Ballistic Missile Defense
DOD Needs to Address Planning and Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe Gao ID: GAO-11-220 January 26, 2011In September 2009, the President announced a revised approach for ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is designed to defend against existing and near-term ballistic missile threats and build up defenses over four phases as threats mature and new BMD technologies become available. Although the approach will include capabilities such as radars and landand sea-based BMD assets, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not yet established EPAA life-cycle costs. EPAA is DOD's first implementation of its new, regional approach to BMD. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD's plans for implementing EPAA. GAO reviewed the extent to which: (1) DOD has developed guidance and addressed management of cost and schedule for EPAA, and (2) DOD planning for EPAA is informed by operational performance data. GAO reviewed key legislation, policy and guidance, and initial plans for implementation and asset allocation.
DOD has initiated multiple simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA but faces three key management challenges--the lack of clear guidance, life-cycle cost estimates, and a fully integrated schedule--which may result in inefficient planning and execution, limited oversight, and increased cost and performance risks. Since the September 2009 announcement of EPAA, stakeholders throughout DOD--including U.S. European Command, the Missile Defense Agency, and the military services--as well as the State Department, have taken steps to implement this policy, including considering options for the deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, and analyzing infrastructure needs. However, effective planning requires clear guidance regarding desired end states and key BMD stakeholders, including the combatant commands and military services, believe that such guidance is not yet in place for EPAA. Further, key principles for preparing cost estimates state that complete and credible estimates are important to support preparation of budget submissions over the short-term as well as to assess long-term affordability. DOD has not developed EPAA life-cycle cost estimates because it considers EPAA an adaptive approach that will change over time. However, best practices for cost estimating include methods for developing valid cost estimates even with such uncertainties. These estimates could serve as a basis for DOD to assess its goal of fielding affordable and cost-effective ballistic missile defenses as well as determine if corrective actions are needed. Finally, the EPAA phase schedule is not fully integrated with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities that will need to be synchronized. As a result, DOD is at risk of incurring schedule slips, decreased performance, and increased cost as it implements the phases of EPAA. DOD also faces planning challenges for EPAA because DOD has not yet established key operational performance metrics that would provide the combatant commands with needed visibility into the operational capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intend to employ. DOD is incorporating some combatant commands' requirements into BMD testing, in part, by having U.S. European Command participate in the test design process. However, the system's desired performance is not yet defined using operationally relevant quantifiable metrics, such as how long and how well it can defend. The combatant commands are attempting to define operational performance metrics to enable credible assessment of operational performance gaps. However, these metrics have yet to be finalized and implemented. Without a more complete understanding of BMD operational capabilities and limitations, the combatant commands face potential risk in EPAA operational planning. GAO recommends that DOD provide guidance on EPAA end states; develop EPAA life-cycle cost estimates; and integrate its phase schedule with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. GAO also recommends that DOD adopt operational performance metrics and include them in the BMD test program. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: John H. Pendleton Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (404) 679-1816GAO-11-220, Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Addressees:
January 2011:
Ballistic Missile Defense:
DOD Needs to Address Planning and Implementation Challenges for Future
Capabilities in Europe:
GAO-11-220:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-220, a report to congressional addressees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In September 2009, the President announced a revised approach for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe. The European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is designed to defend against existing and
near-term ballistic missile threats and build up defenses over four
phases as threats mature and new BMD technologies become available.
Although the approach will include capabilities such as radars and
land-and sea-based BMD assets, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not
yet established EPAA life-cycle costs. EPAA is DOD‘s first
implementation of its new, regional approach to BMD.
GAO was asked to evaluate DOD‘s plans for implementing EPAA. GAO
reviewed the extent to which: (1) DOD has developed guidance and
addressed management of cost and schedule for EPAA, and (2) DOD
planning for EPAA is informed by operational performance data. GAO
reviewed key legislation, policy and guidance, and initial plans for
implementation and asset allocation.
What GAO Found:
DOD has initiated multiple simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA but
faces three key management challenges”the lack of clear guidance, life-
cycle cost estimates, and a fully integrated schedule”which may result
in inefficient planning and execution, limited oversight, and
increased cost and performance risks. Since the September 2009
announcement of EPAA, stakeholders throughout DOD”including U.S.
European Command, the Missile Defense Agency, and the military
services”as well as the State Department, have taken steps to
implement this policy, including considering options for the
deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing, and
analyzing infrastructure needs. However, effective planning requires
clear guidance regarding desired end states and key BMD stakeholders,
including the combatant commands and military services, believe that
such guidance is not yet in place for EPAA. Further, key principles
for preparing cost estimates state that complete and credible
estimates are important to support preparation of budget submissions
over the short-term as well as to assess long-term affordability. DOD
has not developed EPAA life-cycle cost estimates because it considers
EPAA an adaptive approach that will change over time. However, best
practices for cost estimating include methods for developing valid
cost estimates even with such uncertainties. These estimates could
serve as a basis for DOD to assess its goal of fielding affordable and
cost-effective ballistic missile defenses as well as determine if
corrective actions are needed. Finally, the EPAA phase schedule is not
fully integrated with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel
activities that will need to be synchronized. As a result, DOD is at
risk of incurring schedule slips, decreased performance, and increased
cost as it implements the phases of EPAA.
DOD also faces planning challenges for EPAA because DOD has not yet
established key operational performance metrics that would provide the
combatant commands with needed visibility into the operational
capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intend to employ.
DOD is incorporating some combatant commands‘ requirements into BMD
testing, in part, by having U.S. European Command participate in the
test design process. However, the system‘s desired performance is not
yet defined using operationally relevant quantifiable metrics, such as
how long and how well it can defend. The combatant commands are
attempting to define operational performance metrics to enable
credible assessment of operational performance gaps. However, these
metrics have yet to be finalized and implemented. Without a more
complete understanding of BMD operational capabilities and
limitations, the combatant commands face potential risk in EPAA
operational planning.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD provide guidance on EPAA end states; develop
EPAA life-cycle cost estimates; and integrate its phase schedule with
acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. GAO also
recommends that DOD adopt operational performance metrics and include
them in the BMD test program. DOD generally concurred with GAO‘s
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-220] or key
components. For more information, contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-
3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
DOD has Initiated Efforts to Implement EPAA but Faces Key Management
Challenges Due to Incomplete Guidance and the Lack of Life-Cycle Cost
Estimates and an Integrated Schedule:
Although Combatant Commands' Involvement in BMD Testing Has Increased,
Limited Visibility of BMD Operational Capabilities and Limitations
Creates Challenges in Integrating BMD into Operational Plans:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Potential BMDS Elements for EPAA:
Appendix III: BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities,
Integration, and Location on Defended Areas:
Appendix IV: U.S. Progress in Achieving NATO Support for BMD in Europe:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: General Description of EPAA:
Table 2: Key DOD Stakeholders Involved in Planning and Implementing
EPAA:
Table 3: DOD Rationale for EPAA Flexibility, Limitations, and
Implications for Life-Cycle Cost Estimates:
Table 4: System Development Risks May Be Exacerbated by EPAA Schedule
Compression:
Figures:
Figure 1: Current Status of DOD's BMD Assets That May Be Part of EPAA:
Figure 2: BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities,
Integration, and Location on Defended Area:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 26, 2011:
The Honorable Michael R. Turner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jim Langevin:
House of Representatives:
On September 17, 2009, the President announced a revised approach for
ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe, with significant
implications for the Department of Defense's (DOD) BMD program. In
response to this guidance, DOD canceled the previously-planned
European missile defense program--a fixed interceptor site in Poland
and a fixed radar site in the Czech Republic--intended to defend
against future long-range Iranian ballistic missiles.[Footnote 1]
Instead, DOD now will deploy in phases increasingly capable elements
and interceptors in Europe to defend against the growing ballistic
missile threat.[Footnote 2] This "European Phased Adaptive Approach"
(EPAA) to BMD is designed to defend against existing and near-term
threats posed by short-and medium-range ballistic missiles, as well as
build up defenses against longer-range ballistic missile threats over
time as those threats mature.[Footnote 3] The Administration stated
that the new approach will augment current protection of the U.S.
homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats and will use
more flexible and survivable systems to provide for the defense of
U.S. deployed forces, their families, and our allies in Europe sooner
and more comprehensively than the previous approach.
The President's announcement, further elaborated upon several months
later in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report,[Footnote 4] lays
out the most comprehensive shift in U.S. BMD policy since 2002 when
the Secretary of Defense created the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and
the President directed fielding of an initial set of missile defense
capabilities by 2004. To assist Congress in its review of this policy
shift and its implications, we were asked to assess DOD's efforts to
implement the phased adaptive approach for BMD in Europe. In December
2010, we issued a correspondence on acquisition management and near-
term development risks related to EPAA.[Footnote 5] For this report,
we assessed: (1) the extent to which DOD has developed guidance and
addressed management of cost and schedule in the planning and
implementation of EPAA, and (2) the extent to which DOD planning for
EPAA is informed by operational performance data.
To address these objectives, we reviewed key legislation related to
ballistic missile defenses in Europe and DOD's overall approach for
planning, implementing, and preparing to support BMD. To review the
extent to which DOD has developed guidance and addressed management of
EPAA cost and schedule, we interviewed DOD and State Department
officials and reviewed documents and briefs that specifically
described DOD efforts to plan for and implement EPAA and assessed
their implications for managing EPAA cost and schedule. To review the
extent to which DOD planning for EPAA is informed by operational
performance data, we interviewed DOD officials and reviewed DOD
documents on policy and guidance needed for military planning. To
address these objectives, we also conducted site visits and
interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
U.S. European Command and its components, as well as officials from
U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Northern Command, the Ballistic Missile
Defense System Operational Test Agency, and various Navy, Army, and
MDA offices.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to January 2011
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional
details on our scope and methodology are discussed in more detail in
appendix I.
Background:
DOD revised its approach to BMD in Europe as part of the department's
comprehensive review of BMD strategy and policy, which culminated in
the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. In that report,
DOD set out to match U.S. BMD strategies, policies, and capabilities
to the requirements of current and future threats and to inform DOD
planning, programming, budgeting, and oversight. Judging that the
current and planned defenses against intercontinental ballistic
missiles will protect the United States against such threats from
North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future, DOD is refocusing its
resources to defend deployed forces and allies against regional
threats. Each region will have a phased adaptive approach to BMD
tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to that region, with
a principal focus on Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. DOD's
goal is to enable a flexible, scalable response to BMD threats around
the world by incorporating new technologies quickly and cost-
effectively and concentrating on the use of mobile and relocatable BMD
assets instead of fixed assets. In addition, DOD expressed a
commitment to testing new assets before fielding to allow assessment
under realistic operational conditions. Finally, DOD is emphasizing
working with regional allies to strengthen BMD and its deterrent value.
The European Phased Adaptive Approach to BMD is the first
implementation of this revised strategy and policy. EPAA currently
consists of four phases of increasing capability that spans to 2020.
Table 1 summarizes DOD's proposed time frames and capabilities for the
four phases of EPAA. For a further description of the various BMD
assets that may be part of EPAA, see appendix II.
Table 1: General Description of EPAA:
Phase 1;
Time frame: 2011;
Planned capability (capabilities are cumulative): Deploy existing
missile defenses to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles. Planned BMD assets to include deployment of:
* An existing sensor (the AN/TPY-2 radar),[A];
* BMD-capable Aegis ships (Aegis BMD),[B] and the currently fielded
Standard Missile-3 interceptor (SM-3 Block IA).
Phase 2;
Time frame: 2015;
Planned capability (capabilities are cumulative): Field enhanced
capability to defend against short-and medium-range ballistic
missiles. Planned BMD assets to include:
* One Aegis Ashore--a land-based version of the Aegis BMD weapon
system--in Romania and the more advanced SM-3 Block IB interceptor.
Phase 3;
Time frame: 2018;
Planned capability (capabilities are cumulative): Field enhanced
capability to defend against medium-and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles. Planned BMD assets to include:
* One additional Aegis Ashore in Poland and the upgraded SM-3 Block
IIA interceptor.
Phase 4;
Time frame: 2020;
Planned capability (capabilities are cumulative): Field enhanced
capability to defend against potentially longer-range threats,
including intercontinental ballistic missiles. Planned BMD assets
include:
* Further upgraded SM-3 Block IIB interceptors.
Source: GAO summary of DOD information.
Notes: DOD plans for all four phases to include upgrades to the
missile defense command and control system, known as the Command,
Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC).
[A] DOD intends to use the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance
system (AN/TPY-2) both for defense against regional threats and for
homeland defense.
[B] Aegis BMD is a ship-based system that (1) provides a forward-
deployed sensor capability for other BMD elements and (2) employs its
own sensor and interceptors. The element is based on a modification to
existing Navy Aegis ships and utilizes the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)
interceptor. For further details on the phases and elements, see
figure 1 and appendix II.
[End of table]
A number of stakeholders within DOD play a role in the developing,
building, fielding, and governing of BMD. MDA is responsible for the
acquisition of the elements that comprise the integrated Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS). MDA continues to be exempted from DOD's
traditional joint requirements determination, acquisition, and
associated oversight processes and retains its expanded responsibility
and authority to define BMD technical requirements, change goals and
plans, and allocate resources. Although not required to build elements
to meet specific operational requirements as it would be under
traditional DOD processes, MDA is required to work closely with the
combatant commands when developing BMD capabilities. DOD reported in
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review that it would maintain its
existing policy of developing, building, fielding, and governing BMD
as it had prior to the EPAA announcement. Table 2 identifies some of
the key DOD stakeholders that are involved in the implementation of
EPAA.
