Afghanistan Security
Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined Gao ID: GAO-11-66 January 27, 2011Developing capable Afghan National Army (ANA) forces is a key element of the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led coalition effort to counter the insurgency and create sustainable security in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the United States, with assistance from NATO and other coalition nations, has worked to develop the ANA. The Department of Defense (DOD) leads U.S. efforts to train and equip the ANA. U.S. agencies have allocated about $20 billion in support of the ANA since 2002 and have requested $7.5 billion more for fiscal year 2011. GAO examined (1) the extent of progress made and challenges faced in expanding the size of the ANA, (2) the extent of progress made and challenges faced in developing ANA capability, and (3) how much estimated future funding will be needed to sustain and further grow the ANA. GAO reviewed DOD and NATO documents and met with officials in Washington, D.C.; Tampa, FL; Brussels, Belgium; and Kabul, Afghanistan.
Between January 2010 and July 2010, the ANA grew from 104,000 to 134,000 personnel, reaching the interim growth goal set by the Afghan government and international community 3 months ahead of schedule. Officials cited increased recruitment of new soldiers and higher training capacity as factors that enabled the growth. The ANA has also generally achieved its goal of drawing proportionally from Afghanistan's major ethnic groups, with some key exceptions. However, the ANA faces challenges, including high rates of attrition--the loss of soldiers from the force before they complete their contracts--and absenteeism. In particular, high attrition could impact the ANA's ability to meet its end size goal of 171,600 by October 2011. The Afghan government and international community have set an objective of having the Afghan army and police lead and conduct security operations in all Afghan provinces by the end of 2014. As of September 2010, no ANA unit was assessed as capable of conducting its mission independent of coalition assistance. About two-thirds were assessed as effective with limited coalition support. Efforts to develop ANA capability have been challenged by difficulties in staffing leadership positions and a shortage of coalition trainers, including a shortfall of approximately 18 percent (275 of 1,495) of the personnel needed to provide instruction at ANA training facilities. Neither DOD nor NATO has completed an analysis of ANA sustainment costs. Such analysis is important given that, as of January 2010, the International Monetary Fund projected that it will take until at least 2023 for the Afghan government to raise sufficient revenues to cover its operating expenses, including those related to the army--highlighting Afghanistan's continued dependence on external sources of funding. In addition, DOD and NATO studies indicate that growth of the ANA beyond the current end goal of 171,600 may be needed--potentially up to a force size of 240,000 personnel. Any such growth will necessitate additional donor assistance. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with international partners, take steps to eliminate the shortage of trainers; clarify what ANA growth beyond the current end goal, if any, is needed; and develop estimates of the future funding needed to further grow and sustain the ANA. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation regarding trainers. DOD partially concurred with the need to develop growth and cost estimates for the ANA.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Charles M. Johnson Jr Team: Government Accountability Office: International Affairs and Trade Phone: (202) 512-7331GAO-11-66, Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Addressees:
January 2011:
Afghanistan Security:
Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs
Not Determined:
GAO-11-66:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-66, a report to congressional addressees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Developing capable Afghan National Army (ANA) forces is a key element
of the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led
coalition effort to counter the insurgency and create sustainable
security in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the United States, with
assistance from NATO and other coalition nations, has worked to
develop the ANA. The Department of Defense (DOD) leads U.S. efforts to
train and equip the ANA. U.S. agencies have allocated about $20
billion in support of the ANA since 2002 and have requested $7.5
billion more for fiscal year 2011.
GAO examined (1) the extent of progress made and challenges faced in
expanding the size of the ANA, (2) the extent of progress made and
challenges faced in developing ANA capability, and (3) how much
estimated future funding will be needed to sustain and further grow
the ANA. GAO reviewed DOD and NATO documents and met with officials in
Washington, D.C.; Tampa, FL; Brussels, Belgium; and Kabul, Afghanistan.
What GAO Found:
Between January 2010 and July 2010, the ANA grew from 104,000 to
134,000 personnel, reaching the interim growth goal set by the Afghan
government and international community 3 months ahead of schedule.
Officials cited increased recruitment of new soldiers and higher
training capacity as factors that enabled the growth. The ANA has also
generally achieved its goal of drawing proportionally from
Afghanistan‘s major ethnic groups, with some key exceptions. However,
the ANA faces challenges, including high rates of attrition”-the loss
of soldiers from the force before they complete their contracts”-and
absenteeism. In particular, high attrition could impact the ANA‘s
ability to meet its end size goal of 171,600 by October 2011.
The Afghan government and international community have set an
objective of having the Afghan army and police lead and conduct
security operations in all Afghan provinces by the end of 2014. As of
September 2010, no ANA unit was assessed as capable of conducting its
mission independent of coalition assistance. About two-thirds were
assessed as effective with limited coalition support. Efforts to
develop ANA capability have been challenged by difficulties in
staffing leadership positions and a shortage of coalition trainers,
including a shortfall of approximately 18 percent (275 of 1,495) of
the personnel needed to provide instruction at ANA training facilities.
Figure: Shortage of Instructors for the ANA, as of November 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph, vertical bar graph, pie-chart]
Instructor positions, Total 1,495;
Filled or pledged to be filled: 1,220 (82%);
Unfilled and lacking pledges: 275 (18%).
Critical instructor positions, Total: 281;
Filled or pledged to be filled: 180 (64%);
Unfilled and lacking pledges: 101 (36%).
Photograph of instructor and ANA members.
Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; GAO (photo).
[End of figure]
Neither DOD nor NATO has completed an analysis of ANA sustainment
costs. Such analysis is important given that, as of January 2010, the
International Monetary Fund projected that it will take until at least
2023 for the Afghan government to raise sufficient revenues to cover
its operating expenses, including those related to the army”
highlighting Afghanistan‘s continued dependence on external sources of
funding. In addition, DOD and NATO studies indicate that growth of the
ANA beyond the current end goal of 171,600 may be needed”potentially
up to a force size of 240,000 personnel. Any such growth will
necessitate additional donor assistance.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with
international partners, take steps to eliminate the shortage of
trainers; clarify what ANA growth beyond the current end goal, if any,
is needed; and develop estimates of the future funding needed to
further grow and sustain the ANA. DOD concurred with GAO‘s
recommendation regarding trainers. DOD partially concurred with the
need to develop growth and cost estimates for the ANA.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-66] or key
components. For more information, contact Charles Michael Johnson,
Jr.at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
ANA Achieved Interim Growth Goal Ahead of Schedule, but Challenges to
Meeting End Goal Remain:
Limited Capability Leads ANA Units to Remain Reliant on Coalition
Assistance:
Future ANA Sustainment Costs Have Not Been Determined, and Studies
Indicate More Growth May Be Needed:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Structure of the Afghan National Army:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: DOD and State Support to Train and Equip the Afghan Army,
Fiscal Years 2002-2011:
Table 2: ANA Monthly Pay Rates Before and After Pay Reform:
Table 3: Rating Definition Levels for Assessing ANA Capability:
Table 4: NCO Staffing in ANA Combat Units, as of October 2010:
Table 5: ANA Equipment Items with Less Than Half of the Authorized
Amount on Hand, as of November 2010:
Figures:
Figure 1: Average Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks Reported in
Afghanistan, November 2004 to November 2010:
Figure 2: Command and Control in Afghanistan:
Figure 3: Equipment Provided to Typical ANA Soldier and Associated
Costs:
Figure 4: Equipment Provided to Standard ANA Infantry Battalion and
Associated Costs:
Figure 5: ANA Growth between January 2010 and December 2010:
Figure 6: ANA Recruits at Kabul Military Training Center:
Figure 7: Typical Training Paths for ANA Soldiers:
Figure 8: Percentages of ANA Personnel from Various Ethnic Groups, as
of September 2010:
Figure 9: ANA Monthly Attrition Rate, November 2009 to October 2010:
Figure 10: Shortage of Instructors for the ANA, as of November 2010:
Figure 11: U.S. Soldier Providing Marksmanship Training to ANA Basic
Trainees:
Figure 12: Afghan Revenues and Total Expenditures, 2008-2013:
Figure 13: Geographic Distribution of Afghan Army Combat Forces:
Figure 14: Planned Changes in ANA Force Composition between 2010 and
2011:
Abbreviations:
ANA: Afghan National Army:
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces:
AWOL: absent without leave:
CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:
DOD: Department of Defense:
IJC: ISAF Joint Command:
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force:
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
NCO: non-commissioned officer:
NTM-A: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan:
SIGAR: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction:
State: Department of State:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 27, 2011:
Congressional Addressees:
Developing a capable Afghan National Army (ANA) is a key component of
the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led coalition
effort to counter the insurgency and create sustainable security in
Afghanistan.[Footnote 1] Since 2002, the United States, with
assistance from NATO and other coalition nations, has worked to
develop the ANA, with the underlying goal of eventually transferring
responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international
community to the Afghan government. The United States has allocated
about $20 billion to train and equip the ANA since 2002, and an
additional $7.5 billion in fiscal year 2011 funding has been
requested. In 2008,[Footnote 2] we found that, although the Department
of Defense (DOD) had made progress in increasing the size of the army,
efforts to develop ANA capability were hampered by difficulty in
recruiting qualified leaders and retaining soldiers, insufficient
numbers of U.S. and coalition personnel to train the ANA, and critical
shortfalls in equipment for ANA combat forces. In April 2009,[Footnote
3] we noted some progress in the development of ANA capability, but we
found that several of these challenges remained. Subsequently, in
December 2009, the President announced his decision to rapidly deploy
an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. This increase was
intended, among other things, to enhance the training of Afghan
security forces and create the conditions necessary for the Afghan
government to start assuming lead security responsibility. The United
States and its international partners have indicated that this
transition to Afghan security lead will begin in early 2011, and the
United States has identified July 2011 as the start date for the
withdrawal of its combat forces from Afghanistan.
Because of broad congressional interest in this issue, we performed
our work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United
States. We examined (1) the extent of progress made and challenges
faced in expanding the size of the ANA, (2) the extent of progress
made and challenges faced in developing ANA capability, and (3) how
much estimated future funding will be needed to sustain and further
grow the ANA.
To address the objectives of this engagement, we reviewed a wide range
of DOD and NATO documents related to U.S. and coalition efforts to
expand, develop, and sustain the ANA, including planning documents,
progress reports, assessments of the army's capability, and future
funding estimates, among others. We also discussed these efforts with
DOD and Department of State (State) officials in Washington, D.C., as
well as with representatives of the U.S. Central Command in Tampa,
Florida, and the U.S. Mission to NATO and U.S. Military Delegation to
NATO in Brussels, Belgium. Additionally, in Kabul, Afghanistan, we
visited ANA training facilities and met with officials from DOD,
State, NATO, and the Afghan Ministry of Defense. Also, see appendix I
for a complete description of our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2009 to January
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
As part of the security reform strategy for Afghanistan established in
2002 by the United States and several other donor nations, the United
States volunteered to lead the training and development of the Afghan
army. The Afghan National Development Strategy specifies that the ANA
will be an ethnically balanced, professional army trained and equipped
to meet the security needs of the country.
