Warfighter Support
DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation Gao ID: GAO-11-273 March 1, 2011Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced significant risks of mission failure and loss of life due to rapidly changing enemy threats. In response, the Department of Defense (DOD) established urgent operational needs processes to rapidly develop, modify, and field new capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technology, and counter-improvised explosive devices (IED) systems. However, GAO, the Defense Science Board, and others have raised concerns about the effectiveness, efficiency, and oversight of DOD's various urgent needs processes. GAO conducted this review to determine (1) what various entities exist within DOD for responding to urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) the extent to which DOD has evaluated the potential for consolidations. To conduct this review, GAO examined DOD's urgent needs processes and collected and analyzed data from urgent needs entities.
Over the past two decades, the fulfillment of urgent needs has evolved as a set of complex processes within the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, each of the military services, and the combatant commands to rapidly develop, equip, and field solutions and critical capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified at least 31 entities that manage urgent needs and expedite the development of solutions to address them. Moreover, GAO found that some overlap exists. For example, there are numerous points of entry for the warfighter to submit a request for an urgently needed capability, including through the Joint Staff and each military service. Additionally, several entities have focused on developing solutions for the same subject areas, such as counter-IED and ISR capabilities, potentially resulting in duplication of efforts. For example, both the Army and the Marine Corps had their own separate efforts to develop counter-IED mine rollers. DOD has taken steps to improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, but the department does not have a comprehensive approach to manage and oversee the breadth of its activities to address capability gaps identified by warfighters in-theater. Steps DOD has taken include developing policy to guide joint urgent need efforts and working to establish a senior oversight council to help synchronize DOD's efforts. Federal internal control standards require detailed policies, procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. However, DOD does not have a comprehensive, DOD-wide policy that establishes a baseline and provides a common approach for how all joint and military service urgent needs are to be addressed. Moreover, DOD lacks visibility over the full range of its urgent needs efforts. For example, DOD cannot readily identify the cost of its departmentwide urgent needs efforts, which is at least $76.9 billion based on GAO's analysis. Additionally, DOD does not have a senior-level focal point to lead the department's efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs requirements. Without DOD-wide guidance and a focal point to lead its efforts, DOD risks having duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented efforts, which can result in avoidable costs. DOD also has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for consolidation across the department. GAO's Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide establishes that such a comprehensive analysis of alternative processes should be performed, to include a performance-based, risk-adjusted analysis of benefits and costs for each alternative. In an effort to examine various ways the department might improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, GAO identified and analyzed several potential consolidation options, ranging from consolidation of all DOD urgent needs entities to more limited consolidation of key functions. Until DOD comprehensively evaluates its strategic direction on urgent needs, it will be unaware of opportunities for consolidation as well as opportunities for increased efficiencies in its fulfillment of urgent needs. GAO recommends that DOD develop comprehensive guidance that, among other things, defines roles, responsibilities, and authorities across the department and designates a focal point to lead urgent needs efforts. GAO also recommends that DOD evaluate potential options for consolidation. DOD concurred with the recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: William M. Solis Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-8365GAO-11-273, Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-273
entitled 'Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More
Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation'
which was released on March 1, 2011.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
March 2011:
Warfighter Support:
DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and
Evaluation for Potential Consolidation:
GAO-11-273:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-273, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced significant risks of mission
failure and loss of life due to rapidly changing enemy threats. In
response, the Department of Defense (DOD) established urgent
operational needs processes to rapidly develop, modify, and field new
capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) technology, and counter–improvised explosive devices (IED)
systems. However, GAO, the Defense Science Board, and others have
raised concerns about the effectiveness, efficiency, and oversight of
DOD‘s various urgent needs processes. GAO conducted this review to
determine (1) what various entities exist within DOD for responding to
urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is
fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DOD
has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent
needs activities; and (3) the extent to which DOD has evaluated the
potential for consolidations. To conduct this review, GAO examined DOD‘
s urgent needs processes and collected and analyzed data from urgent
needs entities.
What GAO Found:
Over the past two decades, the fulfillment of urgent needs has evolved
as a set of complex processes within the Joint Staff, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, each of the military services, and the
combatant commands to rapidly develop, equip, and field solutions and
critical capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified at least 31
entities that manage urgent needs and expedite the development of
solutions to address them. Moreover, GAO found that some overlap
exists. For example, there are numerous points of entry for the
warfighter to submit a request for an urgently needed capability,
including through the Joint Staff and each military service.
Additionally, several entities have focused on developing solutions
for the same subject areas, such as counter-IED and ISR capabilities,
potentially resulting in duplication of efforts. For example, both the
Army and the Marine Corps had their own separate efforts to develop
counter-IED mine rollers.