Table 2: Key DOD Stakeholders Involved in Planning and Implementing
EPAA:
Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
Primary role in EPAA: Develops and integrates U.S. missile defense
policy within the broader framework of national security strategy and
ensures consistency between missile defense policy and development and
acquisition plans and approaches.
Organization: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics;
Primary role in EPAA: Provides acquisition policy direction, program
guidance, and overall management oversight of MDA. Chairs the Missile
Defense Executive Board, provides program guidance, and makes
recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on missile defense
issues.
Organization: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Primary role in EPAA: Provides advice on desired BMD system
capabilities and characteristics. Through the Joint Integrated Air and
Missile Defense Organization, directly supports U.S. Strategic
Command--the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority and
operational proponent for global BMD.
Organization: Missile Defense Executive Board;
Primary role in EPAA: A senior-level body that reviews DOD's BMD
efforts and provides the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics or Deputy Secretary of Defense, as
necessary, with a recommended BMD strategic program plan and feasible
funding strategy for approval.
Organization: U.S. European Command;
Primary role in EPAA: The geographic combatant command whose area of
responsibility includes all of Europe (including Russia and Turkey),
Greenland, Israel, and surrounding waters. It is the primary
geographic combatant command responsible for planning and implementing
EPAA. It is assisted in this effort by its service components--
principally U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Army Europe, and U.S. Air
Forces in Europe[A,B].
Organization: U.S. Central Command;
Primary role in EPAA: The geographic combatant command whose area of
responsibility includes parts of the Middle East. Coordinates with
U.S. European Command to defend against ballistic missile threats
originating from their area of responsibility.
Organization: U.S. Strategic Command;
Primary role in EPAA: Functional combatant command with
responsibilities to integrate global missions and capabilities that
cross the boundaries of the geographic combatant commands, such as
planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense,
including missile defense advocacy for the combatant commands.[C].
Organization: Missile Defense Agency;
Primary role in EPAA: Responsible for the research, development,
testing, and acquisition of the integrated BMDS, comprised of
individual BMD elements.
Organization: Military Services;
Primary role in EPAA: Responsible for providing forces and resources
to support fielding of the BMD assets, and assisting in planning for
and managing the operations and maintenance and infrastructure needs
of BMD assets.
Organization: Army Corps of Engineers;
Primary role in EPAA: Perform site studies for EPAA installations,
help identify infrastructure requirements, and oversee construction to
meet MDA and service requirements.
Source: GAO summary of DOD information.
[A] The six geographic combatant commands are U.S. Africa Command,
U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command,
U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command.
[B] A service component command is a command consisting of the service
component commander and all those service forces, such as individuals,
units, detachments, organizations, and installations under the
command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a
combatant command.
[C] The four functional combatant commands are U.S. Joint Forces
Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and
U.S. Transportation Command.
[End of table]
In previous reports on BMD, we have identified challenges associated
with MDA's BMD efforts and DOD's broader approach to BMD planning,
implementation, and oversight. For instance, we concluded in a
February 2010 report that although MDA had shown progress in
demonstrating increased performance, its cost estimates could not be
thoroughly assessed and some planned capability could not be verified
due to target shortfalls and modeling limitations.[Footnote 6] In
addition, in September 2009, we reported that DOD had not identified
its requirements for BMD elements and interceptors and had not fully
established units to operate the elements before making them available
for use.[Footnote 7] For additional GAO reports on BMD, see the
Related GAO Products section.
DOD has Initiated Efforts to Implement EPAA but Faces Key Management
Challenges Due to Incomplete Guidance and the Lack of Life-Cycle Cost
Estimates and an Integrated Schedule:
DOD has initiated multiple simultaneous efforts to implement EPAA,
including considering options for the deployment of assets, requesting
forces, preparing for testing, analyzing infrastructure needs, and
gaining North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for BMD in
Europe. DOD manages its BMD efforts by individual program elements and
considers EPAA a flexible approach, not a program. However, the
department faces three key management challenges--lack of clear
guidance, life-cycle cost estimates,[Footnote 8] and a fully
integrated schedule--that may result in inefficient planning and
execution, increased cost and performance risks, and limited oversight
of EPAA. First, DOD has not yet established clear guidance to help
direct and align its EPAA efforts. Without such guidance, DOD faces
uncertainty in planning and implementing this revised approach.
Second, DOD has not yet developed EPAA life-cycle cost estimates and
has indicated that it is unlikely to do so because EPAA is considered
a policy designed to maximize flexibility. As a result, DOD does not
have a basis from which to assess EPAA's affordability and cost-
effectiveness and is missing a tool with which to monitor
implementation progress. Finally, the EPAA phase schedule is not fully
integrated with acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities.
As a result, DOD does not have the information it needs to assess
whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify
potential problems, or analyze how changes will impact the execution
of this effort, and therefore is exposed to increased schedule,
performance, and cost risks. Without addressing these three management
challenges, DOD will likely face difficulties in planning for and
implementing EPAA, potentially resulting in significant cost increases.
DOD and the State Department Have Taken Multiple Steps to Implement
EPAA:
Since the September 2009 announcement of EPAA, stakeholders throughout
DOD--including U.S. European Command (EUCOM), MDA, and the military
services--as well as the State Department, have taken steps to
implement this policy, including considering options for the
deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing,
analyzing infrastructure needs, and gaining NATO support for BMD in
Europe. For example, EUCOM initiated EPAA planning efforts and
submitted an official request for some of the BMD assets it determined
are needed for Phase 1, including the personnel to operate them.
EUCOM, with the assistance of its service components, has been
developing an operation plan for EPAA.[Footnote 9] DOD officials told
us that this plan, covering Phase 1, is expected to be approved in the
spring of 2011. EUCOM officials told us that their efforts have been
informed by the command's close collaboration with MDA, which has
provided it with information on the capabilities of BMD assets the
command intends to employ in its operational plan. In order to
facilitate the information exchange, MDA has located representatives
at EUCOM headquarters. EUCOM has also been working with MDA to develop
test designs for the BMD system that may be fielded in EUCOM's area of
responsibility. In particular, EUCOM designed notional EPAA
architectures[Footnote 10] that will be used in testing. The results
of these tests are intended to provide the command with greater
visibility into the performance of the BMD system it will be
responsible for employing.
MDA has also taken a number of steps to implement EPAA. As we reported
in December 2010,[Footnote 11] MDA has made progress in acquisition
planning for EPAA, including integrating and aligning its test
planning efforts with EPAA phases through its semiannual Ballistic
Missile Defense System Integrated Master Test Plan.[Footnote 12] MDA
has collaborated with the combatant commands and members of the
testing community to develop an Integrated Master Test Plan to support
planning and execution of all BMD testing for the phased adaptive
approach. Additionally, according to MDA, its Global Deployment
Program Office has been actively engaged in an effort to align the
acquisition activities of EPAA with the EPAA efforts of other
stakeholders, such as the State Department, host country embassy
personnel, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
EUCOM, the Joint Staff, and the military services.
Officials from the military services and EUCOM's service components
told us they are also pursuing activities to support EPAA planning, as
the following examples illustrate.
* The Navy has established the Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise,
which is an effort aimed at coordinating all Navy BMD activities to
support EPAA as well as other BMD missions.[Footnote 13]
* The Army Corps of Engineers is working with MDA and the Navy on the
preliminary stages of a technical analysis related to Aegis Ashore
site options.
* U.S. Naval Forces Europe is analyzing its Aegis BMD ship presence
options and requirements as well as planning for Aegis Ashore.
* U.S. Army Europe is conducting resource planning for potential
basing concepts and manning requirements of Army BMD assets that may
be allocated for EPAA, such as the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) element and the AN/TPY-2 radar.
* U.S. Air Forces in Europe is drafting a concept of operations
[Footnote 14] that, when approved by the EUCOM Commander, will
establish the command and control relationships for conducting BMD
operations for EPAA. Similar efforts are in progress within NATO.
The State Department, in coordination with DOD, has also made
significant progress in achieving NATO support for BMD in Europe. NATO
recently adopted the territorial missile defense mission--to protect
its populations and territories in Europe against ballistic missile
attack--but now must undertake the challenging task of reaching
agreement on how to implement this new mission. Poland and Romania
have agreed to host U.S. BMD assets although the U.S. has not yet
found a host nation for a critical sensor planned for deployment in
2011. Finally, NATO members may provide BMD assets to assist in the
defense of Europe. However, the U.S. currently is the only NATO member
with BMD assets designed to provide territorial defense. See appendix
IV for more details of NATO support for BMD in Europe.
DOD's Guidance for EPAA Is Not Yet Complete:
DOD has initiated many efforts to implement EPAA, but the department
has not yet established clear guidance to help direct and align its
efforts. According to DOD, effective planning requires clear guidance
on desired end states.[Footnote 15] In the context of BMD, this could
include information such as the purpose and duration of the mission
and areas to be defended, as well as priorities within a region and
between regions. While senior DOD officials stated that the
President's EPAA announcement and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
provide sufficient guidance to begin planning and implementation, a
recent DOD study recommended planning guidance be further refined.
Further, key BMD stakeholders, including those from the Joint Staff,
combatant commands, and military services believe that additional
guidance is needed for EPAA.
Senior DOD officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Joint Staff, and MDA told
us it was their view that the President's announcement and the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review[Footnote 16] provide sufficient
guidance to enable the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and services
to begin planning and implementing EPAA. The officials also noted that
some additional guidance would be forthcoming through the regular
updating of DOD's high-level policy and planning documents.[Footnote
17] According to these officials, EPAA is a policy framework for the
evolutionary development and fielding of missile defenses in Europe to
defend against ballistic missile threats. They further indicated that
the EPAA framework does not establish or dictate a specific
architecture or force structure requirement. Additionally, the
officials stated that the Joint Staff and the combatant commands are
responsible for translating the overarching policy into specific
requirements to allow military forces to execute the policy. Moreover,
the senior officials also stated that the specific requirements for
EPAA, including architecture, would be developed by the combatant
commands and Joint Staff in consultation with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense using standard DOD planning processes and that
any policy gaps that may emerge would be addressed as plans are
iterated through the normal planning process.
DOD examined the need for policy guidance in the Global Force
Management Development Project, a study to clarify and more fully
assess the scope and implications of the decision to adopt EPAA and
the phased adaptive approach in general. This effort was led by the
Joint Staff and included participation from U.S. Strategic Command,
EUCOM, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Northern
Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, and technical assistance from MDA. The study
was tasked with developing the plan and facts to be used to allocate
limited BMD assets among the combatant commands as regional situations
and national strategies require. The classified study was unable to
fully address this task but concluded, among other things, that DOD
needed to refine its BMD planning guidance, identifying 14 BMD-related
general planning guidance questions that DOD needed to answer.
According to Joint Staff officials, the study's findings were briefed
to and endorsed by several senior DOD boards, including the Missile
Defense Executive Board in May 2010. Officials from the Office of the
Under Secretary for Defense for Policy told us that it takes time to
fully develop all of the strategic planning and investment guidance
necessary to implement a significant policy shift like EPAA. Further,
the officials added that some of the guidance questions identified in
the study could not be addressed immediately because they had to be
sequenced with other events. They gave the example that some of the
guidance would rely on decisions made by NATO, which has only recently
adopted the territorial missile defense mission.[Footnote 18]
Consistent with the study's findings, officials from the Joint Staff,
combatant commands, and services told us that DOD needed to provide
more clarity on desired EPAA end states to ensure that they were
appropriately executing their responsibilities. For example, Army
officials told us that the Army's primary concern with EPAA was the
lack of clear guidance on end states and said that the Army could not
be certain that it was appropriately preparing to support EPAA assets
without knowing what assets would be deployed when, where, and for how
long. In addition, the Navy created a new organization to help
coordinate the service's BMD efforts and also developed its own set of
EPAA facts and assumptions so that it could support EPAA requirements.
However, Navy officials told us that although they coordinate with
other BMD stakeholders regularly, they did not know if everyone was
operating under the same end-state assumptions, including assumptions
about force allocation and deployment deadlines. Combatant command
officials also told us that existing guidance did not provide clarity
on desired end states, including prioritization of regions to be
defended. By contrast, other BMD policy decisions, such as the 2002
decision to deploy BMD and the later decision to deploy an AN/TPY-2
radar to Israel, were based on clear and formal policy guidance,
according to Joint Staff officials. The officials told us that the
lack of clear guidance for EPAA was leading different organizations to
make different assumptions about desired end states and that this was
resulting in inefficient planning and execution.
