Joint Strike Fighter
Restructuring Should Improve Outcomes, but Progress Is Still Lagging Overall Gao ID: GAO-11-450T March 15, 2011The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical for recapitalizing tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very large annual funding outlays. The estimated total investment cost is currently about $385 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft. Because of a history of relatively poor cost and schedule outcomes, defense leadership over the past year has directed a comprehensive restructuring of the JSF program that is continuing. This testimony draws substantially from our extensive body of work on the JSF, including the current annual review mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 244 (2009). Our draft report is being reviewed by the Department and we expect to issue it early next month. That report and this testimony discusses (1) program cost and schedule changes and their implications on affordability; (2) progress made during 2010; (3) design and manufacturing maturity; and (4) test plans and progress. GAO's work included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews with defense and contractor officials.
DOD continues to restructure the JSF program, taking positive, substantial actions that should lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences--higher up-front development costs, fewer aircraft bought in the near term, training delays, and extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to warfighters. Total development funding is now estimated at $56.4 billion to complete in 2018, a 26 percent cost increase and a 5-year schedule slip from the current baseline. DOD also reduced procurement quantities by 246 aircraft through 2016, but has not calculated the net effects of restructuring on total procurement costs nor approved a new baseline. Affordability for the U.S. and partners is challenged by a near doubling in average unit prices since program start and higher estimated life-cycle costs. Going forward, the JSF requires unprecedented funding levels in a period of more austere defense budgets. The program had mixed success in 2010, achieving 6 of 12 major goals and progressing in varying degrees on the rest. Successes included the first flight of the carrier variant, award of a fixed-price aircraft procurement contract, and an accelerated pace in development flight tests that accomplished three times as many flights in 2010 as the previous 3 years combined. However, the program did not deliver as many aircraft to test and training sites as planned and made only a partial release of software capabilities. The short takeoff and landing (STOVL) variant had significant technical problems and deficient flight test performance. DOD directed a 2-year period to evaluate and engineer STOVL solutions. After more than 9 years in development and 4 in production, the JSF program has not fully demonstrated that the aircraft design is stable, manufacturing processes are mature, and the system is reliable. Engineering drawings are still being released to the manufacturing floor and design changes continue at higher rates than desired. More changes are expected as testing accelerates. Test and production aircraft cost more and are taking longer to deliver than expected. Manufacturers are improving operations and implemented 8 of 20 recommendations from an expert panel, but have not yet demonstrated a capacity to efficiently produce at higher production rates. Substantial improvements in factory throughput and the global supply chain are needed. Development testing is still early in demonstrating that aircraft will work as intended and meet warfighter requirements. About 4 percent of JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results, or both. Only 3 of the extensive network of 32 ground test labs and simulation models are fully accredited to ensure the fidelity of results. Software development--essential for achieving about 80 percent of the JSF functionality--is significantly behind schedule as it enters its most challenging phase.
GAO-11-450T, Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Should Improve Outcomes, but Progress Is Still Lagging Overall
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 11:30 a.m. EST:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011:
Joint Strike Fighter:
Restructuring Should Improve Outcomes, but Progress Is Still Lagging
Overall:
Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-11-450T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-450T, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is
the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft
acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three
aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight
international partners. The JSF is critical for recapitalizing
tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very
large annual funding outlays. The estimated total investment cost is
currently about $385 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft.
Because of a history of relatively poor cost and schedule outcomes,
defense leadership over the past year has directed a comprehensive
restructuring of the JSF program that is continuing.
This testimony draws substantially from our extensive body of work on
the JSF, including the current annual review mandated in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 §
244 (2009). Our draft report is being reviewed by the Department and
we expect to issue it early next month. That report and this testimony
discusses (1) program cost and schedule changes and their implications
on affordability; (2) progress made during 2010; (3) design and
manufacturing maturity; and (4) test plans and progress. GAO‘s work
included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews
with defense and contractor officials.
What GAO Found:
DOD continues to restructure the JSF program, taking positive,
substantial actions that should lead to more achievable and
predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences”higher up-front
development costs, fewer aircraft bought in the near term, training
delays, and extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to
warfighters. Total development funding is now estimated at $56.4
billion to complete in 2018, a 26 percent cost increase and a 5-year
schedule slip from the current baseline. DOD also reduced procurement
quantities by 246 aircraft through 2016, but has not calculated the
net effects of restructuring on total procurement costs nor approved a
new baseline. Affordability for the U.S. and partners is challenged by
a near doubling in average unit prices since program start and higher
estimated life-cycle costs. Going forward, the JSF requires
unprecedented funding levels in a period of more austere defense
budgets.
The program had mixed success in 2010, achieving 6 of 12 major goals
and progressing in varying degrees on the rest. Successes included the
first flight of the carrier variant, award of a fixed-price aircraft
procurement contract, and an accelerated pace in development flight
tests that accomplished three times as many flights in 2010 as the
previous 3 years combined. However, the program did not deliver as
many aircraft to test and training sites as planned and made only a
partial release of software capabilities. The short takeoff and
landing (STOVL) variant had significant technical problems and
deficient flight test performance. DOD directed a 2-year period to
evaluate and engineer STOVL solutions.
After more than 9 years in development and 4 in production, the JSF
program has not fully demonstrated that the aircraft design is stable,
manufacturing processes are mature, and the system is reliable.
Engineering drawings are still being released to the manufacturing
floor and design changes continue at higher rates than desired. More
changes are expected as testing accelerates. Test and production
aircraft cost more and are taking longer to deliver than expected.
Manufacturers are improving operations and implemented 8 of 20
recommendations from an expert panel, but have not yet demonstrated a
capacity to efficiently produce at higher production rates.
Substantial improvements in factory throughput and the global supply
chain are needed.