DOD has taken steps to improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, but
the department does not have a comprehensive approach to manage and
oversee the breadth of its activities to address capability gaps
identified by warfighters in-theater. Steps DOD has taken include
developing policy to guide joint urgent need efforts and working to
establish a senior oversight council to help synchronize DOD‘s
efforts. Federal internal control standards require detailed policies,
procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve desired
results through effective stewardship of public resources. However,
DOD does not have a comprehensive, DOD-wide policy that establishes a
baseline and provides a common approach for how all joint and military
service urgent needs are to be addressed. Moreover, DOD lacks
visibility over the full range of its urgent needs efforts. For
example, DOD cannot readily identify the cost of its departmentwide
urgent needs efforts, which is at least $76.9 billion based on GAO‘s
analysis. Additionally, DOD does not have a senior-level focal point
to lead the department‘s efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs
requirements. Without DOD-wide guidance and a focal point to lead its
efforts, DOD risks having duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented
efforts, which can result in avoidable costs.
DOD also has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for
consolidation across the department. GAO‘s Business Process
Reengineering Assessment Guide establishes that such a comprehensive
analysis of alternative processes should be performed, to include a
performance-based, risk-adjusted analysis of benefits and costs for
each alternative. In an effort to examine various ways the department
might improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, GAO identified and
analyzed several potential consolidation options, ranging from
consolidation of all DOD urgent needs entities to more limited
consolidation of key functions. Until DOD comprehensively evaluates
its strategic direction on urgent needs, it will be unaware of
opportunities for consolidation as well as opportunities for increased
efficiencies in its fulfillment of urgent needs.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD develop comprehensive guidance that, among
other things, defines roles, responsibilities, and authorities across
the department and designates a focal point to lead urgent needs
efforts. GAO also recommends that DOD evaluate potential options for
consolidation. DOD concurred with the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-273] or key
components. For more information, contact William M. Solis, (202) 512-
8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Fulfillment of Urgent Needs Involves a Number of Entities and
Processes, Resulting in Fragmentation and Some Overlap of Efforts:
DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Guidance and Full Visibility to
Effectively Manage and Oversee Its Urgent Needs:
Opportunities Exist for Consolidating Urgent Needs Processes and
Entities:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Timeline of Significant Events within DOD and the Military
Services to Fulfill Urgent Needs:
Table 2: Activities Involved in Meeting Urgent Needs:
Table 3: DOD Entities Involved in the Fulfillment of Urgent Needs:
Table 4: Roles of Urgent Needs Entities in Key Activities:
Table 5: Activities Included in Urgent Needs Policies and Guidance:
Table 6: Identified Potential Options for Consolidating the
Department's Urgent Needs Processes, with Advantages and Disadvantages:
Figure:
Figure 1: Estimated Funding for the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational
Needs of Entities Identified by GAO, Fiscal Year 2005 through Fiscal
Year 2010:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
IED: improvised explosive device:
ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System:
JIEDDO: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization:
JUON: Joint Urgent Operational Need:
MRAP: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
PEO: Program Executive Office:
PM: Project Manager:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 1, 2011:
Congressional Committees:
Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have
encountered changing adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures,
which challenged the Department of Defense (DOD) to quickly develop
and provide new equipment and new capabilities to address evolving
threats. Further, U.S. troops faced shortages of critical items,
including body armor, tires, and batteries. DOD's goal was to provide
solutions to urgent warfighter needs as quickly as possible to prevent
loss of life or mission failure. DOD had to look beyond traditional
acquisition procedures, to expand the use of existing processes to
meet urgent needs, and to develop new processes and entities designed
to be as responsive as possible to urgent warfighter requests. In
addition to requests for equipment from DOD's existing stocks,
warfighters have requested new capabilities, such as: technology to
counter improvised explosive devices (IED); intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technology to provide increased
situational awareness; and command and control equipment to enhance
operations on the battlefield.
In meeting urgent needs, it is important for DOD to efficiently use
the department's financial resources. Our past work on weapons
acquisition has shown that the department has often pursued more
programs than its resources can support.[Footnote 1] Our work also has
shown that DOD has had difficulty translating needs into programs,
which often has led to cost growth and delayed delivery of needed
capabilities to the warfighter.
Over the past 5 years, DOD has sponsored several reviews of its
abilities to rapidly respond to and field urgently needed capabilities
in the 21st century security environment. One completed by the Defense
Science Board in July 2009 identified more than 20 rapid-reaction
programs and organizations addressing DOD urgent warfighter needs.
[Footnote 2] Another study, completed by the Defense Science Board in
September 2009, estimated that these programs spent more than $50
billion[Footnote 3] over the period 2005 to 2009.[Footnote 4]
Moreover, the Defense Science Board found that DOD had done little to
adopt urgent needs as a critical, ongoing DOD institutional capability
essential to addressing future threats, and it provided DOD with
recommendations on potential organizational and programmatic
consolidations in July and September 2009.
