service's anticipated shortfall was
reduced by several hundred aircraft. However, the JSF program has
continued to experience problems and is in the process of being
restructured, which could result in a lower production rate. In
addition to JSF's problems, DOD's investments in legacy systems have
generally been assigned lower priority in the budgeting process, and
many critical upgrade and modernization efforts face funding
shortfalls. The Navy and Air Force are exploring various options to
close their projected gaps. For example, the Navy is considering an
investment of around $7 billion to extend the service life of almost
300 F/A-18A-D aircraft, and the Air Force is looking at similar
options for as many as 300 F-16s, but a fully informed cost and
benefit analysis has not yet been done.
The Services Project Tactical Aircraft Inventory Shortfalls, but the
Timing and Magnitude of These Shortfalls Are Uncertain:
The Air Force projects a shortfall in its tactical aircraft inventory
beginning in 2012 and persisting for at least two decades, even with
optimistic assumptions about JSF production. According to recent data,
service officials expect the number of tactical aircraft in the
inventory to drop below required levels in 2012 and to continue to be
below required levels through 2030. Based on information in a report
the service recently submitted to Congress, the Air Force's shortfall
is expected to exceed 200 aircraft in the 2025 time frame and continue
to stay at about that level through 2030, the last year in the
projection (see figure 2). The assessed shortfall is likely to
continue beyond 2030, absent other developments, because at that time,
JSF production will have already reached its predicted peak rate, and
no other new tactical aircraft procurements are yet planned.
Figure 2: Air Force Tactical Aircraft Requirements versus Projected
Tactical Aircraft Inventory, 2011 through 2030:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Previous requirement: 2,250 total aircraft;
Current requirement: 2,000 total aircraft.
Fiscal year: 2011;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 250;
F-15E: 190;
F-16: 1,000;
F-22A: 180;
F-35A: 20.
Fiscal year: 2012;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 250;
F-15E: 190;
F-16: 940;
F-22A: 170;
F-35A: 33.
Fiscal year: 2013;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 220;
F-15E: 200;
F-16: 945;
F-22A: 170;
F-35A: 45.
Fiscal year: 2014;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 220;
F-15E: 190;
F-16: 915;
F-22A: 175;
F-35A: 80.
Fiscal year: 2015;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 210;
F-15E: 190;
F-16: 840;
F-22A: 180;
F-35A: 100.
Fiscal year: 2016;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 200;
F-15E: 175;
F-16: 785;
F-22A: 180;
F-35A: 150.
Fiscal year: 2017;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 190;
F-15E: 158;
F-16: 725;
F-22A: 180;
F-35A: 210.
Fiscal year: 2018;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 190;
F-15E: 150;
F-16: 670;
F-22A: 175;
F-35A: 285.
Fiscal year: 2019;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 175;
F-15E: 130;
F-16: 640;
F-22A: 175;
F-35A: 360.
Fiscal year: 2020;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 165;
F-15E: 115;
F-16: 600;
F-22A: 180;
F-35A: 440.
Fiscal year: 2021;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 155;
F-15E: 110;
F-16: 530;
F-22A: 180;
F-35A: 520.
Fiscal year: 2022;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 150;
F-15E: 80;
F-16: 480;
F-22A: 180;
F-35A: 580.
Fiscal year: 2023;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 140;
F-15E: 70;
F-16: 420;
F-22A: 160;
F-35A: 680.
Fiscal year: 2024;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 120;
F-15E: 60;
F-16: 370;
F-22A: 160;
F-35A: 750.
Fiscal year: 2025;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 95;
F-15E: 50;
F-16: 300;
F-22A: 160;
F-35A: 820.
Fiscal year: 2026;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 75;
F-15E: 40;
F-16: 250;
F-22A: 160;
F-35A: 890.
Fiscal year: 2027;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 50;
F-15E: 44;
F-16: 180;
F-22A: 160;
F-35A: 970.
Fiscal year: 2028;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 40;
F-15E: 30;
F-16: 120;
F-22A: 160;
F-35A: 1,060.
Fiscal year: 2029;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 30;
F-15E: 30;
F-16: 90;
F-22A: 160;
F-35A: 1,120.
Fiscal year: 2030;
A-10: 345;
F-15C/D: 5;
F-15E: 10;
F-16: 30;
F-22A: 160;
F-35A: 1,230.
Source: Air Force.
[End of figure]
The timing and magnitude of the Air Force's projected shortfall have
fluctuated over time due to changes in assumptions regarding JSF
production rates, the overall requirement, and the way the Air Force
calculates the service life of its aircraft. The current projected
shortfall of around 200 aircraft is smaller than earlier projections
had indicated. At one point, the shortfall was expected to be as large
as 800 aircraft. At that time, the Air Force was assuming lower annual
JSF production rates and had an established requirement of 2,250 total
aircraft. These important factors have since been revised. JSF
production assumptions now reflect a higher peak production rate of 80
aircraft per year, and the requirement is now 250 aircraft less--
significantly reducing the magnitude of the projected shortfall (see
figure 2 above). In addition, the Air Force has established a service-
wide method of calculating aircraft service life. This new calculation
accounts for both the number of flight hours and the severity of
flight conditions, a calculation that the Air Force believes will
improve both fleet management and force planning by providing higher
quality information regarding aircraft structural life.
Like the Air Force, the Navy and Marine Corps also project a shortfall
in their integrated tactical aircraft inventory, expected to peak at
177 aircraft in 2018.[Footnote 7] The Navy does not assess its
shortfall against its total inventory requirement of 1,240 tactical
aircraft, but instead, against the total number of aircraft needed to
meet current warfighter demand within resource constraints--around
1,154. At this constrained level, the Navy and Marine Corps have fewer
tactical aircraft squadrons with which to equip their respective air
wings and aircraft groups--specifically five fewer Navy squadrons and
four fewer Marine Corps squadrons. If assessed against the total
requirement, the peak shortfall would increase by 86 aircraft to a
total shortfall of 263. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between the
Navy's total requirement, current warfighter demand, and the Navy's
expected tactical aircraft inventory from 2011 through 2030.
Figure 3: Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Aircraft Requirements versus
Projected Tactical Aircraft Inventory, 2011 through 2030:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Requirement: 1,240 total aircraft;
Demand: 1,154 total aircraft
Fiscal year: 2011;
AV-8B: 125;
EA-6B: 94;
FA-18A-D: 535;
FA-18E-F: 438;
EA-18G: 56;
F-35B-C: 13.
Fiscal year: 2012;
AV-8B: 123;
EA-6B: 84;
FA-18A-D: 480;
FA-18E-F: 454;
EA-18G: 77;
F-35B-C: 33.
Fiscal year: 2013;
AV-8B: 121;
EA-6B: 68;
FA-18A-D: 407;
FA-18E-F: 475;
EA-18G: 89;
F-35B-C: 53.
Fiscal year: 2014;
AV-8B: 119;
EA-6B: 52;
FA-18A-D: 347;
FA-18E-F: 474;
EA-18G: 112;
F-35B-C: 73.
Fiscal year: 2015;
AV-8B: 113;
EA-6B: 40;
FA-18A-D: 282;
FA-18E-F: 497;
EA-18G: 111;
F-35B-C: 111.
Fiscal year: 2016;
AV-8B: 111;
EA-6B: 35;
FA-18A-D: 224;
FA-18E-F: 496;
EA-18G: 110;
F-35B-C: 146.
Fiscal year: 2017;
AV-8B: 107;
EA-6B: 27;
FA-18A-D: 172;
FA-18E-F: 494;
EA-18G: 109;
F-35B-C: 187.
Fiscal year: 2018;
AV-8B: 91;
EA-6B: 17;
FA-18A-D: 113;
FA-18E-F: 492;
EA-18G: 108;
F-35B-C: 228.
Fiscal year: 2019;
AV-8B: 75;
EA-6B: 8;
FA-18A-D: 121;
FA-18E-F: 490;
EA-18G: 108;
F-35B-C: 268.
Fiscal year: 2020;
AV-8B: 58;
EA-6B: 0;
FA-18A-D: 95;
FA-18E-F: 488;
EA-18G: 107;
F-35B-C: 317.
Fiscal year: 2021;
AV-8B: 42;
EA-6B: 0;
FA-18A-D: 43;
FA-18E-F: 487;
EA-18G: 105;
F-35B-C: 395.
Fiscal year: 2022;
AV-8B: 26;
EA-6B: 0;
FA-18A-D: 26;
FA-18E-F: 485;
EA-18G: 104;
F-35B-C: 458.
Fiscal year: 2023;
AV-8B: 10;
EA-6B: 0;
FA-18A-D: 20;
FA-18E-F: 483;
EA-18G: 103v
F-35B-C: 519.
Fiscal year: 2024;
AV-8B: 0;
EA-6B: 0;
FA-18A-D: 17;
FA-18A-D: 470;
EA-18G: 102v
F-35B-C: 581.
Fiscal year: 2025;
AV-8B: 0;
EA-6B: 0;
FA-18A-D: 12;
FA-18E-F: 450;
EA-18G: 101;
F-35B-C: 642.
Fiscal year: 2026;
AV-8B: 0;
EA-6B: 0;
FA-18A-D: 8;
FA-18E-F: 421;
EA-18G: 100;
F-35B-C: 693.
Fiscal year: 2027;
AV-8B: 0;
EA-6B: 0;
FA-18A-D: 7;
FA-18E-F: 387;
EA-18G: 99;
F-35B-C: 717.
Fiscal year: 2028;
AV-8B: 0;
EA-6B: 0;
FA-18A-D: 5;
FA-18E-F: 350;
EA-18G: 98;
F-35B-C: 740.
Fiscal year: 2029;
AV-8B: 0;
EA-6B: 0;
FA-18A-D: 4;
FA-18E-F: 305;
EA-18G: 97;
F-35B-C: 753.
Fiscal year: 2030;
AV-8B: 0;
EA-6B: 0;
FA-18A-D: 3;
FA-18E-F: 264;
EA-18G: 96;
F-35B-C: 757.
Source: DOD data; GAO presentation.
[End of figure]
Like the Air Force's estimates, the timing and magnitude of the Navy's
tactical aircraft shortfall have fluctuated over time due in large
part to changes in assumptions about new aircraft procurement and
legacy aircraft service life. For example, at the time of the Navy's
2010 budget submission, the peak shortfall was projected to be 146
aircraft in about 2014--31 aircraft fewer and 4 years sooner than the
current projection--because at that time the Navy assumed that it
would be able to extend the service life of 295 legacy F/A-18 aircraft
from 8,600 flight hours to 10,000 flight hours and that the JSF would
be delivered on time and at planned rates. Since then, however, the
Navy has had to revise these assumptions because the funding needed to
extend the service life of the legacy F/A-18s has not been budgeted,
and the JSF program has experienced significant problems and is being
restructured. As a result, the most recent shortfall projections
assume that the service lives of the legacy F/A-18s will not be
extended beyond 8,600 hours and reflect the fact that JSF aircraft
deliveries have been delayed and quantities have been reduced by 55
aircraft between 2011 and 2015.
One key assumption consistent across the Navy's shortfall projections
is that the new, more advanced F/A-18 aircraft--F/A-18E/Fs--will
achieve 9,000 flight hours, which is 3,000 hours longer than their
designed service life. This assumption roughly equates to an
additional 10 years of service life per aircraft.[Footnote 8] While
the Navy believes that this service life extension will be relatively
easy to accomplish, it has not yet finished assessing the aircraft to
determine the extent of the work that will have to be done. Service
officials acknowledge the possibility that their assessment could
uncover the need for more work than currently anticipated. Therefore,
current projected inventory levels could be too high.
Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Issues:
According to the Director of the Air National Guard and other Guard
officials, the impact of the Air Force tactical aircraft shortfall on
the Guard is expected to be significant, largely because the Guard
operates a preponderance of the Air Force's oldest aircraft, which are
quickly reaching the end of their service lives. The Director believes
that the Guard's portion of the shortfall will reach a critical point
around fiscal year 2016. In a recent report to Congress, the Director
noted that without an effective shortfall mitigation plan the Guard
will lose the equivalent of four squadrons of F-16s before 2017, when
the Air Force expects to have enough JSF aircraft to begin
transferring its newer F-16s to guard units. The Director also points
out that this potential loss of capacity directly threatens the
Guard's ability to conduct air defense missions within the United
States and support air expeditionary force missions overseas. However,
Air Force headquarters officials emphasize that while the Guard's
fighter force structure is potentially at risk in the long-term,
defending the homeland remains the top Air Force priority and is not
at risk.
In 2009, we reported related concerns about the impact of aging
aircraft and fighter shortfalls on the Air National Guard's capability
to sustain air sovereignty alert operations and protect United States
airspace.[Footnote 9] We determined that the Air Force had not
developed plans and actions to mitigate two significant challenges:
(1) replacing or extending the service life of aging fighter aircraft
and (2) replacing air alert units with equipment and trained personnel
when they deploy or are being trained on new aircraft. Our analysis
showed that by 2020, 11 of the 18 current air sovereignty alert sites
could be without viable aircraft (meaning aircraft that have not yet
reached the end of their useful service life). We also found that
operations at 14 of 18 sites may have to suspend operations for
periods of time from 2010 to 2020 as aircraft reach the end of their
useful life or when units are in training on new systems.
The Air Force Reserve Command also recognizes that shortfalls in the
Air Force's tactical aircraft inventory will increase the risk that
future capability needs might not be met. The command expects to
recapitalize its aging fleet of older F-16s with newer F-16s as the
active duty Air Force transitions to the JSF. However, Reserve
officials note that they are concerned that the active duty Air Force
will be unable to field the JSF as planned, a situation that will
likely affect the flow of aircraft down to the Reserves. This is
especially troublesome since their F-16 aircraft are approaching the
end of their service life.
