Defense Acquisitions
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs Gao ID: GAO-11-233SP March 29, 2011This is GAO's ninth annual assessment of Department of Defense (DOD) weapon system acquisitions, an area that is on GAO's high-risk list. The report is in response to the mandate in the joint explanatory statement to the DOD Appropriations Act, 2009. It includes observations on the performance of DOD's 2010 portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs; data on selected factors that can affect program outcomes; an assessment of the knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 40 programs, which were selected because they were in development or early production; and observations on the implementation of acquisition reforms. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports and collected data from program offices on performance requirements and software development; technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; and the implementation of DOD's acquisition policy and acquisition reforms. GAO also compiled one- or two-page assessments of 71 weapon programs. These programs were selected based on their cost, stage in the acquisition process, and congressional interest. DOD disagreed with GAO's use of total program cost growth as a performance metric because it includes costs associated with capability upgrades and quantity increases. GAO believes it remains a meaningful metric and that the report explicitly accounts for the cost effect of quantity changes.
Since 2008, DOD's portfolio of major defense acquisition programs has grown from 96 to 98 programs, and its investment in those programs has grown to $1.68 trillion. The total acquisition cost of the programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio has increased by $135 billion over the past 2 years, of which $70 billion cannot be attributed to quantity changes. A small number of programs are driving most of this cost growth; however, half of DOD's major defense acquisition programs do not meet cost performance goals agreed to by DOD, the Office of Management and Budget, and GAO. Further, 80 percent of programs have experienced an increase in unit costs from initial estimates; thereby reducing DOD's buying power on these programs. GAO continues to find that newer programs are demonstrating higher levels of knowledge at key decision points, but most are still not fully adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition approach, putting them at a higher risk for cost growth and schedule delays. For the programs GAO assessed in depth, GAO found that a lack of technology maturity, changes to requirements, increases in the scope of software development, and a lack of focus on reliability were all characteristics of programs that exhibited poorer performance outcomes. Last year GAO reported that DOD had begun to incorporate acquisition reforms that require programs to invest more time and resources at the beginning of the acquisition process refining concepts through early systems engineering and building prototypes before beginning system development. Many, but not all, planned acquisition programs are adopting these practices. As GAO has previously recommended, more consistently applying a knowledge-based approach, as well as improving implementation of acquisition reforms, can help DOD achieve better outcomes for its portfolio of major weapon system programs.
GAO-11-233SP, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
March 2011:
Defense Acquisitions:
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs:
GAO-11-233SP:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-233SP, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
This is GAO‘s ninth annual assessment of Department of Defense (DOD)
weapon system acquisitions, an area that is on GAO‘s high-risk list.
The report is in response to the mandate in the joint explanatory
statement to the DOD Appropriations Act, 2009. It includes
observations on the performance of DOD‘s 2010 portfolio of 98 major
defense acquisition programs; data on selected factors that can affect
program outcomes; an assessment of the knowledge attained by key
junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 40 programs,
which were selected because they were in development or early
production; and observations on the implementation of acquisition
reforms. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and
quantity data from DOD‘s Selected Acquisition Reports and collected
data from program offices on performance requirements and software
development; technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; and the
implementation of DOD‘s acquisition policy and acquisition reforms.
GAO also compiled one- or two-page assessments of 71 weapon programs.
These programs were selected based on their cost, stage in the
acquisition process, and congressional interest.
DOD disagreed with GAO‘s use of total program cost growth as a
performance metric because it includes costs associated with
capability upgrades and quantity increases. GAO believes it remains a
meaningful metric and that the report explicitly accounts for the cost
effect of quantity changes.
What GAO Found:
Since 2008, DOD‘s portfolio of major defense acquisition programs has
grown from 96 to 98 programs, and its investment in those programs has
grown to $1.68 trillion. The total acquisition cost of the programs in
DOD‘s 2010 portfolio has increased by $135 billion over the past 2
years, of which $70 billion cannot be attributed to quantity changes.
A small number of programs are driving most of this cost growth;
however, half of DOD‘s major defense acquisition programs do not meet
cost performance goals agreed to by DOD, the Office of Management and
Budget, and GAO. Further, 80 percent of programs have experienced an
increase in unit costs from initial estimates; thereby reducing DOD‘s
buying power on these programs.
Table: Changes in DOD‘s Fiscal Year 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs over the Past 2 Years (Fiscal Year 2011 Dollars
in Billions):
Total estimated research and development costs:
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008: $407 billion;
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $428 billion;
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[A]: $15 billion;
Percentage growth since 2008[A]: 5%.
Total estimated procurement costs:
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008: $1.089 trillion;
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $1.219 trillion;
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[A]: $121 billion;
Percentage growth since 2008[A]: 11%.
Total estimated acquisition cost:
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008: $1.531 trillion;
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $1.680 trillion;
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[A]: $135 billion;
Percentage growth since 2008[A]: 9%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] These columns do not include $6 billion in research and
development and $9 billion in procurement cost changes for the
Ballistic Missile Defense System. DOD does not consider these
adjustments to represent cost growth because the program has been
allowed to add 2 years of new funding with each biennial budget.
[End of table]
GAO continues to find that newer programs are demonstrating higher
levels of knowledge at key decision points, but most are still not
fully adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition approach, putting them
at a higher risk for cost growth and schedule delays. For the programs
GAO assessed in depth, GAO found that a lack of technology maturity,
changes to requirements, increases in the scope of software
development, and a lack of focus on reliability were all
characteristics of programs that exhibited poorer performance outcomes.
Last year GAO reported that DOD had begun to incorporate acquisition
reforms that require programs to invest more time and resources at the
beginning of the acquisition process refining concepts through early
systems engineering and building prototypes before beginning system
development. Many, but not all, planned acquisition programs are
adopting these practices. As GAO has previously recommended, more
consistently applying a knowledge-based approach, as well as improving
implementation of acquisition reforms, can help DOD achieve better
outcomes for its portfolio of major weapon system programs.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-233SP] or key
components. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202)
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Foreword:
Letter:
Observations on DOD's 2010 Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio:
Observations on Factors That Can Affect Program Outcomes:
Observations from Our Assessment of Knowledge Attained by Key
Junctures in the Acquisition Process:
Observations about DOD's Implementation of Recent Acquisition Reforms:
Assessments of Individual Programs:
Two-Page Assessments of Individual Programs:
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite:
AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM):
Apache Block III (AB3):
Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Army IAMD):
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 1:
BMDS: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
BMDS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS):
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP):
CH-53K - Heavy Lift Replacement:
CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier:
DDG 1000 Destroyer:
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE):
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter):
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T):
Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B):
Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA:
GPS III OCX Ground Control Segment:
Gray Eagle:
Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT):
Intelligent Munitions System-Scorpion:
Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM):
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM):
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV):
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS):
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS):
Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System (AMF
JTRS):
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radios (GMR):
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form
Fit (HMS):
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
Littoral Combat Ship-Mission Modules:
LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship:
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform:
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):
Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT):
P-8A Poseidon:
PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined Aggregate
Program (CAP) Fire Unit:
Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System:
Ship to Shore Connector (SSC):
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II:
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program:
Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM):
Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV):
Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774):
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2:
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3:
One-Page Assessments of Individual Programs:
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR):
B-2 Defensive Management System (DMS) Modernization:
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 2:
BMDS: Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB):
BMDS: Flexible Target Family (FTF):
C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA):
DDG 51 Destroyer:
Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS):
Enhanced Polar System (EPS):
F-22A Raptor:
H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z):
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV):
KC-X Program:
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):
Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Aircraft Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-
D):
Nett Warrior Increment I:
Ohio-Class Replacement (OR)/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent:
Space Fence:
Stryker Modernization (SMOD):
Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR):
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey):
Presidential Helicopter (VXX):
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs over Time:
Appendix III: Current and Baseline Cost Estimates for DOD's 2010
Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs:
Appendix IV: Knowledge-Based Acquisition Practices:
Appendix V: Technology Readiness Levels:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
184:
Tables:
Table 1: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs over the Past 2 Years:
Table 2: Changes in Total Acquisition Cost and Program Acquisition
Unit Cost for 10 of the Highest-Cost Acquisition Programs:
Table 3: Program Office Composition for 44 DOD Programs, as of 2010:
Table 4: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs over Time:
Table 5: Current Cost Estimates and Baseline Cost Estimates for DOD's
2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs:
Figures:
Figure 1: Programs Meeting DOD, OMB, and GAO Cost Performance Metrics:
Figure 2: Change in Planned Quantities and Program Acquisition Unit
Cost for the F-22 Raptor and DDG 51 Destroyer:
Figure 3: Relationship between Key Performance Parameter Changes,
Research and Development Cost Growth, and Delays in Achieving Initial
Operational Capabilities:
Figure 4: DOD's Acquisition Cycle and GAO Knowledge Points:
Figure 5: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by a Program
Beginning Engineering and Manufacturing Development since 2009:
Figure 6: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by Programs
Holding Their Critical Design Review since 2009:
Figure 7: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by Programs
Holding Their Production Decision since 2009:
Figure 8: Depiction of Notional Weapon System Knowledge as Compared
with Knowledge-Based Practices:
Abbreviations:
BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System:
DAMIR: Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval:
DOD: Department of Defense:
IAMD: Integrated Air and Missile Defense:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
NA: not applicable:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
RDT&E: research, development, test, and evaluation:
SAR: Selected Acquisition Report:
TRL: Technology Readiness Level:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Comptroller General of the United States:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
March 29, 2011:
Congressional Committees:
I am pleased to present GAO's ninth annual assessment of selected
weapon programs. This report provides a snapshot of how well the
Department of Defense (DOD) is planning and executing its major
defense acquisition programs--an area that is on GAO's high-risk list.
[Footnote 1] It comes at a time when DOD is pressing forward with
implementation of the weapon acquisition reforms put in place over the
past few years and searching for efficiencies that will allow it to
instill fiscal discipline into weapon programs and obtain better
buying power for the warfighter and taxpayer. These reforms and
efficiency initiatives are consistent with the recommendations we have
made over the years emphasizing the need for DOD to acquire greater
knowledge about programs' requirements, technology, and design before
they start; improve the realism of cost estimates for both ongoing and
new programs; and achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that are
affordable, feasible, and provide the best military value to the
warfighter.
To its credit, DOD has demonstrated a strong commitment, at the
highest levels, to address the management of its weapon system
acquisitions, and the department has started to reprioritize and
rebalance its weapon system investments. Since 2009, the Secretary of
Defense has proposed canceling or significantly curtailing weapon
programs, such as the Army's Future Combat System, which he
characterized as too costly or no longer relevant for current
operations. Congress's support for several of the recommended
terminations indicates a willingness to make difficult choices on
individual weapon systems and DOD's major defense acquisition program
portfolio as a whole.
The focus of this year's report is slightly different than in years
past. We still provide information on the cumulative cost growth
experienced by the 98 programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio of major
defense acquisition programs, but much of our cost analysis examines
program performance over the last 2 years. This allows us to better
focus on the department's management of its major defense acquisition
programs since key acquisition reforms were put into place by Congress
and DOD. In addition, our cost analysis now explicitly accounts for
cost growth associated with changes in weapon system quantities,
identifies the programs that drive most of DOD's cost growth, and
assesses DOD against cost performance goals agreed to by DOD, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and GAO.
Our review this year indicates that DOD is making decisions that put
most new or planned programs in a better position to succeed, but
still faces challenges to effectively managing its current weapon
system programs. DOD can help assure it delivers the promised return
on investment for its weapon system spending by using the knowledge-
based acquisition approach that is now embodied in law and policy. Our
review this year found continued improvement in the knowledge DOD
officials had about programs' technologies, designs, and manufacturing
processes for programs that recently progressed through key points in
the acquisition process. However, most programs are still proceeding
with less knowledge than best practices suggest, putting them at
higher risk for cost growth and schedule delays. In fact, a majority
of DOD's major defense acquisition programs did not meet cost
performance goals agreed to by DOD, OMB, and GAO for total cost growth
over 2-year and 5-year periods and from their initial program
estimates. More consistently applying a knowledge-based approach, as
well as improving implementation of acquisition reforms, can help DOD
achieve better outcomes for its portfolio of major weapon system
programs.
While recent acquisition reforms have put newer programs in a better
position to field capabilities on-time and at the estimated cost,
existing programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter--which began
without following knowledge-based acquisition strategies--continue to
drive poor outcomes for DOD's major defense acquisition program
portfolio. Over the last 2 years, the total acquisition cost of the
programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio has grown by $135 billion (in fiscal
year 2011 dollars). About half of this growth can be associated with
quantity changes, versus poor management and execution problems, but
at least $70 billion is indicative of such problems. The cost growth
on the Joint Strike Fighter alone accounted for almost $34 billion of
that amount. Cost overruns of this magnitude on programs that have
already spent years in development can only be meaningfully offset by
reductions in planned capabilities or quantities. Serious
consideration by DOD of these types of tradeoffs will be essential to
getting cost growth under control.
This report provides insights that will help DOD place programs in a
better position to succeed, thus helping the department maximize its
investments. The current acquisition reform environment, coupled with
fiscal imperatives, constitute an opportunity to leverage the lessons
of the past and manage risks differently. This environment is shaped
by significant acquisition reform legislation, constructive changes in
DOD's acquisition policy, and initiatives by the administration,
including making difficult decisions on individual weapon systems. To
sustain momentum and make the most of this opportunity, it will be
essential that decisions to approve and fund acquisitions be
consistent with the reforms and policies aimed at achieving better
outcomes. Such decisions will need the support of both DOD and
Congress.
Signed by:
Gene L. Dodaro:
Comptroller General of the United States:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
March 29, 2011:
Congressional Committees:
This is GAO's ninth annual assessment of selected Department of
Defense (DOD) weapon programs and the third in response to the mandate
in the joint explanatory statement to the DOD Appropriations Act,
2009.[Footnote 2] This report provides a snapshot of how well DOD is
planning and executing its weapon programs--an area that is on GAO's
high-risk list. Congress and DOD have long explored ways to improve
the acquisition of major weapon systems, yet poor program outcomes
persist. In the past 2 years, we have reported improvements in the
knowledge programs attained about technologies, design, and
manufacturing processes at key points during the acquisition process.
However, we have found that most programs continue to proceed with
less knowledge than recommended, putting them at higher risk for cost
growth and schedule delays. Recent reforms place additional emphasis
on applying knowledge-based acquisition practices, which, if
implemented, put programs in a better position to field capabilities
on time at the estimated cost.
This report includes (1) observations on the performance of DOD's
portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs, (2) data on
factors, such as performance requirements and software management,
that can affect program outcomes, (3) our assessment of the knowledge
attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of
40 weapon programs--primarily in development or the early stages of
production--from the 2010 portfolio, and (4) observations on the
extent to which DOD is implementing recent acquisition reforms.
There are three sets of programs on which our observations are
primarily based in this report. We assessed all 98 major defense
acquisition programs for our analysis of portfolio performance; 40
programs in development or early production for our analysis of
factors that can affect outcomes and knowledge attained by key
junctures; and 14 planned major defense acquisition programs for our
analysis of DOD's progress in implementing selected acquisition
reforms. To develop our observations on the performance of DOD's
portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs, we obtained cost,
schedule, and quantity data from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports
(SAR) and from the Defense Acquisition Management Information
Retrieval Purview system.[Footnote 3] For unit cost reporting, DOD
breaks several of these 98 programs into components. Therefore, some
of our analysis is based on 100 or 101 programs or components. To
analyze factors that can affect program outcomes and to assess how
well programs are adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition approach,
we examined a subset of 40 major defense acquisition programs and
components from DOD's 2010 portfolio that were in development or early
production as of June 2010. We submitted a questionnaire to program
offices to collect information on aspects of program management
including performance requirements, manufacturing planning, software
development, and program office staffing. All 40 major defense
acquisition programs we surveyed that were in development or early
production responded to our questionnaire. We also obtained
information on the extent to which they follow knowledge-based
practices for technology maturity, design stability, and production
maturity using a data collection instrument provided to 40 programs.
To examine the extent to which DOD is implementing recent acquisition
reforms, we used additional information from a questionnaire submitted
to 17 planned major defense acquisition programs approaching program
start; 14 of these planned programs responded. In addition to our
observations, we present one-or two-page assessments of 71 weapon
programs. We chose these 71 programs based on their estimated cost,
stage in the acquisition process, and congressional interest.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to March 2011 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains detailed
information on our scope and methodology.
Observations on DOD's 2010 Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio:
Since 2008, the number of programs in DOD's portfolio of major defense
acquisition programs has increased from 96 to 98, and DOD's total
planned investment in these programs has increased by $45 billion to
$1.68 trillion.[Footnote 4] Thirteen programs with a total estimated
cost of $174 billion left the portfolio.[Footnote 5] Fifteen programs
with an estimated cost of $77 billion entered the portfolio.[Footnote
6] These programs are smaller, on average, than those already in the
portfolio. Our analysis of the 98 programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio of
major defense acquisition programs allows us to make five observations
about the overall portfolio, as well as about the performance of
individual programs. First, the total cost of the programs in DOD's
portfolio has grown by about $135 billion, or 9 percent, over the last
2 years, of which about $70 billion cannot be attributed to quantity
changes. We focused on this 2-year period instead of program
performance against initial estimates in order to assess the
department's recent management of major defense acquisition programs.
[Footnote 7] Second, over half of the portfolio's total cost growth
over the last 2 years is driven by 10 of DOD's largest programs, which
are all in production. As these programs leave the portfolio through
completion or cancellation, their cost will leave with them. Third,
about half of the programs in the portfolio have experienced cost
increases that exceed cost performance goals agreed to by DOD, OMB,
and GAO.[Footnote 8] Fourth, almost 80 percent of the programs in the
portfolio have experienced an increase in unit cost when compared to
their original estimates, thereby reducing DOD's buying power on these
programs. Fifth, on average, the majority of cost growth materialized
after programs entered production, meaning they continued to
experience significant changes well after the programs and their costs
should have stabilized. Additional details about each of these
observations follow.
* The total cost of DOD's 2010 portfolio of major defense acquisition
programs has grown by $135 billion, or 9 percent, over the past 2
years, of which about $70 billion cannot be attributed to changes in
quantities of some weapon systems. As shown in table 1, since 2008,
the total cost to develop and procure all of the weapon systems in
this year's portfolio has increased by $135 billion, or 9 percent.
[Footnote 9] About $65 billion of that growth can be attributed to
quantity changes on 57 programs.[Footnote 10] The DDG 51 Destroyer,
Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, and C-17A aircraft
programs experienced the largest cost increases due to increased
quantities and account for almost half of that growth. The remaining
$70 billion in cost growth is not attributable to quantity changes.
For example, the procurement cost of the Joint Strike Fighter program
increased by $28 billion in the last 2 years without a change in
quantities. This type of cost growth could be indicative of production
problems and inefficiencies or flawed initial cost estimates.
Additionally, research and development costs increased by $15 billion
over the past 2 years. Five programs--the Joint Strike Fighter, CH-53K
Heavy Lift Replacement, F-22 Raptor, Space Based Infrared System High,
and Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite--accounted for 70
percent of this increase with each experiencing research and
development cost growth of over $1 billion. With the exception of CH-
53K, these programs are all in production, but are still incurring
additional research and development costs. For the most part, these
programs began with unrealistic business cases, which contributed to
these poor outcomes.[Footnote 11]
Table 1: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs over the Past 2 Years:
Fiscal year 2011 dollars:
Total estimated research and development cost;
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008[A]: $407 billion;
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $428 billion;
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[B]: $15 billion;
Percentage growth since 2008[B]: 5%.
Total estimated procurement cost;
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008[A]: $1.089 trillion;
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $1.219 trillion;
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[B]: $121 billion;
Percentage growth since 2008[B]: 11%.
Total estimated acquisition cost;
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008[A]: $1.531 trillion;
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $1.680 trillion;
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[B]: $135 billion;
Percentage growth since 2008[B]: 9%.
Average delay in delivering initial capabilities;
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[B]: 5 months;
Percentage growth since 2008[B]: 8%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: In addition to research and development and procurement costs,
total acquisition cost includes acquisition operation and maintenance
and system-specific military construction costs. Details on program
costs used for this analysis are provided in appendix III.
[A] The 2008 estimate includes costs for the 83 programs that are at
least 2 years old, and the first available estimate for the remaining
15 programs that are new to the 2010 portfolio.
[B] The portfolio cost columns include the reported cost of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS); however, the portfolio cost
growth columns do not include $6 billion in research and development
and $9 billion in procurement cost changes for the BMDS. DOD does not
consider these adjustments to represent cost growth because the
program has been allowed to add 2 years of new funding with each
biennial budget.
[End of table]
In addition to higher costs, programs in the 2010 portfolio have also
experienced additional delays within the past 2 years. The average
delay in delivering initial capabilities increased by 5 months. When
examined from a longer-term perspective, the average delay in
delivering initial capabilities is 22 months for these programs when
measured against their first full estimates. See appendix II for our
analysis of cost growth and delays in delivering initial capabilities
against first full estimates for DOD's 2010 portfolio of major defense
acquisition programs.
* Ten of DOD's largest acquisition programs account for over half the
portfolio's total acquisition cost growth over the past 2 years. DOD's
largest programs represent more than half of its total investment in
major defense acquisition programs. These programs range in age from 3
to 32 years; all 10 are in production; and 8 have attained initial
operational capability. Collectively, the estimated cost of these
programs is $853 billion. These 10 programs account for $79 billion in
cost growth over the last 2 years, or over half of the $135 billion in
total cost growth for this period. Of the $79 billion in cost growth,
$35 billion is attributable to increased purchases--primarily of the C-
17A aircraft, DDG 51 Destroyer, and Joint Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected family of vehicles, which has been in high demand because of
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. When examined from a more
historical perspective, the total acquisition cost of these 10
programs has grown by $196 billion over their first full estimates,
which is almost half of the $402 billion in total cost growth for the
2010 portfolio. As these programs leave the portfolio through
completion or cancellation, their cost will leave with them. While
some of these programs are nearing the end of their procurement,
others such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Virginia Class Submarine, V-
22, and CVN 21 will continue to demand large amounts of annual
funding. Table 2 provides a summary of 10 of the largest DOD
acquisition programs.
Table 2: Changes in Total Acquisition Cost and Program Acquisition
Unit Cost for 10 of the Highest-Cost Acquisition Programs:
Program: Joint Strike Fighter;
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008
estimate: $249,690;
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $283,674;
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $33,984;
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
2008 estimate: $101.7;
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $115.5;
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2
years: 13.6%.
Program: DDG 51 Destroyer;
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008
estimate: $77,382;
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $94,344;
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $16,961;
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
2008 estimate: $1,248.1;
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $1,328.8;
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2
years: 6.5%.
Program: C-17A Globemaster III;
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008
estimate: $75,046;
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $82,347;
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $7,301;
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
2008 estimate: $395.0;
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $369.3;
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2
years: -6.5%.
Program: Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774);
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008
estimate: $83,194;
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $82,193;
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: -$1,002;
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
2008 estimate: $2,773.1;
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $2,739.8;
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2
years: -1.2%.
Program: F-22 Raptor;
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008
estimate: $75,200;
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $77,393;
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $2,193;
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
2008 estimate: $408.7;
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $411.7;
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2
years: 0.7%.
Program: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey);
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008
estimate: $56,659;
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $56,061;
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: -$598;
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
2008 estimate: $123.7;
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $122.4;
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 years:
-1.1%.
Program: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet;
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008
estimate: $52,824;
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $54,625;
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $1,801;
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
2008 estimate: $107.1;
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $106.1;
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2
years: -1.0%.
Program: Trident II Missile;
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008
estimate: $50,611;
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $51,410;
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $799;
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
2008 estimate: $90.2;
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $91.6;
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2
years: 1.6%.
Program: Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP);
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008
estimate: $22,792;
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $36,375;
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $13,583;
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
2008 estimate: $1.5;
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $1.6;
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2
years: 7.2%.
Program: CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier;
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008
estimate: $30,513;
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $34,186;
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $3,673;
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
2008 estimate: $10,171.0;
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $11,395.2;
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2
years: 12.0%.
Program: Total;
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008
estimate: $773,911;
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $852,607;
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $78,696;
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
2008 estimate: [Empty];
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: [Empty];
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2
years: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Figures may not add due to rounding.
[End of table]
* Fewer than half of the programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio are meeting
established performance metrics for cost growth. In December 2008,
DOD, working with OMB and GAO, developed a set of outcome metrics and
goals to measure program performance over time. As shown in figure 1,
less than half of the programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio met the total
acquisition cost growth goals that were set.[Footnote 12] The metrics
also show that those programs experiencing significant cost growth--
more than 15 percent over initial estimates--dominate DOD's portfolio,
representing about 72 percent of DOD's total investment in its major
defense acquisition programs.[Footnote 13]
Figure 1: Programs Meeting DOD, OMB, and GAO Cost Performance Metrics:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph and pie-chart]
2-year comparison, less than 4% growth:
Programs that meet criteria: 49;
Programs that do not meet criteria: 51.
5-year comparison, less than 10% growth:
Programs that meet criteria: 49;
Programs that do not meet criteria: 51.
Baseline comparison, less than 15% growth:
Programs that meet criteria: 44;
Programs that do not meet criteria: 57.
Percent of DOD‘s total investment in major defense acquisition
programs:
Programs that meet criteria: 28%;
Programs that do not meet criteria: 72%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: The number of programs represents those in the 2010 portfolio--
those with December 2009 SARs--which break down several programs into
smaller elements for reporting purposes. One program, Airborne Signals
Intelligence Payload (ASIP)-Baseline, was not included in 2-year and 5-
year comparisons because data were not available to make those
comparisons.
[End of figure]
* DOD's buying power has been reduced for almost 80 percent of its
portfolio of major defense acquisition programs. Of the 100 programs
or components in DOD's 2010 portfolio that reported program
acquisition unit cost data, 79 are planning to deliver capabilities at
higher unit costs than originally estimated, while only 21 are
planning to deliver capabilities at or below initial estimates.
[Footnote 14] We did not examine whether these programs delivered a
lower or higher level of performance than initially promised. To
quantify the change in DOD's buying power, we examined changes in
program acquisition unit cost and quantities.[Footnote 15] An example
of a program that experienced reduced buying power is the F-22 Raptor.
Despite a 70 percent reduction in quantities for the program, total
acquisition costs have only decreased by 14 percent, due to research
and development and average procurement unit cost increases. As a
result, program acquisition unit costs for the F-22 Raptor have almost
tripled, from $139 million to $412 million per airplane. For the
current 188 aircraft program, the $273 million increase per plane
translates to $51.3 billion in lost buying power for the F-22 program
as a whole. Conversely, some programs are planning to deliver more
quantities than planned at a lower program acquisition unit cost,
which translates into increased buying power for DOD. For example,
despite research and development costs almost tripling and the total
program cost increasing by $79 billion, the DDG 51 Destroyer's program
acquisition unit cost has decreased by about 20 percent, because it
has spread out those research and development costs over significantly
higher quantities and its average procurement unit cost has decreased
over time. For the currently planned fleet of 71 ships, the $333
million reduction per ship corresponds to $24 billion in increased
buying power for the program as a whole.
Figure 2: Change in Planned Quantities and Program Acquisition Unit
Cost for the F-22 Raptor and DDG 51 Destroyer:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 vertical bar graphs]
F-22 Raptor:
Baseline estimate:
Total quantity: 648;
Program acquisition unit cost: $139 million.
Current estimate:
Total quantity: 188;
Program acquisition unit cost: $412 million.
DDG 51 Destroyer:
Baseline estimate:
Total quantity: 9;
Program acquisition unit cost: $1,662 billion.
Current estimate:
Total quantity: 71;
Program acquisition unit cost: $1,329 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
* On average, the majority of cost growth materialized after programs
entered production, meaning they continued to experience significant
changes well after the programs and their costs should have
stabilized. For the 56 major defense acquisition programs in DOD's
2010 portfolio that had production cost estimates as of the end of
2009, we found that the average program experienced the majority of
its research and development and procurement cost growth after its
production decision. Fifty-two percent of the average program's
research and development cost growth was incurred after production
start. Additionally, 65 percent of the average program's procurement
cost growth materialized after production start. On average, these
programs are 14 years old. Given the age of the programs in this
group, most of them were started before DOD acquisition polices were
revised to promote a knowledge-based, evolutionary acquisition
approach. Therefore, newer programs that follow a knowledge-based
approach may be better positioned to avoid cost growth this late in
the acquisition cycle.
Observations on Factors That Can Affect Program Outcomes:
For 40 individual weapon programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio, we
collected and assessed data on DOD's management of requirements,
software, and program office staffing. We previously reported that
both requirements changes and increases in the scope of software
development were associated with poor program outcomes.[Footnote 16]
We found similar results this year. Our analysis of the data allows us
to make three observations. First, over half of the programs in our
assessment made a change to a key performance requirement after
development start and experienced higher levels of cost growth and
longer schedule delays than programs with unchanged requirements.
Second, half of the programs in our assessment that provided data on
software lines of code saw the scope of software development increase
after development start, which also corresponded with poorer outcomes.
Third, programs continue to use contractors to make up for staffing
shortfalls, though programs' reliance on nongovernment personnel has
declined from last year's assessment. Additional details about each of
these observations follow.
* Programs that modified key performance requirements after
development start experienced higher levels of cost growth and longer
delays in delivering capabilities. Of the 39 programs in our current
assessment that reported tracking requirements changes since
development start, 21 reported having had at least one change to a key
performance parameter--a top-level requirement. Specifically, 10 of
the 21 programs reported adding or enhancing a key performance
parameter; 3 of the 21 programs reported reducing, deferring, or
deleting a key performance parameter; and 8 of the 21 programs
reported making both types of changes to key performance parameters.
Most of the programs that experienced requirements changes are
programs that started prior to 2005. While changing requirements
creates instability and, therefore, can adversely affect program
outcomes, it is also possible that some programs experiencing poor
outcomes may be decreasing program requirements in an effort to
prevent further cost growth. As shown in figure 3, programs with
changes to performance requirements experienced roughly four times
more growth in research and development costs and three to five times
greater schedule delays compared to programs with unchanged
requirements. Similarly, programs with increases to key system
attributes--lower level, but still crucial requirements of the system--
experienced greater, albeit less pronounced, cost growth and schedule
delays than other programs.
Figure 3: Relationship between Key Performance Parameter Changes,
Research and Development Cost Growth, and Delays in Achieving Initial
Operational Capabilities:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Programs with decreased, deferred, or deleted requirements (11
programs):
Average increase in research and development costs: 84%;
Average increase in length of acquisition cycle: 40%.
Programs with new or enhanced requirements (18 programs):
Average increase in research and development costs: 75%;
Average increase in length of acquisition cycle: 27%.
Programs with no change in requirements (18 programs):
Average increase in research and development costs: 18%;
Average increase in length of acquisition cycle: 8%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Programs that had both increases and decreases in key
performance parameters are included in both categories. Cost and
schedule data were not available for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff
Missile Extended Range variant, which had a new or enhanced
requirement.
[End of figure]
* Substantial increases in the scope of software development efforts
after development start also correspond to higher cost growth and
longer schedule delays. In our last several assessments, we reported
that programs experiencing more growth in software lines of code since
development start had higher development cost growth and longer
schedule delays than other programs. Similarly, for the 25 programs in
our current assessment that reported data on lines of code, we found
that increases in total lines of code after development start
correlate highly with both increases in research and development costs
and longer delays in achieving initial operational capability. Over
half of these programs, or 14 of 25, estimated that the number of
lines of code required for the system to function has grown or will
grow by 25 percent or more. These programs tend to be those that began
development more than 5 years ago. Newer programs have also
experienced some software growth, though it has been less severe, on
average. In addition to measuring growth in software lines of code, we
have previously reported that collecting earned value management data
for software development is a good management practice. Thirty-two of
the 40 programs in our assessment reported collecting such data to
help manage software development by allowing visibility into schedule
and cost performance of software. These programs generally had
software efforts that were more than twice as large, on average, as
those programs that reported not collecting earned value data for
software development. Finally, we have previously reported that
tracking and capturing software defects in-phase is important because
discovering defects out of phase can cause expensive rework later in
programs. For the 21 programs that reported collecting some type of
software defect data, on average, only 69 percent of the defects were
corrected in the phase of software development in which they occurred.
* Programs continue to use contractors to make up for staffing
shortfalls, but reliance on nongovernment personnel has decreased.
Congress and DOD have made it a priority to ensure the acquisition
workforce has the capacity, personnel, and skills needed to properly
perform its mission. Most programs, however, continue to struggle to
fill all staff positions authorized. Specifically, 36 of the 44
programs we surveyed reported having been authorized all the positions
they requested, but a majority--23 programs--were unable to fill all
of them.[Footnote 17] A majority of programs we assessed reported that
they are in the process of staffing unfilled positions. Several cited
delays and difficulty in finding qualified candidates as reasons for
not being able to fill these positions. Additionally, almost all
programs--39 of 44--reported using support contractors to make up for
shortfalls in government personnel or capabilities. Program offices'
reliance on contractors has decreased since last year's assessment. As
shown in table 3, more than half (55 percent) of all program office
staff for the 44 programs in our assessment were government personnel--
a reversal of the downward trend in the percentage of government
personnel that we have reported in the previous 3 years.[Footnote 18]
The percentage of support contractors declined in every discipline.
Support contractors still fill the majority of administrative support
positions; however, the greatest numbers of support contractors
continue to be in engineering and technical positions.
Table 3: Program Office Composition for 44 DOD Programs, as of 2010:
Percentage of staff: Military personnel;
Program management: 30%;
Engineering: 7%;
Contracting: 6%;
Business functions: 3%;
Administrative support: 8%;
Other: 11%;
Total: 10%.
Percentage of staff: Civilian government;
Program management: 43%;
Engineering: 45%;
Contracting: 84%;
Business functions: 57%;
Administrative support: 30%;
Other: 25%;
Total: 46%.
Percentage of staff: Total government;
Program management: 73%;
Engineering: 52%;
Contracting: 90%;
Business functions: 60%;
Administrative support: 37%;
Other: 36%;
Total: 55%.
Percentage of staff: Support contractors;
Program management: 27%;
Engineering: 40%;
Contracting: 10%;
Business functions: 38%;
Administrative support: 61%;
Other: 64%;
Total: 39%.
Percentage of staff: Other nongovernment[A];
Program management: 0%;
Engineering: 8%;
Contracting: 0%;
Business functions: 2%;
Administrative support: 2%;
Other: 0%;
Total: 6%.
Percentage of staff: Total nongovernment;
Program management: 27%;
Engineering: 48%;
Contracting: 10%;
Business functions: 40%;
Administrative support: 63%;
Other: 64%;
Total: 45%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
[A] Other nongovernment includes federally funded research and
development center and university-affiliated employees.
[End of table]
Observations from Our Assessment of Knowledge Attained by Key
Junctures in the Acquisition Process:
Good acquisition outcomes require the use of a knowledge-based
approach to product development that demonstrates high levels of
knowledge before significant commitments are made. In essence,
knowledge supplants risk over time. In our past work examining weapon
acquisition issues and best practices for product development, we have
found that leading commercial firms pursue an acquisition approach
that is anchored in knowledge, whereby high levels of product
knowledge are demonstrated by critical points in the acquisition
process.[Footnote 19] On the basis of this work, we have identified
three key knowledge points during the acquisition cycle--development
start; design review, which occurs during engineering and
manufacturing development; and production start--at which programs
need to demonstrate critical levels of knowledge to proceed. Figure 4
compares DOD acquisition milestones with the timing of the three
knowledge points.
Figure 4: DOD's Acquisition Cycle and GAO Knowledge Points:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Technology Development:
DOD acquisition milestones: Development start (milestone B);
GAO knowledge points: Knowledge point 1: Technologies and resources
match requirements.
Engineering and manufacturing development: Integration:
GAO knowledge points: Knowledge point 2: Design performs as expected.
Engineering and manufacturing development: Demonstration:
GAO knowledge points: Knowledge point 3: Production can meet cost,
schedule, and quality targets.
Production:
DOD acquisition milestones: Production start (milestone C).
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
The building of knowledge consists of information that should be
gathered at these three critical points over the course of a program:
* Knowledge point 1: Resources and requirements match. Achieving a
high level of technology maturity by the start of system development
is an important indicator of whether this match has been made. This
means that the technologies needed to meet essential product
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended
environment. In addition, the developer has completed a preliminary
design of the product that shows the design is feasible.
* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when
a program determines that a product's design will meet customer
requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability targets. A
best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-level
critical design review, usually held midway through system
development. Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings
at this point or 100 percent of the 3D product models for ships at
fabrication start provides tangible evidence that the product's design
is stable, and a prototype demonstration shows that the design is
capable of meeting performance requirements.
* Knowledge point 3: Manufacturing processes are mature. This point is
achieved when it has been demonstrated that the developer can
manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A
best practice is to ensure that all critical manufacturing processes
are in statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable,
and capable of consistently producing parts within the product's
quality tolerances and standards--at the start of production.
A knowledge-based acquisition approach is a cumulative process in
which certain knowledge is acquired by key decision points before
proceeding. In other words, demonstrating technology maturity is a
prerequisite for moving forward into system development, during which
the focus should be on design and integration. Additional details
about key practices at each of the knowledge points can be found in
appendix IV.
For 40 individual weapon programs in development and early production
in DOD's 2010 portfolio, we assessed the knowledge attained by key
junctures in the acquisition process. In particular, we focused on the
17 programs that progressed through these key acquisition points since
2009 and evaluated their adherence to knowledge-based practices. While
we continue to find that newer programs are demonstrating higher
levels of knowledge at key decision points, most are still not fully
adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition approach, putting them at a
higher risk for cost growth and schedule delays.[Footnote 20] Only one
program in our assessment began system development since 2009, and it
did so with all its critical technologies nearing maturity, in
accordance with DOD and statutory requirements. However, it did not
fully mature its critical technologies before beginning development,
in accordance with knowledge-based practices, and only three nonship
programs in our assessment had done so by development start. Six of
nine programs that held a critical design review since 2009 did so
with a stable design; however, these programs did not implement other
practices that increase confidence that the design is stable and
capable of meeting performance requirements. Finally, almost all
programs that held a production decision since 2009 identified key
product characteristics and critical manufacturing processes; however,
none of the programs demonstrated that critical manufacturing
processes were in control and only half tested production-
representative prototypes prior to this decision. Additional details
about these observations follow.
* The one program in our assessment that began development since 2009
did so with all its technologies nearing maturity, but few programs
overall began development with fully mature technologies. The Army's
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) program began development in
2009 with all critical technologies at least nearing maturity--that
is, demonstrated in a relevant environment--in accordance with DOD and
statutory requirements,[Footnote 21] but did not demonstrate them in a
realistic environment as GAO has recommended.[Footnote 22] Our
analysis of the 26 nonship programs in our assessment that provided
technology data shows that only three of these programs began
development with fully mature technologies--that is, demonstrated in a
realistic environment. Our analysis also shows that mature
technologies are associated with improved program outcomes.
Specifically, the 3 programs that began development with fully mature
technologies have experienced 4 percent less growth in research and
development costs over their first estimates, on average, compared to
the 11 programs that began development with all technologies at least
nearing maturity, and 33 percent less growth, on average, than the 12
programs with at least one immature technology at the start of system
development. In addition, as shown in figure 5, the IAMD program did
not implement other knowledge-based practices before beginning
development, including holding a program-level preliminary design
review and constraining the length of system development. We have
previously reported that before starting development, programs should
hold key system engineering events, such as the preliminary design
review, to ensure that requirements are defined and feasible and that
the proposed design can meet those requirements within cost, schedule,
and other system constraints.[Footnote 23] IAMD did hold a system
requirements review and a system functional review before development
start, which is a major improvement over other programs in our
assessment, which held these reviews, on average, 18 months and 25
months after development start, respectively. Knowledge-based
acquisition practices also recommend that a system or increment be
developed in 5 to 6 years or fewer.[Footnote 24] Further, DOD
acquisition policy states that a condition for exiting technology
development is that a system or increment can be developed for
production within a short time frame, defined as normally less than 5
years for weapons systems. Constraining development time increases the
predictability of funding needs and the likelihood of program success.
While IAMD plans to follow an incremental approach, system development
will take almost 7 years.
Figure 5: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by a Program
Beginning Engineering and Manufacturing Development since 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Knowledge-based practices at development start: Knowledge point 1:
Mature all critical technologies:
IAMD: Practice not implemented by program.
Hold system requirements review:
IAMD: Practice implemented by program.
Hold system functional review:
IAMD: Practice not implemented by program.
Hold preliminary design review:
IAMD: Practice not implemented by program[A].
Constrain development phase to 6 years or less:
IAMD: Practice not implemented by program.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] The IAMD program received a waiver for the requirement to hold a
preliminary design review before beginning system development.
[End of figure]
* Six of nine programs in our assessment that held a critical design
review since 2009 did so with a stable design; however, these programs
did not implement other knowledge-based practices to increase
confidence that the design is stable. Knowing a product's design is
stable before system demonstration reduces the risk of costly design
changes occurring during the manufacturing of production-
representative prototypes--when investments in acquisitions become
more significant. The overall design knowledge that programs have
demonstrated at their critical design review has increased over the
last few years, and six of nine programs that held a design review
since 2009 did so with a stable design. However, as shown in figure 6,
none of the nine programs in our assessment that held their critical
design review since 2009 demonstrated that their design is capable of
meeting performance requirements by testing an integrated prototype
before the design review. We have previously reported that early
system prototypes are useful to demonstrate design stability and that
the design will work and can be built. On average, the nine programs
tested or plan to test an integrated prototype 13 months after the
critical design review, which is an improvement over the 31-month
average we reported in last year's assessment.
Figure 6: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by Programs
Holding Their Critical Design Review since 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Knowledge-based practices at development start: Knowledge point 2:
Mature all critical technologies:
AB3: Practice not implemented by program;
AMF JTRS: Practice not implemented by program;
CH-53K: Practice not implemented by program;
FAB-T: Practice not implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program;
JPALS: Practice not implemented by program;
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice implemented by program;
Reaper: Practice implemented by program.
Release at least 90 percent of design drawings:
AB3: Practice not implemented by program;
AMF JTRS: Practice implemented by program;
CH-53K: Practice implemented by program;
FAB-T: Practice not implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program;
JPALS: Practice implemented by program;
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice implemented by program;
Reaper: Practice implemented by program.
Test a system-level integrated prototype:
AB3: Practice not implemented by program;
AMF JTRS: Practice not implemented by program;
CH-53K: Practice not implemented by program;
FAB-T: Practice not implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice not implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program;
JPALS: Practice not implemented by program;
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice not implemented by program;
Reaper: Practice not applicable or information not available.
Use a reliability growth curve:
AB3: Practice not implemented by program;
AMF JTRS: Practice not implemented by program;
CH-53K: Practice not implemented by program;
FAB-T: Practice not implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice not implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program;
JPALS: Practice implemented by program;
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice implemented by program;
Reaper: Practice not implemented by program.
Conduct producibility assessments to identify manufacturing risks for
key technologies:
AB3: Practice implemented by program;
AMF JTRS: Practice implemented by program;
CH-53K: Practice implemented by program;
FAB-T: Practice not applicable or information not available;
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program;
JPALS: Practice not applicable or information not available;
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice implemented by program;
Reaper: Practice not applicable or information not available.
Complete failure modes and effects analysis:
AB3: Practice implemented by program;
AMF JTRS: Practice implemented by program;
CH-53K: Practice implemented by program;
FAB-T: Practice implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program;
JPALS: Practice not applicable or information not available;
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice implemented by program;
Reaper: Practice not applicable or information not available.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Many of these programs are also still concurrently developing
technologies and finalizing designs, which can lead to cost and
schedule inefficiencies and rework. Of the nine programs, only three
had fully matured all critical technologies at this point in the
acquisition cycle. The remaining programs accepted technologies into
their product's design based on no more than a laboratory
demonstration of basic performance, technical feasibility, and
functionality instead of a representative model or prototype in a
realistic environment.
Despite not demonstrating that their design is stable, many of these
programs are taking steps to plan for production. Almost all programs
that held their critical design review since 2009 reported completing
failure modes and effects analysis to identify potential failures and
early design fixes and conducting producibility assessments to
identify manufacturing risks for key technologies. However, only three
programs reported having a reliability growth curve at the time of the
critical design review. Reliability growth testing provides visibility
over how reliability is improving and uncovers design problems so
fixes can be incorporated before production begins. Our assessment of
programs in development or early production that provided cost data
shows that on average, programs using a reliability growth curve have
experienced about one-third the research and development cost growth
after development start than programs that have not used a reliability
growth curve.
* Almost all programs that held a production decision since 2009 took
steps to plan for manufacturing; however, none of the programs
demonstrated that critical manufacturing processes were in control,
and only half tested production-representative prototypes prior to
this decision. Capturing critical manufacturing knowledge before
entering production helps ensure that a weapon system will work as
intended and can be manufactured efficiently to meet cost, schedule,
and quality targets. Identifying key product characteristics and the
associated critical manufacturing processes is a key initial step to
ensuring production elements are stable and in control. As shown in
figure 7, almost all of the programs in our assessment that made a
production decision since 2009 reported conducting these activities
before entering production. However, none of the 10 programs that made
a production decision since 2009 demonstrated that their critical
manufacturing processes were in statistical control at production
start.[Footnote 25] Bringing processes under statistical control
reduces variations in parts manufacturing, thus reducing the potential
for defects, and is generally less costly than performing extensive
inspection after a product is built.
Figure 7: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by Programs
Holding Their Production Decision since 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Knowledge-based practices at production decision: Knowledge point 3:
Mature all critical technologies:
AB3: Practice implemented by program;
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program;
E-2D AHE: Practice implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program;
Gray Eagle: Practice not implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program;
NMT: Practice implemented by program;
P-8A: Practice implemented by program;
SM-6: Practice implemented by program;
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice implemented by program.
Release at least 90 percent of design drawings:
AB3: Practice implemented by program;
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program;
E-2D AHE: Practice implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice not applicable or information not available;
Gray Eagle: Practice implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program;
NMT: Practice not applicable or information not available;
P-8A: Practice implemented by program;
SM-6: Practice not implemented by program;
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice not applicable or information not
available.
Identify key product characteristics:
AB3: Practice implemented by program;
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program;
E-2D AHE: Practice not implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice not applicable or information not available;
Gray Eagle: Practice implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program;
NMT: Practice implemented by program;
P-8A: Practice implemented by program;
SM-6: Practice implemented by program;
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice implemented by program.
Identify critical manufacturing processes:
AB3: Practice implemented by program;
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program;
E-2D AHE: Practice implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program;
Gray Eagle: Practice implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program;
NMT: Practice implemented by program;
P-8A: Practice implemented by program;
SM-6: Practice implemented by program;
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice not applicable or information not
available.
Demonstrate critical processes are in statistical control:
AB3: Practice not implemented by program;
C-130 AMP: Practice not implemented by program;
E-2D AHE: Practice not implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice not implemented by program;
Gray Eagle: Practice not implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program;
NMT: Practice not implemented by program;
P-8A: Practice not implemented by program;
SM-6: Practice not implemented by program;
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice not applicable or information not
available.
Demonstrate critical processes on a pilot production line:
AB3: Practice implemented by program;
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program;
E-2D AHE: Practice implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice not implemented by program;
Gray Eagle: Practice implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program;
NMT: Practice implemented by program;
P-8A: Practice implemented by program;
SM-6: Practice implemented by program;
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice not applicable or information not
available.
Test a production-representative prototype:
AB3: Practice implemented by program;
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program;
E-2D AHE: Practice implemented by program;
GPS IIIA: Practice not implemented by program;
Gray Eagle: Practice not implemented by program;
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program;
NMT: Practice implemented by program;
P-8A: Practice not implemented by program;
SM-6: Practice not implemented by program;
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice implemented by program.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Several programs also began production without knowledge they ought to
have gained much earlier in their acquisition process. One program--
Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT)--entered
production without mature technologies or a stable design. Another
program--Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System--also did not have mature
technologies by its production decision, while the Standard Missile-6
(SM-6) began production without completing its design. These programs
are at risk of continued cost growth.
Additionally, many of these programs are still not testing production-
representative prototypes before committing to production. We
previously reported that production and postproduction costs are
minimized when a fully integrated, capable prototype is demonstrated
to show that the system will work as intended in a reliable manner.
These benefits are maximized when tests are completed prior to a
production decision, because making design changes after production
begins can be both costly and inefficient. Moreover, DOD's December
2008 revision to its acquisition policy requires programs to test
production-representative articles before entering production. Only 5
of the 10 programs that held a production decision since 2009 reported
testing a production-representative prototype before their production
decision. However, 11 of the 13 programs that are scheduled to hold
their production decision after 2010 and provided data do plan to test
a fully configured prototype before that decision.
Observations about DOD's Implementation of Recent Acquisition Reforms:
Last year we reported that DOD had begun to incorporate recent
acquisition reforms into the strategies of new programs. These
reforms--in DOD's December 2008 revised acquisition policy, the Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, and recent defense
authorization acts--require programs to invest more time and resources
at the beginning of the acquisition process refining concepts through
early systems engineering and building prototypes before beginning
system development, among other requirements. In addition, for ongoing
programs, DOD policy and statute require establishment of annual
configuration steering boards to review all program requirements
changes as well as to make recommendations on proposed descoping
options that could help maintain a program's cost and schedule
targets. Our examination of the extent to which weapon systems are
adhering to recent acquisition reforms indicates that many, but not
all, programs are implementing these reforms.
