Weapons of Mass Destruction
Actions Needed to Track Budget Execution for Counterproliferation Programs and Better Align Resources with Combating WMD Strategy Gao ID: GAO-10-755R September 28, 2010Combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is one of the greatest challenges the United States faces. Traditionally, the use of WMD--which include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons--has been constrained by the logic of deterrence and of diplomacy, but these constraints may be of less utility in preventing the use of WMD by rogue states or terrorist groups. The Department of Defense (DOD) assigns top priority to dissuading, deterring, and defeating those who seek to harm the United States directly, especially extremist enemies with WMD. In 1994, Congress established an interagency committee, now known as the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC), with a variety of duties related to coordinating the activities and programs of federal agencies that address improvements in the U.S. government's efforts to combat WMD. The Secretary of Defense, as chairman of the CPRC, is required to report its findings biennially. The Departments of Energy, State, and Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence are also members of the CPRC, and must provide it with access to information on all pertinent programs, projects, and activities. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, as chairman of the CPRC Standing Committee, compiles the report of the CPRC and submits it to Congress biennially. GAO has reported extensively in recent years on nonproliferation and consequence management - two of the three pillars of combating WMD. Our most recent report on the third pillar, counterproliferation, was issued in 2000. DOD defines counterproliferation as "those actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of WMD against the United States, our military forces, friends, and allies." House Armed Services Committee Report 111-166 accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, directed GAO to assess and report on DOD and interagency counterproliferation activities, including the extent to which (1) existing strategies for the combating WMD mission are effective and the strategic framework encompasses a common lexicon, (2) DOD has developed comprehensive plans that are integrated across combating WMD mission areas, and (3) counterproliferation programs and related funding support DOD plans and strategies. In response to discussions with your staff, this report focuses on the extent to which DOD counterproliferation programs and related funding support DOD plans and strategies.7 You asked us to focus on the third objective at this time, to inform Congress as it deliberates on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. We expect to issue our final report, which will address all three objectives, later this year.
Although DOD compiles a biennial list of programs "strongly related to combating WMD" and related costs, it cannot identify with precision what proportion of its resources are devoted specifically to counterproliferation. One of the key elements of an effective national strategy is identifying resources and investments necessary to execute that strategy. However, the CPRC report provides information on only budget requests; it does not provide any data on budget authority or actual outlays. In addition, visibility over how the department's resources support its counterproliferation strategies is limited, in part because those resources are not comprehensively aligned with gaps in counterproliferation capabilities identified by the Joint Staff based on inputs from the combatant commands and other DOD sources. Moreover, efforts across DOD to align resources with identified gaps in its ability to carry out its counterproliferation strategy have not been fully integrated into DOD's budget process. Although the 2009 CPRC report shows what mission areas the various programs/program elements are responsive to, it does not show what functional capability gaps they are designed to mitigate. As a result, the report does not present congressional decision makers with a clear portrait of how counter-WMD gaps translate into DOD funding priorities. We are recommending that DOD report actual appropriations and expenditures as well as budget requests related to counterproliferation in the CPRC report and that DOD align prioritized counterproliferation capability gaps with programs and resources.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Davi M. Dagostino Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: No phone on recordGAO-10-755R, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Actions Needed to Track Budget Execution for Counterproliferation Programs and Better Align Resources with Combating WMD Strategy
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GAO-10-755R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 28, 2010:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Weapons of Mass Destruction: Actions Needed to Track Budget
Execution for Counterproliferation Programs and Better Align Resources
with Combating WMD Strategy:
Combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of
delivery is one of the greatest challenges the United States faces.
[Footnote 1] Traditionally, the use of WMD--which include chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons--has been constrained by
the logic of deterrence and of diplomacy, but these constraints may be
of less utility in preventing the use of WMD by rogue states or
terrorist groups. The Department of Defense (DOD) assigns top priority
to dissuading, deterring, and defeating those who seek to harm the
United States directly, especially extremist enemies with WMD.