Optimistic Assumptions about JSF Production Rates, Initial Operational
Capability, and Funding Drive Estimates of the Magnitude and Timing of
the Services' Inventory Shortfalls:
Because of its magnitude and the hundreds of legacy aircraft it is
slated to replace, the JSF is the lynchpin in DOD's tactical aircraft
recapitalization plans. As a result, JSF program setbacks in costs,
deliveries, and performance directly affect modernization plans and
retirement schedules of the legacy aircraft. We reported in March 2010
that the JSF program continues to encounter increased costs and slowed
progress and that further cost growth and delays were likely, putting
at risk the ability to deliver aircraft quantities and capabilities on
time.[Footnote 10] While noting some improvements, we determined that
manufacturing inefficiencies, parts problems, and engineering
technical changes indicate that design and production processes may
lack the maturity needed to efficiently produce aircraft at planned
rates. We also reported that, slowed by late aircraft deliveries,
technical problems, and low productivity, the flight test program only
completed 10 percent of its planned sorties in 2009. Testing and other
technical challenges will likely add costs and time to development
and, as a result, the program may be unable to deliver promised
capabilities to the warfighter in the time frame currently required.
Initial operational capability, which represents full warfighting
capability, has slipped several years for both the Air Force and Navy--
both services now expected to achieve initial capability in 2016. The
Marine Corps continues to depend on timely deliveries of JSF to meet
its required initial operational capability in 2012 because of its
plans to recapitalize its entire fleet of F/A-18A-D, EA-6B, and AV-8B
aircraft with the short take-off and vertical landing version of the
JSF.
Figure 4 below shows new tactical aircraft procurements made and
expected through 2035, and underscores the prominence of the JSF in
these plans. This figure reflects the assumption of a combined peak
annual production rate of 130 JSF's for U.S. forces--80 Air Force
aircraft and 50 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft.
Figure 4: New Tactical Aircraft Procurements between 1997 and 2035:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 1997;
F/A-18E-F: 12.
Fiscal year: 1998;
F/A-18E-F: 20.
Fiscal year: 1999;
F-22A: 2;
F/A-18E-F: 30.
Fiscal year: 2000;
F/A-18E-F: 36.
Fiscal year: 2001;
F-22A: 10;
F/A-18E-F: 39.
Fiscal year: 2002;
F-22A: 13;
F/A-18E-F: 48.
Fiscal year: 2003;
F-22A: 21;
F/A-18E-F: 45.
Fiscal year: 2004;
F-22A: 22;
F/A-18E-F: 42.
Fiscal year: 2005;
F-22A: 24;
F/A-18E-F: 42.
Fiscal year: 2006;
F-22A: 23;
F/A-18E-F: 38;
EA-18G: 4.
Fiscal year: 2007;
F-22A: 20;
F/A-18E-F: 37;
EA-18G: 9;
JSF: 2.
Fiscal year: 2008;
F-22A: 20;
F/A-18E-F: 37;
EA-18G: 21;
JSF: 12.
Fiscal year: 2009;
F-22A: 24;
F/A-18E-F: 23;
EA-18G: 22;
JSF: 14.
Fiscal year: 2010;
F/A-18E-F: 18;
EA-18G: 22;
JSF: 30.
Fiscal year: 2011;
F/A-18E-F: 22;
EA-18G: 12;
JSF: 43.
Fiscal year: 2012;
F/A-18E-F: 1;
EA-18G: 24;
JSF: 45.
Fiscal year: 2013;
F/A-18E-F: 25;
JSF: 71.
Fiscal year: 2014;
JSF: 90.
Fiscal year: 2015;
JSF: 113.
Fiscal year: 2016;
JSF: 130.
Fiscal year: 2017;
JSF: 130.
Fiscal year: 2018;
JSF: 130.
Fiscal year: 2019;
JSF: 130.
Fiscal year: 2020;
JSF: 130.
Fiscal year: 2021;
JSF: 130.
Fiscal year: 2022;
JSF: 130.
Fiscal year: 2023;
JSF: 130.
Fiscal year: 2024;
JSF: 118.
Fiscal year: 2025;
JSF: 105.
Fiscal year: 2026;
JSF: 105.
Fiscal year: 2027;
JSF: 80.
Fiscal year: 2028;
JSF: 80.
Fiscal year: 2029;
JSF: 80.
Fiscal year: 2030;
JSF: 80.
Fiscal year: 2031;
JSF: 80.
Fiscal year: 2032;
JSF: 80.
Fiscal year: 2033;
JSF: 80.
Fiscal year: 2034;
JSF: 80.
Fiscal year: 2035;
JSF: 15.
Source: DOD data; GAO presentation.
[End of figure]
Uncertainty about JSF's costs and deliveries makes it challenging for
the services to plan and implement modernization efforts and
retirement schedules. As a result, service officials have been forced
to react to changing JSF schedules and to put forward unfunded
contingency plans to modernize and extend the life of some legacy
aircraft. For example, Navy officials have noted that they are unable
to fully fund proactive efforts to detect and correct deficiencies on
F/A-18A-D Hornets and AV-8B Harrier aircraft. Similarly, the low
priority placed on modernizing radar on Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles
has delayed procurement of sufficient numbers of more advanced active
electronically scanned array (AESA) radars and threatens to ground
portions of the fleet beginning in 2013 if sufficient numbers of the
new radar are not available to mitigate reliability problems with the
older units. Other important upgrades for the F-15E are also unfunded.
All legacy aircraft in both services are becoming increasingly more
expensive to operate and maintain as they age and also face issues
with parts obsolescence and/or diminishing manufacturing sources,
which threaten to further increase sustainment costs for the affected
systems and place additional cost pressures on the tactical aircraft
portfolio as a whole. See appendix III for details and further
information about the legacy aircraft and new acquisitions.
As a result of the JSF program's continuing cost and schedule
problems, the Secretary of Defense mandated a restructuring of the
program in February 2010. Among other things, this restructuring
increased time and funding for system development, added 13 months and
4 additional aircraft to the test program, and reduced near-term
procurement quantities. Our March report noted that these and other
positive steps, if implemented effectively, should improve program
outcomes and provide more realistic projections of cost and schedule.
[Footnote 11] However, the program continues to face significant risks
that will likely add to costs and further delay aircraft deliveries.
The combination of significant development cost increases and reduced
procurements resulted in unit cost increases that exceeded statutory
thresholds, requiring DOD to certify the need for the program to
Congress.[Footnote 12] According to the December 2009 Selected
Acquisition Report for the JSF, program unit costs are 57 percent
higher than the original baseline. However, this figure represents
cost estimates from the latest independent analyses through fiscal
year 2015[Footnote 13] only. Estimated program costs from fiscal year
2016 through the end of procurement in 2035 are still based on the
Joint Program Office's estimates, which some DOD officials consider
overly optimistic.
The Services Are Exploring Options and Identifying Near-Term Funding
Needs for Addressing Projected Shortfalls, but Lack Information Needed
for Sound Decision-Making:
The Air Force has several options for addressing its projected
tactical aircraft shortfall. These options, which were identified and
assessed in two reports issued to Congress in March 2010,[Footnote 14]
include extending the service life of and modernizing legacy F-16
aircraft, increasing annual JSF procurement to more than the 80
aircraft per year, and procuring new upgraded variants of legacy
aircraft such as the F-16 and F-15. The Air Force notes in both
reports, that by making investments in its older legacy F-16 aircraft,
it could mitigate the shortfall through 2015. Furthermore, the Air
Force believes that by extending the service life of and modernizing
300 newer legacy F-16s, along with procuring JSF at the planed rate of
80 aircraft per year, it could mitigate the shortfall through 2030.
However, Air Force Reserve officials emphasize that the older F-16
aircraft are not part of the Air Force's service life extension plans.
They point out that the small investment in the older F-16s, noted by
the Air Force, would allow those aircraft to simply reach their
intended service life of 8,000 flight hours, but would not extend
their service life.
Initial funding for F-16 service life extension and modernization
efforts is expected to be part of the Air Force's 2012 budget request,
but the full cost is not yet known. The Air Force's analysis
supporting its report assumed that extending the service life of newer
F-16s would cost approximately $2.6 billion (in 2010 base year
dollars), but the report points out that full-scale fatigue testing of
a newer F-16 has to be completed before any feasibility or cost and
benefit analysis can be fully informed. According to officials
responsible for maintaining and sustaining the F-16 fleet, such
testing is not expected to begin until around May 2011. They also note
that the testing will take approximately 3 years from set-up to
reporting and is estimated to cost $38 million.
Two other options examined by the Air Force are the possibility of
increasing JSF procurement to more than 80 aircraft per year and
purchasing new, upgraded variants of legacy aircraft, such as the F-16
and F-15, referred to as "4.5 generation" aircraft. The Air Force
notes that higher annual JSF procurements could reduce unit costs
while quickly transitioning the inventory to a higher ratio of fifth
generation aircraft. However, JSF procurement acquisition unit cost
has increased 57 percent from original estimates, and some service
officials question whether the Air Force will be able to afford the
current planned procurement of 80 aircraft per year. With regard to
purchasing 4.5 generation aircraft, the Air Force does not believe
that this option supports the appropriate mix of legacy and stealth
aircraft needed for future warfighting scenarios. In addition, it
believes that extending the service life of existing fighters would
provide essentially the same capability at 10 to 15 percent of the
cost. This cost comparison, however, is based on an analysis that was
not informed by the results of a full scale fatigue test of existing
fighters, and did not include the costs associated with the unique
sustainment equipment and personnel that would be required to support
4.5 generation aircraft.
The Director of the Air National Guard agrees with the Air Force's
assessment of the shortfall mitigation options, but believes that an
additional option--one that addresses its specific shortfall--may
exist. This additional option is to move 6 aircraft, and associated
personnel and support equipment, out of each active duty squadron and
into guard units, thereby reducing the number of primary aircraft
assigned to each active duty squadron from 24 to 18. The Guard
believes that, among other benefits, this would produce more than 180
combat ready aircraft to recapitalize its aging fleet, and allow for a
more even distribution of aircraft utilization and better balance
aircrew and maintenance personnel experience between active and Guard
units. The Guard believes that this approach would maximize the amount
of combat power that can be generated within resource constraints.
However, the official Air Force position is that the affect of the
shortfall on the Guard is minimal over the next several years.
Therefore, some Air Force headquarters officials are resistant to this
option, in large part because they believe that reducing the number of
aircraft in each squadron will negatively affect mission efficiency
with respect to force rotation.
As part of its 2012 budget preparations, the Navy is exploring the
possibility of funding a service life extension program for
approximately 280 legacy F/A-18 aircraft in order to address its
projected tactical aircraft shortfall in the near term. This program
would extend the lives of the aircraft from 8,600 to 10,000 flight
hours, thus, according to the Navy, reducing the peak of the shortfall
from 177 to less than 50 aircraft. While the Navy has funded some F/A-
18 structural upgrades over the past several years, it has not yet
budgeted funding for this service life extension program. The Navy
estimates that, on average, this program will cost $25.1 million per
aircraft, or a total of more than $7 billion. Nearly all of that cost
is expected to go toward buying the parts and equipment needed to make
structural upgrades and address parts obsolescence issues. Navy
officials emphasize that the program is also expected to purchase some
additional capabilities.
The Navy is also exploring other options for addressing the near term
impacts of its projected shortfall, including: reducing the number of
expeditionary squadrons; accelerating the scheduled transition of
several legacy F/A-18 squadrons to available F/A-18E/F aircraft; and,
changing the way the aircraft carrier fleet is managed and used. Navy
officials note that exercising some of these options--like adjusting
the way the carrier fleet is managed and used--would only be possible
if current demands on the force change and point out that each option
must be balanced against operational requirements.
In 2007, we noted that one option available to the Navy was simply to
buy more new F/A-18E/F aircraft. Since the F/A-18E/F production line
is still running, the option remains viable, but the Navy does not
appear to include it in any of its analyses. During a congressional
hearing in March 2010, senior Navy officials did not provide a direct
answer when asked if they had compared the cost of buying new F/A-
18E/F with the estimated cost of extending the service lives of legacy
aircraft. Our analysis, detailed below and summarized in table 2,
using the Navy's most recent estimates and data from the December 2009
Selected Acquisition Reports, indicates that buying additional
aircraft has the potential to provide a better return on investment as
measured by the cost per additional flight hour.[Footnote 15]
As noted above, the Navy expects the service life extension program,
if funded and executed, to result in 1,400 additional flight hours per
legacy aircraft--from 8,600 to 10,000 hours. Given that the estimated
cost of the program will be $25.1 million per aircraft, the average
cost per additional flight hour would be $17,929. If the Navy were to
procure 100 additional F/A-18E/F aircraft--a number roughly equivalent
to its projected shortfall--at a procurement unit cost of $61 million,
which is the unit cost for the aircraft being procured in 2011, the
cost per additional flight hour, assuming a 6,000 flight hour service
life, would be $10,167. Even if the new F/A-18E/F aircraft were
procured at a unit cost of $76 million, the same unit cost as the 25
aircraft being procured in 2013, the cost per additional flight hour
would still be less than the cost of each hour added by the service
life extension option--$12,667 versus $17,929 per hour. The cost per
additional flight hour reaches a breakeven point at a unit cost of
roughly $105 million. This analysis assumes that each new F/A-18E/F
would have a 6,000 flight hour service life, but as noted above the
Navy believes that the aircraft will be able to achieve 9,000 flight
hours. If so, the option of buying new aircraft becomes even more
attractive.
Table 2: Comparison of Procuring New F/A-18E/F Aircraft and Extending
the Service Life of Legacy Aircraft:
Options: Service life extension;
Number of aircraft: 280;
Average cost per aircraft: $25,100,000;
Additional flight hours per aircraft: 1,400;
Average cost per additional flight hour: $17,929.
Options: Buy new F/A-18E/Fs at FY11 unit cost;
Number of aircraft: 100;
Average cost per aircraft: $61,000,000;
Additional flight hours per aircraft: 6,000;
Average cost per additional flight hour: $10,167.