DOD's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review cited that the department's
institutions and processes needed reforms to better support the urgent
needs of the warfighter; buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and
truly needed; and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and
responsibly. In addition, in 2007 DOD established a Chief Management
Officer position to ensure that core business operations are optimally
aligned to support the department's warfighting mission and that
performance goals and measures are established for improving and
evaluating overall economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the
department, among other functions. Also, in August 2010, the Secretary
of Defense initiated a major effort to instill a culture of savings,
and set a goal to identify $100 billion in savings over a 5-year
period.
Our previous work has highlighted challenges with the department's
management and oversight of its urgent operational needs organizations
and processes.[Footnote 5] In April 2010, we reported that DOD's
guidance over its joint urgent needs processes was fragmented and
outdated, and the department was unable to fully assess how well those
processes addressed critical deficiencies or to measure the
effectiveness of fielded solutions.[Footnote 6] Likewise, in October
2009, we reported and testified on DOD's need to improve visibility
and coordination of its counter-IED efforts.[Footnote 7]
We conducted this review under the authority of the Comptroller
General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, in light of
continuing congressional interest in the department's ability to
adequately fulfill urgent needs and our prior findings regarding the
department's oversight and management of its urgent needs processes.
[Footnote 8] In addition, Title II of Public Law Number 111-139
requires GAO to identify government programs, agencies, offices, and
initiatives with duplicative goals and activities and to report those
findings to Congress.[Footnote 9] Our objectives for this review were
to determine (1) what entities exist within DOD for responding to
urgent operational needs and to what extent, if any, there is
fragmentation, overlap, or duplication in their missions, roles, and
responsibilities; (2) to what extent DOD has a comprehensive approach
for managing and overseeing its various activities to address urgent
needs identified by warfighters in-theater; and (3) to what extent has
DOD comprehensively evaluated its urgent needs entities and processes
and identified potential for consolidations.
To determine and describe the various entities within DOD that respond
to urgent operational needs and to what extent, if any, there is
fragmentation, overlap, or duplication, we used a data-collection
instrument to obtain information from DOD and military service
entities identified in our scope regarding their role in the urgent
needs process, including how urgent needs are submitted, validated,
funded, and tracked, and how fielded capabilities are sustained,
transitioned, or terminated. We also analyzed prior Defense Science
Board reports that identified entities involved in the process, and
interviewed DOD and military service officials to gain an
understanding of mission, role, and responsibility as well as to gain
insight into other entities that may have a role in the fulfillment of
urgent needs. To determine the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive
approach for managing all of its various urgent needs processes, we
analyzed strategic management guidance as well as conducted
comparative analysis of DOD and military service policies for meeting
urgent operational needs. We interviewed DOD and military service
officials to gain an understanding of the department's efforts to
satisfy urgent warfighter requirements as well as the metrics used to
evaluate the effectiveness of urgent needs solutions. To determine the
extent to which DOD has comprehensively evaluated its urgent needs
entities and processes, we interviewed key officials from various DOD
and military service entities as well as officials from selected
combatant commands to gain an understanding of how joint urgent
operational needs and service-based urgent needs are fulfilled. Using
this information, together with analysis of prior reports and studies
and the responses from our data-collection instrument, we developed
potential consolidation options for the department to consider. We
analyzed these options in terms of their potential capacity to gain
increased efficiencies in the visibility, coordination, management,
and oversight of the department's urgent needs processes as well as to
reduce the potential for duplication, overlap, and fragmentation.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 through March
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. For
additional details on how we performed our review, see appendix I.
Background:
Evolving Threats in Iraq and Afghanistan Highlighted Need for DOD to
Fill Capability Gaps Rapidly:
As evidenced by evolving threats in Iraq and Afghanistan, enemy forces
have exploited capability gaps in the technology, systems, and
equipment used by U.S. forces. Such tactics made it evident that U.S.
warfighters were not always equipped to deal with the fast-changing
tactics, techniques, and procedures of the enemy. For example, one of
the most publicized of these adversarial capabilities was the use of
IEDs. While U.S. forces responded initially by changing tactics and
techniques by purchasing equipment locally, the department then
determined it needed to more quickly develop and deploy new
capabilities. Some of DOD's efforts to rapidly address counter-IED and
other significant capability gaps include the following:
* Counter-IED Solutions--Congress provides funding for joint urgent
needs related to countering IEDs through the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), an organization that
reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Congress has
appropriated nearly $16 billion through fiscal year 2009 to JIEDDO.