Our assessment allows us to make five observations concerning DOD's
progress in implementing legislative and policy reforms. First, almost
all of the 14 planned major defense acquisition programs we reviewed
intend to hold preliminary design reviews before beginning
development, but fewer are taking other actions, such as developing
prototypes, that could improve their chances of success.[Footnote 26]
Second, seven of these programs reported making major cost, schedule,
or performance tradeoffs to-date, as required under a DOD and
statutory requirement that programs make appropriate tradeoffs before
beginning development. Third, six of the planned programs have
acquisition strategies that include competition after the start of
development. Fourth, of the 40 programs in our assessment that have
begun development or are in the early stages of production, about one-
third have not yet held a configuration steering board meeting, and
only five programs reported presenting descoping options at this
meeting. Finally, as part of DOD's effort to "do more without more,"
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics is beginning to implement a range of efficiency initiatives
that focus on affordability, tradeoffs, and portfolio reviews, and are
consistent with past GAO recommendations. Additional details about
these observations follow.
* Almost all of the planned major defense acquisition programs in our
assessment intend to conduct a preliminary design review before
development start, but fewer are taking other actions, such as
developing prototypes, that could improve their chances of success.
Thirteen of the 14 planned major defense acquisition programs we
reviewed intend to hold a preliminary design review,[Footnote 27] and
all 10 that provided dates for this review plan to hold it before
milestone B--the beginning of system development--as required by the
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. Nine of the 14 planned
programs intend to develop prototypes of the proposed weapon system or
a key system element before milestone B.[Footnote 28] Programs can
seek a waiver of the prototyping requirement, as provided by the
policy. Holding a preliminary design review before beginning
development can help ensure that program requirements are defined and
feasible, but by not developing prototypes, some programs might be
missing an opportunity to further reduce technical risk, refine
requirements, validate designs and cost estimates, and evaluate
manufacturing processes.
Programs can also put themselves in a better position to succeed by
implementing incremental acquisition strategies that limit the time in
development and constrain requirements. Seven of the 14 planned
programs in our assessment reported using DOD's preferred incremental,
or evolutionary, acquisition approach, while the other 7 programs
planned for a single-step-to-full-capability. The single-step-to-full-
capability approach affords few, if any, opportunities to
incrementally, and thus more quickly and inexpensively, adapt the
final system to the changing needs of the warfighter. Conversely, an
evolutionary acquisition strategy emphasizes a more flexible approach
that can help reduce risk because it delivers the weapon system in
more manageable increments. In addition, six of the nine planned
programs in our assessment that provided data plan to deliver
capabilities in less than 6 years, the recommended time limit for
system development, while the remaining three programs are planning
for longer development periods. We have previously reported that
constraining development cycles increases the predictability of
funding needs and the likelihood of program success, while
unconstrained and lengthy cycle times lead to higher costs and
diminished military effectiveness.
* Half of the planned programs we reviewed reported making major cost,
schedule, or performance tradeoffs before beginning development. DOD
acquisition policy and statute require that the Milestone Decision
Authority certify, before a program begins development, that
appropriate tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives
have been made to ensure that the program is affordable. Seven of the
14 planned programs in our assessment reported making major cost,
schedule, or performance tradeoffs during the technology development
phase to-date. For example, in an effort to reduce cost, the Mobile
Landing Platform program reduced requirements for size, personnel
accommodations, and cargo fuel. The Joint Requirements Oversight
Council is also statutorily required to consider cost, schedule, and
performance tradeoffs when validating joint military requirements.
* Fewer than half of planned programs have acquisition strategies to
ensure competition throughout the acquisition cycle. The Weapon
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires that DOD ensure that
the acquisition strategy for each major defense acquisition program
includes measures to ensure competition, or the option of competition,
throughout the program's life cycle. These measures may include
developing competitive prototypes, dual-source contracting, and
periodic competitions for subsystem upgrades. Incorporating
competition throughout a program's life cycle can be used to drive
productivity and thereby reduce program costs. Six of the 14 planned
programs in our assessment reported having acquisition strategies that
call for competition post-milestone B at the system or subsystem level.
* About one-third of the major weapon programs in our assessment
reported that a configuration steering board meeting has not been held
for the program, and few program managers presented descoping options.
Under DOD's revised acquisition policy and in statute, ongoing
programs are required to conduct annual configuration steering boards
to review requirements changes and significant technical configuration
changes that have the potential to result in cost and schedule effects
on the program. Since January 2009, 10 programs in our assessment
reported changing either a key performance parameter or key system
attribute, but only 4 of these reported holding a configuration
steering board meeting during that period. In addition, as of June
2010, 12 of the 40 programs in our assessment reported never having
held a configuration steering board. In addition to conducting an
annual board meeting, the program manager is expected to present
descoping options that could reduce program costs or moderate
requirements. Only five programs in our assessment reported having
presented descoping options and four programs had their options
approved.
* The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics is beginning to implement a range of efficiency initiatives
that focus on affordability, tradeoffs, and portfolio reviews, and are
consistent with past GAO recommendations. In September 2010, the Under
Secretary issued a memorandum intent on obtaining greater efficiency
and productivity in defense spending. Several of the proposed
initiatives build on the recent acquisition reforms that DOD has
already begun to implement. For example, the memorandum emphasizes the
need to set shorter program timelines and manage to them to avoid
costly delays in delivering capability to the warfighter. To target
affordability, the memo directs program managers to treat
affordability as a requirement before programs are started. In
addition, the memo underscores the policy and statutory requirement
for making tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives
using systems engineering analysis prior to system development. To
ensure competition throughout a program's life cycle, the memo
proposes requiring the presentation of a competitive strategy at each
program milestone. Finally, the Under Secretary proposed conducting
portfolio analyses to eliminate redundancies across programs,
providing the potential for substantial savings.
Assessments of Individual Programs:
This section contains assessments of individual weapon programs. Each
assessment presents data on the extent to which programs are following
a knowledge-based approach to system development and other program
information. In total, we present information on 71 weapon programs.
For 49 programs, we produced two-page assessments discussing
technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge obtained, as well as
other program issues. Each two-page assessment also contains a
comparison of total acquisition cost from the first full estimate for
the program to the current estimate. The first full estimate is
generally the cost estimate established at development start; however,
for a few programs that did not have such an estimate, we used the
estimate at production start instead. For shipbuilding programs, we
used their planning estimates if those estimates were available. For
programs that began as non-major defense acquisition programs, we used
the first full estimate available. Forty-one of these 49 two-page
assessments are of major defense acquisition programs, most of which
are in development or early production; 3 assessments are of
components of major defense acquisition programs, including elements
of MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense System; and 5 assessments are of
programs that were projected to become major defense acquisition
programs during or soon after our review. In addition, we produced one-
page assessments on the current status of 22 programs, which include
13 pre-major defense acquisition programs, 4 major defense acquisition
programs that are past their full-rate production decision, 2 elements
of MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense System, 1 major defense acquisition
program that was recently terminated, 1 major defense acquisition
program that is a commercially derived aircraft, and 1 technology
demonstration program.
How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed:
For our two-page assessments, we depict the extent of knowledge gained
by key points in a program using a stacked bar graph and provide a
narrative summary at the bottom of the first page of each assessment.
As illustrated in figure 8, the knowledge graph is based on three
knowledge points. The key indicators for the attainment of knowledge
are technology maturity (in orange), design stability (in green), and
production maturity (in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based
on the ideal attainment of the three types of knowledge at the three
knowledge points. The closer a program's attained knowledge is to the
best practice line, the more likely the weapon will be delivered
within estimated cost and schedule. A knowledge deficit at development
start--indicated by a gap between the technology maturity attained and
the best practice line--means the program proceeded with immature
technologies and faces a greater likelihood of cost and schedule
increases as risks are discovered and resolved.
Figure 8: Depiction of Notional Weapon System Knowledge as Compared
with Knowledge-Based Practices:
[Refer to PDF for image: graph illustration]
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
Depicted on the graph are three levels of attainment of product
knowledge:
Technology maturity;
Design and technology maturity;
Production, design, and technology maturity.
An ascending desired level of knowledge is depicted for the following:
Development start;
DOD design review;
GAO review;
Production decision.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
An interpretation of this notional example would be that system
development began with critical technologies that were partially
immature, thereby missing knowledge point 1, which is indicated by the
orange diamond. By the design review, technology knowledge had
increased, as indicated by the orange bar, but all critical
technologies were not yet mature; only 33 percent of the program's
design drawings were releasable to the manufacturer, as indicated by
the green bar. Therefore, knowledge point 2, which is indicated by the
green diamond, was not attained. At the time of GAO's review, this
program had matured all of its critical technologies and released
approximately 75 percent of its design drawings, as indicated by the
green bar. When the program plans to make a production decision, it
expects to have released all of its design drawings and have half of
its critical manufacturing processes in statistical control. The
expected knowledge at this future point is captured in the outlined
region marked "projection." This program is not projected to reach
knowledge point 3, which is indicated by the blue diamond, by the time
it makes a production decision. For shipbuilding programs, knowledge
point 1 occurs when a program awards a detailed design and
construction contract, and knowledge point 2 occurs when the lead ship
starts fabrication. We do not assess production maturity at knowledge
point 3 for shipbuilding programs.
[End of section]
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite:
Illustration: Source: © 2009 Lockheed Martin Corporation. All rights
reserved.
The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing
Milstar system with higher-capacity, survivable, jam-resistant,
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and
tactical warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission
control segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications
are acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international
program that includes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.
We assessed the satellite and mission control segments.
Concept:
Program start (4/99);
System development:
Development start: (9/01);
Design review (4/04);
Low-rate decision (9/08).
Production:
Production decision: (6/04);
First launch: (8/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Initial capability (TBD).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $566.8 million:
Procurement: $2,765.5 million:
Total funding: $3,332.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 2:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 10/2001: $4,843.9;
Latest 12/2009: $7,346.3;
Percent change: 51.7.
Procurement cost:
As of 10/2001: $1,432.6;
Latest 12/2009: $5,573.3;
Percent change: 289.0.
Total program cost:
As of 10/2001: $6,276.5;
Latest 12/2009: $12,919.6;
Percent change: 105.8.
Program unit cost:
As of 10/2001: $1,255.309;
Latest 12/2009: $2,153.272;
Percent change: 71.5.
Total quantities:
As of 10/2001: 5;
Latest 12/2009: 6;
Percent change: 20.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 10/2001: 111;
Latest 12/2009: 170;
Percent change: 53.2.
[End of table]
The first AEHF satellite (AEHF-1) was launched in August 2010;
however, an anomaly with the satellite's propulsion system will delay
the satellite from reaching its planned orbit and will affect the
launch dates of the two satellites currently in testing. According to
the program office, all 14 AEHF critical technologies are mature and
its design is stable. However, the program is investigating the cause
of the propulsion failure. We have not assessed the AEHF's production
maturity because the program office does not collect statistical
process control data. The Air Force plans to acquire six AEHF
satellites that are expected to be clones except for changes to
address obsolete parts, and is evaluating requirements and
alternatives for meeting future military satellite communication needs
beyond the sixth satellite.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 9/01;
DOD design review: 4/04;
Production decision: 6/04;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
AEHF Program:
Technology, Design, and Production Maturity:
According to the program office, all 14 AEHF critical technologies are
mature and its design is stable with all of its expected design
drawings released. However, the program office is investigating the
cause of a propulsion system failure on the first launched satellite.
The propulsion system was not a critical technology and did not
experience problems during prelaunch testing. We did not assess the
AEHF's production maturity because the program office does not collect
statistical process control data.
Other Program Issues:
AEHF-1 was launched in August 2010 on an Atlas V rocket; however, an
anomaly with the propulsion system will delay the satellite from
reaching its planned orbit and will affect the launch dates of the two
satellites currently in testing. According to Air Force officials, the
satellite separated from the rocket, as planned, and was expected to
reach its intended orbit in about 3 months using its liquid apogee
engine and hall current thrusters. The satellite's software aborted
the liquid apogee engine burns due to low acceleration of the
spacecraft, and this engine was rendered unusable because of the
propulsion system anomaly. The Air Force plans to use the propulsion
systems designed for controlling and repositioning the satellite to
raise the satellite into its planned orbit. As a result, the satellite
arrival on orbit will be delayed by about 7 to 9 months. Once the
satellite is in its designated orbit, the program office will conduct
about 100 days of satellite checkout and system testing before the
satellite becomes available for operations. The planned February 2011
launch of AEHF-2 was intended to provide enough time between launches
to allow the first satellite to reach orbit and complete on-orbit
checkout so any problems identified could be corrected in AEHF-2.
Following the same model, the program office will delay the AEHF-2
launch until (1) it is cleared for flight in light of the AEHF-1
propulsion system anomaly and (2) AEHF-1 is on orbit and tested. AEHF-
3 will launch about 8 months after AEHF-2. The program's initial
operational capability, which requires two on-orbit satellites to
achieve, will be delayed as well. The program office plans to complete
a review to identify the root cause of the propulsion system anomaly
by the end of 2010. After that, the program office will determine what
actions are required to clear AEHF-2 and AEHF-3 for launch.
The Air Force plans to procure three additional AEHF satellites--for a
total of six--which will be clones of the first three except for
obsolete parts. There will be an approximately 4-year break in
production between the third and fourth satellites. The program office
is working to resolve several obsolescence issues and has identified
between 12 and 15 flight boxes that have parts that are no longer
available from the original manufacturer. Program officials do not
anticipate encountering significant technical challenges, but
integrating, testing and requalifying the new parts will require
additional time and money. The notional launch dates for satellites
four through six are 2017, 2018, and 2020, respectively. The Air Force
is in the process of developing a new acquisition program baseline
that includes these satellites.
With the cancellation of the Transformational Satellite Communications
System (TSAT) program in April 2009, the Air Force is in the process
of reevaluating its military satellite communications requirements
beyond the sixth AEHF satellite. It plans to conduct an analysis of
alternatives to assess options for meeting future requirements,
including the possible use of commercial satellite communications.
Program Office Comments:
The AEHF program office provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM):
Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's AARGM is an air-to-ground-missile for carrier-based
aircraft designed to destroy enemy radio-frequency-enabled surface-to-
air defenses. The AARGM is an upgrade to the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-
Radiation Missile (HARM). It will utilize the existing HARM propulsion
and warhead sections, a modified control section, and a new guidance
section with Global Positioning System and improved targeting
capabilities. The program is following a phased approach for
development. We assessed Phase I.
Concept:
System development:
Development start (6/03);
Design review (3/06);
Production:
Low-rate decision (9/08);
GAO review (1/10);
Initial capability (TBD);
Full-rate decision (TBD).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: ATK Missile Systems Company:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $7.8 million:
Procurement: $1,018.5 million:
Total funding: $1,026.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,814:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
[Empty]; As of; 07/2003; Latest 07/2010; Percent change.
Research and development cost:
As of 7/2003: $627.8;
Latest 7/2010: $702.8;
Percent change: 11.9.
Procurement cost:
As of 7/2003: $949.4;
Latest 7/2010: $1,135.5;
Percent change: 19.6.
Total program cost:
As of 7/2003: $1,577.2;
Latest 7/2010: $1,838.3;
Percent change: 16.6.
Program unit cost:
As of 7/2003: $.881;
Latest 7/2010: $.958;
Percent change: 8.7.
Total quantities:
As of 7/2003: 1,790;
Latest 7/2010: 1,919;
Percent change: 7.2.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 7/2003: 85;
Latest 7/2010: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The AARGM program entered production in September 2008 with its
critical technologies mature and design stable, but without
demonstrating production maturity. Since then, the program has
experienced multiple test delays, which could affect the program's
planned delivery of initial operational capability in May 2011. The
program began operational testing in June 2010 after a 9-month delay
due to deficiencies in the missile's reliability and situational
awareness and concerns about the production-representativeness of test
missiles. The Navy halted operational testing in September 2010 after
hardware and software issues caused a series of missile failures.
According to Defense Contract Management Agency officials, the program
is working with the contractor to identify the cause of the failures
and develop corrective action plans.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 6/03;
DOD design review: 3/06;
Production decision: 9/08;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
AARGM Program:
Technology Maturity:
The AARGM program began system development in 2003 with its two
critical technologies--the millimeter wave software and radome--
nearing maturity. According to the program office, these technologies
were mature and demonstrated in a realistic environment when the
program entered production in September 2008. However, during
development tests, the program identified deficiencies related to the
missile's reliability and situational awareness that delayed the start
of operational testing. As a result of these deficiencies, the program
requested and received approval to defer demonstration of its
lethality requirement for a specific target in a specified scenario
until follow-on operational testing and evaluation. The Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), noted in its fiscal year 2009
assessment that software development challenges, including those
related to the millimeter wave, continue to pose a risk to the
program's schedule and the missile's reliability.
Design Maturity:
The design of the AARGM appears stable and all drawings were
releasable to manufacturing by the start of production.
Production Maturity:
The AARGM program's production processes were not mature when it
entered production in September 2008. According to the program office,
the contractor identified 18 critical manufacturing processes, of
which 5 are currently in statistical control. The program plans to
demonstrate that all 18 processes are mature during the second lot of
low-rate initial production. Since entering production, the program
has experienced multiple production delays and operational test
failures. According to Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and
DOT&E officials, the test failures were caused by both hardware and
software issues. The hardware failures involved multiple
subcontractors and were primarily attributed to poor parts quality.
DCMA officials said that the contractor is conducting detailed
supplier assessments to determine the cause of the failures and
formulate corrective action plans. According to DOD's manufacturing
readiness level deskbook, assessments of critical suppliers should be
performed before a program enters production. Due to the operational
test failures, the program halted missile deliveries. According to
DCMA officials, the program will return all delivered production
missiles and production-representative test rounds to the contractor
to implement any corrective actions. Prior to the test failures, the
AARGM program office had already been working with the contractor to
improve manufacturing planning, risk identification, and reporting. It
also included a requirement for the contractor to develop a detailed
manufacturing plan in the second low-rate production contract, awarded
in July 2010.
Other Program Issues:
The AARGM program has experienced multiple test delays, which could
affect the program's planned delivery of initial operational
capability in May 2011. The program began operational testing in June
2010 after a 9-month delay due in part to concerns from DOT&E about
the production-representativeness of test missiles. The Navy halted
operational testing in September 2010 after hardware and software
issues caused a series of missile failures. According to DOT&E, the
program plans to conduct additional developmental tests and a new
operational test readiness review in April 2011 before restarting
operational tests.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
Program Executive Office, with the support of the Office of the
Director of Air Warfare and the Commander, Operational Test and
Evaluation Force, decertified AARGM from operational testing as a
result of intermittent weapon failures and inaccurate weapon health
reporting to the aircrew. Upon decertification, the program
established a review team to assist in root cause analysis and system-
level assessments. The team found immature manufacturing processes and
software coding errors. A software development and test program is
underway and has demonstrated improved performance. Manufacturing
processes are being updated. The first rescreened missiles will enter
flight testing by December 2010. An integrated test phase has been
coordinated with DOT&E and the Commander, Operational Test and
Evaluation Force, to reduce risk upon reentering operational test. The
Italian Air Force remains committed to the program. Italian missile
deliveries begin in 2011. The Navy also provided technical comments,
which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Apache Block III (AB3):
Photograph: Source: U.S. Army.
The Army's Apache Block III (AB3) program will upgrade AH-64D Longbow
Apache helicopters. It is expected to improve performance, situational
awareness, lethality, survivability, interoperability, and the
prevention of friendly fire incidents. Each Apache goes to the factory
for hardware changes. Software improvements can be installed in the
field, which reduces the time an aircraft is away from the unit and
increases the training time for soldiers in the field. Upgraded AH-
64Ds are scheduled to enter service starting in 2011.
Concept:
System development:
Development start (6/03);
System design review: (1/08);
Production design review (3/09).
Production:
Low-rate decision (10/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Full-rate decision (7/12);
Initial capability (5/13).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $799.7 million:
Procurement: $8,726.3 million:
Total funding: $9,526.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 682:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 8/2006: $1,138.4;
Latest 7/2010: $1,629.6;
Percent change: 43.1.
Procurement cost:
As of 8/2006: $5,996.7;
Latest 7/2010: $11,112.6;
Percent change: 85.3.
Total program cost:
As of 8/2006: $7,135.1;
Latest 7/2010: $12,742.2;
Percent change: 78.6.
Program unit cost:
As of 8/2006: $11.852;
Latest 7/2010: $18.334;
Percent change: 54.7.
Total quantities:
As of 8/2006: 602;
Latest 7/2010: 695;
Percent change: 15.4.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 8/2006: 79;
Latest 7/2010: 82;
Percent change: 3.8.
[End of table]
Latest cost and quantities include 56 new-build helicopters.
In October 2010, the AB3 received approval to enter production with
mature critical technologies and a stable hardware design. AB3
upgrades involve a time-phased series of hardware and software-related
technical insertions. According to program officials, the design
reviews for the hardware portion of the program have been held, all
the expected design drawings are releaseable to manufacturing, and the
last two software-related design reviews are scheduled for fiscal
years 2012 and 2014. In May 2010, the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering, assessed the AB3 as ready for production using
engineering manufacturing readiness levels, a metric that includes
technology and design maturity and production readiness. The AB3
program experienced a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical
threshold in June 2010, due to the addition of 56 new-build
helicopters to the upgrade program.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 7/06;
DOD design review: 3/09;
Production decision: 10/10;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
AB3 Program:
Technology Maturity:
The AB3 program's one critical technology--an improved drive system--
is mature. This is the first time this technology will be used in a
helicopter transmission, and it is expected to provide more power and
be more reliable than the existing transmission. A developmental test
aircraft has successfully completed flight tests and has demonstrated
the maturity of the drive system in a realistic environment.
Design Maturity:
The AB3 hardware design is stable. AB3 upgrades involve a time-phased
series of hardware and software-related technical insertions. The
design reviews for the hardware portion of the program have been held
and all the expected design drawings are releasable to manufacturing.
According to program officials, the last two critical design reviews,
which are software-related, should not significantly affect the total
number of design drawings. These reviews are scheduled for fiscal
years 2012 and 2014--after upgraded AH-64Ds are scheduled to start to
enter service. According to program officials, the AB3 program uses a
contract provision requiring the completion of 85 to 90 percent of the
estimated design drawings for each design review as a mechanism for
ensuring design stability. In addition, the success of each design
review determines whether the program will move forward.
Production Maturity:
In October 2010, AB3 received approval to enter production. We did not
assess production maturity because the program has not started to
collect statistical process control data. However, the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering, assessed the AB3 as ready for
production in May 2010. The assessment used engineering manufacturing
readiness levels, a metric that includes technology and design
maturity and production readiness, as the basis for reaching this
conclusion.
Other Program Issues:
The AB3 program experienced a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the
critical threshold in June 2010 due to the addition of new-build
helicopters to the upgrade program. The original AB3 program involved
taking legacy aircraft and remanufacturing them with upgraded
capabilities. However, decreases in the numbers of legacy aircraft
available for remanufacture due to combat losses, combined with
increasing wartime demands and the addition of a 13th Combat Aviation
Brigade, has resulted in a new acquisition strategy that includes
acquiring 56 new-build aircraft. Since new-build Apaches cost three
times more than a remanufactured Apache, a cost breach occurred. As
part of its Nunn-McCurdy restructuring, the AB3 will be divided into
two separate major defense acquisition programs--one for
remanufactured aircraft and one for new builds. This division will
permit visibility into the cost, schedule, and performance of both
programs. Even after the program restructuring, risks remain in the
AB3 program. An analysis by DOD's Program Assessment and Root Cause
Analyses office noted that even though the AB3 contractor has
performed well on its development contract, increasing software
content, extensions of the development schedule, and the ability of
the contractor to provide production aircraft at prices consistent
with the existing program baseline, all pose risks for the current
program.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Army IAMD):
Photograph: Source: Northrop Grumman.
The Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) program is being
developed to network sensors and weapons and a common battle command
system across a single integrated fire control network to support the
engagement of air and missile threats. The IAMD Battle Command System
(IBCS) will provide control and management for IAMD sensors and
weapons, such as the Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated
Netted Sensor System and PATRIOT through an interface module that
supplies battle management data and enables networked operations.
Concept:
Technology development: (2/06);
System development:
Development start (12/09);
GAO review (11/10);
Design review (8/11).
Production:
Low-rate decision (12/14);
Initial capability (8/16).
Full-rate decision (5/17).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space & Mission Systems Corp:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,177.4 million:
Procurement: $3,382.6 million:
Total funding: $4,560.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 285:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 12/2009: $1,571.4;
Latest 12/2009: $1,571.4;
Percent change: 0.0.
Procurement cost:
As of 12/2009: $3,382.6;
Latest 12/2009: $3,382.6;
Percent change: 0.0.
Total program cost:
As of 12/2009: $4,954.0;
Latest 12/2009: $4,954.0;
Percent change: 0.0.
Program unit cost:
As of 12/2009: $16.737;
Latest 12/2009: $16.737;
Percent change: 0.0.
Total quantities:
As of 12/2009: 296;
Latest 12/2009: 296;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 12/2009: 80;
Latest 12/2009: 80;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
IAMD entered development in December 2009 with its four critical
technologies nearing maturity. However, according to program
officials, the technologies will not be fully mature until after the
design review in August 2011. As a result, the program will not have
demonstrated that the proposed design meets requirements until after
the design review, which puts it at risk for late design changes. The
platform the IBCS was originally planned to be fielded on will not be
available when production begins in 2014, but according to program
officials, an alternative has been selected. The cost and schedule of
the IAMD program may also be affected by an Army proposal to
substitute the IBCS for the current battle management system under
development for the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). If
this option is selected for any of the MEADS partners, the development
schedule for IAMD will need to be synchronized with MEADS.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 12/09;
GAO review; 11/10;
DOD design review: 8/11 (not assessed);
Production decision: 12/14 (not assessed).
[End of figure]
Army IAMD Program:
Technology Maturity:
IAMD entered development in December 2009 with its four critical
technologies--integrated battle command, integrated defense design,
integrated fire control network, and distributed track management--
nearing maturity. In August 2009, the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology approved a
technology readiness assessment that stated that all of the critical
technologies were tested in a relevant environment using digital
simulations. In addition, the integrated fire control network and the
distributed track management technologies were demonstrated through
hardware tests, and the integrated defense design was demonstrated
through a prototype. Program officials estimate that the technologies
will be mature by the IAMD production decision in 2014, but not by its
planned August 2011 design review.
Design Maturity:
The IAMD program is preparing for its August 2011 design review;
however, the risk of late and potentially costly design changes will
persist because the program will not have demonstrated that the
program's critical technologies are fully mature or the proposed
design meets requirements by then. The Army completed a partial
preliminary design review prior to development start for the IAMD and
its components. The IBCS preliminary design review is complete, and
the reviews for IAMD, the interface modules, and the overall
integration of the components were expected to be complete in November
2010. Officials stated that the Army expects to modify the IBCS design
because the platform it was planned to be fielded on--the High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle--will not be available when it
enters production in 2014. The Army and the contractor evaluated
alternatives and selected a chassis from the Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicles (FMTV) as a replacement. The program is now working on
integrating the FMTV chassis into the design for the IBCS.
Other Program Issues:
The cost and schedule of the IAMD program could be affected by an Army
proposal to substitute the IBCS for the Battle Management Command,
Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (BMC4I) system
under development for the MEADS program. According to Army officials,
a number of issues would need to be resolved before the proposal could
be adopted. These issues include a decision between the IBCS and BMC4I
contractors about whether the substitution is feasible and a decision
about whether to adopt it for any or all of the MEADS partners. If any
of the MEADS partners agree to the substitution, the development
schedule for IAMD will need to be synchronized with MEADS.
Specifically, IBCS would be needed for integration testing prior to
the MEADS low-rate initial production decision, currently planned for
November 2012.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army stated that the
IAMD program entered the engineering and manufacturing development
(EMD) phase in December 2009 after a competitive prototyping phase
lasting 15 months. During this phase, the competitors (Raytheon and
Northrop) developed IBCS prototypes which were demonstrated to the
government prior to the selection of one contractor (Northrop). Both
contractors were assessed at technology readiness levels necessary for
entry into the EMD phase. Subsequently, Northrop's design was
reassessed in December 2010, and all critical technologies were at the
level needed for the current phase of the program. The program is on
track to conduct the critical design review in August 2011. With
regards to the insertion of the IBCS into the MEADS program, the Army
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed to withdraw the
proposal based on cost and schedule considerations. Any use of the
IBCS with the MEADS components will be after fiscal year 2016. The
Army also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 1:
Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force]
The Air Force's B-2 EHF satellite communications upgrade is being
developed in three increments. Increment 1 upgrades the computing
system speed and storage capacity of the current avionics
infrastructure to facilitate future B-2 upgrades. Increment 2 will
provide connectivity through low-observable antennas and radomes, and
includes nonintegrated Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight
Terminals and related hardware. Increment 3 will enable connectivity
with the Global Information Grid and net-ready capability. We assessed
Increment 1.
Concept:
Program start: (3/02).
System development:
Development start (2/07);
Design review (10/08);
GAO review (11/10).
Production:
Low-rate decision (7/11);
Full-rate decision (7/12);
Required assets available: (3/14);
Last procurement: (2014).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $119.7 million:
Procurement: $116.7 million:
Total funding: $236.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 16:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 5/2007: $577.7;
Latest 7/2010: $501.9;
Percent change: -13.1.
Procurement cost:
As of 5/2007: $121.7;
Latest 7/2010: $116.7;
Percent change: -4.1.
Total program cost:
As of 5/2007: $699.4;
Latest 7/2010: $618.6;
Percent change: -11.6.
Program unit cost:
As of 5/2007: $33.303;
Latest 7/2010: $30.929;
Percent change: -7.1.
Total quantities:
As of 5/2007: 21;
Latest 7/2010: 20;
Percent change: -4.8.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 5/2007: 85;
Latest 7/2010: 85;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
According to the program office, the B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 will
have mature critical technologies and a stable design by its planned
July 2011 low-rate initial production decision. The program office
also plans to demonstrate critical manufacturing processes using a
pilot production line and high levels of manufacturing readiness for
two key technologies prior to the production decision. The program
expects an operational assessment to be completed by the Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center in early 2011 to support the
production decision. The B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 program completed
software certification in April 2010 and flight testing began in
September 2010, after a 5-month delay. According to the program
office, this delay has added pressure to the test schedule and the
program's plan to begin initial operational test and evaluation in
fiscal year 2012.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 2/07;
DOD design review: 10/08;
GAO review; 11/10.
Production decision: 7/11.
[End of figure]
B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 Program:
Technology and Design Maturity:
The B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 program entered system development in
February 2007 with all six of its critical technologies nearing
maturity. The program office expects all critical technologies to be
mature and flight-qualified by the program's planned July 2011
production decision. The B-2 EHF Increment 1 design also appears
stable. According to the program office, all of the expected drawings
were releasable at the October 2008 design review and the number of
design drawings has not grown.
The development and successful integration of new disk drive units and
integrated processing units is a primary objective for Increment 1.
The Air Force has completed disk drive unit qualification and design
verification without discovering any significant issues, and
integrated processing unit durability and airworthiness testing was
also completed.
Production Maturity:
Although we did not fully assess production maturity because the
program does not have statistical process control data, we did assess
aspects of production maturity. According to the program office, the B-
2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 is based on commercial-off-the-shelf
technology with proven manufacturing processes. The program is
implementing other practices that will also help demonstrate
production maturity. For example, according to the program office,
system-level development testing of a fully configured, production-
representative prototype in its intended environment began in July
2010, and critical manufacturing processes will be demonstrated on a
pilot production line using production-representative articles prior
to the July 2011 production decision. In addition, the program plans
to complete a manufacturing readiness level assessment to support a
production readiness review in April 2011 and demonstrate a high level
of manufacturing readiness for the disk drive units and integrated
processing units.
Other Program Issues:
B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 testing is progressing; however, earlier
delays have added schedule risk to the test program. The program
completed software certification in April 2010, after recovering from
early software development issues that delayed the start of
developmental test and evaluation by 9 months. Flight testing began in
September 2010 after a 5-month delay. The delay has added pressure to
the current test schedule and increased the schedule risk for the
start of initial operational test and evaluation in fiscal year 2012.
According to the program office, the delay was a result of
installation issues, test aircraft concerns, and higher B-2 testing
priorities. The program office has taken steps to address the
installation issues and the health of the test aircraft.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the B-2 program office
noted that despite the delays in software development and in the start
of flight test, the B-2 EHF Increment 1 schedule remains a year ahead
of the July 2012 threshold date for its low-rate initial production
decision, and 7 months ahead of the September 2012 threshold date for
completion of initial operational test and evaluation. The Air Force
also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
BMDS: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD):
Photograph: Source: Missile Defense Agency.
MDA's GMD is being fielded to defend against limited long-range
ballistic missile attacks during their midcourse phase. GMD consists
of an interceptor with a 3-stage booster and kill vehicle, and a fire
control system that formulates battle plans and directs components
integrated with BMDS radars. We assessed the maturity of all GMD
critical technologies, as well as the design of the Capability
Enhancement II (CE-II) configuration of the Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle (EKV), which began emplacements in fiscal year 2009.
Technology/System development:
Program start: (2/96);
Directive to field initial capability: (12/02);
1st emplaced CE-I interceptor (7/04);
Design readiness review (3/06);
Low-rate decision (9/08).
Initial capability:
Initial capability (10/04);
1st emplaced CE-I successful intercept (9/06);
1st emplaced CE-II interceptor (10/08);
Failed intercept test (1/10);
GAO review (11/10).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Redstone Arsenal, AL:
Funding FY11-FY15:
R&D: $5,512.2 million:
Procurement: $0.0 million:
Total funding: $5,553.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 0:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: $37,844.0;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: $0.0;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: $38,082.4;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities:
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
Columns include costs from program inception through fiscal year 2015.
Totals do not include the future cost of the European component.
MDA continues to put the GMD program at risk for further cost growth
and delays as it buys and emplaces CE-II interceptors before all the
critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic
environment. After a 1-year delay, MDA tested the CE-II EKV in January
2010, but it failed to achieve an intercept. GMD reconducted the test
in December 2010 and although the booster and EKV were successfully
launched, it again failed to achieve an intercept. Almost all of the
CE-II kill vehicles currently under contract will have been delivered
before the test is successfully conducted. Moreover, developmental
testing is expected to continue until fiscal year 2021, well after the
last planned EKV deliveries. Due to the concurrent testing and
production of the CE-II EKV, the program could experience costly late
design changes and retrofits if problems are discovered during flight
testing.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: NA;
DOD design review: 5/06;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: TBD (not assessed).
[End of figure]
BMDS: GMD Program:
Technology Maturity:
All nine technologies in the GMD operational configuration are mature,
but two technologies developed for the CE-II interceptor--an upgraded
infrared seeker and onboard discrimination--are nearing maturity.
Although the program delivered and fielded more upgraded interceptors
in fiscal year 2010, its full capability has yet to be verified
through flight tests.
Design Maturity:
The design of the enhanced interceptor appears stable with all of its
expected drawings released to manufacturing. However, the design could
still change because two technologies are still being developed and
have not had their capability verified through flight testing.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess the maturity of the production processes for the GMD
interceptors. The program is buying interceptors for operational use,
but officials do not plan to make an official production decision or
collect statistical control data because the planned quantities are
small. However, according to GMD officials, the program does track
defects per unit for each major interceptor component. In addition,
GMD employs a manufacturing capability assessment process in which all
critical manufacturing indicators are assessed on a monthly basis.
Other Program Issues:
GMD continues to concurrently develop, manufacture, and field the CE-
II EKVs putting it at risk for further cost growth, schedule delays,
and performance shortfalls in delivered capability. After experiencing
over a 1-year delay, GMD conducted an intercept flight test to assess
the capability of the CE-II EKV in January 2010; however, it did not
intercept the target because of a failure in the EKV. GMD reconducted
this test in December 2010. Although the booster was successfully
launched and deployed the EKV, it failed to intercept the target. The
next flight test will be determined after identification of the cause
of the failure. Although the emplaced CE-II ground-based interceptors
(GBI) have not been declared operational, the production of the CE-II
is nearly complete. Consequently, the program is at risk for costly
late design changes and retrofits if problems are discovered during
flight testing.
In fiscal year 2010, GMD conducted a nonintercept flight test of its
two stage GBI, which was originally designed for a European site.
Although all flight test objectives were achieved, an EKV anomaly was
experienced that might affect system performance.
MDA is currently developing plans to sustain the GMD element through
2032; however, key unknowns and a lack of analysis have hindered these
efforts. In fiscal year 2010, GMD continued to develop its fleet
rotation strategy and aging and surveillance test plan and completed
its stockpile reliability plan. GAO has been unable to fully assess
these efforts because they lack key analysis. For example, the
sufficiency of the planned inventory of operational GBIs is based on
various assumptions, including the reliability of the interceptor.
However, developmental testing is expected to continue until at least
2021 and the reliability of the interceptor is not fully known.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
BMDS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD):
Photograph: Source: Missile Defense Agency.
MDA's THAAD is being developed as a rapidly-deployable, ground-based
missile defense system with the capability to defend against short-and
medium-range ballistic missiles during their late midcourse and
terminal phases. A THAAD battery includes interceptor missiles, three
to six launchers, an X-band radar, and a fire control and
communications system. MDA is scheduled to deliver the first two of
nine planned THAAD batteries to the Army in fiscal years 2011 and 2012
for initial operational use.
Technology/System development:
Program start: (1/92);
Transition to MDA: (10/01);
Contract award for Batteries 1 and 2: (12/06).
Initial capability:
Contract award for Battery 3 interceptors: (9/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Materiel release to Army: (3/11);
Battery 1 initial capability delivery: (9/11);
Battery 2 initial capability delivery: (3/12).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding FY11-FY15:
R&D: $1,892.4 million:
Procurement: $3,881.9 million:
Total funding: $6,544.9 million:
Procurement quantity: NA:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: $15,973.3;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: $4,412.3;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: $21,156.2;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities:
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of: NA;
Latest 2/2010: NA;
Percent change: NA.
Columns include costs from the program's inception through fiscal year
2015.
[End of table]
THAAD has mature technologies and has had a production contract since
2006, but the program is still experiencing design and production
issues. Problems with a safety switch have caused interceptor
production issues, design changes, and schedule delays. Deliveries of
Batteries 1 and 2 have been delayed at least 1 year; the number of
design drawings has increased by more than 20 percent since production
began due to the switch redesign and other related changes; and the
Army's acceptance of THAAD batteries has been delayed 6 months until
testing on the switch is complete. Most THAAD ground component
deliveries for Batteries 1 and 2 are complete, but there will be a
production gap of more than a year for future battery ground and
missile components, which could increase costs. In fiscal year 2010,
THAAD successfully proved out its objective software in flight testing.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 6/00 (not assessed);
DOD design review: 12/03;
Production decision: 12/06;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
BMDS: THAAD Program:
Technology and Design Maturity:
The THAAD program's major components--the fire control and
communications system, interceptor, launcher, and radar--are mature.
According to the program office, the prime contractor has released 100
percent of the expected design drawings. However, the number of design
drawings has increased by more than 20 percent since production
started in December 2006, due primarily to fire control risk reduction
efforts, design changes for a safety system called an optical block
that prevents inadvertent launches, and associated changes to the
flight sequencing assembly, which houses the optical block. Additional
drawings or design work could still be required based on the results
of remaining ground and flight testing.
Production Maturity:
MDA awarded a contract for its first two initial operational batteries
in December 2006 before completing developmental testing on all the
system's critical components and has experienced production delays as
a result. While we did not assess THAAD's overall production maturity
because the program has not collected statistical process control data
on its critical manufacturing processes, the program's production
readiness assessments highlighted a number of risks including design
producibility and qualification of critical components. The delivery
of the first two batteries has been delayed by at least a year after
these risks materialized in parts of the THAAD interceptor. A
qualified optical block design failed during integration qualification
testing in early fiscal year 2010 due to contamination during
manufacturing. The program changed to cleaner manufacturing processes
and subsequently completed this qualification testing in September
2010. According to program officials, the program plans to develop a
more producible design of the optical block for use on future THAAD
battery interceptors. All of the ground components necessary for
Batteries 1 and 2 have been delivered except for the launchers which
are experiencing a 2 year delay in completing the government
acceptance process because of production issues as well as delays to
the qualification process due to design changes. In addition,
discoveries during a recent ground test have led to further design
changes. The launchers are expected to complete the government
acceptance process by the end of the third quarter of fiscal year 2011.
Other Program Issues:
The THAAD program delayed its conditional release of batteries to the
Army from September 2010 until March 2011 because of ongoing safety
issues with interceptor components. For the release to occur, the Army
must certify that the batteries are safe, suitable, and logistically
supported. According to program officials, the results from optical
block safety testing in February 2011 are needed before the release
board can make its decision.
The THAAD program is facing a production gap that poses cost and
schedule risks. Product qualification issues delayed contract award
for Battery 3 interceptors by approximately 6 months to the end of
fiscal year 2010, and there will be as much as a 1-year production gap
for some interceptor components. The program did not plan to award the
contract for THAAD ground components and Battery 4 interceptors until
the first quarter of fiscal year 2011, which means there will be a
production gap of up to 3 years for some ground components. As a
result of these gaps, the program will have to retrain workers and
recertify and requalify parts. The effect of these gaps on cost is not
yet known.
Despite test delays due to target issues, the program was able to
conduct one flight test in June 2010 to successfully demonstrate the
complete objective software for the THAAD battery.
Program Office Comments:
Program officials stated that the THAAD program is significantly more
mature than indicated in the "Attainment of Product Knowledge" graph
and associated language. At production start all production design was
completed except for two items associated with the fire control and
interceptor. At the time of this review, none of the interceptors for
the THAAD batteries were delivered, but all THAAD system and component
qualifications were completed except for two interceptor-related
tests. All but one of the subassemblies for each of the 50
interceptors was delivered. Other technical comments were incorporated
as appropriate.
[End of section]
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS):
Illustration: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System
(BAMS UAS) is intended to provide a persistent maritime intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. BAMS UAS will be
part of a family of maritime patrol and reconnaissance systems that
recapitalizes the Navy's airborne ISR assets. Increments 2 and 3 of
the program will upgrade the system's communication relay and add a
signals intelligence capability. We assessed Increment 1.
Concept:
System development:
Program/Development start (4/08);
GAO review (11/10);
Design review (1/11);
Low-rate decision (9/08).
Production:
Low-rate production: (5/13);
Initial capability (12/15);
Full capability (2019).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,106.5 million:
Procurement: $9,501.8 million:
Total funding: $11,988.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 65:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 2/2009: $3,094.5;
Latest 12/2009: $3,150.0;
Percent change: 1.8.
Procurement cost:
As of 2/2009: $9,185.3;
Latest 12/2009: $9,501.8;
Percent change: 3.4.
Total program cost:
As of 2/2009: $12,656.7;
Latest 12/2009: $13,031.5;
Percent change: 3.0.
Program unit cost:
As of 2/2009: $180.811;
Latest 12/2009: $186.165;
Percent change: 3.0.
Total quantities:
As of 2/2009: 70;
Latest 12/2009: 70;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 2/2009: 92;
Latest 12/2009: 92;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
The BAMS UAS program began development in 2008 with all technologies
nearing maturity and plans to demonstrate its design is stable by its
critical design review in January 2011. The program office continues
to monitor six watch-list items that were identified in a 2007
independent technology readiness assessment that could affect the
program's cost, schedule, and performance. The BAMS UAS program plans
to enter production in May 2013. According to program officials, the
BAMS air vehicle is based on the RQ-4B Global Hawk and uses sensor
components or entire subsystems from other existing platforms. There
are some structural changes to the airframe, but none of these require
significant changes to manufacturing processes. The program expects to
purchase two developmental aircraft and begin testing prior to
production.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 4/08;
GAO review; 11/10;
DOD design review: 1/11;
Production decision: 5/12 (not assessed);
BAMS UAS Program:
Technology Maturity:
DOD and the Navy certified that all BAMS UAS technologies were nearing
maturity and had been demonstrated in a relevant environment before
the start of system development. The program is monitoring six watch-
list items that were identified in a 2007 independent technology
readiness assessment, which could cause cost, schedule, or performance
issues during development. According to the program, the Navy
conducted an additional independent technology readiness assessment
after the program's February 2010 preliminary design review. DOD was
reviewing the results at the time of our assessment.
Design Maturity:
The BAMS UAS program expects the air vehicle's design to be stable by
its January 2011 critical design review. However, the program will be
at risk for design changes until it integrates all of its key
subsystems and components and tests them through an integration
laboratory or an early system prototype demonstration. This will not
occur until January 2012. According to the program office, about 79
percent of the BAMS UAS air vehicle's expected drawings are releasable
to manufacturing and 8 of the 11 subsystem critical design reviews
have been successfully completed.
Production Maturity:
The BAMS aircraft is based on the Global Hawk RQ-4B currently in
production, and, according to program officials, uses sensor
components or entire subsystems from other existing platforms. There
are some significant changes to the airframe, such as deicing and
structural reinforcements for the wings, but none of these require
significant manufacturing process changes. The program expects to
purchase two developmental aircraft and begin testing them prior to
production.
Other Program Issues:
In 2010, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council directed the Navy
and Air Force to seek efficiencies in the Global Hawk and BAMS UAS
programs. According to BAMS UAS program officials, the Air Force and
Navy programs are investigating commonality opportunities in areas
such as sense-and-avoid capabilities, a common ground control station
architecture, a consolidated maintenance hub, and basing options for
both UASs. According to program staff, thus far, only minor changes to
the configuration of the BAMS UAS are anticipated.
The BAMS UAS program is also continuing to leverage knowledge from the
BAMS demonstrator program. The demonstrator consists of two Block 10
Global Hawk UASs. It is used to support BAMS UAS design activity, test
ground station capabilities, and develop concepts of operations. For
example, a BAMS UAS official noted the demonstrator has been
successful using mission operating bases, which conduct data analysis
and operate flight controls, located in the continental United States.
As a result, the program office plans to update its concept of
operations to reflect this lesson learned. According to the program,
forward operating bases, responsible for launch and recovery of the
aircraft, will remain in theater as planned.
The BAMS UAS program poses a significant software development
challenge. The program will utilize more than 6 million lines of code,
including more than 1 million lines of new code. Total lines of code
have increased by about 13 percent since development start, which
according to the program, were the result of selecting a different
sense-and-avoid radar subsystem, and shifting from reused code to new
software for the synthetic aperture radar. The program is closely
monitoring the software effort and software is being developed in
three blocks of capability to decrease risks.
Program Office Comments:
According to the Navy, the program continues to meet its cost,
schedule, and performance requirements. In support of the engineering
and manufacturing development decision, the Navy stated that the
Office of the Secretary of Defense assessed the technology and
determined BAMS had been demonstrated in a relevant environment, since
the program leverages existing DOD investment in its airframe, engine,
avionics, payloads, and software. The Navy also stated that the
program is capturing and applying lessons learned from the programs it
is leveraging in order to maximize its effectiveness and efficiency.
Furthermore, the Navy stated that the BAMS UAS and Air Force Global
Hawk programs continue to work closely together to seek synergistic
opportunities in all phases of the programs. The Navy also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP):
Photograph: Source: Lockheed Martin.
The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. The
RERP is designed to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and
availability of the C-5 by replacing the propulsion system; modifying
the mechanical, hydraulic, avionics, fuel, and landing gear systems;
and making required structural modifications. Together with the C-5
Avionics Modernization Program, these upgrades are intended to improve
C-5 mission capability rates and reduce total ownership costs.
Concept:
Program start: (2/00).
System development:
Development start (11/01);
Design review (4/04).
Production:
Low-rate decision (3/08).
Full-rate decision B-Model (10/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Last procurement (2014).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $49.0 million:
Procurement: $4,409.2 million:
Total funding: $4,458.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 40:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 11/2001: $1,726.6;
Latest 3/2010: $1,760.6;
Percent change: 2.0.
Procurement cost:
As of 11/2001: $9,013.3;
Latest 3/2010: $5,582.9;
Percent change: -38.1.
Total program cost:
As of 11/2001: $10,743.7;
Latest 3/2010: $7,348.8;
Percent change: -31.6.
Program unit cost:
As of 11/2001: $85.267;
Latest 3/2010: $141.323;
Percent change: 65.7.
Total quantities:
As of 11/2001: 126;
Latest 3/2010: 52;
Percent change: -58.7.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 11/2001: 100;
Latest 3/2010: 135;
Percent change: 35.0.
[End of table]
The C-5 RERP entered production in March 2008 with mature technologies
and a design that was nearing completion. We did not assess production
maturity because the program office does not require process control
data to be collected. To determine the program's readiness to enter
full-rate production, the program completed a manufacturing readiness
assessment, which concluded its manufacturing processes were capable,
in control, and affordable. The assessment was performed on the first
low-rate initial production aircraft and may not reflect all
manufacturing risks. A production aircraft was not used for initial
operational testing. The Air Force test organization found the system
to be effective, suitable, and mission capable; however, it noted that
incomplete development and testing of the aircraft's defensive systems
and thrust reversers increased the risk of operating in certain
environments.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 11/01;
DOD design review: 4/04;
Production decision: 3/08;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
C-5 RERP Program:
Technology and Design Maturity:
According to an independent technology readiness assessment conducted
in October 2001, the C-5 RERP's technologies are mature. In addition,
the C-5 RERP design is stable.
Production Maturity:
The C-5 RERP program entered production in March 2008. We did not
assess production maturity because the program office does not require
process control data to be collected as part of the production
contract. In order to determine the program's readiness to enter full-
rate production, the Air Force and the prime contractor, Lockheed
Martin, performed a manufacturing readiness assessment in early 2010.
According to the final report, a manufacturing readiness assessment is
normally conducted near the end of low-rate initial production.
However, the assessment was performed on the first low-rate initial
production aircraft while it was in production and may not reflect all
the manufacturing risks. Program officials stated that conducting the
assessment at the beginning of low-rate initial production was driven
by full-rate production decision requirements established in an
acquisition decision memorandum and the expected date of the decision.
The Air Force accepted delivery of the first production aircraft in
October 2010.
The C-5 RERP program's manufacturing assessment concluded that the
manufacturing risk was understood and that the manufacturing processes
for the system were capable, in control, and affordable. The
assessment identified what program officials believe to be two minor
issues with the aircraft engine's thrust reverser, which will not
affect production, and an air exit door that could affect production.