The United States and its international partners have agreed on
several occasions to help Afghanistan develop a larger army. Original
plans called for a 50,000 personnel force,[Footnote 4] which the
United States and its international partners revised in December 2002
to a target force size of 70,000. Since then, citing increased
security challenges, the international community has agreed several
more times to help Afghanistan develop a larger force. Figure 1
depicts attacks against security forces and civilians in Afghanistan
since 2004, as well as the progressively larger force size goals
agreed upon by the international community. In each of these cases,
the new force size goal was announced before the existing force size
goal had been met.
Figure 1: Average Daily Enemy-Initiated Attacks Reported in
Afghanistan, November 2004 to November 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Number of average daily attacks per month:
November 2004:
Total average daily attacks: 4.5;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2.1;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.0;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1.4.
December 2004:
Total average daily attacks: 4.3;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.1;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1.1.
January 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 3.2;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 1;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.1;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1.2.
February 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 2.2;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 1.0;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 0.4;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 0.8.
March 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 4.0;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 1.7;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.3;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1.
April 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 5.8;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.7;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.1.
May 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 6.7;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2.1;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.6;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.0.
June 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 8.2;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 3.1;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.9;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.2.
July 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 7.0;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2.7;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.2;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.
August 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 9.2;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 3.9;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.4;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.8.
September 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 11.1;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5.1;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.9;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.1.
October 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 8.2;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 4.1;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.0.
November 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 7.0;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 3.1;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.1.
December 2005:
Total average daily attacks: 5.7;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2.4;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.9;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1.4.
January 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 5.6;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 2.2;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.5;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 1.9.
February 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 7.8;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 3.4;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.5.
March 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 8.2;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 3.8;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 1.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.6.
April 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 10.6;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5.6;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.2;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.8.
May 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 10.4;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5.0;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.7;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.7.
June 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 13.5;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 7.5;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.1;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.9.
July 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 18.7;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 10.4;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.6;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.7.
August 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 22.9;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 12.8;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.3;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.7.
September 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 23.3;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 14.4;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.6;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.3.
October 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 18.5;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 9.9;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.6;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.1.
November 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 15.2;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 8.1;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.4;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.7.
December 2006:
Total average daily attacks: 11;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5.4;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.8.
January 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 11.9;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5.5;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.1;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.2.
February 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 9.7;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 5;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.1;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 2.6.
March 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 15.5;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 9;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.7;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.8;
April 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 17.3;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 9.3;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.0;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.0.
May 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 19.1;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 11.7;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.9;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.5.
June 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 22.2;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 14.1;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.4;
July 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 23.3;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 14.4;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.2.
August 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 26.5;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 17.5;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.5;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.5.
September 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 26.6;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 17.5;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.3.
October 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 21.7;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 14.8;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.9;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 4.0.
November 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 19.9;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 13.4;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.7.
December 2007:
Total average daily attacks: 16.2;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 9.7;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.2;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 3.2.
January 2008:
Total average daily attacks: 16.0;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 7.5;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 5.7.
February 2008: ANA force size goal increased to 80,000;
Total average daily attacks: 16.3;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 7.9;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 2.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 5.7.
March 2008:
Total average daily attacks: 20.8;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 11.5;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 6.3.
April 2008:
Total average daily attacks: 23.5;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 12.3;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.1;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 6.1.
May 2008:
Total average daily attacks: 32.3;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 17.6;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.5;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 9.1.
June 2008:
Total average daily attacks: 33.7;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 18.9;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 6.2;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 8.5.
July 2008:
Total average daily attacks: 40.8;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 21.4;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 7.7;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 11.7.
August 2008:
Total average daily attacks: 46.4;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 29.3;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 11.3.
September 2008: ANA force size goal increased to 134,000;
Total average daily attacks: 48.9;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 26.5;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 7.2;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 15.2.
October 2008:
Total average daily attacks: 43.4;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 23.2;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 7.0;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 13.2.
November 2008:
Total average daily attacks: 41.6;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 21.6;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.7;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 14.3.
December 2008:
Total average daily attacks: 33.4;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 17.3;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.7;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 10.4.
January 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 27.6;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 14.6;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.4;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 9.7.
February 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 29.8;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 15.1;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.3;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 10.4.
March 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 38.1;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 21.5;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.1;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 11.5.
April 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 35.5;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 19.0;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 3.9;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 12.6.
May 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 49.5;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 26.8;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 8.2;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 14.5.
June 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 69.8;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 40.2;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 8.9;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 20.8.
July 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 80.4;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 46.2;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 10.1;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 24.1.
August 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 102.0;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 57.6;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 12.7;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 31.7.
September 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 82.2;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 46.8;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 9.9;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 25.5.
October 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 68.3;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 40.2;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 7.1;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 21.1.
November 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 60.6;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 35.6;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 6.7;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 18.3.
December 2009:
Total average daily attacks: 54.8;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 30.7;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.1;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 18.9.
January 2010: ANA force size goal increased to 171,600;
Total average daily attacks: 58.0;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 31.0;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 6.4;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 20.6.
February 2010:
Total average daily attacks: 54.9;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 32.6;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.3;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 18.0.
March 2010:
Total average daily attacks: 67.5;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 40.3;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.6;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 21.6.
April 2010:
Total average daily attacks: 70.3;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 43;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 4.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 22.5.
May 2010:
Total average daily attacks: 93.1;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 64.4;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 6.9;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 21.8.
June 2010:
Total average daily attacks: 114.5;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 83.9;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 8.0;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 22.7.
July 2010:
Total average daily attacks: 133.1;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 98.7;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 8.6;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 25.8.
August 2010:
Total average daily attacks: 148.6;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 106.9;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 12.8;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 28.9.
September 2010:
Total average daily attacks: 144.9;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 104.8.
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 11.6;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 28.5.
October 2010:
Total average daily attacks: 114.0;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 79.4;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 8.4;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 26.2.
November 2010:
Total average daily attacks: 110.2;
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces: 72.8;
Average daily attacks against ANSF: 5.7;
Average daily attacks against civilians: 31.6.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Most recently, at the January 2010 London conference, the United
States and its international partners endorsed a new end goal of
171,600 personnel to be completed by October 2011, thereby changing
the previous end goal of 134,000 to an interim goal. The participants
also agreed to move forward the deadline for ANA growth to this
interim goal of 134,000 by 14 months, from December 2011 to October
2010.
The ANA of 134,000 is designed to consist primarily of infantry forces
in order to supply "boots on the ground" for the ongoing
counterinsurgency effort. By contrast, ANA growth from 134,000 to
171,600 personnel is intended to start rebalancing the force by adding
specialist units--such as logistics and combat support battalions,
route clearance companies, military intelligence, and military police--
that are necessary for the army to eventually operate independently.
Overall, this growth will increase the total number of ANA units from
186 to 244. See appendix II for additional details on the ANA's
planned force structure.
Command and control responsibilities for developing the ANA have
changed since our last report. In 2008,[Footnote 5] we noted that
developing the Afghan army was a U.S.-led mission, with the DOD-
staffed Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
overseeing the Afghan army's training, facilities development,
assessment, and equipment provision. Subsequently, in April 2009, the
United States and its NATO allies agreed to establish NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) to oversee institutional training[Footnote
6] for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).[Footnote 7] This
shifted responsibility for ANA development from the United States to
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). NTM-
A/CSTC-A's headquarter elements were fully operational by February
2010 and now operate as an integrated NATO and U.S. command with the
mission of generating and developing the ANSF.
While NTM-A/CSTC-A focuses on training recruits and building
institutional training capacity, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) now
takes responsibility for developing Afghan soldiers in the field, as
well as conducting combat operations. Having achieved full operational
capacity in November 2009, the IJC provides training to ANA units in
the field through training teams and partner units.[Footnote 8] U.S.
officials we met with in Brussels and Kabul described the rationale
behind these transitions in command and control as an attempt to
encourage increased NATO contributions to develop the ANA, while
providing clearer command and control for units in the field. As shown
in figure 2, both NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC report to the commander of ISAF
and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.[Footnote 9]
Figure 2: Command and Control in Afghanistan:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Top level:
ISAF/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (4 stars);
Second level, reporting to ISAF/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan:
* NTM-A/CSTC-A (3 stars): Trains ANSF:
- establishes training schools and academies;
- runs training for soldiers in institutional training;
- mentors Afghan ministries;
*IJC (3 stars): Plans and executes military operations:
- conducts military operations to disrupt insurgent activities;
- coordinates training teams and partner units.
Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; Adobe Illustrator and Corel
(symbols).
[End of figure]
U.S. Support for ANA Development:
The United States has been the leading contributor of funds for ANA
development since efforts to build the army began in 2002. Table 1
shows that, from fiscal years 2002 through 2010, DOD and State
allocated about $20 billion[Footnote 10] in support of the ANA. DOD
and State have requested an additional $7.5 billion in fiscal year
2011.
Table 1: DOD and State Support to Train and Equip the Afghan Army,
Fiscal Years 2002-2011:
Agency: DOD;
Fiscal year: 2002: $2.0 million;
Fiscal year: 2003: $165.0 million;
Fiscal year: 2004: $283.2 million;
Fiscal year: 2005: $1.32 billion;
Fiscal year: 2006: $766.1 million;
Fiscal year: 2007: $4.9 billion;
Fiscal year: 2008: $1.8 billion;
Fiscal year: 2009: $4.1 billion;
Fiscal year: 2010: $5.6 billion;
Fiscal year: 2011 request: $7.5 billion;
Total: $26.4 billion.
Agency: State;
Fiscal year: 2002: $74.7 million;
Fiscal year: 2003: $191.6 million;
Fiscal year: 2004: $434.4 million;
Fiscal year: 2005: $413.3 million;
Fiscal year: 2006: $1.0 million;
Fiscal year: 2007: $1.2 million;
Fiscal year: 2008: $1.7 million;
Fiscal year: 2009: $1.4 million;
Fiscal year: 2010: $1.5 million;
Fiscal year: 2011 request: $1.5 million;
Total: $1.1 billion.
Agency: Total;
Fiscal year: 2002: $76.7 million;
Fiscal year: 2003: $356.6 million;
Fiscal year: 2004: $717.5 million;
Fiscal year: 2005: $1.7 billion;
Fiscal year: 2006: $767.1 million;
Fiscal year: 2007: $4.9 billion;
Fiscal year: 2008: $1.8 million;
Fiscal year: 2009: $4.1 billion;
Fiscal year: 2010: $5.6 billion;
Fiscal year: 2011 request: $7.5 billion;
Total: $27.5 billion.
Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.
Notes:
These figures do not include certain operational costs, such as the
personnel costs for U.S. servicemembers assigned to the ANA
development mission.
Totals may not add due to rounding.
Funding includes detainee operations.
[A] Totals include funding from a variety of DOD and State sources.