Development testing is still early in demonstrating that aircraft will
work as intended and meet warfighter requirements. About 4 percent of
JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab
results, or both. Only 3 of the extensive network of 32 ground test
labs and simulation models are fully accredited to ensure the fidelity
of results. Software development”essential for achieving about 80
percent of the JSF functionality”is significantly behind schedule as
it enters its most challenging phase.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-450T] or key
components. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202)
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and members of the Tactical
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the F-35
Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The JSF is
the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft
acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three
aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight
international partners. The JSF is the core of DOD's long-term
tactical aircraft recapitalization plans as it is intended to replace
hundreds of legacy aircraft. Total planned U.S. investment in JSF is
now about $385 billion to develop and acquire 2,457 aircraft through
2035. With such a substantial funding commitment amidst pressing
warfighter requirements for this next generation capability, DOD has
lately recognized numerous technical, financial, and management
shortcomings and continues to significantly restructure the program,
adding more time and money and making other changes that we support.
GAO has reported on the JSF acquisition program for a number of years.
Our March 2010 report[Footnote 1] discussed additional cost and
schedule pressures, unsatisfactory performance in manufacturing and
delivering aircraft, and concerns about not meeting warfighter
requirements on time and in quantity. We concluded that DOD's plans to
restructure the JSF program, just announced before our report was
issued, were well-founded, if overdue. Also in March 2010, the
Department declared that the program experienced a breach of the
critical cost growth statutory threshold and subsequently certified to
Congress in June 2010 that the JSF program should continue.[Footnote
2] Appendix I summarizes the evolution of JSF cost and schedule
estimates at key junctures in its acquisition history through the Nunn-
McCurdy certification. Since then, in January 2011, the Secretary of
Defense announced additional development cost increases and further
changes consequent to the ongoing restructure, but has not yet
established a new approved acquisition program baseline.
My comments today are focused largely on our latest review. Our draft
report is with DOD for comment and we expect to issue it early next
month. This will be the second annual JSF report under our current
mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010.[Footnote 3] For our latest report, we (1) evaluated program cost
and schedule changes and their implications on affordability; (2)
identified progress made in 2010 against established goals; (3)
assessed elements of design stability and manufacturing maturity and
reviewed production results; and (4) reported the status of
development testing and technical challenges facing the program. To
conduct this work, we evaluated DOD's restructuring actions and
impacts on the program, tracked cost and schedule changes, and
determined factors driving the changes. We reviewed program status
reports, manufacturing data, test plans, and internal DOD analyses. We
discussed results to date and future plans to complete JSF development
and move further into procurement with officials from DOD, the JSF
program office, contractor officials, and members of the independent
review teams. We toured aircraft and engine manufacturing plants,
obtained production and supply performance indicators, and discussed
improvements underway with contractors. We conducted this performance
audit from May 2010 to March 2011 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
JSF Restructuring Improves Program, but Affordability Is Challenged by
Rising Costs and Delays:
Over the past year, DOD has substantially restructured the JSF
program, taking positive actions that should lead to more achievable
and predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences--higher
development costs, fewer aircraft in the near term, training delays,
and extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to
warfighters. Key restructuring changes include the following:
* The total system development cost estimate rose to $56.4 billion and
its schedule was extended to 2018. This represents a 26 percent
increase in cost and a 5-year slip in schedule compared to the current
approved program baseline established in 2007.
* Resources and time were added to development testing. Testing plans
were made more robust by adding another development test aircraft and
the use of several production aircraft; increasing the number of test
flights by one-third; extending development testing to 2016; and
reducing its overlap with initial operational testing.
* Near-term procurement quantities were reduced by 246 aircraft
through 2016; the annual rate of increase in production was lowered;
and the full-rate production decision moved to 2018, a 5-year slip
from the current baseline.
* The military services were directed to reexamine their initial
operational capability (IOC) requirements, the critical need dates
when the warfighter must have in place the first increment of
operational forces available for combat. We expect the Marine Corps'
IOC will slip significantly from its current 2012 date and that the
Air Force's and Navy's IOC dates will also slip from the current dates
in 2016.
* To address technical problems and test deficiencies for the short
takeoff and landing (STOVL) variant, the Department significantly
scaled back its procurement quantities and directed a 2-year period
for evaluating and engineering technical solutions to inform future
decisions on this variant. DOD also "decoupled" STOVL testing from the
other two variants so as not to delay them and to allow all three to
proceed at their own speeds.
The fiscal year 2012 Defense Budget reflects the financial effects
from restructuring actions through fiscal year 2016. The net effect
was increased development funding and decreased procurement funding in
the near term. For example, compared to last year's estimate for the
same year, DOD for fiscal year 2012 requested an increase of $520
million for JSF development and a decrease of $2.6 billion for
procurement, reflecting the reduction of 13 aircraft and associated
spares. Table 1 summarizes the revised procurement funding
requirements and annual quantities during this 5-year period following
the Secretary's reductions. Even after decreasing annual quantities
and lowering the production rate of increase, JSF procurement still
escalates significantly. Annual procurement funding levels more than
double and quantities more than triple during this period. These
numbers do not include the additional orders expected from the
international partners.
Table 1: JSF Procurement Funding and Quantities Requested in the
Fiscal Year 2012 Defense Budget:
Air Force:
2012: $3.8 billion;
2013: $4.1 billion;
2014: $5.6 billion;
2015: $6.5 billion;
2016: $8.5 billion;
Total: $28.5 billion.
Navy:
2012: $1.8 billion;
2013: $2.5 billion;
2014: $2.8 billion;
2015: $3.3 billion;
2016: $2.9 billion;
Total: $13.2 billion.
Marine Corps:
2012: $1.3 billion;
2013: $1.3 billion;
2014: $1.4 billion;
2015: $2.0 billion;
2016: $2.9 billion;
Total: $9.0 billion.
U.S. total:
2012: $6.9 billion;
2013: $7.9 billion;
2014: $9.8 billion;
2015: $11.8 billion;
2016: $14.3 billion;
Total: $50.7 billion.
Procurement Quantities:
Air Force:
2012: 19;
2013: 24;
2014: 40;
2015: 50;
2016: 70;
Total: 203.
Navy:
2012: 7;
2013: 12;
2014: 14;
2015: 19;
2016: 20;
Total: 72.
Marine Corps:
2012: 6;
2013: 6;
2014: 8;
2015: 12;
2016: 18;
Total: 50.
U.S. total:
2012: 32;
2013: 42;
2014: 62;
2015: 81;
2016: 108;
Total: 325.