According to program officials, design changes are being made to the
thrust reverser to prevent freezing and will be ready for testing in
April 2011. The thrust reverser modifications will be installed on all
modernized C-5 aircraft, including those that have already been
upgraded. The malfunctioning air exit door will be addressed through a
change to production processes and will not require additional flight
testing. The program expects all aircraft in the modernized C-5 fleet
to eventually receive modified air exit doors.
Other Program Issues:
The Commander, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, found
the C-5 RERP to be effective, suitable, and mission-capable during
operational testing conducted from October 2009 to January 2010. The
Air Force did not provide a low-rate initial production aircraft for
operational testing as recommended by the Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation, because one was not available. However, according to
program officials, a production-representative aircraft was used in
operational testing. According to the test report, the modified
development aircraft increased the C-5 maximum operating weight,
significantly surpassed its reliability requirement, and performed its
required mission better than the C-5 legacy fleet. However, the Air
Force test organization also noted that incomplete development and
testing of the aircraft's defensive systems and thrust reversers
increased the risk of operating in certain environments.
In February 2010, DOD released the Mobility Capabilities Requirements
Study-2016, which concluded that the Air Force has excess strategic
airlift capacity. As a result, the Air Force is requesting approval to
retire 22 C-5A aircraft. This would reduce the number of aircraft in
the C-5 Avionics Modernization Program, but it would not affect the
number of aircraft in the C-5 RERP program.
Program Office Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP):
Photograph: Source: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program.
The Air Force's C-130 AMP will standardize the cockpit and avionics
for three combat configurations of the C-130 fleet. The program is
intended to ensure the C-130 global access and deployability by
satisfying navigation and safety requirements, installing upgrades to
the cockpit systems, and replacing many systems no longer supportable
due to diminishing manufacturing resources. It is also expected to
increase the reliability, maintainability, and sustainability of the
upgraded aircraft.
Concept:
System development:
Development start (7/01);
Design review (8/05).
Production:
Low-rate decision (6/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Full-rate decision (2/13);
Last procurement (2018).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $55.9 million:
Procurement: $3,942.8 million:
Total funding: $3,998.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 214:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 7/2001: $764.0;
Latest 4/2010: $1,895.6;
Percent change: 148.1.
Procurement cost:
As of 7/2001: $3,307.2;
Latest 4/2010: $4,100.0;
Percent change: 24.0.
Total program cost:
As of 7/2001: $4,071.2;
Latest 4/2010: $5,995.6;
Percent change: 47.3.
Program unit cost:
As of 7/2001: $7.844;
Latest 4/2010: $27.129;
Percent change: 245.8.
Total quantities:
As of 72001: 519;
Latest 4/2010: 221;
Percent change: -57.4.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 7/2001: NA;
Latest 4/2010: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The C-130 AMP program entered production in June 2010 with mature
technologies and a stable design. The program reported that it
demonstrated critical manufacturing processes prior to production;
however, it did not assess manufacturing readiness levels at key
suppliers and installation facilities. The first two aircraft to
receive the AMP upgrade have begun the modification process. During
low-rate production, the program plans to qualify a second contractor
to compete for the full-rate production contract. In February 2010 the
program reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the significant
cost growth threshold, which it attributed to factors such as the
omission of training devices and adequate spares from initial
estimates, and delays in the production decision. The program has been
restructured and planned dates for key events have been pushed back by
more than 1 year.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 7/01;
DOD design review: 8/05;
Production decision: 6/10;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
C-130 AMP Program:
Technology and Design Maturity:
The C-130 AMP program's three current critical technologies--global
air traffic management, defensive systems, and combat delivery
navigator removal--are mature. After a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach
of the critical cost growth threshold in 2007, the program was
restructured and the number of critical technologies was cut from six
to three. The removed technologies were intended for Special Mission C-
130 aircraft configurations, which were eliminated from the program.
The design of the C-130 AMP combat delivery configuration is stable,
with all of the expected drawings releasable to manufacturing.
Production Maturity:
The C-130 AMP program reported that it demonstrated critical
manufacturing processes using production-representative articles prior
to entering production, but it did not assess manufacturing readiness
levels at key suppliers and installation facilities. Program officials
reported that they will perform these assessments during low-rate
production and develop manufacturing maturity plans as needed in order
to demonstrate its readiness to begin full-rate production. We did not
assess the overall production maturity of the program because it does
not collect statistical process control data on its critical
manufacturing processes. However, the program does track quality
metrics related to the numbers of nonconformance and corrective action
reports, as well as the percentage of inspection points passed.
Other Program Issues:
After 2 years of delays and the threat of program cancellation, the C-
130 AMP received approval to enter production in June 2010. The first
two aircraft scheduled for AMP kit installation began the modification
process in August and October 2010, respectively. During low-rate
production, the program will conduct a full and open competition to
select a second contractor. The program will qualify the second
contractor by providing installation and maintenance training, and the
second contractor will perform up to five low-rate production kit
installations. This contractor will compete with the current
contractor for the full-rate production contract, which includes the
procurement of 198 kits and up to 141 kit installations. The
competition and planned contract award for the second source have been
delayed by about 4 months to early 2011 and early 2012, respectively,
because the program has changed the acquisition approach for this
effort. These delays could affect the program's planned entry into
full-rate production in early 2013.
The C-130 AMP program has completed developmental testing, which
identified key deficiencies in the areas of crew workload and
avionics. Specifically, testing found that the core avionics were not
well adapted to the C-130 tactical missions, and identified the need
to reduce crew workload during airdrop, low-level, and certain
formation operations. The program plans to develop additional software
builds to correct these issues. However, the program has reported a
delay in awarding the contract for one of these software builds, which
could affect its ability to begin operational testing in fiscal year
2012 as planned.
In February 2010, the C-130 AMP program reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost breach of the significant cost growth threshold after the average
procurement unit cost increased by almost 18 percent over its existing
baseline. According to the program office, the cost breach was due to
the omission of training devices and adequate spares in initial
program estimates, inflation, delays in the program's production
decision, and a change in the kit installation strategy. The program
has been restructured, and the completion of operational testing and
low-rate production kit installation, as well as the full-rate
production decision, are now scheduled to occur more than 1 year later
than previously planned.
Program Office Comments:
The program office concurred with this assessment.
[End of section]
CH-53K - Heavy Lift Replacement:
Illustration: Source: © 2008 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation.
The Marine Corps' CH-53K helicopter will perform heavy-lift assault
transport of armored vehicles, equipment, and personnel to support
operations deep inland from a sea-based center of operations. The CH-
53K program is expected to replace the legacy CH-53E helicopter and
improve range and payload, survivability and force protection,
reliability and maintainability, and coordination with other assets,
while reducing total ownership cost.
Concept:
Program start: (11/03).
System development:
Development start (12/05);
Design review (7/10);
GAO review (11/10).
Production:
Low-rate decision (9/14);
Initial capability (9/18);
Full-rate decision (3/19).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation:
Program office: Patuxent River NAS, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,703.2 million:
Procurement: $15,986.9 million:
Total funding: $19,690.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 196:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 12/2005: $4,313.6;
Latest 7/2010: $5,915.4;
Percent change: 37.1.
Procurement cost:
As of 12/2005: $11,997.9;
Latest 7/2010: $15,986.9;
Percent change: 33.2.
Total program cost:
As of 12/2005: $16,311.5;
Latest 7/2010: $21,902.3;
Percent change: 34.3.
Program unit cost:
As of 12/2005: $104.561;
Latest 7/2010: $109.512;
Percent change: 4.7.
Total quantities:
As of 12/2005: 156;
Latest 7/2010: 200;
Percent change: 28.2.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 12/2005: 119;
Latest 7/2010: 153;
Percent change: 28.6.
[End of table]
According to program officials, both CH-53K current critical
technologies are nearing maturity and are expected to be fully mature
by its production decision in 2014. A third technology, the
viscoelastic lag damper, has been replaced with a modified version of
an existing technology to reduce cost and weight. The program
completed its design review in July 2010--16 months later than
planned--with over 90 percent of its total expected design drawings
released. Developmental testing and initial operational capability
have been delayed, and the overall cost of development has increased
by $1.7 billion. The program is revising its acquisition strategy to
move the start of production up by 1 year to align with its production
decision. The program will also update its schedule and cost estimate.
As it stands now, delivery of the capability will occur more than 2
years later than planned.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 12/05;
DOD design review: 7/10;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: 9/14.
[End of figure]
CH-53K Program:
Technology Maturity:
The CH-53K program began development in 2005 with three critical
technologies, all of which were immature. One of these technologies,
the viscoelastic lag damper, was replaced by a modified version of an
existing technology to reduce cost and weight. According to the
program office, the CH-53K's two remaining critical technologies--the
main rotor blade and the main gearbox--were nearing maturity when the
program's design review was held in July 2010. The program office
plans for these technologies to be fully mature and demonstrated in a
realistic environment prior to its production decision in 2014.
Design Maturity:
The CH-53K design appears stable. In July 2010, the program office
completed its critical design review with over 90 percent of total
expected design drawings released. However, the continuing maturation
of critical technologies could result in design changes as testing
progresses.
Other Program Issues:
CH-53K developmental testing and initial operational capability have
been delayed, and the overall cost of development has increased by
$1.7 billion. To avoid further cost and schedule problems, the program
has taken several steps, including allowing more time to review the
design and deferring certain requirements. For example, the program
delayed its critical design review to ensure that all subsystems had
completed their design reviews before moving forward. In addition, the
program has received approval to defer three net ready capabilities--
variable message format (VMF), mode 5, and link 16--to later in
production to reduce development costs. According to the program
office, deferring these capabilities would save approximately $103.5
million in the near term. However, it will also decrease the initial
capability that is delivered to the warfighter. The program is
currently revising its acquisition strategy to move the start of
production up by 1 year to align with its production decision.
Currently, there is a 1-year gap between the production decision date
and the scheduled start of production. According to the program
office, it is also updating its schedule and cost estimates.
Delays in the CH-53K program may result in the extended use of and
increased costs for legacy systems, such as the CH-53E and CH-53D
helicopter. Currently deployed CH-53E aircraft are flying at almost
three times the planned utilization rate. This operational pace is
expected to result in higher airframe and component repair costs, as
the Marine Corps seeks to minimize CH-53E inventory reductions until
CH-53K deliveries reach meaningful levels. According to program
officials, all available decommissioned CH-53E and CH-53D helicopters
have been reclaimed and all available parts have been salvaged to keep
the current inventory of aircraft in service. However, as a cost-
saving measure, the Marine Corps now plans to begin retiring the
entire CH-53D fleet earlier than anticipated.
In 2008, the program office was directed to increase the number of
planned CH-53K aircraft from 156 to 200 to accommodate an increase in
Marine troop levels from 174,000 to 202,000. The quantity increase
added $5 billion in procurement cost to the program.
Program Office Comments:
In its comments on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that,
during 2010, the CH-53K program completed the critical design review
and began assembly of the engineering development model test articles.
Critical technologies are maturing as planned in the approved
technology maturation plan. In August 2010, the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering, certified that both critical technology
elements had achieved technology readiness level 6, which is the
appropriate level of maturity for this stage of program development.
The President's 2011 budget fully funded the program to achieve a
fiscal year 2018 initial operational capability. The Navy also
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier:
Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's CVN 21 program is developing a new class of nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers. The carriers will include advanced propulsion,
aircraft launch and recovery, and survivability technologies designed
to improve operational efficiency, enable higher sortie rates, and
reduce manpower. The Navy awarded a contract for detail design and
construction of the lead ship, CVN 78, in September 2008 and expects
delivery of the ship by September 2015. The Navy plans to award a
construction contract for the second ship, CVN 79, in December 2012.
Concept:
Program start (6/00);
System development:
Construction-preparation contract award: (5/03);
Production:
Lead-ship fabrication start: (9/08);
GAO review (11/10);
Construction contract award--second ship (12/12);
First ship delivery: (9/15);
Initial capability (9/16).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $991.2 million:
Procurement: $19,047.6 million:
Total funding: $20,038.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 2:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 4/2004: $4,732.3;
Latest 6/2010: $4,588.0;
Percent change: -3.1.
Procurement cost:
As of 4/2004: $30,316.2;
Latest 6/2010: $29,597.8;
Percent change: -2.4.
Total program cost:
As of 4/2004: $35,048.5;
Latest 6/2010: $34,185.7;
Percent change: -2.5.
Program unit cost:
As of 4/2004: $11,682.827;
Latest 6/2010: $11,395.246;
Percent change: -2.5.
Total quantities:
As of 4/2004: 3;
Latest 6/2010: 3;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 4/2004: 137;
Latest 12/2009: 149;
Percent change: 8.8.
[End of table]
CVN 78 began construction in September 2008. However, 7 of the
program's 13 critical technologies are still not fully mature because
they have not been demonstrated in a realistic, at-sea environment. Of
these technologies, the electromagnetic aircraft launch system
(EMALS), advanced arresting gear, and dual band radar present the
greatest cost and schedule risk. The ship's three-dimensional product
model was completed in November 2009, but the contractor is making
design changes and could experience more as EMALS and other systems
complete testing. Seventy-two percent of the ship's structural units
are complete, accounting for about 19 percent of the total production
hours. A number of units are behind schedule due to late materials.
The program's shift from a 4-to 5-year build cycle could increase
costs if it results in the type of inefficiencies predicted by the
shipbuilder.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Contract award: (5/04;
Lead ship fabrication: 9/08;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
CVN 21 Program:
Technology Maturity:
Seven of the CVN 21 program's 13 current critical technologies have
not been demonstrated in a realistic, at-sea environment. Of these
technologies, EMALS, the advanced arresting gear, and dual band radar
present the greatest risk to the ship's cost and schedule. Program
officials stated that EMALS development has been one of the primary
drivers of CVN 78 cost increases. Problems have occurred in EMALS
testing which could result in more design changes later in the
program. Testing uncovered a crack in the motor, which has already
resulted in several design changes; and in January 2010, a motor
controller software error caused damage to the EMALS hardware. Both
fixes have successfully been retested. The program completed the first
four F/A-18E launches in December 2010. The advanced arresting gear is
nearing maturity and has completed extended reliability testing.
However, delays in land-based testing with simulated and live aircraft
could lead to late delivery. The Navy finalized a fixed-price
production contract for EMALS and the advanced arresting gear in June
2010. Although the Navy continues to pay design and testing costs, any
EMALS changes identified during development will be incorporated into
the production units at no cost to the government. The dual band
radar, which includes the volume search and multifunction radars, is
being developed by the DDG 1000 destroyer program and is also nearing
maturity. However, as a part of a program restructuring, the DDG 1000
eliminated the volume search radar from the program. According to Navy
officials, radar development has not been affected, but CVN 78 will
now be the first ship to operate with this radar. Radar equipment will
be delivered for installation and testing beginning September 2011 for
the multifunction radar and in January 2012 for the volume search
radar.
Design Maturity:
In September 2008, CVN 78 began production with only 76 percent of its
three-dimensional product model complete. The three-dimensional
product model was completed by November 2009, but the contractor is
currently making design changes to prevent electrical cable routing
from interfering with other design features. As EMALS and other
systems complete testing, additional design changes may be necessary.
Production Maturity:
The Navy awarded the CVN 78 construction contract in September 2008.
Construction of approximately 65 percent of the ship's structural
units is complete. These units account for about 19 percent of the
ship's total production hours. As of July 2010, construction of the
hull in dry dock was behind schedule because of late material
deliveries from suppliers.
Other Program Issues:
In 2010, the CVN 21 program shifted from a 4-to 5-year build cycle,
which could increase program costs. According to program officials,
the shipbuilder projects that this change will increase costs by 9 to
15 percent due to the loss of learning and effect on the supplier
base, among other inefficiencies. The Navy disagrees with this
assessment and reported to Congress that the shift will have minimal
negative consequences. The dual band radar also presents cost risks
for the program. Program officials are considering buying the radar
for both CVN 79 and CVN 80 at the same time, in order to reduce the
risks associated with the production line being idle for up to 5
years. However, this strategy could lead to increased costs if changes
identified during at-sea testing on CVN 78 need to be incorporated
into the already-procured systems for the two follow-on ships.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy generally
concurred with this assessment. Officials stated the program is
addressing the technology and construction challenges for a successful
September 2015 delivery, and that CVN 79 is on track to award a
construction contract by the first quarter fiscal year 2013. The Navy
stated that while the change from a 4-to 5-year build cycle will
increase the unit cost of the CVN 78 class carrier, it facilitates a
reduced average yearly funding requirement over a longer period of
time. The Navy also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
DDG 1000 Destroyer:
Illustration: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's DDG 1000 destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed
to provide advanced land-attack capability in support of forces ashore
and littoral operations. Construction has begun on the first and
second ships, and the Navy anticipates awarding a construction
contract for the third ship in the second quarter of fiscal year 2011.
Bath Iron Works will build all three ships in this class with key
segments built by Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding Gulf Coast.
Concept:
Program start (1/98);
System development:
Development start (3/04);
Production:
Production decision: (11/05);
Contract award--construction detail design: (8/06);
Lead ship construction start: (2/09);
Second ship construction start: (3/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Initial capability (6/16).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: BAE Systems, Bath Iron Works, Northrop Grumman
Shipbuilding, Raytheon:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 1/1998: $2,240.4;
Latest 1/2011: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost:
As of 1/1998: $32,043.5;
Latest 1/2011: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of 1/1998: $34,283.9;
Latest 1/2011: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost:
As of 1/1998: $1,071.372;
Latest 1/2011: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities:
As of 1/1998: 32;
Latest 1/2011: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 1/1998: 128;
Latest 1/2011: 221;
Percent change: 72.7.
[End of table]
Latest cost data resulting from the June 2010 Nunn-McCurdy
restructuring were not available at the time of this assessment.
The second ship in the DDG 1000 class began construction in March 2010
with a complete design. While all 12 of the program's critical
technologies are now nearing maturity or are fully mature, 8 of these
technologies will not be demonstrated in a realistic environment until
after installation on the first ship. Software development for the
total ship computing environment also continues to be a challenge. In
fiscal year 2008, the Navy truncated the DDG 1000 program to three
ships, triggering a critical Nunn-McCurdy cost breach and a
restructure of the program. DOD removed the volume search radar from
the baseline design and will modify software for the remaining
multifunction radar to meet volume search requirements. The
restructured program delayed initial operational capability by 1 year
to allow additional time for the program to retire remaining software
and production risks.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Construction award: 8/06;
Lead ship fabrication: 2/09;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
DDG 1000 Program:
Technology Maturity:
Three of DDG 1000's 12 critical technologies are mature, and the
remaining 9 have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. The Navy
plans to fully demonstrate the integrated deckhouse before
installation on the ship, but the remaining 8 technologies will not be
demonstrated in a realistic environment until after ship installation.
The design review for one of the technologies--the ship's long-range
land-attack projectile--was delayed from 2010 to 2011 to allow time to
correct issues found during rocket motor testing, but program
officials noted that the projectile has performed well and met
accuracy and range requirements in flight tests completed to date. The
total ship computing environment (phased over six releases and one
spiral) is now nearing maturity, and, according to program officials,
the integration and testing of software release 5 is complete.
However, software development challenges remain. According to the
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), there has been significant
cost growth due to testing delays for release 5, and several
unresolved problems have been deferred to release 6. DCMA has reported
that these deferred requirements, coupled with software requirements
changes for release 6, could create significant cost and schedule
challenges.
Design Maturity:
The DDG 1000 design appears stable. The design was 88 percent complete
at the start of lead ship construction and 100 percent complete
shortly thereafter.
Production Maturity:
The first DDG 1000 began construction in February 2009 and the Navy
estimates that approximately 30 percent of the ship is complete.
Fabrication of the second ship began in March 2010, and 38 percent of
the units that make up the ship are now in various stages of
production. The Navy reported that it contractually requires the
shipbuilders to specify detailed structural attributes to be monitored
during unit fabrication and integration in order to reduce the risk of
rework. While the shipbuilders are not currently meeting some of the
production metrics, program officials reported that these issues have
been addressed in part by retraining personnel.
Other Program Issues:
In fiscal year 2008, the Navy truncated the DDG 1000 program to three
ships, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical
threshold and a restructure of the program. To reduce program costs,
DOD removed the volume search radar from the design, leaving only the
multifunction radar on the ship. According to program officials,
removing the volume search radar will save the program $300 million
and will not preclude DDG 1000 from meeting its key performance
parameters. However, the software for the multifunction radar will
have to be modified to provide a volume search capability that meets
all planned threat scenarios. The program office has not yet estimated
the cost of these multifunction radar modifications; it does not
expect them to affect the program's schedule. According to program
officials, the ship could accept the volume search radar in the future
because space and weight will be reserved, but there are currently no
plans to include it. The program restructure also delayed initial
operational capability by 1 year to the third quarter of fiscal year
2016 to allow additional time for the program to retire remaining
software and production risks. The program expects all three ships to
be operational by 2018.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
program received milestone B approval, after the critical Nunn-McCurdy
breach, in October 2010 and is closely monitoring and managing risk
through comprehensive program metrics, program reviews, and an earned
value management system. At the time of the review, all critical
technologies had been at the appropriate level of maturity for the
program phase. Earned value assessments of both shipbuilders and an
independent logistics assessment are to be completed in fiscal year
2011. All 26 major mission systems equipment are in production and on
track for on-time delivery to the shipyard. Software release 6 is on
track to support land-based testing for the propulsion system and
light off of the main engine. The first advanced gun system magazine
was delivered on time and the first gun has been shipped for testing.
A successful test mission readiness review and associated tests for
the multifunction radar were completed in September 2010. The Navy
also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE):
Photograph: Source: u.S. Navy.
The Navy's E-2D AHE is an all-weather, twin-engine, carrier-based
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities.
It is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The key objectives of
the E-2D AHE are to improve target detection and situational
awareness, especially in the littorals; support theater air and
missile defense operations; and provide improved operational
availability for the radar system.
Concept:
System development:
Program/Development start (6/03);
Design review (10/05).
Production:
Low-rate decision (5/09);
GAO review (11/10);
Initial capability (10/14);
Last procurement (2019).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corp.
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $276.5 million:
Procurement: $12,237.2 million:
Total funding: $12,528.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 65:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 6/2003: $3,784.3;
Latest 6/2010: $4,230.8;
Percent change: 11.8.
Procurement cost:
As of 6/2003: $10,750.2;
Latest 6/2010: $13,556.9;
Percent change: 26.1.
Total program cost:
As of 6/2003: $14,534.5;
Latest 6/2010: $17,830.7;
Percent change: 22.7.
Program unit cost:
As of 6/2003: $193.794;
Latest 6/2010: $237.743;
Percent change: 22.7.
Total quantities:
As of 6/2003: 75;
Latest 6/2010: 75;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 6/2003: 95;
Latest 6/2010: 136;
Percent change: 43.2.
[End of table]
The E-2D AHE was approved for entry into production in May 2009 with
all its critical technologies mature and its design stable. We did not
assess production maturity; however, according to E-2D program and
Defense Contract Management Agency officials, the contractor is
performing well on a variety of production metrics and inspections
have not identified any significant concerns. The program must
complete a second operational assessment and improve radar reliability
before it can award its next production contract. According to program
officials, the Navy completed a second operational assessment in
November 2010. However, the program's test plan for improving the
reliability of the radar system remains aggressive. The program also
experienced delays in development testing and the delivery of pilot
production aircraft related to a now-resolved problem with the engine
mount design.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 6/03;
DOD design review: 10/05;
Production decision: 5/09;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
E-2D AHE Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the Navy, all five of the E-2D AHE's critical
technologies are mature. The Navy completed a technology readiness
assessment in 2009 to support the program's low-rate initial
production decision, and DOD concurred with that assessment. The
assessment included one new critical technology--the high-power UHF
circulator. In the assessment, DOD raised concerns about the UHF
transmitter's durability and its potential effect on life-cycle costs
and operational availability. According to program officials, the
durability of the parts has improved as a result of increased quality
control efforts.
Design Maturity:
The E-2D AHE design is stable. Program officials said that all current
design drawings are releasable, but some design changes will be
necessary to incorporate recent modifications to the aircraft,
including those related to an engine heat shield puncture issue
discovered during carrier suitability testing.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess production maturity; however, according to E-2D
program and Defense Contract Management Agency officials, the
contractor is performing well on a variety of postproduction metrics,
and inspections have not identified any significant concerns. The
contractor reports monthly to the Defense Contract Management Agency
and the program office on a series of production metrics, such as
scrap and rework rates, and the program office reported that the
contractor is meeting its rework goal. The program did not identify
any critical manufacturing processes associated with the E-2D AHE, nor
does the program require the contractor's major assembly site to use
statistical process controls to ensure its critical processes are
producing high-quality and reliable products because components are
assembled using manual processes that do not lend themselves to such
measures.
Other Program Issues:
The E-2D AHE program must complete a second operational assessment and
improve radar reliability before it can award its next production
contract. The program plans to award this contract after a March 2011
Defense Acquisition Board review of the program's progress. According
to program officials, the Navy completed a second operational
assessment in November 2010. However, the program's test plan for
improving the reliability of the radar system remains aggressive. The
radar must demonstrate a reliability rate greater than or equal to 65
hours. As of November 2010, the program reported a radar reliability
rate of 46.7 hours. Program officials expect that the radar will
exceed the 65-hour threshold by the March review because some
corrective actions have already been implemented, several fixes for
identified root causes are waiting to be implemented, and few new
types of errors are occurring. According to program officials,
forthcoming software updates should address a number of existing
failures and improve reliability.
The program also experienced delays in development testing and the
delivery of pilot production aircraft related to a now-resolved
problem with the engine mount design discovered during carrier
suitability testing. Specifically, engine movement led to a
temperature sensor puncturing a heat shield and making contact with a
bulkhead during simulated aircraft carrier landings. In response,
certain carrier landing tests were stopped and other flight tests
reduced from October 2009 through July 2010 while the program
implemented a new engine mount design to address the problem. The
program office decided to adopt this design modification and others on
the program's three pilot production aircraft, which resulted in a 3-
to 4-month delay in the delivery of each aircraft. According to
program officials, the third pilot production aircraft was delivered
in November 2010.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile:
Illustration: Source: U.S. Army.
The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based,
fire-and-forget, 155 mm cannon artillery precision munitions intended
to provide improved range and accuracy. The near-vertical angle of
fall is expected to reduce collateral damage, making it more effective
in urban environments. The Army plans to develop the unitary warhead
version in three increments--Ia-1, Ia-2, and Ib. We assessed
increments Ia-1 and Ia-2 and made observations on increment Ib.
Concept:
System development:
Program/Development start (5/97);
Design review (5/05).
Production:
Low-rate decision--increment Ia-2 (7/07).
GAO review (11/10);
Initial capability--increment Ia-2 (6/11);
Last procurement (2016).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $67.2 million:
Procurement: $285.6 million:
Total funding: $352.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 3,930:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 2/2003: $754.2;
Latest 11/2010: $975.1;
Percent change: 29.3.
Procurement cost:
As of 2/2003: $3,951.7;
Latest 11/2010: $695.8;
Percent change: -82.4.
Total program cost:
As of 2/2003: $4,705.9;
Latest 11/2010: $1,670.9;
Percent change: -64.5.
Program unit cost:
As of 2/2003: $.061;
Latest 11/2010: $.237;
Percent change: 286.2.
Total quantities:
As of 2/2003: 76,677;
Latest 11/2010: 7,050;
Percent change: -90.8.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 2/2003: 136;
Latest 11/2010: 171;
Percent change: 25.7.
[End of table]
Excalibur increments Ia-1 and Ia-2 are in production. According to
program officials, their critical technologies are mature and designs
are stable. The program received approval to begin production of
increment Ia-1 in May 2005 to support an urgent requirement in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Increment Ia-2 entered production in July 2007 and
completed initial operational test in February 2010. After a design
and prototype demonstration phase, the Army began engineering and
manufacturing development for increment Ib in August 2010. The two
critical technologies for this increment are mature. In May 2010, the
Army reduced overall program quantities from 30,000 to 6,264 based on
a review of precision munition needs. The resulting unit cost increase
led to a Nunn-McCurdy breach of the critical threshold. The program
expects to be certified to continue in early 2011.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 5/97;
DOD design review: 5/05;
Production decision: 7/07;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
Excalibur Program:
Technology Maturity:
The Excalibur's three critical technologies for increments Ia-1 and Ia-
2--the airframe, guidance system, and warhead--are mature. According
to the program office, the technologies were demonstrated in a
realistic environment at the time of their respective design reviews
in May 2005 and March 2007. After an 18-month prototype design and
demonstration phase, the Army began engineering and manufacturing
development for increment Ib in August 2010. According to program
officials, the two critical technologies for this increment--the
guidance systems and safe-and-arm fuze--are mature. The contractor for
increment Ib plans to leverage existing technology from the increment
Ia program.
Design Maturity:
The Excalibur increment Ia-1 and Ia-2 designs are stable. According to
the program office, more than 90 percent of each increment's expected
design drawings were releasable at the time of their design reviews.
The number of design drawings increased by almost 20 percent between
increment Ia-1 and Ia-2. According to a program official, the increase
was due to parts changes on increment Ia-1, as well as upgrades and
changes for increment Ia-2.
Production Maturity:
The Excalibur program appears to have overcome a series of quality
lapses that increased program costs, halted deliveries, and delayed
the qualification of the Ia-2. As a result of those problems, the
program manager asked the contractor to review acceptance procedures
and implement processes to control product quality. The program also
qualified a new supplier for the inertial measurement unit--a part of
the projectile's guidance system--which has improved program
reliability. While we could not assess Excalibur's overall production
maturity because statistical process controls have not been
implemented at the system level, the program is taking steps to
utilize these controls at the assembly plants and subcontractors. The
contractor has started to compile these data and, as production
continues and quantities increase, plans to look for key areas at the
subcontractor level to place under control.
Other Program Issues:
The Excalibur program is following an incremental acquisition
strategy. Increment Ia-1 Excalibur was fielded in Iraq and first used
in combat in 2007. The program office reported that over 85 percent of
the rounds expended in combat operations have functioned as expected.
The program plans to complete production of increment Ia-1 in fiscal
years 2010 and 2011. Increment Ia-2 is currently in production and
completed initial operational test and evaluation in February 2010.
During operational tests, it demonstrated an overall reliability rate
of 73 percent by successfully completing 35 of 48 shots. The increment
Ib projectile, which is planned to increase reliability and lower unit
costs, is scheduled to begin production in fiscal year 2012.
In May 2010, the Army reduced overall program quantities from 30,000
to 6,264 based on a review of precision munition needs. The resulting
unit cost increase--from $47,000 to $99,000 per projectile--led to a
Nunn-McCurdy breach of the critical threshold. Congress was notified
of the breach in August 2010. The program expects to be restructured
and certified by the Secretary of Defense to continue in January 2011.
As a result of the Nunn-McCurdy breach, the program projects the full-
rate production decision for increment Ia-2 will move from August 2010
to February 2011. The effects of the program restructure on increment
Ib are still being determined by the program office.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
Illustration: Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps' EFV is designed to transport troops from ships
offshore to inland locales at higher speeds and from longer distances
than its predecessor, the Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 (AAV 7A1).
The EFV will have two variants--a troop carrier for 17 combat-equipped
Marines and 3 crew members and a command vehicle to manage combat
operations. Since the program started, DOD has also awarded contracts
to redesign key subsystems to improve reliability and to develop an
armor kit to protect EFVs from improvised explosive devices.
Concept:
Program start (12/00);
Nunn-McCurdy breach (2/07);
System development:
Development start (7/08);
GAO review (11/10);
KP-2 demonstrated reliability (1/11);
Operational testing (7/11).
Production:
Low-rate decision (1/12);
Initial capability (8/16).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics:
Program office: Woodbridge, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $575.7 million:
Procurement: $9,993.4 million:
Total funding: $10,637.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 573:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 12/2000: $1,625.2;
Latest 11/2010: $3,740.2;
Percent change: 130.1.
Procurement cost:
As of 12/2000: $7,299.8;
Latest 11/2010: $10,208.4;
Percent change: 39.8.
Total program cost:
As of 12/2000: $9,018.7;
Latest 11/2010: $14,043.7;
Percent change: 55.7.
Program unit cost:
As of 12/2000: $8.799;
Latest 11/2010: $23.682;
Percent change: 169.2.
Total quantities:
As of 12/2000: 1,025;
Latest 11/2010: 593;
Percent change: -42.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 12/2000: 138;
Latest 11/2010: 257;
Percent change: 86.2.
[End of table]
The EFV's critical technologies are mature, but its design is still
evolving. In 2007, DOD extended system development, and the program
revised its approach to meeting its reliability requirements. In
addition to reliability, the program is monitoring risks related to
its schedule, the vehicle's weight, and the potential for increased
unit costs. Seven new prototypes, which incorporate significant design
changes, are now undergoing development and reliability growth
testing, and the program plans to demonstrate the prototypes' initial
reliability in January 2011. The Secretary of Defense has proposed
canceling the program. If it is not canceled, the program will
determine whether schedule or quantity changes--such as delaying its
production decision or reducing initial quantities--are warranted.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 12/00;
DOD design review: 12/08;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: 1/12;
[End of figure]
EFV Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, all four EFV critical technologies--
high-pressure jet, high-speed planing, lightweight armor, and power
diesel--are mature.
Design Maturity:
The EFV's design is still evolving. In 2007, DOD extended system
development, and the program revised its approach to meeting its
reliability requirements. One part of this approach involved a
restructured development effort to test redesigned components on
existing prototypes. Another part involved building seven new
prototypes, which incorporate 180 significant subsystem design changes
to improve the EFV's ability to move, shoot, communicate, and carry
and protect troops. The initial reliability goal of the design changes
is to increase system reliability from the 4.5 hours mean time between
operational mission failures measured in the program's 2006
operational assessment to 16.4 hours prior to the next operational
assessment, which is planned for July 2011. The prototypes are now
undergoing development and reliability growth testing, and the program
plans to demonstrate this 16.4 hour goal in January 2011. The eventual
goal is for low-rate initial production vehicles to demonstrate 43.5
hours of reliability during initial operational test and evaluation,
which is scheduled to begin in July 2015. These operational test
results will support the program's full-rate production decision in
September 2016.
Production Maturity:
According to the EFV program, it is too early to determine the
maturity of the EFV production processes. While the seven
developmental prototype vehicles were built using tooling and
processes that were representative of those used in production, the
program does not intend to collect data on key manufacturing processes
or use statistical process controls until low-rate production begins.
EFV suppliers are performing inspections of the program's key product
characteristics and recording the data in preparation for future
statistical process control analysis.
Other Program Issues:
The EFV program is entering a period that could determine whether or
not it continues. In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense proposed
canceling this program, stating that the EFV would be an enormously
capable vehicle if completed, but that the mounting costs of acquiring
it needed to be weighed against other priorities.
The program is currently monitoring four risk areas that could affect
the ultimate success of the program. Reliability growth has been
identified as a risk because there is a chance that the design changes
the program has made may not be significant enough to provide the
needed improvement in reliability. The program has also identified
vehicle weight as a risk. Program officials expect aggressive weight
management throughout the current development effort and low-rate
initial production to mitigate this risk. While the program's current
weight assessment shows that the prototype design will not accommodate
the required weight growth for future upgrades and increased loads,
the program currently projects that the low-rate initial production
design will meet the weight growth margin in the EFV's requirement
document for production. The program's schedule leading up to the
program's production decision also faces risks. Specifically,
technical and software issues could delay key events, such as
developmental testing and the start of the program's July 2011
operational assessment. Finally, there is a risk that redesign of the
EFV could increase unit costs as well as operations and support costs
for the program. If the program continues, it will determine whether
schedule or quantity changes--such as delaying its production decision
or reducing initial quantities--are warranted to address these risks
and its overall affordability.
Program Office Comments:
DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which
we incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter):
Illustration: Source: 2010 Lockheed Martin.
DOD's JSF program is developing a family of stealthy, strike fighter
aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. allies, with
the goal of maximizing commonality to minimize life-cycle costs. The
carrier-suitable variant will complement the Navy F/A-18E/F. The Air
Force variant will primarily be an air-to-ground replacement for the F-
16 and the A-10, and will complement the F-22. The short take-off and
vertical landing variant will replace the Marine Corps F/A-18 and AV-
8B aircraft.
Concept:
Program start (11/96);
System development:
Development start (10/01);
Design review (2/06 and 6/07);
Production decision (6/07).
Production:
GAO review (11/10);
Initial capability--USMC (12/12);
Initial capability--USAF & USN (4/16);
Last procurement (2035).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Arlington, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $8,359.6 million:
Procurement: $215,146.0 million:
Total funding: $223,815.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 2,385:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 10/2001: $38,402.1;
Latest 8/2010: $53,663.1;
Percent change: 39.7.
Procurement cost:
As of 10/2001: $170,372.1;
Latest 8/2010: $229,467.6;
Percent change: 34.7.
Total program cost:
As of 10/2001: $210,557.6;
Latest 8/2010: $283,674.5;
Percent change: 34.7.
Program unit cost:
As of 10/2001: $73.467;
Latest 8/2010: $115.456;
Percent change: 57.2.
Total quantities:
As of 10/2001: 2,866;
Latest 8/2010: 2,457;
Percent change: -14.3.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 10/2001: 116;
Latest 8/2010: 174;
Percent change: 50.0.
[End of table]
Latest cost data do not fully account for cost and schedule changes
resulting from the program's critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach.
The JSF is in production but three critical technologies are not
mature, manufacturing processes are not proven, and testing is not
complete. Continuing manufacturing inefficiencies, parts problems, and
technical changes indicate that the aircraft's design and production
processes may lack the maturity needed to efficiently produce aircraft
at planned rates. With most of developmental and operational flight
testing still ahead, the risk of future design changes is significant.
DOD restructured the JSF program in February 2010 to address
development challenges. The projected cost growth triggered a Nunn-
McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold. According to
program officials, the JSF is tracking well against its new, less
aggressive test schedule despite late deliveries of test aircraft and
lower than expected availability rates for short take-off/vertical
landing test aircraft.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 10/01;
DOD design review: 2/06 & 6/07;
Production start: 6/07;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
JSF Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JSF program entered system development in 2001 with none of its
eight critical technologies fully mature. According to the program
office, five of these technologies are now mature and three
technologies--mission systems integration, prognostics and health
management, and radar--are nearing maturity. However, significant
development risks remain as the program integrates and tests these
technologies.
Design Maturity:
The JSF program did not have a stable design at its critical design
reviews. The program has now released over 99 percent of its total
expected drawings; however, the program continues to experience
numerous design changes. With most of developmental and operational
flight testing still ahead, the risk of future design changes and
their potential effect on the program are significant.
Production Maturity:
Despite beginning production in 2006 and procuring 58 aircraft to
date, the JSF program's manufacturing processes are still not mature
and only 12 percent of its critical processes are in statistical
control. DOD has reduced near-term production quantities. However,
continuing manufacturing inefficiencies, parts problems, and technical
changes indicate that the aircraft's design and production processes
may lack the maturity needed to efficiently produce aircraft at
planned rates. Managing an extensive, still-maturing global network of
suppliers adds another layer of complexity to producing aircraft
efficiently and on-time. The prime contractor is implementing
manufacturing process improvements. However, due to the extensive
amount of testing still to be completed, the program could be required
to make alterations to its production processes, changes to its
supplier base, and costly retrofits to produced and fielded aircraft,
if problems are discovered.
Other Program Issues:
After an extensive programwide review, DOD restructured the JSF
program in February 2010 to address development challenges. The
restructure increased time and funding for system development, added
more aircraft to support flight testing, reduced near-term procurement
quantities, and incorporated additional software resources. The
projected cost growth--including almost $104 billion since 2007--
triggered a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold. A
milestone review was scheduled for November 2010 to update cost and
schedule estimates.
According to program officials, the JSF is making progress when
measured against its new, less aggressive test schedule and all three
variants have had their first flights. However, several issues could
affect testing. The program had only delivered eight aircraft to test
sites as of December 2010, and short take-off/vertical landing test
aircraft have experienced lower than expected availability rates. The
program also continues to experience challenges in developing and
integrating the very large and complex software requirements needed to
achieve JSF capabilities. Further delays in either flight testing or
software development could jeopardize the Marine Corps' planned
initial operating capability date. Finally, the uncertain fidelity of
test results is a risk because the program relies on an unaccredited
network of test laboratories and simulation models to evaluate system
performance.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office noted
that JSF is undergoing a technical baseline review of requirements to
complete the development effort as part of the consideration for
recertification of the development milestone. Eight aircraft of the 10
anticipated in 2010 have been delivered to the test sites. An
additional 4 are projected to be delivered by June 2011. The test
program has slightly exceeded the overall test flight and test point
metrics planned for 2010; testing of the Marine Corps variant is
behind plan while testing of the Air Force variant has exceeded plans.
Mission systems testing is underway with Block 1.0 on both Air Force
and Marine Corps mission systems test aircraft. Over half of the
projected airborne system software is in testing including the
foundational sensor fusion architecture. Survivability testing has
begun (live fire testing and radar cross section signature ground
testing) and results thus far are matching predictions. The first
airborne dynamic signature test with aircraft AF-3 will begin December
2010.
[End of section]
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T):
Illustration: Source: Boeing.
The Air Force's FAB-T will provide a family of satellite
communications terminals for airborne and ground-based users. FAB-T
will address current and future communications capabilities and
technologies, replacing many program-unique terminals. FAB-T is being
developed incrementally. The first increment will provide voice and
data military satellite communications for nuclear and conventional
forces as well as airborne and ground command posts, including the B-
2, B-52, RC-135, E-6, and E-4 aircraft. We assessed this increment.
Concept:
System development:
Development start (9/02);
Critical design review (1/09);
GAO review (11/10).
Production:
Low-rate decision (TBD);
Full-rate production (TBD);
Last procurement (TBD).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Hanscom AFB, MA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $220.2 million:
Procurement: $2,081.8 million:
Total funding: $2,302.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 209:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 12/2006: $1,514.4;
Latest 12/2009: $1,735.2;
Percent change: 14.6.
Procurement cost:
As of 12/2006: $1,627.0;
Latest 12/2009: $2,194.6;
Percent change: 34.9.
Total program cost:
As of 12/2006: $3,141.5;
Latest 12/2009: $3,929.9;
Percent change: 25.1.
Program unit cost:
As of 12/2006: $14.544;
Latest 12/2009: $16.172;
Percent change: 11.2.
Total quantities:
As of 12/2006: 216;
Latest 12/2009: 243;
Percent change: 12.5.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 12/2006: 129;
Latest 12/2009: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The program did not provide an updated cost position or future funding
stream because of ongoing changes related to the rebaseline.
The FAB-T program expected to enter production in February 2010 with
its critical technologies mature and its design stable; however, the
program now plans to significantly extend its development phase to
more fully develop the high-data-rate variant and reduce the
concurrency in testing and production. A new low-rate production
decision date has not yet been approved, but is tentatively scheduled
for the first quarter of fiscal year 2013. Two critical technologies
have not yet demonstrated their maturity as planned, and the FAB-T
program office continues to monitor certification of the system's
cryptography by the National Security Agency. The FAB-T design also
does not appear to be stable; however, we were unable to specifically
assess it because the program has not provided updated information on
its design relating to its restructure and rebaseline efforts.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 9/02;
DOD design review: 1/09;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: TBD (not assessed);
[End of figure]
FAB-T Program:
Technology Maturity:
The FAB-T program expected to enter production in February 2010 with
all six critical technologies mature and demonstrated in a realistic
environment. However, according to program officials, two critical
technologies--the continuous transverse stub antenna and the high-data-
rate software configuration architecture--have not yet demonstrated
their maturity as planned. The program has decided to extend the
development phase, in large part to more fully develop the high-data-
rate software variant. FAB-T's critical technologies were not assessed
at development start in 2002 because it was not yet a major defense
acquisition program.
Design Maturity:
The FAB-T design does not appear to be stable. Even though the program
office reported a high percentage of releasable design drawings last
year, there have been changes to the program since then that could
affect the design. Specifically, as a result of hardware qualification
problems and testing failures, the program decided to extend
development and delay production. Resolving these issues could require
design changes. According to program officials, the program also
anticipates that two engineering changes--one related to secure
transmissions and another related to environmental specifications--
will require additional design work. We were unable to specifically
assess the design as a whole because the program has not provided
updated information on its design relating to its restructure and
rebaseline efforts.
Other Program Issues:
The FAB-T program has recently been restructured and rebaselined to
more fully develop the high-data-rate variant and reduce concurrency
between testing and production. The program delayed its scheduled
February 2010 production decision and plans to extend its development
phase. In January 2009, the contractor delivered the first FAB-T
engineering model. According to program officials, FAB-T completed all
the objectives for developmental flight testing of the hardware for
the low-data-rate system in August 2009. At that time, program
officials expected the extended or high-data-rate system to undergo
most of its testing concurrently with low-rate production. However,
according to the program office, hardware qualification problems and
testing failures made this level of concurrency an unacceptable risk.
The new low-rate production decision date is tentatively scheduled for
November 2012. In addition, in response to cost and schedule growth on
the FAB-T program, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the
establishment of four integrated product teams to perform reviews
similar to those required for a Nunn-McCurdy breach on management,
technical, and cost issues, and to examine potential alternative
sources and changes to requirements.
FAB-T certification by the National Security Agency (NSA) is another
key step in the program. FAB-T needs to properly protect information
at various classification levels and NSA will provide a certification
of the cryptography in certain equipment. In June 2009, NSA completed
a review of the low-data-rate version of system software and approved
limited use of the FAB-T cryptographic element in program testing.
Program officials expected to be authorized to test the extended-data-
rate version of system software around the end of 2010. The NSA is
currently scheduled to complete final certification of this version in
March 2013. However, delays in the maturation of the high-data-rate
software configuration architecture technology could affect the
certification schedule.
Program Office Comments:
The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B):
Photograph: Source: Northrop Grumman.
The Air Force's Global Hawk is a high-altitude, long-endurance
unmanned aircraft with integrated sensors and ground stations
providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
The Global Hawk will replace the U-2. After a successful technology
demonstration, the system entered development and limited production
in March 2001. The program includes RQ-4A aircraft similar to the
original demonstrators, as well as larger and more capable RQ-4Bs. We
assessed the RQ-4B, which is being procured in three blocks.
Concept:
Demonstration program start (2/94);
System development:
Production:
Development start/low-rate decision (3/01).
GAO review (11/10);
Last procurement (2018).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,067.5 million:
Procurement: $5,339.1 million:
Total funding: $6,406.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 39:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 3/2001: $1,026.3;
Latest 7/2010: $3,948.7;
Percent change: 284.8.
Procurement cost:
As of 3/2001: $4,255.0;
Latest 7/2010: $9,481.6;
Percent change: 122.8.
Total program cost:
As of 3/2001: $5,312.4;
Latest 7/2010: $13,575.7;
Percent change: 155.5.
Program unit cost:
As of 3/2001: $84.323;
Latest 7/2010: $176.307;
Percent change: 109.1.
Total quantities:
As of 3/2001: 63;
Latest 7/2010: 77;
Percent change: 22.2.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 3/2001: 55;
Latest 7/2010: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The Global Hawk RQ-4B has mature critical technologies, a stable
design, and proven production processes, but it remains at risk for
late design changes and costly retrofits. The completion of
operational tests for the aircraft that make up the largest part of
the program has been delayed nearly 4 years by testing discoveries,
concurrent testing, resource constraints, and weather problems. The
program will have procured more than half of those aircraft by the
time testing is complete in December 2010. The program also plans to
procure more than half the aircraft with advanced radar before it
completes operational testing in 2013. The Air Force is taking steps
to address some of the testing delays. In fiscal year 2010, the Air
Force increased the total number of aircraft to be procured from 54 to
77 and extended planned production through 2018.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: NA;
DOD design review: NA;
DEvelopment start/production decision: 3/01;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
Global Hawk Program:
Technology Maturity:
The critical technologies for the RQ-4B are mature. However, the
program must still successfully test two key capabilities--the
advanced signals intelligence payload and multiple platform radar--to
ensure they perform as expected. The first flight of an RQ-4B equipped
with the signals intelligence payload occurred in September 2008 and
operational testing is scheduled to be completed in December 2010.
After delays in its development, the first flight of an RQ-4B equipped
with the multiple platform radar is expected to occur in April 2011.
Development testing is underway.
Design Maturity:
The RQ-4B basic airframe design is stable with all of its expected
design drawings released; however, the program remains at risk for
late design changes and costly retrofits if problems are discovered in
testing. During the first year of production, frequent substantive
engineering changes increased development and airframe costs and
delayed deliveries and testing. Substantial commonality between the RQ-
4A and RQ-4B had been expected, but as the designs were finalized and
production geared up, the design differences were much more extensive
and complex than anticipated.
Production Maturity:
The manufacturing processes for the RQ-4B airframe are mature and in
statistical control. In addition, the program reports that it is
meeting its quality goal on the number of nonconforming parts. The RQ-
4B aircraft is being produced in three configurations. Block 20
aircraft are equipped with an enhanced imagery intelligence payload;
block 30 aircraft have both imagery and signals intelligence payloads;
and block 40 aircraft will have an advanced radar surveillance
capability. All six block 20 aircraft have been produced. Production
continues on block 30 and block 40 aircraft. The first block 30
aircraft was delivered in November 2007 and the first block 40
aircraft was delivered without the sensor in November 2009.