In 1994, Congress established an interagency committee, now known as
the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC), with a
variety of duties related to coordinating the activities and programs
of federal agencies that address improvements in the U.S. government's
efforts to combat WMD.[Footnote 2] The Secretary of Defense, as
chairman of the CPRC, is required to report its findings biennially.
[Footnote 3] The Departments of Energy, State, and Homeland Security
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence are also
members of the CPRC, and must provide it with access to information on
all pertinent programs, projects, and activities.[Footnote 4] The
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs, as chairman of the CPRC Standing
Committee, compiles the report of the CPRC and submits it to Congress
biennially.
GAO has reported extensively in recent years on nonproliferation and
consequence management - two of the three pillars of combating WMD.
Our most recent report on the third pillar, counterproliferation, was
issued in 2000.[Footnote 5] DOD defines counterproliferation as "those
actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of WMD against the
United States, our military forces, friends, and allies."
House Armed Services Committee Report 111-166 accompanying the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, directed GAO
to assess and report on DOD and interagency counterproliferation
activities, including the extent to which (1) existing strategies for
the combating WMD mission are effective and the strategic framework
encompasses a common lexicon, (2) DOD has developed comprehensive
plans that are integrated across combating WMD mission areas, and (3)
counterproliferation programs and related funding support DOD plans
and strategies.[Footnote 6]
In response to discussions with your staff, this report focuses on the
extent to which DOD counterproliferation programs and related funding
support DOD plans and strategies.[Footnote 7] You asked us to focus on
the third objective at this time, to inform Congress as it deliberates
on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. We
expect to issue our final report, which will address all three
objectives, later this year.
Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which counterproliferation programs and
related funding support DOD plans and strategies, we reviewed the
reports of the CPRC since 2004 and data from the Future Years Defense
Program. We also reviewed capability-based assessments on the
counterproliferation mission areas and other inputs to the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council and the Interagency Combating WMD
Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities. We also
interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Office of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation, the Joint Staff; the Joint
Requirements Office for Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear
Defense; and the U.S. Strategic Command. We reviewed several analyses
that had identified capability gaps and shortfalls in
counterproliferation programs in order to determine whether the gap
lists were consistent with one another. We also analyzed data from the
CPRC reports and the Future Years Defense Program in order to assess
trends in counterproliferation spending. This report analyzes
strategies and budget information published as of March 2010, but our
final report will incorporate any new or revised information that may
be published in the coming months. To assess the reliability of the
data, we spoke with a key DOD official responsible for incorporating
DOD inputs into the report, and we determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 through May 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
Although DOD compiles a biennial list of programs "strongly related to
combating WMD" and related costs, it cannot identify with precision
what proportion of its resources are devoted specifically to
counterproliferation. One of the key elements of an effective national
strategy is identifying resources and investments necessary to execute
that strategy. However, the CPRC report provides information on only
budget requests; it does not provide any data on budget authority or
actual outlays. In addition, visibility over how the department's
resources support its counterproliferation strategies is limited, in
part because those resources are not comprehensively aligned with gaps
in counterproliferation capabilities identified by the Joint Staff
based on inputs from the combatant commands and other DOD sources.
Moreover, efforts across DOD to align resources with identified gaps
in its ability to carry out its counterproliferation strategy have not
been fully integrated into DOD's budget process. Although the 2009
CPRC report shows what mission areas the various programs/program
elements are responsive to, it does not show what functional
capability gaps they are designed to mitigate. As a result, the report
does not present congressional decision makers with a clear portrait
of how counter-WMD gaps translate into DOD funding priorities. We are
recommending that DOD report actual appropriations and expenditures as
well as budget requests related to counterproliferation in the CPRC
report and that DOD align prioritized counterproliferation capability
gaps with programs and resources.