Source: GAO analysis of fiscal year 2012 President's Budget.
[End of table]
DOD does not yet know the full impact from restructuring actions on
future procurement funding requirements beyond this 5-year period.
Cost analysts are still calculating the net effects from deferring the
near-term procurement of 246 aircraft to future years and from
lowering the annual rate of increased procurement. After a Nunn-
McCurdy breach of the critical cost growth threshold and DOD
certification, the most recent milestone must be rescinded, the
program restructured to address the cause of the breach, and a new
acquisition program baseline must be approved that reflects the
certification approved by the milestone decision authority. The
Secretary has not yet granted new milestone B approval for the JSF nor
approved a new acquisition program baseline. Future funding
requirements could be higher than projected and the quantities, which
are considered affordable by the U.S. and allies, could be reduced,
further driving up unit costs.
Affordability--in terms of the investment costs to acquire the JSF,
the continuing costs to operate and maintain it over the life-cycle,
and its impact on other defense programs--is a challenging issue.
Including the funding added by the restructuring actions, system
development cost estimates have increased 64 percent since program
start. (App. II summarizes the increases in target prices on
development contracts, and major cost drivers contributing to
increased system development funding requirements.) Also, the
estimated average unit procurement price for the JSF has about doubled
since program start and current forecasts indicate that life-cycle
costs will be substantially higher than the legacy aircraft it
replaces. Rising JSF costs erode buying power and may make it
difficult for the U.S. and its allies to buy and sustain as many
aircraft as planned.
Going forward, the JSF will require unprecedented demands for funding
in a period of more austere defense budgets where it will have to
annually compete with other defense and nondefense priorities for the
discretionary federal dollar. Figure 1 illustrates the substantive
annual development and procurement funding requirements--almost $11
billion on average through program completion in 2035. This reflects
the program's estimate at the time of the fiscal year 2011 budget
submission. These funding levels do not include additional funding
increases pursuant to the June 2010 Nunn-McCurdy certification nor
funding changes in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. As discussed
earlier, defense cost analysts are still computing the long-term
procurement funding requirements reflecting the deferral of aircraft
to future years.
Figure 1: JSF Annual Development and Procurement Funding Requirements
(April 2010 Estimate):
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 1994;
Funding requirements: $0.03 billion.
Fiscal year: 1995;
Funding requirements: $0.18 billion.
Fiscal year: 1996;
Funding requirements: $0.21 billion.
Fiscal year: 1997;
Funding requirements: $0.63 billion.
Fiscal year: 1998;
Funding requirements: $0.99 billion.
Fiscal year: 1999;
Funding requirements: $0.98 billion.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Funding requirements: $0.52 billion.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Funding requirements: $0.68 billion.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Funding requirements: $1.74 billion.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Funding requirements: $3.68 billion.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Funding requirements: $4.66 billion.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Funding requirements: $4.93 billion.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Funding requirements: $5.37 billion.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Funding requirements: $5.60 billion.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Funding requirements: $7.14 billion.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Funding requirements: $7.31 billion.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Funding requirements: $11.41 billion.
[Through FY 2010: $56.1 billion]
Fiscal year: 2011;
Funding requirements: $11.90 billion.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Funding requirements: $12.11 billion.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Funding requirements: $14.12 billion.
Fiscal year: 2014;
Funding requirements: $14.33 billion.
Fiscal year: 2015;
Funding requirements: $14.66 billion.
Fiscal year: 2016;
Funding requirements: $13.52 billion.
Fiscal year: 2017;
Funding requirements: $13.46 billion.
Fiscal year: 2018;
Funding requirements: $13.03 billion.
Fiscal year: 2019;
Funding requirements: $12.91 billion.
Fiscal year: 2020;
Funding requirements: $12.92 billion.
Fiscal year: 2021;
Funding requirements: $13.02 billion.
Fiscal year: 2022;
Funding requirements: $13.05 billion.
Fiscal year: 2023;
Funding requirements: $12.87 billion.
Fiscal year: 2024;
Funding requirements: $11.67 billion.
Fiscal year: 2025;
Funding requirements: $10.51 billion.
Fiscal year: 2026;
Funding requirements: $10.16 billion.
Fiscal year: 2027;
Funding requirements: $8.21 billion.
Fiscal year: 2028;
Funding requirements: $8.33 billion.
Fiscal year: 2029;
Funding requirements: $8.33 billion.
Fiscal year: 2030;
Funding requirements: $8.20 billion.
Fiscal year: 2031;
Funding requirements: $8.25 billion.
Fiscal year: 2032;
Funding requirements: $8.36 billion.
Fiscal year: 2033;
Funding requirements: $8.46 billion.
Fiscal year: 2034;
Funding requirements: $7.85 billion.
Fiscal year: 2035;
Funding requirements: $1.94 billion.
[FY 2011 through FY 2035: $272.2 billion]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Progress In Achieving the JSF Program's 2010 Goals Was Mixed:
The JSF program established 12 clearly stated goals in testing,
contracting, and manufacturing for completion in calendar year 2010.
It had mixed success, achieving 6 goals and making varying degrees of
progress on the other 6. For example, the program exceeded its goal
for the number of development flight tests but did not deliver as many
test and production aircraft as planned. Also, the program awarded its
first fixed-price contract on its fourth lot of production aircraft,
but did not award the fixed-price engine contract in 2010 as planned.
Table 2 summarizes JSF goals and accomplishments for 2010.
Table 2: JSF Progress on Stated Goals for 2010:
Key event: Complete 400 development flight tests;
Achieved in 2010: Yes;
Status: Completed 410 test flights.
Key event: First vertical landing of STOVL variant;
Achieved in 2010: Yes;
Status: Achieved March 2010.
Key event: Carrier variant first flight;
Achieved in 2010: Yes;
Status: Achieved June 2010.
Key event: Autonomic logistic information system is operational;
Achieved in 2010: Yes;
Status: Began limited operations July 2010.
Key event: Training for 125 maintenance personnel completed;
Achieved in 2010: Yes;
Status: Trained 138 maintenance personnel.
Key event: Award contract for fourth aircraft production lot;
Achieved in 2010: Yes;
Status: Awarded contract November 2010.