A reason that BMD stakeholders throughout DOD may be seeking further
planning guidance is that there is a lack of clarity on both the
relative priority of EPAA to other BMD missions around the world and
the extent to which BMD assets will be deployed forward. Although the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review presents the phased adaptive approach
as pertaining to all geographic combatant commands, EPAA was a
presidential policy decision, implying a certain priority for European
BMD needs. However, this priority has not yet been formally codified
through a presidential directive or memorandum. Additionally,
statements by senior DOD officials have detailed potential EPAA plans
that, if carried out, would consume a significant portion of DOD's BMD
assets, depending on the amount of physical presence required. For
example, depending on interpretation of existing guidance for EPAA,
Aegis BMD ships could be tasked with maintaining a continuous physical
forward presence; only needing to be available to surge into the
theater in response to heightened threat situations; or be available
for a mixture of forward presence and surge capability. The Ballistic
Missile Defense Review also discusses the need to have a strategic
approach to regional BMD and tailor the requirements to the unique and
varied needs of each region, including Europe. DOD is undertaking
several studies related to regional BMD led by the Joint Staff and
U.S. Strategic Command that should help to better define force
allocation and quantity needs for both surge and forward presence BMD
forces. Additionally, senior officials from the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and MDA said that
there is a draft presidential directive that will help clarify EPAA
policy. However, DOD has not yet issued formal guidance clarifying the
EPAA mission, including its relative priority among the regions
identified for the phased adaptive approach. DOD officials told us
that combatant commands responded to the EPAA announcement and the
uncertainty about priorities with a surge of requests for BMD forces
to ensure that their requirements would be met. Without establishing
guidance to more fully align understanding throughout the department
on what the desired end states are for EPAA, including its relative
priority to other regional BMD architecture requirements, the
department faces uncertainty in planning and implementing this revised
approach.
DOD Has Not Established EPAA Life-Cycle Cost Estimates:
DOD has not established life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA and
therefore is missing an important management tool for preparing
budgets, monitoring progress and assessing long-term affordability of
its revised approach to BMD in Europe. DOD has stated two main reasons
for not establishing life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA. First, DOD
officials told us that DOD does not intend to prepare separate life-
cycle cost estimates for EPAA because DOD views it as an approach, not
a program, and so funding is provided through the individual BMD
elements that make up EPAA. However, in introducing the revised
approach to BMD, the department emphasized that it would be fiscally
sustainable and affordable. Additionally, in referring to EPAA in
prepared testimony before Congress, the MDA Director stated that DOD
was "committed to fully funding this program."[Footnote 19] Although
DOD reported that the acquisition cost estimates and annual BMD budget
request for individual elements include EPAA costs, we found that such
information does not include full life-cycle costs.[Footnote 20]
Further, this budgeting method is fragmented and so does not provide
decision makers with a transparent and holistic view of EPAA costs.
Second, DOD has emphasized that the inherent flexibility of EPAA makes
developing life-cycle cost estimates for the approach difficult.
However, without life-cycle cost estimates DOD may not be able to
determine whether its revised approach to BMD in Europe is fiscally
sustainable and affordable.
We have found that key principles for managing major investments such
as EPAA include that an organization should understand the financial
commitment involved and ensure appropriate transparency and
accountability.[Footnote 21] Further, according to the GAO cost
estimating guide,[Footnote 22] a credible cost estimate is required in
order to assess a program's affordability and cost-effectiveness and
to serve as a basis for a budget.[Footnote 23] The guide identifies 12
steps necessary for developing credible cost estimates.[Footnote 24]
Following these steps ensures that realistic cost estimates are
developed and presented to management, enabling them to make informed
decisions about whether the program is affordable within the portfolio
plan. Providing decision makers with a program's updated cost estimate
helps them monitor the implementation of the program and ensure that
adequate funding is available to execute the program according to
plan. Finally, credible cost estimates serve as a basis for a
program's budget and validate that a program's strategy has an
adequate budget for its planned resources.
Part of the challenge in determining EPAA life-cycle costs results
from uncertainty about what elements and interceptors will be included
in EPAA. According to the GAO cost estimating guide, the final
accuracy of cost estimates depends on how well a program is defined.
In order to develop credible estimates, an organization needs detailed
technical, program, and schedule descriptions from which all life-
cycle cost estimates can be derived. Some of these details would
include system architecture, deployment details, operational concepts,
personnel requirements, and logistics support. DOD's phased schedule
for EPAA is comprised of multiple elements and interceptors to provide
ever-improving integrated BMD capability, but many aspects of the
approach have not yet been determined. For example, DOD has thus far
committed to using two Aegis Ashore facilities and at least one AN/TPY-
2 radar. Additionally, each EPAA phase could have as many as three
Aegis BMD ship patrol areas, but DOD has not yet committed to a
specific number of ships or SM-3 interceptors for each phase. As we
reported in December 2010,[Footnote 25] DOD also has not yet committed
to the specific type or number of the other elements and interceptors
that will be part of the EPAA phases. Figure 1 summarizes the current
status of DOD's BMD assets that may be part of EPAA.
Figure 1: Current Status of DOD's BMD Assets That May Be Part of EPAA:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Element: 1 AN/TPY-2 sensor (location not established);
Phase 1 (~2011): EPAA assets and their quantities known;
Phase 2 (~2015): EPAA assets and their quantities known;
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets and their quantities known;
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets and their quantities known.
Element: Aegis BMD ships;
Phase 1 (~2011): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined;
Phase 2 (~2015): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined;
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined;
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined.
Element: Aegis BMD ships; SM-3 interceptors;
Phase 1 (~2011): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined;
Phase 2 (~2015): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined;
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined;
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined.
Element: PAC-3;
Phase 1 (~2011): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 2 (~2015): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 4 (~2020): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 3 (~2018): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined.
Element: THAAD batteries;
Phase 1 (~2011): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 2 (~2015): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 4 (~2020): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 3 (~2018): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined.
Element: THAAD batteries; THAAD interceptors;
Phase 1 (~2011): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 2 (~2015): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 4 (~2020): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 3 (~2018): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined.
Element: 1 Aegis Ashore (Romania);
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty];
Phase 2 (~2015): EPAA assets and their quantities known;
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets and their quantities known;
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets and their quantities known.
Element:
Element: SM-3 interceptors;
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty];
Phase 2 (~2015): EPAA assets and their quantities known;
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets and their quantities known;
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets and their quantities known.
Element: 1 Aegis Ashore (Poland);
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty];
Phase 2 (~2015): [Empty];
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets and their quantities known;
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets and their quantities known.
Element: 1 Aegis Ashore (Poland); SM-3 interceptors;
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty];
Phase 2 (~2015): [Empty];
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets and their quantities known;
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets and their quantities known.
Element: Additional AN/TPY-2 sensor;
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty];
Phase 2 (~2015): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 4 (~2020): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 3 (~2018): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined.
Element: PTSS;
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty];
Phase 2 (~2015): [Empty];
Phase 4 (~2020): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined;
Phase 3 (~2018): EPAA assets known, quantities to be determined.
Element: ABIR sensor;
Phase 1 (~2011): [Empty];
Phase 2 (~2015): [Empty];
Phase 4 (~2020): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined;
Phase 3 (~2018): Assets that may be part of EPAA, quantities to be
determined.
ABIR (Airborne Infrared sensor);
AN/TPY-2 (Army Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance - Model 2);
PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3);
PTSS (Precision Tracking Space System);
SM-3 (Standard Missile-3);
THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense).
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data; Missile Defense Agency (images).
For a further description of the various BMD assets that may be part
of EPAA, see appendix II.
[End of figure]
Despite the current lack of detail on the implementation of EPAA
policy, best practices for cost estimating include methods by which to
develop valid cost estimates when a program's details are limited and
thus still provide markers for measuring progress and assessing
affordability. The cost guide makes special mention of spiral
development efforts that, like EPAA, do not have clearly defined final
requirements.[Footnote 26] In such cases, valid cost estimates can be
developed as long as they clearly state the requirements that have
been included and account for those that have been excluded. The
Congressional Budget Office and the Institute for Defense Analysis
have completed such analyses for the previous approach to BMD in
Europe and the Institute for Defense Analysis also completed a cost
estimate for EPAA.[Footnote 27] As the types and quantities of
elements and interceptors needed for EPAA become better defined over
time, cost estimates should be updated to ensure that managers
understand the impact of any changes.
DOD has also emphasized that the inherent flexibility of EPAA makes
developing life-cycle cost estimates for the approach difficult.
According to senior DOD officials, the department could develop a life-
cycle cost estimate for the phased adaptive approach but they were
unsure of the relevancy of characterizing unique costs for EPAA. The
officials said that DOD places significant emphasis on flexibility in
its new approach to regional BMD, calling EPAA flexible by nature. The
officials also stated that DOD's focus on using mobile and relocatable
BMD assets for EPAA and in other regions means that the mix of
elements and interceptors in each region could be adjusted to adapt to
changes in threat. The result of this flexibility, according to the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review, is that the actual life-cycle cost
of the missile defense system is difficult to determine because there
is no final configuration for the system. However, an organization can
develop estimates for a range of possible scenarios. A cost estimating
best practice in developing technical baselines includes defining
deployment details for various scenarios, such as peacetime,
contingency, and war. By presenting a range of scenarios, decision
makers can better understand the short-term and long-term cost
implications of different options and better evaluate their choices.
While we recognize that life-cycle cost estimates will have increased
levels of uncertainty for the later phases compared to the near-term
phases, the level of flexibility inherent in EPAA needed to respond to
changes in threat or technology over the four phases of this approach
is bounded and cost estimating practices are adaptive enough to allow
for the development of valid cost estimates. Table 3 describes our
assessment of DOD's rationales for EPAA flexibility, factors limiting
flexibility or the need for it, and their impact on DOD's ability to
develop life-cycle cost estimates for EPAA.
Table 3: DOD Rationale for EPAA Flexibility, Limitations, and
Implications for Life-Cycle Cost Estimates:
DOD rationale for flexibility in EPAA: Preserves ability to respond to
changes in quantity of threat missiles;
Limitations: Large and growing numbers of threat missiles and
relatively low numbers of BMD assets for the foreseeable future mean
that high demand for BMD assets for EPAA is essentially a constant.
Year-to-year change in numbers of threat missiles is relatively
predictable, according to DOD officials;
Implications for EPAA life-cycle cost estimation: The marginal change
in the already high EPAA demand for BMD assets caused by an unexpected
increase in threat missiles should be limited and therefore should not
impede the development of cost estimates. The Joint Staff is leading a
study, expected to be completed in the spring of 2011, that should
help identify the specific BMD assets needed to address this high
demand.
DOD rationale for flexibility in EPAA: Preserves ability to respond to
crises by surging mobile and relocatable BMD assets wherever needed;
Limitations: A surge strategy assumes a baseline BMD capability as
well as defined capabilities that could be surged to a given region as
threats change;
Implications for EPAA life-cycle cost estimation: A developed surge
strategy should include details on assumed baselines and surged assets
and so would provide details that could improve the quality of a cost
estimate. U.S. Strategic Command is leading a force allocation study,
expected to be complete in the spring of 2011, that should help to
better define DOD's surge strategy.
DOD rationale for flexibility in EPAA: Preserves ability to integrate
new BMD technology that has been proven effective through
operationally realistic testing[A];
Limitations: Taking new BMD technologies from concept to fielding,
including testing them, can take many years. We have previously found
that BMD testing schedules have tended to slip[B];
Implications for EPAA life-cycle cost estimation: Given DOD's
commitment to deploying only proven BMD capabilities means that
timelines for deploying new technologies as part of EPAA should be
relatively predictable, allowing for the updating of cost estimates.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] The Ballistic Missile Defense Review lays out how DOD currently
uses its testing approach to evaluate operational effectiveness. In
sum, the Integrated Master Testing Plan identifies a number of ground
and flight tests that an asset must participate in to obtain data
needed to validate models and simulations that, in turn, are intended
to provide further visibility into the asset's operational
performance. DOD has also added additional operational test events
controlled by the testing community and combatant commands that
include additional ground and flight tests. According to DOD, it is
the information gathered from this combination of efforts that can be
used to evaluate an asset's operational effectiveness.
[B] See for example, GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense
Transition Provides Opportunity to Strengthen Acquisition Approach,
GAO-09-338 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2010).
[End of table]
There may be occasions when DOD, in response to more rapid than
projected quantitative and qualitative developments in the existing
threat or the emergence of new missile threats from an unexpected
location, will need to adjust to those threats. Good life-cycle cost
estimates are equipped to deal with such unforeseen circumstances
because they clearly list the facts and assumptions on which they are
based. In such circumstances, a life-cycle cost estimate would provide
additional information to decision makers in DOD and Congress as they
evaluate their options. Until DOD develops EPAA life-cycle cost
estimates--which could potentially be part of a larger phased adaptive
approach life-cycle cost estimate--the department will not have an
accurate basis from which to determine the financial sustainability
and affordability of the revised approach to BMD in Europe and is
missing a tool with which to monitor its implementation.
DOD's EPAA Phase Schedule Does Not Fully Integrate Key Acquisition,
Infrastructure, and Personnel Activities:
DOD established the EPAA phase schedule without fully integrating it
with key acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities and, as
a result, the department does not have an important management tool
with which to assess whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and
achievable, identify potential problems, or analyze how changes will
impact the execution of this effort. As a result, the program may be
exposed to schedule, performance, and cost risks. Implementing EPAA
will require the synchronization of numerous efforts, including
acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. For example,
DOD must develop and produce the BMD elements and interceptors for
EPAA and must be able to integrate them into a system. The performance
of a fielded BMD architecture, including the size of the area
defended, is dependent on several factors, including the types and
numbers of elements and interceptors fielded, the extent to which
fielded elements are linked together operationally, and the geographic
location of the elements (see figure 2). Further, DOD must also have
the appropriate infrastructure in place--such as needed power, water,
roads, facilities, and security--in time to support not only the EPAA
elements and interceptors it intends to field as part of EPAA but also
the personnel necessary to operate and maintain them. DOD must also
have these trained personnel available in time to carry out those
duties. The department is working to implement EPAA, but EPAA
timelines may not match the time needed to integrate and execute the
necessary acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities.