JIEDDO has funded many counter-IED solutions to support the
warfighter, including electronic jammers to block radio-frequency
signals that detonate IEDs. However, in our prior work, we found that
JIEDDO lacked full visibility over all counter-IED initiatives
throughout DOD, faced difficulties with transitioning its counter-IED
initiatives to the military services, and lacked criteria for
selecting which counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, which
affect its training investment decisions. We recommended that DOD
improve its visibility over all of DOD's counter-IED efforts, work
with the military services to develop a complete transition plan for
initiatives, and define criteria for funding training initiatives.
[Footnote 10] DOD agreed with these recommendations and identified
several actions it had taken or planned to take to address them.
* Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Technology--
DOD's ISR systems--including manned and unmanned airborne, space-
borne, maritime, and terrestrial systems--play critical roles in
supporting military operations and national security missions.
Effective ISR data can provide early warning of enemy threats as well
as enable U.S. military forces to increase effectiveness,
coordination, and lethality, and demand has increased for ISR
capabilities to support ongoing military operations. To meet this
growing demand, DOD is making sizeable investments in ISR systems and
related ISR capabilities.[Footnote 11] We have reported since 2005
that DOD's ISR activities are not always well integrated and
efficient, effectiveness may be compromised by lack of visibility into
operational use of ISR assets, and agencies could better collaborate
in the acquisition of new capabilities.[Footnote 12] In January 2010,
we recommended that DOD develop overarching guidance for sharing
intelligence information and that the military services develop plans
with timelines that prioritize and identify the types of ISR data they
will share.[Footnote 13] DOD agreed with these recommendations and
noted actions it planned to take to address them.
* Command and Control Equipment--Urgently needed assets may include,
but are not limited to, satellite communication equipment for military
personnel who require a method for communicating with each other in
remote areas without established infrastructure, or distributed
tactical communication systems for warfighters in Afghanistan because
current handset devices do not operate adequately in the mountainous
terrain. To meet this demand, solutions are being sought from various
sources that include commercial off-the-shelf technology, other types
of technology, and other sources. We have reported on the challenges
associated with availability of such technology, including lengthy
delays in the approval and order processes.[Footnote 14] To address
these and other urgent needs-related challenges, we made several
recommendations to improve DOD's ability to assess how well its
processes are meeting critical warfighter needs, address challenges
with training, make decisions about when to use its rapid acquisition
authority, and make reprogramming decisions to expedite fielding of
solutions. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations and agreed
to take several actions to address them.
The Department's Processes to Fulfill Urgent Needs Have Evolved:
Over the past two decades, the fulfillment of urgent needs has evolved
as a set of complex processes--within the Joint Staff, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), each of the military services, as well
as the combatant commands--to rapidly develop, equip, and field
solutions and critical capabilities to the warfighter. DOD's
experience in Iraq and Afghanistan led to the expanded use of existing
urgent needs processes, the creation of new policies, and the
establishment of new organizations intended to be more responsive to
urgent warfighter requests.[Footnote 15]
As shown in table 1 below, significant events in the expansion of
DOD's efforts to respond to and fulfill urgent operational needs began
in the late 1980s but increased rapidly after the onset of the Global
War on Terrorism in late 2001.
Table 1: Timeline of Significant Events within DOD and the Military
Services to Fulfill Urgent Needs:
Year: 1987;
Event: * Operational Needs Statement process established by the Army
to provide a way for unit commanders to identify urgent needs for new
materiel or new capabilities;
* Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command received
acquisition authority specific to the command to develop, acquire, and
fund special operations-peculiar equipment.
Year: 1994;
Event:
* Rapid Response Process established by the Air Force to address
critical capability gaps or shortfalls that could result in "loss of
life" or prevent mission accomplishment.
Year: 1995;
Event:
* Capabilities Development Directorate established by the Marine Corps
to lead the operation of the Expeditionary Force Development System, a
process to determine service requirements and prioritize resources.
Year: 2002;
Event: * Rapid Equipping Force organization established by the Army's
Vice Chief of Staff to combine and integrate capability development
functions that cross staff elements and major commands;
* Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force, under the direction of
the DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering, formed following
the events of September 11, 2001, and later renamed the Rapid Reaction
Technology Office;
* Rapid Fielding Initiative established in Program Executive Office
Soldier after forces deploying to Afghanistan were not equipped with
proper items for theater.
Year: 2003;
Event: * Army Improvised Explosive Device Task Force established by
the Army Chief of Staff to address the escalating use of IEDs. It was
later transformed into a joint entity, called JIEDDO, under the
authority of the Deputy Secretary of Defense;
* National Defense Authorization Act provided that the Secretary of
Defense prescribe procedures for rapid acquisition and deployment of
items that are under development or commercially available and
urgently needed to respond to significant and urgent safety
situations.[A]
Year: 2004;
Event:
* Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell established by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to act as the DOD focal point to
prioritize, identify solutions, facilitate funding, and work with the
appropriate components to resolve issues that hinder rapid response of
validated joint urgent operational needs;
* Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar capability development began at the
Army's Chief of Staff's direction to find a solution for the indirect
fire threat.