Other Program Issues:
The Global Hawk program expects to have procured all of its block 20
aircarft, and more than half of its block 30 and block 40 aircraft
before operational testing is complete. As a result, if problems are
found in operational testing, it could result in costly retrofits for
large numbers of aircraft. The Global Hawk program has continued to
experience delays in developmental and operational testing. The
completion of operational tests for the block 20 and 30 aircraft has
been delayed nearly 4 years to December 2010. The start of operational
testing for block 40 aircraft has been delayed by more than 3 years to
March 2013. According to the Global Hawk's December 2009 Selected
Acquisition Report, several factors contributed to the most recent
schedule slips, including developmental test discoveries; concurrent
development and production testing; testing resource constraints; and
weather problems. According to program officials, a shift in focus and
resources required to address a Joint Urgent Operational Need, using
two block 20 aircraft, has also contributed to block 40 operational
test delays. The Air Force is taking steps to address some of the
testing delays. For example, the program is now conducting aircraft
acceptance tests at Beale Air Force Base in order to free up resources
for operational testing at Edwards Air Force Base.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force emphasized
that the Global Hawk program has improved program execution while
reducing program risk. The Air Force noted that older RQ-4A Global
Hawk aircraft--which we did not assess--have been successfully used by
the warfighters and other government agencies to carry out various
missions. The service also noted that each of the variants of its
larger RQ-4B aircraft is now either in operations or testing. Flight
operations of deployed aircraft and flight testing of the advanced
radar payload are expected to begin in 2011. The Air Force noted that
current challenges facing the program include initial system
deployments and normalization of operations and sustainment. In
addition to commenting on this assessment, the Air Force provided
technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
[End of section]
Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA:
Illustration: Source: Lockheed Martin.
The Air Force's Global Positioning System (GPS) III program will
develop and field a new generation of satellites to supplement and
eventually replace GPS satellites currently in use. It consists of
three increments: IIIA, IIIB, and IIIC. Other programs will develop
the ground control system and user equipment. We assessed GPS IIIA,
which intends to provide capabilities such as a stronger military
navigation signal to improve jamming resistance and a new civilian
signal that will be interoperable with foreign satellite navigation
systems.
Concept:
System development:
Development start (5/08);
Design review (8/10);
GAO review (11/10).
Production:
Production decision (12/10);
First satellite available for launch (5/14).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,238.6 million:
Procurement: $1,409.6 million:
Total funding: $2,648.2 million:
Total quantity: 8:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 5/2008: $2,486.9;
Latest 7/2010: $2,615.2;
Percent change: 5.2.
Procurement cost:
As of 5/2008: $1,396.3;
Latest 7/2010: $1,409.6;
Percent change: 1.0.
Total program cost:
As of 5/2008: $3,883.1;
Latest 7/2010: $4,024.8;
Percent change: 3.6.
Program unit cost:
As of 5/2008: $485.392;
Latest 7/2010: $503.099;
Percent change: 3.6.
Total quantities:
As of 5/2008: 8;
Latest 7/2010: 8;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 5/2008: NA;
Latest 7/2010: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
We could not calculate acquisition cycle times for GPS IIIA because
initial operational capability will not occur until GPS IIIC
satellites are fielded.
The GPS IIIA program completed its critical design review in August
2010 with its critical technologies mature and design stable. The
program plans to prove its production processes by building and
testing a prototype spacecraft prior to its December 2010 production
decision. This prototype will include almost all satellite parts
excluding redundant units, but will not be flight-worthy. A complete
GPS IIIA satellite will not be available for testing prior to the
production decision. The GPS IIIA program is using a "back-to-basics"
approach, which emphasizes best practices such as maintaining stable
requirements and using mature technologies. The program still faces
risks to delivering and launching satellites as planned, due to its
compressed schedule and dependence on a separately developed ground
control system being fully functional.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 5/08;
DOD design review: 8/10;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: 12/10.
[End of figure]
GPS-IIIA Program:
Technology and Design Maturity:
The GPS IIIA program's critical technologies are mature and its design
is stable. The critical technologies have changed for the GPS IIIA
program as it has developed its design. Prior to contract award, the
program's five critical technologies were based on a notional
government architecture for the satellite. According to the program
office, the Lockheed Martin satellite design differs significantly
from this architecture. A postpreliminary design review technology
readiness assessment in 2009 identified seven critical technologies.
However, the number of critical technologies was revised to eight when
the results of that assessment were finalized in 2010. All eight have
been demonstrated in a relevant environment. According to the program
office, the number of critical technologies has been stable as of the
postpreliminary design review assessment. In addition, the design for
GPS IIIA is stable with 98 percent of design drawings releasable at
its August 2010 critical design review.
Production Maturity:
The GPS IIIA program plans to reduce risk and prove out its production
processes by building and testing a prototype spacecraft prior to its
December 2010 production decision. However, this prototype will not be
production-representative. It will include almost all satellite parts,
excluding redundant units. According to the program office, it will
not be flight-worthy because its parts will not go through the flight
screening process. A complete GPS IIIA satellite will not be available
for testing prior to the production decision. We did not assess
production maturity because the program office does not collect
statistical process control data for its critical manufacturing
processes, but rather uses other process and technology maturity
metrics.
Other Program Issues:
The GPS IIIA program has adopted an acquisition approach that should
increase its chances of meeting its cost and schedule goals; however,
the program still faces risks that could affect the on-time delivery
and launch of GPS satellites. GPS IIIA is being managed using a "back-
to-basics" approach, which is designed to maintain stable
requirements, implement an incremental development strategy, use
mature technologies, and provide more oversight than under the
previous GPS satellite program. While this approach should enable the
GPS III program to deliver satellites more quickly than the
predecessor GPS program, its schedule is still aggressive considering
the complexities associated with the integration phase. The Air Force
plans to launch the first GPS IIIA satellite in 2014. This would
require the program to go from contract award to first launch 3.5
years faster than the GPS IIF.
In addition, the GPS IIIA program could be affected by the development
schedule for the next-generation GPS ground control system, the OCX,
which is being managed as a separate major defense acquisition
program. Though the GPS IIIA satellites can provide positioning and
timing services without OCX, it is needed to control other features of
the satellites, such as the enhanced military signal and additional
civil signals. Until OCX is operational, these additional signals
cannot be operated on the GPS IIIA satellite, and the Air Force is
reluctant to launch the second IIIA satellite before the first one is
fully tested. The Air Force currently plans to deliver GPS OCX Block I
in August 2015--15 months after the first planned GPS IIIA satellite
launch.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, GPS program officials
acknowledged that there is currently a disconnect between the OCX
delivery schedule and the GPS IIIA launch schedule. As a result, the
program office recently awarded a contract to the OCX and GPS IIIA
contractors to study possible technical solutions to provide
preliminary ground control capabilities to support the first GPS IIIA
launch. The program expects this interim system to be delivered in the
third quarter of 2013. The program officials believe that this system
will provide the capability to launch and check out the GPS IIIA
vehicle ahead of OCX completion. Program officials also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
GPS III OCX Ground Control Segment:
Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force.
The Air Force's next generation GPS control segment (OCX) will provide
command, control, and mission support for the GPS Block II and III
satellites. OCX is expected to assure reliable and secure delivery of
position and timing signals to serve the evolving needs of GPS
military and civilian users. The Air Force plans to develop OCX in
four blocks to deliver upgrades as they become available. We assessed
the first block, which will support the operations of GPS Block II and
Block III satellites.
Concept:
Program start (2/07);
System development:
GAO review (11/10);
Preliminary design review (4/11);
Development start (6/11).
Production:
Production decision (4/15).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,675.5 million:
Procurement: $22.5 million:
Total funding: $1,873.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 0:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: $2,693.1;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: $22.6;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: $2,891.3;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: $1,445.642
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities:
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: 2;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The GPS OCX program is scheduled to enter development in June 2011
with its 14 critical technologies nearing maturity. In February 2010,
the Air Force awarded a cost-reimbursement contract to Raytheon for
Blocks I and II of the OCX program. The GPS OCX program built
prototypes and plans to hold a preliminary design review in April 2011
prior to entry into engineering and manufacturing development, as
required by DOD acquisition policy and statute. The GPS OCX will not
be fielded in time for the May 2014 launch of the first GPS IIIA
satellite. As a result, the GPS Directorate is considering funding a
parallel effort that accelerates existing launch and checkout
requirements to develop a command and control capability for the first
GPS IIIA satellites.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
GAO review; 11/10;
Development start: 6/11;
DOD design review: TBD (not assessed);
Production decision: 4/15 (not assessed).
[End of figure]
GPS OCX Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to program officials, when the GPS OCX enters development in
June 2011, its 14 critical technologies will be nearing maturity. As
part of its risk-reduction activities, the program selected two
contractors, through a competitive process, to develop system-level
prototypes. It also plans to hold a preliminary design review in April
2011 prior to entry into engineering and manufacturing development, as
required by DOD acquisition policy and statute. In an October 2010
memorandum, the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, stated
that an independent assessment of the program found that all but one
critical technology had been demonstrated in a relevant environment.
The technology that had not been demonstrated in a relevant
environment has been deferred to future OCX blocks. The assessment
also found that GPS OCX will eventually require larger bandwidths, and
questioned whether the backup command and control site will have the
capability to take control of all the functions managed by the primary
site. Furthermore, the assessment found that the program did not have
a security architecture that meets all information assurance
requirements, and that the OCX system may not be able to handle large
data sets required to service external users. The Director recommended
that the Air Force conduct a technology readiness assessment on future
OCX blocks to explain how these and any new requirements are fully
addressed by mature technologies.
Other Program Issues:
In February 2010, the Air Force awarded a cost-reimbursement contract
to Raytheon for Block I and II of the GPS OCX program. According to
program officials, a cost-reimbursement contract was used because of
the high level of risk associated with developing complex software
programs for GPS OCX.
The GPS OCX program plans to enter engineering and manufacturing
development in June 2011--over 2 years later than initially planned.
According to program officials, this delay was due, in part, to the
need to hold a preliminary design review and report on its results
before the milestone review. In addition, the GPS Directorate and GPS
OCX program manager wanted to make sure that the program understood
the risks associated with the development effort before moving forward
to the next phase of the program.
The Air Force plans to deliver GPS OCX Block I in August 2015--15
months after the first planned GPS IIIA satellite launch. To address
this issue, the GPS Directorate is considering funding a parallel
effort that accelerates existing launch and checkout requirements to
develop a command and control capability for the first GPS IIIA
satellites. However, GPS Directorate officials indicated that the
effort would not enable new capabilities offered by GPS IIIA
satellites, including a military signal designed to enable resistance
to jamming and three civil signals. The program expects to release a
request for proposal for the parallel effort during the first quarter
of fiscal year 2011 and receive the Air Force's authority to proceed
during the third quarter of fiscal year 2011.
Program Office Comments:
The GPS Directorate provided written technical comments that were
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Gray Eagle:
Photograph: Source: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.
The Army's Gray Eagle, formerly known as ER/MP, will perform
reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and attack missions.
It will operate either alone or with other platforms such as the
Longbow Apache helicopter. Each system includes 12 aircraft as well as
ground control stations, ground and air data terminals, automatic
takeoff and landing systems, and ground support equipment. The program
consists of Block 1 systems and two less-capable Quick Reaction
Capability systems. We assessed the Block 1 configuration.
Concept:
System development:
Program/development start (4/05);
Design review (11/06).
Production:
Low-rate decision (2/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Initial capability (7/12);
Full capability (8/12).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $246.0 million:
Procurement: $2,285.1 million:
Total funding: $3,374.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 10:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 4/2005: $339.8;
Latest 9/2010: $875.3;
Percent change: 157.6.
Procurement cost:
As of 4/2005: $660.5;
Latest 9/2010: $2,965.8;
Percent change: 349.0.
Total program cost:
As of 4/2005: $1,000.2;
Latest 9/2010: $4,844.0;
Percent change: 384.3.
Program unit cost:
As of 4/2005: $200.046;
Latest 9/2010: $372.613;
Percent change: 86.3.
Total quantities:
As of 4/2005: 5;
Latest 9/2010: 13;
Percent change: 160.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 4/2005: 50;
Latest 9/2010: 87;
Percent change: 74.0.
[End of table]
As of December 2010, DOD had not yet approved a new cost and schedule
baseline for the program.
The Gray Eagle entered production in February 2010 without having all
of its critical technologies mature. The program office reported that
the system's design is stable and its production processes are proven,
but the program remains at risk for late and costly design and
manufacturing changes during production until its critical
technologies have been fully integrated and tested. A January 2010
risk review board identified risks related to areas including
software, engine availability, and supplier capacity. The Army has
identified operational availability and reliability as a risk after
limited user testing showed that the system could not meet its key
performance parameter for that area. The Army has plans in place to
mitigate these risks and will undertake various risk-reduction
activities leading up to the system's entry into initial operational
test and evaluation in 2011.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 4/05;
DOD design review: 11/06;
Production decision: 2/10;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
Gray Eagle Program:
Technology Maturity:
The Gray Eagle entered production in February 2010 without all its
critical technologies mature, as recommended in DOD's Technology
Readiness Assessment Deskbook. Two technologies--the heavy fuel engine
and deicing--have been assessed as mature. The other three
technologies--the automatic takeoff and landing system, tactical
common data link, and manned-unmanned teaming--are nearing maturity.
Prior to 2010, the program office had reported that all its critical
technologies would be mature at production. However, an independent
technology readiness assessment by the Office of the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering, reached a different conclusion on both the
identification and maturity level of the program's critical
technologies. This assessment resulted in the Army dropping one
critical technology, adding two newly identified technologies, and
downgrading the maturity level of three technologies. According to the
program office, the maturity levels were downgraded because the
program office had previously assessed the technologies alone, whereas
the independent assessment considered their maturity when integrated
with Gray Eagle. For example, the program office had assessed the
automatic takeoff and landing system as mature because the same
technology is used on the already-fielded Shadow unmanned aircraft
system, but the independent assessors rated it as nearing maturity
because the system had not yet been fully integrated into the Gray
Eagle and tested in an operational environment.
Design Maturity:
While the program office indicated that the Gray Eagle design is
stable, the program remains at risk for late and costly design and
manufacturing changes during production until its critical
technologies have been fully integrated and tested. Despite this risk,
the Army plans to proceed with production. In 2009, the Army's
Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center
independently assessed the program's production readiness and
concluded that the design of the system was mature and stable enough
such that potential design changes would not present a significant
risk to the program during low-rate initial production.
Production Maturity:
According to an independent Army assessment of the program's
production readiness, for critical or major suppliers, its
manufacturing process maturity was satisfactory and manufacturing
infrastructure met or exceeded requirements for low-rate initial
production. However, in January 2010, an Army review board noted
production risks associated with the tactical common data link
subcontractor's capacity to produce, provide spares for, and repair
that component as needed to meet program schedule. In addition, it
identified issues with software development and engine availability
resulting from issues with financial stability of the engine supplier.
According to the program office, the data link production capacity
issue has been largely mitigated and the prime contractor has
qualified a second engine supplier.
Other Program Issues:
In October 2010, the Army identified operational availability and
reliability as a risk after limited user testing showed that the
system could not meet its key performance parameter for that area. The
Army plans to undertake risk-reduction activities leading up to the
system's initial operational test and evaluation in 2011.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of the assessment, the program office
indicated that the DOD Technology Readiness Assessment Deskbook
discourages the practice of evaluating technology readiness based on
degree of integration. The program also believes that our product
knowledge graph did not accurately capture the Gray Eagle's production
maturity because there are more methods to assess maturity than the
critical processes assessment we used. The program did not detail the
methods it believed applicable. Finally, the program stated that all
risk-mitigation plans were on schedule as of January 2011. The program
also provided technical corrections, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
GAO Response:
According to the DOD deskbook, technologies should be at technology
readiness level (TRL) 7 or higher at production start. To achieve TRL
7, a program should demonstrate a system prototype in an operational
environment, which would require them to be integrated in the system.
[End of section]
Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT):
Illustration: Source: U.S. Army.
The Army's E-IBCT program will augment brigade-level capabilities
through an incremental, expedited fielding of systems to current
forces. The first increment, scheduled for fielding in late 2011,
includes unattended sensors, unmanned ground and air vehicles, and new
radios and battle command software. Increment 1 evolved from Army
efforts to quickly equip current forces with the more mature
capabilities from the now terminated Future Combat System program. The
Army anticipates at least one follow-on increment.
Concept:
System development:
Program/development start (7/04);
Limited user test (9/09);
Design review (10/09);
Low-rate decision (12/09);
Production:
Low-rate decision (12/09);
Limited user test (9/19;
GAO review (11/10);
Initial capability (9/11);
Full-rate production (12/11);
Last procurement (8/13).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Warren, MI:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $112.9 million:
Procurement: $2,182.6 million:
Total funding: $2,295.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 8:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 2/2010: $590.0;
Latest 8/2010: $595.9;
Percent change: 1.0.
Procurement cost:
As of 2/2010: $2,594.2;
Latest 8/2010: $2,661.7;
Percent change: 2.6.
Total program cost:
As of 2/2010: $3,184.2;
Latest 8/2010: $3,257.6;
Percent change: 2.3.
Program unit cost:
As of 2/2010: $353.801;
Latest 8/2010: $361.956;
Percent change: 2.3.
Total quantities:
As of 2/2010 9;
Latest 8/2010: 9;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 2/2010: 27;
Latest 8/2010: 27;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
E-IBCT Increment 1 was approved for production in December 2009, even
though an independent review team later found that none of its
critical technologies were mature, and the program was still making
design changes to address reliability issues identified in testing.
Since that time, the Army has worked to improve performance and
reliability of the E-IBCT systems. According to the Army, all current
Increment 1 critical technologies are mature and its systems' designs
are stable. The results of an updated independent technology
assessment were not available at the time of our review. In addition,
the Army was unable to provide production data from the contractor.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics was scheduled to review the program in December 2010 to
determine whether to proceed with the production of the next two sets
of systems.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: NA;
DOD design review: 10/09;
Production decision: 12/09;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
Increment 1 E-IBCT Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the Army, all current E-IBCT Increment 1 critical
technologies are mature, although independent reviewers disagree.
Prior to the December 2009 production decision, the Army reported that
9 out of 10 critical technologies were mature. However, a March 2010
independent assessment reported that none of the critical technologies
were mature and only two technologies were nearing maturity. The
assessment found that the Army had not demonstrated two key radio
technologies under the expected operational conditions or at the
required range. It also found that other technologies displayed
erratic performance, experienced excessive reboots, or were relatively
primitive with regard to efficiency and robustness. According to Army
officials, a September 2010 limited user test planned to demonstrate
the improved maturity of these technologies. To support the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics'
December 2010 review of the program, the Director, Defense Research
and Engineering, planned to complete an updated independent technology
assessment. The results of that assessment were not available at the
time of our review.
Design Maturity:
According to the Army, the designs of the E-ICBT Increment 1 systems
are stable with 93 percent of the total expected design drawings
releasable to manufacturing. These designs were not stable when the
program received approval to enter production in December 2009. The
program has made 86 design changes since then to address performance
and reliability issues. These design changes were incorporated into
the equipment that was used in a September 2010 limited user test and
into the systems' production configuration.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess production maturity because the Army was unable to
provide statistical process control data on critical manufacturing
processes. However, Army documents indicate that the systems have
achieved an engineering manufacturing readiness level of 3, which
demonstrates readiness for low-rate production.
Other Program Issues:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics was scheduled to review the program in December 2010 to
consider the systems' readiness for further testing and fielding,
whether to proceed with additional production, and the direction for
the remainder of the program. The review was to be based on the Army's
progress improving the systems' reliability and network performance
during the September 2010 limited user test.
During tests leading up to the September 2010 limited user test, the
Army reported that only one system failed to meet its reliability
requirement for entrance into the limited user test. However, an Army
assessment of the 2010 limited user test reported that only three of
the five systems met or exceeded reliability requirements. Although
reliability did improve since the 2009 limited user test, the systems
were collectively assessed as not providing force effectiveness at the
system of systems level and, with the exception of the small unmanned
ground vehicle, provided minimal military utility.
Program Office Comments:
According to the program office, in 2009, significant concerns were
raised regarding the reliability of Increment 1 systems and network
maturity. Testing conducted in 2010 demonstrated significant
reliability improvements with all systems (less the unmanned aerial
system) greatly exceeding their reliability requirements. Testing also
proved network maturity for the E-IBCT configuration and the Network
Integration Kit was determined to be a key command and control
enabler. The Training and Doctrine Command identified two key issues
with the Network Integration Kit, and the program manager has already
implemented and demonstrated fixes. The Training and Doctrine Command
has voiced strong support for the Network Integration Kit and Small
Unmanned Ground Vehicle. On the basis of a December 2010 Army
Configuration Steering Board and a pending Defense Acquisition Board,
a descoping of systems and quantities is expected. Cost and quantity
information for the anticipated changes are predecisional and were not
made available for this report. The Army provided additional technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Intelligent Munitions System-Scorpion:
Photograph: Source: U.S. Army.
The Army's Intelligent Munitions System-Scorpion is a remotely
controlled, antivehicular landmine alternative system. The Scorpion
includes an integrated system of lethal and nonlethal munitions,
sensors, software, and communications that detects, tracks,
classifies, reports, engages, and kills light wheeled through heavy
tracked vehicles. As part of the Army's capability portfolio review,
it was determined that the Scorpion is no longer affordable. Program
closeout was approved by a configuration steering board in October
2010.
Concept:
System development:
Development start (5/06);
Critical design review (4/09);
GAO review (11/10).
Production:
Low-rate decision (12/11);
Full-rate decision (1/11);
Initial operational capability (9/13).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Textron Defense Systems:
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $78.7 million:
Procurement: $870.0 million:
Total funding: $1,275.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 2,624:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 11/2010: $487.3;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 11/2010: $870.5;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 11/2010: $1,685.2;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 11/2010: $.642;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities:
As of: NA;
Latest 11/2010: 2,624;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of: NA;
Latest 11/2010: 89;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The Scorpion program's critical technologies are mature and its design
is stable. The program initially planned to use the Joint Tactical
Radio System, but has switched to the more mature Spider radio. While
the Scorpion's design was not stable at its April 2009 design review,
over 90 percent of its design drawings are now releasable and its
critical software functionality has been tested. The program will
conduct a series of production readiness reviews as it prepares for
its December 2011 production decision. In addition, the program is
already producing test hardware on the production floor using
production processes, personnel, and tooling. Originally part of the
Future Combat System, the program was established as a stand-alone
program in January 2007. The separation caused cost growth which led
to the program being designated a major defense acquisition program in
February 2010.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 5/06;
DOD design review: 4/09;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: 12/11.
[End of figure]
Scorpion Program:
Technology Maturity:
All four of the Scorpion's critical technologies--the control station
computing unit, situational awareness, antivehicle effects, and
communications through Spider radio--are mature. When the program
began development in 2006, its critical technologies included the
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5 radio and the JTRS
Network Enterprise Domain soldier radio waveform. As a result of
differences between the Scorpion and JTRS development schedules, the
program switched to the mature Spider radio.
Design Maturity:
The Scorpion's design has stabilized since its April 2009 design
review when only 61 percent of its total expected drawings were
releasable. Over 90 percent of its design drawings are now releasable
and its safety-critical and major software functionality has been
tested. While risk-reduction tests completed in November 2009 have
demonstrated the capability of the system's design utilizing
production-representative hardware, the system's poor performance
against heavy tracked vehicles and another required target is a design
concern. According to the program's January 2010 post-critical design
review assessment, the Army needs to make a decision on the importance
of this requirement because the program is utilizing resources to try
to meet it and it could affect the system's overall performance. In
addition, the assessment identified system reliability and an
aggressive program schedule as challenges.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess production maturity because the program does not
collect statistical process control data on its critical manufacturing
processes; however, the program has taken a number of steps to prepare
for its planned December 2011 production decision. The program has
identified its critical manufacturing processes and key product
characteristics and uses yield and defect data and defect management
to track them. According to the program office, the contractor began
identifying and developing custom tooling and test equipment that
would be required for production shortly after development start.
Production processes and tooling were refined during this period and
utilized in the next phase wherein operations personnel built hardware
with engineering oversight. All Scorpion hardware delivered for
qualification testing has been produced on the production floor, using
production processes, personnel, tooling, and special test equipment.
The program will also conduct a series of production readiness reviews
to support the transition to production.
Other Program Issues:
The Scorpion began development as part of the Future Combat System
(FCS) program in 2006. It supports the National Landmine Policy
announced in February 2004, which stated the United States would no
longer use non-self-destructing antivehicle and antipersonnel
landmines after December 31, 2010. In January 2007, the Army separated
the Scorpion program from the FCS. In February 2010, due to
development cost growth, which was attributed to negative effects from
the separation and technical issues during development, the Scorpion
program was designated as a major defense acquisition program.
As part of the Army's capability portfolio reviews, it was determined
that the Scorpion is no longer affordable and that the Army is willing
to accept the operational risk of not fielding this capability.
However, some of this technology will roll into the Spider program.
The decision to conduct an orderly closeout was approved by a
configuration steering board in October 2010 and the official
acquisition decision memorandum is pending.
Program Office Comments:
The Scorpion program was developed to avoid a capability gap
associated with the National Landmine Policy and field a capability
prior to December 31, 2010. Due to this pressure, the program was
initially schedule driven. Following the critical design review, the
program plan was updated to reflect an event driven schedule.
Following the risk-reduction testing in November 2009, design changes
and modifications to the requirement improved performance against the
heavy tracked vehicles, and changes to the tactics, techniques, and
procedures by the engineer school resulted in improved performance
against lightwheeled vehicles. These enhancements were demonstrated
during conduct of development and live fire testing in September 2010.
Program officials also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM):
Illustration: Source: Department of Defense.
The Joint Air-to-Ground Missile is a joint Army/Navy program with
Marine Corps participation. The missile will be air-launched from
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and designed to target tanks;
light armored vehicles; missile launchers; command, control, and
communications vehicles; bunkers; and buildings. It is to provide line-
of-sight and beyond line-of sight capabilities and can be employed in
a fire-and-forget mode or a precision attack mode. The missile will
replace Hellfire, Maverick, and air-launched TOW.
Concept:
Technology development start (9/08);
Preliminary design review (6/10);
Prototype missile tests (9/10);
GAO review (11/10).
System development:
Development start (TBD);
Critical design review (TBD).
Production:
Production start (TBD);
Initial operational capability (TBD).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD:
Program office: Warren, MI:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,206.9 million:
Procurement: $5,202.1 million:
Total funding: $6,409.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 33,853:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: $1,650.8;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: $5,202.1;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: $6,852.9;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: $.202;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities:
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: 33,853;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of: NA;
Latest 7/2010: 69;
Percent change: NA.
[Empty]; As of; Latest 07/2010; Percent change.
[End of table]
According to the program office, the three JAGM critical technologies
are expected to be nearing maturity and demonstrated in a relevant
environment before a decision is made to enter development. However,
an independent technology readiness assessment identified five
critical technologies, at least one of which has not reached this
level of maturity. The program office has incorporated a provision in
the draft request for proposal for the development contract that may
mitigate some of the technology risk by requiring both contractors to
submit two rocket motor designs. According to program officials, the
release of the request for proposal has been delayed until the third
quarter of fiscal year 2011 because the program's acquisition strategy
and requirements needed to be updated to reflect the cancellation of
the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter and new guidance on affordability.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
GAO review; 11/10;
Development start: TBD;
DOD design review: TBD (not assessed);
Production decision: TBD (not assessed).
[End of figure]
JAGM Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, the three JAGM critical technologies
are expected to be nearing maturity and demonstrated in a relevant
environment before a decision is made to start system development. The
critical technologies include a multimode seeker for increased
countermeasure resistance, boost-sustain propulsion for increased
standoff range, and a multipurpose warhead for increased lethality.
However, an independent technology readiness assessment identified
five critical technologies, at least one of which has not reached this
level of maturity. The program office has incorporated a provision in
the draft request for proposal for the engineering and manufacturing
development contract that may mitigate some of the technology risk by
requiring both contractors to submit two rocket motor designs.
Other Program Issues:
In September 2008, the Army awarded two fixed-price incentive
contracts to Raytheon and Lockheed Martin for a 27-month JAGM
technology development phase. During technology development, each
contractor completed three tests using prototype missiles in order for
the program to assess the technical risks of proceeding to the next
phase of development. In addition to testing prototypes, each
contractor completed a preliminary design review. According to program
officials, a post-preliminary design review assessment should be
complete by December 2010.
The JAGM program planned to receive approval to enter system
development in November 2010 and award an engineering and
manufacturing development contract in December 2010. However, the
release of the request for proposal for this contract has been delayed
because the program's acquisition strategy and requirements needed to
be updated to reflect the cancellation of the Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopter, the addition of the OH-58 Kiowa as a replacement platform,
and new guidance on affordability. According to program officials,
contract award is now expected no earlier than the third quarter of
fiscal year 2011. The JAGM program office has requested a
justification and approval for a limited competition for the
engineering and manufacturing development contract between the two
technology development contractors.
The Army and the Navy will continue to rely on Hellfire and Maverick
missiles until JAGM is fielded. The Army will continue to extend the
fielding of Hellfire to meet the needs of the warfighter, while the
Navy will rely on both Maverick and Hellfire until JAGM becomes
available.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated
that due to the delay in the signing of the JAGM acquisition strategy,
key dates in the development phase have the potential to be delayed.
[End of section]
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM):
Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force.
The Air Force's JASSM program is intended to field a next-generation
air-to-ground cruise missile capable of stealthy flight and reliable
performance at affordable costs. It is designed to destroy enemy
targets from outside the range of air defenses. The Air Force is
currently producing a baseline JASSM and is developing an extended
range version--JASSM-ER--that will more than double the range of the
baseline version. The two variants are 70 percent common in hardware
and 95 percent common in software. We assessed the JASSM-ER variant.
Concept:
Program start (6/96);
System development:
JASSM development start (11/98);
ER development start (6/03);
GAO review (11/10).
Production:
ER low-rate decision (12/10);
ER Full-rate decision (6/13);
ER Initial capability (TBD);
ER last procurement (2025).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Eglin AFB, FL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $84.4 million:
Procurement: $4,736.2 million:
Total funding: $4,820.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 3,747:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 11/1998: $1,004.7;
Latest 6/2010: $1,462.3;
Percent change: 45.5.
Procurement cost:
As of 11/1998: $1,252.9;
Latest 6/2010: $5,738.7;
Percent change: 358.0.
Total program cost:
As of 11/1998: $2,281.6;
Latest 6/2010: $7,201.0;
Percent change: 215.6.
Program unit cost:
As of 11/1998: $.924;
Latest 6/2010: $1.435;
Percent change: 55.3.
Total quantities:
As of 11/1998: 2,469;
Latest 6/2010: 5,018;
Percent change: 103.2.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 11/1998: 75;
Latest 6/2010: 87;
Percent change: 16.0.
[End of table]
Latest costs include funding for both JASSM and JASSM-ER. According to
program officials, JASSM-ER does not have an approved program baseline
separating its costs from the baseline program, but is completing one
for the upcoming production decision.
According to the program office, the JASSM-ER plans to enter
production in December 2010 with all of its critical technologies and
manufacturing processes mature. We did not assess the design stability
of the JASSM-ER because the program office does not collect design
drawing data. However, the JASSM-ER design has been demonstrated to
perform as intended. It has been successful in 10 out of 11 flight
tests. The program plans to perform additional tests in order to
demonstrate that it meets its reliability requirement. As part of the
upcoming production decision, the program has assessed its
manufacturing readiness and proven out manufacturing and quality
processes in a pilot-line environment. The cost of the JASSM-ER could
be higher than predicted because prior cost estimates were overly
optimistic and flight tests will be needed to achieve its reliability
requirement.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 6/03;
DOD design review: 10/05;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: 12/10.
[End of figure]
JASSM Program:
Technology Maturity:
An independent review panel recently assessed all five JASSM-ER
critical technologies as mature. The five technologies are the engine
system, engine lube system, fuse, low-observable features, and global
positioning system. This assessment was conducted to support the
upcoming JASSM-ER production decision.
Design Maturity:
According to the program office, the JASSM-ER design is stable. The
design has been demonstrated to perform as intended and the missile
has been successful in 10 out of 11 flight tests. However, we did not
specifically assess design stability because the JASSM-ER program
office does not track the number of design drawings. According to the
program office, under the total system performance responsibility
arrangement that was in place when the program was initiated, all
design drawings were developed and managed by the contractor. The Air
Force has since sought more control over the design of the missile. It
now has approval authority over major configuration changes, as well
as approval authority over configuration changes that may increase
cost, require retrofit, or affect safety for missiles currently in
production.
Production Maturity:
According to a program official, the JASSM-ER plans to enter
production in December 2010 with all of its manufacturing processes
mature. The Air Force recently assessed JASSM-ER at a manufacturing
readiness level 8, meaning, among other things, that its technologies
are mature, manufacturing and quality processes and procedures have
been proven in a pilot-line environment, and it is ready to enter into
low-rate production. In addition, the JASSM-ER missiles are being
produced on the same production line as the JASSM baseline, and the
two missiles are 70 percent common in hardware and 95 percent common
in software.
Other Program Issues:
The cost of the JASSM-ER program could be higher than predicted.
First, lower than projected annual procurement levels could increase
production costs. The Air Force's current cost estimate for the JASSM
program may be overly optimistic since it is based on a production
rate of 280 missiles per year (combined JASSM and JASSM-ER production
rate), which has not been achieved since 2005. Not producing at the
expected rate has led to a less efficient production process and a
longer production period, both of which increase costs. Further,
Lockheed Martin officials stated that low production rates could cause
skilled labor to look elsewhere for work and JASSM reliability could
be adversely affected. In addition, according to the Air Force, as
many as 20 flight tests may be needed to fully demonstrate JASSM-ER's
reliability goal of 85 percent. These flight tests could cost as much
as $70 million.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JASSM program office
noted the reliability concerns have been alleviated by successful
tests of JASSM-ER (10 of 11, completed November 2010) and Lot 7 JASSM
baseline (15 of 16, completed October 2009). Additional flight tests
beyond the budgeted operational test and reliability assessment
programs are not required to achieve the reliability requirement of 85
percent following JASSM-ER Lot 4. In fact, JASSM-ER is currently at 87
percent at the conclusion of developmental tests. The risk for higher
JASSM-ER costs stems from unforeseen budget cuts that reduce
production quantities and drive up unit price. Additionally, the JASSM-
ER design is stable as evidenced by the last five flight tests flown
with the current production configuration, and the program's
successful completion of a production readiness review. The JASSM
program also provided technical comments, which were incorporated
where appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV):
Photograph: Source: Austal USA.
The JHSV is a joint Army and Navy program to acquire a high-speed,
shallow-draft vessel for rapid intratheater transport of combat-ready
units. The ship will be capable of operating without reliance on shore
based infrastructure. The program intends to produce a total of 18
ships, 13 for the Navy, and 5 for the Army. DOD authorized
construction of the lead ship in December 2009. It is expected to be
delivered in November 2011.
Concept:
Program start (4/06);
System development:
Contract award (11/08).
Production:
Lead-ship fabrication start (12/09);
GAO review (11/10);
Lead-ship delivery (11/11);
Second ship delivery (1/13);
Last ship delivery (1/17).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Austal, USA:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $18.8 million:
Procurement: $2,593.2 million:
Total funding: $2,612.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 13:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 2/2009: $126.5;
Latest 7/2010: $125.7;
Percent change: -0.7.
Procurement cost:
As of 2/2009: $3,456.0;
Latest 7/2010: $3,543.4;
Percent change: 2.5.
Total program cost:
As of 2/2009: $3,582.5;
Latest 7/2010: $3,669.1;
Percent change: 2.4.
Program unit cost:
As of 2/2009: $199.028;
Latest 7/2010: $203.836;
Percent change: 2.4.
Total quantities:
As of 2/2009: 18;
Latest 7/2010: 18;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 2/2009: 48;
Latest 12/2009: 50;
Percent change: 4.2.
[End of table]
The JHSV program entered production in December 2009 with its critical
technologies mature, but without a complete three dimensional design.
Nine of the ship's 46 design zones were complete in the three-
dimensional model when construction began. According to the Navy's own
measure of design maturity--which takes into account other design
metrics such as completeness of two-dimensional design drawings and
engineering reviews, as well as the three-dimensional model--the
design was at least 85 percent complete. Program officials state that
the three-dimensional model was completed in September 2010. As of
October 2010, 33 modules were in production utilizing instructions
derived from the model. Prior to starting production, DOD agreed to
reduce the JHSV's required transit speed, in order to avoid the need
for a significant redesign that could have affected the program's cost
and schedule.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Contract award: 11/08;
Lead ship fabrication: 12/09;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
JHSV Program:
Technology and Design Maturity:
The JHSV program awarded its detailed design and construction contract
in November 2008 with 17 of its 18 critical technologies mature and
demonstrated in a realistic environment. Before production began in
December 2009, the program was required to demonstrate that all
technologies were mature.
In December 2009, DOD authorized the Navy to begin construction of the
lead ship without a complete three-dimensional design. According to
program officials, 9 of the ship's 46 three-dimensional design zones
were complete at the start of construction. An additional 14 design
zones were nearing completion. According to program officials,
construction start was delayed 34 days to complete product modeling
for the JHSV's most complex areas, such as the ship's machinery rooms.
This level of design maturity falls short of GAO's recommended
shipbuilding best practices, which call for achieving a complete and
stable three-dimensional product model before construction begins. The
program office believes that the completion of the model prior to
construction start was less critical for JHSV because it is not as
complex as other Navy ships, such as the DDG 1000. According to the
Navy's own measure of design maturity--which includes the completion
of two-dimensional design drawings and engineering reviews as well as
the three-dimensional model--the design was at least 85 percent
complete. According to program officials, the three-dimensional model
was completed in September 2010.
Production Maturity:
Prior to the start of production, the JHSV program was required to
demonstrate that its manufacturing processes were in control. The
program conducted two pilot production phases and built a pilot module
in the shipbuilder's new module manufacturing facility. According to
program officials, production will be monitored through the use of
earned value management data to track the cost of the work performed,
and through reviews and inspections performed by the American Bureau
of Shipbuilding and the Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding. As of
October 2010, the program office reported that 33 of the ship's
modules were in production.
Other Program Issues:
DOD chose the JHSV to participate in the capital budget account pilot
program, which was created to control cost growth by providing stable
funding. Under this initiative, the program office must gain approval
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for changes in funding or
requirements. Program officials stated that this is useful as it
allows them to stabilize their requirements and the flow of work to
the shipyard. Funding for 10 of the program's 18 ships is currently
guaranteed.
Prior to starting production, DOD agreed to reduce the JHSV's required
transit speed, to avoid design changes that could have affected the
program's cost and schedule. Previously JHSV had been required to have
a transit range of 4,700 nautical miles traveling at a speed of 25
knots. According to program officials, transiting at this speed
requires additional amounts of fuel that would have triggered the need
for a significant redesign, cost increases, and schedule delays. As a
part of a configuration steering board meeting, officials from the
JHSV Navy requirements office, Joint Staff, and DOD agreed that the
speed could be reduced to 23 knots to preserve the current design and
schedule with minimal effect on meeting mission needs.
Program Office Comments:
The program office did not concur with our findings related to design
maturity. As certified by Navy and Defense Department officials, per
Public Law 110-181, greater than 85 percent of the design was
completed prior to construction start by the Navy's measure of design
maturity. In addition, the three-dimensional model was completed prior
to the start of fabrication of the future USS Vigilant, the first
JHSV, on September 13, 2010. Significant production and financial risk
has been avoided by using proven commercial production design and
technology, ensuring stable requirements, minimizing change, and
through the ruthless pursuit of cost reduction and efficiency.
GAO Response:
Our findings on the design maturity of the JHSV are based on metrics
determined by previous audits of Navy shipbuilding programs and
commercial best practices.
[End of section]
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS):
Photograph: Source: U.S. Army.
The Army's JLENS will provide over-the-horizon detection and tracking
of land-attack cruise missiles and other targets. The Army is
developing JLENS in two spirals. Spiral 1 is complete and served as a
test bed to demonstrate the concept. Spiral 2 will utilize two
aerostats with advanced sensors for surveillance and tracking, as well
as mobile mooring stations, communication payloads, and processing
stations. JLENS will provide surveillance and engagement support to
other systems, such as PAC-3, SM-6, and MEADS. We assessed Spiral 2.
Concept:
System development:
Development start (8/05);
Design review (12/08);
GAO review (11/10).
Production:
Low-rate decision (3/12);
Initial capability (9/13).
Full-rate decision (11/14);
Last procurement (2020).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Redstone Arsenal, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $649.1 million:
Procurement: $5,041.9 million:
Total funding: $5,852.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 14:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 8/2005: $1,975.5;
Latest 12/2009: $2,154.7;
Percent change: 9.1.
Procurement cost:
As of 8/2005: $4,520.7;
Latest 12/2009: $5,041.9;
Percent change: 11.5.
Total program cost:
As of 8/2005: $6,566.9;
Latest 12/2009: $7,378.0;
Percent change: 12.4.
Program unit cost:
As of 8/2005: $410.432;
Latest 12/2009: $461.122;
Percent change: 12.4.
Total quantities:
As of 8/2005: 16;
Latest 12/2009: 16;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 8/2005: 97;
Latest 12/2009: 97;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
According to program officials, JLENS will enter production with
mature technologies, a stable design, and proven production processes.
The program began development in 2005 with only one of its five
critical technologies mature, and only two of the four current
critical technologies are mature. The design appears stable, but the
potential for design changes remains until the maturity of JLENS
components have been demonstrated. In September 2010, an aerostat
accident resulted in the loss of one of the JLENS platforms. This
accident and other system integration challenges are expected to delay
several key program events, including the production decision. Twelve
of the program's 15 critical manufacturing processes are currently in
control. The JLENS program has also completed a number of key
production planning activities, such as assessing supplier
capabilities and risks.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 8/05;
DOD design review: 12/08;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: 3/12.
[End of figure]
JLENS Program:
Technology Maturity:
JLENS entered system development in August 2005 with only one of its
five critical technologies mature. The program subsequently combined
two of the critical technologies--the communications payload and the
processing group--into the communications processing group. The
communications processing group and platform are currently mature. The
program expects to demonstrate the fire control radar and surveillance
radar in a realistic environment before the program enters production.
Many of the JLENS radar technologies have legacy components. However,
sensor software items related to signal processing, timing, and
control, as well as element measurement, are not yet mature. The
program office has successfully conducted tests of the fire control
radar antenna, but the integration of both the fire control radar and
surveillance radar components in the program's system integration
laboratory has yet to occur.
Design Maturity:
The JLENS design appears stable, but the potential for design changes
will remain until key JLENS components have been integrated and
tested. For example, a first flight demonstration of the aerostat was
successfully conducted in August 2009, but the program must still
complete a series of tests integrating the JLENS mobile mooring
station with the aerostat. In September 2010, the program experienced
the loss of a platform following an aerostat accident. The program is
analyzing the cause of the accident, as well as other system
integration issues. The JLENS program has received approval to
transport the mobile mooring station without armor, which mitigates a
risk the program office has identified in the past.
Production Maturity:
The JLENS program projects that it will enter production with all 15
of its critical manufacturing processes mature and stable. According
to the program office, 12 of the program's critical manufacturing
processes are currently in control. The JLENS program has also
completed a number of key activities that are essential to effective
production management, including updating its manufacturing plan and
addressing areas such as supplier capabilities and risks, cost,
quality control, materials, producibility, and workforce skills.
Other Program Issues:
The JLENS program is working to address several risks that could
affect the program's cost, schedule, and performance. First, the
program received $32 million less than the amount requested in the
President's fiscal year 2010 budget. If additional funding is not
provided in fiscal year 2012, the program reports it will not be able
to procure the equipment to field an initial operational capability by
the end of fiscal year 2013. Second, due to the September 2010
aerostat accident and subsequent loss of a platform, the program
expects several key events, including the start of production, to be
delayed. Third, if problems occur during systems integration and
verification tests, the program expects that cost and schedule would
be affected. Fourth, if test site preparations are not complete by
April 2011, then the production timeline could be jeopardized.
Finally, the program could also be affected by alignment with the
Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense program. As part of the
integrated strategy, the Army extended the system development and
demonstration phase by 12 months. The JLENS program is waiting
approval of a new acquisition program baseline with updated cost and
schedule estimates that reflect this change.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program stated that
the Army is planning to request funds in its fiscal year 2012 budget
to offset the fiscal year 2010 reduction. The program also reported
experiencing development challenges that have caused system
integration delays, and schedule challenges due to a September 2010
aerostat accident. The program office continues to work on a new
acquisition program baseline. A new cost estimate was presented to the
Army Cost Review Board in July 2009. The estimate will be updated
based on the results of an Army review and submission of the
President's fiscal year 2012 budget. A revised baseline is expected to
be approved in the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. The Army
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS):
Illustration: Source: Department of Defense.
JPALS is a joint Army, Navy, and Air Force program that will replace
the obsolete radar-based SPN-46 and SPN-35 systems. It is a Global
Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System-based system that will
provide a rapidly deployable, adverse weather, adverse terrain, day-
night precision approach and landing capability for all DOD ground and
airborne systems. Increment 1A is a Navy-led sea-based ship system,
and increment 1B will integrate JPALS with sea-based aircraft. We
assessed increment 1A.
Concept:
System development:
Development start (7/08);
Preliminary design review (12/09);
GAO review (11/10).
Production:
Production decision (2/13);
Initial capability (12/14);
Full-rate decision (6/15).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Lexington Park, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $305.2 million:
Procurement: $219.2 million:
Total funding: $524.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 26:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 7/2008: $780.2;
Latest 7/2010: $750.3;
Percent change: -3.8.
Procurement cost:
As of 7/2008: $210.1;
Latest 7/2010: $219.0;
Percent change: 4.2.
Total program cost:
As of 7/2008: $997.1;
Latest 7/2010: $976.2;
Percent change: -2.1.
Program unit cost:
As of 7/2008: $26.950;
Latest 7/2010: $26.384;
Percent change: -2.1.
Total quantities:
As of 7/2008: 37;
Latest 7/2010: 37;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 7/2008: 75;
Latest 7/2010: 77;
Percent change: 2.7.
[End of table]
JPALS began system development in July 2008 with both of its critical
technologies nearing maturity. JPALS is primarily a software
development effort but also includes commercial hardware components.
The hardware design is stable and program officials accepted the
system's drawings in preparation for the December 2010 critical design
review. However, design stability has been affected by requirements
changes. As of January 2011, there were 387 requirements in the system
performance specification--an increase of 33 since the start of
development. Officials also report ship integration challenges on CVN
78 may require changing the antenna placement to accommodate
performance and maintenance requirements. The program plans to enter
production in 2013. Increment 1B will begin development in 2012 and
integrate the system with the avionics of the F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, and
MH-60R/S.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 7/08;
GAO review; 11/10;
DOD design review: 12/10;
Production decision: 2/13 (Not assessed).
[End of figure]
JPALS Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JPALS program began development in July 2008 with two critical
technologies--the geometry extra redundant almost fixed solution and
the vertical protection level/lateral protection level--nearing
maturity. Program officials expect both critical technologies to be
mature and demonstrated in a realistic environment by the JPALS
production decision in 2013. While JPALS utilizes existing commercial
components for most of its hardware, its functionality will be enabled
by over 700,000 lines of software code. The program plans to rely
heavily on reused code with 77 percent of the program's total lines of
code expected to be reused. If less software is reused than originally
estimated, the potential consequences are longer development time and
greater cost.
Design Maturity:
JPALS is primarily a software development effort, but also includes
commercial hardware components. The hardware design is stable with 96
percent of the total expected design drawings released to
manufacturing. The drawings cover the JPALS ship system-radio,
antenna, receiver, racks, and console. The program also tracks
requirement changes to monitor design stability. As of January 2011,
there were 387 requirements in the system performance specification--
an increase of 33 since the start of development. These changes are
due to system design gaps uncovered for L-class ships, the Joint
Strike Fighter, and legacy landing systems and updated maintenance
requirements. According to program officials, detailed software
requirements are stable and proceeding according to schedule to
support software development. The first of seven software blocks is
complete and blocks 2 and 3 are on schedule.
Production Maturity:
Program officials plan to employ various techniques to assess
production maturity, including tool design, fabrication metrics, and
quarterly production readiness reviews. The program will build eight
engineering development models to be installed on aircraft carriers
and sent to test facilities to demonstrate system performance. These
models are expected to be delivered in fiscal years 2011 through 2012.
The program plans to enter production in February 2013.
Other Program Issues:
According to program officials, several ship integration challenges
are being addressed. Specifically, the current JPALS antenna location
for the JPALS system on CVN 78 affects the program's ability to meet
performance and maintenance requirements. Trade studies are
investigating several potential antenna location changes to determine
the optimal position for it. The cost effect of moving the antenna
will not be known until the studies are complete. Program officials
also continue to monitor the system's maintainability to ensure JPALS
requires no manpower increase compared to legacy systems--a key
performance parameter. JPALS has completed a detailed maintenance
analysis, the results of which indicate that the estimated workload
meets this manpower requirement. JPALS is also at risk of exceeding
its weight limit for CVN 78. It currently exceeds the requirement by
500 pounds. The program office reported that CVN 78 has updated the
ship design to account for the increased weight.
The JPALS acquisition strategy separates the program into seven
increments. Increment 1 is separated into two phases, A and B.
Increment 1B--aircraft integration--will begin development in 2012 and
integrate the system with the avionics of the F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, and
MH-60R/S. Increment 2--land-based--will be led and funded by the Air
Force and was expected to begin development during 2011.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy generally
concurred with this assessment. Officials stated that the JPALS
increment 1A program is on track for system integration with
acceptable risk, that cost and schedule performance are within the
baseline plan, and that the system requirements and acquisition
strategy continue to be accurate, supportable, and executable. The
Navy also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System (AMF
JTRS):
Illustration: Source: Department of Defense.
DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and
networking capabilities. A joint program executive office provides a
central acquisition authority that cuts across the military services.
Program and product offices develop hardware and software for users
with similar requirements. The AMF program will develop radios and
associated equipment for integration into nearly 160 different types
of aircraft, ships, and fixed stations.
Technology system development:
Program start (3/08);
Design review (11/09);
GAO review (11/10);
SA production decision (11/11);
MF production decision (6/12).
Initial capability:
Initial capability (8/14).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $950.4 million:
Procurement: $6,213.7 million:
Total funding: $7,164.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 26,878:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 10/2008: $1,915.8;
Latest 7/2010: $1,998.1;
Percent change: 4.3.