Figure 2: BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities,
Integration, and Location on Defended Area:
[Refer to PDF for image: interactive illustration]
Interactivity instructions:
Click on each option to see the results. For print version, see
appendix III.
Depicted on the illustration:
BMD-capable ship;
BMD sensor;
Integrated;
Defended area.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: The defended areas shown are for illustrative purposes only.
This graphic is interactive in the electronic version of this report.
For the print version, the graphic is broken out by the different
options in appendix III.
[End of figure]
Our past work shows that a program's success depends on the quality of
its schedule.[Footnote 28] If it is well-integrated, a schedule
clearly shows the relationships between program activities, activity
resource requirements and durations, and any constraints that affect
their start or completion. The schedule shows when major events are
expected as well as the completion dates for all activities leading up
to them, which can help determine if the schedule is realistic and
achievable. When fully laid out, a detailed schedule can be used to
identify where problems are or could potentially be. Moreover, as
changes occur within a program, a well-integrated schedule will aid in
analyzing how they affect the program. For these reasons, an
integrated schedule is key in managing program performance and is
necessary for determining what work remains and the expected cost to
complete it.
According to officials from MDA, the Navy, the Army, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and EUCOM, a principle
challenge for implementing EPAA is meeting its schedule. DOD
established the EPAA phase schedule based on a top-level evaluation of
the implementation activities that could impact or be impacted by that
schedule and, as a result, DOD may face challenges executing it. EPAA
is a policy framework and not a fully developed architecture or
program, according to senior DOD officials responsible for developing
the policy. Further, the schedule for EPAA was largely based on the
alignment of the changes in the threat to availability of new
technology, including the various SM-3 interceptor variants. These
officials said that they relied upon acquisition feasibility and
affordability information for various options that was provided by MDA
and that the Joint Staff represented service and combatant command
concerns during the development of the phased schedule. However, they
also stated that the military services and combatant commands began
examining the specific implementation requirements of EPAA after the
policy's announcement.
Phases Not Yet Integrated with Supporting Acquisition Activities:
EPAA's phases are not yet integrated with key acquisition activities
and so are exposed to risk of schedule slips, decreased performance,
and increased cost. As we reported in December 2010,[Footnote 29] EPAA
policy calls for DOD to deliver BMD capabilities on a timeline that
requires concurrency among technology, design, testing, and other
development activities; this concurrency introduces risk of increased
costs, schedule delay, or performance shortfalls that must be
addressed. A sound acquisition has firm requirements, mature
technologies, and a strategy that provides sufficient time for design
activities before the decision is made to start development and
demonstration or to transition to production. As we reported, it is
questionable whether DOD's approach allows sufficient time for these
activities. Schedules for the individual elements are highly
optimistic in technology development, testing, production, and
integration, leaving little room for potential delays.
Additionally, DOD has not formally or fully aligned acquisition
programming to support EPAA or set acquisition decision points for
each phase, including production decisions. An integrated schedule
defines major decision points at which to review demonstrated progress
and follow-on plans. It establishes exit and entrance criteria to show
that components are ready to move from one developmental step to the
next, and that the component fits within the context of the bigger
system to which it contributes. While individual BMD elements have a
schedule, DOD has not developed an integrated schedule for EPAA that
aligns the necessary acquisition activities. As a result, decisions
about production of individual elements, risks associated with
individual elements and interceptors, overall BMD system
interoperability and integration, and assessment of the integrated
system do not appear to be fully linked to the phases. Additionally,
the Missile Defense Executive Board, which is responsible for
overseeing missile defense portfolio developments, has thus far
focused program reviews solely at the element level, not the broader
EPAA level.[Footnote 30] According to DOD, the department is
developing an integrated acquisition schedule for EPAA. Without such a
schedule, DOD acquisition managers, stakeholders, and Congress lack an
integrated EPAA-level view of BMD development. Table 4 summarizes some
development risks for the individual BMD assets as well as the
integrated system that may be exacerbated by the EPAA schedule
compression.
Table 4: System Development Risks May Be Exacerbated by EPAA Schedule
Compression:
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications; (C2BMC):
The C2BMC element, which is designed to integrate the BMDS
capabilities and provide planning, situational awareness, sensor
management, and battle management, may present an incorrect picture of
the battle space because it may not accurately group threat missile
tracks to reduce multiple cues from sensors about the tracks.
Aegis Ashore:
The Aegis BMD weapon system currently in service on ships will require
modifications for use on land as Aegis Ashore.[A] According to Navy
officials, overall system design has not been selected. Also, detail
design has not yet begun. The contract for a portion of Aegis Ashore
is scheduled for award prior to preliminary or critical design reviews
for Aegis Ashore; we have reported that such sequencing can lead to
costly modifications later in the process.[B] Integration of Aegis
Ashore with C2BMC, which links Aegis Ashore to cueing forward sensors,
is critical and has not been demonstrated. Testing of Aegis Ashore has
been reduced from four flight test intercepts to two intercept tests,
eliminating opportunities for DOD to learn about the performance of
the system.
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) IB:
Technology development of a key subsystem is following a high-risk
path. According to the Director, MDA, a flight test was recently
rescheduled to allow time to complete all qualifications prior to the
test.
Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
Some production risks for THAAD batteries--including incomplete system
and some component qualification, potential design changes, and
demonstrated production rates for interceptor components not
supporting production needs--have caused more than a six-month delay
in production. The program has now addressed most of these risks and
has mitigation plans in place for those remaining.
Interoperability and Assessment of Integrated System Performance:
As a system-of-systems, the BMDS is expected to perform as a whole,
not just the sum of its individual parts; thus technical
interoperability and integration among individual systems is key to
whole system performance. Ability of testing and assessment plans to
fully demonstrate BMDS capabilities in a regional context is
constrained by existing limitations in models and simulations. These
limitations include incorrect representations of how BMDS elements are
linked in the real world and can result in overstating integrated
system performance. Interoperability with friends and allies is
uncertain; who will contribute, how, and the degree of technical
feasibility and investment to interoperate with other nations has yet
to be determined.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: This table is based on the findings of GAO-11-179R. For
additional information and findings regarding EPAA acquisition issues,
please see that report.
[A] Modifications necessary for converting the Aegis BMD weapon system
for shore use include design, integration, and fabrication of a new
deckhouse enclosure for the radar, modification of the interceptor
vertical launching system, and suppression or disabling of certain
features used at sea, such as software for a ship's pitch and yaw.
[B] GAO, Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points
Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding, GAO-09-
322 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009).
[End of table]
Phases Not Yet Integrated with Supporting Infrastructure Requirements:
Furthermore, the EPAA phase schedule is not yet integrated with key
infrastructure activities and therefore is also exposed to risk of
schedule slips, decreased performance, and increased cost. BMD assets,
such as the AN/TPY-2 radar and Aegis Ashore, require infrastructure to
support and secure the assets. Designing, funding, and building
military infrastructure can take years. Officials from MDA, the Navy,
EUCOM, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and the Army Corps of Engineers
[Footnote 31] stated that having the necessary infrastructure in place
to support the scheduled 2015 operational date for the first Aegis
Ashore could be challenging. There were some early design questions
about how relocatable Aegis Ashore was supposed to be, which had
direct implications for infrastructure requirements. According to
officials from MDA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, initial
design options included a modular construction option that allowed for
placement or removal of Aegis Ashore from a site within 120 days.
Infrastructure needs for the initial modular design option would have
been minimal. Nevertheless, DOD decided not to pursue the initial
modular design because of technical challenges that may have impacted
performance and driven up the Aegis Ashore development and acquisition
costs, as well as potentially increasing costs for operating and
sustaining the element. However, there was disagreement among the
officials to whom we spoke about the impact of pursuing a new design
on infrastructure needs--ranging from no change to requiring
significant additional infrastructure.
Although DOD is beginning to narrow its design approach for Aegis
Ashore, DOD is operating under a compressed schedule to meet the 2015
operational date for Phase 2. Construction, and therefore funding, for
all of the necessary Phase 2 Aegis Ashore facilities and associated
infrastructure needs to begin in fiscal year 2013, according to
officials from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Navy, and U.S. Naval
Forces Europe. However, MDA reported to us and a senior DOD official
testified to Congress that Aegis Ashore site construction will take
approximately 1 year. According to officials from the Navy and U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Aegis Ashore infrastructure costs remain
unknown because the designs have not yet been finalized for the system
itself or the supporting infrastructure. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
officials said that they are working closely with the Navy and MDA to
reach basic agreement on the design of the infrastructure in March
2011, which is in time for MDA to budget for the needed facilities in
fiscal year 2013. However, Army Corps of Engineers officials said that
the Romania Aegis Ashore site design and construction estimate will
not be as mature as those of typical military construction projects,
which may expose the Aegis Ashore construction site to increased risk
of design modifications, increased costs, and possible delays. As we
have previously reported, DOD underestimated its BMD support
infrastructure requirements and military construction costs for the
prior plan for BMD in Europe when it did not follow the traditional
military construction requirements.[Footnote 32] Army Corps of
Engineers officials noted that DOD is accepting this extra risk with
Aegis Ashore, because waiting for a more complete design for Aegis
Ashore in Romania would result in missing the 2015 deadline.
A significant infrastructure-related schedule risk to EPAA over which
DOD and the U.S. government in general has limited control but which
can have significant implications for implementation is the entry into
force requirements of agreements, such as ratification, with nations
to host EPAA assets and personnel.[Footnote 33],[Footnote 34] Delays
in ratification could impact the schedule for infrastructure because
U.S. law prohibits DOD from constructing land-based BMD interceptor
facilities in Europe until after the host nation ratifies the
agreements it has reached with the U.S.[Footnote 35] State Department
officials stated that the host nation negotiations and ratification
process for the Aegis Ashore facilities in Romania and Poland--to be
completed as part of Phases 2 and 3 respectively--are in progress and,
though they do not anticipate any significant delays, they also cannot
predict when negotiations and ratification will be complete or when
agreements will enter into force. For example, the U.S. government ran
into unexpected delays in host nation agreement ratification when it
was attempting to implement the previous approach to BMD in Europe.
According to DOD, its schedule assumption in 2007 was that both Poland
and the Czech Republic would complete the necessary ratification of
host nation agreements by the end of fiscal year 2008. However, as we
previously reported, delays in the ratification of key host nation
agreements presented challenges to DOD's planning and implementation
of its prior approach to BMD in Europe.[Footnote 36] In that report,
we also noted that the ratification votes were delayed, in part,
because of a desire on the part of both the Polish and Czech
parliaments to wait for an indication from the current U.S.
administration on its policy toward ballistic missile defenses in
Europe. In the end, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic ratified the
necessary agreements before September 2009 when the U.S. decided to
take a new approach to BMD in Europe.[Footnote 37] Similar delays in
host nation agreement ratification for Aegis Ashore could also impact
EPAA and result in schedule slips, decreased performance, or increased
cost. Additionally, the U.S. must also reach agreement with nations to
host other land-based BMD assets that may be part of EPAA. For
example, DOD's plans for EPAA Phase 1 include an AN/TPY-2 radar
intended to provide early warning data to engage short-and medium-
range ballistic missile threats and provide additional tracking
information for homeland defense. According to a senior Joint Staff
official, the AN/TPY-2 will significantly increase the capability of
Aegis BMD that is also intended to be part of Phase 1. However, the
U.S. has not reached agreement with a country to host the AN/TPY-2. If
such an agreement is not reached soon, there may not be enough time to
construct the necessary facilities for the AN/TPY-2 and deploy it by
the end of 2011, thereby diminishing DOD's expected EPAA Phase 1
performance.
Phases Not Yet Integrated with Supporting Personnel Needs:
The EPAA timeline is not yet integrated with key activities to ensure
personnel needs are met. The military services are responsible for
organizing and training personnel, a process that typically takes
years once requirements are identified. DOD generally requires that
major weapon systems be fielded with a full complement of organized
and trained personnel. As we previously reported, DOD has in the past
put BMD elements into operational use before first ensuring that the
military services had created units and trained service members to
operate them and, as a result, combatant commanders sometimes lacked
certainty that the forces could operate the elements as expected.
[Footnote 38] DOD concurred with our recommendation that it require,
in the absence of an immediate threat or crisis, that operational
units be established with the organizations, personnel, and training
needed to perform all of their BMD responsibilities before first
making elements available for operational use.
DOD's aggressive EPAA schedule runs the risk of deploying assets
without the full complement of trained personnel needed to carry out
the mission, which could lead to issues with operational performance.
For example, Navy officials told us that they will likely have to
extend sailors' rotations beyond the standard deployment length to
meet possible EPAA ship requirements for Phase 1, thus placing a
strain on the force and possibly affecting performance. The Navy is
already dealing with manning issues that may affect BMD asset
capabilities. In 2010, separate reports by the Navy found Aegis radar
manpower and performance in decline. The reports stressed that the
Navy's Aegis crews are already overextended and they lack sufficient
numbers of qualified people to meet its radar maintenance
requirements. Additional requirements for Aegis presence because of
EPAA could contribute further to this problem. Reducing EPAA
deployments to address these concerns would result in a decrease in
expected capability.
