Hybrid Warfare
Gao ID: GAO-10-1036R September 10, 2010Senior military officials recently testified before Congress that current and future adversaries are likely to use "hybrid warfare" tactics, a blending of conventional and irregular approaches across the full spectrum of conflict. In addition, several academic and professional trade publications have commented that future conflict will likely be characterized by a fusion of different forms of warfare rather than a singular approach. The overarching implication of hybrid warfare is that U.S. forces must become more adaptable and flexible in order to defeat adversaries that employ an array of lethal technologies to protracted, population-centric conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Department of Defense (DOD) officials have discussed the need to counter the continuum of threats that U.S. forces could face from nonstate- and state-sponsored adversaries, including computer network and satellite attacks; portable surface-to-air missiles; improvised explosive devices; information and media manipulation; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and highyield explosive devices. In light of references to "hybrid warfare" by senior military officials and possible implications it could have for DOD's strategic planning, Congress requested we examine: (1) whether DOD has defined hybrid warfare and how hybrid warfare differs from other types of warfare and (2) the extent to which DOD is considering the implications of hybrid warfare in its overarching strategic planning documents. On June 16, 2010, we met with congressional staff to discuss the preliminary results of our work. This report formally transmits our final response to Congress' request.
Senior military officials in recent public testimony asserted the increased likelihood of U.S. forces encountering an adversary that uses hybrid warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, DOD has not officially defined hybrid warfare at this time and has no plans to do so because DOD does not consider it a new form of warfare. Rather, officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, the four military services, and U.S. Joint Forces Command told us that their use of the term hybrid warfare describes the increasing complexity of future conflicts as well as the nature of the threat. Moreover, the DOD organizations we met with differed on their descriptions of hybrid warfare. For example, according to Air Force officials, hybrid warfare is a potent, complex variation of irregular warfare. U.S. Special Operations Command officials, though, do not use the term hybrid warfare, stating that current doctrine on traditional and irregular warfare is sufficient to describe the current and future operational environment. Although hybrid warfare is not an official term, we found references to "hybrid" and hybrid-related concepts in some DOD strategic planning documents; however, "hybrid warfare" has not been incorporated into DOD doctrine. For example, according to OSD officials, hybrid was used in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report to draw attention to the increasing complexity of future conflicts and the need for adaptable, resilient U.S. forces, and not to introduce a new form of warfare. The military services and U.S. Joint Forces Command also use the term "hybrid" in some of their strategic planning documents to articulate how each is addressing current and future threats, such as the cyber threat; however, the term full spectrum often is used in addition to or in lieu of hybrid.
GAO-10-1036R, Hybrid Warfare
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GAO-10-1036R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 10, 2010:
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Jeff Miller:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Hybrid Warfare:
Senior military officials recently testified[Footnote 1] before
Congress that current and future adversaries are likely to use "hybrid
warfare" tactics, a blending of conventional and irregular approaches
across the full spectrum of conflict. In addition, several academic
and professional trade publications have commented that future
conflict will likely be characterized by a fusion of different forms
of warfare rather than a singular approach. The overarching
implication of hybrid warfare is that U.S. forces must become more
adaptable and flexible in order to defeat adversaries that employ an
array of lethal technologies to protracted, population-centric
conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Department of Defense
(DOD) officials have discussed the need to counter the continuum of
threats that U.S. forces could face from non-state-and state-sponsored
adversaries, including computer network and satellite attacks;
portable surface-to-air missiles; improvised explosive devices;
information and media manipulation; and chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive devices.
In light of references to "hybrid warfare" by senior military
officials and possible implications it could have for DOD's strategic
planning, you requested we examine: (1) whether DOD has defined hybrid
warfare and how hybrid warfare differs from other types of warfare and
(2) the extent to which DOD is considering the implications of hybrid
warfare in its overarching strategic planning documents. On June 16,
2010, we met with your staff to discuss the preliminary results of our
work. This report formally transmits our final response to your
request.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine how DOD defines hybrid warfare, how hybrid warfare
differs from other types of warfare, and how DOD uses the concept in
its strategic planning documents, we reviewed and analyzed DOD
doctrine, guidance, policy, and strategic planning documents, and
interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff,
service headquarters, Defense Intelligence Agency, and combatant
command officials. More specifically, our review and analysis included
the most recent National Defense Strategy; the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report; and the 2010 Joint Operating Environment.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2010 to September
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
Senior military officials in recent public testimony asserted the
increased likelihood of U.S. forces encountering an adversary that
uses hybrid warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, DOD
has not officially defined hybrid warfare at this time and has no
plans to do so because DOD does not consider it a new form of warfare.