Options: Buy new F/A-18E/Fs at FY13 unit cost;
Number of aircraft: 100;
Average cost per aircraft: $76,000,000;
Additional flight hours per aircraft: 6,000;
Average cost per additional flight hour: $12,667.
Source: Navy data; GAO analysis and presentation.
[End of table]
Services Have Not Considered Future Requirements in Light of Recent
Strategic Planning and Threat Assessment Changes:
DOD's current tactical aircraft requirement does not fully reflect
recent changes in strategic planning and threat assessments, as
reported in OSD's 2010 QDR,[Footnote 16] because the foundational
analyses have not been done. The QDR is expected to articulate the
nation's defense strategy and identify associated budget plans. As
such, it provides a starting point from which DOD assesses its needs
and establishes its requirements. According to service officials, the
2010 QDR effectively validates the services' existing force structures
and focuses on the near-term, principally the next 6 years.
Furthermore, OSD's recent Aircraft Investment Plan[Footnote 17] and
fiscal year 2011 budget decisions made some changes in near-term
aircraft investments, such as increasing purchases of unmanned
aircraft and electronic warfare systems, but did not change the
current tactical aircraft requirement. However, the QDR reflects a
fundamental change in how DOD views future national security
challenges by examining them in various combinations and recognizing
the need to plan for and acquire systems, including unmanned aircraft,
that are adaptive and agile. Although the QDR report has been
released, the department is still in the process of establishing the
more detailed analytical foundation for its future requirements and,
until the analyses are complete and a foundation in place, it will be
difficult for DOD to make informed investment decisions about legacy
aircraft upgrades and modernizations and new aircraft procurements.
Current Tactical Aircraft Requirements Do Not Fully Reflect Recent
Changes in Strategic Planning and Threat Assessments:
Changes in DOD's planning assumptions and threat assessments reflect a
fundamental shift in the department's view of the various national
security challenges the U.S. may face in the future, but current
tactical aircraft requirements and shortfall projections are primarily
based on previously established assumptions and assessments largely
focused on fighting and winning two major regional conflicts. Air
Force officials note that the 2010 QDR could actually result in an
increase in tactical aircraft requirements because it includes demands
in addition to "deterring and defeating two regional aggressors."
Specifically the QDR states that "U.S. forces today and in the years
to come can be plausibly challenged by a range of threats that extend
far beyond the familiar 'major regional conflicts' that have dominated
U.S. planning since the end of the Cold War." Therefore, the 2010 QDR
conveys DOD's assessment of the force structure and capabilities
needed to meet many types of demands by presenting three scenario
combinations that reflect both current and projected security
environments. Each scenario includes a different combination of types
of operations, ranging from engaging in major stabilization
operations, deterring and defeating two regional aggressors,
conducting counterinsurgency, maintaining a long-duration deterrence
operation, and extending support to civil authorities. According to
DOD officials, this approach to planning provides a more realistic
picture of the future, but makes quantifying long-term requirements
difficult.
While the 2010 QDR presents changes to previous assumptions and threat
assessments, it does not significantly change the department's
tactical aviation force structure requirements. The QDR establishes
force structure parameters through fiscal year 2015 at 10 Navy carrier
air wings, six Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft groups, and an Air
Force component comprised of 10 to 11 strike fighter and 6 air
superiority wing-equivalents. These parameters generally reflect and,
according to service officials, validate the current tactical aviation
force structure. Furthermore, service officials continue to cite as
official force requirements those requirements that were in place
prior to the QDR's publication.
The 2010 QDR's focus on both near-term and long-term needs does,
however, affect tactical aviation forces. In connection to the force
structure plan it lays out, the QDR states that "whereas QDRs have
often emphasized shaping the force beyond the five-year time frame,
this QDR, of necessity, had to focus intensively on present conflicts
as well as potential future needs. Our force-sizing construct
therefore takes into account the realities of the current operational
environment." As part of this new dual focus, the QDR directs more
investment be made in various enabling capabilities designed to
significantly enhance the ability of U.S. forces to protect and
advance U.S. interests in both the near and longer term. Some of these
capabilities are tactical aircraft capabilities, including more and
better intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and
electronic warfare systems. OSD's recent budget decisions and its
Aircraft Investment Plan for fiscal years 2011 through 2040--informed
by early QDR analysis--focus on the near-term and make corresponding
changes to aircraft investments. OSD's Resource Management Decision
number 700, also made a number of changes to the military services'
aircraft investment plans for the next 5 years, including:
* adding $1.8 billion to procure 74 additional MQ-9 Reapers;
* adding $344 million to develop, procure, and integrate jamming pods
on 33 MQ-9 aircraft to counter improvised explosive devices and
address other irregular warfare needs;
* adding $4 billion to procure 26 additional EA-18G aircraft to
continue the Navy's expeditionary airborne electronic attack mission;
[Footnote 18]
* adding $2 billion to fund the development of a carrier-based
unmanned aircraft system, beginning in 2013; and:
* reducing JSF procurements by 122 aircraft between fiscal years 2011
and 2015, and adjusting resources to fully fund the restructured JSF
program to recent independent cost estimates:
DOD's Aircraft Investment Plan reflects these budget actions and is
shaped by and implements some of the QDR's near-term initiatives
relating to electronic warfare and ISR. The plan also creates a new
"unmanned multirole surveillance and strike" category, distinct from
fighter/attack and ISR, for aircraft systems such as the MQ-9 Reaper
and the contemplated carrier-based unmanned aircraft system. However,
despite a growing consensus that unmanned systems offer increasingly
sophisticated attack capabilities that complement existing tactical
aircraft, plans to procure additional unmanned assets, as discussed
earlier in this report, have thus far not impacted the service's
existing tactical aircraft requirements.
In our 2007 report, we recommended, and DOD agreed, that the
department develop an integrated and affordable enterprise-level
investment strategy based on a joint assessment of warfighting needs
and a full set of potential and viable solutions, considering not only
new acquisitions, but also modifications to legacy aircraft within
realistic and affordable resource constraints.[Footnote 19] We noted
that this strategy should strike a balance between maintaining near-
term readiness and addressing long-term needs, considering the
contributions of unmanned aircraft systems, bombers, long-range strike
aircraft, missiles, and other weapons currently in the inventory and
those planned that can be employed to perform missions similar to
those performed by tactical aircraft. DOD's Aircraft Investment Plan
is a step in the right direction. However, while the Aircraft
Investment Plan's cost estimates and projections account for new
procurements through 2015, they do not include the considerable
investments that could be needed to upgrade legacy assets.
Foundational Analyses to Determine Future Tactical Aircraft
Requirements Have Not Yet Been Conducted:
The QDR is to set a long-term course for DOD to follow and provide a
strategic framework for the department's budget plan and force
management decisions. As such the 2010 QDR reflects changes to
previous planning assumptions and threat assessments that could impact
future tactical aircraft requirements. However, detailed analyses of
the foundational capability requirements, which reflect current QDR
guidance and assumptions and which are needed to provide the framework
for determining future tactical aircraft requirements and for making
related investment decisions, are not yet complete. For example, an
Air Force official stated that, even though the QDR has been
published, joint analytics are ongoing to establish acceptable
scenarios on which to base force planning. The updated "joint
analytics agenda" will provide the basis for any requirements changes
resulting from the QDR. Until then, the Air Force is operating from
the previously established framework, and it is therefore unclear
whether current Air Force requirements accurately reflect long term
needs. Marine Corps requirements officials said they had not been
fully briefed on the QDR scenarios and assumptions.
Once complete, these analyses could result in changes to prior
assumptions and projections regarding future force structure needs.
These changes, in turn, will impact investment decisions regarding
legacy aircraft modernization and service-life extension programs, JSF
procurements, and other capabilities. While these decisions and
others, such as those involving retirement of older aircraft and
production quantities and schedules for the JSF, will be made in the
near-term, they will have long-term funding and capability
implications. Therefore, these decisions must be adequately informed
and based on the most up-to-date data available on force structure
requirements.
Conclusions:
Current tactical aircraft requirements have been set at levels that
service officials believe are sufficient to meet national security
needs with moderate, but manageable risk. At the same time, the
services continue to report that their tactical aircraft inventories
will soon fall below required quantities--shortfalls they expect to
persist for years. As a result, DOD faces important investment
decisions in the upcoming budget cycle. However, the magnitude and
timing of projected shortfalls are uncertain and heavily dependent on
assumptions about JSF production rates and deliveries, as well as
investments in legacy aircraft. OSD's 2010 QDR and Aircraft Investment
Plan for fiscal years 2011-2040 focus on the near-term, and a more
detailed framework for determining long-term requirements has not yet
been established. In addition, the Aircraft Investment Plan addresses
investments in new procurements, as directed by Congress, but does not
include the considerable amount of money that could be needed to
upgrade legacy assets. Given the inherent uncertainty in planning for
future events, it is unlikely that perfect knowledge will ever be
attained, but DOD must gain a clearer and more comprehensive
understanding of its tactical aircraft requirements and potential
shortfalls to ensure that upcoming investment decisions are adequately
informed.
The pending restructure of the JSF program could provide more
realistic expectations of what the program is capable of delivering in
the next few years. If JSF quantities are reduced or deliveries slip
into future years, billions of dollars more in as yet unbudgeted
funding may be required to sustain, modernize, and extend the life of
legacy aircraft. Until the JSF restructuring is complete, and DOD
determines how to account for tactical capabilities provided by
unmanned aircraft, it will be difficult for DOD to make informed
investment decisions about legacy aircraft upgrades and
modernizations, and new aircraft procurements. In addition, without a
joint comprehensive analysis that compares and contrasts the costs and
benefits of various Air Force and Navy options for addressing
inventory shortfalls, it will be difficult to determine the most
efficient and effective approach to meeting established requirements
to mitigate shortfalls or, alternatively, eliminate redundancies.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
To ensure that DOD's future Aircraft Investment Plans are more
complete, balanced, and comprehensive, Congress should consider
modifying the reporting requirements of future Plans to include not
only acquisition costs for new procurements, but also investments for
modernizing and sustaining legacy aircraft, including service life
extension programs.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To address the uncertainty surrounding projected tactical aircraft
shortfalls, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, working with
the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy, more clearly explain
the department's requirements and the size and severity of anticipated
tactical aircraft shortfalls, identify the key assumptions underlying
shortfall projections, and identify alternatives and associated costs
to mitigate the impact.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense more directly and
clearly articulate how the complementary capabilities provided by
unmanned aircraft, bombers, missiles, and other weapon systems are
accounted for and quantified when calculating tactical aircraft
requirements.
To ensure that upcoming investment decisions are fully informed, we
recommend that when reassessing tactical aircraft requirements and
potential shortfalls, the Secretary of Defense also complete a
comprehensive tactical aircraft analysis that compares and contrasts
the costs and benefits of extending the lives of legacy aircraft with
the costs and benefits of procuring additional new aircraft including
the F-22, JSF, F/A-18E/F, F-15E, and newest block F-16. This analysis
should be provided to the Congress with the defense budget in February
2011 and include:
* an assessment of the technological and manufacturing feasibility of
each option;
* an evaluation of the pros and cons for each option in terms of
combat effectiveness and desirability from the warfighter's
perspective;
* identification of data sources and explanation of underlying
assumptions; and identification of potential sources of funding for
the various options including the deferment of JSF procurements into
the future.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The
comments appear in appendix IV. DOD also provided technical comments
that were incorporated as appropriate. During the agency comment
period, DOD requested clarification regarding our first
recommendation. As a result, we revised the recommendation to more
clearly state that the Secretary of Defense, working with the service
secretaries, should clarify the uncertainty surrounding DOD's
projected tactical aircraft shortfalls.
DOD partially concurred with the revised version of our first
recommendation that the Secretary of Defense more clearly explain the
department's requirements and the size and severity of anticipated
shortfalls, identify the key assumptions underlying shortfall
projections, and identify alternatives and associated costs to
mitigate the impact. The department believes that the Air Force and
Navy have provided this type of information to Congress in the past
and notes that the services intend to do so again in support of their
fiscal year 2012 budget requests. The department also emphasized that
requirements and inventory trends change over time as the strategic
environment evolves. Although the services have provided Congress with
some information, it has generally been limited to summary level data
and has not provided a clear and comprehensive understanding of
underlying assumptions or how the projections were calculated. As
noted in our report, we recognize that there is inherent uncertainty
in planning for future events and requirements and projected inventory
shortfalls are critically dependent on a number of factors that can
change over time. However, we continue to believe that DOD needs to
provide additional clarity regarding the basis for its tactical
aircraft requirements and anticipated shortfalls to ensure that
Congress and DOD officials have adequate information when making
upcoming investment decisions.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense more directly and clearly articulate how complementary
capabilities are accounted for and quantified when calculating
tactical aircraft requirements. DOD noted that multiple analyses and
studies examining the aviation portfolio are being conducted with the
intent of achieving the correct balance of capabilities and capacity.
As these analyses are done, we believe it is important that DOD
provides a clear understanding of how other types of systems such as
unmanned aircraft and bombers directly impact tactical aircraft needs.
DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the
Secretary of Defense complete a comprehensive analysis comparing the
costs and benefits of extending the lives of legacy aircraft with the
costs and benefits of procuring additional new aircraft. DOD noted
that as part of its fiscal year 2012 budget preparations, it is
assessing tactical aircraft costs and capabilities, and focusing on
platforms and systems that require near term decisions. However, it is
not clear from DOD's response if the assessment being done is a
comprehensive cost and benefit analysis or if it includes any of the
following elements:
* an assessment of the technological and manufacturing feasibility of
each option;
* an evaluation of the pros and cons for each option in terms of
combat effectiveness and desirability from the warfighter's
perspective;
* identification of data sources and explanation of underlying
assumptions; and:
* identification of potential sources of funding for the various
options including the deferment of JSF procurements into the future.