Year: 2005;
Event:
* DOD established the Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) process to
respond to urgent needs associated with combat operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq and the war on terror;
* The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell used Iraqi Freedom Funds to fund
joint urgent operational needs until 2008;
* National Defense Authorization Act amendment gave the Secretary of
Defense rapid acquisition authority to waive, under certain
circumstances, any provision of law, policy, directive, or regulation
that would unnecessarily impede the rapid acquisition and deployment
of equipment that is urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability
deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities.[B]
Year: 2006;
Event:
* JIEDDO established by and reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions in
support of combatant commands and their respective Joint Task Forces'
efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence[C];
* Rapid Reaction Technology Office formed after the attacks on
September 11, 2001, as the Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force.
Reporting to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, this
shift was to focus on capabilities to counter insurgency and irregular
warfare;
* Army Asymmetric Warfare Office established by the Secretary of the
Army to integrate military and civilian disciplines to rapidly
organize, train, and equip Army formations to defeat asymmetric[D]
threats[E];
- Established within the Army's Asymmetric Warfare Office, the
Asymmetric Warfare Group is a focal point to identify asymmetric
threats and enemy and friendly vulnerabilities. The group influences
the Army's capability for adaptation across the entire Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel,
and Facilities spectrum[F];
- Established within the Army's Asymmetric Warfare Office, the
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Division, renamed the Adaptive
Networks Threats and Solutions Division in 2008, is the Army's focal
point for counter-IED JUONs emerging from JIEDDO;
* Biometrics Task Force established under the Army Chief Information
Officer G-6 to lead the development and implementation of biometrics
technology for the combatant commands, military services, and agencies.
Year: 2007;
Event:
* Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) Task Force established by
Secretary of Defense to accelerate the development of vehicles to
counter IEDs;
* Urgent Needs Process established by the Navy to institute rapid
acquisition processes to streamline the dialogue between the
requirements and acquisition communities to expedite technical,
programmatic, and financial solutions;
* Navy's Rapid Development and Deployment Office established in the
Office of Naval Research along with a Rapid Action Team process to
execute Rapid Development and Deployment projects and provide
technical assessment of all Navy and Marine Corps urgent needs
requests.
Year: 2008;
Event:
* Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Task Force established by
the Secretary of Defense to identify and overcome bottlenecks and
barriers related to rapidly acquiring and fielding ISR capabilities;
* Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Sensors-Combined
system created based on combining eight joint urgent operational needs
submitted by the Central Command.
Year: 2009;
Event:
* Rapid Fielding Directorate established under the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to
rapidly transition innovative concepts into critical capabilities that
counter unconventional and time-sensitive threats.
Year: 2010;
Event:
* Biometrics Task Force redesignated as the Biometrics Identity
Management Agency, making it a permanent entity reporting to the
Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7.
Year: 2011;
Event:
* Section 803 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2011 (the FY 2011 NDAA) amended the existing rapid
acquisition authority. Previously, the authority could be used to
eliminate deficiencies that resulted in combat fatalities. The amended
section now permits the use of the authority to acquire and deploy
certain supplies to eliminate deficiencies that result in combat
casualties, rather than just combat fatalities. The amendment also
increased from $100 million to $200 million the amount that can be
used annually to acquire the supplies necessary to address such
deficiencies[G];
* Section 804 of the FY 2011 NDAA, among other things, requires the
Secretary of Defense to review the processes for the fielding of
capabilities in response to urgent operational needs, consider
improvements to those processes, and report to the congressional
defense committees in January 2012[H].
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 806 (2002).
[B] Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 811 (2004).
[C] Department of Defense Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) (Feb. 14, 2006).
[D] Asymmetric warfare refers to threats outside the range of
conventional warfare, including terrorism.
[E] According to an Army official, the Army's Asymmetric Warfare
Office was dissolved in October 2010.
[F] As of October 2010, an Army official stated that stated the Army
Asymmetric Warfare Group reports directly to G-33, Army's Staff
Directorate for Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization.
[G] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 803 (2011).
[H] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 804 (2011).
[End of table]
As table 1 indicates, many of these newly established entities and
processes were created, in part, because the department had not
anticipated the accelerated pace of change in enemy tactics and
techniques that ultimately heightened the need for a rapid response to
new threats in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to the Defense Science
Board, while DOD, the military services, and combatant commands took
actions to respond more quickly to demands to fulfill urgent needs, it
became apparent that within the last half decade the department, as
well as the acquisition community it depends on, has struggled in
their ability to field new capabilities in a disciplined, efficient,
and effective way.[Footnote 16] While many entities started as ad hoc
organizations, several have been permanently established.