Background:
Congress has long been concerned about the spread and threat of
weapons of mass destruction. In response, the federal government has
developed a strategy at the national and government-wide levels for
combating WMD. This includes assigning responsibility throughout DOD
and coordinating the combating WMD efforts of U.S. government
departments and agencies.
Congress established a commission, in 1996, to assess the organization
of the federal government to combat the proliferation of WMD.[Footnote
8] The commission recommended, among other things, that the President
ensure that the federal government formulate a strategy for combating
WMD. In December 2002, the White House published the National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which identifies three pillars
of effort for combating WMD: counterproliferation, nonproliferation,
and consequence management. The strategy includes a statement that
U.S. military and civilian agencies must possess the full range of
operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by
states and terrorists against the United States, U.S. military forces,
and friends and allies. The strategy listed three specific
counterproliferation capabilities that the United States would need in
order to deter and defend against the full range of possible WMD
employment scenarios: interdiction, deterrence, and defense and
mitigation. In February 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff published the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction, which drew on the 2002 national strategy. The
chairman wrote that the military strategic goal for combating WMD is
to ensure that the United States, its Armed Forces, allies, partners
and interests are neither coerced nor attacked with WMD. The strategy
further described eight mission areas that collectively strengthen the
three pillars. These eight mission areas are security cooperation and
partnership activities, threat reduction cooperation, consequence
management, interdiction, elimination, passive defense, active
defense, and offensive operations.[Footnote 9]
Responsibility for achieving the broad goal of combating WMD is spread
throughout DOD. Four Under Secretaries of Defense, the Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological
Defense Programs, defense agencies, the military services, Joint
Staff, and geographic and functional combatant commands are all
assigned combating WMD responsibilities.[Footnote 10] For example, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
is tasked to develop a comprehensive research, development, and
acquisition strategy for the eight mission areas to combat WMD. The
Secretaries of the Military Departments organize, train, equip, and
otherwise prepare their respective forces to combat WMD, means of
delivery, and related materials. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff serves as the principal military advisor to the President, the
National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense regarding
combating WMD activities. The Commanders of the Combatant Commands are
to be prepared to perform combating WMD missions in permissive,
uncertain, and hostile environments and coordinate efforts with other
U.S. government agencies, partners, friends, and allies, as directed.
In 2005, the Secretary of Defense assigned U.S. Strategic Command as
the lead combatant command for the combating WMD mission, and assigned
it the tasks of synchronizing DOD planning and advocating for
combating WMD capabilities. To accomplish this mission, the U.S.
Strategic Command established the Center for Combating WMD later that
year to plan, advocate and advise on WMD-related matters.
The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is responsible for
administering DOD planning, programming, and budgeting systems, as
well as supervising and directing the formulation and presentation of
DOD budgets. The Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, has
responsibilities for providing analysis, advice, and recommendations
to the Planning and Programming phases of the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution system, as well as for managing its program
review phase.
Identification of capabilities needed by combatant commanders is done
through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.
This system supports the acquisition process by identifying and
assessing capability needs and associated performance criteria to be
used as a basis for acquiring the right capabilities. The process
starts with the development of a Capabilities-Based Assessment, which
identifies and validates capability gaps, and may recommend types of
solutions to address the capability gap.
DOD also coordinates its efforts with other federal agencies. DOD
compiles combating WMD efforts by U.S. Government departments and
agencies in its Interagency Combating WMD Database of
Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities System, which the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency and U.S. Strategic Command's Center
for Combating WMD developed and maintains. The National Security
Council has endorsed the database and directed all U.S. government
departments and agencies to work with the Center for Combating WMD in
populating and validating their respective combating WMD information
in the system.