* Therefore, we reiterate the need for an assessment that contains
these elements.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that future versions
of its Aircraft Investment Plan should not only address new
acquisitions, but should also include investments in modernization and
sustainment of legacy aircraft. The department's response indicated
that this additional information would not likely be included in
future versions of the Plan because it is not currently required by
Congress. However, to provide decision makers with more complete and
comprehensive information we believe that future versions of the Plan
need to include an examination of the costs and benefits of
modernizing and sustaining legacy aircraft. Therefore, we have changed
our original recommendation to a matter for congressional
consideration.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until
at least 5 business days after its issue date. At that time, we will
send copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the
Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. The report will also be made available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were
Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant Director; Michael Aiken; Julie Hadley;
Travis Masters; and Andrew Redd.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan, Director:
Acquisition and Source Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify DOD's current tactical aircraft requirements, we compiled
and analyzed data related to DOD's stated requirements and current
tactical aircraft inventories. We met with Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps requirements officials to discuss their respective services'
requirements and to gain an understanding of how those requirements
were established. We also discussed how capabilities provided by other
weapon systems are considered in the requirements determination
process. We reviewed key requirements documents including the National
Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, 2010 and prior
Quadrennial Defense Review reports, Guidance for Development of the
Force, and DOD's Aircraft Investment Plan Fiscal Years 2011-2040, as
well as service-level planning documents and briefings.
To determine the extent to which DOD's plans for acquiring new
aircraft and modernizing and retiring legacy aircraft are likely to
meet its current requirements, we compared current Air Force and Navy--
including Marine Corps--inventory projections with the established
requirements. We met with service requirements and long-range planning
officials to identify the planning factors and assumptions underlying
the service inventory projections. We also assessed the progress being
made in developing and fielding replacement systems, specifically the
JSF, and also analyzed plans for and progress in modernizing and
retiring legacy aircraft. We likewise identified and assessed various
recapitalization and force structure efforts, underway and planned,
that the services believe will help them meet their stated tactical
aircraft requirements. We analyzed the cost and performance
implications of some of the efforts using data and information
obtained from DOD and service documents.
To determine how changes in DOD's strategic planning and threat
assessments, as reported in its 2010 QDR, and recent investment
decisions have impacted tactical aircraft requirements we analyzed
changes in the threat environment as described in current and prior
QDR reports and other strategy documents. We examined how changes in
the threat environment are noted in force planning guidance and
incorporated into service-level plans. We analyzed fleet and force
structure changes, including planned investments and acquisition
strategies, relating to the tactical aircraft systems in our review,
and examined the assumptions upon which these changes and plans were
based.
In performing our work, we obtained documents, data, and other
information from Air Force requirements officials at Air Combat
Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and Navy requirements
officials at the Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia. We also met with Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps headquarters, and OSD officials in
Washington, D.C.; as well as Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps system
program offices at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and Patuxent
River, Maryland, to discuss service requirements and individual
tactical aircraft systems. The program officials we met with
represented the JSF program as well as the Air Force F-16, F-15, A-10,
F-22A, and MQ-9 systems, and the Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18, EA-6B,
AV-8B, and EA-18G systems. We drew extensively on prior GAO work
related to the JSF program, tactical aircraft requirements, and force
planning, and reviewed the analyses and assessments of other
government agencies and non-governmental organizations.
To assess the reliability of DOD's requirements, inventory, cost,
schedule, and performance data we talked to knowledgeable agency
officials about the processes and practices used to generate the data.
We also corroborated the data by reviewing relevant documentation from
various sources. We determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2009 to July 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Tactical Air Forces Funding, Fiscal Years 2011 through
2015:
Then-year dollars in millions:
Air Force: Military construction;
2011: $727.3;
2012: $537.4;
2013: $436.9;
2014: $561.2;
2015: $504.0;
2011-2015: $2,766.8.
Air Force: Military personnel;
2011: $10,643.3;
2012: $10,924.4;
2013: $11,216.5;
2014: $11,621.2;
2015: $12,043.2;
2011-2015: $56,448.4.
Air Force: Operations and maintenance;
2011: $14,800.8;
2012: $14,822.1;
2013: $15,334.5;
2014: $16,069.5;
2015: $17,028.9;
2011-2015: $78,055.8.
Air Force: Procurement;
2011: $11,261.6;
2012: $11,686.9;
2013: $12,159.5;
2014: $14,108.2;
2015: $15,178.5;
2011-2015: $64,394.7.
Air Force: Research, development, test and evaluation;
2011: $6,542.4;
2012: $6,976.8;
2013: $6,287.9;
2014: $4,720.9;
2015: $4,076.4;
2011-2015: $28,604.4.
Marine Corps: Military construction;
2011: 0;
2012: 0;
2013: 0;
2014: 0;
2015: 0;
2011-2015: 0.
Marine Corps: Military personnel;
2011: $2,054.7;
2012: $2,232.7;
2013: $2,299.3;
2014: $2,371.4;
2015: $2,449.9;
2011-2015: $11,408.1.
Marine Corps: Operations and maintenance;
2011: $956.6;
2012: $1,044.3;
2013: $1,077.9;
2014: $1,091.7;
2015: $1,137.3;
2011-2015: $5,307.8.
Marine Corps: Procurement;
2011: $2,934.4;
2012: $3,199.0;
2013: $4,728.4;
2014: $4,379.3;
2015: $4,497.7;
2011-2015: $19,738.7.
Marine Corps: Research, development, test and evaluation;
2011: $667.9;
2012: $594.0;
2013: $529.8;
2014: $375.9;
2015: $134.7;
2011-2015: $2,302.4.
Navy: Military construction;
2011: 0;
2012: 0;
2013: 0;
2014: 0;
2015: 0;
2011-2015: 0.
Navy: Military personnel;
2011: $1,392.7;
2012: $1,461.5;
2013: $1,508.2;
2014: $1,558.7;
2015: $1,613.1;
2011-2015: $7,534.3.
Navy: Operations and maintenance;
2011: $2,522.5;
2012: $2,633.8;
2013: $2,703.8;
2014: $2,850.3;
2015: $2,999.0;
2011-2015: $13,709.4.
Navy: Procurement;
2011: $8,535.2;
2012: $9,132.6;
2013: $9,233.2;
2014: $7,812.7;
2015: $7,659.0;
2011-2015: $42,372.8.
Navy: Research, development, test and evaluation;
2011: $1,041.9;
2012: $941.5;
2013: $754.2;
2014: $570.3;
2015: $306.3;
2011-2015: $3,614.2.
Total DOD: Military construction;
2011: $727.3;
2012: $537.4;
2013: $436.9;
2014: $561.2;
2015: $504.0;
2011-2015: $2,766.8.
Total DOD: Military personnel;
2011: $14,090.7;
2012: $14,618.6;
2013: $15,024.0;
2014: $15,551.3;
2015: $16,106.2;
2011-2015: $75,390.8.
Total DOD: Operations and maintenance;
2011: $18,279.9;
2012: $18,500.2;
2013: $19,116.2;
2014: $20,011.5;
2015: $21,165.1;
2011-2015: $97,072.9.
Total DOD: Procurement;
2011: $22,731.2;
2012: $24,018.5;
2013: $26,121.1;
2014: $26,300.3;
2015: $27,335.3;
2011-2015: $126,506.3.
Total DOD: Research, development, test and evaluation;
2011: $8,252.2;
2012: $8,512.3;
2013: $7,571.9;
2014: $5,667.1;
2015: $4,517.5;
2011-2015: $34,520.9.
Grand Totals:
2011: $64,081.3;
2012: $66,186.9;
2013: $68,270.1;
2014: $68,091.4;
2015: $69,628.1;
2011-2015: $336,257.8.
Source: DOD's 2011 Future Years Defense Program.
Note: Numbers may not add because of rounding.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Summary of Tactical Aircraft Systems Ongoing and Future
Efforts:
This appendix provides more details on new and legacy tactical
aircraft expanding upon summary information provided in the body of
this report. We include a brief description of each aircraft's
mission, program status, and our observations on program execution and
outcomes. Where applicable, we also highlight recent GAO work on some
systems. The appendix also includes a funding table for each aircraft
that contains the fiscal year 2011 budget request and projected
funding needs through fiscal year 2015. The budget information in
these tables is expressed in current (then-year) dollars, and the
totals may not add exactly because of rounding.
Figure 5: F-35 Lightning II, Joint Strike Fighter:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Lockheed Martin.
Initial Operational Capability (planned): 2012 (Marines), 2016 (Air
Force & Navy).
Aircraft Inventory: 0 (production aircraft).
Average Age of Aircraft: 0:
[End of figure]
System Description:
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program's goals are to develop and
field an affordable and highly common family of stealthy, fifth-
generation, strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Marine Corps, Air
Force, and U.S. allies. The carrier suitable variant will provide the
Navy a multi-role, stealthy, strike aircraft to complement the F/A-
18E/F Super Hornet. The conventional take-off and landing variant will
primarily be an air-to-ground replacement for the Air Force's A-10 and
F-16 aircraft, and will complement the F-22A Raptor. The short take-
off and vertical landing variant will be a replacement for the Marine
Corp's AV-8B and F/A-18 aircraft.
Program Status:
JSF concept demonstration began in November 1996. The program entered
system development and demonstration in October 2001 and is now
expected to be completed in April 2016, more than 2 years later than
planned in the acquisition baseline that was approved in 2007. Because
of continuing cost and schedule problems, the Secretary of Defense
directed a comprehensive restructuring of the JSF program in February
2010. In addition, cumulative cost and schedule increases resulted in
a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach of the original baseline. Overall, the
cost estimate to complete development has increased from $34.4 billion
in the 2001 original baseline to $51.8 billion currently, an increase
of $17.4 million or 51 percent. Estimated procurement costs have
increased from $196.6 billion in the 2001 baseline to a current
estimate of $325.1 billion, an increase of $128.5 billion, or 65
percent. During that same period, the expected procurement quantity
for the U.S. decreased from 2,852 to 2,443 aircraft.
The JSF program is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and
ambitious aircraft acquisition program and the linchpin of the long-
term plans to recapitalize the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
tactical air forces. DOD estimates that the total cost to develop and
procure its fleet of aircraft will be about $323 billion. The
estimated total investment, including the cost to maintain and operate
the JSF over its expected life, exceeds $1 trillion. Eight partner
countries are providing funding for system development and
demonstration: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
GAO Observations:
GAO has issued annual reports on the JSF for the last 6 years.
[Footnote 20] The JSF program continues to struggle with cost
increases and slow progress--negative outcomes that were foreseeable
as events have unfolded over several years. The program continues to
be at risk for not delivering aircraft quantities and capabilities on
time. Dates for achieving initial operational capabilities may have to
be extended and some requirements deferred to future upgrades. In
March 2010, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology
and Logistics testified that the Marine Corp's initial capability date
had not changed and was still planned for 2012, while the Air Force
and Navy had both slipped their anticipated initial capability dates
to 2016.
The restructuring ordered by DOD leadership in February 2010, included
positive steps that should reduce risk and provide more realistic cost
and schedule estimates. Officials increased time and funding for
system development, added four aircraft to the flight test program,
and reduced near-term procurement quantities. If effectively
implemented these actions should improve future program outcomes.
However, manufacturing test aircraft continues to take more time,
money, and effort than budgeted, hampering the development flight test
program. While some improvement is noted, continuing manufacturing
inefficiencies, parts problems, and engineering technical changes
indicate that design and production processes may lack the maturity
needed to efficiently produce aircraft at the currently planned rates.
Although restructuring actions should help, there is still substantial
overlap of development, test, and production activities while DOD
continues to invest in large quantities of production aircraft before
the different variants are proved and performance is verified--DOD
intends to purchase up to 307 aircraft at an estimated cost of $58.2
billion before completing development flight testing. At the same
time, progress on flight testing is behind schedule--completing only
10 percent of the sorties planned during 2009--because of late
deliveries and low productivity. In addition, the program faces other
technical challenges including (1) relying on an extensive but largely
unproven and unaccredited network of ground test laboratories and
simulation models to evaluate system performance; (2) developing and
integrating very large and complex software requirements; and (3)
maturing several critical technologies essential to meet operational
performance and logistical support requirements. Given these
challenges, DOD's plan to procure large quantities of JSF aircraft
before flight testing proves they will perform as required, increases
the likelihood and impact of design, manufacturing, and requirements
changes that could result in subsequent cost growth, schedule delays,
and performance shortfalls. As the program moves forward, risks are
manifold--mounting cost and schedule pressures; complex extensive, and
unproven software requirements; and a nascent, very aggressive test
program that continues to experience significant delays.
Table 4: F-35 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Dollars in millions:
RDT&E;
FY11: $2,449.8;
FY12: $2,433.0;
FY13: $1,982.7;
FY14: $1,337.4;
FY15: $446.7;
Total: $8,649.6.
Procurement;
FY11: $9,313.0;
FY12: $9,602.5;
FY13: $12,054.7;
FY14: $12,996.7;
FY15: $14,183.1;
Total: $58,150.0.
Total;
FY11: $11,762.8;
FY12: $12,035.5;
FY13: $14,037.4;
FY14: $14,334.1;
FY15: $14,629.8;
Total: $66,799.6.
Source: Fiscal year 2011 President's Budget.
Note: The President's budget requested supplemental funds in
associated accounts where appropriate, funds that we have added here.
[End of table]
Figure 6: F-22A Raptor:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Date First Deployed: December 2005.
Aircraft Inventory: 157.
Average Age of Aircraft: 3 years.
[End of figure]
System Description:
The F-22A is the Air Force's fifth generation air superiority fighter
that incorporates a stealthy and highly maneuverable airframe,
advanced integrated avionics, and a supercruise engine. It will
replace or complement the F-15 as the Air Force's primary air-to-air
fighter and was originally developed to counter threats posed by the
Soviet Union. However, the Air Force decided to add more robust air-to-
ground and intelligence-gathering capabilities not previously
envisioned at program start, but now considered necessary to increase
the platform's utility in future operations. As a result, the F-22A is
now expected to perform multiple missions including air-to-air
superiority, destruction of enemy air defenses, air-to-ground attack,
electronic attack, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.