Moreover, DOD has yet to make key decisions that will affect its
personnel needs and so does not yet know how these needs will affect
the EPAA schedule. For example, Navy officials told us that they lack
some crucial information such as the required Aegis ship presence for
the early phases of EPAA or the design of Aegis Ashore for later
phases. This hinders their ability to fully plan and develop the
necessary organizations, personnel, and training requirements. Navy
officials said that the Navy expects to keep training requirements for
the personnel operating the Aegis Ashore weapon system very similar to
the training needed for the Aegis weapon system on the ship, thus
simplifying training requirements. However, Navy officials said that
some support infrastructure jobs unique to Aegis Ashore are difficult
to assess, and training for these will have to be developed as Aegis
Ashore designs mature. The Navy has not yet been able to establish
training requirements for maintaining the land-based vertical launch
system that is part of Aegis Ashore, for instance, because design has
not been finalized. Further, Navy officials told us that the personnel
required for Aegis Ashore could differ significantly if it is required
to operate at full readiness at all times or if it is required to
operate at some lower level of readiness. A requirement for
maintaining high readiness could increase personnel costs and
challenge the service's ability to provide sufficient personnel. Also,
Army officials told us that they need more guidance on what Army
systems will be part of EPAA and when these systems will need to be
operational. DOD is working to clarify many of its EPAA needs and
doing so will help inform personnel needs and allow the services to
prepare the necessary organizations and training for personnel. We
have already mentioned several of these efforts, such as EUCOM's
operational plan expected to be completed in spring 2011, the plan by
the Navy, MDA, and Army Corps of Engineers to reach agreement on Aegis
Ashore facilities needs in March 2011, and the U.S. Strategic Command-
led force allocation study that will inform DOD's decisions on force
distribution. However, service processes to ensure that the full
complement of trained personnel is in place will take time. Without an
integrated schedule, DOD is missing a management tool with which to
assess the effects of emerging personnel needs on the execution of the
phased adaptive approach in Europe.
Although Combatant Commands' Involvement in BMD Testing Has Increased,
Limited Visibility of BMD Operational Capabilities and Limitations
Creates Challenges in Integrating BMD into Operational Plans:
DOD has not yet established key performance metrics that would provide
the combatant commands with needed visibility into the operational
capabilities and limitations of the BMD system they intend to employ,
creating potential challenges for EUCOM as it integrates BMD into its
operational plans. DOD has already incorporated some combatant
commands' testing needs into BMD testing; however, as of January 2011,
the combatant commands' more detailed, operationally-relevant,
quantifiable metrics had not yet been incorporated into DOD's BMD
testing plans. Lack of such metrics inhibits EUCOM's understanding of
the operational capabilities and limitations of the integrated BMD
system they would have to employ. As a result, the combatant commands
will lack key information they need to plan for the phased adaptive
approach and so may face challenges in integrating BMD into
operational plans. The combatant commands recognize this issue and are
currently attempting to establish these metrics; however, they have
yet to be finalized and implemented.
DOD Has Taken Steps to Increase Combatant Commands' Visibility into
BMD Performance:
Following the establishment of MDA in 2002, initial BMD system designs
did not formally consider combatant command requirements because of
MDA's exemption from DOD's requirements process; however, DOD has
since taken multiple steps to increase combatant commands' visibility
into BMD operational performance. According to U.S. Strategic Command,
MDA initially achieved the rapid deployment of BMD capabilities
because it was unconstrained by operational requirements. Moreover,
its testing did not focus on verification of operational BMD system
performance against combatant command requirements. The BMD
development and assessment process presented challenges for the
combatant commands because MDA's criteria for declaring a BMD element
technically capable of performing some tasks did not always allow the
combatant commands to thoroughly assess how the element could be
operationally employed. For example, after DOD fielded the AN/TPY-2
radar in Japan in 2006, the combatant commands realized they did not
have a good understanding of the operational capabilities and
limitations of the radar that would allow them to fully employ it.
In response to these problems, U.S. Strategic Command, in its role as
warfighter advocate for missile defense, began efforts to incorporate
combatant command needs into BMD testing and evaluation in order to
assess the operational utility of the elements being fielded. In 2008,
U.S. Strategic Command published the Force Preparation Campaign Plan,
which laid out a framework designed to help manage risk to the
combatant commands' operations by identifying the information
combatant commands need about BMD operational capabilities and
limitations. For instance, the plan describes the need for designing
BMD tests around combatant command operational plans and testing
against validated scenarios and threats,[Footnote 39] since the
integrated BMD system level performance is heavily threat,
environment, and scenario-dependent. U.S. Strategic Command stressed
that combatant commands need this information to develop flexible
operational plans and assess BMD capabilities for supporting a
command's missions.
MDA has also taken steps to revise its testing program to incorporate
combatant command needs, but testing continues to be driven by
collection of data points needed to verify the models and simulations
used to characterize BMD performance.[Footnote 40] MDA has integrated
many combatant command testing needs into the Integrated Master Test
Plan. For instance, MDA has added three Operational Test periods, each
aligned with the first three phases of the phased adaptive approach,
which, according to U.S. Strategic Command officials, allow the
combatant commands to use the BMD system configuration unique to the
particular phase for training and operational system evaluation. These
ground tests[Footnote 41] are based on combatant command-developed
architectures and the relevant validated threats. EUCOM has been
involved in the test design process, including providing input
regarding where BMD assets should be located for EPAA. According to
EUCOM officials, the test designs were then vetted through EUCOM
intelligence and operations experts. Officials also said that the
results of the tests will be used by the command to inform its EPAA
planning.
Combatant Commands Lack Visibility into Key Operational Capabilities
and Limitations of the BMD System That Is Important for EPAA
Operational Planning:
Although combatant commands are increasingly involved in BMD testing,
they have expressed the need for additional metrics that can be used
to assess the durability (how long it can defend) and effectiveness
(how well it can defend) of the BMD system, which are important for
planning the phased adaptive approach. For instance, one of MDA's
metrics for effectiveness[Footnote 42] is based on a "one-on-one"
engagement between a given element or group of elements and a single
threat missile. According to DOD officials, it therefore has limited
applicability to a more realistic operational scenario where combatant
commanders employ an integrated BMD system against multiple threat
missiles.
The combatant commands have concluded that they need to understand BMD
system effectiveness and durability in quantitative terms so that, as
they prepare their operational plans, they understand BMD's
contribution to the overall mission and appropriately balance it with
other options. BMD is part of the defensive capabilities, and in
combat operations, it alone cannot achieve or maintain effective
defense against an adversary ballistic missile attack. DOD planning
doctrine emphasizes that integrated and interoperable military forces
improve the ability to not only defend against a ballistic missile
attack with defensive counterair, such as BMD, but also ensure that
offensive counterair can strike potential ballistic missile threats.
[Footnote 43]
As more ballistic defense assets are deployed into the EUCOM area of
responsibility, creating a more complex BMD system, insight into the
capabilities and limitations of the system and its overall
contribution to EUCOM's operational plans will become more important.
The balance between offensive and defensive options, and therefore the
need for a clear understanding of the operational capabilities of the
BMD system, is further complicated for EPAA since it requires
coordination between two geographic combatant commands--EUCCOM and U.S
Central Command--given where the threats may originate. A threat
originating from the Middle East, which is primarily U.S. Central
Command's area of responsibility, could be directed at Europe, which
is in EUCOM's area of responsibility. Therefore, these two commands
must work together to balance BMD with other options. Without metrics
to credibly quantify BMD system performance, EUCOM, and other
combatant commands will not be able to thoroughly analyze performance
gaps. Moreover, without the full understanding of their BMD system
capabilities and limitations, they will be limited in their ability to
develop comprehensive plans that integrate defensive and offensive
options.
The combatant commands, led by U.S. Strategic Command, created a
process in 2006 to provide them with additional understanding of the
operational utility of the BMD system but this process does not
provide the specific performance information the combatant commands
seek. Specifically, this BMD assessment process was initially intended
to enhance visibility into BMD element capabilities by using
subjective assessment criteria expressed in terms of yes or no
judgments rather than quantified performance parameters. For example,
the effectiveness criteria for the AN/TPY-2 radar includes whether
that sensor possesses the ability to detect, classify, track and
discriminate ballistic missile threats targeting U.S. defended areas.
Thus, rather than assessing the extent to which a capability can
perform a certain mission-essential function, the assessment focuses
on whether or not a BMD component can perform a certain task. When the
combatant commands first implemented this process, they concluded they
would need to later introduce quantifiable mission-essential
performance goals that would enable more complete operational
assessments of BMD system capability in relation to their operational
needs.
To address the effort of developing quantifiable mission-essential
performance goals, the combatant commands, led by U.S. Strategic
Command, are currently attempting to introduce quantifiable
operational performance metrics into the testing program through an
effort called "Assess-to." The combatant commands are defining metrics
to measure BMD system effectiveness (how well it can defend) and
durability (how long it can defend) against threats projected by the
intelligence and operational communities. More specifically, as
defined in a draft Assess-to criteria document, the metric used to
measure effectiveness of a BMD system is expressed mathematically as
the ratio of threats defeated to total threats launched. As such, this
metric is designed to allow assessment of BMD system effectiveness
against multiple ballistic missile threats. Durability, on the other
hand, is defined as the length of time that an established BMD system
can provide and sustain defensive capability at a specific level of
protection against projected threats.
U.S. Strategic Command officials agree that developing Assess-to
criteria would help to quantify BMD system capabilities and
limitations and thereby provide better data to the combatant commands
as they develop their operational plans. The combatant commands have
articulated the need for BMD system effectiveness and durability
metrics since 2008 and developed a draft Assess-to document that
describes them, but there are two main barriers that have prevented
DOD from adopting Assess-to. First, various DOD officials stated that
MDA is reluctant to have Assess-to metrics established due to concerns
that these types of metrics could effectively turn into requirements
to which MDA will be held accountable. As stated previously, MDA is
exempt from formal acquisition requirements and the BMD elements it
developed were not built to operational requirements. U.S. Strategic
Command officials and documents describing Assess-to are sensitive to
this concern and characterize Assess-to criteria in terms of
communicating testing needs to MDA as well as goals to "build towards"
rather than strict requirements. Second, an additional obstacle to
Assess-to implementation is that current limitations in system-level
modeling may limit DOD's ability to test against the identified
metrics. Assess-to metrics are geared towards system-level assessment,
and currently ground tests--the primary venue for such assessments--
rely on models and simulations, many of which continue to lack
operational realism. Although MDA is working to validate models and
simulations, they currently have technical limitations associated with
their ability to represent system-wide operationally realistic
scenarios. However, MDA officials told us that, while there are
challenges associated with coming to agreement on how to quantify BMD
effectiveness and durability, MDA believes that it is possible to do
so. While various DOD officials told us that MDA and U.S. Strategic
Command are collaborating to develop solutions to these issues, until
quantifiable operational metrics for BMD system-level assessment are
in place, the combatant commands will lack key information they need
to plan for the phased adaptive approach and so may face operational
risks should a conflict arise.
Conclusions:
DOD's revised approach to BMD in Europe reflects the Administration's
desire to focus on threats currently facing the United States and
allies while maintaining the flexibility to adapt the approach as
threats change and new missile defense technologies become available.
Since the September 2009 announcement of EPAA, DOD has taken steps to
implement this policy, including considering options for the
deployment of assets, requesting forces, preparing for testing,
analyzing infrastructure needs, and gaining NATO support for BMD in
Europe. However, this approach creates significant planning and
implementation challenges that--if left unaddressed--could result in
significant management issues and unforeseen costs. First, as a result
of the lack of guidance on EPAA's desired end states, including its
priority compared to other BMD missions, the department faces
uncertainty in planning and implementing its revised approach,
particularly in how it will allocate limited assets among multiple
geographic regions. Second, without cost estimates for the life cycle
of EPAA, DOD will be unable to judge whether it is meeting its goal
that EPAA be fiscally sustainable and affordable. The department will
also have difficulty in monitoring the implementation of the program
and ensuring that adequate funding is available to execute the program
according to plan if it does not develop life-cycle cost estimates.
Third, DOD does not have an EPAA schedule that integrates key
acquisition, infrastructure, and personnel activities. As a result,
the department does not have the information it needs to assess
whether the EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify
potential problems, or analyze how changes will impact the execution
of this effort, and therefore is exposed to increased schedule,
performance, and cost risks. Finally, without incorporating
operationally quantifiable metrics--such as how long the system can
defend (durability) and how well the system can defend
(effectiveness)--into its test program, DOD will not be able to fully
understand the capabilities and limitations of the BMD system and
EUCOM will not have the most relevant performance data it needs to
thoroughly assess the extent to which BMD capabilities support its
mission objectives and judge how to best plan for and employ BMD
assets. Unless the department addresses these challenges, DOD will
likely face implementation risks that ultimately may increase the cost
for this approach in Europe and potentially beyond as it expands this
BMD approach to other regions of the world.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four
actions:
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide guidance on EPAA that describes
desired EPAA end states in response to concerns raised by key
stakeholders.
* Direct the Missile Defense Executive Board to oversee and coordinate
the development of:
- life-cycle cost estimates that would provide for the management and
oversight of EPAA and allow the department to assess whether its plans
for EPAA are affordable and determine if corrective actions are
needed, and:
- an integrated EPAA schedule to include acquisition, infrastructure,
and personnel activities that would help identify EPAA implementation
risks that need to be considered.