Proportion of DOD Resources Used for Counterproliferation Programs and
Relationship between Those Resources and Strategies or Budget Requests
Are Unclear:
DOD Cannot Precisely Identify What Proportion of Its Resources Are
Specifically Devoted to Counterproliferation:
Although DOD compiles a biennial list of combating WMD programs and
related costs, it cannot identify with precision what proportion of
its resources are devoted specifically to counterproliferation. The
biennial CPRC report is the principal executive branch report on
activities and programs that provide technologies and capabilities to
combat WMD. Although the CPRC reports budget requests, not budget
authority or actual outlays, DOD officials told us that the CPRC
reports are the only compilation of combating WMD programs and budgets
within DOD. The biennial report contains a list of programs and other
activities that "directly support, or are strongly related to, the
area of combating WMD" and related budget requests that are summarized
by WMD mission area.[Footnote 11] These mission areas are components
of the three pillars for combating WMD as set forth in the National
Strategy to Combat WMD. Table 1 shows the three pillars and their
corresponding mission areas.
Table 1: Pillars for Combating WMD:
Pillar: Nonproliferation;
Mission Areas:
Security Cooperation and Partner Activities;
Threat Reduction Cooperation.
Pillar: Counterproliferation;
Mission Areas:
Interdiction;
Elimination;
Offensive Operations;
Active Defense;
Passive Defense.
Pillar: Consequence Management;
Mission Areas:
Consequence Management.
Source: DOD:
Note: The CPRC includes "intelligence" as a ninth "area for capability
enhancement" along with the eight mission areas.
[End of table]
Although the CPRC reports contain a large amount of information about
requested funding for counterproliferation programs, limitations to
the CPRC data prevent DOD from being able to identify its resources
for counterproliferation with precision. First, some programs span
multiple mission areas. For example, in the 2009 report, 43 out of 228
programs supported at least two mission areas, and 12 supported more
than two mission areas. Antibiotics or vaccines against biological
agents were listed in both the passive defense and consequence
management areas, and consequently, as elements of both the
counterproliferation and consequence management pillars. The total
funding for each mission area can vary, depending how funding for
these programs is allocated. Second, some programs span
counterproliferation and other DOD missions. For example, hardened and
deeply buried target defeat is included in the offensive operations
mission area, but the capability could also be used to hold non-WMD
targets at risk. Moreover, such programs both leverage and depend on
much larger investments, such as intelligence assets and command and
control infrastructure. Third, with respect to intelligence programs,
the report only contains data on selected DOD intelligence programs
that are related to combating WMD. No annex was published about
"special compartmented information" or other special access programs,
despite the statutory requirement to include such an annex, which
might have provided information on the full range of programs in DOD
and national intelligence programs. Hence, budget amounts contained in
the CPRC report should be considered approximate.
According to the CPRC report, DOD requested about $19.1 billion in
fiscal year 2010 funding for all programs strongly related to
combating WMD. Figure 1 illustrates the CPRC's alignment of DOD's
fiscal years 2006 through 2010 budget request for these programs, by
pillar.
Figure 1: DOD Budget Requests for Combating WMD, Fiscal Years 2006
Through 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Nonproliferation: $519.5 million;
Counterproliferation: $12.2 billion;
Consequence management: $183.2 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Nonproliferation: $497.6 million;
Counterproliferation: $13.8 billion;
Consequence management: $123.3 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Nonproliferation: $462.4 million;
Counterproliferation: $13.8 billion;
Consequence management: $91.5 million.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Nonproliferation: $2.0 billion;
Counterproliferation: $17.6 billion;
Consequence management: $218 million;
Intelligence: $2.6 billion.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Nonproliferation: $2.0 billion;
Counterproliferation: $15.6 billion;
Consequence management: $202 million;
Intelligence: $1.2 billion.
Source: Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Report on
Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism
(July 2009).
[End of figure]
Figure 2 shows the CPRC's estimates of budget requests since 2006
(when the CPRC began to report budget data by mission area) for each
of the five combating WMD mission areas most strongly related to
counterproliferation.