Program Status:
F-22A demonstration and validation began in October 1986 and system
development started in June 1991. Low rate initial production was
approved in August 2001 and full-rate production in March 2005.
Initial operational capability was declared in December 2005. The
first production aircraft was delivered in June 2003 and, in April
2009, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (OSD) announced that
F-22A production would end at 187 total aircraft--as of April 2010,
the Air Force had received delivery of 157 aircraft. The program is
expected to cost a total of $66.7 billion at completion. The specific
cost to shut down the production line has not yet been determined, but
according to Air Combat Command (ACC) officials, the shutdown is
expected to cost from $300 to $700 million.
The Air Force initiated a formal F-22A modernization and reliability
improvement program in 2003 to incrementally develop and deliver
increasing capabilities over time. As of March 2010, the first
increment had been fielded; the second increment was in development
flight testing and scheduled to begin follow-on test and evaluation
later in 2010; and requirements for the third increment were being
analyzed. A fourth increment is being considered, but no formal plans
have been made. More than $3 billion has been obligated to the
modernization program through fiscal year 2009, and about $2.7 billion
budgeted for fiscal years 2010 to 2013. The Air Force is continuing
efforts to achieve a more common configuration within its F-22A
aircraft fleet. Program officials note that this common configuration
effort is necessary to maximize the number of aircraft capable of
receiving the incremental upgrades.
GAO Observations:
At the time of our last tactical aircraft report in 2007, the Air
Force continued to believe that 381 F-22A aircraft were required to
effectively meet warfighter needs. We noted, however, that because of
past cost overruns and budget constraints OSD had limited production
quantities to 183, or 198 aircraft fewer than what the Air Force
believed were required. Subsequently, the Air Force received approval
to procure four additional aircraft. While Air Force officials still
believe that procuring 381 F-22A aircraft would provide increased
capability to the force and reduce risk, they recognize that no more
than 187 will be procured.
The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) reported that
ACC officials acknowledge that the F-22A aircraft will not be able to
meet its required reliability rate largely because of difficulties in
maintaining its low observable materials and characteristics.
According to the program office, the F-22A is not fully capable of
performing missions 40 percent of the time, on average. Though a
complete assessment of trends will not be available until all test
data are collected and analyzed, ACC's interim findings indicate
ongoing challenges in F-22A low observable maintainability. For
example, ACC officials noted that the Air Force originally estimated
that it would need 36 low observable maintainers for every 40
aircraft, but has since discovered that 106 maintainers are required.
DOT&E reported in December 2009, that the Air Force may experience
significant challenges in meeting a number of operational suitability
thresholds specified in the current F-22 operational requirements and
capabilities production documents because of maintainability problems.
F-22A program officials emphasize that a low mission capable rate does
not mean that the aircraft is not flyable or that it can not perform
some missions, but in most cases means that its low observable
characteristics have been compromised in some way.
Table 5: F-22 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Dollars in millions:
RDT&E;
FY11: $576.3;
FY12: $555.2;
FY13: $467.9;
FY14: $454.0;
FY15: $677.4;
Total: $2,730.8.
Procurement[A];
FY11: $650.2;
FY12: $506.8;
FY13: $287.9;
FY14: $341.6;
FY15: $255.6;
Total: $2,042.1.
Total;
FY11: $1,226.5;
FY12: $1,062.0;
FY13: $755.8;
FY14: $795.6;
FY15: $933.0;
Total: $4,772.9.
Source: Fiscal year 2011 President's Budget.
Note: The President's budget requested supplemental funds in
associated accounts where appropriate, sums that we have added here.
[A] Procurement funding includes modifications.
[End of table]
Figure 7: A-10 Thunderbolt II:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Air Force, Master Sgt. Blake R. Borsic.
Date First Deployed: March 1976.
Aircraft Inventory: 356.
Average Age of Aircraft: 28 years.
[End of figure]
System Description:
The A-10 was the first Air Force aircraft specially designed for close
air support of ground forces. The aircraft remains the premier close
air support platform of choice and has maintained a near continuous
presence since 2003 in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
It has excellent maneuverability at low air speeds and altitude, and
is a highly accurate weapons-delivery platform. A wide combat radius
and short takeoff and landing capability permit operations in and out
of locations near front lines. The A-10 is a simple, effective, and
survivable twin-engine jet used against all ground targets, including
tanks. In addition, the aircraft can survive direct hits from armor-
piercing and high explosive projectiles up to 23 mm. With eleven
weapons stations and a targeting pod, the A-10 is able to engage any
target with a wide variety of general purpose and precision munitions.
Program Status:
Because of the A-10's relevant combat capabilities--demonstrated first
during Desert Storm and recently in operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan--the Air Force now plans to keep it in the inventory
longer than anticipated. How long and with what upgrades is dependent
upon whether the JSF aircraft are delivered on schedule. As we
reported in 2007, the Air Force is pursuing several major
modifications to upgrade systems and structures on the A-10 fleet. The
most costly modification is replacing the wings on two-thirds of the
fleet for about $1 billion. ACC officials said many aircraft are
receiving the new wings at 10,000 flight hours, and the officials
expect this step to extend service life to 20,000 hours from the
current 16,000 hour life. [Footnote 21] Wings on the remaining third
of the fleet will be repaired as needed. The wing replacement is fully
funded through fiscal year 2015.
ACC officials said the number one procurement priority for the A-10 is
the Helmet Mounted Cueing System that is intended to reduce the time
it takes to identify, engage, and destroy a target by about 400
percent. This system is similar to, but not exactly the same as, the
Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System in use on the F/A-18E/F and being
developed for the F-15s; but they only cost about half as much,
according to the A-10 officials. The Air Force is also conducting Full
Scale Fatigue Testing on the A-10 aircraft and completing its
precision engagement modification, a significant upgrade to weapons
delivery, avionics, and cockpit controls. A-10A aircraft with
precision engagement are redesignated A-10C.
GAO Observations:
According to ACC officials, the A-10 was originally envisioned as a
single seat, day-only, low-altitude attack aircraft; however, through
a number of modernization efforts the aircraft is now a day/night,
multi-weapon (both precision guided and general purpose munitions),
highly sophisticated aircraft. The Air Force has successfully
transformed the A-10 to adapt to the needs of the warfighter, and both
the A and C models have much more capability than originally
envisioned. The officials noted, however, that software development
for the A-10 is critical, especially the software needed to integrate
the helmet mounted cuing system with the aircraft.
The A-10 is expected to remain in the Air Force's inventory beyond
2030, although quantities are anticipated to decrease from 340 to 196
by that time through retirements and attrition. While the JSF is
slated to meet close air support mission needs, ACC officials question
whether the JSF will be as effective as the A-10 in performing that
mission. They noted that the JSF will only have a limited gun
capability, essential for closing-in on enemy troops without
endangering the lives of nearby friendly forces, and may fly too high
and too fast for successful close air support. The A-10 on the other
hand, can provide support or strike enemy troops to within 20 or 30
meters of friendly forces without endangering them. ACC officials said
the Air Force is currently contemplating procurement of a light attack
aircraft (designated OA-X) to supplement the A-10, as well as
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. However, no
official program has been established. And officials are not expecting
the effort to result in a complete A-10 replacement, as platforms
being considered will not have enough capability to replace the legacy
platform.
Table 6: A-10 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Dollars in millions:
RDT&E;
FY11: $5.7;
FY12: $5.8;
FY13: $6.0;
FY14: $6.1;
FY15: $6.2;
Total: $29.8.
Procurement[A];
FY11: $181.9;
FY12: $155.8;
FY13: $148.8;
FY14: $137.8;
FY15: 0;
Total: $624.3.
Total;
FY11: $187.6;
FY12: $161.6;
FY13: $154.8;
FY14: $143.9;
FY15: $6.2;
Total: $654.1.
Source: Fiscal year 2011 President's Budget.
Note: The President's budget requested supplemental funds in
associated accounts where appropriate, which we have added here.
[A] Procurement funding includes modifications.
[End of table]
Figure 8: F-16 Fighting Falcon:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: www.af.mil.
Date First Deployed: January 1979.
Aircraft Inventory: 1,135:
Average Age of Aircraft: 20 years.
[End of figure]
System Description:
The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a compact single-engine, multi-role
fighter aircraft. It is highly maneuverable and has proven itself in
air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack. It provides a relatively
low-cost, high-performance weapon system for the United States and
allied nations. The F-16 fleet includes several different
configurations or blocks, and comprises more than half of the Air
Force's fighter force.
Program Status:
The Air Force plans to make a number of improvements to its F-16
fleet, both on the older aircraft, operated primarily by the Air
National Guard and the Air Force Reserve Command, and newer aircraft,
operated primarily by ACC.[Footnote 22] The aircraft continue to
receive structural and engine modifications to enable them to reach an
expected 8,000 flight hour service life. Additionally, the older
aircraft will receive a new fire control computer because current
units lack adequate processing capacity and parts needed to keep them
viable are becoming obsolete.
The newer F-16s in the active duty component are receiving a common
configuration upgrade that will give them all virtually the same
capability. Common systems include the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing
System, a Modular Mission Computer, Link 16 (a communications data
link), and color multifunctional displays. Common configuration
upgrades were scheduled for completion by June 2010. Additionally,
some aircraft are being fitted with ARC-210 Radios to provide secure
line-of-sight and beyond line-of-sight satellite communications
capability, to replace the fleet's very high frequency FM radios.
GAO Observations:
With the JSF facing further delays and a projected shortfall in the
Air Force's fighter inventory, the aging F-16 fleet may be required to
remain in service longer than currently planned. The Air Force is
assessing the viability of different options for sustaining its F-16
fleet to manage this shortfall. These options include (1) procuring
new "4.5 generation fighters" with more advanced radar, electronic
warfare, and communications capabilities, and (2) extending the
service life of up to 300 newer F-16s, along with capability
modernizations to provide warfighting capabilities similar to 4.5
generation aircraft. Recently, the Air Force provided Congress with a
report titled Procurement of 4.5 Generation Fighter Aircraft, which
concluded that modernizing and extending the service life of current
fighters would provide essentially the same capability of new 4.5
generation fighters at 10 to 15 percent of the cost. This conclusion
was based on a comparison of current estimates for procurement of new
4.5 generation fighters (F-15E+, F-16 block 50+, and F/A-18E/F) and a
budget estimate for an F-16 block 40/50 service life extension program
(SLEP) to address structural issues and upgrade avionics. Both
estimates assumed a procurement quantity of 300 fighters and
considered many variables, including making structural improvements
only, compared to capability enhancements, and multi-year versus
single year procurement.
This estimate precedes a full scale fatigue test and subsequent
analysis to be conducted on a block 50 aircraft beginning in 2011 and
lasting for about 3 years. However, an Air Force official said that
the estimate takes into account known and suspected issues with the
aircraft as well as desired modernization options and that fatigue
testing would have to uncover a considerable surprise--which he
acknowledged is possible--to drive estimates significantly higher.
Service officials said the option to extend the service life of and
modernize a number of newer F-16s will be considered as part of the
fiscal year 2012 budget process.
The Air Force has also concluded that small investments in older F-16
aircraft will provide relief over the current Future Years Defense
Program. Service officials noted that some mission equipment added
after these F-16s were built has significantly increased the
aircraft's weight and stressed the airframe beyond initial estimates.
Investments in these aircraft are therefore aimed at enabling them to
reach their anticipated service life, but are not intended to extend
the service life of the fleet.
Table 7: F-16 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Dollars in millions:
RDT&E;
FY11: $129.1;
FY12: $110.9;
FY13: $112.6;
FY14: $109.1;
FY15: $110.7;
Total: $572.4.
Procurement[A];
FY11: $167.2;
FY12: $86.2;
FY13: $25.2;
FY14: $9.6;
FY15: $13.0;
Total: $301.2.
Total;
FY11: $296.3;
FY12: $197.1;
FY13: $137.8;
FY14: $118.7;
FY15: $123.7;
Total: $873.6.
Source: Fiscal year 2011 President's Budget.
Note: The President's budget requested supplemental funds in
associated accounts where appropriate, sums that we have added here.
[A] Procurement funding includes modifications.
[End of table]
Figure 9: F-15C/D Eagle:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Navy, Petty Officer John P. Curtis.
Date First Deployed: 1979.
Aircraft Inventory: 379:
Average Age of Aircraft: 26 years.
[End of figure]
System Description:
The F-15C/D Eagle is a single-or two-seat, twin engine, all weather
tactical fighter designed to permit the Air Force to gain and maintain
air supremacy over the battlefield. The Eagle is a fourth generation
air superiority fighter that is used for the offensive/defensive
counter air missions and homeland defense. The Eagle's air superiority
is achieved through a mixture of maneuverability and acceleration,
range, weapons, and avionics.
Program Status:
F-15C and F-15D aircraft have been in the Air Force inventory since
1979 and are being modernized to enhance operational effectiveness.
Air Force officials consider these planned or ongoing upgrades
necessary to keep the platform viable:
Operational flight program software upgrades are required to integrate
modernization programs onto the F-15, improve combat capability, and
provide electronic protection updates for aircraft radars.
* A new, active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar will provide
significantly increased capability over its predecessor and is,
according to Air Force officials, the only way to counter the
electronic warfare environment into the future.
* An Infrared Search and Track system, being developed under Navy
leadership, will provide passive radar capability to detect and target
adversaries without their knowing they are being targeted.
* New core processor and displays will replace obsolete systems.
* The Eagle Passive/Active Radar Warning and Survivability System will
correct operational deficiencies as well as obsolescence and
supportability issues with the aircraft's radar warning receiver that,
if not addressed, could force the Air Force to ground F-15s beginning
in fiscal year 2015.