Procurement cost:
As of 10/2008: $6,117.1;
Latest 7/2010: $6,213.7;
Percent change: 1.6.
Total program cost:
As of 10/2008: $8,032.9;
Latest 7/2010: $8,211.8;
Percent change: 2.2.
Program unit cost:
As of 10/2008: $.296;
Latest 7/2010: $.303;
Percent change: 2.2.
Total quantities:
As of 10/2008: 27,102;
Latest 7/2010: 27,102;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 10/2008: 80;
Latest 7/2010: 77;
Percent change: -3.8.
The program office reported quantities in terms of channels rather
than radios. The program is developing a 2-channel small airborne (SA)
radio and a 4-channel maritime/fixed station (M/F) radio based on a
single common architecture.
[End of table]
The AMF JTRS program completed its design review in November 2009 with
its five critical technologies nearing maturity and its design stable.
There will be an independent technology readiness assessment before
the small airborne variant production decision, currently planned for
November 2011. AMF JTRS production processes are also approaching
maturity with manufacturing sites having demonstrated a capability to
produce components or subsystems in a production-relevant environment.
Each of the AMF variants will undergo initial operational test and
evaluation after the program's initial production decision. AMF JTRS
quantities could increase depending on whether the Navy and Marine
Corps decide to acquire AMF JTRS small airborne radios for their
networking capabilities.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 3/08;
DOD design review: 11/09;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: 11/11.
[End of figure]
AMF JTRS Program:
Technology Maturity:
DOD certified the AMF JTRS program for entry into system development
in March 2008 with all five of its critical technologies nearing
maturity and demonstrated in a relevant environment. Prior to the
start of system development, the AMF JTRS program took steps to
develop key product knowledge. In 2004, the program awarded
competitive system design contracts to two industry teams led by
Boeing and Lockheed Martin to help mitigate technical risks and
address key integration challenges. According to program officials, an
independent technology readiness assessment will be performed in
preparation for the small airborne variant production decision, which
is scheduled for November 2011.
Design Maturity:
The AMF JTRS design appears stable. The program reported that all of
its expected design drawings were releasable when it completed its
design review in November 2009. AMF JTRS' ability to demonstrate that
the system meets its performance requirements is dependent on
waveforms and network management services from the JTRS Network
Enterprise Domain program. Of the two open items remaining from the
design review, program officials consider the ability to route and
retransmit between radio channels to be high risk. More specifically,
the program is concerned that a needed waveform may not be available
in time to allow operational testers to complete testing before the
program's small airborne variant production decision in November 2011.
Program officials assessed the other open item--security certification
from the National Security Agency--as a medium risk. Both the program
office and National Security Agency agree that there are currently no
certification issues with the design. Once the National Security
Agency certifies AMF JTRS, any changes will require an additional
certification. Certification requirements may impact the system
verification testing schedule.
Production Maturity:
The AMF JTRS program expects to have mature production processes
before beginning production. A joint government-contractor assessment
team has conducted manufacturing readiness level assessments--which
include assessing statistical process controls--at each manufacturing
site. Consistent with best practices, the sites are expected to
demonstrate the ability to produce production-representative units on
pilot lines before beginning low-rate production. Several
manufacturing sites have already demonstrated a capability to produce
prototype components or subsystems in a production-relevant
environment.
Other Program Issues:
AMF JTRS quantities could change depending on the Navy and Marine
Corps' strategy for acquiring networking capabilities. While all of
the services are planning to buy maritime/fixed station radios, the
Army and Air Force are currently the only services planning to
purchase the small airborne AMF JTRS radios. A March 2008 acquisition
decision memorandum removed this requirement for the Navy and the
Marine Corps and indicated that they plan to rely on the less capable
ARC-210 radios for their airborne communications needs. While the ARC-
210 radio is being upgraded, it will not have the waveforms for air-to-
air and air-to-ground data networking. In August 2008, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
directed the JTRS joint program executive office, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
Integration (NII), along with the Joint Staff and military services,
to assess issues and options related to replacing currently fielded
ARC-210 radios with AMF JTRS capabilities. According to an NII
official, this assessment has still not been initiated.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Joint Program
Executive Office JTRS provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radios (GMR):
Illustration: Source: Department of Defense.
DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with selected radios and increase communications and
networking capabilities. The JTRS GMR program is developing radios for
ground vehicles. JTRS GMR depends on waveforms being developed by the
JTRS Network Enterprise Domain program, and shares interdependencies
with the JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit program as well as the
JTRS Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station program.
Concept:
Program start (9/97);
System development:
Development start (6/02);
Design review (12/07);
New acquisition baseline (1/08);
Program baseline directed (9/08);
GAO review (11/10).
Production:
Production decision (10/11).
Initial capability (1/13).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $128.3 million:
Procurement: $14,170.4 million:
Total funding: $14,298.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 86,948:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 6/2002: $1,004.8;
Latest 1/2011: $1,697.3;
Percent change: 68.9.
Procurement cost:
As of 6/2002: $16,159.9;
Latest 1/2011: $14,170.4;
Percent change: -12.3.
Total program cost:
As of 6/2002: $17,164.7;
Latest 1/2011: $15,867.7;
Percent change: -7.6.
Program unit cost:
As of 6/2002: $.158;
Latest 1/2011: $.182;
Percent change: 15.1.
Total quantities:
As of 6/2002: 108,388;
Latest 1/2011: 87,079;
Percent change: -19.7.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 6/2002: 55;
Latest 1/2011: 127;
Percent change: 130.9.
[End of table]
The JTRS GMR program expects to have its critical technologies mature,
design stable, and most of its production processes in control by its
planned October 2011 production decision. However, the JTRS GMR
limited user test and production decision may be delayed to allow the
program to test the GMR radio with its final software build and better
assess the maturity of the wideband networking waveform. Even if the
JTRS GMR limited user test and production decision are delayed, the
Army's Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team program still plans to
request approval to procure the radios for its next two brigades. The
JTRS GMR program has yet to fully test key networking capabilities and
receive its final National Security Agency certification. The program
expects the Office of the Director, Cost Analysis and Program
Evaluation, to complete a new independent cost estimate in January
2011.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 6/02;
DOD design review: 12/07;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: 10/11.
[End of figure]
JTRS GMR Program:
Technology Maturity:
The JTRS GMR program started system development in 2002 with none of
its 20 critical technologies mature and demonstrated in a realistic
environment. The JTRS GMR program expects to have its critical
technologies mature by its planned October 2011 production decision.
According to the program office, 11 of the 19 current critical
technologies are now mature, 7 are nearing maturity, and 1 is still
immature. The immature critical technology--bridging/retransmission
software--is to be tested as part of GMR's multiservice operational
test and evaluation, which is scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter
of fiscal year 2012.
JTRS GMR relies on the wideband networking waveform--among other
waveforms--to meet the requirements of key users, most notably the
Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) program. While program
officials reported the wideband networking waveform to be approaching
maturity, the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E), assessed the waveform's maturity to be substantially lower in
a March 2010 technology readiness assessment for the E-IBCT program.
According to the program office, there have been discussions between
the JTRS program executive office and the Army about delaying GMR's
limited user test--which was scheduled for completion in December 2010-
-until later in fiscal year 2011. The delay would allow the program to
test the GMR radio with its final software build and collect more data
for DDR&E to better assess the maturity of the wideband networking
waveform. Testing the radio with its final software build could reduce
the risk of late, costly design changes in production.
According to program officials, the most significant technical
challenge remaining for GMR is meeting security requirements. The
program's security verification test was scheduled for the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2010. The program expects to receive its final
security certification from the National Security Agency in the third
quarter of fiscal year 2011.
Design Maturity:
The design of the JTRS GMR appears stable with over 90 percent of the
total expected design releasable to manufacturing. However, until all
its technologies are mature, key waveforms have been fully integrated
and tested, and the program's final security certification is
received, the potential for design changes remains.
Production Maturity:
The JTRS GMR program has reported that 27 of its 35 critical
manufacturing processes will be in statistical control by the
program's planned October 2011 production decision. By not having all
these processes in statistical control at production start, there is a
greater risk that the radio will not be produced within cost,
schedule, and quality targets. However, prior to its production
decision, the program will demonstrate its critical manufacturing
processes on a pilot production line. In addition, the program has
delivered 91 engineering development model sets for use in
developmental and operational testing.
Other Program Issues:
Until a complete and comprehensive cost estimate is developed, JTRS
GMR program costs will remain uncertain. In August 2008, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
directed the JTRS GMR program to update its cost estimate and revise
its acquisition program baseline. Program officials expect the Office
of the Director, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, to complete an
independent cost estimate by August 2011.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office provided technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form
Fit (HMS):
Illustration: Source: © 2009-2010 General Dynamics.
DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and
networking capabilities. The JTRS HMS program has two concurrent
phases of development. Phase 1 includes the Rifleman radio and two
small form fit radios. Phase 2 consists of the manpack radio and two
additional small form fit radios, all of which are for use in a
classified security domain. We assessed phase 1 and made observations
on phase 2.
Concept:
System development:
Program/development start (4/04);
Design review phase 1 (3/08);
Design review phase I1 (9/09);
GAO review (11/10).
Production:
Low-rate decision--Manpack (2/11).
Low-rate decision--Rifleman radio (4/11)
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc.
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $79.3 million:
Procurement: $3,889.9 million:
Total funding: $3,969.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 215,551:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 5/2004: $536.6;
Latest 7/2010: $896.2;
Percent change: 67.0.
Procurement cost:
As of 5/2004: $9,352.6;
Latest 7/2010: $3,889.9;
Percent change: -58.4.
Total program cost:
As of 5/2004: $9,889.2;
Latest 7/2010: $4,786.2;
Percent change: -51.6.
Program unit cost:
As of 5/2004: $.030;
Latest 7/2010: $.022;
Percent change: -26.3.
Total quantities:
As of 5/2004: 328,674;
Latest 7/2010: 215,961;
Percent change: -34.3.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 5/2004: 85;
Latest 7/2010: 104;
Percent change: 22.4.
[End of table]
The Rifleman radio's production decision has been delayed from August
2010 to approximately April 2011, and the manpack radio's production
decision is also at risk. In addition, since August 2009, the
program's estimated procurement cost increased from $2.5 billion to
$3.9 billion, as engineering design models were produced and the
program learned more about actual costs. While this amount is less
than half the program's original estimate, it is planning to buy far
fewer radios--in particular the more expensive handheld and manpack
radios--than initially planned.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 4/04;
DOD design review: 3/08;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: 4/11.
[End of figure]
JTRS HMS Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the JTRS HMS program, its phase 1 critical technologies--
logical partitioning and software power management--are nearing
maturity. In October 2010, the Army assessed the Early Infantry
Brigade Combat Team and concluded that one of the JTRS HMS small form
fit radios was mature, and in January 2011, the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering, concurred with this assessment.
Additionally, the program office reported that it will demonstrate the
Rifleman radio is fully mature during operational testing in January
2011.
The Army has not assessed the maturity of any of the program's four
phase 2 technologies, but the program office reported that it will
demonstrate that the manpack radio is fully mature during operational
testing in February 2011. The program office has also reported that
the manpack radio is currently meeting its size, weight, and power
requirements.
Design Maturity:
According to the JTRS HMS program office, the phase 1 design is now
stable. The phase 1 Rifleman radio has been reconfigured to address
issues identified in its 2009 limited user test. The program office
reported that the radio now has fewer parts; meets size, weight, and
battery requirements; and provides increased reliability and range.
The phase 2 design continues to change. JTRS HMS and the Nett Warrior
program, which will use the phase 2 small form fit B radio, are
investigating alternatives to better accommodate Nett Warrior's
updated requirements, but the program office does not expect this
redesign to be a challenge because it will not involve new technology.
Production Maturity:
According to the JTRS HMS program, its production processes are
mature. In 2010, the program identified one critical manufacturing
process and reported it was in control. In 2009, the program
identified 24 critical manufacturing processes, but it no longer
considers any of these processes critical because their maturity has
increased.
Other Program Issues:
The production decision for the Rifleman radio has been further
delayed from August 2010 to approximately April 2011, and the manpack
radio's planned February 2011 production decision is also at risk. The
waveforms targeted for the radio's limited user test are being
operationally tested in February 2011; the National Security Agency is
not scheduled to complete certification of the manpack radio until
after successful verification testing in May 2011; and the MUOS
waveform that the manpack radio is required to use is not scheduled to
be operationally tested until 2012.
Since August 2009, the program's estimated procurement cost has
increased from $2.5 billion to $3.9 billion, as engineering design
models were produced and the program learned more about actual costs.
While this amount is less than half the program's original estimate,
it is planning to buy far fewer radios--in particular the more
expensive handheld and manpack radios--than initially planned.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program
Executive Office provided technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate.
[End of section]
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
Two photographs: Sources: Lockheed Martin (left); General Dynamics
(right).
The Navy's LCS is designed to perform mine countermeasures,
antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare missions. It consists of
the ship itself, or seaframe, and the mission package it deploys. The
Navy is procuring the first four seaframes in two unique designs. The
first seaframe (LCS 1) was delivered in September 2008. The second
seaframe (LCS 2) followed in December 2009. We assessed both
seaframes. See pages 99-100 for an assessment of LCS mission packages.
Concept:
Program start (9/02);
System development:
Development start (6/04).
Production:
Production decision--1st design (12/04);
Production decision--2nd design (10/05);
First ship delivery (9/08);
Second ship delivery (12/09);
GAO review (11/10);
Initial capability (7/12).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 5/2004: $873.9;
Latest: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost:
As of 5/2004: $464.6;
Latest: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of 5/2004: $1,338.5;
Latest: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost:
As of 5/2004: $334.622;
Latest: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities:
As of 5/2004: 4;
Latest: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 5/2004: 41;
Latest: 98;
Percent change: 139.0.
Baseline estimates above are for seaframe-related costs only. Research
and development funding includes detail design and construction of two
ships.
[End of table]
The Navy is building the third and fourth LCS seaframes without having
matured all the critical technologies or having achieved a stable
design. Three of 19 seaframe critical technologies are still only
nearing maturity and the Navy reported last year that LCS 3 and LCS 4
began fabrication with only 69 percent and 57 percent of basic and
functional drawings complete, respectively. In addition, the Navy's
efforts to resolve technical issues affecting the lead ships have led
to design changes to LCS 3 and LCS 4 during construction, several of
which remain in progress. Following failed contract negotiations in
2009 for fiscal year 2010-funded ships, the Navy twice restructured
the program's acquisition strategy. This process culminated in
December 2010 when the Navy awarded contracts for 10 ships of each
design between fiscal years 2010 and 2015.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Contract award: 12/04;
Lead ship fabrication: 2/05;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
LCS Program:
Technology Maturity:
Sixteen of 19 critical technologies for both LCS designs are mature.
Three technologies--LCS 1's overhead launch and retrieval system and
LCS 2's trimaran hull and aluminum structure--are nearing maturity.
Further, launch, handling, and recovery systems, which are essential
to the LCS antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasures missions,
are still being refined for both designs. For LCS 1, Navy simulations
have identified risks in safely launching and recovering mission
systems that experience pendulous motion during handling--such as the
remote multimission vehicle and unmanned surface vehicle systems.
These operations may be complicated by unacceptably high water levels
intruding into the ship's launch bay during high sea states. On LCS 2,
the twin boom extensible crane system--designed to launch, handle, and
recover watercraft--contains unproven elements. The Navy reports
recent progress on these systems including (1) successful operation
and movement of an embarked 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat
onboard LCS 1 in March 2010, (2) synthetic lift lines on LCS 2
successfully completing a 200 percent lift test, and (3) routine usage
of a straddle carrier to move an 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat
(with stowage cradle) and berthing modules around the LCS 2 mission
bay. Navy officials also report that testing of LCS 2's twin-boom
extensible crane is progressing.
Design and Production Maturity:
The Navy provided historical data on design completeness that was
inconsistent with data it provided to GAO last year, but officials did
not respond to requests for clarification. The data provided by the
Navy last year indicated that the LCS 3 and LCS 4 began fabrication
with only 69 percent and 57 percent of basic and functional drawings
complete, respectively. The Navy also could not provide this data for
the LCS 1 and LCS 2. GAO's work on shipbuilding best practices has
found that leading commercial firms assess a ship design as stable
when 100 percent of these drawings are complete. By delaying
construction start until basic and functional design is completed and
a stable design is achieved, shipbuilders minimize the risk of design
changes and the subsequent costly rework and out-of-sequence work
these changes can drive.
The Navy used a concurrent design-build strategy for LCS 1 and LCS 2
seaframes, which proved unsuccessful. Implementation of new design
guidelines, delays in major equipment deliveries, and strong focus on
achieving schedule and performance goals resulted in increased
construction costs. The Navy's ongoing efforts to resolve technical
issues affecting LCS 1 and LCS 2, implement cost reduction measures,
and increase mission capability have led to design changes for LCS 3
and LCS 4. These changes are significant and have affected the
configuration of several major ship systems including propulsion,
communications, electrical, and navigation.
Other Program Issues:
After unsuccessful contract negotiations for fiscal year 2010-funded
seaframes, the Navy outlined a new acquisition strategy for the LCS
program in September 2009 aimed at improving affordability by
selecting one seaframe design for the fiscal year 2010 ships and
beyond. In November 2010, the Navy amended this strategy and proposed
contracting for 10 ships of each seaframe design through fiscal year
2015. In December 2010, Congress approved this revised strategy, and
the Navy subsequently awarded fixed-price incentive contracts for up
to 10 ships each to Lockheed Martin and Austal USA.
Program Office Comments:
According to the Navy, two industry teams (1) have each designed,
built, and delivered to the Navy a lead ship meeting the LCS
performance requirements and (2) are currently building their second
ships, with lessons learned from the lead ships incorporated into the
designs. The Navy states that both designs are stable, with LCS 3 and
LCS 4 having experienced minimal design changes to-date, and cites
impressive learning and investment by both shipbuilders as well as
significant improvement in cost and schedule performance. According to
the Navy, LCS 3 launched on December 4, 2010, at over 80 percent
complete. This level of completeness at launch, and the improvement in
cost and schedule performance by both shipbuilders, provides the Navy
confidence that risk of design change and out-of-sequence work is
minimal. The Navy also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Littoral Combat Ship-Mission Modules:
Illustration: Source: © Northrop Grumman Corporation.
The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will perform mine
countermeasures (MCM), surface warfare (SUW), and antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) missions using modular mission packages. Packages
include weapons and sensors that operate from MH-60 helicopters or
unmanned underwater, aerial, or surface vehicles. Initial packages
include engineering development models and production-representative
systems of some, but not all, systems planned. Mission capability
improves with each package delivered until it reaches a baseline
capability.
Concept:
LCS program start (5/04);
System development:
First MCM delivery (9/07);
First SUW delivery (7/08);
First ASW delivery (9/08);
GAO review (11/10);
Milestone B-LCS (2QFY11);
Development start (6/03);
Design review (3/06);
Low-rate decision (9/08).
Initial capability MCM (2013);
Initial capability SUW (2013).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corporation, Integrated Systems:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 8/2007: $484.5;
Latest: TBD.
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost:
As of 8/2007: $3,211.0;
Latest: TBD.
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of 8/2007: $3,695.6;
Latest: TBD.
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost:
As of 8/2007: $57.743;
Latest: TBD.
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities:
As of 8/2007: 64;
Latest: TBD.
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 8/2007: NA;
Latest: NA;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The Navy has accepted delivery of five partially capable mission
packages. At full baseline capability, packages require a total of 21
critical technologies, including 11 sensors, 6 vehicles, and 4 weapons
for their operation. Most of these technologies are mature; however,
some mission systems have experienced test failures and have not
demonstrated the promised capability. Individual systems in the mine
countermeasures packages do not meet reliability requirements, and the
Navy is currently evaluating alternatives to replace the canceled Non-
Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) and missiles. The Navy is also
reexamining the content of the ASW package. Due to developmental
delays with key mission systems, the Navy risks acquiring significant
numbers of seaframes and mission packages before the mission packages
are proven.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: NA (not assessed);
DOD design review: NA (not assessed);
Production start: NA (not assessed);
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
LCS Modules Program:
Technology Maturity:
At its full baseline capability, operation of the MCM, SUW, and ASW
packages on LCS requires a total of 21 critical technologies,
including 11 sensors, 6 vehicles, and 4 weapons. Of these
technologies, 18 are mature and have been demonstrated in a realistic
environment.
The Navy has accepted delivery of two partially capable MCM mission
packages. According to program officials, in 2010 the MCM mission
package completed end-to-end testing, and two MCM systems--the AN/AQS-
20A sonar and Airborne Laser Mine Detection System--have completed
developmental testing in separate test events. Two other systems--the
Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) and Unmanned Surface Sweep System--have
not yet been demonstrated in a realistic environment, and a third--the
Remote Minehunting System (RMS)--has been delayed because of poor
reliability. Program officials report that the Navy is assessing
alternative USV designs because the current system does not meet power
output requirements necessary to support the towed surface sweep
system. The RMS, which is its own major defense acquisition program,
experienced a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold
in December 2009, due to cost increases resulting from a 51 percent
reduction in quantity and efforts to improve reliability. In June
2010, the Office of the Secretary of Defense completed its review and
certified RMS for continuation. According to Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation, officials, RMS reliability has improved from 7.9
hours to nearly 45 hours between failures. According to program
officials, the Navy plans to recommence RMS production in fiscal year
2015. Further, program officials report that the Rapid Airborne Mine
Clearance System has been removed from the package while the Navy
evaluates more cost-effective alternatives for meeting desired
capability delivery time frames.
The Navy has accepted delivery of two partially capable SUW mission
packages and expects to accept delivery of a third mission package in
fiscal year 2011. The Navy will resume procuring SUW packages in
fiscal year 2012. The 30 millimeter gun was test-fired from LCS 1 in
September 2009 and according to program officials, integrated with the
LCS 1 combat system and demonstrated at sea in April 2010. In May
2010, DOD canceled the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System due to cost and
technical challenges. Officials note the Navy is evaluating other
alternatives and expects to complete evaluation by the second quarter
of fiscal year 2011.
The Navy accepted delivery of one partially capable ASW mission
package in September 2008. However, program officials stated that the
Navy plans to introduce new mission systems and classified
capabilities before procuring additional ASW packages. Program
officials report that the Navy has completed development and testing
of the first ASW mission package to evaluate operational concepts and
refine requirements.
Other Program Issues:
The Navy plans to purchase 18 ships and 13 mission packages between
fiscal years 2011 and 2015, but developmental delays in key mission
package systems mean the Navy will acquire significant numbers of
seaframes before mission packages are proven. GAO has reported since
2007 on challenges developing systems constituting LCS mission
packages and integrating them with their host platforms. These
challenges have delayed the planned delivery of baseline capability by
several years. Until mission package performance is proven, the Navy
risks investing in a fleet of ships that does not deliver its promised
capability and is largely constrained to self-defense as opposed to
mission-related tasks.
Program Office Comments:
The Navy stated that recent testing has been comprehensive,
operationally relevant, and successful. According to the Navy, the SUW
mission package supported early deployment of LCS 1, providing a
counter-illicit trafficking capability. Further, the Navy stated that
from program inception, the acquisition strategy for mission package
has employed an incremental approach and remained stable, fielding
systems as they achieve the required level of maturity. According to
the Navy, those few systems experiencing issues (NLOS-LS and RMS) are
either being replaced with alternative systems or are targets of
increased focus and attention. According to the Navy, the results have
been positive in all cases. In addition, the Navy provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship:
Illustration: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's LHA 6 will replace the LHA 1 Tarawa-class amphibious
assault ships. The LHA 6 is a modified variant of the fielded LHD 8
amphibious assault ship and will feature enhanced aviation
capabilities and is designed to support all Marine aviation assets in
the Expeditionary Strike Group. LHA 6 construction began in December
2008. It is currently scheduled to be delivered in April 2013. The LHA
6 ship class includes three ships. We assessed LHA 6 and made
observations on LHA 7 and LHA 8.
Concept:
Program start (7/01);
System development:
Contract award (6/07).
Production:
Construction start (12/08);
GAO review (11/10);
Ship delivery (4/13);
Initial capability (10/14).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $48.8 million:
Procurement: $2,866.3 million:
Total funding: $2,916.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 1:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 1/2006: $217.6;
Latest 12/2009: $286.0;
Percent change: 31.4.
Procurement cost:
As of 1/2006: $2,915.4;
Latest 12/2009: $6,100.0;
Percent change: 109.2.
Total program cost:
As of 1/2006: $3,133.0;
Latest 12/2009: $6,387.3;
Percent change: 103.9.
Program unit cost:
As of 1/2006: $3,133.034;
Latest 12/2009: $3,193.635;
Percent change: 1.9.
Total quantities:
As of 1/2006: 1;
Latest 12/2009: 2;
Percent change: 100.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 1/2006: 146;
Latest 12/2009: 159;
Percent change: 8.9.
Research and development costs include the LHA 6, LHA 7, and LHA 8.
Procurement costs only include the LHA 6 and LHA 7.
[End of table]
The LHA 6 began construction in December 2008 with mature
technologies, but a design that was only 65 percent complete. Almost
all detailed design drawings have now been released. In July 2009, the
Secretary of the Navy certified that the LHA 6 program was ready to
commence full shipbuilding construction activities. As of September
2010, the program office reported it had conducted unit readiness
reviews for all of the ship's 216 assembly units, and the shipbuilder
had started fabrication on 215 units. The LHA 6 program may incur cost
growth due to the need for postdelivery rework of the ship's deck to
cope with the intense, hot downwash from the Joint Strike Fighter.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Contract award: 6/07;
Lead ship fabrication: 12/08;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
LHA 6 Program:
Technology Maturity:
All LHA critical technologies were mature by the time the program
awarded its construction contract in June 2007. DOD and the Navy
concluded in 2005 that all LHA 6 components and technologies were
fully mature and will have been installed on other ships prior to LHA
6 delivery. Although not considered critical technologies, the program
has identified six key subsystems needed to achieve the LHA 6's full
capabilities. Five of these are mature, installed on numerous Navy
ships, and do not require modification for the LHA 6. The sixth, the
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System, a Global Positioning
System-based aircraft landing system, is still in development. While
this system is necessary to realize the LHA 6's full capabilities, it
is not required to meet its operational requirements. The program
office has also previously identified the machinery control system as
a potential risk. The shipbuilder expected to commence integrated
testing of the machinery control system for LHA 6 in January 2011 in
the land based test equipment.
Design Stability:
The LHA 6 began construction in December 2008 with only 65 percent of
its design complete. Almost all detailed design drawings have now been
released. The LHA 7 design will be very close to the LHA 6. Design
changes will be limited. These changes include a new firefighting
system and radar and command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence updates. Design changes may be more significant on the
LHA 8 if the Navy includes a well deck on the ship. All LHA ships
except LHA 6 and LHA 7 have a well deck. Officials report that
reintroducing the well deck would affect aviation capabilities such as
fuel storage space. The Navy will determine the final configuration,
capabilities, and cost for the LHA 8 after trade studies are completed
in fiscal year 2011. Program officials reported that decisions on the
LHA 8 design and the potential increase in funding needed to execute
them have not yet been determined.
Production Maturity:
In July 2009, the Secretary of the Navy certified that the LHA 6
program was ready to commence full shipbuilding construction
activities. As of September 2010, the program office reported it had
conducted unit-level readiness reviews for all of the ship's 216
assembly units and the shipbuilder had started fabrication on 215
units.
Other Program Issues:
The LHA 6 is likely to experience further cost growth. Costly
postdelivery rework of the ship's deck may be necessary to cope with
the downwash from the Joint Strike Fighter. The heat from these
aircraft could warp the LHA 6 deck or damage deck equipment. The Navy
will conduct at-sea testing on USS WASP to determine if and how the
LHA 6 and other Joint Strike Fighter-capable ships will need to modify
their flight decks. The program office does not expect the Navy to
finalize a solution to this issue prior to LHA 6 ship delivery.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
program manager is continually monitoring shipyard performance and is
working closely with the shipbuilder to identify mitigation
strategies. The Navy also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform:
Illustration: Source: Computer Sciences Corp.
The Navy's Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) is one of four classes of
ships in the Maritime Propositioning Force (Future)--MPF(F)--squadron
that supports seabasing. The MLP is designed to facilitate at-sea
vehicle and cargo transfer in low-threat environments to support
operations ashore. In 2010, the Navy restructured the MPF(F) program,
which includes a lower-cost variant of the MLP based largely on a
commercial oil tanker. The Navy plans to award the construction
contract for the first of three MLP vessels in early 2011.
Concept:
Program start (6/08);
GAO review (11/10).
System development:
Design/construction approval (3/11).
Production:
Lead-ship fabrication (7/11);
Lead-ship delivery (9/13);
Initial operating capability (3/15).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics/NASSCO:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $24.2 million:
Procurement: $1,307.0 million:
Total funding: $1,331.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 3:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 12/2009: $93.7;
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 12/2009: $1,426.1;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 12/2009: $1,519.9;
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost:
As of: NA;
Latest 12/2009: $506.622;
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities:
As of: NA;
Latest 12/2009: 3;
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of: NA;
Latest 12/2009: 81;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The MLP program will award its detailed design and construction
contract with three of its four current critical technologies mature.
The remaining technology, operations with MLP and its supporting
vessels, is nearing maturity. It is not expected to be mature before
construction begins because it requires a complete or near complete
MLP to be tested at-sea. The program is currently testing the
technology using small-scale models. As part of the MPF(F)
restructuring, the MLP program replaced most of its critical
technologies. The redesigned MLP is largely based on a commercial oil
tanker. The new design offers less capability, but reduces the
program's cost and schedule. According to program officials,
leveraging the design of a commercial oil tanker will allow them to
have a higher level of design maturity and a lower level of
technological risk prior to the start of construction.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
GAO review; 11/10;
Contract award: 3/11;
Lead ship fabrication: 7/11 (not assessed).
[End of figure]
MPF(F)/MLP Program:
Technology Maturity:
The MLP program will award its detailed design and construction
contract with three of its current critical technologies mature and
one nearing maturity. As a result of the MPF(F) restructure, the MLP
adopted a new design and lowered the number of critical technologies
from five to four, reducing MLP capabilities as well as costs. The
technologies are designed to assist in the transfer of cargo between
the MLP and other ships. The three technologies that have reached
maturity--skin-to-skin vehicle transfer with the Large, Medium Speed
Roll-on/Roll-off vessel, vehicle transfer with the Joint High Speed
Vessel (JHSV), and the Landing Craft Air Cushion interface--were
tested at-sea using surrogate platforms. Program officials reported
that the vehicle transfer technologies--which use ramps to connect MLP
to the large cargo vessel or the JHSV at-sea while in motion--were
tested as recently as March 2010. Vehicle transfers with the JHSV are
currently limited to operations in calm waters. The landing craft
interface was tested at sea in March 2010 by loading landing craft at
different speeds and approaches in varying sea states onto a surrogate
MLP. While on the MLP, landing craft may receive cargo, undergo
limited maintenance, and refuel. The last technology--landing craft
operations with MLP and larger cargo vessel connected--requires the
simultaneous interaction of two of the other technologies. Program
officials do not expect this technology to reach maturity before
construction as it requires a complete or near complete MLP for at-sea
testing. Program officials said it is currently being tested using
small scale models.
Design Maturity:
The MLP has undergone significant design changes due to the MPF(F)
program restructure and budget reductions. The new MLP design will
offer less cargo, personnel, and aviation capacity, but at a lower
cost. The design is based on the Alaska-class crude oil carrier with
modifications that allow the MLP to raise and lower itself into the
water so that landing craft can float on and off. Program officials
reported that the MLP will leverage approximately 60 percent of the
commercial design. They also reported 81 percent of preliminary design
drawings are complete and the three-dimensional design is underway.
The largest changes will be to the central portion of the ship, which
will be modified to store supplies and vehicles, as well as the
equipment needed for the landing craft interface. In the future, the
MLP may be able to accommodate float-on modules to provide additional
capabilities.
Other Program Issues:
Due to resource constraints, the Navy has restructured MPF squadrons
by deferring the construction of new Large, Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-
off vessels, redesignating two classes of ships out of the MPF(F), and
reducing the capabilities and costs of the MLP. Additionally, the
MPF(F) concept of operations has changed from assembling cargo on-
board the MLP to assembling it onshore.
Program Office Comments:
According to the MLP program, it is working with the Office of Naval
Research and the Technology Readiness Assessment office to reassess
MLP critical technologies. The program anticipates that this
assessment will state that MLP has no critical technologies. The
program has also identified a series of production-readiness criteria
in the request for proposal for the construction contract, including
having certain American Bureau of Shipbuilding drawings 100 percent
complete, the three dimensional model by zone 90 percent complete, the
model by block 65 percent complete, and work package kits 5 percent
complete. According to the program, these criteria and the program's
detailed plan for completing all design artifacts to support
production will ensure the design is sufficiently mature for
construction. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has also
validated all changes in MLP capabilities. The program office also
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS):
Illustration: Source: © 2008 Lockheed Martin.
The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to
provide a worldwide, multiservice population of mobile and fixed-site
terminal users with an increase in narrowband communications capacity
and improved availability for small terminals. MUOS will replace the
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) satellite system currently
in operation and provide interoperability with legacy terminals. MUOS
consists of a network of satellites and an integrated ground network.
We assessed both the space and ground segments.
Concept:
Program start (9/02).
System development:
Development start (9/04);
Design review (3/07).
Production:
Production decision (2/08).
GAO review (11/10);
On-orbit capability (3/12);
Full capability (9/15).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $875.2 million:
Procurement: $1,561.2 million:
Total funding: $2,436.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 2:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 9/2004: $3,593.8;
Latest 6/2010: $4,151.8;
Percent change: 15.5.
Procurement cost:
As of 9/2004: $2,990.2;
Latest 6/2010: $2,613.3;
Percent change: -12.6.
Total program cost:
As of 9/2004: $6,622.0;
Latest 6/2010: $6,830.2;
Percent change: 3.1.
Program unit cost:
As of 9/2004: $1,103.658;
Latest 6/2010: $1,138.361;
Percent change: 3.1.
Total quantities:
As of 9/2004: 6;
Latest 6/2010: 6;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 9/2004: 90;
Latest 6/2010: 112;
Percent change: 24.4.
[End of table]
The latest cost data do not reflect the current cost of the program,
and a new acquisition program baseline has not yet been approved.
All MUOS critical technologies are mature and all design drawings have
been released; however, design flaws discovered late in production
continue to pose cost and schedule risks for the program. After a 2009
review of the program found that the MUOS schedule was optimistic and
its budget was inadequate, the program developed more realistic cost
and schedule baselines. The new cost baseline has not yet been
approved. The current estimate for the first satellite to begin on-
orbit operations is March 2012--24 months later than planned when the
program began development. The delivery of MUOS capabilities is time-
critical due to the operational failures of two UFO satellites. The
MUOS program has taken several steps to address any potential
capability gap that could occur prior to the first MUOS satellite
beginning on-orbit operations.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 9/04;
DOD design review: 3/07;
Production decision: 2/08;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
MUOS Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the program office, all eight MUOS critical technologies
are mature and have been demonstrated in at least a realistic
environment.
Design Maturity:
According to the program office, the MUOS design is stable and the
design flaws discovered late in production have largely been resolved.
However, design issues with UHF reflectors continue to pose cost and
schedule risks for the program. Specifically, the UHF reflectors have
been redesigned to mitigate signal interference and structural
hardware bonding issues. According to the program, the late delivery
of the UHF reflectors--which are on the program critical path for the
first MUOS satellite launch--is the program's top challenge. The
hinges that connect the solar panels and booms in the solar array wing
assembly are also causing unwanted signal interference.
According to the program, it has mitigated the schedule effects of
these design issues by proceeding in September 2010 with system-level
vibration testing, which approximates the level of vibration
experienced during launch, prior to incorporating all of the planned
designed modifications for the reflectors and solar panels. According
to DOD, system-level vibration testing has been completed and the risk
associated with the nonflight components are being mitigated by
conducting component-level vibration testing on these parts prior to
their reinstallation on the spacecraft. According to the program, the
reflectors and solar panels are going through rework and test in
parallel with system-level thermal vacuum testing and are to be
available for reinstallation on the spacecraft after system-level
testing.
Production Maturity:
According to the program office, the production maturity of the first
MUOS satellite is high. We could not assess production maturity
because the program does not collect statistical process control data
on its critical manufacturing processes. According to the program
office, the space segment does collect, track, and analyze data on
manufacturing process defects. While manufacturing defects have
contributed to cost growth and schedule delays on the program, the
number of defects has decreased slightly over time as the maturity of
the manufacturing process has increased.
Other Program Issues:
The importance of the first MUOS launch increased due to the
unexpected failures of two UFO satellites. Based on the current health
of on-orbit satellites, UHF communication capabilities are currently
predicted to provide the required availability level until the first
MUOS satellite begins on-orbit operations--currently planned for March
2012. However, the MUOS program is addressing the potential for a
capability gap by activating dual digital receiver unit operations on
a UFO satellite, examining the potential of purchasing or leasing UHF
satellite communications services on a commercial satellite, and
exploring the feasibility of expanded digital receiver unit operations
on the legacy payloads of the MUOS satellites.
In 2009, a Navy-initiated review of the MUOS program found that while
it was technically sound, its schedule was optimistic and its budget
was inadequate. As a result, the program developed new cost and
schedule baselines. The acquisition program baseline has been under
revision since December 2009, but has not yet been approved. The prime
contract cost baseline for the MUOS program was renegotiated in
February 2010. According to the program, the prime contract cost
baseline, which includes $162 million in engineering change proposals,
has increased about 61 percent since contract award in September 2004.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT):
Illustration: Source: © 2008 Raytheon Company.
The Navy's NMT is the next-generation maritime military satellite
communications terminal. It will be installed in existing ships,
submarines, and shore sites. NMT is designed to work with the Air
Force's Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite system to
enhance protected and survivable satellite communications to naval
forces. Its multiband capabilities will also enable communications
over existing military satellite communication systems, such as
Milstar, Wideband Global SATCOM, and the Defense Satellite
Communications System.
Concept:
System development:
Development start (10/03);
Design review (5/08).
Production:
Low-rate decision (7/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Initial capability (9/12);
Full capability (9/15).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $57.2 million:
Procurement: $1,081.3 million:
Total funding: $1,138.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 254:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 12/2006: $687.0;
Latest 10/2010: $660.9;
Percent change: -3.8.
Procurement cost:
As of 12/2006: $1,599.8;
Latest 10/2010: $1,143.7;
Percent change: -28.5.
Total program cost:
As of 12/2006: $2,286.8;
Latest 10/2010: $1,804.7;
Percent change: -21.1.
Program unit cost:
As of 12/2006: $6.867;
Latest 10/2010: $5.936;
Percent change: -13.6.
Total quantities:
As of 12/2006: 333;
Latest 10/2010: 304;
Percent change: -8.7.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 12/2006: 107;
Latest 10/2010: 107;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
The NMT program entered production in July 2010 with mature critical
technologies and a stable design, but without demonstrating its
critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control--a key
step for ensuring these processes are repeatable, sustainable, and
capable of consistently producing quality parts. The NMT program began
to produce production-representative engineering development models in
May 2008. According to the NMT program, it used these models to mature
and baseline its manufacturing processes. The program also plans to
complete a manufacturing readiness assessment during fiscal year 2011
to support a full-rate production decision in fiscal year 2012. The
NMT program is dependent on AEHF satellites to test its full range of
capabilities. The first AEHF satellite was launched in August 2010,
but a propulsion issue has delayed it from reaching its planned orbit.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 10/03;
DOD design review: 5/08;
Production decision: 7/10;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
NMT Program:
Technology Maturity:
The NMT program's two critical technologies--a multiband antenna feed
and monolithic microwave integrated circuit power amplifiers for Q-
band and Ka-band communication frequencies--are mature. Both of these
technologies have been demonstrated in fully capable, production-
representative engineering development models.
Design Maturity:
The NMT's design is stable. The program has released all of its
expected design drawings and placed the design under configuration
control. At its May 2008 design review, program officials reported
that about 70 percent of the expected drawings were releasable to
manufacturing.
Production Maturity:
The NMT program office entered production in July 2010 without
demonstrating that its manufacturing processes were in statistical
control--a key step for ensuring these processes are repeatable,
sustainable, and capable of consistently producing high-quality parts.
During a June 2008 technology readiness assessment, the program
identified three critical manufacturing processes related to the Q-
band and Ka-band monolithic microwave integrated circuits and the Q/Ka
radome. The NMT program began to produce production-representative
engineering development models in May 2008. According to the NMT
program, it used its production run of 33 engineering development
models to mature and baseline its manufacturing processes. This will
allow the program to begin tracking statistical process control data.
A manufacturing readiness level assessment is scheduled to occur
during fiscal year 2011 to support a full-rate production decision
review in fiscal year 2012.
Other Program Issues:
The NMT program is dependent on AEHF satellites to test its full range
of capabilities. The first AEHF satellite was launched in August 2010;
however, a faulty satellite propulsion system will delay the satellite
from reaching its planned orbit by about 7 to 9 months. Delays with
AEHF capability directly affect the ability of the NMT program to test
the new higher data rate communications capability. However, NMT
officials stated that the new higher data rate can be tested with one
AEHF satellite, should the Air Force configure it in that fashion.
Additional AEHF satellites provide more coverage and program officials
noted that initial operational capability can be achieved with two
installed systems that have successfully completed system operational
verification test. In addition, the NMT program can provide value to
the fleet when it is fielded by accessing existing satellite
communication systems such as the Defense Satellite Communications
System, Milstar, Wideband Global SATCOM, Interim Polar, and UFO
satellite constellations.
The NMT program's software lines of code have significantly increased
since development start to accommodate software communications
architecture requirements. Currently, software integration testing is
over 80 percent complete with over 95 percent of the defects resolved.
According to NMT program officials, the NMT program is containing most
of the defects that it finds within phase, which is a good indicator
because it is more efficient to correct problems within the phase in
which they occur.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
NMT program has successfully entered the production phase and
continues to successfully progress to provide deployed naval
commanders with assured access to secure, protected, command and
control and communication capabilities to support the exchange of
warfighter-critical information. It will support the Navy's net-
centric FORCEnet architecture and act as an enabler for transforming
operational capability available to the warfighter. The Navy also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
P-8A Poseidon:
Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's P-8A Poseidon is a Boeing 737 commercial derivative that
will replace the P-3C Orion. Its primary roles are antisubmarine
warfare; antisurface warfare; and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance. The P-8A is a part of a family of systems that share
the integrated maritime patrol mission and support the Navy's maritime
warfighting capability. The program plans to field capabilities in
three increments. We assessed increment one.
Concept:
Program start (3/00).
System development:
Development start (5/04);
Design review (6/07).
Production:
Low-rate decision (8/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Full-rate decision (4/13);
Initial capability (7/13);
Last procurement (2019).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,857.7 million:
Procurement: $21,751.5 million:
Total funding: $24,327.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 111:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 5/2004: $7,420.2;
Latest 11/2010: $7,795.0;
Percent change: 5.1.
Procurement cost:
As of 5/2004: $23,020.1;
Latest 11/2010: $23,738.8;
Percent change: 3.1.
Total program cost:
As of 5/2004: $30,575.9;
Latest 11/2010: $32,352.6;
Percent change: 5.8.
Program unit cost:
As of 5/2004: $265.877;
Latest 11/2010: $265.186;
Percent change: -0.3.
Total quantities:
As of 5/2004: 115;
Latest 11/2010: 122;
Percent change: 6.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 5/2004: 160;
Latest 11/2010: 160;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
The P-8A entered production in August 2010 with mature technologies
and a stable design. The program completed a production readiness
review in January 2010 and demonstrated its airframe manufacturing
processes on a commercial line prior to the production decision.
However, several parts of the P-8A, including the sonobouy launcher,
auxiliary fuel tanks, and a new fuel tank safety system, have
manufacturing readiness levels that are lower than recommended for the
start of production. The airframe on the P-8A program has been
designated as a commercial item. The Defense Contract Audit Agency has
expressed concern about the designation because of the extent of the
modifications being made to the aircraft. In addition, according to
the program office, the Defense Contract Management Agency has cited
limited access to commercial production facilities as a concern.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 5/04;
DOD design review: 6/07;
Production decision: 8/10;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
P-8A Program:
Technology and Design Maturity:
The P-8A entered production in August 2010 with mature technologies
and a stable design. An independent technology readiness assessment of
the program was conducted in December 2009 to support the production
decision. The assessment identified one current critical technology,
the hydro-carbon sensor, and rated it mature. The sensor has been
tested in ground-based applications, but has not been demonstrated in
an aircraft. While the ESM digital receiver was considered a critical
technology during development, program officials stated that this
technology was no longer identified as such because it is mature and
has been demonstrated on the E/A-18G. However, no formal ESM flight
testing has been conducted on the P-8A. According to the program
office, another formerly identified critical technology, the sonobouy
launcher, is scheduled to begin testing in a realistic environment in
fiscal year 2011.
Production Maturity:
The critical manufacturing processes for the P-8A airframe are proven,
but manufacturing readiness levels are lower than recommended for the
start of production. The P-8A program completed a production readiness
review in January 2010 and demonstrated its critical airframe
manufacturing processes on a commercial line prior to its August 2010
production decision. The airframe is being procured as a commercial
item and has stable production processes that support production rates
in excess of 32 airframes per month. However, several parts of the P-
8A, including the sonobouy launcher, auxiliary fuel tanks, and new
fuel tank safety system are currently assessed at manufacturing
readiness levels that are lower than those recommended for the start
of production.
Other Program Issues:
The P-8A airframe has been designated as a commercial item. As a
result, the contractor is not required to submit cost or pricing data
to the government. According to the Navy, it weighed the assumed cost
and benefits before making the commercial item designation. The
Defense Contract Audit Agency has expressed concern about the
designation because of the extent of the modifications being made to
the aircraft, which include an estimated $460 million in nonrecurring
engineering. In addition, according to the program office, both the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Contract Management
Agency (DCMA) have expressed concerns about the limited access to
production facilities and limited surveillance of aircraft parts
afforded by the commercial item designation.
Prior to entering production, an operational assessment of the P-8A
found that the system demonstrated the expected level of maturity or
exceeded all test thresholds. The assessment was conducted in the
program's Weapon System Integration Laboratory (WSIL) and not with an
operationally representative aircraft. The Navy operational testers
stated that conducting the operational assessment in the WSIL proved
to be useful in determining and evaluating the preliminary risks in
the development of the P-8A system, but that characterizing system
risks based on this data alone represented a major limitation.
According to the Navy testers, subsequent flight tests conducted in
June 2010 have been successful with only minor issues observed.
Initial operational test and evaluation will begin in 2012.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that
since the P-8A was competitively awarded and more than one offer was
received, it did not ask for certified cost or pricing data for the
system development and demonstration contract with Boeing Defense,
Space and Security (BDS). The Navy further explained that as the
airframe is purchased as an interdivisional commercial item, DCMA does
not have independent access to inspect it in Boeing Commercial
Airplanes' (BCA) facilities. However, the DCMA and the Navy may
accompany BDS during BCA selected quality reviews. These events are
typical and customary for any customer of BCA. Inspections apply to
the aircraft once it reaches the BDS facilities where DCMA can inspect
any part of the end product. The Navy also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined Aggregate
Program (CAP) Fire Unit:
Illustration: Source: U.S. Army.
The Army's PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program
transitions the PATRIOT missile system to MEADS. MEADS is intended to
provide low-to-medium-altitude air and missile defense to counter,
defeat, or destroy tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or
other air-breathing threats. MEADS is being developed by the United
States, Germany, and Italy. We assessed the MEADS fire unit, which
includes launchers, radars, a battle management component, and
reloaders. We did not assess the PATRIOT missile.
Concept:
System development:
Program/development start (8/04);
Critical design review (8/10);
GAO review (11/10).
Production:
Full-rate decision (11/12);
Initial capability (9/17).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: MEADS International:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,820.2 million:
Procurement: $13,693.0 million:
Total funding: $16,513.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 48:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 8/2004: $5,229.5;
Latest 12/2009: $4,820.3;
Percent change: -7.8.
Procurement cost:
As of 8/2004: $13,847.8;
Latest 12/2009: $13,693.0;
Percent change: -1.1.
Total program cost:
As of 8/2004: $19,077.3;
Latest 12/2009: $18,513.3;
Percent change: -3.0.
Program unit cost:
As of 8/2004: $397.444;
Latest 12/2009: $385.694;
Percent change: -3.0.
Total quantities:
As of 8/2004: 48;
Latest 12/2009: 48;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 8/2004: 157;
Latest 12/2009: 157;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
The cost, schedule, quantity, and funding data are for the MEADS fire
unit.
The MEADS program completed a system-level critical design review in
August 2010 with its technologies mature and design stable. The MEADS
member nations held a program review in October 2010, according to
officials, to decide whether or not to continue with the program and
whether or not to modify the system to use a unified battle management
control system being developed by the Army's Integrated Air and
Missile Defense program. If the Army and member nations decide to use
the new unified battle management control system, the MEADS program
will require increased time and funding to develop, field, and
integrate this system into the existing fire unit software and
hardware. The MEADS program is expected to be rebaselined following
the program review if the decision is made to continue it.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 8/04;
DOD design review: 8/10;
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: 11/12.
[End of figure]
PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit Program:
Technology Maturity:
All five of the MEADS critical technologies--launcher electronics,
multifunction fire control radar exciter, multifunction fire control
radar transmit/receive module, slip ring, and spray cooling system--
are mature.
Design Maturity:
The MEADS program completed its system-level critical design review in
August 2010 and its design is stable. At critical design review the
program had released 93 percent of the total expected design drawings
across the five major end items. The MEADS battle management, command,
control, communications, computer, and intelligence (BMC4I) software
and hardware was the only major end item with less than 90 percent of
its drawings released. Only 76 percent of BMC4I drawings were
releasable by the design review because, according to program
officials, one of the international partners came in with a late
request to change the collapsible roof design to a fixed roof. As of
December 2010, the program has released 98 percent of the expected
drawings for the BMC4I and 98 percent across the five major end items.