* Direct U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with the Missile
Defense Agency, to adopt BMD operational performance metrics for
durability and effectiveness and include these metrics into the BMD
test programs.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with two
of our recommendations and partially concurred with two others. The
department's comments are reprinted in appendix V. DOD and the State
Department also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to provide guidance on
EPAA that describes desired end states in response to concerns raised
by key stakeholders. In its comments, DOD stated that it recognizes
the need to provide policy guidance on the decision to pursue the
EPAA. The department also noted that it has taken steps to provide
guidance in the 2012 Guidance for the Employment of the Force and that
this would provide detailed guidance to the Joint Staff, combatant
commanders and other DOD components on end states, strategic
assumptions and contingency planning, including for EPAA. However,
since this guidance has not yet been approved by the Secretary of
Defense, we cannot determine if the concerns raised by key
stakeholders will be addressed. Additionally, since EPAA is a flexible
approach, DOD will need to continue to refine its guidance over time.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Missile
Defense Executive Board oversee and coordinate the development of life-
cycle cost estimates that would provide for the management and
oversight of EPAA and allow the department to assess whether its plans
for EPAA are affordable and determine if corrective actions are
needed. In its comments, DOD stated that EPAA is an approach, not an
acquisition program, and that it is designed to be flexible and match
resources to the combatant commander's requirements. The department
believes a more effective approach is to prepare BMDS program element-
specific life-cycle cost estimates and use them to inform the
management of ongoing acquisition programs and senior-level oversight
of the phased adaptive approach as BMDS systems are applied to the
defense of Europe. We recognize that life-cycle cost estimates for
individual elements will provide decision makers with information on
DOD's BMD efforts; however, we believe that DOD should also develop
life-cycle cost estimates for its overall EPAA effort and that doing
so will not impede flexibility. Without cost estimates for the life
cycle of EPAA, DOD will be unable to judge whether EPAA is affordable
and sustainable. The department will also have difficulty in
monitoring the implementation of EPAA and ensuring that adequate
funding is available to execute the program according to plan.
In its response to our third recommendation, DOD concurred that the
Missile Defense Executive Board oversee and coordinate the development
of an integrated EPAA schedule to include acquisition, infrastructure,
and personnel activities that would help identify EPAA implementation
risks that need to be considered. DOD stated that MDA includes the
anticipated phased adaptive approach requirements into the broader
BMDS acquisition program and uses an integrated BMDS schedule for the
emerging EPAA requirements, ensuring they are included in appropriate
detail and timing within the BMD element-level schedules. DOD further
indicated that MDA has a strict process to manage and integrate the
acquisition of discrete BMDS elements which make up the capability to
be delivered in each of the EPAA phases. While the department has an
integrated BMDS acquisition schedule comprised of element-level
acquisition schedules, we found that the schedules for the individual
elements are highly optimistic. Additionally, DOD has not developed an
integrated schedule specifically for EPAA so that EPAA-related
acquisition activities as well as EPAA-related infrastructure and
personnel activities can be synchronized directly within that
schedule. As a result, we continue to believe that the department does
not have an important management tool with which to assess whether the
EPAA schedule is realistic and achievable, identify potential
problems, or analyze how changes will impact the execution of this
effort.
DOD concurred with our recommendation to adopt BMD operational
performance metrics for durability and effectiveness and include these
metrics into the BMD test programs. In its comments, DOD stated that
it recognizes the inherent value of measurable BMDS performance
metrics and that, once provided with the warfighter's operationally
defined metrics, DOD will crosswalk these metrics to the BMD System
specification values assessed to be achievable, and determine whether
the specifications meet the operational requirements. Taking such
actions would meet the intent of our recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of State; the Director, Missile Defense Agency; the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command; and the Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force. In addition, this report will be available at no charge
on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
During our review of the Department of Defense's (DOD) plans for
implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), we reviewed
relevant documentation and met with representatives from numerous
agencies and offices. To assess the extent to which DOD has provided
guidance for the force structure requirements, identified costs, and
established an integrated schedule for EPAA we reviewed relevant
documentation and spoke with cognizant DOD, State Department, and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials. The documents we
reviewed relating to guidance for force structure requirements
included the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the President's
announcement from September 2009, and testimony from senior DOD
officials. We also reviewed U.S. Strategic Command's 2010 Military
Utility Assessment and 2009 Prioritized Capabilities List. We spoke to
senior-level officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and the Joint Staff about the
presence or absence of a firm architecture for EPAA, any guidance that
would be provided to the services, and how force structure for EPAA
would be determined. Officials from U.S. Strategic Command, U.S.
European Command, and U.S. Northern Command informed us about the
typical processes for determining ballistic missile defense (BMD)
force structure. We spoke to service representatives from the Army and
Navy, including the Army Space and Missile Defense Command and the
Naval Air and Missile Defense Command, about the kind of guidance they
will need to prepare cost and force structure estimates for EPAA. We
also reviewed intelligence documents and threat assessments and met
with intelligence officials from the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
National Air and Space Intelligence Center to become familiar with the
threats that EPAA is intended to defeat and the type of force
structure that might be required to accomplish this mission. To
determine the extent to which DOD has identified the costs of EPAA, we
reviewed the budget requests for some of the elements DOD stated would
be part of EPAA and also met with representatives from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation). In
evaluating whether DOD has an integrated schedule that considers the
factors that may impact EPAA, we relied on policy documents such as
the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review and the statements made by
the President and the Secretary of Defense about the timelines for
EPAA. We reviewed MDA's Integrated Master Test Plan and the
President's budget requests and justifications for BMD elements. We
also met with service representatives to discuss the kinds of
schedules they typically follow when preparing infrastructure,
training personnel, and preparing force structure to be fielded. For
example, the Army Corps of Engineers provided information related to
the efforts involved with constructing facilities in foreign countries
and the types of challenges they face with such construction. Further,
State Department officials provided us with information about the
activities and schedule involved in establishing government-to-
government agreements for hosting U.S. BMD assets. We also spoke with
NATO representatives about that organization's schedule for adopting
the territorial missile defense mission and the process of making
assets interoperable with U.S. missile defense assets. We also relied
on our recent work dealing with the acquisition risks related to the
EPAA schedule, contained in GAO-11-179R.
To assess the extent to which the combatant commands are involved with
testing for EPAA-related assets and understand the capabilities and
limitations of the BMD system, we reviewed the Integrated Master Test
Plan as well as U.S. Strategic Command's 2010 Military Utility
Assessment, and the Force Preparation Campaign Plan. We also spoke to
officials at U.S. Northern Command and U.S. European Command about
their understanding and confidence in the BMD system as a whole and
the individual assets that comprise it. Officials from these same
commands provided information about efforts to establish "Assess-to"
criteria for durability and effectiveness of the BMD system. We met
with officials from the office of the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation and the Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational Test
Agency to discuss the status of models and simulations for the BMD
system and elements.
To understand DOD's and the State Department's plans for cooperation
and coordination with NATO, friends, and allies in implementing EPAA,
we conducted site visits to numerous installations both in the U.S.
and in Europe. We met with State Department officials to discuss their
ongoing efforts to negotiate agreements with countries that may host
U.S. BMD assets and received updates on the progress of negotiations.
We interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy to discuss DOD's role in negotiating these
agreements. We also met with MDA officials to discuss the efforts to
make EPAA interoperable with the Active Layered Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense system of NATO. We also attended the Nimble Titan 2010
wargame in Suffolk, Va., where we talked to the representatives of
foreign governments and militaries and learned about the efforts
already under way that may affect the collaboration and coordination
amongst allies, as well as points of conflict that could hinder
cooperation. In Europe, officials with the U.S. mission to NATO
informed us of the process whereby NATO would decide whether or not to
adopt the territorial BMD mission, the likelihood of such an adoption,
and next steps following adoption of the mission. We also met with the
European representatives from U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Air
Forces in Europe to discuss their perspective on the efforts and
challenges to cooperating with NATO and foreign allies on BMD.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to January
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Potential BMDS Elements for EPAA:
BMDS element: Aegis Ballistic Missile; Defense (Aegis BMD);
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 1, 2, 3, 4;
Element description: A system that (1) provides a forward deployed
capability to search, detect, and track ballistic missiles of all
ranges and transmit track data to the BMDS and (2) employs its own
sensors and interceptors or exploits off-board sensors to protect
deployed forces, large regions, and population centers. The element is
based on a modification to existing Navy Aegis ships to provide these
capabilities. The interceptors include the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3),
designed to defend against short-to intermediate-range ballistic
missile threats in the midcourse and ascent phases, and a modified
Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) designed to defend against short-range
threats in the terminal phase.
BMDS element: Command, Control, Battle; Management, and;
Communications (C2BMC);
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 1, 2, 3, 4;
Element description: A networked computer and communications element
developed by MDA to integrate the BMDS by providing deliberate
planning, situational awareness, sensor management, and battle
management capabilities.
BMDS element: Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance - Model 2
(AN/TPY-2);
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 1, 2, 3, 4;
Element description: A transportable, land-based radar, similar in
design to the THAAD radar, which provides advance warning of ballistic
missile launches to the BMDS from forward-based locations.
BMDS element: Terminal High-Altitude Area; Defense (THAAD);
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 1, 2, 3, 4;
Element description: The THAAD element employs the THAAD Interceptor
and the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance - Model 2 (AN/TPY-
2) (THAAD Mode) to engage ballistic targets in the late mid-course and
terminal phases of their trajectory. THAAD can act as a surveillance
sensor, providing sensor data to cue other elements of the BMDS.
BMDS element: PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3);
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 1, 2, 3, 4;
Element description: PAC-3 provides simultaneous air and missile
defense capabilities as the Lower Tier element in defense of U.S.
deployed forces and allies against short-range ballistic missiles.
BMDS element: Aegis Ashore;
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 2, 3, 4;
Element description: Land-based element designed by MDA to provide
capability to detect, track, and intercept threats. Aegis Ashore will
leverage the Aegis BMD capability and deploy it at shore-based sites
in Europe starting in 2015. DOD intends for it to employ the SM-3 for
exoatmospheric defense against short-to medium-and some intermediate-
range ballistic missile threats in the later stages of flight. Use of
the SM-3 at shore-based sites will broaden the BMDS use of the SM-3
from its current sea-based applications and DOD plans for Aegis Ashore
to employ SM-3 IIB in Phase 4 against intercontinental ballistic
missiles.
BMDS element: Airborne Infrared Radar (ABIR);
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 3, 4;
Element description: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-based sensor in
development designed to acquire and track large ballistic missile raid
sizes. The sensor is also intended to provide tracking data of high
enough quality to be used for launch-on-remote[A] and early
intercept[B] engagements.
BMDS element: Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS);
Projected for operational availability in EPAA phases: 3, 4;
Element description: Space-based sensor system, in early development,
designed to provide end-to-end intercept quality tracking of ballistic
missile threats.
Source: GAO summary of DOD data.
[A] Launch-on-remote is a future capability designed to sense a threat
remotely, transmit tracking information to the interceptor's flight
computer, and launch the interceptor earlier and farther down range
than other radars would allow. According to MDA, investments are also
being made to develop an "engage-on-remote" technology that includes
not only launching on data from a remote sensor track but also the
ability to uplink data from assets other than the Aegis radar. This
will allow the interceptor to engage the threat missile at greater
ranges.
[B] Early intercept is the concept of intercepting missiles early in
their flight using currently planned interceptors and sensors. Early
intercept is achieved by reducing the timelines associated with early
sensor tracking and rapidly developing fire-control solutions so that
today's missiles can intercept threat missiles much earlier in their
flight. Early intercept should provide an additional opportunity to
shoot at incoming threat missiles.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: BMD Architecture Performance: Impact of Quantities,
Integration, and Location on Defended Areas:
Notes: The defended areas shown are for illustrative purposes only.
[Refer to PDF for image: 3 illustrations]
Each illustration depicts the following:
BMD-capable ship;
BMD sensor;
Integrated;
Defended area.
Option 1:
The size of the area defended depends on the capabilities and numbers
of the BMD elements deployed. In this notional case, the defended area
of two BMD-capable ships is additive.
Option 2:
Integrating BMD elements into a system can increase their capability,
including expanding the defended area. In this notional case, the
defended area of the same two BMD-capable ships is vastly expanded
when integrated with a sensor.
Option 3:
The geographic location of the BMD elements can impact their
performance. In this notional case, the defended area of the same
integrated elements from option 2 is vastly expanded by changing the
location of the sensor.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: The defended areas shown are for illustrative purposes only.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: U.S. Progress in Achieving NATO Support for BMD in Europe:
Since the President's announcement of EPAA in September 2009, the U.S.
has made significant progress in advancing cooperative efforts with
NATO allies on BMD in Europe. Increasing international cooperation on
BMD is a major focus of the Administration's new approach to BMD.
According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, a benefit of EPAA
is that it offers increased opportunities for allied participation and
burden sharing. The U.S. intends to make EPAA its national
contribution to a future NATO BMD capability and is therefore not
asking NATO for financial support for EPAA assets. However, the U.S.
is seeking allied participation and burden sharing for EPAA that may
be demonstrated in various ways. According to DOD and the State
Department, burden sharing may come in the form of support for EPAA,
including adoption of a NATO territorial BMD mission; expansion of
NATO's command and control system for territorial missile defense;
bilateral agreements for hosting U.S. BMD assets; and contributions of
allied BMD assets toward an expanded NATO BMD system capability.