Figures for fiscal years 2002 through 2006 consist of funding
appropriated into several different accounts, while those for fiscal
years 2007 through 2011 consist solely of Afghanistan Security Forces
Fund and International Military Training and Education funds.
[End of table]
Of the approximately $20 billion in U.S. funding allocated to date,
about $17.9 billion, or nearly 90 percent, has come from the DOD-
managed Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. Since its creation in fiscal
year 2005, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund has supported a
variety of activities related to ANA development in the following four
categories:
* equipment and transportation, including procurement of weapons,
vehicles, and communications items;[Footnote 11]
* infrastructure projects, such as construction of garrisons, depots,
and training facilities;
* training and operation, such as establishment of training
institutions and hiring of contractors to provide specialized
training; and:
* sustainment, including salary payments and maintenance of vehicles
and facilities.
Of the $17.9 billion in Afghanistan Security Forces Fund monies
allocated to date, the largest portion--about $7.0 billion, or 39
percent--has been directed toward equipment purchases. Figures 3 and 4
show, respectively, the types of equipment provided to a typical ANA
soldier and a standard ANA infantry battalion along with the
associated costs.
Figure 3: Equipment Provided to Typical ANA Soldier and Associated
Costs:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated photograph]
Total cost for ANA soldier with M16:
Armor: $1,431;
M16: $976;
Clothing: $422;
Equipment: $166;
Total: $2,995.
Body armor = $1,431;
Kevlar helmet;
Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) and Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI)
plates.
Equipment = $166;
Canteen;
Duffel bag;
Elbow pads;
Entrenching tool;
First aid kit;
Knee pads;
Poncho;
Rucksack and frame;
Sleeping bag;
Sleeping mat;
Other.
Weapon = $976;
M16 rifle.
Clothing = $422;
Berets;
Cold weather gear;
Field jacket and liner;
Mechanic coveralls;
Physical training clothing;
Belts;
Undergarments;
Uniform;
Wet weather set;
Boots (steel toed, combat, and cold weather);
Other.
Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; GAO and DOD (photo).
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Equipment Provided to Standard ANA Infantry Battalion and
Associated Costs:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated photograph]
Total cost for standard ANA infantry battalion:
Transportation: $17,575,371 (80%);
Weapons: $2,407,807 (11%);
Communications: $1,812,443 (8%);
Other: $203,174 (1%);
Total: $21,998,795.
Transportation:
Trucks;
Water trailer;
Ambulance;
Forklift;
HMMWVs;
Other.
Weapons:
Pistols;
M16 rifles;
Sniper rifles;
Machine guns;
Grenade launchers;
Mortars;
Other.
Communications:
Radio (handheld, manportable, programming kit, vehicle mounted);
Radio base station;
Switchboard;
Tactical field phone;
Other.
Other:
Generators;
Mobile kitchen;
Binoculars;
Compass;
Tool kits.
Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; GAO (photo).
Note: M16 rifle costs are included in both figure 3 and figure 4.
[End of figure]
Other Donor Support:
In addition to the United States, more than 40 nations and
international organizations have provided equipment or funds to
support efforts to build the ANA. As of October 2010, donor nations
had contributed almost $470 million worth of equipment to the ANA,
with vehicles, weapons, and aircraft comprising the majority of the
donated value. In addition, as of October 2010, non-U.S. donors had
provided about $210 million in funding in support of ANA development,
with nearly another $200 million pledged. Donor nations have provided
funding for the army through the NATO ANA Trust Fund, a mechanism
established in 2007 for nations to support activities such as ANA
training, equipment purchases, and transportation of donated
equipment. In early 2009, NATO broadened the scope of the ANA Trust
Fund to help pay for the ANA's long-term sustainment needs, including
recurring costs for salaries, munitions, repair parts, and fuel.
ANA Achieved Interim Growth Goal Ahead of Schedule, but Challenges to
Meeting End Goal Remain:
Between January 2010 and July 2010, the ANA grew from 104,000 to
134,000 personnel, reaching the interim growth goal set by the Afghan
government and international community 3 months ahead of schedule. NTM-
A/CSTC-A cites increased recruitment of new soldiers and higher
training capacity as factors that have enabled ANA growth. The ANA has
also generally achieved its goal of drawing proportionally from
Afghanistan's ethnic groups, with some key exceptions. However, the
ANA continues to face personnel challenges, including high rates of
attrition--the loss of soldiers from the force before they complete
their contracts--and absenteeism. In particular, high attrition could
impact the ability of the ANA to meet its end goal of generating a
171,600-person force by October 2011.
ANA Met Interim Growth Goal of Generating a 134,000 Personnel Force
Ahead of Schedule:
Since the Afghan government and international community's January 2010
decision to accelerate the deadline for ANA growth to 134,000 from
December 2011 to October 2010, the ANA has expanded rapidly, largely
meeting or surpassing monthly force generation targets. NTM-A/CSTC-A
reports indicate that the ANA achieved its interim goal of generating
a 134,000 personnel force in July 2010, 3 months ahead of schedule.
This is the first time that the ANA met a force size growth goal ahead
of schedule. As of December 2010, the ANA force size was nearly
150,000. ANA growth as reported by NTM-A/CSTC-A from January 2010 to
December 2010 is depicted in figure 5.
Figure 5: ANA Growth between January 2010 and December 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Date: January 2010;
Actual force size: 104,296;
Monthly force size target: 104,500.
Date: February 2010;
Actual force size: 107,224;
Monthly force size target: 108,600.
Date: March 2010;
Actual force size: 112,779;
Monthly force size target: 112,700.
Date: April 2010;
Actual force size: 119,388;
Monthly force size target: 116,500.
Date: May 2010;
Actual force size: 125,694;
Monthly force size target: 119,800.
Date: June 2010;
Actual force size: 130,171;
Monthly force size target: 123,100.
Date: July 2010; Interim goal of 134,000 by October 2010 (met 3 months
ahead of schedule);
Actual force size: 134,028;
Monthly force size target: 126,300.
Date: August 2010;
Actual force size: 136,106;
Monthly force size target: 129,000.
Date: September 2010;
Actual force size: 138,164;
Monthly force size target: 131,600.
Date: October 2010;
Actual force size: 144,638;
Monthly force size target: 134,000.
Date: November 2010;
Actual force size: 146,352;
Monthly force size target: 141,000.
Date: December 2010;
Actual force size: 149,553;
Monthly force size target: 146,114.
Date: October 2011;
Current end goal: 171,600.
Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.
[End of figure]
Increased Recruitment, Retention, and Training Capacity Have Enabled
Accelerated Growth:
The ANA's accelerated growth has been facilitated by increased
recruitment, retention, and training capacity. NTM-A/CSTC-A reports
that ANA recruitment has risen sharply in recent months. From January
to October 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A data show that the ANA met or exceeded
its recruitment target in all but 2 months, with recruitment averaging
over 6,500 soldiers per month. This was more than twice the average
monthly recruitment figure of approximately 3,000 reported for the
preceding 10 months. Overall, the total number of personnel recruited
between January and October 2010 exceeded the total recruitment target
for those months by over 6,000. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials,
during a peak recruitment period, some potential recruits were asked
to return later since the centralized in-processing center was already
operating at capacity.
In addition, NTM-A/CSTC-A reports that retention of ANA personnel who
have fulfilled their contracts has generally continued to meet the
monthly target of 60 to 70 percent. A typical ANA contract lasts for 3
years. At the end of a contract, ANA personnel are given the
opportunity to reenlist. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, between
January and October 2010, the ANA met its overall retention target in
7 out of 10 months. Specifically, in this period, average retention
was just about 70 percent,[Footnote 12] notably higher than the 53
percent figure for the March 2006 to February 2008 period we
previously reported.[Footnote 13] However, ANA retention rates for
certain units in high combat areas, such as southwestern and eastern
parts of Afghanistan, have sometimes fallen below target.
DOD officials cite various factors for the increased recruitment and
retention, the major one being recent pay reform for the ANA. After
increased funding from the United States, in November 2009, the Afghan
Ministry of Defense instituted a base pay raise of at least $45 per
month for all ANA personnel and revised its hazardous duty pay into a
tiered system that compensates soldiers in high combat areas to a
greater extent than before. Table 2 shows ANA monthly pay rates before
and after the pay reform. An NTM-A/CSTC-A official told us that as a
result of the base pay raise and additional hazard pay, many Afghan
soldiers' salaries approximately doubled. U.S. officials we spoke with
cited this pay reform as the primary cause of the ANA's increased
recruitment and retention.
Table 2: ANA Monthly Pay Rates Before and After Pay Reform:
Officer rank: General;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $900;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $945;
Increase in monthly salary: $45;
Percentage increase in salary: 5%.
Officer rank: Lieutenant general;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $800;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $845;
Increase in monthly salary: $45;
Percentage increase in salary: 6%.
Officer rank: Major general;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $700;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $745;
Increase in monthly salary: $45;
Percentage increase in salary: 6%.
Officer rank: Brigadier general;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $600;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $645;
Increase in monthly salary: $45;
Percentage increase in salary: 8%.
Officer rank: Colonel;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $450;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $495;
Increase in monthly salary: $45;
Percentage increase in salary: 10%.
Officer rank: Lieutenant colonel;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $400;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $445;
Increase in monthly salary: $45;
Percentage increase in salary: 11%.
Officer rank: Major;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $350;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $395;
Increase in monthly salary: $45;
Percentage increase in salary: 13%.
Officer rank: Captain;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $270;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $345;
Increase in monthly salary: $75;
Percentage increase in salary: 28%.
Officer rank: First lieutenant;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $230;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $295;
Increase in monthly salary: $65;
Percentage increase in salary: 28%.
Officer rank: Second lieutenant;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $210;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $275;
Increase in monthly salary: $65;
Percentage increase in salary: 31%.
Enlisted rank: Sergeant major;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $230;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $275;
Increase in monthly salary: $45;
Percentage increase in salary: 20%.
Enlisted rank: Master sergeant;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $190;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $255;
Increase in monthly salary: $65;
Percentage increase in salary: 34%.
Enlisted rank: Sergeant first class;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $165;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $235;
Increase in monthly salary: $70;
Percentage increase in salary: 42%.
Enlisted rank: Staff sergeant;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $150;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $210;
Increase in monthly salary: $60;
Percentage increase in salary: 40%.
Enlisted rank: Sergeant;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $135;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $180;
Increase in monthly salary: $45;
Percentage increase in salary: 33%.
Enlisted rank: Soldier;
Monthly rates before pay reform: $120;
Monthly rates after pay reform: $165;
Increase in monthly salary: $45;
Percentage increase in salary: 38%.
Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.
Note: The pay figures above are for personnel with less than 3 years
of service at their current ranks. ANA personnel receive a longevity-
based pay increase every 3 years served at rank.