Other Program Issues:
The MEADS member nations held a program review in October 2010,
according to officials, to decide whether or not to continue with the
program and if so, which battle management system to use--the current
MEADS BMC4I tactical operations center or the Army's Integrated Air
and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS). This program
decision was postponed until December 2010. The Army plans to use IBCS
to control and manage sensors and weapons, such as PATRIOT and the
Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System, and support the engagement of air and missile threats.
However, the MEADS BMC4I is further along in its development than the
IBCS, which entered system development in December 2009. As a result,
the MEADS program would require increased time and funding to develop,
field, and integrate the IBCS into the existing fire unit software and
hardware, if the decision is made to use it.
The MEADS program is expected to be rebaselined following the program
review. MEADS officials expect the program's design and development
phase to be extended by 18 months due in part to issues with BMC4I and
sensor requirements and an underestimation of the sensor development
effort that delayed the program's critical design review. Program
officials stated that the increased cost associated with the schedule
extension is expected to be shared among the three member nations.
Details regarding the schedule extension and its effect on the program
were not available as negotiations had not begun among the member
nations. According to the program's Selected Acquisition Report, the
MEADS contract was expected to be amended in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2011 to incorporate any programmatic changes.
The MEADS program is at risk of not meeting several technical
performance measures, including assembly, disassembly, and emplacement
times, especially in extreme temperatures. According to officials, the
Army has approved a request for relief for several system performance
specifications related to the transportability of various components
on C-130 aircraft as well as CH-47 and CH-53 helicopters. The MEADS
program faces other transportability challenges as well because the
vehicles used to move the system do not meet all NATO road
requirements.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials noted
that the MEADS program is over 6 years into development, that
fabrication is well underway, and that initial major end-item
deliveries would begin in December 2010. They stated that integration
and testing activities are planned to start during calendar year 2011.
While the United States is still planning to use the IBCS, the
international partners are not, and a program decision is still
anticipated by the end of December 2010. Program officials concluded
that requirements satisfaction, software maturity, and cost growth
continue to be concerns. The program also provided technical comments,
which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System:
Photograph: Source: U.S. Air Force.
The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper is a multirole, medium-to-high-altitude
endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at higher
speeds and higher altitudes than its predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator A.
The Reaper is designed to provide a ground-attack capability to find,
fix, track, target, engage, and assess small ground mobile or fixed
targets. Each system consists of four aircraft, a ground control
station, and a satellite communications suite. We assessed increment
1, which consists of two configurations, Block 1 and Block 5.
Concept:
Program start (1/02).
System development:
Development start (2/04).
Production:
Block 1 low-rate decision (2/08);
GAO review (11/10);
Required assets available (12/10;
Initial capability (3/11);
Block 5 low-rate decision (3/11);
Block 5 full-rate production decision (3/13).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $448.2 million:
Procurement: $7,980.0 million:
Total funding: $8,534.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 288:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 2/2008: $413.9;
Latest 6/2010: $806.2;
Percent change: 94.8.
Procurement cost:
As of 2/2008: $2,080.2;
Latest 6/2010: $10,171.9;
Percent change: 389.0.
Total program cost:
As of 2/2008: $2,597.9;
Latest 6/2010: $11,131.8;
Percent change: 328.5.
Program unit cost:
As of 2/2008: $24.742;
Latest 6/2010: $28.470;
Percent change: 15.1.
Total quantities:
As of 2/2008: 105;
Latest 6/2010: 391;
Percent change: 272.4.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 2/2008: 79;
Latest 6/2010: 82;
Percent change: 3.8.
[End of table]
These costs are for Increment 1 of the Reaper program.
The Block 1 Reaper is in production with critical technologies that
are mature and a design that is stable. We did not assess its
production maturity. The MQ-9 program plans to make numerous
enhancements in Block 5, including system power increases, modernized
crew stations, and improvements to the primary data link. The program
office judged these improvements to be technologically mature, but
they still must be integrated and tested on the MQ-9 system. Total
aircraft quantities have increased more than 500 percent since fiscal
year 2007 and the program is incorporating several urgent operational
needs from the warfighter. Although the Reaper's initial operational
testing was completed in August 2008, full-up testing of two key
performance parameters was delayed to November 2012 during Block 5
testing. The Air Force plans to begin development of Increment 2 in
late fiscal year 2012.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 2/04;
DOD design review: 2/09;
Production decision: 2/08;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
Reaper Program:
Technology Maturity:
The Reaper's Block 1 critical technologies are mature. The Air Force
has identified numerous technology enhancements for Block 5 that are
expected to improve the capability of existing onboard subsystems and
ground control stations. These enhancements include power increases,
radar and ground control station upgrades, a secure data link, and
heavyweight landing gear. The program office judged these improvements
to be technologically mature, but they still must be successfully
integrated and tested on the MQ-9 system. For example, the encryption
of the data using the primary data link increases the time to transmit
data. These transmission delays could result in hard landings, which
may damage the aircraft. The program office is currently evaluating a
range of hardware and software solutions to this problem and plans to
test them operationally in November 2012. The program plans to undergo
a Block 5 technology readiness assessment in support of its low-rate
production decision by March 2011.
Design Maturity:
According to the program office, the Block 1 Reaper design is stable
and all engineering drawings have been released. The MQ-9 program
plans to conduct a formal critical design review on the Block 5
configuration in December 2010. At that time, it expects to know the
number of additional drawings needed for this configuration.
Production Maturity:
We did not assess production maturity because the MQ-9 program does
not use statistical process controls. The program uses other quality
control measures such as scrap, rework, and repair to track product
quality. The program is in production and contracted for 103 aircraft.
The contractor has a continuous improvement program that includes
manufacturing process goals, which are updated as they are met. The
Air Force has also conducted several manufacturing reviews of the
contractor's facilities and determined that the production capacity is
sufficient to meet the expected demand.
Other Program Issues:
Since its inception, the MQ-9 program has followed a concurrent
development and production strategy in order to respond to urgent
operational needs. Total aircraft quantities have increased by over
500 percent since fiscal year 2007 and the system's performance
requirements have continued to change. In addition to the Block 5
capability upgrade, the program is also incorporating several urgent
operational requirements from the warfighter, such as data link
encryption, wide area/high resolution surveillance, and a capability
to detect dismounted soldiers. Meeting these demands has put a stress
on the program's resources. A recent systems engineering review noted
that the contractor's resources have been overburdened by the need to
balance software development, support ongoing operations, and enhance
system capability. It also found that the Reaper program lacks
sufficient software metrics to allow proper developmental resource and
schedule planning.
The Block 1 Reaper completed initial operational testing in August
2008. Testers found that it was effective in the killer role, but
problems associated with radar and the network prevented them from
evaluating the hunter and net-ready capability. To enable testers to
fully evaluate the hunter capability, the Air Force is upgrading the
radar's ground moving target indicator and target recognition/
classification capability, and integrating the radar into the crew
station. Full-up testing of these capabilities was delayed and will be
completed during the Block 5 initial operational testing, scheduled
for November 2012.
The Air Force plans to begin development of increment 2 of the MQ-9
Reaper in late fiscal year 2012. This increment will include the small
diameter bomb, an automatic take-off and landing capability, a deicing
system, and national airspace certification.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Ship to Shore Connector (SSC):
Illustration: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's Ship to Shore Connector is expected to provide transport of
personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and cargo from ships to the
shore. SSC is the replacement for the Landing Craft, Air Cushion
(LCAC), which is facing the end of its service life. The SSC will
deploy in existing and planned Navy well deck amphibious ships and
will be used for assault and nonassault operations. It is expected to
operate independent of tides, water depth, underwater obstacles, ice,
mud, or beach conditions.
Concept:
Program start (5/09);
GAO review (11/10);
Preliminary design review (3/11);
System development:
Development start (3QFY11);
Contract award--design/construction (TBD).
Production:
Lead ship fabrication start (TBD);
Initial capability (TBD).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of: NA; $435.7;
Latest 8/2010:
Percent change: NA.
Procurement cost:
As of: NA; $3,885.8;
Latest 8/2010:
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of: NA; $4,343.7;
Latest 8/2010:
Percent change: NA.
Program unit cost:
As of: NA; $59.503;
Latest 8/2010:
Percent change: NA.
Total quantities:
As of: NA; 73;
Latest 8/2010:
Percent change: NA.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of: NA;
Latest 8/2010: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The SSC program plans to award the detail design and construction
contract for the lead ship in fiscal year 2011 with all five potential
critical technologies nearing maturity or mature. According to the
program office, the SSC will be the first government-led Navy ship
design in 14 years. Aligned with goals from Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics'
efficiency initiative, the Navy is focused on balancing costs with
capabilities during the technology development phase in order to
formulate requirements that are technically achievable within known
fiscal constraints. The Under Secretary has also emphasized
affordability and encouraged programs to make tradeoffs in order to
stay within the established costs for the program.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
GAO review: 11/10;
Contract award: TBD;
Lead ship fabrication: TBD (not assessed).
[End of figure]
SSC Program:
Technology Maturity:
The SSC program expects all five potential critical technologies to be
mature or nearing maturity by the time the detail design and
construction contract for the lead ship is awarded. The program has
identified five critical technologies--the aluminum buoyancy box, gas
turbines, fire suppression system, composite shaft, and composite lift
fan. According to the program office, some components of these
technologies are already in use in the Navy fleet. For instance,
several potential SSC candidate engines are used in the aircraft
industry today. According to program officials, there are risks
associated with readying them for ships. The aluminum chosen is the
same alloy that is in use on the second Littoral Combat Ship, and
composites are used throughout the Navy fleet, including on the LCACs.
The Navy plans to release the request for proposal for the detail
design and construction of the SSC in the first quarter of 2011.
Other Program Issues:
According to Navy officials, the SSC is the first government-led Navy
ship design in 14 years. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has emphasized affordability and
encouraged programs in the technology development phase to make
tradeoffs in order to stay within the established costs for the
program. Accordingly, the Navy is focusing on producing a design that
reduces maintenance costs and balances performance requirements
against life-cycle costs. The SSC is expected to have greater lift, a
lower fuel consumption rate, and less expected maintenance than the
LCAC. The Navy plans to achieve this through a series of design
changes, including the extensive use of composite materials, a simpler
and more efficient drive train, and more powerful, fuel-efficient
engines. In validating the SSC's key performance parameters in June
2010, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) required the
program to return to the JROC if costs exceed 10 percent of the
approved program baseline.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the
JROC validated the SSC requirements that have defined the SSC
technical design parameters within the technology development phase.
The Navy noted that the program is considered low risk, technically
sound, and is postured for events leading up to development start,
program initiation, and release of a request for proposal for detail
design and construction and entry into the engineering and
manufacturing development phase. The Navy also provided technical
comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II:
Illustration: Source: © 2010 Raytheon Company.
The Air Force's Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) Increment II is planned to
provide attack capability to moving or stationary mobile targets in
adverse weather from standoff range. It combines radar, infrared, and
semi-active laser sensors in a multi-mode seeker to acquire, track,
and engage targets. It uses a weapons data link from host aircraft as
well as GPS and an inertial navigation system to achieve accuracy. SDB
II will integrate with the F-15E and the Navy and Marine Corps Joint
Strike Fighter, and with other aircraft, such as the F-22A.
Concept:
Program start (5/06).
System development:
Development start (7/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Critical design review (1/11).
Production:
Low-rate decision (1/13);
Initial capability F-15E (7/16);
Initial capability F-35B/C (6/18);
Last procurement (9/23).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Eglin AFB, FL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,071.0 million:
Procurement: $3,009.1 million:
Total funding: $4,080.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 17,000:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 10/2010: $1,618.8;
Latest 10/2010: $1,618.8;
Percent change: 0.0.
Procurement cost:
As of 10/2010: $3,009.1;
Latest 10/2010: $3,009.1;
Percent change: 0.0.
Total program cost:
As of 10/2010: $4,627.9;
Latest 10/2010: $4,627.9;
Percent change: 0.0.
Program unit cost:
As of 10/2010: $.270;
Latest 10/2010: $.270;
Percent change: 0.0.
Total quantities:
As of 10/2010: 17,163;
Latest 10/2010: 17,163;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 10/2010: 72;
Latest 10/2010: 72;
Percent change: 0.0.
[End of table]
The SDB II program entered system development in July 2010 with all
four of its critical technologies nearing maturity. In an April 2010
technology readiness assessment, each technology was found to need
additional development to demonstrate the required level of maturity
for operational use. While some of the SDB II technologies are being
utilized in other systems, they are being applied in new ways on this
program. In addition, the integration of those technologies into the
constrained SDB II design is a risk for the current development
schedule. Further, the program already faces funding shortfalls. When
the program was approved to enter development, it was granted a waiver
from the requirement to provide full funding. The funding shortfall
was estimated to be about 22 percent of the required funding over the
life of the program.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 7/10;
GAO review; 11/10;
DOD design review: 1/11 (not assessed);
Production decision: 1/13 (not assessed).
[End of figure]
SDB II Program:
Technology Maturity:
The SDB II program entered system development in July 2010 with all
four of its critical technologies nearing maturity. In April 2010, an
independent technology readiness assessment found that the SDB II data
link, payload (warhead), seeker, and target classifier had been
demonstrated in a relevant environment. The assessment team based
their conclusions on modeling and simulation, as well as captive
flight, static and dynamic warhead, and other testing methods. Each
technology was found to need additional development to demonstrate the
required level of maturity for operational use. In addition, while
each of these technologies has been fielded in one or more weapon
systems, they are being applied in new ways on this program and must
be integrated into the constrained SDB II design. The data link is a
new application of an existing technology and will require a
tremendous leap forward in packaging. The payload (warhead) will be
used in a way on SDB II that is beyond its current demonstrated
capability, and fuze development has been and continues to be a
problem. The seeker combines proven sensor technologies, but in a
smaller design. The target classifier is a new technology in a weapon
system context. Finally, Joint Strike Fighter integration issues
represent a substantial risk for the program and the Navy because the
aircraft may not be available for environmental and integration
testing until after the SDB II has completed its initial development.
The environments of the Joint Strike Fighter may cause a re-design of
a portion of the weapon or limitations in the weapon's employment.
Design Maturity:
The SDB II program held its critical design review in January 2011. We
could not assess SDB II design maturity because data on design
drawings were not available. As an entrance criteria for holding the
design review, the program had planned to determine if 95 percent of
the system's drawings were completed and under configuration control.
Program officials stated that it appeared the design as presented is
capable of achieving the desired requirements for the system. If the
program's post-critical design review assessment is successful, the
contractor will be cleared to start building hardware for the SDB II
program.
Other Program Issues:
In July 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics approved the SDB II to enter engineering and
manufacturing development. The program will use a fixed-price
incentive contract for this phase of the program. The Under Secretary
also approved an aggressive procurement schedule in an effort to
promote affordability and productivity. However, the acquisition
decision memo that outlined these decisions stated that it will be a
challenge to execute this strategy because of DOD's track record of
procuring weapons at less than economically beneficial rates due to
budget pressures. In addition, the program already faces funding
shortfalls. When the program was approved to enter development, it was
granted a waiver from the requirement to provide full funding. The
program is not currently funded to the Air Force's cost estimate or
its current acquisition program baseline. The shortfall was estimated
to be about 22 percent of the required funding over the life of the
program.
Program Office Comments:
The program office offered technical comments, which were incorporated
as appropriate.
[End of section]
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program:
Illustration: Source: © 2007 Lockheed Martin Corporation.
The Air Force's SBIRS High satellite system is being developed to
replace the Defense Support Program and perform a range of missile
warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace
awareness missions. SBIRS High consists of four satellites in
geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) plus two replenishment satellites,
two sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO) plus
two replenishment sensors, and fixed and mobile ground stations. We
assessed the space segment and made observations about the ground
segment.
Concept:
Program start (2/95).
System development:
Development start (10/96).
Production:
Design review/production decision (8/01);
First sensor delivery (8/04);
Second sensor delivery (9/05);
GAO review (11/10);
First satellite launch (4/11);
Second satellite launch (4/12).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Corporation:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,844.4 million:
Procurement: $3,085.6 million:
Total funding: $4,954.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 3:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 10/1996: $4,304.5;
Latest 12/2009: $10,626.7;
Percent change: 146.9.
Procurement cost:
As of 10/1996: $0.0;
Latest 12/2009: $5,065.3;
Percent change: NA.
Total program cost:
As of 10/1996: $4,520.6;
Latest 12/2009: $15,938.5;
Percent change: 252.6.
Program unit cost:
As of 10/1996: $904.111;
Latest 12/2009: $2,656.409;
Percent change: 193.8.
Total quantities:
As of 10/1996: 5;
Latest 12/2009: 6;
Percent change: 20.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 10/1996: 86;
Latest 12/2009: TBD;
Percent change: NA.
[End of table]
The 1996 data show no procurement cost as the Air Force planned to use
research and development funds to buy all five satellites. The cost of
the HEO replenishment sensors is not included in either column.
According to the program office, SBIRS High critical technologies are
mature, its design is stable, and its manufacturing processes have
been proven; however, continued difficulties with flight software
development could add to the program's cost overruns and schedule
delays. According to the program office, significant progress has been
made on flight software testing. However, various subsystem-and system-
level qualification testing remains and the Defense Contract
Management Agency (DCMA) has reported that the effort required to
finalize the flight software is likely to further delay the launch
date of the first GEO satellite. The program office's best-case
estimate is that the first GEO satellite will launch in April 2011--4
months later than previously estimated and roughly 9 years later than
originally planned.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 10/96;
DOD design review: NA;
Design review/production decision: 8/01;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
SBIRS High Program:
Technology Maturity:
According to the SBIRS High program office, all three critical
technologies--thermal management, onboard processing, and the infrared
sensor--are mature.
Design Maturity:
The SBIRS High hardware design appears stable. According to the
program office, over 99 percent of the total expected design drawings
are releasable. Functional testing of the first GEO spacecraft in 2009
revealed solder fractures on some hardware components, which
contributed to satellite delivery delays. The program disassembled and
tested these components and determined that redesign was unnecessary
and they were suitable for use as-is.
Hosted HEO sensors are currently on-orbit, and program officials
report that they are operational. The program plans to buy
replenishment sensors that will differ only slightly in design.
According to the program office, the design changes will address parts
obsolescence and electromagnetic interference issues that affected the
original sensors. Those interference issues led the program to issue
waivers to accept the original sensors for operational use, even
though they did not meet all the program's specifications.
Replenishment sensors are scheduled for delivery to the host for
integration in fiscal years 2012 and 2015.
Production Maturity:
According to the program office, the manufacturing processes for SBIRS
High are proven since the first and second GEO satellites and the
first two HEO sensors have been built.
Other Program Issues:
The estimated cost of the program continues to grow, and its schedule
is at risk for further delays. DCMA projects nearly $600 million in
cost overruns at contract completion, more than twice the amount
reported last year. Additional contract cost increases and schedule
delays are expected due in part to the continued underestimation of
the effort required to finalize and test the flight software. The
program office is working to rebaseline the SBIRS High contract cost
and schedule estimates for the sixth time; it will then revise its
acquisition program baseline to more realistic cost and schedule goals.
Developing the complex flight software subsystem designed to monitor
the health and status of the spacecraft has already caused multiple
delays, and DCMA has reported that the remaining software effort will
likely further delay the launch date of the first GEO satellite.
According to the program office, significant progress has been made on
flight software testing, but various subsystem-and system-level
qualification testing remains. For example, the fault management
system, which has caused delays in the past, was scheduled to undergo
testing in late 2010 to determine whether the system will perform as
expected. According to DCMA, these tests had to be completed by the
end of 2010 for the program to have a realistic chance of launching
the first GEO satellite in April 2011--the program office's best-case
estimate.
According to program officials, the development of the SBIRS High
ground system is on track, and the system will be available to process
the data generated from the first GEO satellite when it reaches its
orbit. If the first GEO satellite launches in April 2011, program
officials expect that satellite data will be certified for use in
missile warning operations by November 2012.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated
that the first GEO satellite successfully completed all integration
testing. In mid-December 2010, the final system-level test was
completed, and installation began of components, such as solar array
wing assemblies and a deployable light shade. Flight software run-for-
record activities for the first GEO satellite are expected to be
completed in February, supporting the start of launch processing in
March. Independent review teams verified that an April 2011 launch is
achievable. Ground software required for launch has been verified. The
follow-on production contract procures the third and fourth GEO
satellites completing the original SBIRS constellation, plus two HEO
replenishment payloads; it was definitized in June 2010, and values
roughly $3 billion. The program office also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM):
Illustration: Source: Raytheon Missile Systems.
The Navy's Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) is a surface-to-air missile
launched from Aegis destroyers and cruisers to provide ship self-
defense, fleet area defense, and theater air defense. Combining legacy
Standard Missile (SM) and Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM) hardware and technology, SM-6 will allow for over-the-horizon
engagement, improved capability at extended ranges, and capability to
receive in-flight updates from Aegis ships. SM-6 Block 1 is in
production. Follow-on blocks will be developed to meet future threats.
Concept:
Program start (6/04).
System development:
Development start (3/06).
Production:
Low-rate decision (8/09);
GAO review (11/10);
Initial capability (9/11);
Full-rate decision (12/11).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems:
Program office: Arlington, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $72.4 million:
Procurement: $4,940.0 million:
Total funding: $5,012.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,170:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 7/2004: $1,057.9;
Latest 7/2010: $972.0;
Percent change: -8.1.
Procurement cost:
As of 7/2004: $4,558.1;
Latest 7/2010: $5,160.9;
Percent change: 13.2.
Total program cost:
As of 7/2004: $5,616.0;
Latest 7/2010: $6,132.8;
Percent change: 9.2.
Program unit cost:
As of 7/2004: $4.680;
Latest 7/2010: $5.111;
Percent change: 9.2.
Total quantities:
As of 7/2004: 1,200;
Latest 7/2010: 1,200;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 7/2004: 75;
Latest 7/2010: 87;
Percent change: 16.0.
[End of table]
The SM-6 program's concurrent testing and production strategy puts the
program at increased risk of cost growth and schedule delays. The
program is in low-rate production with 30 missiles under contract and
deliveries expected to begin in March 2011. However, the program has
not completed developmental testing to prove that the design meets
performance and reliability requirements, and the risk of design
changes remains. Recent test failures have increased the risk that
unexpected design changes could result in costly rework for the 30
missiles already under contract and schedule delays. To receive
approval to enter full-rate production, the program must successfully
complete flight testing, demonstrate reliability, and achieve
production maturity. Full testing of SM-6 capabilities will not occur
until after full-rate production is well underway.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 6/04;
DOD design review: 3/06;
Production decision: 8/09;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
SM-6 Program:
Technology and Design Maturity:
According to the program office, all SM-6 critical technologies were
mature and its design was stable by its August 2009 production
decision; however, the program has not completed developmental testing
to prove that the design will meet performance and reliability
requirements. Until developmental testing is completed, the risk of
design changes remains. Land-based developmental testing was
successfully completed in 2009. However, sea-based developmental
testing was suspended in May 2010 after two test failures. According
to program officials, the failures did not result in hardware design
changes and developmental testing is scheduled to resume in January
2011. According to an official from DOD's Office of the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, the program's limited number of
developmental test flights leaves little margin for error.
Production Maturity:
The SM-6 is in low-rate production with 30 missiles under contract and
deliveries expected in March 2011. We could not assess production
maturity because the program did not provide statistical process
control data. However, prior to production start, the program
demonstrated a maturity level sufficient to proceed with low-rate
production. To obtain approval to begin full-rate production, the
program must achieve production maturity, successfully conclude at-sea
developmental and operational flight testing, and demonstrate
reliability. However, the program and DOD's Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation have not yet agreed to the flight reliability
metrics and failure definitions that will be used to assess the
program.
Other Program Issues:
The SM-6 program's concurrent testing and production strategy puts the
program at increased risk of cost growth and schedule delays if
unexpected design changes are required as a result of testing. In
2009, the program obtained approval from the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to begin low-rate
initial production of up to 19 missiles before completing
developmental testing. To minimize the risks inherent in this
approach, the Under Secretary required the program to complete
developmental testing and obtain approval prior to awarding subsequent
contracts. Despite the test failures that led to the suspension of at-
sea developmental testing in May 2010, the Under Secretary approved
low-rate production of an additional 11 missiles and the procurement
of long-lead materials for the remaining 59 low-rate missiles.
SM-6 capabilities will not be fully tested until after full-rate
production is well underway. SM-6 is a key pillar of the Naval
Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air System--a system of systems
designed to extend the battle space over the horizon. A developmental
version of the integrated fire control capability was demonstrated in
2009; however, it is not scheduled to be demonstrated at-sea until
fiscal year 2014. The program plans to have three of four full-rate
production lots under contract by that time. According to the program
office, the Office of the Secretary of Defense decided the SM-6 should
be fielded in advance of the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air
System to address the Navy's critical shortage of extended range
missiles.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the SM-6 program office
disagreed with the GAO assertions that the program's concurrent
testing and production strategy puts the program at risk of cost
growth and schedule delays; that the program has not completed testing
to prove that the design meets performance requirements; and that
recent test failures increase the risk of design changes. According to
the program office, the program successfully completed reliability
demonstration testing and has begun high-accelerated-life testing. In
addition, the SM-6 hardware is very mature, and the risk of design
changes is minimal. Officials added that full testing of SM-6 using
the legacy interface will be completed prior to the full-rate
production decision and that flight testing using the integrated fire
control interface will take place prior to delivery of the first full-
rate production missiles.
GAO Response:
Our reviews of DOD weapon systems confirm that fully configured,
integrated, production-representative prototypes should be tested
before committing to production. The benefits of testing are maximized
when the developmental tests are completed prior to a production
decision because making design changes after production begins can be
both costly and inefficient.
[End of section]
Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV):
Photograph: Source: © 2006 Northrop-Grumman Corporation.
The Navy's VTUAV will provide real-time imagery and data to support
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements. A VTUAV
system is composed of up to three air vehicles with associated
sensors, two ground control stations, one recovery system, and spares
and support equipment. The air vehicle launches and recovers
vertically, and operates from ships and land. The VTUAV is being
designed as a modular, reconfigurable system that supports various
operations, including surface, antisubmarine, and mine warfare.
Concept:
System development:
Program start (1/00);
Design review (11/05);
Production:
Low-rate decision (5/07);
GAO review (11/10);
Operational testing (9/11);
Initial capability (9/11);
Full-rate decision (2/12).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $19.1 million:
Procurement: $1,660.2 million:
Total funding: $1,680.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 156:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 12/2006: $589.1;
Latest 7/2010: $664.8;
Percent change: 12.8.
Procurement cost:
As of 12/2006: $1,657.7;
Latest 7/2010: $1,881.3;
Percent change: 13.5.
Total program cost:
As of 12/2006: $2,576.3;
Latest 7/2010: $2,547.2;
Percent change: -1.1.
Program unit cost:
As of 12/2006: $14.555;
Latest 7/2010: $14.555;
Percent change: 0.0.
Total quantities:
As of 12/2006: 177;
Latest 7/2010: 175;
Percent change: -1.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 12/2006: 104;
Latest 7/2010: 141;
Percent change: 35.6.
[End of table]
The VTUAV is in production, but the program may be at risk for further
cost increases and schedule delays as a result of concurrent testing
and production. The VTUAV program delayed the start of operational
test and evaluation by 2 years to September 2011, due to system
reliability and software maturity issues that were discovered during
developmental flight testing. During an August 2010 flight test, the
operator lost contact with the aircraft, resulting in it entering
restricted air space. As a result, the program made changes to the
software. In order to keep suppliers producing at a minimum rate until
operational test and evaluation is complete, the program increased its
low-rate production quantities from 9 to 15. The program plans to
achieve initial operational capability in September 2011 and full-rate
production in February 2012--almost 2 years later than previously
planned.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 1/00;
DOD design review: 11/05;
Production decision: 5/07;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
VTUAV Program:
Technology Maturity:
The VTUAV relies on common, mature technologies.
Design Maturity:
The VTUAV design is still changing as a result of ongoing testing. The
program had released all its expected drawings by its May 2007
production decision, but it subsequently made design changes and added
drawings to address problems discovered during developmental testing.
As of January 2011, 100 percent of the program's total expected design
drawings have been released. However, the program is still making
changes to the design as a result of concurrent testing and
production. The program anticipates 20 changes in the aircraft's
design, requiring 60 additional design drawings. The formal evaluation
of the system's operational suitability and effectiveness was not
completed as anticipated until April 2010. During an assessment of the
system on the USS McInerney and subsequent developmental flight tests,
the program discovered system reliability and software maturity
issues, including a weak communications link and false alarms related
to the unmanned system's status. More specifically, during an August
2010 developmental flight test, the operator lost contact with the
aircraft, causing it to enter restricted air space. An investigation
determined the root cause to be a software design flaw and the program
has since made changes to the software. The VTUAV program also delayed
the start of operational test and evaluation by 2 years to September
2011. The program now plans to achieve initial operational capability
in September 2011 and full-rate production in February 2012--almost 2
years later than previously planned.
Production Maturity:
The VTUAV was originally designed as a modified commercial off-the-
shelf item. We could not assess production maturity because the
program did not require the prime contractor or its supplier base to
identify key product characteristics--the first step to implementing
production process controls. The program reports that one VTUAV
supplier uses statistical process controls to measure elements of
blade manufacturing. In addition, the program plans to develop
production metrics based on critical safety items and safety of flight
inspection criteria to support the full-rate production decision. The
program increased its low-rate production quantities from 9 to 15, in
order to keep suppliers producing at a minimum rate until operational
test and evaluation is complete.
Other Program Issues:
The VTUAV program is currently considering a variety of future
capabilities that could be added to the system, including a surface
search radar, a signals intelligence package, an enhanced data and
communications relay, and weapons. The program office had funding in
place in fiscal year 2010 to integrate a surface search radar, but
that funding was used to sustain the program when it experienced cost
overruns resulting from software issues discovered during
developmental testing. Other planned capabilities are currently
unfunded. Work on these capabilities will be implemented as
subprograms.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that
the VTUAV program has made significant progress in the last year.
VTUAV conducted integration testing on the USS Freedom in November
2010, is deployed on the USS Halyburton, is being deployed to
Afghanistan as part of the Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Task Force, and has been selected by Office of the
Secretary of Defense as the interim solution for a classified,
maritime-based, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance urgent
need requirement.
VTUAV experienced a delay in the start of operational evaluation and
continues to make incremental strides to satisfy the full capability
production document requirements. Software changes to correct problems
discovered during developmental testing have accounted for the
majority of this schedule delay as any newly discovered software
anomaly will delay flight testing until a new software build is
released. The operational evaluation completion date is driven by ship
availability, and the USS Halyburton is not available until late
summer 2011. The Navy also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774):
Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's Virginia class attack submarine is designed to combat enemy
submarines and ships, fire cruise missiles, and provide improved
surveillance and special operations support to enhance littoral
warfare. The Navy awarded a Block III construction contract in 2008
and has begun construction on the first two hulls. In total, 7 ships
have been delivered and 11 more are under contract. The Navy is
introducing one new technology to improve system performance. We
assessed this technology and made observations on design and
production issues.
Concept:
System development:
Development start--SSN 774 (6/95);
Development start--AESR (12/08).
Production:
Full-rate production decision (9/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Production decision--AESR (3/11);
2 per year production begins (2011);
Block IV contract awarded (2013).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Electric Boat Corporation:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $709.7 million:
Procurement: $40,375.8 million:
Total funding: $41,085.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 18:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 6/1995: $4,436.5;
Latest 9/2010: $7,076.9;
Percent change: 59.5.
Procurement cost:
As of 6/1995: $55,113.7;
Latest 9/2010: $76,492.6;
Percent change: 38.8.
Total program cost:
As of 6/1995: $59,550.2;
Latest 9/2010: $83,569.4;
Percent change: 40.3.
Program unit cost:
As of 6/1995: $1,985.005;
Latest 9/2010: $2,785.648;
Percent change: 40.3.
Total quantities:
As of 6/1995: 30;
Latest 9/2010: 30;
Percent change: 0.0.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 6/1995: 134;
Latest 9/2010: 151;
Percent change: 12.7.
[End of table]
The Virginia class submarine program was approved to enter full-rate
production in September 2010. Construction of the first two Block III
submarines has begun, and production of the first hull featuring
several affordability-based design changes is underway. The Navy is
also working to address quality control and reliability concerns. The
Navy will begin buying two submarines per year in fiscal year 2011. It
expects to realize its goal of reducing costs to $2.0 billion (in
fiscal year 2005 dollars) per ship by fiscal year 2012 ship
procurement and hopes to further decrease the time required to build
each ship. The Navy has decided not to pursue two planned technology
insertions for the Virginia class, but it is still developing advanced
electromagnetic signature reduction (AESR) technology that will be
introduced onto existing and new submarines. AESR will begin testing
in 2011.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: NA;
DOD design review: NA;
Production decision: NA;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
SSN 774 Program:
Technology Maturity:
The Navy has decided not to pursue two planned technology insertions
for the Virginia class, but it is still developing advanced
electromagnetic signature reduction (AESR) technology that will be
introduced onto existing and new submarines. The Navy plans to install
AESR--software that monitors and optimizes the submarine's signature--
on ships starting with SSN 782. The software will be installed on
earlier ships over time. According to the Navy, AESR prototype testing
slipped by more than a year due to non-AESR-related schedule delays,
and is scheduled to begin on SSN 778 in September 2011. The Navy
decided not to incorporate a conformal acoustic velocity sensor wide
aperture array on the ship after it found it would significantly
increase, not decrease, life-cycle costs and complicate maintenance.
The Navy is still evaluating more affordable sail designs, but
according to officials, the larger, flexible payload sail is no longer
being considered because the communications requirements that drove
the need for more space have been eliminated.
Prior to the program's full-rate production decision, the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council approved a change to three Virginia
class key performance parameters. According to the Navy, they
determined that the original requirements were unrealistic and would
not be worth the cost needed to achieve them. The change will not
affect operations.
Design and Production Maturity:
The program was approved to enter full-rate production in September
2010. The Navy will begin buying two ships per year in fiscal year
2011. The Navy expects to achieve its goal of reducing costs to $2.0
billion (in fiscal year 2005 dollars) per ship by fiscal year 2012
ship procurement and hopes to reduce the time required to build each
ship to about 60 months. Navy officials said construction of SSN 784--
the first hull incorporating significant cost-reducing design changes--
has been underway for approximately 2 years and is progressing well.
The Navy expects the first few hulls with this new design to take
longer to build, but expects to get back on schedule by the middle of
Block III.
Other Program Issues:
The Navy is working to address quality control and reliability
concerns. In November 2009, the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E), highlighted several design and reliability-
related deficiencies the program needed to address, but concluded they
did not preclude the program from moving forward into full-rate
production. These deficiencies, which included multiple subsystem
failures, multiple "fail to sail" issues, and test aborts, were also
cited by the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, as examples of
the pervasive reliability problems that affect DOD systems. DDR&E also
noted that the program did not have a reliability measurement or
growth program--a best practice. Navy officials told us that plans are
in place to mitigate each of these issues. For example, according to
the Navy, subsystem problems are being addressed with the vendors and
shipyards through changes to installation techniques, engineering
changes or redesigns, and evaluations of alternative technologies.
Navy officials also told us fail to sail events are not unexpected
early in a program and that the Virginia class submarine has not
experienced any fail to sail events while deployed. According to Navy
and DDR&E officials, problems with a special hull treatment separating
from the hull have also been mitigated by changing surface preparation
techniques and redesigning coating molds. Delivered hulls will have
the coating restored as needed, and more significant restoration can
occur during scheduled dry-dockings. According to Navy officials, this
issue is not unique to the Virginia class and has not resulted in any
operational deficiencies. Navy officials said the shipbuilder has also
addressed the torpedo-room manufacturing quality issues that were
identified in 2009.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2:
Illustration: Source: U.S. Army.
WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels
of command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global
Information Grid. WIN-T was restructured following a March 2007 Nunn-
McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold, and will be
fielded in four increments. The second increment will provide the Army
with an initial networking on-the-move capability.
Concept:
System development:
Program/development start (6/07);
Design review (2/08).
Production:
Low-rate decision (2/10);
GAO review (11/10);
Full-rate decision (8/12);
Initial capability (5/13).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $39.4 million:
Procurement: $3,868.6 million:
Total funding: $3,908.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,856:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 10/2007: $235.0;
Latest 12/2009: $268.5;
Percent change: 14.3.
Procurement cost:
As of 10/2007: $3,418.3;
Latest 12/2009: $4,469.9;
Percent change: 30.8.
Total program cost:
As of 10/2007: $3,653.3;
Latest 12/2009: $4,738.4;
Percent change: 29.7.
Program unit cost:
As of 10/2007: $1.930;
Latest 12/2009: $2.138;
Percent change: 10.8.
Total quantities:
As of 10/2007: 1,893;
Latest 12/2009: 2,216;
Percent change: 17.1.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 10/2007: 50;
Latest 12/2009: 65;
Percent change: 30.0.
[End of table]
WIN-T Increment 2 entered production in February 2010 with all 15 of
its critical technologies mature. However, the program is currently
addressing significant performance and reliability shortfalls that
were revealed in a March 2009 limited user test. The test results
showed that WIN-T Increment 2 did not meet its operational reliability
requirements. DOD's Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
recommended that the Army improve performance and training to address
these deficiencies and ensure success during initial operational test,
which is scheduled for early fiscal year 2012. We could not assess
production maturity. According to the Army, WIN-T is primarily an
information technology integration effort that relies on commercially
available products. Performance is measured through a series of test
events to demonstrate performance at increasing levels of system
integration.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 6/07 (not assessed);
DOD design review: 2/08
Production decision: 2/10;
GAO review; 11/10.
[End of figure]
WIN-T Increment 2 Program:
Technology Maturity:
All 15 WIN-T Increment 2 critical technologies were mature by its
February 2010 production decision. In September 2009, the Army
completed a technology readiness assessment to support a low-rate
initial production decision. An independent review team reviewed this
technology readiness assessment and the body of evidence used to
support it and concluded that all 15 critical technologies were
mature. In November 2009, the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering, concurred with the independent review team's assessment,
noting that tests conducted by the Army show that each of WIN-T
Increment 2's critical technologies have been demonstrated in a
realistic environment.
Design Maturity:
We could not assess the design maturity of WIN-T Increment 2 because
the program office does not track the number of releasable drawings.
According to the program office, WIN-T is primarily an information
technology integration effort that relies on commercially available
products. Performance is measured through a series of component,
subsystem, configuration item, and network level test events designed
to demonstrate performance at increasing levels of system integration.
Design stability is measured through a problem tracking report system.
Problem tracking report trends are reported and tracked on a weekly
basis by the program office.
Production Maturity:
We could not assess the production maturity of the WIN-T Increment 2.
According to the program office, WIN-T is primarily an information
technology integration effort that relies on commercially available
products.
Other Program Issues:
During a March 2009 limited user test, WIN-T Increment 2 failed to
demonstrate the ability to support mobile operations as well as the
required capabilities in forested terrain. WIN-T Increment 2
operational effectiveness was degraded because the program's concept
of operations, organizational structure, and manning were not adequate
to operate and troubleshoot the network. Further, the test concluded
that the WIN-T Increment 2 did not meet its operational reliability
requirements because three critical components demonstrated poor
reliability. In a January 2010 operational assessment of this limited
user test, DOD's Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E),
recommended that the Army take certain actions to address these
deficiencies to ensure success at the WIN-T Increment 2 initial
operational test scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2012.
DOT&E recommended that the Army improve the performance of the
Increment 2 waveforms, provide greater training to soldiers, refine
its tactics and manning levels for Increment 2, and aggressively
pursue a reliability growth program for WIN-T Increment 2 components.
According to the program office, it is working to address these
concerns and respond to these recommendations before the start of the
program's operational test.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army addressed (1)
the development of a failure mode closure plan, (2) risk reduction
events, and (3) production qualification testing for WIN-T Increment
2. With regard to the failure mode closure plan, the Army noted that,
as directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the
program office has identified, provided corrections for, tested, and
resolved all 37 of WIN-T Increment 2's identified failure modes
identified from the limited user test. The Army also noted that a
series of OSD-witnessed closure events and formal reports have been
completed. With regard to risk reduction, the Army explained that, as
directed by OSD, the program office designed, executed, and performed
analysis illustrating successful support for seven critical technical
performance parameters, including mobile throughput and scalability.
With regard to production qualification testing, the Army noted that
the program office has two production qualification test events
scheduled in fiscal year 2012 to further validate system readiness
prior to the initial operational test. The Army also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3:
Illustration: Source: U.S. Army.
WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels
of command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global
Information Grid. WIN-T was restructured following a March 2007 Nunn-
McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold, and will be
fielded in four increments. The third increment will provide the Army
a full networking on-the-move capability.
Concept:
System development:
Program/development start (7/03);
GAO review (11/10);
Design review (4/13).
Production:
Low-rate decision (3/15);
Full-rate decision (7/18);
Initial capability (2/19).
Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,046.9 million:
Procurement: $11,476.8 million:
Total funding: $12,523.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 3,168:
Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions):
Research and development cost:
As of 5/2009: $2,647.4;
Latest 10/2010: $2,189.2;
Percent change: -17.3.
Procurement cost:
As of 5/2009: $13,477.9;
Latest 10/2010: $11,476.8;
Percent change: -14.8.
Total program cost:
As of 5/2009: $16,125.3;
Latest 10/2010: $13,666.0;
Percent change: -15.3.
Program unit cost:
As of 5/2009: $4.631;
Latest 10/2010: $4.261;
Percent change: -8.0.
Total quantities:
As of 5/2009: 3,482;
Latest 10/2010: 3,207;
Percent change: -7.9.
Acquisition cycle time (months):
As of 5/2009: 165;
Latest 10/2010: 187;
Percent change: 13.3.
[End of table]
The WIN-T Increment 3 program will not fully mature its critical
technologies until its planned March 2015 production decision. Three
of the program's 20 critical technologies are currently mature and 15
are nearing maturity. Of the two remaining technologies, one was rated
as nearing maturity by an independent review team; but, the Director,
Defense Research and Engineering, concluded that the technology's
ambiguous requirements made it difficult to state whether it had been
adequately demonstrated. The other technology--a cryptographic device
whose development is being managed by the National Security Agency--
has not been formally rated. The Army recently developed a revised WIN-
T Increment 3 acquisition program baseline to account for changes due
to the cancellation of the Future Combat System program.
Attainment of Product Knowledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Development start: 7/03 (not assessed);
GAO review; 11/10;
DOD design review: 4/13;
Production decision: 3/15 (not assessed);
[End of figure]
WIN-T Increment 3 Program:
Technology Maturity:
The WIN-T Increment 3 program will not fully mature its critical
technologies until its planned March 2015 production decision. An
April 2009 review of the Army's technology readiness assessment for
WIN-T Increment 3 by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E), concluded that, of the program's 20 critical technologies, 3
were mature and 15 were nearing maturity.
Of the two remaining technologies, the Quality of Service Edge Device
(QED) was rated as nearing maturity in the Army's assessment; however,
DDR&E concluded that this technology had ambiguous requirements that
made it difficult to state whether it had been adequately
demonstrated. DDR&E noted that while the Army had demonstrated that
the QED technology met requirements under most conditions, in one
stressing scenario, it did not. DDR&E representatives believe that it
is unlikely that any network can meet this requirement in all
environments. Since the QED technology was shown to be robust and
capable of meeting its requirement in most scenarios, DDR&E
recommended that the Army clarify the user's requirements for this
technology by the next design review. According to a program office
official, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command has revisited user
requirements for this critical technology; however, a new rating for
this technology will not be formalized until the program's design
review, currently scheduled for February 2014.
The other remaining technology--High Assurance Internet Protocol
Encryptor (HAIPE) version 3.X--was not available to be rated at the
time of DDR&E's review in April 2009. HAIPE is a device that encrypts
and encapsulates Internet protocol packets so that they can be
securely transported over a network of a different security
classification. Version 1.3.5 of HAIPE is mature; however, according
to the WIN-T program office, its use in WIN-T Increment 3 would result
in a less efficient network design. DDR&E has notified the Army that
the maturity of the HAIPE version 3.X technology should be established
to DDR&E's satisfaction before it is transitioned into WIN-T Increment
3. The National Security Agency (NSA) manages the HAIPE program, and
is responsible for certifying that vendors' HAIPE products comply with
the HAIPE interoperability specification. According to an NSA
representative, NSA has informally assessed HAIPE 3.X and believes it
is mature. However, NSA has not been tasked by the Army or DDR&E with
providing a formal assessment of HAIPE 3.X's technology maturity. As a
result, our assessment and presentation of WIN-T's Increment 3's
technology maturity excludes this critical technology.
Design Maturity:
We could not assess the design stability of the WIN-T Increment 3
because the program office does not track the number of releasable
drawings. According to the program office, this metric is not
meaningful because WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort, but rather an
integration effort. Performance is measured through a series of
component, subsystem, configuration item, and network level test
events designed to demonstrate performance at increasing levels of
system integration. Design stability is measured through a problem
tracking report system. Problem track report trends are reported and
tracked on a weekly basis by the program office.
Other Program Issues:
In May 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics approved a revised acquisition program
baseline for the WIN-T Increment 3 program. However, this new baseline
was developed prior to the Secretary of Defense's recommended
cancellation of the Future Combat System (FCS) program, which was
closely related to WIN-T Increment 3. As a result, the Under Secretary
restricted the Army from obligating or expending WIN-T Increment 3
funds associated directly with FCS and directed that a new cost
estimate and acquisition program baseline be completed and approved.
In October 2010, the Under Secretary approved a revised acquisition
program baseline for WIN-T Increment 3, based on an independent cost
estimate prepared by the Director, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE), that reflects the restructured program.
Program Office Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR):
Illustration: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) will be a next-
generation radar system designed to provide ballistic missile defense,
air defense, and surface warfare capabilities. AMDR will consist of an
S-band radar for ballistic missile defense and air defense, X-band
radar for horizon search, and a radar suite controller that controls
and integrates the two radars. AMDR will initially support DDG 51
Flight III. The Navy expects AMDR to provide the foundation for a
scalable radar architecture to defeat advanced threats.
Current Status:
The AMDR program entered technology development in September 2010 and
is one of the first programs to incorporate affordability cost targets
as part of the acquisition strategy. In addition, in September 2010,
the Navy awarded three fixed-price incentive fee contracts to Northrop
Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon for S-band radar and radar
suite controller technology development. The contractors will build
and test prototypes to demonstrate the critical technologies during a
2-year technology development period. The Navy then plans to conduct a
limited competition among the technology development contractors for
engineering and manufacturing development. According to the program's
technology development strategy, the X-band radar technology is mature
and the Navy plans to acquire it through full and open competition.
The Navy will provide it as government-furnished equipment to the S-
band and radar suite controller contractor to manage the integration
during engineering and manufacturing development. Additional software
development will be required to integrate the two radars.
To support the decision to enter technology development, the Navy
conducted an early evaluation of technology maturity and identified
six candidate critical technologies--four hardware-related and two
software-related. According to program officials, digital beamforming--
necessary for AMDR's simultaneous air defense and ballistic missile
defense mission--will likely take the longest time in development to
mature. Program officials stated that while this technology is
currently in use on existing radars, it has not been demonstrated on a
large-aperture radar. The Navy is coordinating with the Air Force's
Space Fence program on the S-band radar's technology development. The
Navy estimates that AMDR will be available for delivery to a shipyard
in fiscal year 2019.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $15,668.8 million;
Research and development: $2,257.6 million;
Procurement: $13,382.9 million;
Quantities: 24.
Next Major Program Event: Preliminary design review, July 2012:
Program Office Comments: The AMDR program office concurred with this
assessment and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
B-2 Defensive Management System (DMS) Modernization:
Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force.
The Air Force's B-2 DMS modernization is expected to upgrade the 1980s-
era analog defensive management system to a digital capability. The
modernization effort is intended to improve the frequency coverage and
sensitivity of the electronic warfare suite, as well as update pilot
displays and inflight replanning capability for avoiding unanticipated
air defense threats. It is also expected to improve reliability and
maintainability for the system. According to program officials, the
current DMS is a major readiness driver for the aircraft.
Current Status:
In June 2010, the B-2 DMS program received its material development
decision and entered the material solution analysis phase. As part of
this phase, the program will conduct an analysis of alternatives.
According to program officials, the analysis of alternatives will
consider three options: (1) a minimum upgrade (only critical
electronic parts of current DMS); (2) a fully modernized DMS; and (3)
an incremental DMS upgrade. Upon completion of the analysis of
alternatives, the program anticipates entering the technology
development phase in March 2011. The program tentatively plans to
enter engineering and manufacturing development in 2013 after it
completes its preliminary design review, and projects an initial
operational capability for the B-2 DMS around fiscal year 2020.
A primary focus for the B-2 DMS program in technology development will
be the low-observable antennas for the B-2's leading edges. Overall,
the program office has identified six critical technologies. According
to the program office, five of the critical technologies are nearing
maturity or are mature and have been demonstrated in a relevant or
realistic environment. The low-observable antennas for the B-2 leading
edges are the least mature. The primary risk with the technology's
development will be achieving the desired performance while still
meeting the low-observable requirements of the aircraft. During the
technology development phase, the program does not plan to develop
prototypes of the full B-2 DMS, but instead plans to develop prototype
antenna subsystems, which is the area it believes contains the most
technological risk.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,505.8 million;
Research and development: $937.1 million;
Procurement: $568.7 million;
Quantities: 20.
Note: This is an initial draft cost estimate developed by the program
office. A formal baseline cost estimate is expected for the milestone
A decision scheduled for March 2011.
Next Major Program Event: Technology development start (milestone A),
March 2011:
Program Office Comments: The program was provided a draft of this
assessment and had no comments.
[End of section]
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 2:
Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force.