Key event: Eleven test aircraft delivered to test sites;
Achieved in 2010: No;
Status: Delivered eight aircraft.
Key event: Flight test rate of 12 flights per aircraft per month
demonstrated;
Achieved in 2010: No;
Status: Achieved flight test rate of 2 to 8 per month.
Key event: At least 3 aircraft delivered to Eglin Air Force Base;
Achieved in 2010: No;
Status: None delivered, expected mid-2011.
Key event: Begin flight training operations at Eglin Air Force Base;
Achieved in 2010: No;
Status: Expected September 2011.
Key event: Block 1.0 software delivered to flight test;
Achieved in 2010: No;
Status: Delivered limited capability November 2010 with full
capability expected November 2011.
Key event: Award contract for fourth engine production lot;
Achieved in 2010: No;
Status: Expected April 2011.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Although still hampered by the late delivery of test aircraft to
testing sites, the development flight test program significantly
ramped up operations in 2010, accomplishing 3 times as many test
flights as the previous 3 years combined. The Air Force conventional
takeoff and landing variant significantly exceeded the annual plan
while initial limited testing of the Navy's carrier variant was judged
satisfactory, below plans for the number and hours of flight but ahead
on flight test points[Footnote 4] flown. The Marine Corps STOVL,
however, substantially underperformed in flight tests, experienced
significant down times for maintenance, and was challenged by several
technical issues unique to this variant that could add to its weight
and cost. The STOVL's problems were a major factor in the Secretary's
decision to give the STOVL a 2-year period to solve engineering
issues, assess impacts, and inform a future decision as to whether and
how to proceed with this variant. Table 3 summarizes 2010 flight test
results for each variant.
Table 3: Flight Test Performance in 2010:
Flight tests: Actual;
Conventional takeoff and landing variant: 171;
Short takeoff and vertical landing variant: 212;
Carrier variant: 27;
Total: 410.
Flight tests: Planned;
Conventional takeoff and landing variant: 112;
Short takeoff and vertical landing variant: 251;
Carrier variant: 31;
Total: 394.
Flight tests: Difference;
Conventional takeoff and landing variant: 59;
Short takeoff and vertical landing variant: (39);
Carrier variant: (4);
Total: 16.
Flight test hours: Actual;
Conventional takeoff and landing variant: 290;
Short takeoff and vertical landing variant: 286;
Carrier variant: 41;
Total: 617.
Flight test hours: Planned;
Conventional takeoff and landing variant: 202;
Short takeoff and vertical landing variant: 409;
Carrier variant: 56;
Total: 667.
Flight test hours: Difference;
Conventional takeoff and landing variant: 88;
Short takeoff and vertical landing variant: (123);
Carrier variant: (15);
Total: (50).
Flight test points flown: Actual;
Conventional takeoff and landing variant: 1373;
Short takeoff and vertical landing variant: 1924;
Carrier variant: 496;
Total: 3793.
Flight test points flown: Planned;
Conventional takeoff and landing variant: 1064;
Short takeoff and vertical landing variant: 2438;
Carrier variant: 270;
Total: 3772.
Flight test points flown: Difference;
Conventional takeoff and landing variant: 309;
Short takeoff and vertical landing variant: (514);
Carrier variant: 226;
Total: 21.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Program Has Still Not Fully Demonstrated a Stable Design and Mature
Manufacturing Processes as It Enters Its Fifth Year of Production:
After completing 9 years of system development and 4 years of
overlapping production activities, the JSF program has been slow to
gain adequate knowledge to ensure its design is stable and the
manufacturing process ready for greater levels of annual production.
The JSF program still lags in achieving critical indicators of success
expected from well-performing acquisition programs. Specifically, the
program has not yet stabilized aircraft designs--engineering changes
continue at higher than expected rates long after critical design
reviews and well into procurement, and more changes are expected as
testing accelerates. Also, manufacturing cost increases and delays in
delivering test and production aircraft indicate need for substantial
improvements in factory throughput and performance of the global
supply chain.
Engineering drawings released since design review and the number and
rate of design changes exceed those planned at program outset and are
not in line with best practices. Critical design reviews were
completed on the three aircraft variants in 2006 and 2007 and the
designs declared mature, but the program continues to experience
numerous changes. Since 2007, the program has produced 20,000
additional engineering drawings, a 50-percent increase in total
drawings and about five times more than best practices suggest. In
addition, changes to drawings have not yet decreased and leveled off
as planned. Figure 2 tracks and compares monthly design changes and
future forecasts against contractor plans in 2007.
Figure 2: Monthly Design Changes for JSF Aircraft:
[Refer to PDF for image: combination vertical bar and line graph]
Month: January 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 264;
Design changes (actual): 251.
Month: February 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 323;
Design changes (actual): 283.
Month: March 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 341;
Design changes (actual): 362.
Month: April 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 374;
Design changes (actual): 281.
Month: May 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 403;
Design changes (actual): 373.
Month: June 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 378;
Design changes (actual): 447.
Month: July 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 411;
Design changes (actual): 347.
Month: August 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 513;
Design changes (actual): 520.
Month: September 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 575;
Design changes (actual): 385.
Month: October 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 490;
Design changes (actual): 515.
Month: November 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 495;
Design changes (actual): 505.
Month: December 2006;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 547;
Design changes (actual): 378.
Month: January 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 653;
Design changes (actual): 620.
Month: February 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 579;
Design changes (actual): 567.
Month: March 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 576;
Design changes (actual): 598.
Month: April 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 595;
Design changes (actual): 647.
Month: May 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 663;
Design changes (actual): 697.
Month: June 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 702;
Design changes (actual): 634.
Month: July 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 747;
Design changes (actual): 681.
Month: August 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 797;
Design changes (actual): 739.
Month: September 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 775;
Design changes (actual): 744.
Month: October 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 730;
Design changes (actual): 876.
Month: November 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 761;
Design changes (actual): 678.
Month: December 2007;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 814;
Design changes (actual): 578.
Month: January 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 853;
Design changes (actual): 606.
Month: February 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 828;
Design changes (actual): 594.