In its fiscal year 2010 budget request, the Air Force responded to OSD
direction to assume additional risk in its tactical aircraft force
structure with a fleet reduction plan--still awaiting congressional
approval--that would retire more than 110 F-15s, more than 130 older F-
16s, and a small number of A-10s. While Air Force officials said that
for sustainment planning they cannot count on the reduction plan being
approved, it is needed to free up funding for other priorities,
including modernization of legacy forces. Although modernization
programs have progressed to a varying extent, many F-15 initiatives
remained unfunded or partially funded through the Future Years Defense
Program. These programs include the AESA radar, the infrared search
and track system, and a number of other projects--some of which have
been designated unfunded requirements since at least 2006.
GAO Observations:
Long range plans for the fleet call for 176 F-15C/D aircraft equipped
with AESA radars and other modernization upgrades to complement the F-
22A in performing air superiority missions through 2025. We reported
in 2007 that the Air Force will need to modernize and retain more F-
15C/D aircraft for longer periods than originally planned because F-
22A procurement was to be halted at 187 aircraft instead of the Air
Force's stated requirement for 381.[Footnote 23] This continues to be
the case, as the 2010 QDR retained the same basic tactical aircraft
force structure for the Air Force.
According to ACC officials, while some structural issues need to be
addressed on the F-15, the overall airframe is relatively healthy.
They noted that at every planned depot maintenance interval, an
aircraft is completely examined to identify structural and other
problems, and that appropriate solutions are usually found. However,
because of the age of the fleet--25 years on average--and the
frequency with which the aircraft have been used over the past two
decades, the Air Force has launched an extensive investigation into
the service life of the F-15, including a detailed, full-scale fatigue
test on an F-15C. The intent of this testing, according to recent
testimony, is to better understand life-limiting factors for these
aircraft, the feasibility of extending their service life, and the
economic and operational value of doing so. Contingent on the results
of fatigue testing, service officials testified that by enhancing air
superiority capabilities through upgrades such as AESA radar, the
infrared search and tracking system, and a more capable mission
computer, the long-term fleet of 176 F-15C/D aircraft is expected to
operate safely and effectively through at least 2025.
Note: Budget information for the F/15C/D is included in this appendix
with the discussion of the F-15E (see table 7 below). The Air Force
consolidates investment budgets for all models of the F-15.
Figure 10: F-15E Strike Eagle:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Air Force, Staff Sgt. Aaron Allmon.
Date First Deployed: April 1988.
Aircraft Inventory: 223:
Average Age of Aircraft: 18 years.
[End of figure]
System Description:
The F-15E Strike Eagle is a two-seat dual-role fighter designed to
perform air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. An array of avionics
and electronics systems gives the F-15E the capability to strike
targets at low altitude, day or night, and in all weather. Whereas
previous models of the F-15 are assigned air-to-air roles, the "E"
model has the capability to fight its way to a target over long
ranges, destroy enemy ground positions and fight its way out. The F-
15E Strike Eagle retains the basic air-to-air capability of the F-15 A-
D Eagle, but adds a weapon systems operator, rear cockpit, and
advanced systems for all-weather, day/night, all-altitude, deep
penetration air-to-surface attack.
Program Status:
The F-15E is the Air Force's only long-range, deep interdiction
fighter aircraft, and is expected to be in service until about 2035.
The Air Force has a number of modernization programs underway or
planned for the F-15E fleet, many of which are also sustainment
efforts, as future support must be taken into account when making
major program changes. The principle efforts include:
* AESA radar, to address critical reliability and maintainability
issues with the current radar, in addition to providing increased
operational capabilities;
* Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System to provide air crews with "look
and shoot" capability to point weapons and sensors based on head
position; it will also allow pilots to acquire targets 80 percent
faster while simultaneously increasing weapons accuracy and preventing
fratricide or collateral damage;
* Satellite communications upgrades, to modify the aircraft's existing
radio configuration and add new radio and antenna hardware in response
to urgent operational needs; and:
* Eagle Passive and Active Warning and Survivability System that,
according to the Air Force, will address current and future electronic
warfare threats as well as critical reliability and maintainability
issues, significant parts obsolescence, skyrocketing sustainment
costs, and aircraft groundings.
GAO Observations:
ACC officials noted that they do not expect major program changes to
the F-15E as a result of the 2010 QDR because the aircraft is a
multimission aircraft and has a sound structural life. The platform is
expected to be in service until approximately 2035, and the Air Force
does not yet have a planned replacement. With the legacy platform
expected to be in the inventory for 25 more years, challenges
associated with diminishing manufacturing sources are currently
driving high sustainment costs for the aircraft. For example,
diminished manufacturing sources increase the risk that aircraft may
be grounded as old radars wear out before the new AESA radars can be
installed. AESA development is fully funded, while procurement and
installation on the fleet is currently planned to occur over 19 years.
Once installation of the new radars begins (planned for 2013) the old
radars can potentially supply spare parts for other aircraft still
awaiting the new radar. Program officials are using the fiscal year
2012 budget process to push for increased annual AESA procurement
beyond 24 units annually to avert the risk of groundings.
Alternatively, an ACC official said a capability gap will emerge in
2017 unless funding is provided to keep spare parts production lines
open for the existing radar. Additionally, although program officials
said the new radar development program is going well, test radars are
collecting data and information that might require higher security
classification than originally planned. If this is the case, there
will need to be additional work done to ensure the systems that use
the information are certified at the appropriate clearance levels, a
potential development that could delay procurement and installation.
The joint helmet mounted cueing system is thus far only being applied
to F-15E front cockpits, with funding provided for 60 percent of the
fleet and a limited number of helmets. An ACC official said that the
system is important during current conflicts and that the Navy, which
is providing system software and components, has had great success
with the system. However, funding was initially provided in a
supplemental budget for a single year only and is not part of the
service's base budget and out-years program. Consequently, the Air
Force is trying to identify funding to keep the program going.
Similarly, ACC officials told us that radio communications upgrades
are only partially funded, and the passive and active warning and
survivability system is unfunded.
Table 8: F-15 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Dollars in millions:
RDT&E;
FY11: $222.7;
FY12: $212.2;
FY13: $144.3;
FY14: $125.0;
FY15: $118.3;
Total: $822.5.
Procurement;
FY11: $302.2;
FY12: $301.5;
FY13: $390.9;
FY14: $367.8;
FY15: $346.9;
Total: $1,709.3.
Total;
FY11: $524.9;
FY12: $513.7;
FY13: $535.2;
FY14: $492.8;
FY15: $465.2;
Total: $2,531.8.
Source: Fiscal year 2011 President's budget.
Note: The President's budget requested supplemental funds in
associated accounts where appropriate, sums that we have added here.
[End of table]
Figure 11: MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Air Force Photo/Master Sgt. Robert W. Valenca.
Date first deployed: 2007.
Aircraft Inventory: 44.
Average Age of Aircraft: 3 years.
[End of figure]
System Description:
The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper is a multirole, medium-to-high-altitude,
long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at
faster speeds and higher altitudes than its smaller predecessor, the
MQ-1 Predator. While the Predator is primarily a surveillance and
reconnaissance asset, the Reaper is designed for armed reconnaissance
missions. It is expected to provide around-the-clock capability to
detect, attack, and destroy mobile, high-value, time-sensitive
targets. Reaper will carry missiles, laser-guided bombs, and the Joint
Direct Attack Munition. Reaper also will support net-centric military
operations. Each system consists of four aircraft, a ground control
station, and a satellite communications suite.
Program Status:
The Reaper program began in January 2002 in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Since inception, Reaper--
designated an urgent operational need--has followed a nontraditional
acquisition path, resulting in concurrent development and production
and increased risk. Shortly after development began, the user required
accelerated aircraft deliveries to achieve an interim combat
capability. Two years later, the user required additional aircraft for
an even more robust early fielding capability. In response to user
demands, the Air Force contracted for over 30 percent of the total
quantity before completing initial operational testing. The Reaper
completed initial operational testing in August 2008.
Because of recent budget increases, the Reaper program was recently
designated a major defense acquisition program. Reaper has been funded
under the Predator program element since its inception. In its fiscal
year 2008 budget, the Air Force began reporting Reaper as a separate
program element, thereby isolating program costs. As of May 2010 the
Air Force had a total inventory of 44 Reaper aircraft, of which 23
were designated to support wartime missions. As part of the fiscal
year 2011 budget process OSD added $1.8 billion to the Air Force
budget, from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015, to purchase an
additional 74 MQ-9 Reaper aircraft.
GAO Observations:
The Air Force completed initial operational testing in August 2008
during which two of the three key capabilities were not fully
assessed. The Air Force testers gave Reaper a rating of partially
mission capable. DOD's independent test organization has not yet
completed its assessment of the test results. In the testing, test
personnel determined that the Reaper was effective in destroying
targets; however, the platform's radar encountered problems that left
the testers unable to assess the Reaper's ability to detect and
identify targets. In addition, testers did not assess the Reaper's net
centric operations capability. Other areas of concern included
operator workload, off-board communications, and system reliability.
Because the tests were limited, further testing will be needed.
Although the Reaper is capable of performing strike missions, it is
not viewed as a replacement for manned fighter and attack aircraft.
Instead, OSD and Air Force officials emphasize that the Reaper, like
other unmanned aircraft systems, provides complementary or
supplemental capabilities that allow manned fighter and attack
aircraft to more effectively and efficiently perform their missions.
They note that the Reaper was not designed with stealth or self-
protection capabilities and is therefore not capable of performing
missions in defended airspace. They also point out that replacing
manned aircraft with Reapers would require guaranteed, uninterrupted
communication with Reaper aircraft to ensure mission success and the
safety of friendly troops, and that guarantee is not yet possible.
In 2010 DOD made a commitment to grow to a sustained capacity of 50
Reaper/Predator orbits--each orbit, if fully equipped, would be made
up of 4 aircraft and associated ground control equipment. However, the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and OSD's Aircraft Investment Plan
noted an expanded need for both manned and unmanned intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft and directed the Air Force
to increase the number of Reaper orbits from 50 to 65 by 2013. Reaper
program officials told us that while they expect to achieve 65 orbits
on time, orbits will not be fully equipped.
In the fiscal year 2011 budget process, OSD added $344 million to the
Air Force budgets for the period fiscal year 2011 through 2015 to
develop, procure, and integrate counter-communication and counter-
improvised explosive device jamming pods onto 33 MQ-9 Reaper aircraft,
and directed the Air Force to present its assessment of platforms for
this capability by June 1, 2010. According to Reaper program officials
the funds provided are contained in an OSD-level electronic warfare
budget line and were not added to the Reaper program budget. They also
pointed out that although the OSD direction singled out the Reaper,
the Air Force is currently doing an analysis to determine which
platform would best meet its needs. Air Force officials emphasize that
those pods would not be operational until the Block 5 Reapers are
delivered--beginning in fiscal year 2013--because they need the
additional power that the Block 5 is expected to provide.
Table 9: MQ-9 Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Dollars in millions:
RDT&E;
FY11: $125.4;
FY12: $111.6;
FY13: $80.2;
FY14: $52.9;
FY15: $27.4;
Total: $397.5.
Procurement;
FY11: $1,079.6;
FY12: $1,092.2;
FY13: $1,142.1;
FY14: $1,042.2;
FY15: $1,053.0;
Total: $5,409.1.
Total;
FY11: $1,205.0;
FY12: $1,203.8;
FY13: $1,222.3;
FY14: $1,095.1;
FY15: $1,080.4;
Total: $5,806.6.
Source: Fiscal year 2011 President's Budget.
Note: The President's budget requested supplemental funds in
associated accounts where appropriate, amounts that we have added here.
[End of table]
Figure 12: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: www.navy.mil.
Date First Deployed: 2002.
Aircraft Inventory: 393.
Average Age of Aircraft: 5 years.
[End of figure]
System Description:
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornets are single-seat and two-seat high
performance, twin-engine, mid-wing, multimission tactical aircraft
designed to meet current Navy fighter escort and interdiction mission
requirements, to maintain F/A-18 fleet air defense and close air
support roles, as well as an increasing range of missions. The program
was approved as a major modification in the F-18 series in May 1992.
It is replacing the F/A-18A/B/C/D and has an improved range and
payload and is less detectable.
Program Status:
The Navy began procuring the F/A-18E/F in 1996, and it is the Navy's
only remaining carrier-based strike-fighter. In the future the F/A-
18E/F and the F-35 will form the core of each Navy carrier air wing.
Of the aircraft projected to be in each carrier air wing, 44 will be
strike fighters, such as the F/A-18E/F and F-35.
Although many of the F/A-18E/F aircraft have been in the fleet for
less than a decade, a Service Life Assessment Program for the Super
Hornet was started in 2008 and is assessing the feasibility of
extending the 6,000 flight hour service life to 9,000 hours or
greater. This is the first step to determine how long the planes will
last and what significant repairs may be needed to extend the planes
beyond their initial minimum life span of 6,000 flight hours.
If there are any delays in reaching full operation capability for the
F-35, which is intended to be a replacement aircraft for the Navy,
these delays will require the Navy carriers and expeditionary Marine
squadrons to continue to be equipped with the F/A-18 aircraft not
previously expected to serve in that capacity for that length of time.
Any delays in a replacement aircraft must be absorbed wholly within
the F/A-18 community. Also, support for these aircraft must be
extended, including training for aircrew and maintainers, spare
aircraft parts, and repair facilities. Brief delays have been
mitigated by reducing flying, reducing squadrons, and reducing
aircraft allocations. Longer delays will require the Navy to revise
acquisition and sustainment plans. With each official F-35 schedule
delay, these plans are invalidated and must be revised. According to
Navy inventory predictions, the F/A-18E/F fleet will start retirement
in 2014 and will be completely retired by the end of 2032.