Figure 2: Relative Percentage of Budget Requests for
Counterproliferation Mission Areas:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Interdiction: 0.2%;
Passive defense: 14.3%;
Offensive operations: 2.3%;
Active defense: 82.6%;
Elimination: 0.5%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Interdiction: 0%;
Passive defense: 12.8%;
Offensive operations: 2.8%;
Active defense: 83.9%;
Elimination: 0.5%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Interdiction: 1.0%;
Passive defense: 13.6%;
Offensive operations: 2.6%;
Active defense: 81.5%;
Elimination: 1.4%.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Interdiction: 0.5%;
Passive defense: 10.3%;
Offensive operations: 22.1%;
Active defense: 65.8%;
Elimination: 1.3%.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Interdiction: 0.8%;
Passive defense: 11.6%;
Offensive operations: 24.5%;
Active defense: 61.7%;
Elimination: 1.4%.
Source: Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Report on
Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism
(May 2005, May 2006, May 2007, and July 2009).
Notes: The increase in the Offensive Operations mission area after
fiscal year 2008 is related to the first-time inclusion of funding for
DOD nuclear strike force capabilities. In cases where programs were
listed under multiple mission areas, funding was tabulated under the
first-listed, or primary, mission area.
[End of figure]
Figure 2 also illustrates that - according to the CPRC report - aside
from offensive operations, shares of reported requests for each
mission area have not changed significantly since 2006, and active
defense - which includes ballistic missile defense - has accounted for
more than 60 percent of total counterproliferation requests each year.
Offensive operations, which are actions to disrupt, neutralize, or
destroy a weapon of mass destruction before it can be used, or to
deter subsequent use of such weapons, primarily encompass conventional
and strategic nuclear forces. The 2009 CPRC report states that U.S.
nuclear forces contribute uniquely and fundamentally to strategic
deterrence through their ability to impose costs and deny benefits to
an adversary in an exceedingly rapid and devastating manner.
WMD active defense includes, but is broader than, missile defense. It
is "active measures to defeat an attack with chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear weapons by employing actions to divert,
neutralize, or destroy those weapons or their means of delivery while
en route to their target." Examples of activities are missile defense,
air defense, special operations, and security operations, capabilities
which become more critical as the adversary develops a WMD employment
capability. Figure 3 depicts CPRC data indicating the relative
percentage of DOD resources that the CPRC estimates were devoted to
each of the eight combating WMD mission areas, plus intelligence, in
the fiscal year 2010 budget request.
Figure 3: Estimated Fiscal Year 2010 Combating WMD Budget Request by
Mission Area:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Security cooperation and partner activities Interdiction: 0.4%;
Interdiction: 0.7%;
Consequence management: 1%;
Elimination: 1.1%;
Intelligence: 6.5%;
Passive defense: 9.5%;
Threat reduction cooperation: 10.3%;
Offensive operations: 20%;
Active defense: 50.5%.
Source: Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Report on
Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism
(July 2009).
[End of figure]
DOD requested about $8.6 billion in funding for programs unique to
active defense for fiscal year 2010. Of this, about $6.7 billion was
for ballistic missile defense research and development programs out of
a total of about $7.1 billion for ballistic missile defense programs.
Budget Requests for Combating WMD Do Not Fully Relate to
Appropriations and Expenditures:
We have found from prior work that an effective national strategy
identifies what the strategy will cost, identifies the sources and
types of resources and investments needed to execute that strategy,
and designates where those resources and investments should be
targeted.[Footnote 12] Although the CPRC report provides information
on budget requests, it does not provide any data on budget authority
or actual outlays. We found that for the passive defense mission area,
there are DOD reports that link budget requests to authorizations or
outlays, and there are some data for other counterproliferation
mission areas, but no single source of DOD budget information links
counterproliferation programs to spending information. As a result, it
may be more difficult for the CPRC to fulfill some of its statutory
purposes, such as optimizing funding and establishing priorities for
programs and funding.