The Air Force's B-2 EHF SATCOM is a satellite communication system
designed to upgrade the aircraft's ultra high frequency system to
ensure continued secure, survivable communication. The system has
three increments, with each expected to be its own program. Increment
2 is designed to provide connectivity by adding low-observable
antennas and radomes to the aircraft. It also includes separate,
nonintegrated Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-
T) and related hardware.
Current Status:
The B-2 EHF Increment 2 program is in technology development. In March
2008, the program began a component advanced development effort that
includes systems engineering, requirements analysis, technology
maturation, and preliminary design activities. The program plans to
enter engineering and manufacturing development in fiscal year 2013--3
years later than originally planned.
The B-2 EHF Increment 2 program has attempted to make decisions that
balance requirements with technical solutions; however, antenna
technology maturation and FAB-T availability still pose risks. For
example, as a result of a recent trade study, the program's key
performance parameters were revised to reflect what is achievable and
technically feasible. In addition, the Air Force changed the antenna
location and technology to an active electronically scanned array
(AESA) to lower risk. These decisions are expected to mitigate
integration risks, but technology maturation risks still exist. The
program expects its critical technologies to be nearing maturity by
development start, but current technology readiness levels for AESA
are relatively low and the program does not have a fallback antenna
technology option should the AESA technology not mature as expected.
An Air Force review also raised concerns that the decision to pursue
AESA technologies exclusively may have precluded the use of lower
risk, more affordable and mature technologies. In addition to these
challenges, the availability of FAB-T hardware, which enables voice
and data satellite communication, has significantly delayed the
program. Due in part to the FAB-T delays, the B-2 EHF Increment 2 will
not begin production by the current U.S. Strategic Command need date
in fiscal year 2016. The program's initial operational capability is
expected in March 2020.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,796.7 million;
Research and development: $1,331.2 million;
Procurement: $464.5 million;
Quantities: 20.
Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development
start, March 2013:
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment,
the program office noted that a 2008 trade study validated program
risk areas related to the antenna's technology and planned location on
the B-2. This study concluded that changing the antenna's technology
to an electrical antenna would considerably reduce risk, allowing
relocation and, as a result, precluded negative effects on the B-2's
structure and radar cross section. The Air Force also provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
BMDS: Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB):
Photograph: Source: Missile Defense Agency.
MDA's ALTB, formerly the Airborne Laser program, is being developed as
an advanced platform for the Department of Defense's directed energy
research program. The ALTB platform includes two solid state lasers
and a high-energy laser housed aboard a modified Boeing 747-aircraft.
The ALTB will transition to a national test platform over the next 4
years.
Current Status:
Until recently, MDA's Airborne Laser program was developing a
prototype system to negate enemy missiles during the boost phase of
flight. However, after spending more than $5 billion on its
development, DOD designated it as a test bed to demonstrate the
potential of using directed energy as a viable technology against
ballistic missiles. In February 2010, MDA demonstrated that the ALTB
could successfully destroy a short-range threat-representative
ballistic missile during the boost phase. According to the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), the demonstration utilized a
realistic target and was the most operationally relevant test of the
Airborne Laser to-date. However, DOT&E also noted that despite the
realism of the target missile, the test was not operationally
realistic because a key component of the ALTB's detection and tracking
system was removed because it exhibited technical issues during
earlier ground and flight testing. MDA conducted its second major
flight test of the ALTB in early September 2010 against a short-range
ballistic missile in the boost phase, but failed to destroy the
target. The ATLB successfully detected and tracked the target, but
corrupted beam control software steered the high-energy laser slightly
off center. The ALTB safety system detected this shift and shut down
the high-energy laser. MDA conducted a third flight test in October
2010 against a solid-fuel missile. However, while the system seems to
have successfully acquired and tracked the plume or rocket exhaust of
the target, it never transitioned to active tracking. As a result, the
laser was not fired. The laser incorrectly reported that it was not
ready and the safety default aborted the engagement.
Total Program Funding: NA:
Next Major Program Event: NA:
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment,
the ALTB program acknowledged DOT&E's comments but noted that the test
bed is focused on scientific learning rather than proof of operational
capability. According to the program, MDA is collaborating with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to establish experiments that
maximize benefits for DOD directed-energy programs. In fiscal year
2010, the ALTB conducted 40 flight experiments, including engagements
of eight boosted targets. The ALTB also destroyed a solid-fuel metal-
body target missile prior to its first major flight test. In May 2010,
ALTB successfully engaged a diagnostic target missile at twice the
range of the February experiments--a key risk-reduction event for
future experiments. MDA continues to support directed energy as a
hedge against the ever-changing threat environment.
[End of section]
BMDS: Flexible Target Family (FTF):
Illustration: Source: Missile Defense Agency.
MDA's Flexible Target Family was designed to be a family of short-,
medium-, and long-range targets with common components for ground-,
air-, and sea-launch capabilities. MDA is currently producing a
groundlaunched, intermediate-range target, the LV-2, for BMDS flight
tests. It is also developing a second target in this family, the 52-
inch extended medium range ballistic missile target (eMRBM).
Current Status:
The LV-2 has been successfully tested and is in production. MDA flew
the first LV-2 target vehicle in January 2010. During this test, the
program was able to demonstrate all the critical technologies
necessary for the LV-2 in the current BMDS test plan. These
technologies had not been flight tested in the necessary form, fit,
and function before production began. There are currently five
additional LV-2 target missiles in various stages of production, all
in the same configuration. In order to assess production risks, the
contractor is collecting data on labor hours and scrap, rework, and
defect rates and has reported that these measures are tracking as
expected. MDA had originally planned to produce at least one
alternative configuration of the LV-2 that used a shrouded reentry
vehicle, but the mission requiring this technology was dropped from
the agency's test plan. MDA officials said they could purchase
additional LV-2 targets, but no additional ones are currently under
contract. The second LV-2 flight test was scheduled for the first
quarter of fiscal year 2011.
MDA is not planning to conduct a risk-reduction flight for the second
Flexible Target Family vehicle, the 52-inch eMRBM, because of budget
constraints. This target uses more than 90 percent of the same ground
and flight software, and 72 percent of the same components as the LV-
2. However, these components must be incorporated into a new, smaller
structure, which could pose an integration risk. MDA plans to use the
first two eMRBMs in a BMDS operational test in 2012. In April 2010,
MDA began acquiring the first three eMRBMs, and in September 2010
increased the quantity from three to five. MDA expects to complete
negotiations and definitize the contract in July 2011.
Total Funding for LV-2 (Fiscal years 2005 to 2013):
Research and development $622.2 million;
Quantities: 6.
Next Major Program Event: Third LV-2 flight test, third quarter fiscal
year 2011:
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment,
MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA):
Photograph: Source: L-3 Communications.
The Air Force's C-27J is a commercially available, multifunctional
small-to-medium-size cargo aircraft. It is designed to help meet time-
sensitive and mission critical transport requirements, and to augment
the Air Force's intratheater lift inventory. Its mission also includes
casualty evacuation, airdrop, troop transport, aerial sustainment, and
homeland security. The aircraft is capable of carrying up-armored High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles and heavy, dense loads such as
aircraft engines and ammunition.
Current Status:
The C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft program has been in production since
June 2007. The sixth aircraft was delivered in November 2010. The
program completed the transition from an Army-led joint program to an
Air Force program in October 2010. Current plans are to procure 38
aircraft and assign them to Air National Guard bases. The Air Force
Air Mobility Command and the National Guard Bureau have identified the
first six locations to receive C-27J aircraft as Mansfield, Ohio;
Baltimore, Maryland; Meridian, Mississippi; Battle Creek, Michigan;
Fargo, North Dakota; and Bradley, Connecticut. The C-27J program
office has established a foreign military sales section which has
received requests for information about pricing and availability from
a number of countries. However, as of July 2010, no foreign military
sales cases had been initiated.
The C-27J program was to achieve initial operational capability in
August 2010, but due to delays in multi-service operational test and
evaluation, as well as delays in receiving certification from the
Federal Aviation Administration, initial capability is now anticipated
for January 2011. In June 2010 the Air Force received authorization
from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics to expand the low-rate initial production procurement (LRIP)
by up to 8 aircraft, to a total of 21. This does not affect the total
quantities. Program officials explained that the firm fixed-price
contract for the C-27J is based on prices established according to the
number of aircraft purchased in a given period. By expanding the
maximum number of LRIP aircraft, the program was able to order 8
aircraft in the latest ordering period at the currently agreed upon
price rather than waiting for the next ordering period. According to
program officials, this helped save an estimated $19 million and avoid
a significant break in production.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,966.3 million;
Research and development: $118.3 million;
Procurement: $1,773.2 million;
Quantities: 38.
Next Major Program Event: Full-rate production decision, February 2011:
Program Office Comments: The program office was provided a draft of
this assessment and did not offer any comments.
[End of section]
DDG 51 Destroyer:
Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's DDG 51 destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed to
operate against air, surface, and subsurface threats. The Navy started
buying DDG 51 destroyers in 1985 and expects to have 62 destroyers in
service by 2012. In 2008, the Navy announced it would continue the
program and plans to buy nine more ships over the next 5 years. The
Navy then expects to start buying a new version of the ship--Flight
III--in fiscal year 2016. Initial plans for Flight III include an
increased emphasis on ballistic missile defense.
Current Status:
In 2008, the Navy announced its plan to restart the DDG 51 Flight IIA
production line. The Navy anticipates that construction of DDG 113--
the first ship in the restart program--will begin in fiscal year 2012
after an approximate 4-year gap in new DDG 51 starts. While program
officials do not currently anticipate utilizing any new technologies
or changing the Flight IIA design, the Navy could decide to use a
hybrid electric drive designed to reduce fuel consumption on both new
and existing DDG 51 destroyers, as well as in future designs, if it
proves to be successful. The system is currently a prototype. The Navy
is also working to address any industrial base issues that result from
the production gap. For example, officials stated that before the Navy
decided to restart DDG 51 production, the existing contractor for DDG
51 main reduction gears sold its production line. The Navy conducted a
full and open competition and will now provide the gears as government-
furnished equipment.
According to the program officials, a new air and missile defense
radar will be the major technology effort for Flight III. The radar is
being developed through a separate program office. According to the
DDG 51 program, improving power generation on Flight III will be
important to accommodate the expected increase in power and cooling
requirements for this radar. The radar could also pose a risk for
Flight III construction. The Navy estimates that it will not be
available for delivery to a shipyard until fiscal year 2019--2 years
prior to ship delivery according to the Navy. Officials stated that a
decision has not been made to determine where the DDG 51 program will
start in DOD's milestone review process for the development and
acquisition of the Flight III changes.
Estimated Total Program Cost (fiscal years 2010-2015): $16,926.5
million;
Research and development: $140.8 million;
Procurement: $16,785.7 million;
Quantities: 9.
Next Major Program Event: DDG 113 construction start, fiscal year 2012:
Program Office Comments: The program office provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS):
Illustration: Source: Northrop Grumman.
DOD's Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) is a next-generation
polar-orbiting environmental satellite system with primary coverage in
the early morning orbit. The system will incorporate data from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)/National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Joint Polar Satellite
System (JPSS) in the afternoon and from the European Meteorological
Operational (MetOp) satellite in mid-morning.
Current Status:
In February 2010, the Executive Office of the President announced that
the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS) program was being restructured because of long-standing cost,
schedule, and performance issues and management deficiencies. DOD and
NOAA/NASA were directed to proceed with separately-managed
acquisitions--DWSS for DOD and JPSS for NOAA/NASA. Currently, DOD
obtains weather data through Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
(DMSP) satellites. The Air Force launched a DMSP satellite in 2009 and
has two remaining satellites, which it plans to launch as needed. To
ensure continued coverage, the Air Force plans to have DWSS satellites
available for launch in 2018 and 2021.
To reduce developmental risks and lower acquisition costs, the Air
Force expects to leverage to the maximum extent the technology and
investments made in the NPOESS program. The DWSS satellite bus is a
modified NPOESS bus, but reduced in size and weight to meet DOD
mission requirements. DWSS plans to use the visible infrared imager
radiometer suite (VIIRS) sensor planned for NPOESS, as well as the
ground control system based on the NPOESS design. The Air Force is
evaluating microwave sensor alternatives, focusing on affordability
while still providing DMSP-comparable microwave capability.
Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD;
Research and development: TBD;
Procurement: NA;
Quantities: 2.
Next Major Program Event: Materiel development decision, February 2011:
Program Office Comments: Program officials stated they are working on
restructuring the NPOESS prime contract to facilitate transition of
civil NOAA/NASA work while focusing on DOD mission needs. Also, DOD
and NOAA/NASA are working to complete a memorandum of agreement on
sharing common elements at the VIIRS contractor and DOD plans to
acquire duplicate test sets and ground support equipment to minimize
single supplier issues.
[End of section]
Enhanced Polar System (EPS):
Illustration: Source: LinQuest Corporation.
The Air Force's Enhanced Polar System (EPS) will provide next-
generation protected extremely high frequency (EHF) satellite
communications in the polar region above 65 degrees northern latitude.
EPS will replace the current Interim Polar System and serve as a polar
adjunct to the Advanced EHF (AEHF) system. EPS consists of two EHF
payloads hosted on classified satellites. A gateway will connect
modified AEHF communications terminals to other communication systems
utilizing an extension of the AEHF mission control segment.
Current Status:
The EPS program is preparing to enter system development. It was
initiated in fiscal year 2006 to fill the gap left by the cancellation
of the Advanced Polar System. In December 2007, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed the program
to bypass concept development and proceed to a system development
decision in order to synchronize the program's schedule with the host
satellite production timeline. Since then, the Air Force has
determined that the EPS program would require additional payload
engineering and changes to the gateway, and the program's entry into
system development has been delayed from February 2010 to the third
quarter of fiscal year 2011. In addition, the program's projected cost
could significantly increase. According to program officials, the EPS
program did not have an opportunity to develop a complete and thorough
cost estimate because it was directed to proceed directly to a system
development decision. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request
included about $1 billion for the program through fiscal year 2015;
however, program officials stated that the new cost estimate might
require double this amount. Before the EPS program can enter system
development, the milestone decision authority will have to certify
that this funding is available.
According to the program office, EPS critical technologies are mature.
Although the program does not plan to conduct prototyping prior to the
start of development, program officials noted the EPS has conducted
prototyping in the payload, ground, gateway, and terminal segments as
part of the technology development phase of the program. According to
DOD acquisition policy, the technology development strategy for each
major defense acquisition program shall provide for prototypes of the
system or, if a system prototype is not feasible, for prototypes of
critical subsystems before it gets approval to enter the engineering
and manufacturing development phase.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,490.7 million;
Research and development: $1,395.4 million;
Procurement: $79.7 million;
Quantities: 2.
Next Major Program Event: System development decision, third quarter
of fiscal year 2011:
Program Office Comments: The EPS program office provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
F-22A Raptor:
Photograph: Source: U.S. Air Force.
The Air Force's F-22A Raptor is the only fifth-generation operational
air-to-air and air-to-ground fighter/attack aircraft. This aircraft
integrates stealth, supercruise, and advanced avionics,
maneuverability, and weapons in one platform. The Air Force
established the F-22A modernization and improvement program in 2003 to
add enhanced air-to-ground, information warfare, reconnaissance, and
other capabilities and improve the reliability and maintainability of
the aircraft.
Current Status:
In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced that F-22A
production would end at 187 aircraft, and as of September 2010, the
Air Force had accepted delivery of 160 aircraft. According to the
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the F-22A could have
difficulty meeting operational suitability requirements relating to
low-observable maintainability when the system reaches full maturity.
Air Force officials reported that the low-observable materials are
difficult to manage and maintain, requiring nearly twice the number of
maintenance personnel as anticipated.
The Air Force is upgrading the F-22A fleet in four increments. The
first increment has been fielded. The second increment--Increment 3.1-
-will begin follow-on operational test and evaluation in January 2011.
These increments add enhanced air-to-air and air-to-ground;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and synthetic aperture
radar capabilities. The third increment--Increment 3.2--has been
divided into two phases. The first will deliver electronic protection,
combat identification, and Link 16 communication upgrades beginning in
2014. The second phase will begin fielding AIM-9X and AIM-120D
capabilities, and additional electronic protection upgrades beginning
in 2016. The multifunction advanced datalink, planned to provide
interoperability with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, was removed from
Increment 3.2 after costs increased significantly over initial
estimates and the program was unable to secure fiscal year 2010
funding. Increment 3.3 will enable compliance with air traffic
management standards, but the additional content for this increment
has not yet been determined.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $77,392.8 million;
Research and development: $39,171.7 million;
Procurement: $37,560.5 million;
Quantities: 188.
Next Major Program Event: Final aircraft delivery, February 2012:
Program Office Comments: The Air Force acknowledged challenges
associated with maintaining a fifth-generation low-observable system,
and said there are currently more than 10 ongoing efforts under the
reliability and maintainability maturation program to increase
maintainability and material durability. The Air Force also stated
that the majority of repairs to the low observable system resulted
from having to perform other maintenance activities, rather than to
address problems with the low observable system itself. According to
the service, all operational units have reported mission capable rates
for the low-observable system of about 90 percent, since January 2009.
The Air Force also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z):
Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's H-1 Upgrades Program converts the AH-1W attack helicopter
and the UH-1N utility helicopter to the AH1-Z and UH-1Y
configurations, respectively. The mission of the AH-1Z attack
helicopter is to provide rotary-wing fire support and reconnaissance
capabilities in day/night and adverse weather conditions. The mission
of the UH-1Y utility helicopter is to provide command, control, and
assault support under the same conditions.
Current Status:
The UH-1Y and AH-1Z configurations are in production. DOD approved
full-rate production for the UH-1Y in September 2008. The program
received approval to enter full-rate production for the AH-1Z in
November 2010. The Navy completed operational testing and evaluation
for the AH-1Z in June 2010. The evaluation report, issued in September
2010, concluded that the AH-1Z is operationally effective and
suitable, and recommended the aircraft for introduction in the fleet.
The report also highlighted concerns with logistics supportability and
recommended this deficiency be corrected prior to the first AH-1Z
operational deployment.
In July 2010, the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation
issued a directive changing the composition of H-1 program
procurements from 123 UH-1Ys and 226 AH-1Zs to 160 UH-1Ys and 189 AH-
1Zs. The Deputy Commandant cited increased demand for utility
helicopters in support of combat operations and the increase in combat
power of the AH-1Z compared to the AH-1W as support for the directive.
As of November 2010, there were 98 H-1 upgrades under contract, and 46
aircraft--34 UH-1Ys and 12 AH-1Zs--had been delivered to the fleet.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $11,866.5 million;
Research and development: $1,855.3 million;
Procurement: $10,011.2 million;
Quantities: 4 (Research and Development), 349 (Procurement).
Next Major Program Event: Initial operational capability, AH-1Z,
second quarter fiscal year 2011:
Program Office Comments: The Navy provided technical comments, which
were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV):
Photograph: Source: Department of Defense.
The Army and Marine Corps' Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is a family of
vehicles focused on balancing personnel protection, payload, and
performance. JLTV is expected to reduce life-cycle costs through
commonality at the subassembly and component level. The JLTV is
expected to provide defensive measures for troops while in transport,
increase payload capability, improve the logistics footprint, and
reduce soldier workload associated with system operation and field
maintenance activities.
Current Status:
In December 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics directed the Army to begin a 27-month
technology development phase for the JLTV program with the goal of
reducing risks prior to and shortening the length of system
development. Prior to entering engineering and manufacturing
development, the JLTV program will develop prototypes, demonstrate
critical technologies in a relevant environment, and conduct a
preliminary design review, as required by DOD policy. In October 2008,
the Army awarded three technology development contracts. The three
contractors delivered prototype vehicles in May 2010. Testing on the
prototypes has begun and is expected to last about a year. At the
conclusion of technology development, the Army plans to hold a full
and open competition and award two engineering and manufacturing
development contracts. One of these two contractors will be selected
for production.
The JLTV's acquisition costs have not been determined, but based on
evolving user requirements the JLTV average unit manufacturing cost is
estimated at $356,000. This cost does not include contractor general
and administrative cost, contractor profit, or government-furnished
equipment. The program has a demanding set of projected requirements
and tradeoffs may be necessary. Among the program's key challenges is
whether the vehicle can provide the performance and reliability
required within the weight limits for helicopter transport.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $53,523.3 million;
Research and development: $1,082.2 million;
Procurement: $52,298.3;
Quantities: 60,383.
Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development
start, January 2012:
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment,
the program office stated that JLTV provides a design that supports
mobility, reliability, and maintainability within weight limits to
ensure transportability to and from the battlefield. The program
office also noted that JLTV uses scalable armor solutions to meet
requirements for added protection while maintaining load carrying
capacity.
[End of section]
KC-X Program:
Photograph: Source: U.S. Air Force. Note: Photo is of the KC-135
Stratotanker, the aircraft the KC-X will replace.
The Air Force's KC-X program is the first of three phases in the
recapitalization of the KC-135 aerial refueling tanker fleet. The KC-X
acquisition strategy calls for the procurement of 179 commercial
derivative aircraft tankers at an expected cost of around $35 billion.
The KC-X is planned to provide sustained aerial refueling capability
to facilitate global attack, air-bridge, deployment, sustainment,
employment, redeployment, homeland defense, theater support, and
specialized national defense missions.
Current Status:
The KC-135 recapitalization effort is the Air Force's highest
acquisition priority. It is expected to involve the procurement of
about 600 aircraft over a 40-year period with a cost that could exceed
$100 billion. The first phase of this recapitalization--the KC-X
program--is in source selection. According to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Air Force plans to award a fixed-price
incentive fee contract for the engineering and manufacturing
development phase of the KC-X program in early fiscal year 2011. The
request for proposal for this contract requires all critical
technologies to be at a technology readiness level 6--demonstrated in
a relevant environment--or higher. According to its current
acquisition strategy, the primary technical risk for the KC-X program
is the integration of military hardware and software on a commercial
platform. The Air Force plans to begin procurement of four aircraft
for development and testing purposes in fiscal year 2011.
The Air Force has experienced numerous delays in awarding a
development contract. In February 2008, the Air Force awarded a
development contract to Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic
Defense and Space Company. However, the contract award was the subject
of a bid protest that was sustained by GAO. As a result, in October
2008, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to
terminate the contract and conduct a new competition.
Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD;
Research and development: TBD;
Procurement: TBD;
Quantities: 179.
Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development
start, early fiscal year 2011:
Program Office Comments: The Office of the Director of Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy provided technical comments on a
draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):
Illustration: Source: Northrop Grumman.
Until it was significantly restructured in February 2010, NPOESS was a
triagency program with the Department of Commerce (National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration), DOD (Air Force), and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) designed to merge civil
and defense weather satellite programs to reduce costs, provide global
weather and climate coverage, and improve capabilities above current
fielded systems.
Current Status:
In February 2010, the Executive Office of the President announced that
the NPOESS program was being restructured because of long-standing
cost, schedule, and performance issues and management deficiencies. As
part of the restructuring, DOD, NOAA, and NASA were directed to
proceed with separately-managed acquisitions--the Defense Weather
Satellite System (DWSS) and the civilian Joint Polar Satellite System
(JPSS). DOD, NOAA, and NASA will still be responsible for meeting
NPOESS weather and climate observational requirements in their
assigned orbits. DOD will be responsible for collecting weather and
climate data during the early morning orbit. NOAA and NASA will be
responsible for collecting weather and climate data during the
afternoon orbit. These agencies are expected to share data from a
common ground system to be managed by NOAA and NASA.
According to the Executive Office of the President, the JPSS will
consist of platforms based on the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)
satellite. NOAA is currently developing its plan for the JPSS and is
considering options such as developing a smaller satellite than the
one planned for NPOESS and removing sensors that were planned for the
NPOESS satellites. NOAA will have to manage a series of challenges
during the transition from NPOESS to JPSS, including the resolution of
existing contracts and intellectual property issues and the loss of
skilled workers. NOAA also has to address risks related to the
readiness of ground systems to support the planned October 2011 NPP
satellite launch and the instrument readiness to support a JPSS launch
in 2014.
DOD is in the early stages of planning its approach for the DWSS
program. See page 138 for more information about the status of the
program.
Estimated Total Program Cost: According to program officials, the
estimated total program cost for NPOESS was about $5.3 billion when
last reported in fiscal year 2010.
Next Major Program Event: NA:
Program Office Comments: We did not request comments on this
assessment because the NPOESS program office was disbanded before we
completed our review.
[End of section]
Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Aircraft Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-
D):
Illustration: Source: Northrop Grumman.
The Navy's UCAS-D program plans to demonstrate and mature technologies
that could be used on a future unmanned, long-range, low-observable
carrier-based aircraft with an autonomous air-refueling capability,
which would provide greater standoff capability, expanded payload and
launch options, and increased naval reach and persistence. Following
completion of the demonstration and technology maturation effort, the
Navy will decide whether to initiate a formal acquisition program.
Current Status:
The Navy UCAS-D program is a demonstration program. The program plans
to demonstrate carrier operations, including autonomous aerial
refueling, of a low-observable unmanned combat air system and mature
both aircraft and other critical technologies needed to operate and
integrate the aircraft with the ship. These efforts are intended to
support an acquisition decision for a potential Navy UCAS major
defense acquisition program, which could enter the acquisition process
at either the technology demonstration or engineering and
manufacturing development phase. In August 2007, the Navy awarded a
cost-plus incentive fee contract to Northrop Grumman for the design,
development, integration, test, and demonstration of two unmanned
combat air systems. The contractor has completed the first air vehicle
and is currently building the second air vehicle. First flight is
scheduled for December 2010, and according to program officials, the
demonstration effort--excluding the autonomous aerial refueling
capability--is scheduled to be completed by 2013. The refueling
capability is not scheduled to be demonstrated until summer 2014 and
all technology maturation and demonstration efforts are to be
completed by 2015.
While the prime contractor's estimated costs have grown by over $200
million to $813 million, according to the program manager, there is
sufficient funding in the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request
to complete the demonstration program. The cost of the prime contract
has grown, in part, because the contractor originally proposed
completing the demonstration sooner than 2013 and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense added an autonomous aerial refueling
demonstration to the program in 2008. Although the Navy officials
initially agreed to the accelerated schedule, it was subsequently
determined that the technology involved was more complex than
originally anticipated. After a 2010 review by the Navy, the program's
cost and schedule estimates were revised to reflect the Navy's
original 2013 program completion date as well as the addition of the
autonomous aerial refueling capability.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,562.1 million;
Quantities: 2.
Next Major Program Event: First flight, December 2010:
Program Office Comments: The Navy UCAS-D program office provided
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Nett Warrior Increment I:
Photograph: Source: U.S. Army.
The Army's Nett Warrior program is an integrated ground soldier system
designed to provide embedded training and increased situational
awareness, lethality, mobility, survivability, and sustainability
during combat operations. There are three increments planned.
Increment I will focus on developing the situational awareness system
used initially with Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The program is a
descendant of the Land Warrior program, which was terminated due to
cost concerns and funding constraints.
Current Status:
The Nett Warrior program was approved to enter technology development
in February 2009 and plans to proceed directly to production in fiscal
year 2011. The Army has awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts to
General Dynamics, Raytheon, and Rockwell Collins for prototypes, which
include a hands-free display, headset, computer, navigation equipment,
antennas, and cables. These prototype designs have undergone
developmental testing and are currently being evaluated in a limited
user test. The Army has identified five critical technologies for Nett
Warrior Increment I--energy/power management subsystem, antenna,
navigation, user controller, and voice intelligibility. These
technologies are currently nearing maturity and, pursuant to a program
acquisition decision memorandum, they must be demonstrated in an
operational environment prior to exiting technology development. Based
on the results of the limited user test, conducted at Ft. Riley,
Kansas, and a technology readiness assessment of the program by the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics will make a decision
on whether the program will proceed to engineering and manufacturing
development or directly to production and deployment as planned. While
it is not designated as a critical technology, the fully networked
capability of the Nett Warrior Increment I will not be achieved until
the Joint Tactical Radio System is incorporated after full-rate
production.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,669.4 million;
Research and development: $179.8 million;
Procurement: $1,489.6 million;
Quantities: 20,430.
Next Major Program Event: Low-rate initial production decision, fiscal
year 2011:
Program Office Comments: The program office provided technical
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Ohio-Class Replacement (OR)/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent:
Illustration: Source: General Dynamics Electric Boat.
The Navy's Ohio-class Replacement (OR)/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent
will replace the current fleet of Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarines (SSBN) as they begin to retire in 2027. The Navy began
research and development in 2008, in order to avoid a gap in sea-based
nuclear deterrence between the Ohio class's retirement and the
production of a replacement. The Navy is working with the United
Kingdom to develop a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) for use on the
Ohio-class replacement and the United Kingdom's replacement for the
Vanguard SSBN.
Current Status:
The OR program was scheduled to enter technology development in
December 2010. The Navy's fiscal year 2011 long range shipbuilding
plan includes 12 OR SSBNs and projects that the program will receive
authorization to begin construction on the lead ship in fiscal year
2019. The high expected cost of the OR has been an early focus of the
program. Both DOD and Navy officials have stated the cost of the
program could dominate Navy shipbuilding budgets in the 2020 to 2030
time frame. The size and number of missile tubes is one of a number of
cost drivers. The OR's analysis of alternatives, which was approved by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense's office of Cost Analysis and
Program Evaluation in December 2009, discussed the size and number of
missile tubes; however, a final decision is still pending. According
to the program office, Northrop Grumman, Babcock Integrated
Technologies, Electric Boat Corporation, and BAE Systems Marine have
been awarded contracts for assembly of prototype missile tubes.
The main focus of OR research and development to date has been the
CMC. The United Kingdom has provided $329 million for this effort
since fiscal year 2008. During fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the Navy
had allocated about $183 million for the design and prototyping of the
missile compartment. According to Navy officials, the program's other
areas of emphasis include developing stealth technologies, ensuring a
balanced ship design and the production readiness of the missile tube
manufacturing base, and strengthening government system engineering
personnel.
Overall, the Navy has received $510.3 million for the OR program over
fiscal years 2009 and 2010. The President's budget request for fiscal
year 2011 included an additional $672.3 million. These numbers include
funding for OR and propulsion plant development.
Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD:
Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development
start, fiscal year 2015:
Program Office Comments: The OR program generally concurred with this
assessment. The program stated that over the past year, it has focused
on containing nonrecurring engineering and construction costs by
incorporating innovations to ship design and construction
methodologies and practices as well as lessons learned from the
Virginia-class program's design and construction. The program office
also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Space Fence:
Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force.
The Air Force's Space Fence will be a new system of ground-based
radars to replace the aging Air Force Space Surveillance System. It
will use higher radio frequencies to detect and track smaller Earth-
orbiting objects. The system will consist of up to two geographically
dispersed radars (notionally located in Australia, Ascension Island,
or Kwajalein Atoll) to help ensure effective space surveillance
coverage. The system's enhanced capabilities are expected to
significantly increase the number of orbiting objects detected and
tracked.
Current Status:
The Space Fence program began technology development in March 2009. In
June 2009, the Air Force awarded three $30 million firm fixed-price
contracts to Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. The
Northrop Grumman contract was subsequently terminated after a
reduction in program funding. The program is currently focused on
making cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs to ensure its
affordability. The Air Force next plans to conduct a full and open
competition and award up to two contracts for a maximum of $214
million to continue technology development. The contracts will go
through the preliminary design review, which is planned for January
2012, followed by another full and open competition leading to a
single, final development and production contract in July 2012. The
first Space Fence radar site is scheduled to provide initial
operational capability by the end of fiscal year 2015, with the final
site providing full capability by 2020.
The program office identified five critical technologies and expects
them to be nearing maturity by the preliminary design review. Mature
backup technologies exist; however, all have potentially higher
acquisition or operating costs associated with them, or both.
According to the program office, using these backups could make the
program unaffordable.
According to the program office, a separate program for the
development of a new space command and control system poses a risk for
Space Fence. This new system, which will process Space Fence data,
needs to be available when the Space Fence is fielded because the
amount of data it will generate exceeds existing command and control
system performance limits.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $2,717.6 million;
Research and development: $1,682.2 million;
Procurement: $1,035.4 million;
Quantities: 1 (Research and Development), 1 (Procurement).
Next Major Program Event: Final development and production start, July
2012:
Program Office Comments: The program office stated that changes to the
acquisition strategy increase competition, induce further contractor
design and cost realism, and reduce program risk to deliver the first
system capability by September 2015. The preliminary design review is
expected to occur 6 months prior to the planned June 2012 milestone B,
allowing for a more informed decision at final contract award. The
program office also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Stryker Modernization (SMOD):
Photograph: Source: U.S. Army.
The Army's Stryker family of vehicles is a group of deployable,
wheeled, armored vehicles. The Stryker upgrade program, commonly known
as Stryker Modernization, is a technological overhaul of targeted
components designed to improve the vehicle's survivability, mobility,
lethality, and networking capabilities. The system enhancements, which
will be applied to all 10 Stryker variants, will enable the vehicles
to remain in operation through 2050. The program will comprise two
increments. We made observations on increment one.
Current Status:
The Army is planning a materiel development decision (MDD) for the
Stryker Modernization program, which will determine where it will
enter the acquisition process. The program is the outgrowth of a
modernization concept that was briefed at a Stryker configuration
steering board meeting in August 2009. According to the Stryker
program, the modernization program is necessary to address space,
weight, and power constraints that could affect the vehicles' ability
to meet current and future warfighting needs. Before moving forward
with the program, the Army had to await the outcome of two events. In
March 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics directed the Army to provide a complete overview of
Stryker Modernization efforts, including an evaluation of how Stryker
Modernization activities fit into the Army strategy for meeting future
ground combat vehicle requirements. In addition, the Army must
complete its combat vehicle portfolio review.
The first increment of the Stryker Modernization program will consist
of two phases. According to program officials, phase 1 will focus on
the common characteristics of all 10 variants, such as the chassis and
drive train, spare parts, and test equipment. Phase 2 will focus on
enhancing characteristics unique to each of the variants, such as fire
support and medical evacuation. The Army has identified three critical
technologies for phase 1--semiactive suspension, survivability
improvements, and power generation. According to the program, all
three technologies will be demonstrated in a relevant or realistic
environment before the program enters engineering and manufacturing
development. The program also plans to select, through competition,
three contractors to develop prototypes of key subsystems prior to
this phase. Additional critical technologies may be identified for
phase 2. The Stryker Modernization strategy will be determined by Army
senior leaders and then that strategy will be recommended to the
defense acquisition executive at the program's MDD for his approval.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $2,179.8 million;
Research and development: $1,190.0 million;
Procurement: $989.8 million;
Quantities: 35 (Research and Development), 664 (Procurement).
Next Major Program Event: Materiel development decision, TBD:
Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment,
the Army provided technical comments, which were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR):
Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force.
The Air Force's 3DELRR will be the long-range, ground-based sensor for
detecting, identifying, tracking, and reporting aircraft and missiles
for the Joint Forces Air Component Commander. It will provide real-
time data and support a range of expeditionary operations in all types
of weather and terrain. It is being acquired to replace the Air
Force's AN/TPS-75 radar systems. The Marine Corps is considering
3DELRR as a potential replacement to the AN/TPS-59 to support the
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Commander.
Current Status:
The 3DELRR program was approved to enter the technology development
phase in May 2009. The Air Force has awarded firm fixed-price
contracts for the development of system-level prototypes. The program
expects to demonstrate the capability of each of the prototypes by the
end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2011. The program plans to
conduct a full and open competition and award a single cost plus
incentive fee contract for program definition and risk reduction
before seeking approval to enter engineering and manufacturing
development in the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. Initial
operational capability for the radar is targeted for approximately
2019.
The 3DELRR program is focused on reducing technical risk before
beginning system development. The program has identified six critical
technologies. The program's technology development strategy calls for
these technologies to be nearing maturity and demonstrated in a
relevant environment by the start of system development. The program
also expects to complete a preliminary design review prior to
development start and a critical design review early in the
engineering and manufacturing development phase.
According to the program office, the primary risks going forward are
securing adequate funding and accurately capturing the user's
requirements. Additional near-term funding is necessary to execute the
current acquisition strategy. In the event of a program budget
shortfall, the program office would have to examine alternatives
including revising the acquisition strategy, conducting requirements
tradeoffs, and extending the delivery schedule. Further, if the
program's requirements document does not accurately represent user
requirements, then the system design could require changes late in the
acquisition process.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $2,092.4 million;
Research and development: $743.3 million;
Procurement: $1,349.1 million (Air Force only);
Quantities: 35 (Air Force only).
Next Major Program Event: Program definition and risk reduction
contract award, second quarter fiscal year 2012:
Program Office Comments: The program office concurred with the
assessment and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey):
Illustration: Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft developed for use by the
Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy. The Marine Corps and Air Force
Special Operations Command have completed multiple deployments of the
MV-22 and CV-22, respectively, in Iraq, Africa, Afghanistan, South
America, and in support of the humanitarian efforts in Haiti. As of
December 2010, there were 125 V-22s in service. The program is
currently focused on improving readiness, decreasing ownership cost,
and preparing for a second multi-year procurement contract.
Current Status:
The V-22 has been deployed and is supporting combat operations;
however, the aircraft has experienced reliability and readiness issues
that have resulted in high maintenance and operating costs. Since
2009, the program has undertaken several initiatives to understand and
reduce operations and maintenance costs after it became apparent the
MV-22 was exceeding its budgeted cost per flight hour. The program
developed a new cost model to increase the quality and accuracy of
cost per flight hour estimates and established a team to identify cost
savings opportunities. According to the Marine Corps, it is also
working with industry to increase the durability of key components
that affect readiness and operating costs. One of the program's top
priorities is the ice protection system. A June 2010 Air Force
accident report on a March 2009 CV-22 engine failure concluded that it
was caused by a part from the central deice distributor (an ice
protection system component) shaking loose and falling into the
engine. The report stated that this part had a history of structural
issues related in part to its design. The program office has addressed
the risks identified in the report by instituting an inspection of
this component at the 35 hour interval and installing a more durable
version of the part on aircraft in production. According to the
program office, all CV-22s and deployed MV-22s have been retrofitted
with the hardware fix and retrofit kits are available for the
remaining fleet. In April 2010, a CV-22 crashed on an infiltration
mission in support of ground forces in Afghanistan. In August 2010,
the Air Force Accident Investigation Board reported that there were 10
substantially contributing factors to the accident and that they fell
into four categories: mission execution, environmental conditions,
human factors, and aircraft performance. We were unable to follow-up
on how these factors are being addressed during our assessment. The V-
22 program is in the fourth year of its first multiyear procurement
contract. The program will request authority to enter, and is planning
and budgeting for, a second multiyear procurement contract to begin in
fiscal year 2013.
Estimated Total Program Cost: $56,061.1 million;
Research and development: $13,114.7 million;
Procurement: $42,829.3 million;
Quantities: 458 aircraft.
Program Office Comments: In its comments on a draft of this
assessment, the program office stated that the V-22 has met all
operational tasking and the Marines and Air Force are exceptionally
satisfied with the V-22's "game changing" capabilities. It also
emphasized the aircraft's exceptional survivability and the numerous
improvements that have been made to it in the last decade. Eight
Marine and two Air Force Osprey squadrons are operational. The program
projects reaching 100,000 flight hours in early 2011. Production is
fully mature with aircraft deliveries on or ahead of schedule. The
program's overall strategy is an effective and affordable globally
deployed Osprey fleet.
[End of section]
Presidential Helicopter (VXX):
Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy.
The Navy's VXX program is expected to develop and field a replacement
for the current fleet of VH-3D and VH-60N helicopters that provide
transportation for the President, Vice President, heads of state, and
others as directed. The program was initiated after the VH-71
presidential helicopter replacement program was terminated in June
2009 due to excessive cost growth and schedule delays. The Navy is
also taking steps to extend the service life of its existing fleet of
VH-3D and VH-60N helicopters until a new helicopter can be fielded.
Current Status:
In March 2010, the VXX program held a materiel development decision
review. The Navy expects to complete an analysis of alternatives by
the second quarter of fiscal year 2011 and enter technology
development by the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. According to
program officials, the new program will complete a four-phase systems
engineering and design review process before beginning system
development.
In June 2009, DOD terminated the VH-71 program due to excessive cost
growth, schedule delays, and technical risk. From its inception,
program officials had acknowledged that the program carried
substantial risk due to an aggressive schedule directed by the White
House. Program officials further attribute the program's problems to a
misunderstanding between the government and contractors over
requirements--a problem exacerbated by a highly compressed development
schedule, a lack of sufficient predevelopment systems engineering and
design work, and the eventual reengineering of entire subsystems
needed to mitigate aircraft performance and weight issues. Prior to
termination, five pilot production VH-71s were built and delivered and
10 percent of the planned 1,460 flight hour test program was completed.
As a result of the VH-71 termination, the Navy has to extend the
service life of its fleet of VH-3D and VH-60N helicopters. Current
projections indicate these helicopters can operate until 2017;
however, the Navy is studying whether the fleet's life can be extended
to 2023 or later until the VXX is fielded.
Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD;
Quantities: TBD.
Next Major Program Event: Technology development start, third quarter
fiscal year 2011:
Program Office Comments: The program office concurred with this
assessment.
[End of section]
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The
comments are reprinted in appendix VI. DOD also provided technical
comments, which we addressed in the report, as appropriate.
In its comments, DOD stated that it did not find GAO's methods for
calculating cost growth useful for management purposes. Specifically,
DOD takes exception to the part of our analysis that aggregates data
on the cost growth that has accumulated from a program's first full
cost estimate, which is typically tied to the start of development--
milestone B--to the current year. DOD considers our methodology to be
flawed and the resulting information to be misleading because it does
not delineate cost growth experienced in the past, cost growth
associated with capability upgrades, and cost growth associated with
quantity increases. DOD requested that those metrics be removed from
the report. In addition, DOD commented that the four different cost
growth metrics presented in the report make it difficult for readers
to gain an understanding of program performance.
Given the magnitude and complexity of major weapon system
acquisitions, we believe no single metric adequately captures all of
the dynamics of cost changes. Measuring cost increases from the formal
start of a program to the present is one of several important metrics
because it conveys the magnitude of the task at hand and provides a
context for management. Further, milestone B is recognized as a key
point for establishing accountability for weapon system programs, as
evidenced by the importance of milestone B cost estimates in reporting
Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breaches to Congress and the statutory
certification requirements a program must meet, which include
developing a reasonable cost estimate, to proceed beyond this point.
Therefore, we retained this as one of several metrics used to measure
program performance in this report. With regard to DOD's comment about
cost growth associated with capability upgrades, we believe that a key
tenet of a knowledge-based acquisition approach is to set realistic
capability requirements at the outset of a program and to avoid
changing them in order to achieve cost and schedule predictability.
We used several other metrics to make distinctions between older and
more recent cost increases and increases stemming from a lack of
knowledge or poor program management versus simple quantity increases.
For example, we designed our cost analysis to focus primarily on
program performance over the last 2 years, which allows us to evaluate
DOD's management of its major defense acquisition programs since key
acquisition reforms were put into place by Congress and DOD. To ensure
the focus remains on this 2-year analysis, we made changes to table 2
in the final report in response to DOD's comments. Our analysis also
explicitly accounts for cost increases associated with changes in
weapon system quantities including cases such as the DDG 51 and the
MRAP. Similarly, we present analysis of the often-overlooked and hard-
to-quantify phenomenon of reducing quantities or capabilities, or
both, to offset cost increases.
DOD also commented on a set of program performance metrics that were
discussed by DOD, OMB, and GAO in 2008, as a mechanism for evaluating
DOD's progress in addressing the issues discussed in GAO's Weapon
Systems Acquisition High-Risk area. DOD believes that these metrics
still do not adequately capture cost growth that results solely from
poor estimating and poor execution as opposed to other sources
including changes in inventory goals and changes in requirements or
capabilities. We agree that these metrics do not quantify the cost
growth attributable to each of those factors; however, DOD
specifically requested that we use these metrics to assess the
performance of its major defense acquisition program portfolio and its
policies in its comments on our 2009 and 2010 annual assessments of
weapon programs. We will continue to work with DOD to develop a set of
metrics to better measure its progress in addressing its long-standing
weapon system acquisition issues. Finally, DOD stated that it is
undertaking a series of actions to obtain greater efficiency and
productivity in defense spending. We support DOD's efforts to get
better value from defense spending and look forward to including the
results of these efforts in future reports.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the report will be made
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Staff members making key contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
This report contains observations on the performance of the Department
of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2010 major defense acquisition program
portfolio. To develop these observations, we obtained and analyzed
data from Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) and other information in
the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval Purview
system, referred to as DAMIR.[Footnote 29] We refer to programs with
SARs dated December 2009 as the 2010 portfolio. We converted cost
information to fiscal year 2011 dollars using conversion factors from
the DOD Comptroller's National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal
Year 2011 (table 5-9). Data for the total planned investment of major
defense acquisition programs were obtained from DAMIR, which we
aggregated for all programs using fiscal year 2011 dollars. However,
the data do not include the full costs of acquiring Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) programs.
We also collected and analyzed data on the composition of DOD's major
defense acquisition program portfolio. To determine changes in that
portfolio, we compared the programs that issued SARs in December 2009
with the list of programs that issued SARs in December 2007. To assess
the cost effect of changes to the major defense acquisition portfolio,
we calculated the estimated total acquisition cost for the 13 programs
exiting the portfolio and for the 15 programs entering the portfolio.
To compare the cost of major defense acquisition programs over 2
years, 5 years, and from baseline estimates, we collected data from
December 2009, December 2007, and December 2004 SARs; acquisition
program baselines; and program offices. We retrieved data that showed
cost estimates for research, development, test, and evaluation;
procurement; and total acquisition for 98 major defense acquisition
programs in the 2010 portfolio. We divided some SAR programs into
smaller elements, because DOD reports performance data on them
separately. We analyzed the data to determine the change in research
and development, procurement, and total acquisition costs from the
first full estimate, generally development start, with the current
estimate. For a few programs that did not have a development estimate,
we compared the current estimate to the production estimate. Also, for
a few shipbuilding programs that had a full planning estimate, we
compared the current estimate to the planning estimate. For programs
that began as non-major defense acquisition programs, the first full
estimate used by GAO as a baseline may be different than the original
baseline contained in DOD SARs. When comparable cost and schedule data
were not available for programs, we excluded them from the analysis.
To calculate cost growth incurred over the past 2 years, from 2008 to
2010, we calculated the difference between the December 2007 and
December 2009 SARs for programs older than 2 years. For programs less
than 2 years old, we calculated the difference between December 2009
and first full estimates. We converted all dollar figures to fiscal
year 2011 constant dollars. We took a similar approach for calculating
cost growth incurred from 2005 to 2010. We also obtained schedule
information and calculated the time since program start, or program
age; cycle time from program start to initial operational capability;
delay in obtaining initial operational capability; and the delay in
initial capability as a percentage of total cycle time. Finally, we
extracted data on quantities and program acquisition unit cost and
compared the current unit cost to the baseline unit cost to determine
whether programs' unit cost has increased or decreased from the
baseline estimate. For three software programs with no quantities, we
assigned each program a quantity of one. For two programs, F-22 and
DDG 51, we then calculated the effect on DOD's buying power from each
program by multiplying the change in program acquisition unit cost by
the current planned quantities.
To calculate the amount of procurement cost growth attributable to
quantity increases, we isolated the change in procurement costs and
the change in procurement quantities for programs over the past 2
years. For those programs with change in procurement quantities, we
calculated the amount attributable to quantity changes as the change
in quantity multiplied by the average procurement unit cost for the
program 2 years ago.
To evaluate program performance according to DOD, OMB, and GAO-
developed metrics, we calculated how many programs had less than a 4
percent increase in total acquisition cost over the past 2 years, less
than a 10 percent increase over the past 5 years, and less than a 15
percent increase from initial estimates using data from December 2009,
December 2007, and December 2004 SARs; acquisition program baselines;
and program offices. For programs that began as non-major defense
acquisition programs, the first full estimate used by GAO as a
baseline may be different than the original baseline contained in DOD
SARs. We also identified 10 of the highest cost programs from the
December 2009 SARs and calculated changes in total costs and program
acquisition unit cost over the past 2 years. We excluded MDA's
Ballistic Missile Defense System from this analysis, because the
program does not report baseline estimates or quantity information in
its annual SAR.
To calculate the amount of cost growth incurred before and after
production start, we identified 56 programs with December 2009 SARs
that had production cost estimates. To determine the average age of
these programs, we calculated the time between program start and
December 2009 for each program. To analyze the cost growth before and
after production, we compared development cost estimates, production
cost estimates, and December 2009 cost estimates for both research and
development and procurement costs and determined the difference
between each estimate for each program. We then calculated the percent
change between development and production estimates, and between
production and current estimates for both development and procurement
costs. Finally, we calculated the average percent change for each
program from development to production and from production to current
estimates to determine the average percent cost growth incurred before
and after production.
Through discussions with DOD officials responsible for the database
and confirming selected data with program offices, we determined that
the SAR data and the information retrieved from DAMIR were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
Analysis of Selected DOD Programs Using Knowledge-Based Criteria:
In total, this report presents information on 71 weapon programs. A
table listing these programs is found in appendix VII. Out of these
programs, 49 are captured in a two-page format discussing technology,
design, and manufacturing knowledge obtained and other program issues.
The remaining 22 programs are described in a one-page format that
describes their current status. We chose these programs based on their
estimated cost, stage in the acquisition process, and congressional
interest. To obtain cost, schedule, technology, design, and
manufacturing information, we asked 49 programs to complete a data-
collection instrument and received responses from all these programs.