[End of table]
In addition, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials attributed increased recruitment
and retention to the Afghan Ministry of Defense's creation of a
recruiting command, the establishment of 16 mobile recruiting
stations, a threefold increase in the number of recruiters, and the
launching of a major Afghan radio and television campaign to encourage
Afghan citizens to enlist in the army.
According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, increased ANA basic training
capacity has also facilitated ANA growth. As of August 2010, NTM-A/
CSTC-A officials stated that, in coordination with the Afghan Ministry
of Defense,[Footnote 14] they had developed the capacity to train
about 75,600 new recruits annually at the Kabul Military Training
Center, five regional military training centers, and a temporary
training center in Kabul. This is nearly a threefold increase since
January 2008, when annual training capacity for new recruits was
27,000. Furthermore, U.S. and NATO officials report that basic
training is operating at full capacity. From May 1, 2010 to July 16,
2010, basic training was filled to 100 percent at all training sites.
During our May 2010 visit to Afghanistan, we observed basic training
operating at full capacity at the Kabul Military Training Center, as
shown in figure 6.
Figure 6: ANA Recruits at Kabul Military Training Center:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Additionally, U.S. and international partners have increased training
capacity by shortening the basic training curriculum from 10 to 8
weeks. As figure 7 indicates, there are two primary routes that
typical ANA recruits take to join the fielded force after entering
basic training. In sum, this increased training capacity has allowed
the ANA to grow at an accelerated pace, since more recruits are able
to join the force given the increased capacity to absorb the new
recruits.
Figure 7: Typical Training Paths for ANA Soldiers:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Institutional training for recruits:
Civilian population:
Recruiting station:
Basic training (8 weeks):
* Fill vacant slots in existing units;
* Form new units:
Unit Training (7 weeks):
* Field new units.
Ongoing training for fielded force:
U.S. partners and mentors:
NATO partners and mentors:
Afghan army:
Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.
Note: There are additional training paths--for example, further
training in specialized skills such as heavy weapons and
reconnaissance--but the two paths depicted in this figure are the most
typical.
[End of figure]
ANA Has Generally Met Ethnic Balance Targets, with Some Exceptions:
In order to develop an ethnically balanced force in accordance with
the Afghan National Development Strategy, the Afghan Ministry of
Defense has set targets for the ethnic composition of the ANA that
generally reflect Afghanistan's ethnic makeup. Specifically, the
Ministry of Defense set the target of having all ranks of the army
comprised of 44 percent Pashtuns, 25 percent Tajiks, 10 percent
Hazaras, 8 percent Uzbeks, and 13 percent other smaller minorities. As
indicated in figure 8, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials report that, as of
September 2010, the ANA has met most of these ethnic balance targets,
with a few notable exceptions. Specifically, at the total force level,
Tajiks and Hazaras were overrepresented while Pashtuns and other
smaller minorities were underrepresented. Tajiks were especially
overrepresented in the officer corps, constituting 40 percent of all
ANA officers, as compared with a target of 25 percent. NTM-A/CSTC-A
officials noted that they were concerned about ethnic imbalance in the
ANA and had taken steps to limit overrepresentation of Tajik officers,
such as keeping a number of eligible officers in reserve and not
assigning them to units in order to avoid increasing the imbalance.
However, some ethnic imbalance within the force still remains.
[Side bar:
Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan:
Recent conflicts in Afghanistan have, in part, reflected rivalries
among the nation‘s various ethnic groups. For example, following the
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, ethnic militias
commanded by powerful warlords waged a protracted civil war that
destroyed much of the country‘s remaining infrastructure. By 1998,
most of Afghanistan had fallen under the control of the Taliban”-a
primarily Pashtun group of Islamic fundamentalists under whose rule
the country became a haven for the al Qaeda terrorist organization.
However, the Taliban remained at war with the Northern Alliance, a
loose confederation of anti-Taliban Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek groups
that joined the United States and several other allies in deposing the
Taliban regime in October 2001. Given this history of Afghan conflict
along ethnic lines, in December 2001, the international community
established a framework for a new, fully representative Afghan
government that, among other things, would be multiethnic in nature.
Subsequently, in December 2002, the Afghan government and donor nations
agreed that the new Afghan army should be an ethnically balanced force.
End of side bar]
Figure 8: Percentages of ANA Personnel from Various Ethnic Groups, as
of September 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal and vertical bar graphs]
By rank, what is the ethnic composition?
Officer:
Pashtun: 43%;
Tajik: 40%;
Hazara: 7%;
Uzbek: 4%;
Others: 5%.
NCO:
Pashtun: 47%;
Tajik: 36%;
Hazara: 10%;
Uzbek: 4%;
Others: 3%.
Soldier:
Pashtun: 38%;
Tajik: 28%;
Hazara: 14%;
Uzbek: 10%;
Others: 10%.
By ethnicity, are the goals being met?
Ethnicity: Pashtun;
Officer: 43%;
NCO: 47%;
Soldier: 38%;
All ranks: 41%;
All ranks goal: 45%.
Ethnicity: Tajik;
Officer: 40%;
NCO: 36%;
Soldier: 28%;
All ranks: 32%;
All ranks goal: 25%.
Ethnicity: Hazara;
Officer: 7%;
NCO: 10%;
Soldier: 14%;
All ranks: 12%;
All ranks goal: 10%.
Ethnicity: Uzbek;
Officer: 4%;
NCO: 4%;
Soldier: 10%;
All ranks: 8%;
All ranks goal: 8%.
Ethnicity: Other;
Officer: 5%;
NCO: 3%;
Soldier: 10%;
All ranks: 7%;
All ranks goal: 13%.
Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.
[End of figure]
Apart from ethnic balance, data suggest that the ANA is unbalanced
along regional lines. Specifically, NTM-A/CSTC-A figures indicate that
only about 3 percent of ANA recruits are Pashtuns from the country's
southern provinces, where the insurgency has been the strongest. NTM-
A/CSTC-A officials stated that although regional balance goals have
not been established for the ANA--unlike ethnic balance goals--there
is concern about the regional imbalance, and particularly the lack of
Pashtuns from the south. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials report that the Afghan
Ministry of Defense has begun to target southern Pashtuns in its
recruiting activities and has instituted special incentives for
southern Pashtun recruits, such as allowing them to serve in ANA corps
in southern Afghanistan, closer to home. Nevertheless, large regional
imbalances remain.
Challenges to Achieving ANA End Goal, Including Attrition and
Absenteeism, Remain:
High attrition has consistently challenged ANA growth. Soldiers are
counted toward attrition figures when they do not fulfill their 3-year
contractual obligation. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, over 90 percent of
ANA attrition is due to personnel who are dropped from the army's
payroll after being absent without leave (AWOL) for 30 consecutive
days for officers and 45 consecutive days for enlisted soldiers. NTM-
A/CSTC-A has set a target of losing no more than 1.2 percent of ANA
personnel to attrition per month. However, NTM-A/CSTC-A data indicate
that from November 2009, when the pay reform was enacted, to October
2010, ANA attrition has exceeded the target of 1.2 percent in all but
2 months, with an average monthly attrition rate for this period of
2.1 percent. Furthermore, as the army grows, greater numbers of ANA
personnel may be lost even at lower attrition rates. For example, the
army's attrition rate was 2.8 percent in October 2010 as compared with
3.1 percent in November 2009. However, due to the army's considerably
larger size in October 2010, the 2.8 percent attrition rate
corresponded to a loss of over 4,000 soldiers, whereas the 3.1 percent
attrition rate for the comparatively smaller force of November 2009
corresponded to a loss of fewer than 3,000 soldiers. Figure 9 shows
the ANA's monthly attrition rates for the 12-month period between
November 2009 and October 2010.
Figure 9: ANA Monthly Attrition Rate, November 2009 to October 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined vertical bar and line graph]
Attrition goal: 1.2%.
Date: November 2010;
Attrition: 3.1%.
Date: December 2010;
Attrition: 1.9%.
Date: January 2010;
Attrition: 1.9%.
Date: February 2010;
Attrition: 2.2%.
Date: March 2010;
Attrition: 1.2%.
Date: April 2010;
Attrition: 1.7%.
Date: May 2010;
Attrition: 1.2%.
Date: June 2010;
Attrition: 1.6%.
Date: July 2010;
Attrition: 3%.
Date: August 2010;
Attrition: 2.4%.
Date: September 2010;
Attrition: 2%.
Date: October 2010;
Attrition: 2.8%.
Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.
[End of figure]
[Side bar:
Impact of Attrition and Retention on ANA Force Size:
Attrition and retention have a cumulative impact on ANA force size. As
discussed earlier in this report, soldiers are counted toward
attrition figures when they do not fulfill their contractual
obligations. When soldiers do fulfill their contractual obligations,
they can choose whether or not to reenlist. Those who choose to
reenlist are counted toward retention figures, while those who do not
are counted toward nonreenlistment totals. The following example
illustrates how attrition and nonreenlistment affected ANA growth in a
given month.
NTM-A/CSTC-A data indicate that, as of October 2010, the ANA consisted
of 144,638 personnel. NTM-A/CSTC-A has also reported that the ANA lost
over 4,000 personnel in October 2010 due to attrition. Furthermore,
NTM-A/CSTC-A data show that nearly 300 ANA personnel whose contracts
ended in October 2010 decided not to reenlist. In sum, approximately
4,300 personnel were dropped from the ANA payroll in October 2010 either
because of attrition or nonreenlistment.
NTM-A/CSTC-A reports that the ANA recruited almost 8,000 new personnel
in October 2010. However, the first 4,300 of these new recruits did
not count toward net growth of the force, since they were needed to
offset the loss of approximately 4,300 personnel due to attrition and
nonreenlistment. Consequently, out of the roughly 8,000 recruits from
July 2010, 3,700-”less than half-”counted toward net growth of the ANA.
End of side bar]
According to NTM-A/CSTC-A officials, a high attrition rate is the
primary challenge the ANA faces in meeting its present goal of growing
the force to 171,600 personnel by October 2011. For instance, in the
12-month period from November 2009 to October 2010, the ANA lost over
30,000 soldiers due to attrition. This means that, in addition to the
recruits needed to grow the force, the ANA also had to recruit 30,000
soldiers to fill these vacant slots. NTM-A/CSTC-A plans have accounted
for the need to achieve this additional recruiting, noting that in
order to grow from the July 2010 force size of just over 134,000 to
the 171,600 goal--an increase of about 37,000--the ANA will need to
recruit and train over 86,000 personnel.
Additionally, absenteeism remains a challenge to fielding an ANA force
as planned. Specifically, IJC data indicate that the number of ANA
present for duty continues to fall below the number of ANA assigned to
units. In September 2010, for example, IJC reported that, across the
ANA, only 69 percent of soldiers were present for duty. In some units,
such as the 215th Corps in southwestern Afghanistan, the ratio of
present for duty was even lower. An analysis of data provided by IJC
indicates that, from January to September 2010, on average, over a
quarter of the ANA was absent during any given month.