DOD Counterproliferation Resources Are Not Clearly Aligned with
Strategies:
DOD has - as part of its own internal efforts and as part of the
CPRC - made progress in delineating the kinds of programs it has
pursued for counterproliferation. For example, the 2009 Report to
Congress on Weapons and Capabilities to Defeat Hardened and Deeply
Buried Targets relates key performance parameters for some
counterproliferation programs to planned and actual funding.[Footnote
13] However, DOD does not clearly demonstrate how the resources it
devotes to "programs strongly related to combating WMD" support
counterproliferation strategies. As we have reported in the past,
[Footnote 14] increased globalization, changing security threats, and
rapid technological advances have prompted fundamental changes in the
environment in which DOD operates and have placed a premium on
effective accountability and maintaining transparency. However, both
within and outside of DOD, visibility over how the department's
resources support the counterproliferation elements of its combating
WMD strategies is limited - not only because DOD cannot clearly
identify what resources it devotes to its counterproliferation mission
areas, but also because those resources are not comprehensively
aligned with gaps in counterproliferation capabilities.
Over the past 4 years, the Joint Staff has prepared capabilities-based
assessments of the eight combating WMD mission areas and has
identified gaps.[Footnote 15] As part of this process, the Joint Staff
assessed potential solutions in each mission area and categorized them
broadly by affordability, identifying solutions as either no, very
low, low, medium, or high cost. In the midst of the joint staff's
assessment process, U.S. Strategic Command, in its role as global
integrator and synchronizer of combating WMD efforts, also developed a
Joint Capabilities Document that included a prioritized list of 35
combating WMD capability gaps that were integrated across all eight
mission areas. DOD has used the Joint Capabilities Document as input
into the budget process, but the document's role is to prioritize
requirements, not to calculate the costs to fulfill them. Moreover,
some DOD and Joint Staff officials said that the Joint Capabilities
Document was of limited utility because it was prepared before all of
the corresponding assessments were complete, whereas such products
were supposed to document the results of capabilities-based
assessments.[Footnote 16]
DOD has prepared two other assessments--the Joint Staff Capability
Gaps Assessment and the Combating WMD Strategic Global Assessment--
that are mostly but not entirely consistent with the Joint
Capabilities Document, which identified several key gaps in the eight
mission areas. The key shortfalls as identified in the Joint Staff
Capability Gaps Assessment [2011-2015] that explicitly are related to
combating WMD missions are scattered through a prioritized list of 85
DOD-wide gaps that were derived from the lists of priorities submitted
by the combatant commands in fiscal year 2009 and other DOD inputs on
operational needs and gaps. For example, there are several shortfalls
that have WMD ramifications but are not specifically listed as
combating WMD shortfalls. The key shortfalls that the combatant
commands identified in the Joint Staff's 2009 Combating WMD Strategic
Global Assessment are a mixture of mission areas and discrete
capabilities: intelligence, foreign consequence management, building
partnership capacity, cooperative threat reduction, and standoff
detection and policy.
Our prior work on effective national strategies has found that such a
strategy might include guidance for implementing parties to manage
their resources and investments according to an assessment of risks
and begin to address the difficult but crucial issues about who pays
and how such efforts will be funded and sustained in the future.
However, efforts across DOD to align resources with identified gaps in
its ability to carry out its counterproliferation strategy have not
been integrated into DOD's budget process. Although the 2009 CPRC
report shows what mission areas the various programs/program elements
are responsive to, it does not show what functional capability gap
they are designed to mitigate. Because the report includes only
limited information on intelligence and detection programs, it is also
difficult to determine how vigorously these gaps are being addressed.
Further, while the CPRC reports include budget requests for individual
programs, relative budget amounts cannot be used to determine the
importance placed on specific programs because of disparities in the
costs of solutions and the likelihood that it will be more expensive
to mitigate some shortfalls than others. As a result, the department's
biennial report does not provide the appropriate officials in the
executive branch or congressional decision makers with a clear
portrait of how DOD's combating WMD gaps translate into funding
priorities.