Month: March 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 759;
Design changes (actual): 645.
Month: April 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 675;
Design changes (actual): 560.
Month: May 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 624;
Design changes (actual): 387.
Month: June 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 599;
Design changes (actual): 459.
Month: July 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 606;
Design changes (actual): 605.
Month: August 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 578;
Design changes (actual): 590.
Month: September 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 477;
Design changes (actual): 590.
Month: October 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 428;
Design changes (actual): 621.
Month: November 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 422;
Design changes (actual): 527.
Month: December 2008;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 421;
Design changes (actual): 508.
Month: January 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 389;
Design changes (actual): 573.
Month: February 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 394;
Design changes (actual): 655.
Month: March 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 328;
Design changes (actual): 716.
Month: April 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 346;
Design changes (actual): 629.
Month: May 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 330;
Design changes (actual): 522.
Month: June 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 306;
Design changes (actual): 568.
Month: July 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 288;
Design changes (actual): 493.
Month: August 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 291;
Design changes (actual): 492.
Month: September 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 301;
Design changes (actual): 482.
Month: October 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 282;
Design changes (actual): 480.
Month: November 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 266;
Design changes (actual): 415.
Month: December 2009;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 259;
Design changes (actual): 302.
Month: January 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 260;
Design changes (actual): 342.
Month: February 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 259;
Design changes (actual): 323.
Month: March 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 270;
Design changes (actual): 363.
Month: April 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 258;
Design changes (actual): 376.
Month: May 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 253;
Design changes (actual): 353.
Month: June 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 254;
Design changes (actual): 314.
Month: July 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 257;
Design changes (actual): 302.
Month: August 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 242;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 233.
Month: September 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 244;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 230.
Month: October 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 226;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 235.
Month: November 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 216;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 233.
Month: December 2010;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 210;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 229.
Month: January 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 202;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 231.
Month: February 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 193;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 245.
Month: March 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 192;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 245.
Month: April 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 178;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 241.
Month: May 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 168;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 254.
Month: June 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 155;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 249.
Month: July 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 152;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 241.
Month: August 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 145;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 256.
Month: September 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 142;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 241.
Month: October 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 142;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 253.
Month: November 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 138;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 247.
Month: December 2011;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 138;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 238.
Month: January 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 144;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 245.
Month: February 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 151;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 242.
Month: March 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 137;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 245.
Month: April 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 140;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 243.
Month: May 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 137;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 245.
Month: June 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 138;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 240.
Month: July 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 140;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 240.
Month: August 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 137;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 241.
Month: September 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 129;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 260.
Month: October 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 124;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 244.
Month: November 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 121;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 257.
Month: December 2012;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 105;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 257.
Month: January 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 72;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 235.
Month: February 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 63;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 235.
Month: March 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 55;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 231.
Month: April 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 38;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 233.
Month: May 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 39;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 213.
Month: June 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 38;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 229.
Month: July 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 30;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 227.
Month: August 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 30;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 251.
Month: September 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 30;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 242.
Month: October 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 30;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 262.
Month: November 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 260.
Month: December 2013;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 268.
Month: January 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 271.
Month: February 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 251.
Month: March 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 249.
Month: April 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 251.
Month: May 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 247.
Month: June 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 224.
Month: July 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 221.
Month: August 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 217.
Month: September 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 204.
Month: October 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 197.
Month: November 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 182.
Month: December 2014;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 169.
Month: January 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 162.
Month: February 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 162.
Month: March 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 142.
Month: April 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 131.
Month: May 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 114.
Month: June 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 94.
Month: July 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 80.
Month: August 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 66.
Month: September 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 48.
Month: October 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 33.
Month: November 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 20.
Month: December 2015;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 8.
Month: Jan 2016;
Anticipated design changes (2007 plan): 0;
Anticipated future design changes (2010 plan): 0.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
The monthly rate in 2009 and 2010 was higher than expected and the
program now anticipates more changes over a longer period of time--
about 10,000 more changes through January 2016. With most of
development testing still ahead for the JSF, the risk and impact from
required design changes are significant. In addition, emerging
concerns about the STOVL lift fan and drive shaft, fatigue cracks in a
ground test article, and stealth-related issues may drive additional
and substantive design changes.
As in prior years, lingering management inefficiencies, including
substantial out-of-station work[Footnote 5] and part shortages,
continued to increase the labor needed to manufacture test aircraft.
Although there have been improvements in these factors, final
acceptance and delivery of test jets were still delayed. Total labor
hours required to produce the test aircraft increased over time. The
cumulative actual labor hours through 2010 to complete the 12 test
aircraft exceeded the budgeted hours estimated in 2007 by more than
1.5 million hours, a 75 percent increase. Figure 3 depicts forecasted
and actual labor hours for building test jets.
Figure 3: JSF Labor Hours for Manufacturing Test Aircraft:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Labor hours:
Aircraft: BF1;
2007 budget: 342,647;
2008 budget: 361,047;
2009 budget: 392,006.
Aircraft: BF2;
2007 budget: 233,319;
2008 budget: 296,681;
2009 budget: 356,814.
Aircraft: BF3;
2007 budget: 179,892;
2008 budget: 254,394;
2009 budget: 311,830.
Aircraft: BF4;
2007 budget: 155,420;
2008 budget: 223,391;
2009 budget: 354,329.
Aircraft: AF1;
2007 budget: 187,781;
2008 budget: 262,694;
2009 budget: 337,244.
Aircraft: AF2;
2007 budget: 145,607;
2008 budget: 222,396;
2009 budget: 275,728.
Aircraft: AF3;
2007 budget: 130,955;
2008 budget: 209,861;
2009 budget: 289,143.
Aircraft: CF1;
2007 budget: 239,351;
2008 budget: 263,064;
2009 budget: 310,099.
Aircraft: CF2;
2007 budget: 125,602;
2008 budget: 218,194;
2009 budget: 236,538.
Aircraft: CF3;
2007 budget: 118,153;
2008 budget: 204,908;
2009 budget: 240,438.
Aircraft: BF5;
2007 budget: 102,505;
2008 budget: 191,410;
2009 budget: 262,069.