Meeting Urgent Needs Involves a Breadth of Activities:
Although each of the services' and Joint Staff's urgent needs
processes is distinct, we identified six broad activities involved
after the submission of an urgent need statement. These activities are
shown in table 2 below.
Table 2: Activities Involved in Meeting Urgent Needs:
Key activity: Validation;
Definition: An urgent need request is received from theater and
reviewed for validation by a headquarters entity. Validation involves
an "in-house" review of an urgent need request to determine if it
meets criteria to be recognized as an urgent operational need and thus
whether it should continue through the process.
Key activity: Facilitation;
Definition: The requirements, costs, potential solution, funding, and
other factors related to the course of action to be taken for the
fulfillment of the urgent need are developed and coordinated between
various entities. This can include, but is not limited to,
coordination between validation and solution-development entities,
coordination of requirements, and knowledge sharing.
Key activity: Sourcing;
Definition: Approval of the proposed course of action and assignment
of a sponsor who will carry out a course of action/potential solution.
Key activity: Execution;
Definition: The approved solution is developed and fielded. This
includes the acquisition, testing, and other activities involved in
solution development.
Key activity: Tracking;
Definition: Collection of feedback from the warfighter regarding
whether the solution met the urgent need request; also collection of
performance data regarding course of action and solution.
Key activity: Transition, Transfer, or Terminate;
Definition: The decision regarding the final disposition of the
capability in terms of whether it will be (1) transitioned to a
program of record if it addresses an enduring capability need, (2)
transferred to an interim sponsor for temporary funding if it
addresses a temporary capability that is not enduring but needs to be
maintained for some period, or (3) terminated if it addresses a niche
capability that is not enduring, nor is it to be maintained for
current operations.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Congressional Interest in DOD's Approach to Urgent Operational Needs
and the Need for Improvement:
Over the past 5 years, there have been several reviews of the
department's ability to rapidly respond and field urgently needed
capabilities in the 21st century security environment.[Footnote 17]
Some of these studies were initiated at the direction of Congress. In
fiscal year 2009, the House Armed Services Committee approved the
department's designation of a process improvement officer who was
tasked with applying Lean Six Sigma process improvement techniques to
the business practices of the department. The committee recommended
that the process improvement officer examine the processes for rapid
acquisition activities that have been established since the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan began and determine whether there were lessons
learned that might be integrated into the department's main
acquisition process. The department conducted the study and found (1)
significant variability in response time at the beginning of the
process, indicating unnecessary delays; (2) senior leadership
involvement in the process enables rapid decision making; (3) shorter
decision processes and focused organizations enable quicker response
than under normal requirements; and (4) reprogramming authority is
cumbersome and adds time to the urgent needs process. Furthermore, the
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009 included a
provision that would require best practices and process improvements
to ensure that urgent operational needs statements and joint urgent
operational needs statements are presented to appropriate authorities
for review and validation not later than 60 days after the documents
are submitted.[Footnote 18] Specifically, the committee report noted
that over the last several years, operational commanders in Iraq had
identified urgent operational needs for MRAP vehicles, nonlethal laser
dazzlers, and other critical equipment. Further, the committee stated
it was aware of allegations that requests for some of these items not
only went unmet, but were not even presented for more than a year to
the senior officials responsible for validating the requests.[Footnote
19] In 2009, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to commission
a study by an independent commission or a federally funded research
and development center to assess and report on the effectiveness of
the processes used by DOD for the generation of urgent operational
need requirements, and the acquisition processes used to fulfill such
requirements.[Footnote 20] In response to this requirement, the Under
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, asked the
Defense Science Board to establish a task force to conduct a study on
the effectiveness of the processes used by the department for the
generation of urgent operational needs requirements and the
acquisition processes used to fulfill such requirements. In July 2009,
the Defense Science Board released its report with recommendations on
potential consolidations necessary to rapidly field new capabilities
for the warfighter in a systematic and effective manner.
Moreover, Section 803 of the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (the FY 2011 NDAA) amended the
existing rapid acquisition authority. Previously, the authority could
be used to eliminate deficiencies that resulted in combat fatalities.
The amended section now permits the use of the authority to acquire
and deploy certain supplies to eliminate deficiencies that result in
combat casualties, rather than just combat fatalities. The amendment
also increased from $100 million to $200 million the amount that can
be used annually to acquire the supplies necessary to address such
deficiencies.[Footnote 21]
Additionally, Section 804 of the FY 2011 NDAA, among other things,
requires the Secretary of Defense to review the processes for the
fielding of capabilities in response to urgent operational needs,
consider improvements to those processes, and report to the
congressional defense committees in January 2012.[Footnote 22]
Fulfillment of Urgent Needs Involves a Number of Entities and
Processes, Resulting in Fragmentation and Some Overlap of Efforts:
The fulfillment of urgent needs involves numerous joint, OSD and
military service entities, which have increased over time. We
identified areas where some overlap exists among urgent needs
entities, such as the submission, validation, and processing of urgent
needs requirements. In addition, our analysis identified multiple
entities with a role in responding to similar types of urgently needed
capabilities, such as ISR and counter-IED, resulting in the potential
for duplication of efforts.