Rather, officials from OSD, the Joint Staff, the four military
services, and U.S. Joint Forces Command told us that their use of the
term hybrid warfare describes the increasing complexity of future
conflicts as well as the nature of the threat. Moreover, the DOD
organizations we met with differed on their descriptions of hybrid
warfare. For example, according to Air Force officials, hybrid warfare
is a potent, complex variation of irregular warfare. U.S. Special
Operations Command officials, though, do not use the term hybrid
warfare, stating that current doctrine on traditional and irregular
warfare is sufficient to describe the current and future operational
environment.
Although hybrid warfare is not an official term, we found references
to "hybrid" and hybrid-related concepts in some DOD strategic planning
documents; however, "hybrid warfare" has not been incorporated into
DOD doctrine. For example, according to OSD officials, hybrid was used
in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report to draw attention to the
increasing complexity of future conflicts and the need for adaptable,
resilient U.S. forces, and not to introduce a new form of warfare. The
military services and U.S. Joint Forces Command also use the term
"hybrid" in some of their strategic planning documents to articulate
how each is addressing current and future threats, such as the cyber
threat; however, the term full spectrum often is used in addition to
or in lieu of hybrid.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DOD. DOD reviewed the draft
report and concurred with the information presented in the report.
DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in enclosure II.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees. We are also sending a copy to the Secretary of Defense. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on our Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/]. Should you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431
or dagostinod@gao.gov or Marc Schwartz at (202) 512-8598 or
schwartzm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report.
Key contributors to this report include Marc Schwartz, Assistant
Director; Jennifer Andreone; Steve Boyles; Richard Powelson; Kimberly
Seay; and Amie Steele.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosures:
[End of section]
Hybrid Warfare:
Briefing to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
September 10, 2010:
Overview:
* Introduction;
* Key Questions;
* Scope and Methodology;
* Summary;
* Background;
* Observations;
* Agency Comments;
* Enclosure I: DOD Definitions of Warfare;
* Enclosure II: Comments from the Department of Defense.
Introduction:
Senior military officials used the term "hybrid warfare" during
testimony before Congress between 2008-2010 to describe the methods
used by U.S. adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what U.S. forces
are likely to encounter in future conflicts.
Moreover, many academic and professional trade publications have
commented that future conflict will likely be characterized by a
fusion of different forms of warfare rather than a singular approach.
Hybrid warfare tactics consist of the blending of conventional,
unconventional, and irregular approaches to warfare across the full
spectrum of conflict.
Key Questions:
In response to your request, our objectives in this review were to
determine:
1. Whether DOD has defined hybrid warfare and how hybrid warfare
differs from other types of warfare.
2. The extent to which DOD is considering the implications of hybrid
warfare in its overarching strategic planning documents.
We conducted this review from January 2010 to September 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine whether DOD has defined or intends to define hybrid
warfare and how hybrid warfare is different from other types of
warfare, we examined DOD-approved definitions of warfare-”such as
irregular and unconventional warfare-”and compared them with the
concept of hybrid warfare. We also met with Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, service headquarters, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and combatant command officials to obtain their perspectives
on the term and determine whether they have formally defined it (see
pages 6-7).
To determine the extent to which DOD is considering the implications
of hybrid warfare in its overarching strategic planning documents, we
reviewed and analyzed DOD strategies, doctrine, guidance, and
policies, including the 2008 National Defense Strategy,[Footnote 2]
the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,[Footnote 3] the 2010 Joint
Operating Environment,[Footnote 4] and the 2009 Capstone Concept for
Joint Operations.[Footnote 5] We also discussed this matter with DOD
officials from the organizations listed on pages 6-7.
We met with officials from the following DOD organizations:
* The Joint Staff, Joint Force Development and Integration Division.
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low
Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities, Office of Special
Operations & Combating Terrorism.
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Force
Development.
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller.
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation.
* Defense Intelligence Agency.
* U.S. Joint Forces Command:
- Joint Irregular Warfare Center;
- Joint Futures Group;
- Joint Center for Operational Analysis;
- Joint Training and Joint Warfighting Center Directorate;
- Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate.
* U.S. Special Operations Command:
- Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate;
- Joint Capability Development Directorate;
- Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate;
- Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate.
* U.S. Army Headquarters:
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans;
- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
* U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
* U.S. Air Force Headquarters:
- Irregular Warfare Requirements Directorate.
* U.S. Navy Headquarters:
- Navy Irregular Warfare Office.
* U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters:
- Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Concepts and Plans.
Summary:
DOD has not officially defined "hybrid warfare" at this time and has
no plans to do so because DOD does not consider it a new form of
warfare.