Aircraft: AF4;
2007 budget: 91,218;
2008 budget: 183,480;
2009 budget: 222,580.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
DOD began procuring production jets in 2007 and has now ordered 58
aircraft on the first four low-rate initial production lots. The JSF
program anticipated the delivery of 14 production aircraft through
2010, but none have been delivered. Delivery of the first two
production jets has been delayed several times since the contract was
signed and is now expected in April 2011. The prices on the first
three cost-reimbursable production contracts have increased from
amounts negotiated at contract award and the completion dates for
delivering aircraft have been extended over 9 months on average. We
are encouraged by DOD's award of a fixed-price incentive fee contract
for lot 4 production and the prospects for the cost study to inform
lot 5 negotiations, but we have not examined contract specifications.
Accumulating a large backlog of jets on order but undelivered is not
an efficient use of federal funds, tying up millions of dollars in
obligations ahead of the ability of the manufacturing process to
produce.
The aircraft and engine manufacturers now have significantly more
items in production flow compared to prior years and are making
efforts to implement restructuring actions and recommendations from
expert defense teams assembled to evaluate and improve production and
supply operations. Eight of 20 key recommendations from the
independent manufacturing review team have been implemented as of
September 2010. Until improvements are fully implemented and
demonstrated, the restructuring actions to reduce near term
procurement quantities and establish a more achievable ramp rate are
appropriate and will provide more time to fully mature manufacturing
and supply processes and catch up with aircraft backlogs. Improving
factory throughput and controlling costs--driving down labor and
material costs and delivering on time--are essential for efficient
manufacturing and timely delivery to the warfighter at the increased
production rates planned for the future.
Testing Has Been Slow and Has Not Demonstrated That the Aircraft Will
Work in Its Intended Environment:
Since the first flight in December 2006, only about 4 percent of JSF
capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab
results, or both. The pace of flight testing accelerated significantly
in 2010, but overall progress is still much below plans forecast
several years ago. Furthermore, only a small portion of the extensive
network of ground test labs and simulation models are fully accredited
to ensure the fidelity of results. Software development--essential for
achieving about 80 percent of the JSF functionality--is significantly
behind schedule as it enters its most challenging phase.
Development flight testing was much more active in 2010 than prior
years and had some notable successes, but cumulatively still lagged
behind previous expectations. The continuing effects from late
delivery of test aircraft and an inability to achieve the planned
flying rates per aircraft substantially reduced the amount and pace of
testing planned previously. Consequently, even though the flight test
program accelerated its pace last year, the total number of flights
accomplished during the first 4 years of the test program
significantly lagged expectations when the program's 2007 baseline was
established. Figure 4 shows that the cumulative number of flights
accomplished by the end of 2010 was only about one-fifth the number
forecast by this time in the 2007 test plan.
Figure 4: Actual JSF Flight Tests Completed through 2010 Compared to
the 2007 Plan:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Date: January 10;
2007 planned flights: 1,155;
2010 actual flights: 144.
Date: February 10;
2007 planned flights: 1,291;
2010 actual flights: 157.
Date: March 10;
2007 planned flights: 1,420;
2010 actual flights: 170.
Date: April 10;
2007 planned flights: 1,546;
2010 actual flights: 197.
Date: May 10;
2007 planned flights: 1,681;
2010 actual flights: 230.
Date: June 10;
2007 planned flights: 1,812;
2010 actual flights: 273.
Date: July 10;
2007 planned flights: 1,953;
2010 actual flights: 322.
Date: August 10;
2007 planned flights: 2,079;
2010 actual flights: 370.
Date: September 10;
2007 planned flights: 2,250;
2010 actual flights: 406.
Date: October 10;
2007 planned flights: 2,393;
2010 actual flights: 458.
Date: November 10;
2007 planned flights: 2,519;
2010 actual flights: 518.
Date: December 10;
2007 planned flights: 2,649;
2010 actual flights: 547.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
By the end of 2010, about 10 percent of more than 50,000 planned
flight test points had been completed.[Footnote 6] The majority of the
points were earned on airworthiness tests (basic airframe handling
characteristics) and in ferrying the planes to test sites. Remaining
test points include more complex and stringent requirements, such as
mission systems, ship suitability, and weapons integration that have
yet to be demonstrated.
The JSF test program relies much more heavily than previous weapon
systems on its modeling and simulation labs to test and verify
aircraft design and subsystem performance. However, only 3 of 32 labs
and models have been fully accredited to date. The program had planned
to accredit 11 labs and models by now. Accreditation is essential to
validate that the models accurately reflect aircraft performance and
it largely depends upon flight test data to verify lab results.
Moreover, the ability to substitute ground testing for some flight
testing is unproven. Contracting officials told us that early results
are providing good correlation between ground and flight tests.
Software providing essential JSF capability is not mature and releases
to the test program are behind schedule. Officials underestimated the
time and effort needed to develop and integrate the software,
substantially contributing to the program's overall cost and schedule
problems and testing delays, and requiring the retention of engineers
for longer periods. Significant learning and development work remains
before the program can demonstrate the mature software capabilities
needed to meet warfighter requirements. The JSF software development
effort is one of the largest and most complex in DOD history,
providing functionality essential to capabilities such as sensor
fusion, weapons and fire control, maintenance diagnostics, and
propulsion. JSF depends on millions more lines of software code than
the F-22A Raptor and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. While good progress has
been reported on the writing of code, total lines of code have grown
by 40 percent since preliminary design review and 13 percent since the
critical design review. The amount of code needed will likely increase
as integration and testing efforts intensify. A second software
integration line added as part of the restructuring will improve
capacity and output.
Delays in developing, integrating, and releasing software to the test
program have cascading effects hampering flight tests, training, and
lab accreditation. While progress is being made, a substantial amount
of software work remains before the program can demonstrate full
warfighting capability. The program released its second block, or
increment, to flight test nearly 2 years later than the plan set in
2006, largely due to integration problems. Each of the remaining three
blocks--providing full mission systems and warfighting capabilities--
are now projected to slip more than 3 years compared to the 2006 plan.
Figure 5 illustrates the actual and projected slips for each of the 5
software blocks in delivering software to the test program.