GAO Observations:
DOT&E has noted that, there are significant deficiencies with
improvements to the F/A-18E/F program. According to a DOT&E official,
the F/A-18E/F program has undergone recent testing to assess the AESA
radar, which is a new and improved radar capability. DOT&E has
identified problems with:
* radar performance,
* suitability issues,
* inability to meet reliability requirements, and:
* deferral of the radar's electronic warfare capabilities:
Despite these deficiencies the Navy has elected to deploy the F/A-18E/
F because of the improved capability the AESA radar offers over the
old radar. DOT&E also expressed concerns about the progress made in
developing and characterizing the full electronic warfare capabilities
of the AESA radar.
Additionally, uncertainty of the F-35 program makes planning for the
F/A-18E/F difficult. If additional F/A-18E/F aircraft are needed, the
decision to buy these aircraft must be made soon. In 2007, we noted
that one option available to the Navy was simply to buy more new F/A-
18E/F aircraft. The F/A-18E/F production line is still running, and
this option remains viable. However, the Navy does not appear to
include it in any of its analyses. During a congressional hearing in
April 2010, senior Navy officials did not provide a direct answer when
they were asked if they had compared the cost of buying new F/A-18E/F
with the estimated cost of extending the service lives of legacy
aircraft. Our analysis, using the Navy's most recent estimates and
data from the December 2009 Selected Acquisition Reports, indicates
that buying additional aircraft has the potential to provide a better
return on investment as measured by the cost per marginal flight hour.
In May 2010 the Navy decided to proceed with a multi-year procurement
contract for 124 F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft in Fiscal Years 2010
through 2013. The Navy estimates it will save approximately $590
million.
Table 10: F/A-18E/F Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Dollars in millions:
RDT&E[A];
Procurement[B];
FY11: $1,828.4;
FY12: $539.1;
FY13: $2,283.9;
FY14: $205.6;
FY15: $16.2;
Total: $4,873.2.
Total;
FY11: $1,828.4;
FY12: $539.1;
FY13: $2,283.9;
FY14: $205.6;
FY15: $16.2;
Total: $4,873.2.
Source: Fiscal year 2011 President's Budget:
Note: The President's budget requested supplemental funds in
associated accounts where appropriate, amounts that we have added here.
[A] See F/A-18 A/B/C/D Appendix for RDT&E funding for F/A-18 Squadrons.
[B] Procurement funding includes modifications.
[End of table]
Figure 13: F/A-18A-D Hornet:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: www.navy.mil.
Date First Deployed: November 1978.
Aircraft Inventory: 635.
Average Age of Aircraft: 24 years (A), 25 years (B), 18 years (C), 17
years (D).
[End of figure]
System Description:
The F/A-18A/B/C/D is an all-weather fighter and attack aircraft also
known as the Hornet. It is a single-and two-seat, twin-engine,
multimission fighter/attack aircraft that can operate from either
aircraft carriers or land bases. The FA-18 fills a variety of roles:
air superiority, fighter escort, suppression of enemy air defenses,
reconnaissance, forward air control, close and deep air support, and
day and night strike missions.
Program Status:
In November 2007, Navy officials initiated plans designed to better
manage the use of Hornet service life. Under this program, service
life was managed for each individual aircraft enabling a more
comprehensive and efficient approach to aircraft service life
preservation. In addition, a Service Life Assessment Program
determined the level of investment that would be required to extend
service life to 10,000 hours. Earlier phases of this program extended
the catapult and landing limits on the fleet. Retirement of aging
Hornets has begun and goes through 2023, as the aircraft are replaced
by F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets and eventually the carrier variant of the
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
Although the F/A-18 A/B/C/Ds are out of production, the existing
inventory of 638 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft will continue to
comprise half of the Naval Aviation force structure through 2013, and
are scheduled to remain in the inventory until 2023. The Navy is in
the process of conducting High Flight Hour inspections to identify and
correct problems on aircraft as they reach 8,000 hours. As a result,
the aircraft are expected to gain an additional 600 hours of service
life. In addition, the Navy is considering a more significant SLEP for
280 Hornets to get the aircraft to 10,000 hours and help mitigate
projected inventory shortfalls. This SLEP would modify or replace
primary aircraft structures that have reached fatigue life limits, as
well as address parts obsolescence issues and provide some additional
capability. The Navy estimates that the program will cost an average
of $25 million per aircraft, a total of about $7 billion for 280
aircraft.
GAO Observations:
Procurement of Super Hornets has proceeded fairly close to schedule,
but the JSF continues to experience cost increases and schedule
delays. Uncertainty in the JSF program makes planning for the F/A-
18A/B/C/D difficult. OSD recently restructured the program to add more
time and money. As a result, the Navy moved its full rate production
date out another 2 years, into 2016. To maintain force structure
requirements for carrier-based strike fighters, delays in delivering
operational JSF aircraft will have to be absorbed by the F/A-18
family. This means that aging Hornets may need to be retained longer
than expected in inventory, along with additional support costs,
including training for aircrew and maintainers, spare parts, increased
maintenance, and repair facilities. Although force structure
shortfalls caused by brief delays in replacement aircraft have been
mitigated through "work around" strategies (e.g., decreased flying
hours and reduced squadrons and aircraft allocations), longer delays
or reduced quantities may require revised acquisition and sustainment
plans with attendant funding. With each official JSF schedule delay,
these plans may be invalidated and need to be revised.
Table 11: F/A-18 A/B/C/D Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Dollars in millions:
RDT&E[A];
FY11: $148.4;
FY12: $115.4;
FY13: $71.9;
FY14: $61.9;
FY15: $38.3;
Total: $435.9.
Procurement[B];
FY11: $536.1;
FY12: $470.9;
FY13: $446.6;
FY14: $598.1;
FY15: $559.1;
Total: $2,610.8.
Total;
FY11: $684.5;
FY12: $586.3;
FY13: $518.5;
FY14: $660.0;
FY15: $597.4;
Total: $3,046.7.
Source: Fiscal year 2011 President's Budget.
Note: The President's budget requested supplemental funds in
associated accounts where appropriate, amounts that we have added here.
[A] RDT&E funding is for F/A-18 Squadrons.
[B] Procurement funding includes modifications.
[End of table]
Figure 14: EA-18G Growler:
[Refer to PDF for image;photograph]
Source: www.navy.mil.
Date First Deployed: Anticipated in 2010.
Aircraft Inventory: 22.
Average Age of Aircraft: 1 year.
[End of figure]
System Description:
The EA-18G Growler will replace the EA-6B Prowler as DOD's tactical
electronic attack aircraft. Like the Prowler, the EA-18G will provide
full-spectrum electronic attack to counter enemy air defenses and
communication networks. The Growler is the 4th variant in the F/A-18
family and has a high degree of commonality with the F/A-18F,
retaining the latter's inherent strike-fighter and self-protection
capabilities while adding electronic warfare capabilities to protect
U.S. strike forces. The EA-18G incorporates advanced jamming
capabilities avionics for the suppression of enemy air defenses,
including accurate emitter targeting for employment of onboard weapons
such as the High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile.
Program Status:
In 2002, an analysis of alternatives was completed which identified 27
platform combinations that were capable of delivering jamming support.
As a result the Navy opted to develop the EA-18G to replace the EA-6B.
The study was motivated by a projected shortfall of the EA-6B
inventory, primarily caused by attrition and the increasing cost of
operating the aging fleet. The Navy's original plan was to procure a
total of 88 EA-18G aircraft. However, in 2009 OSD directed the Navy to
buy an additional 26 aircraft in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 bringing
the total aircraft inventory to 114. The Navy originally estimated the
average procurement unit cost of the program to be around $67 million
(base year 2004 dollars), and as of December 2009 the average unit
cost had increased $6 million or 9 percent, to $73 million (base year
2004 dollars). As of October 2009, Navy officials noted that 14
Growlers had been delivered, and emphasized that those deliveries were
more than 2 months ahead of contract requirements. First deployment of
the EA-18G is anticipated in 2010.
The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation conducted testing on
the EA-18G and found the aircraft to be operationally effective, but
not operationally suitable based upon poor maintainability, Built-In-
Test performance, and problems with the legacy ALQ-99 jamming pods.
Testers reported that the Navy is proceeding aggressively to resolve
deficiencies. Testers recommended that the Navy should consider
accelerating development of the next generation jammer to address the
problems with the ALQ-99 jamming pods. Live fire tests showed that the
Growler is survivable in its planned operational environment, but with
some limitations because of the lack of a dedicated radar warning
capability.
GAO Observations:
Recapitalizing the EA-6B fleet with EA-18G aircraft was originally
intended to ensure that the Navy had sufficient electronic attack
aircraft to support its carrier strike groups. The Navy and Air Force
had agreed that the joint expeditionary mission--performed by both
services using EA-6B aircraft--would transition to the Air Force in
2012 as the Navy retired its EA-6B fleet. However, according to an Air
Force official, on at least two occasions the Air Force abandoned its
efforts to develop a stand-off jamming capability for the B-52 bomber,
and did not pursue any other program to perform the expeditionary
mission. As a result, OSD directed the Navy to procure an additional
26 EA-18Gs in 2011 and 2012 to meet a perceived shortfall in aircraft
performing the expeditionary escort mission and delayed the
procurement of 25 F/A-18E/F aircraft to 2013. Even with the increased
quantities, the Growler will still be considered a low density, high-
demand asset. Although no official decision has been made, the Navy's
future inventory projections assume that the JSF will eventually
recapitalize the EA-18G fleet. According to Navy data, the Growler
fleet will start retirement in 2027 and be completely retired by the
end of 2032.
Table 12: EA-18G Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Dollars in millions:
RDT&E;
FY11: $22.0;
FY12: $16.8;
FY13: $17.0;
FY14: $17.7;
FY15: $18.5;
Total: $92.0.
Procurement;
FY11: $1,095.1;
FY12: $2,361.1;
FY13: $115.3;
FY14: $67.5;
FY15: $11.8;
Total: $3,650.8.
Total;
FY11: $1,117.1;
FY12: $2,377.9;
FY13: $132.3;
FY14: $85.2;
FY15: $30.3;
Total: $3,742.8.
Source: Fiscal year 2011 President's Budget.
Note: The President's budget requested supplemental funds in
associated accounts where appropriate, amounts that we have added here.
[End of table]
Figure 15: EA-6B Prowler:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Airborne Electronic Attack Systems and EA-6B Program Office.
Date first deployed: May 1968.
Aircraft Inventory: 94.
aircraft Average Age of Aircraft: 26 years.
[End of figure]
System Description:
The EA-6B Prowler has served as DOD's primary Airborne Electronic
Attack platform for many years. The primary mission of the Prowler is
the suppression of enemy air defenses in support of strike aircraft
and ground troops by interrupting enemy electronic activity and
obtaining tactical electronic intelligence within the combat area. The
EA-6B uses the ALQ-99 radar jamming pod for non-lethal protection by
jamming air defense systems and its AGM-88 High Speed Anti-radiation
missile for lethal physical attack of air defense systems. Both the
Navy[Footnote 24] and the Marine Corps currently maintain Prowler
assets.
Program Status:
The Navy began replacing its EA-6B aircraft with the EA-18G Growlers
in 2009 and expects all Prowlers to be out of its inventory by 2012.
The Navy is transferring 32 Prowlers to the Marine Corps and will
retire the remaining fleet. The Marine Corps plans to replace all of
its Prowlers with JSF aircraft by 2019. In September 2009, OSD
directed the Navy to suspend retirement of the EA-6B as a result of
combatant commander's urgent request for joint expeditionary airborne
electronic attack capability. Subsequently, OSD directed the Navy to
acquire 26 additional EA-18G aircraft, to meet the joint expeditionary
need.
Over the last several years, the Navy has made significant upgrades to
the EA-6B. Those upgrades include:
* the Improved Capability electronic suite modification (ICAP III)
which provides the EA-6B with greater jamming capability;[Footnote 25]
* an upgrade to the aircraft's current electronic pods, which improves
frequency band capability; and:
* replacement of the wing center sections of the entire fleet and
outer wing panel replacement on portions of the fleet.
ICAP III improvements are being done in a series of block or
incremental modifications specifically designed to improve the
aircraft's overall capability as both a radar-jamming and High Speed
Anti Radiation platform. Initial operational testing of the ICAP III
validated the improvements of ICAP III over ICAP II. The program has
continued to demonstrate its effectiveness during testing. However,
there have been problems related to the platform's ability to conduct
low band transmitter testing and mission planning for the later ICAP
III blocks. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation wants the
program to conduct a total system evaluation in mission scenarios and
to address the issues related to low band transmitter testing.
GAO Observations:
Recapitalizing the EA-6B fleet with EA-18G aircraft was originally
intended to ensure that the Navy had electronic attack aircraft to
support its carrier strike groups. The Navy and Air Force had agreed
that the joint expeditionary mission--performed by both services using
EA-6B aircraft--would transition to the Air Force in 2012 as the Navy
retired its EA-6B fleet. However, according to an Air Force official,
on at least two occasions the Air Force abandoned its efforts to
develop a stand-off jamming capability for the B-52 bomber, and did
not pursue any other program to perform the expeditionary mission. As
a result, OSD directed the Navy to procure an additional 26 EA-18Gs
from 2011 to 2012 to meet a perceived shortfall in aircraft performing
the expeditionary escort mission and delayed the procurement of 25 F/A-
18E/F aircraft to 2013.
According to program officials, parts obsolescence presents the
biggest challenge to the EA-6Bs ability to fulfill its role. While the
Navy has made several structural upgrades to its EA-6B fleet, program
officials note that as the aircraft stays in service longer, other
unforeseen issues will begin to emerge. As a result, there are a
number of items associated with the airframe, components, and avionics
that the officials are watching closely. The items being watched
include the cockpit floors, side walls, fin pods, bulkheads,
actuators, engine components, landing gear, and avionics software.
The Marine Corps plans to operate EA-6B ICAP III aircraft through 2019
and then recapitalize its entire fleet with JSF aircraft. The Marine
Corps expects the JSF will have some inherent electronic warfare
capabilities. However, delays in delivery of the JSF or changes in
quantity could require the Marine Corps to keep its EA-6Bs in service
longer than planned.