DOD officials from the majority of organizations we visited agreed
that "hybrid warfare" encompasses all elements of warfare across the
spectrum. Therefore, to define hybrid warfare risks omitting key and
unforeseen elements.
DOD officials use the term "hybrid" to describe the increasing
complexity of conflict that will require a highly adaptable and
resilient response from U.S. forces, and not to articulate a new form
of warfare.
The term "hybrid" and hybrid-related concepts appear in DOD
overarching strategic planning documents (e.g., 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report); however, "hybrid warfare" has not been
incorporated into DOD doctrine.
Background:
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(Joint Publication 1-02), sets forth standard U.S. military and
associated terminology that, together with their definitions,
constitutes approved DOD terminology. There are approximately
6,000 terms in Joint Publication 1-02.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5705.01 C,
Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology, stipulates
four methods to add, modify, or delete DOD terminology in Joint
Publication 1-02.
As shown in figure 1, according to Joint Staff officials, the approval
process to incorporate a new term in Joint Publication 1-02 can take
place immediately to approximately 18 months. The majority of approved
terms are proposed due to their inclusion in existing joint doctrine
publications.
Figure 1: Methods to Incorporate New DOD Terminology into Joint
Publication 1-02:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Illustration sizing approximated based on agency descriptions.
Directed by Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, or the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Immediate.
Proposed from DOD directives and instructions or Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff instructions[A]: 9 months.
Proposed from joint doctrine publications[A]: 18 months.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD's terminology approval process.
[A] The fourth method to incorporate a new term into Joint Publication
1-02 is through terminology proposed from the NATO Glossary of Terms
and Definitions (English and French), which may be proposed for
adoption and inclusion by the Department of Defense in the appropriate
Joint Publication, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction,
or DOD document.
[End of figure]
Observations: Objective 1: Definition:
DOD has not formally defined hybrid warfare at this time and does not
plan to do so because DOD does not consider it a new form of warfare.
DOD officials indicated that the term "hybrid" is more relevant to
describe the increasing complexity of conflict that will require a
highly adaptable and resilient response from U.S. forces rather than a
new form of warfare.
DOD officials have different characterizations of recent conflicts.
For example:
* Air Force officials stated that the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan are irregular warfare and hybrid, while Army and Navy
officials both considered Afghanistan irregular warfare and Iraq
initially conventional warfare and then later, irregular warfare.
* U.S. Special Operations Command and Army officials characterized the
Russia-Georgia conflict as conventional warfare, while Air Force
officials considered it a hybrid conflict.
Discussions about hybrid threats, as opposed to hybrid warfare, are
ongoing within DOD; however, most of the DOD officials whom we spoke
with stated that it was premature to incorporate hybrid threats into
doctrine.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has defined hybrid
threat as follows, and is developing doctrine on countering the hybrid
threat.
* "A hybrid threat is one posed by any current or potential adversary,
including state, non-state and terrorists, with the ability, whether
demonstrated or likely, to simultaneously employ conventional and non
conventional means adaptively, in pursuit of their objectives."
[Footnote 6]
Observations: Objective 1: The Hybrid Warfare Concept:
According to our analysis of DOD and academic documents, hybrid
warfare blends conventional[Footnote 7] and irregular warfare[Footnote
8] approaches across the full spectrum of conflict. Figure 2 displays
a sample of approaches that could be included in hybrid warfare.
Figure 2: The Hybrid Warfare Concept:
[Refer to PDF for image: overlapping spheres]
Irregular:
Foreign internal defense;
Counterterrorism;
Unconventional;
Counterinsurgency;
Stability operations.
Conventional:
State-on-state conflict.
Hybrid:
Conventional;
Irregular;
Criminality;
Cyber.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD military concept and briefing documents
and academic writings.
[End of figure]
Observations: Objective 1: Definition Comparison:
DOD officials have differing views on whether or how hybrid warfare
differs from other types of warfare.[Footnote 9]
* According to Air Force officials, hybrid warfare is more potent and
complex than irregular warfare due to increased tempo, complexity,
diversity, and wider orchestration across national borders, which are
all exacerbated by the ease with which adversaries can communicate,
access international resources and funding, and acquire more lethal
and sophisticated weaponry.
* Special Operations Command officials stated that hybrid warfare is
no different from current doctrinal forms of warfare employed across
the spectrum of conflict.
* Navy officials stated that hybrid is synonymous with full spectrum and
encompasses both conventional warfare and unconventional warfare.
* Marine Corps officials use the term "hybrid" to describe the
potential threat posed by both state and non-state actors and believe
that hybrid warfare is not a new form of warfare; rather it is
synonymous with full spectrum conflict and is already adequately
covered in current doctrine.