IJC data indicate that high AWOL rates are a large factor in this
absenteeism rate.[Footnote 15] For example, in September 2010, the
AWOL rate accounted for more than half of the absentee rate. The
impact of this absenteeism is a smaller fielded force than planned.
For example, although over 85,000 ANA personnel had been assigned to
the fielded force in September 2010, due to absenteeism, fewer than
59,000 ANA were reported as present for duty that month.[Footnote 16]
The U.S. and international partners have tried to mitigate this
challenge, for example by instituting reforms such as electronic
payment of salaries so soldiers do not have to return home to bring
money to their family. Despite these efforts, the absentee rate has
remained consistently high.
Limited Capability Leads ANA Units to Remain Reliant on Coalition
Assistance:
The Afghan government and international community have set an
objective of having the Afghan army and police lead and conduct
security operations in all Afghan provinces by the end of 2014. As of
September 2010, no ANA unit was assessed by IJC as capable of
conducting its mission independent of coalition assistance.[Footnote
17] About two-thirds were assessed as effective with some form of
limited coalition support.[Footnote 18] U.S. and international partner
efforts to develop the army's capability have been challenged by
difficulties in staffing ANA leadership positions, a limited number of
literate ANA personnel to learn specialized skills, and a persistent
shortfall in coalition trainers. Furthermore, while the ANA has
received more equipment, equipping shortages remain.
New Assessment System Indicates ANA Continues to Rely on Coalition
Assistance:
As of September 2010, IJC reported that none of the 163 ANA units
rated[Footnote 19] was independent and capable of conducting the full
spectrum of its missions without coalition assistance.[Footnote 20]
Nearly two-thirds of units were assessed as effective with some form
of limited coalition support, and about one-third were assessed as
dependent on coalition forces for success.
ANA ratings are based on a new assessment system for evaluating ANA
capability--the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool--that IJC adopted in
April 2010.[Footnote 21] This tool replaces the prior assessment
system--capability milestone ratings--which IJC and others had
criticized as overly quantitative in nature. Specifically, according
to IJC officials, capability milestone ratings focused on how much
equipment and personnel a given unit had rather than the unit's
performance in the field. Similarly, in June 2010, the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that
capability milestone assessments could be misleading due to their
reliance on measurement of a unit's supplies and personnel rather than
on evaluations of the unit's ability to perform its mission
effectively.[Footnote 22] According to IJC, while the Commander's Unit
Assessment Tool takes personnel and equipment numbers into
consideration, it improves on the capability milestone rating system
by incorporating narrative assessments of ANA capability, including
problems and opportunities for improvement, as prepared by the
commanders of U.S. and coalition units training the ANA in the field.
These narrative assessments are accompanied by ratings of individual
ANA units against specific criteria--called rating definition levels--
that identify each unit's level of capability. Table 3 lists the five
rating definition levels. We did not independently assess ANA
capability; rather, we relied on IJC's Commander's Unit Assessment
Tool evaluations.
Table 3: Rating Definition Levels for Assessing ANA Capability:
Rating definition level: Independent;
Description: Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from coalition
forces.
Rating definition level: Effective with advisors;
Description: Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
independent operations within their own battle space and maintaining
regional security with limited guidance from training team only.
Partnered unit assistance is no longer needed.
Rating definition level: Effective with assistance;
Description: Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
independent operations and maintaining regional security with limited
assistance from partnered unit.
Rating definition level: Dependent on coalition forces for success;
Description: Unit capability is dependent on partnered unit presence/
assistance to execute and sustain operations and maintain regional
security.
Rating definition level: Ineffective;
Description: Unit is not capable of executing or sustaining operations
even with partnered unit presence/assistance.
Source: NATO.
[End of table]
While no ANA units are assessed as independent, IJC officials stated
that the ANA has made some progress in its ability to lead and conduct
operations. For instance, IJC credited the ANA with leading a
successful emergency response following the May 2010 crash of a
commercial aircraft in eastern Afghanistan. Specifically, IJC
documentation states that, after the crash, the ANA led an aerial
operation to recover and transport victims' remains from the crash
site to a nearby hospital and, according to IJC, did so with limited
coalition support. Similarly, State officials noted that in Kabul
province--the one Afghan province where the ANSF have assumed lead
responsibility for security--the ANA had performed well in providing
security for the August 2009 presidential elections.
The Afghan government and the international community have stated that
the ANSF should lead and conduct military operations in all Afghan
provinces by the end of 2014. According to IJC, efforts are under way
to determine milestone dates by which ANA units can realistically be
expected to achieve higher rating levels. However, IJC added that in
order for ANA units to achieve the rating level of "independent," the
army will first have to develop capabilities such as medical support,
artillery, and fixed and rotary wing aviation[Footnote 23] that are
currently provided by U.S. and coalition partners--an effort that IJC
stated will take considerable time to complete.
Development of Capable ANA Forces Faces Challenges in Several Areas:
U.S. and international efforts to develop capable ANA forces have been
challenged by shortages of leaders, literate personnel, and trainers.
Moreover, although ANA equipping has improved slightly, various
equipment shortages remain.
ANA Faces Leadership Gap and Limited Number of Literate Personnel:
Despite some progress, the ANA is continuing to face shortfalls in non-
commissioned officers (NCO) needed to provide leadership to ANA units
in the field. As of October 2010, about one-quarter of NCO positions
in ANA combat units were unfilled, as shown in table 4. This
represents an improvement since our last report,[Footnote 24] when we
found that, between November 2007 and February 2008, the proportion of
unfilled NCO positions ranged as high as 50 percent. In spite of this
improvement, NTM-A/CSTC-A stated that it considers the ongoing
shortfall of NCOs to be a major challenge, noting that development of
leaders is essential to improving ANA capability.
Table 4: NCO Staffing in ANA Combat Units, as of October 2010:
ANA unit: 111th Capital Division;
Number of NCO positions: 2,016;
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 756;
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 38%.
ANA unit: 201st Corps;
Number of NCO positions: 5,654;
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 1,376;
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 24%.
ANA unit: 203rd Corps;
Number of NCO positions: 5,449;
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 1,666;
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 31%.
ANA unit: 205th Corps;
Number of NCO positions: 6,219;
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 1,806;
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 29%.
ANA unit: 207th Corps;
Number of NCO positions: 2,488;
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 569;
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 23%.
ANA unit: 209th Corps;
Number of NCO positions: 3,134;
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 798;
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 25%.
ANA unit: 215th Corps;
Number of NCO positions: 4,345;
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 1,222;
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 28%.
ANA unit: Special Operations Forces Division;
Number of NCO positions: 2,570;
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 220;
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 9%.
ANA unit: Total;
Number of NCO positions: 31,875;
Number of NCO positions unfilled: 8,413;
Percentage of NCO positions unfilled: 26%.
Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.
[End of table]
Although NTM-A/CSTC-A has taken steps in conjunction with the Afghan
Ministry of Defense to mitigate the shortage of NCOs, officials
cautioned that these actions will not immediately create an NCO cadre
with the desired level of experience. In January 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A
and the Ministry of Defense began implementation of a new, accelerated
program to recruit high school graduates with no prior military
experience and, over the course of 12 weeks, train them to be midlevel
NCOs. In addition, the top 150 soldiers from each 8-week basic
training class are selected to immediately thereafter attend 4 weeks
of NCO training, from which they graduate as junior NCOs. According to
NTM-A/CSTC-A, these and other initiatives will allow the ANA to
eliminate its NCO shortage by March 2011. However, NTM-A/CSTC-A
officials stated that portions of the NCO corps--particularly those
that attend the accelerated 12-week program and graduate as midlevel
NCOs--will continue to lack experience.
NTM-A/CSTC-A cited two primary causes of the ANA's NCO shortage.
First, officials stated that due to the pressing need for ANA
personnel in the field to participate in operations, army commanders
may be reluctant to promote soldiers under their command to become
NCOs or to release them to attend NCO training. Second, according to a
senior NTM-A/CSTC-A official, the NCO shortfall is due to the rapid
pace at which the ANA is growing. Specifically, the official stated
that experienced leaders cannot be generated at the same rate as
soldiers, thereby creating a leadership gap.
In addition to its NCO shortfall, the ANA has a limited number of
literate personnel to learn specialized skills needed to reduce
reliance on coalition forces. NTM-A/CSTC-A documentation as of August
2010 indicates that about 14 percent of ANA recruits are literate at
the equivalent of a first-grade level. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A and
Afghan officials, this low literacy rate is a key challenge to
developing capabilities that the army will need to become less
dependent on U.S. and international partners, such as logistics,
engineering, communications, and intelligence. In addition, NTM-A/
CSTC-A stated that illiteracy can impede efforts to institute basic
accountability procedures, such as recording of equipment serial
numbers.
To address this challenge, NTM-A/CSTC-A has incorporated 2 weeks of
mandatory literacy training into the ANA's existing basic training
curriculum, with the goal of enabling trainees to write their names
and record serial numbers. In addition, a new 8-week literacy program
began in September 2010. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, this more lengthy
program, which is intended to train students to the equivalent of a
third-grade literacy level, will specifically target those ANA
personnel who will continue on to specialized training in technical
skills necessary for the army to eventually support itself. However,
as the commanding general of NTM-A/CSTC-A has stated, educating the
entire ANA to the level needed for such specialization will take time
and sustained effort.
Shortfall in Coalition Training Personnel Continues to Impede
Development of ANA Capabilities:
The ANA continues to experience shortages in coalition personnel
needed to provide training and assist in its development.[Footnote 25]
These include shortfalls in instructors needed at ANA training
facilities, as well as a shortage of training teams needed to develop
the skills of army units once they are fielded.
NTM-A/CSTC-A documentation specifies that 1,495 instructors are needed
to train the ANA as it grows to 171,600.[Footnote 26] However, as of
November 2010, about 18 percent (275 of 1,495) of instructor positions
were unfilled and lacked pledges to fill them, as shown in figure 10.
Furthermore, out of instructor positions that NTM-A/CSTC-A has
identified as critical priorities, about 36 percent (101 of 281) were
unfilled and lacked pledges. Officials with NTM-A/CSTC-A and the U.S.
Mission to NATO cited several causes for the shortage of instructors,
including low levels of political support for the Afghan mission in
some NATO countries and the potential difficulty of financially
supporting a troop presence abroad during the current global economic
downturn.
Figure 10: Shortage of Instructors for the ANA, as of November 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph, vertical bar graph, pie-chart]
Instructor positions, Total 1,495;
Filled or pledged to be filled: 1,220 (82%);
Unfilled and lacking pledges: 275 (18%).
Critical instructor positions, Total: 281;
Filled or pledged to be filled: 180 (64%);
Unfilled and lacking pledges: 101 (36%).
Photograph of instructor and ANA members.
Sources: GAO analysis of NATO data; GAO (photo).