Figure 5: Software Delivery to Flight Test Slips:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Block 0.1: Flight sciences:
Initial estimate: 2006;
Current estimate: 2007.
Block 0.5: Initial mission systems architecture:
Initial estimate: 2008;
Current estimate: 2010.
Block 1.0: Initial training capability:
Initial estimate: 2008;
Current estimate: 2012.
Block 2.0: Initial warfighting capability:
Initial estimate: 2010;
Current estimate: 2014.
Block 3.0: Full warfighting capability:
Initial estimate: 2011;
Current estimate: 2015.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Schedule delays require retention of engineering staff for longer
periods of time. Also, some capabilities have been moved to future
blocks in attempts to meet schedule and mitigate risks. Uncertainties
pertaining to critical technologies, including the helmet-mounted
display and advanced data links, pose risks for more delays.
Concluding Remarks:
The JSF program is at a critical juncture--9 years in development and
4 years in limited production-but still early in flight testing to
verify aircraft design and performance. If effectively implemented and
sustained, the restructuring DOD is conducting should place the JSF
program on a firmer footing and lead to more achievable and
predictable outcomes. However, restructuring comes with a price--
higher development costs, fewer aircraft received in the near term,
training delays, prolonged times for testing and delivering the
capabilities required by the warfighter, and impacts on other defense
programs and priorities. Reducing near-term procurement quantities
lessens, but does not eliminate the still substantial and risky
concurrency of development and production. Development and testing
activities will now overlap 11 years of procurement. Flight testing
and production activities are increasing and contractors are improving
supply and manufacturing processes, but deliveries are still lagging.
Slowed deliveries have led to a growing backlog of jets on order but
not delivered. This is not a good use of federal funds, obligating
millions of dollars well before the manufacturing process can deliver
aircraft.
We agree with defense leadership that a renewed and sustained focus on
affordability by contractors and the government is critical to moving
this important program forward and enabling our military services and
our allies to acquire and sustain JSF forces in needed quantities.
Maintaining senior leadership's increased focus on program results,
holding government and contractors accountable for improving
performance, and bringing a more responsible management approach to
the JSF to "live within its means" may help limit future cost growth
and the consequences for other programs in the portfolio. The JSF
acquisition demands an unprecedented share of the Department's future
investment funding. The program's size and priority are such that its
cost overruns and extended schedules must either be borne by funding
cuts to other programs or else drive increases in the top line of
defense spending; the latter may not be an option in a period of more
austere budgets. Given the other priorities that DOD must address in a
finite budget, JSF affordability is critical and DOD must plan ahead
to address and manage JSF challenges and risks in the future.
Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and members of the Tactical
Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, this completes my prepared
statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.
GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information on this statement, please contact Michael
Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key
contributions to this statement are Bruce Fairbairn, Charlie Shivers,
Julie Hadley, W. Kendal Roberts, LeAnna Parkey, and Matt Lea.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Changes in Reported JSF Program Cost, Quantities, and
Deliveries:
Expected quantities: Development quantities;
October 2001 (system development start): 14;
December 2003 (2004 replan): 14;
March 2007 (approved baseline): 15;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): 14;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): 14.
Expected quantities: Procurement quantities (U.S. only);
October 2001 (system development start): 2,852;
December 2003 (2004 replan): 2,443;
March 2007 (approved baseline): 2,443;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): 2,443;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): 2,443.
Total quantities:
October 2001 (system development start): 2,866;
December 2003 (2004 replan): 2,457;
March 2007 (approved baseline): 2,458;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): 2,457;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): 2,457.
Cost estimates (then-year dollars in billions): Development;
October 2001 (system development start): $34.4;
December 2003 (2004 replan): $44.8;
March 2007 (approved baseline): $44.8;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): $50.2;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): $51.8.
Cost estimates (then-year dollars in billions): Procurement;
October 2001 (system development start): $196.6;
December 2003 (2004 replan): $199.8;
March 2007 (approved baseline): $231.7;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): $277.5;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): $325.1.
Cost estimates (then-year dollars in billions): Military construction;
October 2001 (system development start): $2.0;
December 2003 (2004 replan): $0.2;
March 2007 (approved baseline): $2.0;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): $0.6;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): $5.6.
Total program acquisition:
October 2001 (system development start): $233.0;
December 2003 (2004 replan): $244.8;
March 2007 (approved baseline): $278.5;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): $328.3;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): $382.5.
Unit cost estimates (then-year dollars in millions): Program
acquisition;
October 2001 (system development start): $81;
December 2003 (2004 replan): $100;
March 2007 (approved baseline): $113;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): $134;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): $156.
Unit cost estimates (then-year dollars in millions): Average
procurement;
October 2001 (system development start): $69;
December 2003 (2004 replan): $82;
March 2007 (approved baseline): $95;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): $114;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): $133.
Estimated delivery and production dates: First operational aircraft
delivery;
October 2001 (system development start): 2008;
December 2003 (2004 replan): 2009;
March 2007 (approved baseline): 2010;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): 2010;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): 2010.
Estimated delivery and production dates: Initial operational
capability;
October 2001 (system development start): 2010-2012;
December 2003 (2004 replan): 2012-2013;
March 2007 (approved baseline): 2012-2015;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): 2012-2016;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): TBD.
Estimated delivery and production dates: Full-rate production;
October 2001 (system development start): 2012;
December 2003 (2004 replan): 2013;
March 2007 (approved baseline): 2013;
April 2010 (initial program restructure): 2016;
June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy): 2016.
Source: GAO analysis and DOD data.
Note: Does not reflect cost and schedule effects from additional
restructuring actions announced after June 2010.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Systems Development Contracts Target Price History and
Engine Schedules:
Projected costs for three contracts comprise about 80 percent of total
system development funding requirements. The airframe and primary
engine development contracts have experienced significant price
increases since contract awards--79 percent and 69 percent
respectively. The alternate, or second, engine contract price has
increased about 12 percent. By design, it began about 4 years after
the primary engine contract and has a more limited scope. The primary
engine contract includes development of both the common engine and the
STOVL lift system while the alternate engine contract develops its
version of the conventional common engine. Figures 6, 7, and 8 depict
the price histories for these three contracts and the reasons behind
major price increases.