Conclusions:
DOD has made progress in integrating the elements of combating WMD and
attempting to define the resources that are allotted to each of the
three pillars: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence
management. DOD's inability to precisely determine how budgets are
allocated among multiple combating WMD mission areas or pillars, or to
be sure in all cases what proportion of spending for a particular
program element goes to combating WMD programs, is due in part to the
difficulty of the task, and we are not convinced that the effort
required to improve DOD's accuracy in this area would provide a
corresponding benefit. Therefore, we are not presently making
recommendations on this issue. However, other limitations of the CPRC
report and other means that DOD uses to show how resources support
strategy make it difficult for Congress to understand how resources
appropriated for counterproliferation programs are being expended and
what effect those resources are having on combating WMD programs and
overall counterproliferation efforts. Without a clearer portrait of
combating WMD shortfalls and their relation to funding priorities,
Congress will be limited in its ability to relate DOD budget requests
to the effectiveness of DOD's combating WMD strategy.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve DOD's ability to track program execution for combating WMD
programs as a whole, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs, as Chairman of the CPRC Standing
Committee, to show actual appropriations and expenditures as well as
budget requests when reporting programs in the CPRC report.
To improve DOD's ability to align resources with its combating WMD
strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs, to more clearly relate prioritized
capability gaps to programs and resources in the CPRC report or other
appropriate forum.
Agency Comments:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in the enclosure.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact Davi D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Key
contributors to this report were Joseph Kirschbaum, Assistant
Director; Susan Ditto; James Driggins; David Keefer; Alberto Leff;
Gregory Marchand; Sally Newman; Rebecca Shea; and Edwin Yuen.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management Enclosure:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Global Strategic Affairs:
2900 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2900:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the unclassified
GAO Draft Report, GAO-10-755R, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Actions
Needed to Track Budget Execution for Counterproliferation Programs and
Better Align Resources With Combating WMD Strategy," dated June 25,
2010 (GAO Code 351500).
DoD has reviewed the draft report and concurs without comment.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment. Any further questions can be
directed to the Action Officer Ms. Laura Gross at (703) 571-2326.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Kenneth B. Handelman:
Acting:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-40,
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (June 10, 2009) I-1.
[2] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-160, §1605 (1993) (as amended) (22 U.S.C. § 2751 note).
[3] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L.
No. 103-337, §1503 (1994) (as amended) (22 U.S.C. § 2751 note).
[4] The membership of the CPRC was most recently updated by § 1256 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-181 (2008).
[5] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD's Efforts Should Be More
Integrated and Focused, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-97] (Washington, D.C., May
26, 2000).
[6] H. Rep. No. 111-166, at 362-363 (2009).
[7] This is an unclassified version of a previously-issued classified
report.
[8] Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-293, §§ 711-717 (1996).
[9] Department of Defense, National Military Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C., February 2006), 22-27.
[10] DOD Directive 2060.02, Department of Defense (DOD) Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy (Apr. 19, 2007).
[11] The CPRC reports use the term Areas for Capability Enhancement --
broad and comprehensive areas for combating WMD that provide a
framework for reviewing progress, assessing combating WMD
requirements, and measuring investment in technologies and
capabilities for combating WMD. They reflect the National Military
Strategy to Combat WMD mission areas and strategic enablers.
[12] GAO, Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual
Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global
Posture Restructuring, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-852] (Washington, D.C., Sept. 13,
2006).
[13] Departments of Defense and Energy and Director of National
Intelligence, 2009 Report to Congress on Weapons and Capabilities to
Defeat Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets (Washington, D.C., January
2010).
[14] GAO, DOD Financial Management: Integrated Approach,
Accountability, Transparency, and Incentives Are Keys to Effective
Reform, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-537T]
(Washington, D.C: Mar. 20, 2002).
[15] The assessment for active defense included only air and missile
defense.
[16] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3170.01F,
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington,
D.C., May 1, 2007), 2. (superseded by CJCSI 3170.01G, Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington, D.C.,
Mar. 1, 2009)).
[End of section]
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