Numerous DOD and Military Service Entities Play a Key Role in the
Fulfillment of Urgent Needs:
The department has many entities that respond to the large number of
urgent needs requests submitted by the combatant commands and military
services. As previously reported by us and DOD, a complex set of
processes has evolved over time, involving numerous joint, OSD, and
military service entities over the past decade as the department seeks
to fulfill the capability gaps identified by warfighters. On the basis
of DOD's and our analysis, we have identified at least 31 entities
that play a significant role in the various urgent needs processes.
Table 3 below shows the 31 entities we identified and when they were
established.
Table 3: DOD Entities Involved in the Fulfillment of Urgent Needs:
Service/joint: OSD or joint;
Name of entity: Joint Staff, J8;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty];
Name of entity: Rapid Fielding Directorate;
Year implemented[A]: 2009;
Name of entity: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Task Force;
Year implemented[A]: 2008;
Name of entity: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) Task Force;
Year implemented[A]: 2007;
Name of entity: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization;
Year implemented[A]: 2006;
Name of entity: Rapid Reaction Technology Office;
Year implemented[A]: 2006;
Name of entity: Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations;
Year implemented[A]: 2006;
Name of entity: Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell;
Year implemented[A]: 2004.
Service/joint: Army;
Name of entity: Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Current and Future
Warfighting Capabilities Division;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Name of entity: Biometrics Identity Management Agency;
Year implemented[A]: 2010;
Name of entity: Asymmetric Warfare Group;
Year implemented[A]: 2006;
Name of entity: Rapid Fielding Initiative;
Year implemented[A]: 2002;
Name of entity: Rapid Equipping Force;
Year implemented[A]: 2002.
Name of entity: Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army
Training & Doctrine Command;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Project Manager (PM) or Program Executive Offices[B] (PEO), such as
Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition
(including Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Sensors-
Combined) or the Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar Program Directorate;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Service/joint: Navy;
Name of entity: Chief of Naval Operations N81D;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Name of entity: U.S. Fleet Forces Command;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Name of entity: U.S. Pacific Fleet;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Name of entity: Rapid Action Teams, led by a Chief of Naval Operations
Sponsor;
Year implemented[A]: 2007;
Name of entity: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary
Warfare;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Name of entity: Rapid Development and Deployment Office;
Year implemented[A]: 2006;
Name of entity: PM or PEO[B], such as PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Service/joint: Marine Corps;
Name of entity: Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and
Integration, Capabilities Development Directorate;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Name of entity: PM or PEO[B], such as PM Light Armored Vehicles;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Service/joint: Air Force;
Name of entity: Air Force Air Combat Command A8XM;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Name of entity: Air Force Air Mobility Command A5QX;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Name of entity: Requirements Policy & Process Division, Directorate of
Operational Capability Requirements;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Name of entity: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Name of entity: PM or PEO[B], such as Aeronautical Systems Center;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Service/joint: Special Operations Command;
Name of entity: Special Operations Command J8;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Name of entity: Special Operations Research, Development, and
Acquisition Center;
Year implemented[A]: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] Dates are not included for entities that were not established to
respond to urgent operational needs.
[B] Each military service has program offices responsible for specific
programs or portfolios of similar programs that may include solutions
to validated urgent need requirements. However, we have not identified
the universe of PMs/PEOs that are or have been involved in the
fulfillment of urgent needs.
[End of table]
Further analysis shows that these entities have three different
missions with respect to fulfilling urgent needs. First, some entities
identify and provide a quick response to threats presented by adaptive
enemies, but not always in support of urgent needs. Often these
entities engage in experimentation and rapid prototyping to accelerate
the transition of technologies to the warfighter. For example, the
Rapid Reaction Technology Office does not directly receive or validate
joint or service urgent needs, but rather anticipates disruptive
threats and in response funds solutions and new capabilities, some of
which have fulfilled validated joint urgent operational needs. Second,
some entities specifically process urgent needs and are generally
involved from validation to sourcing. For example, the joint urgent
operational needs process is overseen by Joint Staff J8, which
receives and validates urgent need requests, and the Joint Rapid
Acquisition Cell, which facilitates a rapid solution. In the Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps, various entities exist to validate,
facilitate, and source urgent needs for their respective processes.
Third, some entities focus on developing solutions in response to
urgent needs requests that have been validated, facilitated, and
sourced by other entities. These solution-development entities are
mostly acquisition program offices, such as Program Executive Office
Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition,
which also develop solutions in response to nonurgent needs as well as
manage existing systems. Finally, some entities are involved in two or
more of the three types of missions described above. For example,
JIEDDO anticipates threats, processes urgent needs requests, and
develops solutions.