Figure 6: JSF Airframe Development Contract Target Price Increases:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Date: October 2001;
Price increases: $19.0 billion.
Date: December 2003;
Price increases: $19.7 billion.
STOVL weight redesign.
Date: December 2005;
Price increases: $25.7 billion.
Date: December 2007;
Price increases: $25.9 billion.
Aircraft development delays and flight test extension.
Date: December 2009;
Price increases: $27.5 billion.
Nunn-McCurdy restructure.
Date: February 2011;
Price increases: $33.9 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: The Feb. 2011 cost is not the contract target price, but the
latest government estimate from the fiscal year 2012 defense budget
request.
[End of figure]
Figure 7: Primary Engine Development Contract Target Price Increases:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Date: October 2001;
Price increases: $4.8 billion.
Date: December 2003;
Price increases: $4.8 billion.
Schedule extension due to STOVL redesign and thrust specification.
STOVL weight redesign.
Date: December 2005;
Price increases: $5.8 billion.
Date: December 2007;
Price increases: $5.9 billion.
Development delays and engine blade issues.
Date: December 2009;
Price increases: $6.7 billion.
Nunn-McCurdy restructure.
Date: February 2011;
Price increases: $8.2 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: The Feb. 2011 cost is not the contract target price, but the
latest government estimate from the fiscal year 2012 defense budget
request.
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Alternate Engine Development Contract Target Price Increases:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Date: August 2005;
Price increases: $2.5 billion.
Date: December 2007;
Price increases: $2.5 billion.
Hardware issues and funding instability.
Date: December 2009;
Price increases: $2.8 billion.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: The Dec. 2009 cost is the contractor's estimate from the 2009
Selected Acquisition Report. The fiscal year 2012 budget includes a
DOD estimate of $2.1 billion for this contract, but it assumes no
funding beyond fiscal year 2010.
[End of figure]
Table 4 shows changes in engine development schedules. The initial
service release milestone usually coincides with low rate initial
production. The engine should have completed required verification
activities and meet specification requirements. The operational
capability release milestone is generally associated with the start of
full-rate production when the engine is acceptable for full production
release.
Table 4: Engine Development Contracts Milestones:
F135 primary engine: Initial service release;
Initial estimate: November 2007;
Current estimate or actual: CTOL/CV March 2010;
STOVL December 2010.
F135 primary engine: Operational capability release;
Initial estimate: November 2008;
Current estimate or actual: July 2016.
F136 alternate engine: Initial service release;
Initial estimate: May 2012;
Current estimate or actual: CTOL/CV December 2012;
STOVL December 2013.
F136 alternate engine: Operational capability release;
Initial estimate: July 2013;
Current estimate or actual: February 2014.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: JSF program officials stated that the Department has not
requested funding for the F136 engine in FY11 or 12, and progress
towards achieving milestone dates is dependent on whether final
appropriations for FY11 and 12 include funding for the F136.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Fighter Force Structure Reports Generally
Addressed Congressional Mandates, but Reflected Dated Plans and
Guidance, and Limited Analyses. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-323R]. Washington, D.C.: February
24, 2011.
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective Actions
Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-171R]. Washington D.C.:
December 16, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment of DOD's Funding Projection for the
F136 Alternate Engine. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1020R]. Washington, D.C.: September
15, 2010.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD's Ability to Meet Future Requirements is
Uncertain, with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment
Decisions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-789].
Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Significant Challenges and Decisions Ahead.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-478T]. Washington,
D.C.: March 24, 2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting
Warfighter Requirements on Time. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-382]. Washington, D.C.: March 19,
2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Significant Challenges Remain as DOD
Restructures Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-520T]. Washington, D.C.: March 11,
2010.
Joint Strike Fighter: Strong Risk Management Essential as Program
Enters Most Challenging Phase. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-711T]. Washington, D.C.: May 20,
2009.
Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing
Development Increases the Government's Financial Risk. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-303]. Washington D.C.: March 12,
2009.
Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on Program Risks.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-569T]. Washington,
D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-388]. Washington, D.C.:
March 11, 2008.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment
Strategy. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-415].
Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.
Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-360]. Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2007.
Tactical Aircraft: DOD's Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter
Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-717R]. Washington,
D.C.: May 22, 2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost
and Schedule Problems under DOD's Revised Policy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-368]. Washington, D.C.: April 13,
2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Get Better Results on Weapons
Systems Investments. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-585T]. Washington, D.C.: April 5,
2006.
Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported by
Knowledge-Based F-22A and JSF Business Cases. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-487T]. Washington, D.C.: March 16,
2006.
Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing
Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-356]. Washington, D.C.: March 15,
2006.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not
Meeting Warfighter Requirements on Time, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-382] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19,
2010). Refer to the related products section for a list of prior GAO
reports and testimonies.
[2] Commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy,10 U.S.C. § 2433 establishes
the requirement for DOD to submit unit cost reports on major defense
acquisition programs or designated major subprograms. Two measures are
tracked against the current and original baseline estimates for a
program: procurement unit cost (total procurement funds divided by the
quantity of systems procured) and program acquisition unit cost (total
funds for development, procurement, and system-specific military
construction divided by the quantity of systems procured). If a
program's procurement unit cost or acquisition unit cost increases by
at least 25 percent over the current baseline estimate or at least 50
percent over the original baseline estimate, it constitutes a breach
of the critical cost growth threshold. When a program experiences a
Nunn-McCurdy breach of the critical cost growth threshold, DOD is
required to take a number of steps, including reassessing the program
and submitting a certification to Congress in order to continue the
program, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2433a.
[3] Pub. L. No. 111-84 § 244 (2009).
[4] Flight test points are specific, quantifiable objectives in flight
plans that are needed to verify aircraft design and performance.
[5] Out of station work occurs when manufacturing steps are not
completed at its designated work station and must be finished
elsewhere later in production. This is highly inefficient, increasing
labor hours, causing delays, and sometimes quality problems.
[6] According to program officials completion of a test point means
that the test point has been flown and that flight engineers ruled
that the point has met the need. Further analysis may be necessary for
the test point to be closed out.
[End of section]
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