Observations: Objective 1: Unofficial Definitions:
The following are examples of unofficial definitions of hybrid
warfare/threat that we found in military concept and briefing
documents and in academic writings (emphases added):
Hybrid Warfare: Conflict executed by either state and/or non-state
threats that employs multiple modes of warfare to include conventional
capabilities, irregular tactics, and criminal disorder. (U.S. Joint
Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis briefing on
"Joint Adaptation to Hybrid War")
Hybrid Threat: An adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs
some fused combination of (1) political, military, economic, social
and information means and (2) conventional, irregular, terrorism and
disruptive/criminal conflict methods. It may include a combination of
state and non-state actors. (Working definition derived by U.S. Joint
Forces Command, Joint Irregular Warfare Center, 2008-2009)
Hybrid Threat: A threat that simultaneously employs regular and
irregular forces, including terrorist and criminal elements to achieve
their objectives using an ever-changing variety of conventional and
unconventional tactics to create multiple dilemmas. (U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command's Operational Environment, 2009-2025)
Hybrid Threats:
Threats that incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare
including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations,
terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and
criminal disorder, conducted by both states and a variety of non-state
actors.[Footnote 10]
Observations: Objective 2: Strategic Planning:
DOD uses the term "hybrid" in select strategic planning documents to
articulate how it is addressing current and future threats. For
example:
* The term "hybrid" is mentioned twice in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review Report to describe the approaches and capabilities that
potential adversaries may use against U.S. forces and counteractions
DOD can take.
* The term "hybrid" is used in the 2010 Joint Operating Environment to
describe the combination of lethal technology and the protracted,
population-centric nature of contemporary and future conflicts.
* The 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations states that future
conflicts will appear as hybrids comprising diverse, dynamic, and
simultaneous combinations of organizations, technologies, and
techniques that defy categorization.
* The 2010 Army Modernization Strategy[Footnote 11] states that the
Army must continue to upgrade its capabilities to remain a dominant
force and successful against hybrid threats, global terrorists, and
followers of extremist ideologies.
Some DOD organizations have adopted the term "full spectrum
operations" in addition to or in lieu of the term "hybrid."
* The 2010 Army Posture Statement[Footnote 12] uses the term "full
spectrum operations"[Footnote 13] in addition to hybrid threats to
describe current and future military operations.
* According to Army officials, full spectrum operations underpin both
conventional and irregular warfare.
* The Air Force Global Partnership Strategy[Footnote 14] states that
as the United States fights insurgencies and terrorism, the U.S. Air
Force must maintain its capacity to conduct full spectrum operations
to defeat U.S. enemies in operations of traditional and irregular
character.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DOD.
DOD reviewed the draft report and concurred with the information
presented in the report.
DOD comments are reprinted in their entirety in enclosure II.
[End of section]
Enclosure I: DOD Definitions of Warfare:
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(Joint Publication 1-02), includes the following definitions of
warfare:[Footnote 15]
Acoustic Warfare (DOD, NATO): Action involving the use of underwater
acoustic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use
of the underwater acoustic spectrum and actions which retain friendly
use of the underwater acoustic spectrum.
Antisubmarine Warfare (DOD, NATO): Operations conducted with the
intention of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines.
Atomic Warfare (DOD, NATO) See nuclear warfare.
Biological Warfare (DOD, NATO): Employment of biological agents to
produce casualties in personnel or animals, or damage to plants or
materiel; or defense against such employment.
Chemical Warfare (DOD): All aspects of military operations involving
the employment of lethal and incapacitating munitions/agents and the
warning and protective measures associated with such offensive
operations. Since riot control agents and herbicides are not
considered to be chemical warfare agents, those two items will be
referred to separately or under the broader term "chemical," which
will be used to include all types of chemical munitions/agents
collectively.
Directed-Energy Warfare (DOD): Military action involving the use of
directed-energy weapons, devices, and countermeasures to either cause
direct damage or destruction of enemy equipment, facilities, and
personnel, or to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of
the electromagnetic spectrum through damage, destruction, and
disruption. It also includes actions taken to protect friendly
equipment, facilities, and personnel and retain friendly use of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
Electronic Warfare (DOD): Military action involving the use of
electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic
spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic warfare consists of three
divisions: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic
warfare support.
Guerrilla Warfare (DOD, NATO): Military and paramilitary operations
conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular,
predominantly indigenous forces.
Irregular Warfare (DOD): A violent struggle among state and non-state
actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).
Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it
may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order
to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.
Land Mine Warfare (DOD, NATO): See mine warfare.