Table 13: EA-6B Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Dollars in millions:
RDT&E[A];
FY11: $24.3;
FY12: $22.4;
FY13: $22.8;
FY14: $23.5;
FY15: $24.2;
Total: $117.2.
Procurement[B];
FY11: $29.9;
FY12: $15.2;
FY13: $11.6;
FY14: $5.0;
FY15: 0;
Total: $61.7.
Total;
FY11: $54.2;
FY12: $37.6;
FY13: $34.4;
FY14: $28.5;
FY15: $24.2;
Total: $178.9.
Source: Fiscal year 2011 President's Budget.
Note: The President's budget requested supplemental funds in
associated accounts where appropriate, which we have added here.
[A] RDT&E funding is limited to Electronic Warfare counter response.
[B] Procurement funding includes modifications.
[End of table]
Figure 16: AV-8B Harrier:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Ted Carlson.
Date first deployed: January 1985.
Aircraft Inventory: 146.
Average Age of Aircraft: 14 years.
[End of figure]
System Description:
The AV-8B Harrier is a short field take-off and vertical landing jet
aircraft that deploys from naval ships, advanced bases, and
expeditionary airfields. Its mission is to attack and destroy enemy
surface targets and escort friendly aircraft, day or night, under all
weather conditions during expeditionary, joint, or combined
operations. The Harrier is responsible for conducting close air
support; armed reconnaissance and air interdiction; offensives and
defensive anti-air warfare, including combat air patrol; armed escort
mission; and offensive missions against enemy ground-to-air defenses.
Program Status:
The Marine Corps introduced the AV-8B, a more powerful longer range
variant of the AV-8A, beginning in 1985. The original AV-8B aircraft
were only capable of performing daytime missions, but in 1991 and 1992
the Marine Corps upgraded the AV-8B to provide nighttime capability.
There is only one day-only aircraft left in the Marine Corps
inventory. Between 1994 and 2001, the Marine Corps remanufactured the
majority of AV-8B's with new fuselages to increase airframe life and
installed a new radar for better weapons delivery. The Marine Corps
currently has 146 AV-8Bs, which it plans to replace entirely with JSF
aircraft by 2021.
In 2007, we reported that the AV-8B was originally designed to last
6,000 flying hours. This was based on a 20-year service life
engineering estimate that projected the aircraft would be flown 300
hours per year on rigorous missions. At that time, the Marine Corps
was confident that it could exceed the 6,000 hour estimate. However,
in 2009 the program office transitioned from using flight hours to
track service life to using a metric that combines flight hours with
aircraft fatigue to determine a percentage of fatigue life expended.
According to program officials the AV-8B fleet will not begin to reach
its service life limits until around 2027, with no significant impact
until 2040. Program officials, however, indicated that they had
concerns regarding attrition and obsolescence affecting the platform's
use for the near term.
GAO Observations:
The most recent schedule delays and problems related to the JSF are
likely to cause the Marine Corps to operate the AV-8B longer than
originally planned. In 2007, we reported that the Marine Corps was
planning to begin replacing its AV-8Bs with JSFs in 2011, but
according to a program office briefing from November 2009, the Marine
Corps now does not expect to begin replacing the aircraft until 4
years later in 2015. Program officials emphasize that funding for AV-
8B sustainment is directly impacted by changes to the replacement
schedule. Therefore, as the JSF slips, the Marine Corps will have to
identify additional funding for the AV-8B or simply retire the
aircraft and accept a gap in capability. Program officials told us
that their goal is to keep sufficient numbers of aircraft capable and
available until the JSF enters the inventory. As such, their key
concern is to obtain the needed funds to address their problems
through either program-related logistics or program-related
engineering.
Program officials note that fatigue life is not the biggest threat to
the AV-8B fleet--the aircraft will not begin to reach their fatigue
life limits until 2027; instead, aircraft attrition and parts
obsolescence are the major risks. According to program officials, the
Harrier operating and support costs have risen, and the attrition rate
is about two aircraft per year. When the AV-8B program began, the
Marine Corps did not expect to operate them for more than 6,000 flight
hours, so it did not plan ahead for possible parts obsolescence
issues. As a result, no significant effort was made to work with the
industrial base to ensure they would have spares and other necessary
parts beyond the 6,000-flight-hour mark. However, the aircraft are now
being required to fly beyond the initial flight hour limit and as a
result are facing the issue of vanishing parts vendors and parts
obsolescence. Specifically, problems program officials noted with
diminishing manufacturing sources include the fact that many of the
smaller vendors and suppliers that made engine and other parts when
the program began have since gone out of business, making it difficult
and expensive for the Marine Corps to replace some of those parts as
they wear out.
Table 14: AV-8B Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget Request:
Dollars in millions:
RDT&E;
FY11: $22.9;
FY12: $21.4;
FY13: $14.5;
FY14: $13.4;
FY15: $13.8;
Total: $86.0.
Procurement;
FY11: $91.5;
FY12: $18.4;
FY13: $24.3;
FY14: $21.4;
FY15: $11.0;
Total: $166.6.
Total;
FY11: $114.4;
FY12: $39.8;
FY13: $38.8;
FY14: $34.8;
FY15: $24.8;
Total: $252.6.
Source: Fiscal year 2011 President's Budget.
Note: The President's budget requested supplemental funds in
associated accounts where appropriate, which we have added here.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Of Defense:
Department Of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, Dc 20301-3000:
July 27, 2010:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GA0-10-789, "Tactical Aircraft: DoD's Ability to Meet Future
Requirements Is Uncertain with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming
Investment Decisions," dated June 16, 2010 (GAO Code 120852). Detailed
comments on the report recommendations are enclosed. Technical
comments have been provided under separate cover.
The DoD partially concurs with recommendations one, three and four and
concurs with recommendation two. The rationale for our position is
included in the enclosure.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point
of contact for this effort is Ms. Danielle Buckon,
Danielle.Buckon@osd.mil, 703-697-2640.
Sincerely.
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Director:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated June 16, 2010:
GA0-10-789 (GAO Code 120852):
"Tactical Aircraft: DOD's Ability To Meet Future Requirements Is
Uncertain With Key Analyses Needed To Inform Upcoming Investment
Decisions"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: To address the uncertainty surrounding projected
tactical aircraft shortfalls, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense, working with the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy,
more clearly explain the department's requirements and the size and
severity of anticipated tactical aircraft shortfalls, identify the key
assumptions underlying shortfall projections, and identify
alternatives and associated costs to mitigate the impact.
DoD Response: Partially concurs. The Departments of the Navy and Air
Force have provided this type of information to Congress in support of
the FY 2011 President's Budget. However, as indicated to Congress, the
assessment of requirements and inventory trends changes over time as
DoD assesses the evolving strategic environment and associated asset
impacts. DoD's latest analysis will be reflected in the 2012
President's Budget.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
more directly and clearly articulate how the complementary
capabilities provided by unmanned aircraft, bombers, missiles, and
other weapon systems are accounted for and quantified when calculating
tactical aircraft requirements.
DoD Response: Concurs. DoD is conducting multiple analyses and studies
examining the Department's aviation portfolio with the intent of
achieving the correct balance of capabilities and capacity. These
studies will inform the Department's FY 2012 President's Budget.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
complete a comprehensive tactical aircraft analysis that compares and
contrasts the costs and benefits of extending the lives of legacy
aircraft with the costs and benefits of procuring additional new
aircraft. This analysis should be provided to the Congress with the
defense budget in February 2011.
DoD Response: Partially concurs. OSD and the Services are assessing
TACAIR costs and capabilities in preparation for the FY 2012
President's Budget. The focus is on platforms and systems that require
a near term decision. DoD will provide the results and the supporting
rationale in written statements and testimony.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct that future editions of the Aircraft Investment Plan include
not only acquisition costs for new systems, but also investments for
modernizing and sustaining legacy aircraft, including service life
extension programs.
DoD Response: Partially concurs. The Aircraft Investment Plan, as
directed by Congress, addresses aircraft procurement and
modernization. Should Congress require additional data, DoD would
recommend a change in the reporting parameters.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Quadrennial Defense Review: 2010 Report Addressed Many but Not All
Required Items. GAO-10-575R. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-10-
388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Significant Challenges and Decisions Ahead. GAO-
10-478T. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting
Warfighter Requirements on Time. GAO-10-382. Washington, D.C.: March
19, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Significant Challenges Remain as DOD
Restructures Program. GAO-10-520T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2010.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve
Management and Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs.
GAO-09-175. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2008.
Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air
Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace. GAO-09-184.
Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Achieve Greater
Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems. GAO-09-
520. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2009.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment
Strategy. GAO-07-415. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency
of DOD's Projected Resource Needs. GAO-04-514. Washington, D.C.: May
7, 2004.
Tactical Aircraft: Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce Average Age of
Aircraft. GAO-01-163. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2001.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated
Investment Strategy, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-415] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2,
2007).
[2] In 2003, the Department of the Navy began implementing a tactical
aircraft integration plan aimed at more closely integrating Navy and
Marine Corps strike fighter inventories, and in effect managing
tactical aircraft as a common pool. This management approach is
intended to provide flexibility to move aircraft between the two
services and more efficiently manage the service life of each aircraft
within the fleet. As a result, Navy and Marine Corps requirements are
often stated as a single number.
[3] Each AEF is made up of various types of systems, including
fighter, bomber, mobility, and electronic warfare aircraft. Air Force
officials point out that the AEF structure is a rotational framework
and does not drive requirements, but if the structure changes in the
future, requirements may need to be revised in order to ensure that
each AEF remains comprised of sufficient capabilities and capacity. In
addition to the number of tactical aircraft needed in each AEF to
support wartime operations, the total Air Force requirement also
includes quantities for training, testing, maintenance, and attrition.
[4] A carrier air wing generally consists of strike fighters,
electronic warfare and early warning aircraft, helicopters, and
delivery aircraft. Each air wing, when fully equipped, contains 44
strike fighter aircraft. In addition to the number of strike fighters
assigned to the 10 carrier wings, the Navy's total tactical aircraft
requirement also includes back-up and training aircraft and aircraft
in for maintenance.
[5] Marine Aircraft Groups deploy and provide the full range of combat
air operations in direct support of Marine expeditionary ground
forces. The Marine Corps requirement is based on the need for a total
of 24 squadrons of fixed-wing strike aircraft that can be assigned to
aircraft groups.
[6] When fully equipped, each Reaper combat air patrol (CAP) is
comprised of 4 aircraft and associated ground control equipment.
Officials note, however, that the Air Force is currently operating
CAPs with less than 4 aircraft in them, known as surge CAPs.
[7] Navy officials emphasize that while the Navy and Marine Corps
manage their tactical aircraft as a single integrated force, the
Navy's specific portion of the peak shortfall is 90 aircraft and the
Marine Corps' portion is 87.
[8] This number of additional years is based on Navy data indicating
that the service's tactical aircraft fly an average of 300 hours per
year.
[9] GAO, Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air
Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-184] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27,
2009).
[10] GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not
Meeting Warfighter Requirements on Time, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-382] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19,
2010).
[11] GAO-10-382; and GAO Joint Strike Fighter: Significant Challenges
Remain as DOD Restructures Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-520T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11,
2010).
[12] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 establishes the requirement for DOD to prepare
unit cost reports on major defense acquisition programs or designated
major defense subprograms. Two measures are tracked: procurement unit
cost (total funds programmed for procurement divided by the total
number of fully configured end items to be procured) and program
acquisition unit cost (total cost of development, procurement, and
system-specific military construction divided by the number of fully
configured end items to be procured). To eliminate the effects of
inflation, costs are expressed in constant base year dollars. If a
program exceeds cost growth thresholds specified in the law, it is
referred to as a Nunn-McCurdy breach and DOD is required to report the
breach to Congress. 10 U.S.C. § 2433a requires a certification to
Congress in order for DOD to continue the program.
[13] This reflects the timeline of the Future Years Defense Program
outlined in the fiscal year 2011 President's Budget. The original unit-
cost reporting baseline was established in October 2001, and cost
increases are expressed in base year 2002 dollars.
[14] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
required the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense
each to submit a report to the congressional defense committees that
addressed the Air Force's projected tactical aircraft shortfall. Pub.
L. No. 111-84, §§ 131 and 1075 (2009). Both reports were submitted to
the committees by the Air Force in March 2010.
[15] Our analysis was done using data from the F/A-18E/F December 2009
Selected Acquisition Report and assumptions about procurement
quantities and additional flight hours. The analysis is only intended
to provide points for discussion and is not a rigorous, comprehensive
cost estimate.
[16] DOD conducts a comprehensive examination of the national defense
strategy, force structure, and force modernization plans every 4
years, as directed by 10 U.S.C. §118 (2004).
[17] The Secretary of Defense is required to submit an annual long-
term plan for the procurement of fixed-wing aircraft with the defense
budget materials for each fiscal year as directed by 10 U.S.C. § 231a.
DOD submitted its first annual report in February 2010.
[18] OSD directed the Navy to recapitalize four joint expeditionary EA-
6B squadrons that the service was planning to retire in 2012. In
Resource Management Decision number 700, OSD provided funding for 26
additional EA-18Gs to continue supporting all services through the
land-based, expeditionary airborne electronic attack mission.
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-415].
[20] For our most recent report, see GAO, Joint Strike Fighter:
Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting Warfighter Requirements
on Time, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-382]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19, 2010).
[21] The official service life for the A-10 is 16,000 flight hours.
[22] Older aircraft are designated blocks 25, 30, and 32; the active
component fleet comprises blocks 40, 42, 50, and 52.
[23] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated
Investment Strategy, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-415] (Washington D.C.: Apr. 2,
2007).
[24] The Navy and Air Force under a memorandum of understanding
jointly operate four expeditionary squadrons of EA-6B aircraft.
[25] The most recent jamming improvement program ICAP III includes the
ability to perform selective reactive jamming.
[End of section]
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