[End of figure]
While the United States has deployed additional forces to temporarily
alleviate the shortage in instructors for the ANA, these efforts do
not fully address the ANA's instructor shortage. NTM-A/CSTC-A
documentation notes that, due to the presence of additional U.S.
personnel, the ANA's average instructor-to-trainee ratio in basic
training improved from about 1 instructor for every 79 trainees as of
November 2009 to approximately 1 instructor for every 24 trainees as
of November 2010--a key factor, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A, in improved
marksmanship qualification rates among ANA trainees. (figure 11 shows
one such U.S. soldier providing marksmanship training to ANA
recruits.) However, according to NTM-A/CSTC-A, while U.S. forces on
temporary deployment have improved the quality of ANA basic training,
these personnel were not intended to provide instruction in the
advanced skills that the ANA must acquire by the time it grows to
171,600.[Footnote 27] Similarly, a November 2010 NTM-A/CSTC-A document
noted a particularly serious shortage in the number of instructors
needed to teach the ANA specialized skills and stated that unless
critical instructor positions are filled between December 2010 and
July 2011, the ability of the ANA to develop skills it needs to start
assuming lead responsibility for Afghanistan's security may be delayed.
Figure 11: U.S. Soldier Providing Marksmanship Training to ANA Basic
Trainees:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
The ANA is also facing shortfalls in coalition training teams needed
to develop the skills of new army units once they are fielded.
According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, field-based training of the ANA is vital
given that army forces completing unit training have limited
capability. For example, NTM-A/CSTC-A data indicate that of the first
12 new ANA units fielded since the adoption of the new capability
assessment system, 11 were assessed as either dependent on coalition
forces for success or ineffective. Given the generally low level of
capability that ANA units have upon completing unit training, NTM-
A/CSTC-A officials stated that they expect newly formed units to
receive substantial training in the field from training teams and
partner units. However, shortages exist in the number of training
teams available to assist in ANA development. NTM-A/CSTC-A
documentation specifies that a total of 205 training teams are needed
to complete fielding of a 171,600-person ANA by October 2011. However,
as of September 2010, the total number of training teams fielded or
pledged by coalition nations was 164--41 fewer than the number needed.
According to IJC, given the serious challenges that the ANA faces, the
ability of army units to develop greater capability will be delayed if
they lack training teams to provide field-based training.
ANA Has Received More Equipment, but Shortages Remain:
Although equipping of the ANA has improved since we last reported,
various shortages remain. Table 5 indicates that, as of November 2010,
the ANA had less than half of the authorized equipment amount on hand
for 17 of 48 equipment items (35 percent). This is a slight
improvement since our 2008 report,[Footnote 28] when we found that
there were 21 of 55 equipment items (38 percent) for which army units
had less than half of the required amount on hand.[Footnote 29]
Additionally, as of November 2010, the ANA had an average of about 72
percent of the authorized amount on hand per equipment item, as
compared with an average of about 60 percent on hand per equipment
item at the time of our last report. This improvement notwithstanding,
shortages remain in weapons, vehicles, communications items, and
protective equipment.
Table 5: ANA Equipment Items with Less Than Half of the Authorized
Amount on Hand, as of November 2010:
Weapons:
Item: D-30 howitzer;
Number authorized: 210;
Number on hand: 99;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 47%.
Item: SPG-9 recoilless gun;
Number authorized: 750;
Number on hand: 254;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 34%.
Vehicles:
Item: Variable reach rough terrain forklift;
Number authorized: 238;
Number on hand: 117;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 49%.
Item: M916 tractor;
Number authorized: 124;
Number on hand: 56;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 45%.
Item: M870 trailer;
Number authorized: 131;
Number on hand: 52;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 40%.
Item: M1151 Humvee;
Number authorized: 2,108;
Number on hand: 829;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 39%.
Item: Motorcycle;
Number authorized: 300;
Number on hand: 110;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 37%.
Item: Fire truck;
Number authorized: 50;
Number on hand: 10;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 20%.
Item: Maintenance van;
Number authorized: 219;
Number on hand: 13;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 6%.
Item: Fuel trailer;
Number authorized: 97;
Number on hand: 5;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 5%.
Item: Warehouse forklift;
Number authorized: 180;
Number on hand: 4;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 2%.
Communications equipment:
Item: Programming kit;
Number authorized: 650;
Number on hand: 308;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 47%.
Item: Very high-frequency handheld radio;
Number authorized: 31,209;
Number on hand: 14,767;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 47%.
Item: High-frequency base station;
Number authorized: 1,497;
Number on hand: 685;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 46%.
Item: Very high-frequency vehicle-mounted radio;
Number authorized: 13,055;
Number on hand: 4,440;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 34%.
Item: Tactical telephone;
Number authorized: 14,749;
Number on hand: 2,089;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 14%.
Protective equipment:
Item: Kevlar helmet;
Number authorized: 144,638;
Number on hand: 40,803;
Percentage of authorized on hand: 28%.
Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.
[End of table]
NTM-A/CSTC-A and DOD officials cited a variety of causes for the ANA's
remaining equipment shortfalls, including competing priorities for
equipment and delays in production and shipping. As equipment orders
are filled, ANA units may not be the top priority to receive certain
equipment items. For instance, NTM-A/CSTC-A officials stated that U.S.
military personnel currently in combat have a higher priority to
receive some of the equipment that the ANA needs. In addition,
officials with the U.S. Central Command stated that given the limited
availability of air assets into Afghanistan, transporting the 30,000
additional U.S. forces--and their equipment--has been a higher
priority than supplying the ANA. NTM-A/CSTC-A officials also
attributed ANA equipment shortages to production limitations,
particularly for communications equipment. A senior Defense Security
Cooperation Agency official added that, in the case of certain
communications items, NTM-A/CSTC-A did not submit equipment requests
in a timely manner, thereby exacerbating production limitations. NTM-
A/CSTC-A also cited delayed shipment of equipment items as a factor in
certain shortages.
Although the ANA's equipping levels have slightly improved, IJC
documentation indicates that not all pieces of equipment that the ANA
has on hand are considered ready to be used in operations. According
to IJC, while factors such as enemy action and normal wear and tear
can lead to equipment being deemed unserviceable, an additional factor
is that the ANA continues to lack responsibility for its equipment. In
addition, a senior NTM-A/CSTC-A official stated that the ANA's nascent
logistics system gives it limited ability to maintain or repair the
equipment it receives. Similarly, IJC and SIGAR[Footnote 30] have both
identified the ANA's weak logistics system as a significant challenge
to development of capable army units. Consequently, although IJC and
NTM-A/CSTC-A are working to institute programs to address these
challenges, concerns exist about the extent to which the ANA will
properly maintain the equipment items it receives.
Future ANA Sustainment Costs Have Not Been Determined, and Studies
Indicate More Growth May Be Needed:
DOD and NATO have not completed an analysis of how much funding will
be needed to pay for ANA sustainment beyond 2011. Such analysis is
important given that, as of January 2010, the International Monetary
Fund projected that it will take at least until 2023 for the Afghan
government to raise sufficient revenues to cover its operating
expenses, including those related to the army--thereby highlighting
Afghanistan's continued dependence on external sources of funding. In
addition, DOD and NATO studies indicate that growth of the ANA beyond
the current end goal of 171,600 may be necessary, which will require
additional funding beyond what the United States and international
community have already provided.
DOD and NATO Have Not Completed Analysis of ANA Sustainment Costs:
DOD budget documentation indicates that, beyond the $7.5 billion
requested in fiscal year 2011, no additional funding is needed to
support the ANA's growth to 171,600. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, once
the ANA reaches its current end goal, which has an October 2011 target
date, the focus of funding efforts will turn to sustainment
activities, such as salary payments and equipment replacement.
However, as of August 2010, neither DOD nor NATO had completed an
analysis of how much future funding will be needed to sustain the ANA.
Prior GAO work has also found that DOD has not adequately analyzed
future funding needed to sustain the ANSF.[Footnote 31] Furthermore,
although DOD has produced a series of congressionally mandated reports
since 2008 on the U.S. plan for sustaining the ANSF, these documents
have not included estimates of the ANA's future sustainment costs.
While NTM-A/CSTC-A provided us with estimates indicating that
sustainment of 171,600 ANA forces would cost between $4.2 billion and
$4.5 billion annually from fiscal years 2012 through 2014, DOD
officials stated that they had not reviewed NTM-A/CSTC-A's analysis
and did not consider the resulting estimates to be official DOD
figures on future sustainment costs. However, these officials said
that they were unaware of any analysis DOD had conducted of how much
ANA sustainment will cost. Similarly, while NATO documentation states
that the amount of funding needed to sustain 171,600 ANA personnel is
under analysis, an official at the U.S. Mission to NATO confirmed that
no such analysis had been completed as of August 2010. To date, the
United States has been the major contributor of sustainment funds for
the ANA, with more than $5 billion allocated since 2005. Officials at
NTM-A/CSTC-A asserted that regardless of how much ANA sustainment
costs, the total each year will be considerably less than the cost of
maintaining a large U.S. and coalition troop presence in Afghanistan.
Afghan Revenues Have Increased but Remain Limited:
Analysis of how much future funding is needed to sustain the ANA is
particularly important given the Afghan government's limited ability
to financially support the ANA. In 2008,[Footnote 32] we reported that
until Afghan revenues increased substantially, the international
community would likely need to assist in paying for sustainment of
Afghanistan's security forces. Subsequently, in June 2010,[Footnote
33] we noted that Afghanistan cannot cover its projected government
expenditures without relying on expected levels of foreign assistance
from the international community, as shown in figure 12.
Figure 12: Afghan Revenues and Total Expenditures, 2008-2013:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 2008-09;
Afghan revenues (actual): $0.81 billion;
Total expenditures (actual): $8.34 billion.
Year: 2009-10;
Afghan revenues (actual): $1.23 billion;
Total expenditures (actual): $7.5 billion.
Year: 2010-11;
Afghan revenues (budgeted): $1.47 billion;
Total expenditures (budgeted): $10.24 billion.
Year: 2011-12;
Afghan revenues (projected): $1.67 billion;
Total expenditures (projected): $11.04 billion.
Year: 2012-13;
Afghan revenues (projected): $1.96 billion;
Total expenditures (projected): $11.64 billion.
Sources: GAO analysis of Afghan Ministry of Finance and Afghan
National Development Strategy data.
Note: Revenues and expenditures shown for 2008-09 and 2009-10 are
actual figures. Data shown for 2010-11 are budget figures, and data
shown for 2011-12 and 2012-13 are projections.