NATO's adoption of the territorial BMD mission at the Lisbon Summit in
November 2010 fulfilled a major U.S. goal. NATO's prior BMD mission
was limited to the protection of deployed troops and so was focused on
defending smaller areas. The shift to a territorial defense mission
means that NATO's BMD efforts will now focus on protecting much larger
geographic areas, including population centers and countries.
Additionally, DOD and State Department officials noted that the
agreement at Lisbon will help facilitate cooperation with NATO allies
on hosting U.S. BMD assets and provides justification for allies to
pursue additional BMD efforts. NATO allies had expressed their support
for EPAA prior to the Lisbon Summit. At the December 2009 NATO Foreign
Ministers Meeting in Brussels, NATO welcomed the U.S. adoption of EPAA
and declared that this approach would further strengthen European
missile defense work in NATO. Further, the NATO Secretary General
stated in October 2010 that building a missile defense for Europe was
important, because missiles are increasingly posing a threat to
European populations, territory, and deployed forces.
Although the political endorsement at Lisbon was a significant
accomplishment, the U.S. and its NATO allies must now overcome the
difficult task of reaching consensus on how to carry out this new BMD
mission, including prioritizing what areas to defend and establishing
command and control relationships. According to DOD, State Department,
and NATO officials, reaching agreement on these issues will be a
challenge facing NATO's new territorial missile defense mission. DOD
and State Department officials told us that reaching such an agreement
on a bilateral basis can be extremely challenging and time-consuming
and that reaching consensus with all 28 NATO member nations is
therefore expected to be even more challenging and time-consuming.
The U.S. and its NATO allies have already taken steps to address the
political challenges inherent in multilateral BMD operations by
beginning to explore and outline potential command and control
relationships. One venue in which the U.S. and its allies have been
examining BMD command and control challenges is the biennial U.S.
Strategic Command-led wargame called Nimble Titan. In 2010, this
wargame involved notional ballistic missile attack scenarios occurring
a decade in the future against fictional adversaries. Nimble Titan
2010 participants came from around the world including representatives
from many NATO member nations, such as Denmark, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and United Kingdom and observers from Belgium, Italy,
Romania, Turkey, NATO, and Russia.[Footnote 44] One of the outcomes of
the Nimble Titan 2010 wargame was the development of a document that
described notional command and control relationships and established a
framework for coalition BMD concept of operations. Additionally, the
U.S. has participated in a Dutch-led BMD exercise that, according to
EUCOM officials, is also helping them to understand and overcome
command and control challenges. EUCOM officials also told us that
their command has begun drafting a concept of operations as well.
However, they emphasized that NATO agreement on a final command and
control concept of operations would remain a challenge and require
significant effort.
At Lisbon, NATO also agreed to expand its missile defense command,
control, and communications program to incorporate the territorial
missile defense mission, thereby fulfilling another burden sharing
goal established by the U.S. The NATO system, called Active Layered
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) is currently designed to
link allies' missile defense assets together to protect deployed
forces. Prior to the Lisbon Summit, NATO commissioned technical
studies that concluded it was feasible to expand ALTBMD capabilities
to include the territorial missile defense mission. As a result of the
agreement reached at Lisbon, NATO plans to modify ALTBMD to be the
command and control backbone into which allied BMD assets will link
and through which NATO will conduct territorial BMD planning, tasking,
engagement coordination, and share situation assessment. MDA and
ALTBMD program officials estimated that an expanded ALTBMD for
territorial defense would be operational and interoperable with the
U.S. command and control system, C2BMC, by 2018. NATO and DOD
officials stated that they do not see major technical challenges in
meeting the 2018 operational target date for the territorial missile
defense mission and interoperability with C2BMC. However, GAO did not
assess the technical feasibility, cost, and schedule of ALTBMD,
including interoperability with C2BMC. According to NATO, expanding
ALTBMD capabilities to include the territorial missile defense mission
would cost less than €200 million or around $260 million over 10
years, to be paid for through NATO common funding. The Secretary of
Defense and NATO Secretary General stated that, as such, expansion of
ALTBMD to include the territorial missile defense mission is not a
significant financial burden to the alliance.
The U.S has made progress in negotiating key bilateral agreements for
allies to host EPAA BMD assets. Romania and Poland have each agreed in
principle to host an Aegis Ashore facility by 2015 and 2018,
respectively. The U.S. must reach agreement with Romania and Poland on
a supplemental Status of Forces Agreement and the Ballistic Missile
Defense Agreement prior to construction of Aegis Ashore.[Footnote 45],
[Footnote 46] The U.S. already has supplemental Status of Forces
Agreements with Romania and Poland that have been ratified by the host
nations and therefore only lacks ratified Ballistic Missile Defense
Agreements with both countries. According to State Department
officials, the U.S. and Romania are in the process of negotiating the
terms of their Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. Poland, having
negotiated a prior Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement for the
previously planned European fixed interceptor site, has completed
negotiations with the U.S. on an amended agreement that adjusts the
existing agreement's language to accommodate the new plan of
establishing an Aegis Ashore facility. This revised agreement is now
awaiting Polish parliamentary ratification.[Footnote 47] The U.S. has
not yet reached agreement with a nation to host the AN/TPY-2 radar,
which is a significant component of the first phase of EPAA and
scheduled to be in place by the 2011 time frame. Although State
Department officials expressed confidence that the U.S. could reach
agreement with the yet to be determined host country for AN/TPY-2 in
2011, they also acknowledged that the U.S does not have control over
how long it will take to reach bilateral agreements with foreign
countries or how long it will take foreign countries to bring those
agreements into force. Additionally, since the U.S. has not yet
identified where other potential EPAA BMD assets will be based, it is
unknown what kind of bilateral agreements will be necessary with
future BMD asset host countries.
A way in which NATO allies can share the burden in providing
territorial missile defense of NATO is by contributing their national
BMD assets; however, the U.S. is thus far the only NATO member nation
developing BMD assets designed to provide territorial defense. BMD
capabilities currently envisioned for a NATO territorial defense
mission include point defenses using assets such as Patriot and area
defenses such as THAAD and Aegis BMD. BMD assets that provide point
defenses are designed to protect a relatively small area, such as an
airport or port, primarily against short-range ballistic missiles
whereas area defense BMD assets are designed to protect much larger
swaths of territory and usually against medium-range or greater
ballistic missiles. Territorial defense is thereby provided much more
efficiently by area defenses than point defenses. For example, in a
1999 report to Congress,[Footnote 48] DOD reported the same
territorial area could be protected by either 6 THAAD batteries or
more than 100 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) batteries. The
report concluded that the Patriot option was impractical for
territorial defense. Further, a senior DOD official testified that
territorial defense of Europe cannot be done using point defenses and
requires area defenses. Several NATO member nations have BMD point
defense assets and, should they choose to contribute them to the NATO
mission, these could be used to defend strategic assets primarily
against short-range ballistic missiles. Additionally, several NATO
allies could also contribute sensors to the BMD mission that, if
compatible and appropriately interoperable, could provide early
warning data to tracking data that enhances the capability of area
defense assets.[Footnote 49] However, the U.S. remains the only NATO
member nation with BMD assets designed to provide area defense needed
for the NATO territorial BMD mission.
Although NATO has adopted the territorial defense mission, the current
fiscal situation of many NATO allies makes it less likely that they
will start expensive new BMD development programs for area defense.
Many NATO countries are trying to cut down on government spending due
to current instability in the European economy, which could cause
decreases in defense expenditures. In a June 2010 speech, the NATO
Secretary General recognized the major defense cuts being made across
NATO nations due to the current fiscal climate and asked allies not to
make drastic defense budget cuts that would compromise NATO's
collective security missions. The Secretary of State and Secretary of
Defense have also expressed their concern about defense budget cuts in
NATO nations and the potential impact on NATO. Additionally, NATO and
DOD officials stated that European countries are not likely to begin
developing new area defense BMD programs in the near future.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
January 13, 2011:
Mr. John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GA0-11-220, "Ballistic Missile Defense: DoD Needs to Address
Planning and Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in
Europe," dated December 14, 2010 (GAO Code 351407).
The DoD concurs with two of the draft report's recommendations and
partially-concurs with two. The rationale for our position is included
in the enclosure. I submitted separately a list of technical and
factual errors for your consideration.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point
of contact for this effort is Mr. David Crim, 703-697-5385,
David.Crim@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
David G. Ahern:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Portfolio Systems Acquisition:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated December 14, 2010:
GA0-11-220 (GAO Code 351407):
"Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs To Address Planning And
Implementation Challenges For Future Capabilities In Europe"
Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff provide guidance on European Phased, Adaptive
Approach (EPAA) that describe desired EPAA end states in response to
concerns raised by key stakeholders. (See page 34/GAO Draft Report)
DoD Response: Partially concur. The Department recognizes the need to
provide policy guidance on the decisions reached in the Ballistic
Missile Defense Review, including the decision to pursue the European
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The Department has taken steps to
provide this guidance in the 2012 Guidance for the Employment of the
Force (GEF), which is nearing completion. Once signed by the
Secretary, it will provide detailed guidance to the Joint Staff,
Combatant Commanders and other DoD components on end states, strategic
assumptions and contingency planning, including for EPAA. We expect
the Secretary will sign this guidance soon.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) to oversee and
coordinate the development of life-cycle cost estimates that would
provide for the management and oversight of EPAA and allow the
Department to assess whether its plans for EPAA are affordable and
determine if corrective actions are needed. (See page 35/GAO Draft
Report)
DoD Response: Partially concur. EPAA is an approach not an acquisition
program. The phased adaptive approach is designed to be flexible and
match resources to the Combatant Commander's requirements to counter a
dynamic threat environment. Although the basic overall architecture of
each phase of the approach is well understood, the ultimate regional
architecture and force structure, including use of still-in-
development assets such as the Precision Tracking Space System,
Airborne Infrared system, and advanced Standard Missile-3
interceptors, is still being refined by the Department. Therefore, the
Department believes a more effective approach is to prepare BMDS
program element-specific lifecycle cost estimates and use them to
inform the management of ongoing acquisition programs and senior-level
oversight of the phased adaptive approach as BMDS systems are applied
to the defense of Europe. The MDEB and its supporting Standing
Committees review BMDS development on a regular basis. BMDS
programmatic changes are reviewed and approved by the MDEB. Discrete
BMDS elements make up the capability to be delivered in each of the
EPAA phases and MDA has a strict process to manage each of these
component elements through six acquisition baselines (resource (cost),
schedule, technical, contracts, test, and operational capacity) as
provided to Congress in the BMDS Accountability Report. Lifecycle cost
estimates are part of these baselines which are established for each
BMDS element, and they are reviewed quarterly to ensure appropriate
execution against the baselines.
To more accurately reflect the intent of the recommendation, DoD
recommends that GAO modify this recommendation to read:
"The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Missile
Defense Executive Board (MDEB) to oversee and coordinate the
development of life-cycle cost estimates of the component BMDS
elements making up the EPAA phases as well as oversee the integrated
BMDS schedule. This would provide for the management and oversight of
EPAA for the Department to assess its plans for EPAA."
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Missile Defense Executive Board to oversee and coordinate
the development of an integrated EPAA schedule to include acquisition,
infrastructure, and personnel activities that would help identify EPAA
implementation risks that need to be considered. (See page 35/GAO
Draft Report)
DoD Response: Concur. We agree that acquisition schedules are
important to managing acquisition programs and agree that the MDEB is
instrumental in providing senior-level oversight of the phased
adaptive approach.
As stated previously, EPAA is an approach not an acquisition program.
The Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, and Services establish the
regional architectures and procurement objectives. MDA has included
the anticipated PAA requirements into the broader BMDS acquisition
program while at the same time coordinating with the Joint Staff,
Combatant Commanders, and Services to refine those requirements over
time. MDA uses an integrated BMDS schedule for the emerging EPAA
requirements, ensuring they are included in appropriate detail and
timing within BMDS element-level schedules. Lead Services and the
Combatant Commanders continue to develop operational and fielding
schedules to satisfy requirements driven by the dynamic threat
environment. This adaptive approach is designed to be flexible and to
match acquisition schedules to the lead Service and Combatant
Commander's requirements.
MDA has a strict process to manage and integrate discrete BMDS
elements which make up the capability to be delivered in each of the
EPAA phases through six acquisition baselines (resource (cost),
schedule, technical, contracts, test, and operational capacity). The
MDEB and its supporting Standing Committees review the BMDS
development priorities and progress on a bimonthly basis. BMDS
programmatic changes are reviewed and approved by the MDEB. MDA also
conducts quarterly (or more frequent if required) Board of Director's
meetings with senior Service staff to discuss and coordinate Service
and MDA issues.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with Missile
Defense Agency, to adopt ballistic missile defense (BMD) operational
performance metrics for durability and effectiveness and include these
metrics into the BMD test programs. (See page 35/GAO Draft Report)
DoD Response: Concur. The Department recognizes the inherent value of
measurable BMDS performance metrics. Provided with the warfighter's
operationally defined metrics, we will crosswalk these metrics to the
BMD System specification values assessed to be achievable, and whether
the specifications meet the operational requirements. The US Strategic
Command currently develops operational performance metrics for the
warfighter in close coordination with MDA and the BMDS Operational
Test Agency Team, which is comprised of Joint and Service test
organizations.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director;
Nicolaas Cornelisse, Analyst-In-Charge; David Best; Cristina Chaplain,
Laurie Choi; Tana Davis; Gregory Marchand; Wiktor Niewiadomski; Karen
Richey; Matthew Spiers; Amie Steele; Alyssa Weir; Erik Wilkins-McKee;
Gwyneth Woolwine; and Edwin Yuen made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face
Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R]. Washington,
D.C.: December 21, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects
Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-676]. Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements and
Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856]. Washington, D.C.:
September 16, 2009.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and
Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European
Sites. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771].
Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.
Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When
Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency's Roles and Missions.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T]. Washington,
D.C.: March 26, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense
Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338]. Washington, D.C.:
March 13, 2009.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates
for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068]. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2008.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for
Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-740]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but
Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-448]. Washington, D.C.: March 14,
2008.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency's Flexibility Reduces
Transparency of Program Cost. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-799T]. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
2007.
Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting
Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-430]. Washington, D.C.: April 17,
2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between
Flexibility and Accountability. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-727T]. Washington, D.C.: April 11,
2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates
Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-387]. Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2007.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and
Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-473]. Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability
but Falls Short of Original Goals. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-327]. Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for
Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-817]. Washington, D.C.:
September 6, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment
Approach. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-962R].
Washington, D.C.: August 4, 2005.
Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly
Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment
Approach. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-540].
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in
2004. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-243]. Washington,
D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency
of DOD's Projected Resource Needs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-514]. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and
Accountability. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-409].
Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004.
Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing
Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-254]. Washington, D.C.: February
26, 2004.
Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for
Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-600]. Washington, D.C.: August 21,
2003.
Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and
Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-597]. Washington, D.C.: May 23,
2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but
Risks Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-441].
Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003.
Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce
Risks in Developing Airborne Laser. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-631]. Washington, D.C.: July 12,
2002.
Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early
National Missile Defense Flight Test. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-124]. Washington, D.C.: February
28, 2002.
Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New
Patriot Missiles to Buy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-153]. Washington, D.C.: June
29, 2000.
Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be
Revised to Reduce Risk. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-121]. Washington, D.C.: May
31, 2000.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO previously reported that DOD's $4 billion estimate that
included the European Interceptor Site in Poland and the European
Midcourse Radar in the Czech Republic was incomplete. See GAO,
Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and
Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European
Sites, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771]
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2009).
[2] The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) defines many of its major BMD
systems as "elements," including the ship-based Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense (Aegis BMD), the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, and
Upgraded Early Warning Radar. An interceptor is a component of some
ballistic missile defense elements that is used to destroy an
adversary's ballistic missile. For example, MDA is currently building
the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) to be used as a ballistic missile
defense interceptor as part of the Aegis BMD element. For a further
listing and description of the elements that may be included as part
of the revised approach to BMD in Europe, including any associated
interceptors, see appendix II.
[3] Ballistic missiles are classified by the distance they can fly as
follows: Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)--up to 1000 km; Medium-
Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)--between 1000 km and 3000 km;
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)--between 3000 km and 5500
km; and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)--range over 5500 km.
[4] Congress mandated in the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 234
(2008) that the Secretary of Defense review and report on United
States BMD policy, strategy, plans, and programs. In response to this
direction, and guided by a presidential directive, DOD conducted a
review and issued the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report in
February 2010, referred to in this report as the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review.
[5] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense: European Phased
Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face Synchronization, Transparency, and
Accountability Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21,
2010).
[6] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides
Opportunity to Strengthen Acquisition Approach, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-311] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25,
2010).
[7] GAO, Missile Defense: DOD Needs to More Fully Assess Requirements
and Establish Operational Units before Fielding New Capabilities,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 16, 2009).
[8] Life-cycle costs are the total cost to the government for a
program over its full life, consisting of research and development,
production, operations, maintenance, and disposal costs and are
helpful in assessing whether a program's cost is affordable.
[9] Operation plan refers to any plan for the conduct of military
operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies.
[10] Architecture is a framework or structure that portrays
relationships among all the elements of the subject force, system, or
activity. See Joint Publication 1-02. For BMD, this would include the
type, number, and location of elements and their linkages to each
other.
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R].
[12] The Integrated Master Test Plan is a semiannual MDA document that
establishes the executable test program for the BMDS. The Integrated
Master Test Plan is an overarching document that describes the BMDS
test environment, supporting test organizations, developmental and
operational test programs, and management of MDA test resources. The
Integrated Master Test Plan is the definitive source for detailed BMDS
test planning and execution guidance.
[13] The Navy Ballistic Missile Defense Enterprise effort allows
missile defense experts from across the Navy to meet regularly to
discuss EPAA implementation issues and challenges, develop analyses of
alternatives, and work to identify courses of action and solutions.
[14] A concept of operations expresses what the joint force commander
intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available
resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the
operation. It is also called commander's concept. See Joint
Publication 1-02.
[15] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation
Planning (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 26, 2006).
[16] See the Background section and footnote 4 for more details on the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review.
[17] The high-level DOD policy and planning documents the officials
referred to include the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, the
Defense Planning and Programming Guidance, and the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan. The Guidance for the Employment of the Force is a
DOD policy document signed by the Secretary of Defense that provides,
among other things, comprehensive, near-term planning guidance and
overarching policy for global posture, force allocations, and
contingency planning. The Defense Planning and Programming Guidance is
a DOD policy document signed by the Secretary of Defense that provides
investment guidance to services and agencies. The Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan is a Joint Chiefs of Staff document that translates
the Office of the Secretary of Defense's overarching policy and
planning guidance into combatant command direction to prepare specific
contingency plans.
[18] For further discussion of EPAA and NATO, including NATO's
adoption of the territorial missile defense mission, see appendix IV.
[19] Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly, Director, Missile Defense
Agency, Missile Defense in Europe, statement for the House Armed
Services Committee (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2009).
[20] We have previously reported that we were unable to assess MDA's
actual costs against a baseline for total acquisition costs for BMD
elements for 7 years in a row because MDA had not baselined such costs
(GAO-10-311) and that DOD lacked independently verified life-cycle
cost estimates for BMD elements (GAO-08-1068). GAO, Defense
Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to
Strengthen Acquisition Approach, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-311] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25,
2010) and GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and
Cost Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 25, 2008).
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R].
[22] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
[23] The GAO cost estimating guide [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] refers to programs broadly to
include not only a specific acquisition program but also projects or
investments. The guide's applicability includes an investment or
project that requires special management attention because (1) of its
importance to the mission of the agency or component of the agency;
(2) it supports financial management and obligates more than $500,000
annually; (3) it has significant program or policy implications; (4)
it has high executive visibility; (5) it has high development,
operating, or maintenance costs; or (6) it is defined as major by the
agency's capital planning and investment control process. The cost
guide is therefore applicable to EPAA.
[24] The 12 steps for developing credible cost estimates are: (1)
defining the estimate's purpose; (2) developing the estimating plan;
(3) defining the project's characteristics; (4) determining the
estimating approach; (5) identifying ground rules and assumptions;
(6) obtaining data; (7) developing the point estimate and comparing it
to an independent cost estimate; (8) conducting sensitivity analysis;
(9) performing a risk and uncertainty analysis; (10) documenting the
estimate; (11) presenting the estimate to management for approval; and
(12) updating the estimate to reflect actual costs and changes. See
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP].
[25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R].
[26] In spiral development, a desired capability is identified but the
end-state requirements are not yet known. These requirements are
refined through demonstration and risk management, based on continuous
user feedback. This approach allows each increment to provide the best
possible capability. Spiral development is often used in the
commercial market because it significantly reduces technical risk
while incorporating new technology. The approach can, however, lead to
increased cost and schedule risks. Spiral development can also present
contract challenges due to repeating phases, trading requirements, and
redefining deliverables. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP].
[27] Congressional Budget Office, Options for Deploying Missile
Defenses in Europe (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2009), Institute for
Defense Analysis, IDA Paper P-4359: Independent Assessment of the
Proposed Deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense Systems in Europe
(Washington, D.C.: July 2008), and Institute for Defense Analysis, IDA
Paper P-4660: Independent Assessment of the European Phased Adaptive
Approach: Follow-on Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2010). The
Congressional Budget Office study was prepared at the request of the
Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee's
Strategic Forces Subcommittee. The first IDA study was undertaken in
response to section 226 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 (2008). The second IDA study was
undertaken in response to section 235 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009). We
did not assess these estimates and have not yet obtained the latest
IDA report from DOD.
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. As noted
earlier, the GAO cost estimating guide refers to programs broadly to
include not only a specific acquisition program but also projects or
investments, such as EPAA.
[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-179R].
[30] According to a DOD official, the Missile Defense Executive Board
has performed a program review of the THAAD system and plans to do a
program review of Aegis BMD.
[31] The Army Corps of Engineers is assigned as the construction agent
for most of Europe, including Romania and Poland. DOD Directive
4270.5, Military Construction, para. 3.2; 4.4.1, enc. 1 (Feb. 12,
2005). As such, the Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for
awarding and monitoring construction contracts to build Aegis Ashore
sites in Romania and Poland by 2015 and 2018, respectively. It is also
involved in the design of the infrastructure.
[32] GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve
Planning and Information on Construction and Support Costs for
Proposed European Sites, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6,
2009).
[33] According to DOD, it is longstanding DOD policy to make best
efforts to conclude a binding international agreement documenting the
host nation's permission for the presence of DOD personnel and
equipment in its territory as well as adequate status protections for
such personnel.
[34] According to the State Department, an agreement enters into force
when the parties consent to be bound by the agreement, at which point
the parties are legally obligated to comply with the agreement's
provisions. Depending on the form of the agreement and the parties'
domestic requirements, entry into force may require any number of
events, including signature, ratification, exchange of notes, or some
combination of these.
[35] Section 223 (a) of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383 (2011) restricts the
obligation or expenditure of funds for Fiscal Year 2011 and beyond for
site activation, construction, or deployment of missile defense
interceptors on European land as part of the phased adaptive approach
to missile defense in Europe until certain conditions are met,
including host nation signing and ratification of basing agreements
and status of forces agreements authorizing deployment of such
interceptors. Section 223(c) allows the Secretary of Defense to waive
the restrictions seven days after the Secretary submits to the
congressional defense committees written certification that the waiver
is in the urgent national security interests of the United States.
[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771].
[37] According to the State Department, after the current
administration came into office in January 2009, the U.S. government
advised both the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic that the
U.S. was reviewing its approach to European BMD. From that point
forward, neither the Czech Republic nor Poland moved their
ratification process forward while they awaited the U.S. decision
regarding its approach to BMD in Europe that was announced in
September 2009 and with the completion of the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review in February 2010.
[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-856].
[39] The Defense Intelligence Agency is responsible for validating
threats and combat scenarios for DOD.
[40] Models and simulations are tools used by DOD to represent
potential BMD configurations, scenarios, and missile threats which are
difficult to live test because of numerous possible combinations of
BMD system configurations. Models and simulations allow demonstration
of BMD system performance and communications without the need to
expend interceptors and targets. However, to work effectively these
models and simulations need to be anchored to data from ground and
flight tests and validated by independent evaluators--the BMDS
Operational Test Agency--in order to have confidence in their results.
[41] Ground tests are tests designed to demonstrate element and BMD
system-level capabilities in a lab environment or assess element
communication networks between fielded assets. According to MDA
officials, MDA obtains the vast majority of its information on BMD
performance through ground tests.
[42] One of MDA's effectiveness metrics is the Probability of
Engagement Success (Pes), which is the probability that the BMD system
will prevent an adversary warhead from carrying out its mission.
[43] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and
Missile Threats (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 5, 2007). According to Joint
Publication 3-01, defensive counterair is defined as all defensive
measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or
negate enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly
airspace. Offensive counterair is defined as offensive operations to
destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch
platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and
after launch, but as close to their source as possible. The goal of
offensive counterair operations is to prevent the launch of enemy
aircraft and missiles by destroying them and their overall supporting
infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean preemptive action
against an adversary. The goal of defensive counterair operations, in
concert with offensive counterair operations, is to provide an area
from which forces can operate, secure from air and missile threats.
Although offensive counterair and defensive counterair are considered
separate operations, they must be mutually supporting to facilitate
unity of effort.
[44] Nimble Titan 2010 participant countries were Australia, Denmark,
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the
U.S. Nimble Titan 2010 observers were Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
EADTF (Extended Air Defense Task Force), Italy, Israel, NATO, Norway,
Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, and Turkey.
[45] Section 223 (a) of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383 (2011) restricts the
obligation or expenditure of funds for Fiscal Year 2011 and beyond for
site activation, construction, or deployment of missile defense
interceptors on European land as part of the phased adaptive approach
to missile defense in Europe until certain conditions are met,
including host nation signing and ratification of basing agreements
and status of forces agreements authorizing deployment of such
interceptors. Section 223(c) allows the Secretary of Defense to waive
the restrictions seven days after the Secretary submits to the
congressional defense committees written certification that the waiver
is in the urgent national security interests of the United States.
[46] The supplemental Status of Forces Agreements supplement the
multilateral NATO Status of Forces Agreement, originally signed on
June 19, 1951.
[47] The revised Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement was officially
submitted by the Polish Prime Minister to the Polish Parliament on
December 28, 2010, initiating the ratification process.
[48] DOD, Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture
Options for the Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 1999).
[49] We did not assess the technical feasibility of NATO member nation
BMD systems or these systems' interoperability with U.S. C2BMC or NATO
ALTBMD.
[End of section]
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