Mine Warfare (DOD): The strategic, operational, and tactical use of
mines and mine countermeasures. Mine warfare is divided into two basic
subdivisions: the laying of mines to degrade the enemy's capabilities
to wage land, air, and maritime warfare; and the countering of enemy-
laid mines to permit friendly maneuver or use of selected land or sea
areas.
Multinational Warfare (DOD): Warfare conducted by forces of two or
more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition
or alliance.
Naval Coastal Warfare (DOD): Coastal sea control, harbor defense, and
port security, executed both in coastal areas outside the United
States in support of national policy and in the United States as part
of this Nation's defense.
Naval Expeditionary Warfare (DOD): Military operations mounted from
the sea, usually on short notice, consisting of forward deployed, or
rapidly deployable, self-sustaining naval forces tailored to achieve a
clearly stated objective.
Naval Special Warfare (DOD): A designated naval warfare specialty that
conducts operations in the coastal, riverine, and maritime
environments. Naval special warfare emphasizes small, flexible, mobile
units operating under, on, and from the sea. These operations are
characterized by stealth, speed, and precise, violent application of
force.
Nuclear Warfare (DOD, NATO): Warfare involving the employment of
nuclear weapons. Partisan Warfare (DOD, NATO) Not to be used. See
guerrilla warfare.
Surface Warfare (DOD): That portion of maritime warfare in which
operations are conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface
forces and merchant vessels.
Unconventional Warfare (DOD): A broad spectrum of military and
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly
conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are
organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying
degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to,
guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and
unconventional assisted recovery.
Under Sea Warfare (DOD): Operations conducted to establish and
maintain control of the underwater environment by denying an opposing
force the effective use of underwater systems and weapons. It includes
offensive and defensive submarine, antisubmarine, and mine warfare
operations.
[End of briefing slides]
Enclosure II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent
Capabilities:
2500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500:
September 1, 2010:
For: Director, Defense Capabilities And Management, Us Government
Accountability Office:
Subject: Hybrid Warfare (GAO Engagement 351444):
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-101036R, 'Hybrid Warfare,' dated August 24, 2010 (GAO Code
351444). As the primary action office, OASD SO/LIC & IC (SOCT) has
reviewed GAO's findings and conclusions. Following consultation with
the appropriate DoD equities, we concur with the information presented
in the report. My point of contact is Ms. Elizabeth Nathan at 703-697-
2945.
Signed by:
James Q. Roberts:
Principal Director for Special Operations & Combating Terrorism:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Hearing on U.S. Southern Command, Northern Command, Africa
Command, and Joint Forces Command Before the House Armed Services
Committee, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of General James N. Mattis,
USMC Commander, United States Joint Forces Command); Hearing on the
Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for
Department of Defense's Science and Technology Programs Before the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities of
the House Armed Services Committee, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of
Rear Admiral Nevin P. Carr, Jr., United States Navy Chief of Naval
Research); and Hearing on U.S. Marine Corps Readiness Before the
Subcommittee on Defense of the House Committee on Appropriations,
110th Cong. 132-133 (2008) (testimony of Lieutenant General James F.
Amos, Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Combat Development and
Integration).
[2] United States Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy
(Washington, D.C., June 2008).
[3] United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review
Report (Washington, D.C., February 2010).
[4] United States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating
Environment (Suffolk, Va., February 2010).
[5] United States Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations, Version 3.0 (Washington, D.C., January 2009).
[6] This definition was approved by the NATO Military Working Group
(Strategic Planning & Concepts), February 2010.
[7] The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, v. 1.0, defines
conventional warfare as a form of warfare between states that employs
direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary's armed forces,
destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain
territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or
policies. Conventional warfare may also be called "traditional"
warfare. Conventional warfare is not defined in Joint Publication 1-02.
[8] Joint Publication 1-02 defines irregular warfare as a violent
struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence
over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military
and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power,
influence, and will.
[9] The Joint Publication 1-02 definitions of types of warfare are
listed in enclosure I.
[10] Lt. Col. Frank G. Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Ret.),
Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, Va.:
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), p.8.
[11] United States Department of the Army, Army Modernization Strategy
(April 2010).
[12] United States Department of the Army, Army Posture Statement,
"America's Army: The Strength of the Nation" (February 2010).
[13] Army Field Manual No. 3-0, Operations, defines full spectrum
operations as an operational concept in which Army forces combine
offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations
simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create
opportunities to achieve decisive results.
[14] United States Air Force, Air Force Global Partnership Strategy:
Building Partnerships for the 21st Century (December 2008).
[15] These definitions were listed in Joint Publication 1-02 as
amended through April 2010.
[End of section]
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