[End of figure]
Although Afghan government funding in support of the ANA has increased
in recent years, it continues to fall short of the full amount needed
to pay for the ANA's recurring sustainment costs. For example, the
Afghan government budgeted about $290 million in solar year 1389
[Footnote 34] for the ANA--nearly one-fifth of the nation's projected
total revenues of $1.5 billion for the year, and an increase of about
17 percent from the approximately $250 million budgeted for the ANA
the prior year. By comparison, however, annual U.S. funding for ANA
sustainment has exceeded $650 million every year since fiscal year
2007 and rose to $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2010--figures that
demonstrate the magnitude of sustainment costs that the Afghan
government is not yet able to pay. Furthermore, as noted earlier,
available estimates indicate that the cost of sustaining the 171,600-
person ANA could exceed $4 billion per year. According to senior
Afghan officials with whom we met, it will be at least a decade before
Afghanistan can financially sustain the ANA. Similarly, a January 2010
International Monetary Fund analysis projected that it will take at
least until 2023 for the Afghan government to raise sufficient
revenues to cover its operating expenses, including those related to
the army.[Footnote 35]
DOD and NATO Studies Indicate ANA May Need to Grow Beyond Current End
Goal:
While NTM-A/CSTC-A and DOD documents state that any ANA growth beyond
the current end goal is subject to approval of the international
community, several DOD and NATO studies suggest that, even after the
ANA reaches a size of 171,600, it may need to expand by nearly another
70,000 personnel in order to quell the insurgency. For example, an
August 2009 ISAF assessment stated that the ANA would need to grow to
an estimated end-strength of 240,000 personnel in order to conduct
sustained counterinsurgency operations in key areas of the country.
Similarly, an October 2009 NTM-A/CSTC-A document concluded that
defeating the insurgency would require 240,000 ANA forces. A senior
Afghan official we met with also stated that the Ministry of Defense
considers 240,000 to be the ANA's necessary end-strength.
Despite the variety of sources recommending a force size of 240,000,
officials with NTM-A/CSTC-A and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
cautioned that there is no consensus on what the ANA's ultimate end-
strength should be, and that any decision on further growth will have
to take into account Afghanistan's security situation. Regardless, the
extent of additional growth that is under consideration indicates that
significant future funding will be needed for continued ANA expansion
and sustainment. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, every 10,000 army
personnel that are added to the ANA will cost about $500 million to
train and equip and an additional $300 million annually to sustain.
Conclusions:
The United States has identified July 2011 as the start date for the
withdrawal of its combat troops from Afghanistan, following the
beginning of the transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan
government in early 2011--a transfer that the United States and its
NATO allies have agreed to complete by the end of 2014. Developing an
Afghan army that is capable of assuming the lead for security is a
vital element of this transition. Since we last reported, the United
States and its international partners have made important progress in
accelerating ANA growth. However, no ANA units have been assessed as
capable of operating independent of coalition assistance, and a
variety of challenges put the ANA's continued growth and development
at risk. Of particular concern is the ongoing shortfall in coalition
training personnel, which continues to hamper the ANA's ability to
acquire skills it needs to become less dependent on coalition forces
and begin assuming lead responsibility for Afghanistan's security.
Until this shortfall is addressed, the ability of the ANA to develop
necessary capabilities will remain at risk.
Due to the Afghan government's limited financial resources,
international backing of the ANA will be needed for years to come--at
least a decade, by some estimates--if the current course is to be
maintained. However, neither DOD nor NATO has completed an analysis of
the estimated future funding needed to sustain the ANA. Moreover,
there are several indications that the ANA will need to grow beyond
its current end goal of 171,600. Given the $20 billion the United
States has already invested in ANA development and the additional $7.5
billion planned, it is vital that decision makers have information on
future funding requirements. Without clarification of what additional
ANA growth is needed, if any, and the associated funding requirements,
as well as estimates of future ANA sustainment costs, decision makers
will continue to lack key information to guide future investments and
weigh potential alternatives.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that the ANA receives the training it needs to become
capable of operating independent of coalition forces, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense work with international partners to
eliminate the ongoing shortfall in training personnel for the ANA.
Additionally, to help ensure that DOD, Congress, and other decision
makers have sufficient information to weigh future funding options in
support of Afghanistan's security, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense, in conjunction with international partners, take the
following three actions:
* Clarify the extent to which the ANA may need to grow beyond its
current internationally approved end goal.
* Identify the funding required for such growth.
* Develop detailed estimates of future ANA sustainment costs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for their review
and comment. DOD provided written comments, which are reprinted in
appendix III. State did not provide written comments. Both DOD and
State provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as
appropriate.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to work with international
partners to eliminate the ongoing shortfall in training personnel for
the ANA, noting that the U.S. government and NATO have made
eliminating the shortfall a priority over the past year, but that more
trainers will be needed.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendations to clarify the extent
of additional ANA growth needed, identify the funding needed for such
growth, and develop detailed estimates of future ANA sustainment
costs. Regarding our recommendation to clarify the extent of further
ANA growth needed, DOD stated that the ANA's final end-strength is not
controlled by DOD but by a joint process also involving the Afghan
government and international community. We acknowledge the role of the
Afghan government and the international community in determining the
size of the ANA and note that our recommendation specified DOD should
work in conjunction with international partners to clarify the extent
of additional ANA growth needed. Regarding our recommendations to
identify the funding required for additional ANA growth and develop
detailed estimates of future ANA sustainment costs, DOD stated that it
is currently evaluating potential growth of the ANA in 2012 and has
prepared cost estimates to grow and sustain various ANA force levels.
DOD asserted that it is difficult to speculate about ANA growth beyond
2012--and the associated costs--given the many variables involved. We
continue to believe that DOD should prepare detailed estimates of the
costs to grow and sustain the ANA under various force size scenarios
in order to inform future funding decisions. While we acknowledge that
any estimates of future costs may have some limitations, we believe
that the experience the United States and NATO have gained through
years of efforts to develop the ANA provides sufficient basis for such
estimates.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, DOD, and State. The report also is available at no charge
on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Congressional Addressees:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
The Honorable John McCain:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa:
Chairman:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Kay Granger:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Nita Lowey:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jason Chaffetz:
Chairman:
The Honorable John Tierney:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Michael Honda:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To examine the progress made and challenges faced in expanding the
size of the Afghan National Army (ANA), we reviewed documentation from
the Department of Defense (DOD), the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF); monthly progress reports produced by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; monthly personnel reports from the ISAF Joint
Command (IJC); documents obtained from NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-
A/CSTC-A); and prior GAO reports.
To examine the progress made and challenges faced in developing ANA
capability, we reviewed planning documents; monthly progress reports
produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; assessment reports from IJC;
documents obtained from NATO, NTM-A/CSTC-A, IJC, and the Center for
Army Lessons Learned; and prior GAO and Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports.
To examine how much estimated future funding will be needed to sustain
and further grow the ANA, we reviewed NATO documentation; budget data
from the Afghan Ministry of Finance; a January 2010 International
Monetary Fund analysis of Afghanistan's economic performance;
sustainment estimates from NTM-A/CSTC-A; and prior GAO reports. We did
not independently estimate ANA sustainment costs or assess the
validity of NTM-A/CSTC-A's sustainment estimates, and we include NTM-
A/CSTC-A's estimates in this report only to broadly illustrate the
potential magnitude of future ANA sustainment costs. We also reviewed
the initial assessment of the situation in Afghanistan as prepared by
the Commander of ISAF and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as well as
documentation summarizing several DOD and ISAF analyses of the ANA's
force size.
In addition, we also met with the following officials to discuss our
objectives:
* In the Washington, D.C., area, we met with officials from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, and the Department of State's (State)
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and Office of NATO
Operations. In addition, we interviewed representatives of the U.S.
Army Forces Command by telephone.
* In Tampa, Florida, we met with officials at the U.S. Central Command.
* In Brussels, Belgium, we met with officials at the U.S. Mission to
NATO and representatives of the U.S. Military Delegation to NATO,
including the deputy military representative to NATO.
* In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with officials from NTM-A/CSTC-A,
including the deputy commanding general for ANA issues; IJC; Embassy
Kabul; and the Afghan Ministry of Defense, including the Deputy
Minister of Defense. We also observed ANA training at two training
facilities. In addition, we interviewed NTM-A/CSTC-A officials based
in Afghanistan by telephone.
To determine the reliability of the data we collected on funding, ANA
personnel figures, ANA capability, coalition training personnel, and
equipment, we compared and corroborated information from multiple
sources and interviewed cognizant officials regarding the processes
they use to collect and track the data.
* To determine the completeness and consistency of U.S. and
international funding data, we compiled and compared data from DOD,
State, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and ISAF. We also compared the funding data with
agency budget requests and reports to Congress to corroborate their
accuracy. In addition, we compared the funding data with our June
2008[Footnote 36] report on the Afghan National Security Forces.
Differences between funding totals shown in table 2 of this report and
the ANA funding information presented in our June 2008 report are due
to the following factors:
* Totals in this report are more current.
* Totals in this report do not include the value of excess defense
articles provided to the ANA because agency officials clarified that
these should not be considered allocated funds.
* For fiscal year 2008, the total included in our June 2008 report
included budget requests. Subsequently, in some cases, the amount of
funding allocated differed from the amount originally requested, such
as the 2008 allocation of money from the Afghanistan Security Forces
Fund.
Although we did not audit the funding data and are not expressing an
opinion on them, based on our examination of the documents received
and our discussions with cognizant agency officials, we concluded that
the funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this engagement.
* We have previously assessed the reliability of ANA personnel data as
part of our prior work and found the data to be sufficiently reliable.
In order to update our assessment, we spoke with officials from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and NTM-A/CSTC-A. In addition, we
asked NTM-A/CSTC-A how the data are collected, tracked, and reviewed
for accuracy. Based on our discussions with agency officials and the
documentation provided to us by NTM-A/CSTC-A, we determined that the
ANA personnel data we collected were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this engagement.
* We did not independently assess the capability of ANA units; rather,
we relied on IJC evaluations of the army's capability. To assess the
reliability of IJC's capability evaluations, we reviewed reporting by
SIGAR to identify the weaknesses it identified in the prior system IJC
used to evaluate ANA capability. Subsequently, we asked IJC to explain
how its new assessment system addresses these weaknesses, what steps
it has taken to train coalition personnel to use the new system in a
consistent manner, and how it reviews the resulting ANA capability
figures for accuracy. In addition, an official with SIGAR stated that
although the new assessment system has not yet been independently
audited, it does reflect IJC's responsiveness to recommendations SIGAR
made in its June 2010 report[Footnote 37] on the prior assessment
system. Based on the documentation IJC provided us with in response to
these questions and the input we received from SIGAR, we concluded
that the ANA capability figures we obtained were sufficiently reliable
to broadly characterize what proportion of ANA units are rated at each
level of capability.
* To determine the reliability of data on coalition training
personnel, we interviewed officials from NTM-A/CSTC-A to discuss
shortages in training personnel fielded. In addition, we asked NTM-
A/CSTC-A how the data on coalition training personnel are collected,
tracked, and checked for accuracy. In addition, we compared different
lists of training personnel and asked officials why the number of
training personnel fielded has varied over time. Based on our
discussions with agency officials and the documentation provided to us
by NTM-A/CSTC-A, we determined that the data we collected on coalition
training personnel were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
engagement.
* We have previously assessed the reliability of ANA equipment data as
part of our prior work and found the data to be sufficiently reliable.