In addition, to collect information from major defense acquisition
programs and components of these programs on other program factors
such as requirements changes, configuration steering board activities,
software development, and program office staffing, we asked 44
programs to complete a second electronic questionnaire and received
responses from all these programs from June to November 2010. To
collect data from pre-major defense acquisition programs including
cost and schedule estimates, technology maturity, and planned
implementation of acquisition reforms, we distributed a separate
electronic questionnaire to 54 programs categorized as pre-major
defense acquisition programs as of July 2010. Both questionnaires were
sent by e-mail in an attached Microsoft Word form that respondents
could return electronically. We received responses from June to
November 2010. During the course of our review, we dropped 37 programs
from this analysis, including 19 that were no longer slated to become
major defense acquisition programs, 11 that had not yet begun the
technology development phase, and 7 that had become major defense
acquisition programs or were spinoffs of major defense acquisition
programs. In addition, three programs did not return the
questionnaire. Therefore, our assessment of planned major defense
acquisition programs consists of 14 programs nearing system
development start. To ensure the reliability of the data collected
through our questionnaires, we took a number of steps to reduce
measurement error, nonresponse error, and respondent bias. These steps
included conducting two pretests of each questionnaire by phone prior
to distribution to ensure that our questions were clear, unbiased, and
consistently interpreted; reviewing responses to identify obvious
errors or inconsistencies; conducting follow-up to clarify responses
when needed; and verifying the accuracy of a sample of keypunched
questionnaires.
Our analysis of how well programs are adhering to a knowledge-based
acquisition approach focuses on a subset of 40 major defense
acquisition programs from DOD's fiscal year 2010 portfolio that were
in development or the early stages of production as of June 2010. The
31 programs that are not included in this analysis either do not have
acquisition milestones that line up with development start, critical
design review, and production start or lack key data on technology,
design, and production necessary to assess them against our knowledge-
based acquisition criteria at this point in time.[Footnote 30]
To assess the cost and schedule outcomes for the 40 programs to-date,
we identified programs with cost, schedule, and quantity data at the
first full estimate, generally milestone B--development start--and the
estimate from the December 2009 SAR. Of the programs in our
assessment, 39 had relevant data on research and development costs, 38
had relevant data on procurement costs, and 34 had data on schedules
for delivering initial capabilities. The remaining programs, not
included in this analysis, did not have comparable data. We summed the
first full estimate and the current estimate of both research and
development costs and procurement costs for the programs and
calculated the percentage change between the estimates. The schedule
assessment is calculated two ways--as the average of the change in
months between the first and current estimates for the planned or
actual delivery of initial operational capability and as the average
change in months divided by the first estimate of acquisition cycle
time.
To assess knowledge attainment of programs at critical decision points
(system development start, critical design review, and production
start), we collected data about their knowledge levels at each point.
The data were collected from 40 program offices as of November 2010.
Additional information on product knowledge is found in the product
knowledge assessment section of this appendix. We did not validate the
data provided by the program offices, but reviewed the data and
performed various checks to determine that they were reliable enough
for our purposes. Where we discovered discrepancies, we clarified the
data accordingly. Programs in our assessment were in various stages of
the acquisition cycle, and not all of the programs provided knowledge
information for each point. Programs were not included in our
assessments if relevant decision or knowledge point data were not
available. In addition, because knowledge points differ for
shipbuilding programs, we exclude them from our assessment of certain
knowledge-based practices. In particular, we focused on the 17
programs that entered these key acquisition points since 2009 and
evaluated their adherence to knowledge-based practices. For each
decision point, we summarized knowledge attainment for the number of
programs with data that achieved that knowledge point. Twenty-six
nonship programs provided data on technology maturity at development
start, 1 of which began development since 2009; 29 nonship programs
provided data on design stability at their critical design review, 9
of which held this review since 2009; and 4 programs provided data on
production processes in control at production start, 1 of which began
production since 2009. Our analysis of knowledge attained at each key
point also includes other factors that we have previously identified
as being key to a knowledge-based acquisition approach, including
holding system design reviews early in development, planning for
manufacturing, testing an integrated prototype prior to the design
review, using a reliability growth curve, and testing a production-
representative prototype prior to making a production decision. See
appendix IV for a list of these practices.
For our analysis of requirements changes, we obtained and analyzed
information from 39 programs about the number and effect of
requirements changes since development start. Using this information,
we compared the average percent change in research and development
cost and delay in delivery of an initial operational capability
between programs that had an added or enhanced key performance
parameter; a reduced, deferred, or deleted key performance parameter;
or stable key performance parameters. We also compared the age of
programs that had stable or unstable requirements.
For our analysis of software development, we obtained and analyzed
information from 25 programs related to the number of software lines
of code expected in the final system at development start and
currently, and from 21 programs that collect data on the percentages
of software defects contained in-phase and in subsequent phases. We
also collected data from 40 programs on whether they collected earned
value management data for software development. We calculated whether
the percentage growth in total lines of code correlated with the
percentage growth in research and development costs, as well as
whether the growth in software correlated with percentage delay in
achieving initial operational capabilities. We also compared the total
lines of code expected currently with whether programs are collecting
earned value management data for software development. Finally we
compared the percentage growth in software lines of code with program
age.
For our analysis of program staffing, we analyzed information related
to program office staffing from 44 programs, including 40 major
defense acquisition programs and 4 MDA elements, on the number of
military personnel, civilian government employees, support
contractors, and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and
university-affiliated employees working in the following functions:
program management, business-related functions, contracting,
engineering, administrative support, and other functions. We compared
this information with data collected in prior years. We also collected
information on whether programs had been authorized all positions
requested, whether they had filled those positions, reasons for not
filling positions, and whether they were using support contractors to
make up for shortfalls in government personnel or capabilities.
To determine how DOD has begun to implement acquisition reforms, we
obtained and analyzed the revised DOD 5000.02 acquisition instruction,
the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, and the Directive-
Type Memorandum 09-027 implementing the Act. We analyzed data from the
survey sent to planned major defense acquisition programs in our
assessment to determine how they were implementing requirements for
holding a preliminary design review; developing prototypes; maturing
critical technologies; and considering tradeoffs among cost, schedule,
and performance objectives before development start. We also collected
information on whether these programs are planning to incorporate
competition into their acquisition strategies.[Footnote 31] To
determine how programs were implementing the requirement to hold
configuration steering boards, we analyzed data from the survey sent
to major defense acquisition programs.
We relied on GAO's body of work examining DOD acquisition issues over
the years. In recent years, we have issued reports that identified
systemic problems with major weapon systems acquisitions and we have
made recommendations to DOD on ways to improve how it acquires major
weapon systems. These reports cover contracting, program management,
acquisition policy, cost estimating, budgeting, and requirements
development. We have also issued many detailed reports evaluating
specific weapon systems, such as aircraft programs, ships,
communication systems, satellites, missile defense systems, and future
combat systems. We also used information from numerous GAO products
that examine how commercial best practices can improve outcomes for
DOD programs. This work has shown that valuable lessons can be learned
from the commercial sector and can be applied to the development of
weapon systems.
System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment:
Over the past several years, DOD has revised policies governing weapon
system acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major
acquisition events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more
consistent across the 71 program assessments, we standardized the
terminology for key program events. For most individual programs in
our assessment, "development start" refers to the initiation of an
acquisition program as well as the start of engineering and
manufacturing development. This coincides with DOD's milestone B. A
few programs in our assessment (mostly programs that began before
2001) have a separate "program start" date, which begins a pre-system
development phase for program definition and risk-reduction
activities. This "program start" date generally coincides with DOD's
former terminology for milestone I, followed by a "development start"
date, either DOD's former milestone II or current milestone B
depending on when the program began system development. The
"production decision" generally refers to the decision to enter the
production and deployment phase, typically with low-rate initial
production. The "initial capability" refers to the initial operational
capability--sometimes called first unit equipped of required asset
availability. For shipbuilding programs, the schedule of key program
events in relation to acquisition milestones varies for each program.
Our work on shipbuilding best practices has identified the detailed
design and construction contract award and the start of lead ship
fabrication as the points in the acquisition process roughly
equivalent to development start and design review for other programs.
For MDA programs that do not follow the standard DOD acquisition model
but instead develop systems' capabilities incrementally, we identify
the key technology development efforts that lead to an initial
capability.
For each program we assessed in a two-page format, we present cost,
schedule, and quantity data at the program's first full estimate,
generally milestone B, and an estimate from the program office
reflecting 2010 data where it was available. To assess the cost,
schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we reviewed DOD's SARs
or obtained data directly from the program offices. In general, we
compared the latest available SAR information with a baseline for each
program. For programs that have started product development--those
that are beyond milestone II or B--we compared the latest available
SAR to the development estimate from the first SAR issued after the
program was approved to enter development, or for the planning
estimate if we had a full estimate. For systems not included in the
SARs, we attempted to obtain comparable baseline and current data from
the individual program offices. For MDA systems, for which a baseline
was not available, we do not present a comparison. For the other
programs assessed in a one-page format, we present the latest
available estimate of cost and quantity from the program office.
For each program we assessed, all cost information is presented in
fiscal year 2011 dollars using Office of the Secretary of Defense-
approved deflators to eliminate the effects of inflation. We have
depicted only the program's main elements of acquisition cost--
research and development and procurement. However, the total program
cost also includes military construction and acquisition operation and
maintenance costs. Because of rounding and these additional costs, in
some situations, total cost may not match the exact sum of the
research and development and procurement costs. The program unit costs
are calculated by dividing the total program cost by the total
quantities planned. In some instances, the data were not applicable,
and we annotate this by using the term "not applicable (NA)." The
quantities listed refer to total quantities, including both
procurement and development quantities.
The schedule assessment for each program is based on acquisition cycle
time, defined as the number of months between program start and the
achievement of initial operational capability or an equivalent
fielding date. In some instances the data were not yet available, and
we annotate this by using the term "to be determinded (TBD)" or "NA."
The information presented on the "funding needed to complete" is from
fiscal year 2011 through completion and, unless otherwise noted, draws
on information from SARs or on data from the program office. In some
instances, the data were not available, and we annotate this by the
term "TBD" or "NA." The quantities listed refer only to procurement
quantities. Satellite programs, in particular, produce a large
percentage of their total operations units as development quantities,
which are not included in the quantity figure.
The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate, or
overall, picture of a program's history. These assessments represent
the sum of the federal government's actions on a program, not just
those of the program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of
detailed analyses of changes that attempt to link specific changes
with triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to
make such detailed distinctions.
Product Knowledge Data on Individual Two-Page Assessments:
In our past work examining weapon acquisition issues and best
practices for product development, we have found that leading
commercial firms pursue an acquisition approach that is anchored in
knowledge, whereby high levels of product knowledge are demonstrated
by critical points in the acquisition process. On the basis of this
work, we have identified three key knowledge points during the
acquisition cycle--development start; design review, which occurs
during engineering and manufacturing development; and production
start--at which programs need to demonstrate critical levels of
knowledge to proceed. To assess the product development knowledge of
each program at these key points, we submitted a data-collection
instrument to 49 program offices. We received responses from all 49
programs; however, not every program had responses to each element of
the data-collection instrument. The results are graphically depicted
in each two-page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program
documentation and discussed the information presented on the data-
collection instrument with program officials as necessary.
To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a
tool, referred to as Technology Readiness Levels (TRL), for our
analysis. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally
developed TRLs, and the Army and Air Force science and technology
research organizations use them to determine when technologies are
ready to be handed off from science and technology managers to product
developers. TRLs are measured on a scale from 1 to 9, beginning with
paper studies of a technology's feasibility and culminating with a
technology fully integrated into a completed product. See appendix V
for TRL definitions. Our best practices work has shown that a
technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a technology in a
realistic environment--is the level of technology maturity that
constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program.
[Footnote 32] For shipbuilding programs, we have recommended that this
level of maturity be achieved by the contract award for detailed
design and construction.[Footnote 33] In our assessment, the
technologies that have reached TRL 7, a prototype demonstrated in a
realistic environment, are referred to as mature or fully mature.
Those technologies that have reached TRL 6, a prototype demonstrated
in a relevant environment, are referred to as approaching or nearing
maturity and are assessed at attaining 50 percent of the desired level
of knowledge. Satellite technologies that have achieved TRL 6 are
assessed as fully mature due to the difficulty of demonstrating
maturity in a realistic environment--space.
In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level
of maturity. We sought to clarify the TRLs in those cases where
information existed that raised concerns. If we were to conduct a
detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies assessed,
their readiness levels demonstrated, or both. It was not always
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system
at key decision points after the passage of many years. Where
practicable, we compared technology assessments provided by the
program office to assessments conducted by officials from the Office
of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering.
To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of
our current assessment.[Footnote 34] In most cases, we did not verify
or validate the percentage of engineering drawings provided by the
program office. We clarified the percentage of drawings completed in
those cases where information that raised concerns existed. Completed
drawings were defined as the number of drawings released or deemed
releasable to manufacturing that can be considered the "build to"
drawings. For shipbuilding programs, we asked program officials to
provide the percentage of the 3D product model that had been completed
by the start of lead ship fabrication, and as of our current
assessment.[Footnote 35]
To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available,
to quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those
processes.[Footnote 36] In most cases, we did not verify or validate
the information provided by the program office. We clarified the
number of critical manufacturing processes and the percentage of
statistical process control where information existed that raised
concerns. We used a standard called the Process Capability Index, a
process performance measurement that quantifies how closely a process
is running to its specification limits. The index can be translated
into an expected product defect rate, and we have found it to be a
best practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and rework trends
in those cases where quantifiable statistical control data were
unavailable. We do not assess production maturity for shipbuilding
programs.
Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of
potential risks, by themselves they do not cover all elements of risk
that a program encounters during development, such as funding
instability. Our detailed reviews on individual systems normally
provide a more comprehensive assessment of risk elements.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to March 2011, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs over Time:
Table 4 shows the change in research and development costs,
procurement costs, total acquisition cost, and average delay in
delivering initial operational capability for the Department of
Defense's (DOD) 2010 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs.
The table presents changes that have occurred on these programs in the
last 2 years, the last 5 years, and since their first full cost and
schedule estimates.
Table 4: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs over Time:
Fiscal year 2011 dollars in billions.
Increase in total research and development cost;
Last 2 years: (2008 to 2010): $15 billion; 5 percent;
Last 5 years: (2005 to 2010): $29 billion; 10 percent;
Since first full estimate: (Baseline to 2010): $102 billion; 47
percent.
Increase in total procurement cost;
Last 2 years: (2008 to 2010): $121 billion; 11 percent;
Last 5 years: (2005 to 2010): $186 billion; 18 percent;
Since first full estimate: (Baseline to 2010): $287 billion; 31
percent.
Increase in total acquisition cost;
Last 2 years: (2008 to 2010): $135 billion; 9 percent;
Last 5 years: (2005 to 2010): $217 billion; 16 percent;
Since first full estimate: (Baseline to 2010): $402 billion; 35
percent.
Average delay in delivering initial capabilities;
Last 2 years: (2008 to 2010): 5 months; 8 percent;
Last 5 years: (2005 to 2010): 9 months; 13 percent;
Since first full estimate: (Baseline to 2010): 22 months; 30 percent.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Data were obtained from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports. In
a few cases data were obtained directly from program offices. Not all
programs had comparable cost and schedule data and these programs were
excluded from the analysis where appropriate. Portfolio performance
data do not include costs of developing Missile Defense Agency
elements. Total acquisition cost includes research and development,
procurement, acquisition operation and maintenance, and system-
specific military construction costs.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Current and Baseline Cost Estimates for DOD's 2010
Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs:
Table 5 contains the current and baseline total acquisition cost
estimates (in fiscal year 2011 dollars) for each program or element in
the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2010 major defense acquisition
program portfolio. We excluded elements of the Missile Defense
Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense System because comparable current
and baseline cost estimates were not available. For each program we
show the percent change in total acquisition cost from the program
baseline, as well as over the past 2 years and 5 years.
Table 5: Current Cost Estimates and Baseline Cost Estimates for DOD's
2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs:
Fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions.
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite;
Current total acquisition cost: $12,920;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,277;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 105.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 61.3;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 87.1.
Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System
(ATIRCM/CMWS);
Current total acquisition cost: $4,701;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,362;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 39.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -4.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -1.6.
AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM);
Current total acquisition cost: $1,825;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,577;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 15.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 8.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 11.2.
AH-64D Longbow Apache;
Current total acquisition cost: $14,507;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,041;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 140.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 15.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 38.9.
AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM);
Current total acquisition cost: $23,900;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $10,767;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 122.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 30.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 41.7.
AIM-9X/Air-to-Air Missile;
Current total acquisition cost: $3,589;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,096;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 15.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 7.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 16.2.
Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP)-Baseline;
Current total acquisition cost: $546;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $342;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 59.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): NA;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): NA.
Apache Block III (AB3);
Current total acquisition cost: $10,577;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $7,135;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 48.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 35.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 48.2.
Army Integrated Air & Missile Defense (Army IAMD);
Current total acquisition cost: $4,954;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,954;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 0.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 0.0.
B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 1;
Current total acquisition cost: $619;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $699;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -11.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -8.3;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -11.6.
B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP);
Current total acquisition cost: $1,305;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,319;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -1.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 2.8.
Black Hawk (UH-60M);
Current total acquisition cost: $21,936;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $12,779;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 71.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 16.3.
Block IV Tomahawk (Tactical Tomahawk);
Current total acquisition cost: $6,845;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,085;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 228.3;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 49.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 50.9.
Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems (BFVS) A3 Upgrade;
Current total acquisition cost: $9,670;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,119;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 134.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -5.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 200.4.
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS);
Current total acquisition cost: $13,032;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $12,657;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 3.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 3.0.
C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP);
Current total acquisition cost: $6,053;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,071;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 48.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 9.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 33.3.
C-130J Hercules;
Current total acquisition cost: $15,327;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $935;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 1,539.3;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 22.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 117.4.
C-17A Globemaster III;
Current total acquisition cost: $82,347;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $52,769;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 56.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 9.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 13.9.
C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA);
Current total acquisition cost: $1,966;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,854;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -49.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -49.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -49.0.
C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP);
Current total acquisition cost: $1,320;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,087;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 21.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -11.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 38.3.
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP);
Current total acquisition cost: $7,348;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $10,744;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -31.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -29.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -30.4.
CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F);
Current total acquisition cost: $13,530;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,172;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 326.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 4.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 13.5.
CH-53K--Heavy Lift Replacement;
Current total acquisition cost: $21,902;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $16,311;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 34.3;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 33.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 34.3.
Chemical Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives
(Chem Demil-ACWA);
Current total acquisition cost: $7,935;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,596;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 205.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 8.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 73.0.
Chemical Demilitarization-Chemical Materials Agency (Chem Demil-CMA);
Current total acquisition cost: $28,362;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $15,260;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 85.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -4.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 0.1.
Cobra Judy Replacement (CJR);
Current total acquisition cost: $1,797;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,607;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 11.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 5.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 12.4.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC);
Current total acquisition cost: $5,063;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,897;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 74.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -0.1.
CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier;
Current total acquisition cost: $34,186;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $35,048;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -2.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 12.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 2.9.
CVN-68 Class/Carrier Replacement Program (CVN 77);
Current total acquisition cost: $6,873;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,948;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 15.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -0.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -3.5.
DDG 1000 Destroyer;
Current total acquisition cost: $19,810;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $34,284;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -42.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -29.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 120.6.
DDG 51 Destroyer;
Current total acquisition cost: $94,344;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $14,960;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 530.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 21.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 20.8.
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE);
Current total acquisition cost: $17,831;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $14,535;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 22.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 12.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 21.0.
EA-18G Growler;
Current total acquisition cost: $11,601;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $8,843;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 31.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 32.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 32.3.
EA-6B Improved Capability (ICAP) III;
Current total acquisition cost: $1,187;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,170;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 1.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 1.4.
Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile;
Current total acquisition cost: $2,437;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,706;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -48.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 10.3.
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV);
Current total acquisition cost: $14,044;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $9,019;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 55.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 14.6.
Gray Eagle;
Current total acquisition cost: $4,978;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,000;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 397.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 108.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 397.7.
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet;
Current total acquisition cost: $54,625;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $80,513;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -32.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 7.7.
F-22 Raptor;
Current total acquisition cost: $77,393;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $89,901;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -13.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 2.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 6.8.
F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter);
Current total acquisition cost: $283,674;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $210,558;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 34.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 13.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 23.9.
Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T);
Current total acquisition cost: $3,930;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,141;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 25.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 11.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 25.1.
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV);
Current total acquisition cost: $21,301;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $10,292;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 107.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 19.6.
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2);
Current total acquisition cost: $4,113;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,785;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 47.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 13.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 102.3.
Global Broadcast Service (GBS);
Current total acquisition cost: $1,118;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $567;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 97.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 22.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 28.0.
Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B);
Current total acquisition cost: $13,576;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,312;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 155.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 37.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 92.7.
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS);
Current total acquisition cost: $5,767;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,742;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 231.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -53.8.
H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z);
Current total acquisition cost: $11,866;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,572;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 232.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 37.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 47.3.
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS);
Current total acquisition cost: $2,126;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,297;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -50.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -52.3.
Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT);
Current total acquisition cost: $3,077;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,184;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -3.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -3.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -3.4.
Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) Block 4;
Current total acquisition cost: $692;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $684;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 1.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 1.2.
Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) Blocks 2/3;
Current total acquisition cost: $1,531;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,461;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 4.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 4.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 4.8.
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM);
Current total acquisition cost: $7,201;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,282;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 215.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 23.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 50.5.
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM);
Current total acquisition cost: $6,377;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,367;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 89.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 8.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 3.0.
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV);
Current total acquisition cost: $3,669;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,583;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 2.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 2.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 2.4.
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS);
Current total acquisition cost: $7,378;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,567;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 12.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 7.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 12.4.
Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP);
Current total acquisition cost: $36,375;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $22,792;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 59.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 59.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 59.6.
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS);
Current total acquisition cost: $971;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $997;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -2.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -2.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -2.6.
Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS);
Current total acquisition cost: $5,815;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,670;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 58.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -0.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 2.5.
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Baseline;
Current total acquisition cost: $2,205;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,813;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -21.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -0.6.
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Unitary;
Current total acquisition cost: $3,125;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,015;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -37.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 17.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 9.8.
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radios (GMR);
Current total acquisition cost: $15,868;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $17,165;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -7.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -6.3;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -11.8.
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form
Fit (HMS);
Current total acquisition cost: $4,786;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $9,889;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -51.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 55.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -51.6.
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Network Enterprise Domain (NED);
Current total acquisition cost: $1,995;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $966;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 106.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -3.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 43.1.
Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System (AMF
JTRS);
Current total acquisition cost: $8,212;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $8,033;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 2.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 2.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 2.2.
Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM);
Current total acquisition cost: $454;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $397;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 14.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 14.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 14.4.
Lewis and Clark Class (T-AKE) Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship;
Current total acquisition cost: $6,586;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,205;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 26.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 16.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 35.7.
LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship;
Current total acquisition cost: $6,387;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,133;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 103.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 90.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 103.9.
Light Utility Helicopter (LUH), UH-72A Lakota;
Current total acquisition cost: $1,969;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,784;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 10.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -0.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 10.4.
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS);
Current total acquisition cost: $3,865;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,353;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 185.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 29.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 165.9.
LPD 17 Amphibious Transport Dock;
Current total acquisition cost: $18,361;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $11,539;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 59.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 24.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 39.3.
MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopter;
Current total acquisition cost: $14,340;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,453;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 163.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 16.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 23.5.
MH-60S Fleet Combat Support Helicopter;
Current total acquisition cost: $8,318;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,456;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 140.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 2.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 1.4.
Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP);
Current total acquisition cost: $2,913;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,775;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 5.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 1.1.
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS);
Current total acquisition cost: $6,830;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,622;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 3.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 4.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 14.6.
Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS);
Current total acquisition cost: $2,939;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,284;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 129.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 9.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 21.0.
Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP);
Current total acquisition cost: $1,363;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,770;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -23.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -18.7.
National Airspace System (NAS);
Current total acquisition cost: $1,597;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $855;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 86.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -1.2.
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS);
Current total acquisition cost: $6,309;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,584;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -4.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -43.3;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -13.9.
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA;
Current total acquisition cost: $4,141;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,883;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 6.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 6.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 6.6.
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control;
Current total acquisition cost: $7,361;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,125;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 20.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 0.0.
Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) User Equipment;
Current total acquisition cost: $2,165;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $974;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 122.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -1.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 49.6.
Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT);
Current total acquisition cost: $2,005;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,287;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -12.3;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -12.3.
P-8A Poseidon;
Current total acquisition cost: $32,361;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $30,576;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 5.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 7.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 7.1.
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3);
Current total acquisition cost: $10,768;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,136;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 109.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 8.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 7.2.
PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined Aggregate
Program (CAP) Fire Unit;
Current total acquisition cost: $18,513;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $19,077;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -3.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -0.4.
PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined Aggregate
Program (CAP) Missile;
Current total acquisition cost: $7,677;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $7,179;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 6.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 10.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 9.2.
Predator--Unmanned Aircraft System;
Current total acquisition cost: $3,581;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,579;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 0.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 0.1.
Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System;
Current total acquisition cost: $11,132;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,598;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 328.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 328.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 328.5.
Remote Minehunting System (RMS);
Current total acquisition cost: $1,275;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,420;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -10.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -15.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -10.2.
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile-UGM 133A Trident II (D-5) Missile;
Current total acquisition cost: $51,410;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $50,942;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 0.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 4.4.
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program;
Current total acquisition cost: $15,938;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,521;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 252.6;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 27.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 48.6.
Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block 10;
Current total acquisition cost: $922;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $859;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 7.3;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 7.3;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 7.3.
Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM);
Current total acquisition cost: $6,133;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,616;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 9.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 13.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 12.0.
Stryker Family of Vehicles (Stryker);
Current total acquisition cost: $16,153;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $7,914;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 104.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -1.8;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 42.7.
V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey);
Current total acquisition cost: $56,061;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $39,501;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 41.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -1.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 3.3.
Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV);
Current total acquisition cost: $2,469;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,576;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -4.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 20.9;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -4.2.
Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774);
Current total acquisition cost: $82,193;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $59,550;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 38.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -1.2;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -7.8.
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2;
Current total acquisition cost: $4,738;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,653;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 29.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 29.7;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 29.7.
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3;
Current total acquisition cost: $13,552;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $16,125;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -16.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -16.0;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -16.0.
Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment I;
Current total acquisition cost: $4,006;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,027;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -0.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -0.5;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -0.5.
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS);
Current total acquisition cost: $3,561;
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,175;
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 203.1;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 68.4;
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 75.6.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: Data were obtained from DOD's SARs, acquisition program
baselines, and, in some cases, program offices. NA indicates data were
not available to make the assessment.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Knowledge-Based Acquisition Practices:
GAO's prior work on best product development practices found that
successful programs take steps to gather knowledge that confirms that
their technologies are mature, their designs stable, and their
production processes are in control. Successful product developers
ensure a high level of knowledge is achieved at key junctures in
development. We characterize these junctures as knowledge points. The
Related GAO Products section of this report includes references to the
body of work that helped us identify these practices and apply them as
criteria in weapon system reviews. The following summarizes these
knowledge points and associated key practices.
Knowledge Point 1: Technologies, time, funding, and other resources
match customer needs. Decision to invest in product development:
* Demonstrate technologies to a high readiness level--technology
readiness level 7--to ensure technologies will work in an operational
environment.
* Ensure that requirements for product increment are informed by
preliminary design review using systems engineering process (such as
prototyping of preliminary design).
* Establish cost and schedule estimates for product on the basis of
knowledge from preliminary design using system engineering tools (such
as prototyping of preliminary design).
* Constrain development phase (5 to 6 years or less) for incremental
development.
* Ensure development phase fully funded (programmed in anticipation of
milestone).
* Align program manager tenure to complete development phase.
* Contract strategy that separates system integration and system
demonstration activities.
* Conduct independent cost estimate.
* Conduct independent program assessment.
* Conduct major milestone decision review for development start.
Knowledge Point 2: Design is stable and performs as expected. Decision
to start building and testing production-representative prototypes:
* Complete system critical design review.
* Complete 90 percent of engineering design drawing packages.
* Complete subsystem and system design reviews.
* Demonstrate with system-level integrated prototype that design meets
requirements.
* Complete the failure modes and effects analysis.
* Identify key system characteristics.
* Identify critical manufacturing processes.
* Establish reliability targets and growth plan on the basis of
demonstrated reliability rates of components and subsystems.
* Conduct independent cost estimate.
* Conduct independent program assessment.
* Conduct major milestone decision review to enter system
demonstration.
Knowledge Point 3: Production meets cost, schedule and quality
targets. Decision to produce first units for customer:
* Demonstrate manufacturing processes.
* Build and test production-representative prototypes to demonstrate
product in intended environment.
* Test production-representative prototypes to achieve reliability
goal.
* Collect statistical process control data.
* Demonstrate that critical processes are capable and in statistical
control.
* Conduct independent cost estimate.
* Conduct independent program assessment.
* Conduct major milestone decision review to begin production.
[End of table]
Source: GAO.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Technology Readiness Levels:
Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported;
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research
begins to be translated into applied research and development.
Examples might include paper studies of a technology's basic
properties;
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application
formulated;
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed,
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption.
Examples are still limited to paper studies;
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis);
Demonstration environment: None.
Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical
function and/or characteristic proof of concept;
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the
technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or
representative;
Hardware/software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale
individual components (pieces of subsystem);
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard validation
in laboratory environment;
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to
establish that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low
fidelity" compared to the eventual system. Examples include
integration of "ad hoc" hardware in a laboratory;
Hardware/software: Low-fidelity breadboard. Integration of nonscale
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach
suitable for flight articles;
Demonstration environment: Lab.
Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation
in relevant environment;
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases
significantly. The basic technological components are integrated with
reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be
tested in a simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity"
laboratory integration of components;
Hardware/software: High-fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc).
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of
several components with reasonably realistic support
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality;
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not
form and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies.
Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype
demonstration in a relevant environment;
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity
laboratory environment or in simulated realistic environment;
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be very close to form, fit and
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full
functionality of the subsystem;
Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or limited/
restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment.
Integration of technology is well defined.
Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in a
realistic environment;
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system.
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of
an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in an
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in
a test bed aircraft;
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to
demonstrate full functionality of subsystem;
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative
realistic environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data.
Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight
qualified" through test and demonstration;
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents
the end of true system development. Examples include developmental
test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to
determine if it meets design specifications;
Hardware/software: Flight-qualified hardware;
Demonstration environment: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in
the actual system application.
Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through
successful mission operations;
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form
and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational
test and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last
"bug fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include
using the system under operational mission conditions;
Hardware/software: Actual system in final form;
Demonstration environment: Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in
operational mission conditions.
Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space
Administration data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
March 11, 2011:
Mr. Michael J. Sullivan:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-11-233SP, "Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected
Weapon Programs," dated January 31, 2011 (GAO Code 120920).
While the Department recognizes that program cost growth is a long-
standing and unacceptable tendency, it does not find GAO's methods of
calculating cost growth useful for management purposes. Although the
Draft Report includes the cost and schedule growth metrics developed
cooperatively among DoD, GAO, and OMB, we are concerned that GAO
continues to publish performance metrics using its traditional
methodology of measuring total program cost growth from Milestone B to
the current year. This methodology has serious flaws that AT&L
continues to highlight - cost growth that occurred in the 1990s,
capability upgrades, and quantity increases are all summed
together, producing misleading information. Some examples of
questionable calculation: in the Draft Report:
* The DDG-51 ship program grew in both quantity and capability since
2008, adding 9 ships with more robust missile defense. The Draft
Report includes a program cost growth of almost $17B, making DDG-51
appear to be one of the worst performing programs in the Department.
Yet the quantity increase DoD reports (the 9 ships) accounts for most
of this growth, along with some growth for additional capability to
improve air and anti-missile defense and improve land attack. DoD
considers this program to be very successful.
* The Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle is also
listed in the Draft Report as showing significant cost growth; in
fact, GAO reports it as the third largest contributor to cost growth
over the last two years. Yet the Joint MRAP program is one of the
Department's major acquisition success stories from the conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. During this time, the demand for the MRAP
continued to rise, and in 2007 Secretary Gates declared it the DoD's
highest priority acquisition program. This resulted in a quantity
increase of over 7,000 units and is the sole driver behind GAO's cost
growth calculation for the MRAP. The program remained efficient,
successfully managing the additional quantity and several capability
upgrades, and even experiencing a small decrease in unit costs.
The fact that these "traditional metrics" have been highlighted in
Table 2 and discussed in detail throughout the text is disappointing.
In addition, the Draft Report now gives up to four different cost
growth metrics for each program, making it extremely difficult for
readers to gain a factual understanding of program performance. The
Department again requests that all of GAO's "traditional metrics" be
removed from the Report.
The Draft Report does make an effort to include metrics discussed in
2008 with DoD, OMB, and GAO and we appreciate this. However, these
metrics still do not adequately capture cost growth that results
solely from poor estimating and poor execution as opposed to other
sources including changes in inventory goals and changes in
requirements or capabilities. We again offer to work with GAO to
develop better metrics of cost growth associated with poor estimating
and program execution using unit cost, adjusted for quantity and/or
capability changes unassociated with these problems. Our goal would be
to use the same data and metrics so that all of us better understand
the underlying information being reported for all programs.
To address cost growth where it is real and unacceptable in an era of
constrained budgets, the Department is pursuing an Efficiency
Initiative to manage defense dollars in a manner that is, to quote
Secretary Gates at his May 8, 2010 speech at the Eisenhower Library,
"respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and fiscal
distress." Secretary Carter issued "Better Buying Power" guidance in
September 2010, directing the acquisition workforce to undertake 23
principal actions, organized in five areas, to obtain greater
efficiency and productivity in defense spending.
There is every reason to believe the efficiencies we are seeking can
be realized. It has taken years for excessive costs and unproductive
overhead to creep into our business practices, but over the coming
years we can work them out again.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report.
Technical comments are provided as an enclosure to this letter. My
point of contact for this effort is Ms. Anne Twist, 703-614-5420.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Dr. Nancy L. Spruill:
Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of section]
Appendix VII GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or s [Hyperlink,
sullivanm@gao.gov] ullivanm@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
Principal contributors to this report were Ronald E. Schwenn,
Assistant Director; Raj C. Chitikila; Deanna R. Laufer; Alan D. Rozzi;
and Wendy P. Smythe. Other key contributors included David B. Best,
Maricela Cherveny, Bruce D. Fairbairn, Arthur Gallegos, William R.
Graveline, Kristine R. Hassinger, Michael J. Hesse, Meredith A.
Kimmett, C. James Madar, Stephen P. Marchesani, Jean L. McSween,
Kenneth E. Patton, Charles W. Perdue, W. Kendal Roberts, Rae Ann H.
Sapp, Roxanna T. Sun, Robert S. Swierczek, Bruce H. Thomas, and Karen
S. Zuckerstein.
The following were responsible for individual programs:
System: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite;
Primary staff: Bradley L. Terry.
System: AGM-88 Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM);
Primary staff: Kathryn M. Edelman, Grant M. Sutton.
System: Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR);
Primary staff: Molly W. Traci.
System: Apache Block III (AB3);
Primary staff: Helena Brink.
System: Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Army IAMD);
Primary staff: Carol T. Mebane, Ryan D. Stott.
System: B-2 Defensive Management System (DMS) Modernization;
Primary staff: Matthew P. Lea, Sean D. Merrill.
System: B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability,
Increment 1;
Primary staff: Sean D. Merrill, Don M. Springman.
System: B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability,
Increment 2;
Primary staff: Don M. Springman, Sean D. Merrill.
System: BMDS: Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB);
Primary staff: LaTonya D. Miller.
System: BMDS: Flexible Target Family (FTF);
Primary staff: Ivy G. Hubler, Teague A. Lyons.
System: BMDS: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD);
Primary staff: Steven B. Stern, Rebecca Guerrero.
System: BMDS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD);
Primary staff: Meredith A. Kimmett, Brian A. Tittle.
System: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft
System (UAS);
Primary staff: W. William Russell, Jodi G. Munson.
System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP);
Primary staff: Lauren M. Heft, Kathy Hubbell.
System: C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA);
Primary staff: Andrew H. Redd.
System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP);
Primary staff: Cheryl K. Andrew, Megan L. Hill.
System: CH-53K - Heavy Lift Replacement;
Primary staff: Marvin E. Bonner, Robert K. Miller.
System: CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier;
Primary staff: W. Kendal Roberts, Robert P. Bullock.
System: DDG 1000 Destroyer;
Primary staff: Deanna R. Laufer, W. Kendal Roberts.
System: DDG 51 Destroyer;
Primary staff: Molly W. Traci.
System: Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS);
Primary staff: Maricela Cherveny.
System: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE);
Primary staff: Jeffrey L. Hartnett, Teague A. Lyons.
System: Enhanced Polar System (EPS);
Primary staff: Bradley L. Terry.
System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile;
Primary staff: Wendy P. Smythe.
System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV);
Primary staff: Jerry W. Clark, MacKenzie H. Cooper.
System: F-22A Raptor;
Primary staff: Andrew H. Redd, Michael W. Aiken.
System: F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter);
Primary staff: Charlie Shivers, LeAnna Parkey.
System: Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T);
Primary staff: Scott Purdy, Alexandra K. Dew.
System: Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B);
Primary staff: Laura Jezewski, Travis J. Masters.
System: Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA;
Primary staff: Laura T. Holliday, Laura Hook, Sigrid McGinty.
System: GPS III OCX Ground Control Segment;
Primary staff: Arturo Holguin, Jr.
System: Gray Eagle;
Primary staff: Tana M. Davis.
System: H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z);
Primary staff: Stephen V. Marchesani.
System: Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT);
Primary staff: Marcus C. Ferguson, Tana M. Davis.
System: Intelligent Munitions System-Scorpion;
Primary staff: Wendy P. Smythe, John S. Warren.
System: Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM);
Primary staff: Carrie W. Rogers.
System: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM);
Primary staff: John W. Crawford, Michael J. Hesse.
System: Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV);
Primary staff: J. Kristopher Keener, Erin E. Preston.
System: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted
Sensor System (JLENS);
Primary staff: John M. Ortiz.
System: Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV);
Primary staff: Danny G. Owens, Dayna L. Foster.
System: Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS);
Primary staff: W. Kendal Roberts.
System: Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio
System (AMF JTRS);
Primary staff: Paul G. Williams.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radios (GMR);
Primary staff: Nathan A. Tranquilli, Ridge C. Bowman.
System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and
Small Form Fit (HMS);
Primary staff: Nathan A. Tranquilli, Ridge C. Bowman.
System: KC-X Program;
Primary staff: Wendell K. Hudson, Mary Jo Lewnard.
System: LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA 6);
Primary staff: Celina F. Davidson.
System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS);
Primary staff: John P. Dell'Osso, Christopher R. Durbin.
System: Littoral Combat Ship-Mission Modules;
Primary staff: Gwyneth B. Woolwine, Jeremy Hawk, Christopher R. Durbin.
System: Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform;
Primary staff: Erin E. Preston, J. Kristopher Keener.
System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS);
Primary staff: Richard Y. Horiuchi.
System: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite
System (NPOESS);
Primary staff: Suzanne Sterling.
System: Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT);
Primary staff: Lisa P. Gardner.
System: Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Aircraft Carrier Demonstration
(UCAS-D);
Primary staff: Julie C. Hadley, Travis J. Masters.
System: Nett Warrior Increment 1;
Primary staff: William C. Allbritton.
System: Ohio-Class Replacement (OR)/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent;
Primary staff: Alan D. Rozzi, C. James Madar.
System: P-8A Poseidon;
Primary staff: Heather L. Miller, Jacob L. Beier.
System: PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined
Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit;
Primary staff: Ryan D. Stott, Carol T. Mebane.
System: Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System;
Primary staff: Rae Ann H. Sapp.
System: Ship to Shore Connector (SSC);
Primary staff: Meghan Hardy, Kelly Bradley.
System: Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II;
Primary staff: Michael J. Hesse.
System: Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program;
Primary staff: Claire Buck.
System: Space Fence;
Primary staff: Peter E. Zwanzig.
System: Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM);
Primary staff: Angie Nichols-Friedman, Deanna R. Laufer.
System: Stryker Modernization (SMOD);
Primary staff: Andrea M. Bivens, Wendy P. Smythe.
System: Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR);
Primary staff: Anne McDonough-Hughes, Amy Moran Lowe.
System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey);
Primary staff: Bonita P. Oden, Jerry W. Clark.
System: Presidential Helicopter (VXX);
Primary staff: J. Andrew Walker, Michael W. Aiken.
System: Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(VTUAV);
Primary staff: Leigh Ann Nally.
System: Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774);
Primary staff: C. James Madar, Alan D. Rozzi.
System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2;
Primary staff: James P. Tallon.
System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3;
Primary staff: James P. Tallon.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Defense Acquisitions: Observations on Weapon Program Performance and
Acquisition Reforms. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-
706T]. Washington, D.C: May 19, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning and
Executing Stable Weapon Programs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-522]. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2010.
Best Practices: DOD Can Achieve Better Outcomes by Standardizing the
Way Manufacturing Risks Are Managed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-439]. Washington, D.C: April 22,
2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 30, 2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Many Analyses of Alternatives Have Not Provided
a Robust Assessment of Weapon System Options. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-665]. Washington, D.C.: September
24, 2009.
Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate
Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322]. Washington, D.C.: May 13,
2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Lasting Reform.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-663T. Washington, D.C.:
April 30, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's Weapon Programs
Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T]. Washington, D.C.: April 1,
2009.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Must Balance Its Needs with Available
Resources and Follow an Incremental Approach to Acquiring Weapon
Systems. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-431T].
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2009.
GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 2,
2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Perspectives on Potential Changes to Department
of Defense Acquisition Management Framework. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-295R]. Washington, D.C.: February
27, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination Process Has Not
Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060]. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2008.
Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve
Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619]. Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2008.
Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed
to Improve DOD's Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-294]. Washington, D.C.:
February 1, 2008.
Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon
System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-388]. Washington, D.C.:
March 30, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost
and Schedule Problems under DOD's Revised Policy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-368]. Washington, D.C.: April 14,
2006.
Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers
Needed to Improve Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-110]. Washington, D.C.: November
30, 2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to
Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-393]. Washington, D.C.: March 1,
2004.
Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-57]. Washington, D.C.: February 11,
2003.
Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701]. Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002.
Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-288]. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
2001.
Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better
Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-199]. Washington, D.C.: July
31, 2000.
Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can
Improve Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162]. Washington, D.C.: July
30, 1999.
Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires
Changes in DOD's Environment. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-56]. Washington, D.C.:
February 24, 1998.
Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer
Improvements for DOD. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-96-162]. Washington, D.C.:
August 26, 1996.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16,
2011).
[2] See Explanatory Statement, 154 Cong. Rec. H 9427, 9526 (daily ed.,
Sept. 24, 2008), to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act
Fiscal Year 2009, contained in Division C of the Consolidated
Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act,
2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329.
[3] Major defense acquisition programs are those identified by DOD
that require eventual total research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures, including all planned increments, of
more than $365 million, or procurement expenditures, including all
planned increments, of more than $2.19 billion, in fiscal year 2000
constant dollars.
[4] All dollar figures are in fiscal year 2011 constant dollars unless
otherwise noted.
[5] The 13 programs that have left the portfolio include the Advanced
Deployable System (AN/WQR-3), Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, Defense
Integrated Military Human Resources System, Extended Range Munition,
Future Combat System, Advanced Anti-Tank Weapon System-Medium
(Javelin), Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program, Mission
Planning System, Small Diameter Bomb Increment 1, Ship Self Defense
System, Ohio Class SSGN Conversion, T-45TS Naval Undergraduate Jet
Flight Training System (Goshawk), and Presidential Helicopter
Replacement (VH-71) Program.
[6] The 15 programs that have entered the portfolio include the
Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload-Baseline, Army Integrated Air
and Missile Defense, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned
Aircraft System, C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft, EA-6B Improved Capability
III, Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System, Global Positioning System
IIIA, Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Integrated
Defensive Electronic Countermeasures, Joint High Speed Vessel, Joint
Precision Approach and Landing System, Airborne and Maritime/Fixed
Station Joint Tactical Radio System, Predator Unmanned Aircraft
System, Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System, and Warfighter Information
Network-Tactical Increment 3. Not all of these programs are new
starts. Several began as acquisition category II programs before
growing in cost.
[7] We chose a 2-year period instead of a 1-year period because DOD
did not issue annual, comprehensive Selected Acquisition Reports in
December 2008.
[8] DOD, OMB, and GAO agreed upon outcome metrics designed to evaluate
program performance by measuring acquisition cost growth over the last
year, the last 5 years, and since their original program estimate.
[9] Appendix II includes 5-year and baseline estimate comparisons for
the overall 2010 portfolio.
[10] Programs that increased quantities had $87 billion in cost growth
attributable to those increased purchases and programs that reduced
quantities had $22 billion in cost decreases attributable to those
reduced purchases. To calculate the portion of the procurement cost
growth attributable to quantity changes, we compared a program's
average procurement unit cost from December 2007 with its average
procurement unit cost from December 2009. When quantities changed, we
multiplied the change by the previous average procurement unit cost to
determine the cost growth due to these quantity changes. See appendix
I for additional information on our scope and methodology.
[11] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported
by Knowledge-Based F-22A and JSF Business Cases, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-487T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16,
2006); Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program
Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-48] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31,
2003); and Defense Acquisitions: Space System Acquisition Risks and
Keys to Addressing Them, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-776R] (Washington, D.C.: June 1,
2006).
[12] These metrics are designed to capture total cost growth
performance over 1-year and 5-year periods and from the original
program estimate. We modified these metrics to measure a 2-year
comparison since cost data were not available to make a 1-year
comparison.
[13] The original estimates we used are primarily programs' cost
estimates at development start. These may differ from DOD baseline
estimates used for Nunn-McCurdy cost growth purposes, which can be
reset after a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold.
[14] Program acquisition unit cost is the total cost for development,
procurement, acquisition operation and maintenance, and system-
specific military construction for the acquisition program divided by
the number of items to be produced. DOD's 2010 portfolio includes 98
programs with SARs; however, DOD's SAR summary tables break down
several of these programs into smaller elements. We did not include
the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense System
because comparable cost and schedule data were not available, or the
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System,
because quantities were reduced to zero.
[15] We calculated the effect on DOD's buying power from a program by
multiplying the change in the program acquisition unit cost by the
current planned quantities.
[16] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009).
[17] In addition to data from 40 major defense acquisition programs,
our analysis of program staffing includes data from four MDA elements.
[18] We reported last year that 49 percent of program office staff
were government personnel. The program offices we collected data from
differ year to year. However, in both years, we focused on programs
that were in development or the early stages of production.
[19] GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development
Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162] (Washington, D.C.: July
30, 1999); Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will
Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-288] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8,
2001); Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge
Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701] (Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002); Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could
Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619] (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2008); Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points
Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322] (Washington, D.C.:
May 13, 2009); Best Practices: DOD Can Achieve Better Outcomes by
Standardizing the Way Manufacturing Risks Are Managed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-439] (Washington, D.C: Apr. 22,
2010).
[20] Not all programs provided information for every knowledge point
or had reached all of the knowledge points--development start, design
review, and production start. Because knowledge points differ for
shipbuilding programs, we exclude them from our assessment of certain
knowledge-based practices. Appendix IV contains a list of knowledge-
based practices at each of the three knowledge points.
[21] According to DOD policy, in order to be considered mature enough
to use in product development, technology shall have been demonstrated
in a relevant environment or, preferably, in an operational
environment. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of
the Defense Acquisition System, enc. 2, para. 5.d.(4) (Dec. 8, 2008).
In addition, a major defense acquisition program may not receive
milestone B approval until the milestone decision authority certifies
that the technology in the program has been demonstrated in a relevant
environment. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 801 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §
2366b(a)(3)(D)).
[22] Demonstration in a relevant environment is Technology Readiness
Level (TRL) 6. Demonstration in a realistic environment is TRL 7. See
appendix V for a detailed description of TRLs.
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]. A major
defense acquisition program may not receive milestone B approval until
the program has held a preliminary design review and the milestone
decision authority has conducted a formal postpreliminary design
review assessment and certified on the basis of such assessment that
the program demonstrates a high likelihood of accomplishing its
intended mission. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-23, § 205(a)(3) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2366b(a)(2)). IAMD
received a waiver from this requirement.
[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619].
[25] DOD policy states that the knowledge required for a major defense
acquisition program to proceed beyond low-rate initial production
shall include demonstrated control of the manufacturing process and
acceptable reliability, the collection of statistical process control
data, and demonstrated control and capability of critical processes.
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System, enc. 2, para. 7.c.(2) (Dec. 8, 2008). Since we
focus on the low-rate production decision, we did not specifically
assess compliance with this requirement.
[26] We refer to DOD's designated pre-major defense acquisition
programs (pre-MDAPs) as planned programs throughout this report.
[27] The Common Vertical Lift Support Platform program does not plan
to hold a preliminary design review because the program is planning to
enter the acquisition cycle at production start.
[28] According to DOD acquisition policy, the technology development
strategy for a major defense acquisition program shall provide for
prototypes of the system or, if a system prototype is not feasible,
for prototypes of critical subsystems before the program gets approval
to enter development. Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027--
Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009,
attachment 1, para. 4 (Dec. 4, 2009).
[29] DAMIR Purview is an executive information system operated by the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics/Acquisition Resources and Analysis.
[30] The 31 programs in our assessment that are not covered in this
analysis include: 18 planned major defense acquisition programs, 4 MDA
elements, 4 programs that are well into production, 1 component within
a major defense acquisition program, 1 program that is based on a
commercially-derived aircraft, 2 programs that were canceled, and 1
technology development program.
[31] The DOD and statutory requirement is that the acquisition
strategy for each major defense acquisition program include measures
to ensure competition, or the option of competition, throughout the
life cycle of the program. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-23, § 202; Under Secretary of Defense,
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM)
09-027--Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of
2009, attachment 1, para. 2 (Dec. 4, 2009). The survey question with
respect to this requirement read "Does the acquisition strategy call
for competition post-Milestone B." When programs answered "no" to the
question, GAO interpreted that answer to mean that the program is not
planning to incorporate into the acquisition strategy competition, or
the option of competition, after development start.
[32] GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development
Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162] (Washington, D.C.: July
30, 1999); Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will
Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-288] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8,
2001).
[33] GAO, Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points
Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322] (Washington, D.C.:
May 13, 2009).
[34] GAO, Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge
Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701] (Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2002).
[35] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322].
[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701].
[End of section]
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