In order to update our assessment, we interviewed NTM-A/CSTC-A
officials to discuss shortages of equipment and procedures for
tracking the equipment provided to the ANA. Additionally, we asked NTM-
A/CSTC-A how the equipment data are collected, tracked, and reviewed
for accuracy. We also compared different lists of equipment on hand
and asked IJC why the amount of equipment on hand differs, in some
cases, from the amount of equipment that is considered serviceable.
Based on our discussions with agency officials and the documentation
provided to us by NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC, we concluded that the ANA
equipment data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes
of this engagement.
* We have previously assessed the reliability of data on enemy-
initiated attacks in Afghanistan as part of our prior work and found
the data to be sufficiently reliable. In order to update our
assessment, we conducted additional reliability checks and reviewed
the Defense Intelligence Agency's methodology for collecting the data.
Based on these steps, we determined that the data we collected on
enemy-initiated attacks were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this engagement.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2009 to January
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Structure of the Afghan National Army:
The force structure for the ANA includes (1) Ministry of Defense and
general staff personnel, who are responsible for developing, fielding,
and ensuring the operational readiness of the ANA; (2) sustaining
institutions and intermediate commands, which support the Ministry of
Defense at an institutional level; (3) combat forces, the operational
arm of the ANA; and (4) Afghan Air Force personnel, who provide
support for Afghan army and police forces.
Combat forces form the basic operational arm of the ANA and are
divided into six corps and one division, located in different regions
of Afghanistan as depicted in figure 13. Each corps or division
includes between one and four brigades. A typical brigade consists of
a headquarters, a garrison support unit, four infantry battalions, one
combat support battalion, and one combat services support battalion.
ANA battalions are referred to as kandaks. Infantry kandaks, with
approximately 800 personnel each, are the most common units in the ANA.
Figure 13: Geographic Distribution of Afghan Army Combat Forces:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map]
The map depicts the geographic distribution of the following Afghan
Army Combat Forces:
111th Capital Division;
201st Corps;
203rd Corps;
205th Corps;
207th Corps;
209th Corps;
215th Corps.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
As the ANA grows from a 134,000 personnel force in 2010 to a 171,600
personnel force in 2011, both combat and support units will increase
in number. After fielding of combat forces is completed, force
generation efforts will shift to creating support units, as depicted
in figure 14. Some support units, such as route clearance companies,
logistics battalions, and military police and military intelligence
units, are planned to more than double in number.
Figure 14: Planned Changes in ANA Force Composition between 2010 and
2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Command:
ANA unit type: Headquarters;
Number of units, 2010: 34;
Number of units, 2011: 36;
Percentage increase in number of units: 6%.
Infantry:
ANA unit type: Maneuver units;
Number of units, 2010: 84;
Number of units, 2011: 96;
Percentage increase in number of units: 14%.
Support:
ANA unit type: Garrison support units;
Number of units, 2010: 23;
Number of units, 2011: 23;
Percentage increase in number of units: 0.
ANA unit type: General combat services support;
Number of units, 2010: 21;
Number of units, 2011: 22;
Percentage increase in number of units: 5%.
ANA unit type: Combat support;
Number of units, 2010: 13;
Number of units, 2011: 22;
Percentage increase in number of units: 69%.
ANA unit type: Route clearance companies;
Number of units, 2010: 6;
Number of units, 2011: 21;
Percentage increase in number of units: 250%.
ANA unit type: Logistics battalions;
Number of units, 2010: 2;
Number of units, 2011: 7;
Percentage increase in number of units: 250%.
ANA unit type: Military police and military intelligence;
Number of units, 2010: 5;
Number of units, 2011: 19;
Percentage increase in number of units: 280%.
Source: GAO analysis of NATO data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Asian & Pacific Security Affairs:
2700 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2700:
Mr. Charles M. Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Johnson:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-11-66, "Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing but
Additional Trainers Needed; Long-Term Costs Not Determined," dated
December 3, 2010 (GAO Code 320712). DoD comments refer to the two
recommendations in the draft report.
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
work with international partners to eliminate the ongoing shortfall in
training personnel for the Afghan National Army (ANA).
DOD Response: DoD concurs in the recommendation and notes that the U.S.
Government, including DoD, and NATO have made eliminating the
shortfall of trainers a priority over the past year. DoD has developed
a coordinated approach to support NATO's force generation efforts in
support of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan's trainer requirements.
This was a key objective at several high-level NATO meetings over the
past year, including the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010. At
the NATO Summit in Lisbon, the Heads of State and Government announced
that international partners had met the current priority requirements
for ANA trainers, but acknowledged that further trainer requirements
existed for the future.
Recommendation 2: Additionally, to help ensure that DoD, Congress, and
other decision makers have sufficient information to weigh future
funding options in support of Afghanistan's security, the GAO
recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with
international partners: a) clarify the extent to which the ANA may
need to grow beyond its current internationally approved end goal; b)
identify the funding required for such growth; and c) develop detailed
estimates of future ANA sustainment costs.
DOD Response: DoD partially concurs in this recommendation. The
Department is currently evaluating potential growth of the ANA in
2012. To help inform that evaluation and future growth decisions, the
Department has prepared cost estimates to grow and sustain various ANA
force levels. The necessary resources to support an eventual growth
decision will be included in the Department's upcoming budget
submission and are regularly shared with our international partners to
encourage them to contribute the necessary resources. Beyond 2012, it
is difficult to speculate as to the exact overall ANA end-strength
requirement and associated costs due to the large number of variables
(e.g., size and composition of international forces, future security
threat, and future capability of the ANA). Additionally, we note that
the final end-strength of the ANA is not controlled by the DoD, but
ultimately decided by the Government of Afghanistan and the
international community through the Joint Coordination Monitoring
Board process.
My point of contact is Ms. Cara Negrette, (703) 695-8268, or email:
cara.negrette@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
[Illegible] for:
David Sedney:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Central Asia:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant
Director), Aniruddha Dasgupta, Arthur Lord, Jonathan Mulcare,
Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers, David Dayton, Karen Deans, Martin De
Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, Bruce Kutnick, and Michael
Silver made key contributions to this report. Mason Calhoun, Joyce
Evans, Cheron Green, Cristina Ruggiero-Mendoza, Cynthia S. Taylor, and
Laverne Tharpes provided technical assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] We reported on the strategic framework for U.S. efforts in
Afghanistan in June 2010. See GAO, The Strategic Framework for U.S.
Efforts in Afghanistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-655R] (Washington, D.C.: June 15,
2010).
[2] GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be
Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain
Capable Afghan National Security Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661] (Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2008).
[3] GAO, Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-473SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009).
[4] ANA personnel are counted toward the force size after they have
successfully passed vetting procedures. In order to pass vetting
procedures, recruits must validate that they are Afghan citizens
between 18 and 35 years old; present two vouchers of recommendation
(often written by village elders); and pass a physical and mental
examination and a drug test. Recruits also undergo biometric testing
to verify that they are not assigned to any other armed forces unit
and have not been involved in previous attacks against U.S., NATO, or
Afghan forces.
[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661].
[6] In this report, training that occurs at training facilities is
referred to as institutional training. U.S. and coalition personnel
who provide institutional training are referred to as instructors.
[7] The ANA and the Afghan National Police collectively comprise the
ANSF.
[8] In this report, teams of U.S. and coalition military personnel
whose primary role is to train and advise the ANA in the field are
referred to as training teams. U.S. and coalition operational units
that conduct joint operations with the ANA are referred to as partner
units.
[9] U.S. Forces-Afghanistan is the operational arm of the DOD in
Afghanistan responsible for all missions not covered within the NATO
mandate. The commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan also serves as the
commander of NATO's ISAF force.
[10] In addition to funding allocated for ANA development, DOD has
donated about $30 million in excess defense articles to the ANA since
fiscal year 2003. Items donated include trucks and personnel carriers.
[11] DOD originally planned to equip the army with donated and
salvaged Soviet weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of this
equipment proved to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other
equipment. DOD subsequently began providing U.S. equipment to ANA
forces.
[12] This figure includes personnel who rejoined the ANA after
previously leaving the force.
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661].
[14] NTM-A/CSTC-A reports that it has a three-step approach to
training the ANA: train Afghan recruits, train Afghans to be trainers,
and train Afghans to assume control of their systems and institutions.
It is currently in the process of moving from the first step to the
second and third steps.
[15] Other factors contributing to absenteeism include scheduled
leave, unscheduled emergency leave, and training events conducted away
from the unit, among others.
[16] NTM-A/CSTC-A figures indicate that of the more than 26,000 ANA
personnel absent from duty in September 2010, about 60 percent were
AWOL. The remaining 40 percent were on leave, in training, or absent
due to medical reasons.
[17] A unit is considered independent if it is capable of conducting
the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from coalition
forces. See table 3 later in this report for additional details.
[18] A unit is considered effective with some form of limited
coalition support if is capable of conducting operations and
maintaining regional security with limited guidance or assistance from
coalition personnel. See table 3 later in this report for additional
details.
[19] An additional 38 ANA units did not receive ratings in September
2010.
[20] During our agency comment period, we received documentation
indicating that 2 ANA combat units were rated as independent as of
November 2010.
[21] IJC is also using this assessment tool to evaluate the capability
of the Afghan National Police.
[22] Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan
Security Force Assessments, Audit 10-11 (Arlington, VA: June 29, 2010).
[23] In conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Defense, NTM-A/CSTC-A
is in the process of developing the Afghan Air Force to provide
capabilities such as close air support and airlift, among others.
According to NTM-A/CSTC-A, current plans estimate that the Afghan Air
Force will be able to provide basic airlift by 2014 and, by 2016,
close air support and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661].
[25] We also reported in 2005 and 2008 on shortages of personnel to
train the ANA. See GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish
Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better
Defined, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-575]
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005) and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661].
[26] As noted earlier in this report, ANA growth to 171,600 personnel
is intended to start rebalancing the infantry-heavy force of 134,000
by adding specialist units such as logistics and combat support
battalions, route clearance companies, military intelligence, and
military police--development of which requires specialized training.
[27] NTM-A/CSTC-A informed us that these personnel may not have the
military occupational specialties needed to teach the ANA specialized
skills such as engineering, artillery, and intelligence.
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661].
[29] The total number of equipment items decreased from 55 to 48
primarily because the 55 included former Eastern bloc weapons, such as
AK-47 rifles, that are no longer authorized for the ANA.
[30] Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, Audit 10-11.
[31] We reported in 2005 and 2008 on inadequate analysis of future
funding needed to sustain the ANSF. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-575] and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661].
[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661].
[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-655R].
[34] Afghanistan's budget cycle is organized around solar years. Solar
year 1389 began on March 21, 2010, and will end on March 20, 2011.
[35] International Monetary Fund, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan:
Sixth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility, Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance
Criterion, Modification and Performance Criteria, and Rephasing and
Extension of the Arrangement, Country Report No. 10/22 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2010).
[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661].
[37] Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, Audit 10-11.
[End of section]
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