Overlap Exists among the Numerous Entities Involved in Processing
Urgent Requirements and Expediting Solutions:
Our analysis shows that overlap exists among urgent needs entities in
the roles they play as well as the capabilities for which they are
responsible. Table 4 shows the roles played by the various
organizations in relation to the activities involved in meeting urgent
needs identified earlier.
Table 4: Roles of Urgent Needs Entities in Key Activities:
Service/Joint: OSD or Joint;
Entity involved in urgent needs: Joint Staff, J8;
Validation: [Check];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance Task Force;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Empty];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
(vehicle) Task Force;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization;
Validation: [Check];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Check];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Fielding Directorate; Rapid
Reaction Technology Office;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Fielding Directorate; Joint
Capability Technology Demonstration;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Empty];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Empty];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check].
Service/Joint: Army;
Entity involved in urgent needs: Deputy Chief of Staff, Army G-3/5/7,
Current and Future Warfighting Capabilities Division;
Validation: [Check];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Biometrics Identity Management Agency;
Validation: Service/Joint: [Empty];
Facilitation: Service/Joint: [Check];
Sourcing: Service/Joint: [Check];
Execution: Service/Joint: [Empty];
Tracking: Service/Joint: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: Service/Joint: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Asymmetric Warfare Group;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Empty];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Fielding Initiative;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Empty];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Check];
Tracking: [Empty];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Equipping Force;
Validation: [Check];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Check];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Army Capabilities Integration Center,
U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Empty];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check].
Entity involved in urgent needs: PM or PEO, such as Night
Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (Base
Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Sensors-Combined) or the
Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar Program Directorate;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Empty];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Check];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Service/Joint: Navy;
Entity involved in urgent needs: Chief Naval of Operations N81D;
Validation: [Check];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: U.S. Fleet Forces Command;
Validation: [Check];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Empty];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: U.S. Pacific Fleet;
Validation: [Check];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Empty];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Action Teams, led by a Chief of
Naval Operational Sponsor;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, Expeditionary Warfare;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Rapid Development and Deployment
Office;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Empty];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Check];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: PM or PEO, such as PEO Littoral and
Mine Warfare;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Empty];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Check];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check].
Service/Joint: Marine Corps;
Entity involved in urgent needs: Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration, Capabilities Development Directorate;
Validation: [A];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check].
Entity involved in urgent needs: PM or PEO, such as PM Light Armored
Vehicles;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Check];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Service/Joint: Air Force;
Entity involved in urgent needs: Air Combat Command A8XM;
Validation: [Check];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Empty];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Air Mobility Command A5QX;
Validation: [Check];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Empty];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Requirements Policy & Process
Division, Directorate of Operational Capability Requirements;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Office of the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition, responsible for Air Force Rapid
Response Process;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Empty];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Entity involved in urgent needs: PM or PEO, such as Aeronautical
Systems Center;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Empty];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Check];
Tracking: [Empty];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
Service/Joint: Special Operations Command;
Entity involved in urgent needs: Special Operations Command J8;
Validation: [Check];
Facilitation: [Check];
Sourcing: [Check];
Execution: [Empty];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Check].
Entity involved in urgent needs: Special Operations Research,
Development, and Acquisition Center;
Validation: [Empty];
Facilitation: [Empty];
Sourcing: [Empty];
Execution: [Check];
Tracking: [Check];
Transition, Transfer, or Terminate: [Empty].
[End of table]
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] In the Marine Corps, urgent needs are validated by theater
commanders. Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration
further validate urgent needs after a course of action has been
facilitated and sourced.
DOD entities at the joint level, and each of the services, also have
their own policies for meeting urgent needs. These policies result in
seven different processes for the fulfillment of urgent needs;
additionally, the Army Rapid Equipping Force also has an urgent needs
process. For example, warfighters may submit urgent needs, depending
on their military service and the type of need, to Joint Staff J8,
JIEDDO, Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7, Army Rapid Equipping
Force, Navy Fleet Forces Command or Commander Pacific Fleet, Marine
Corps Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Air
Force Major Commands, or Special Operations Command J8. These entities
then validate the submitted urgent need request and thus allow it to
proceed through their specific process. This contrasts with
traditional requirements and needs, which are generally processed
under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(JCIDS). JCIDS was established to provide the department with an
integrated, collaborative process to identify and guide development of
a broad set of new capabilities that address the current and emerging
security environment.
Moreover, within some of the services, multiple processes and
validation points exist. For example, in the Army, urgent needs can be
submitted via two routes: (1) the warfighter can make a request to the
Rapid Equipping Force for approval by its Director; or (2) the
warfighter can submit an operational needs statement, documenting the
urgent need to the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army G-3/5/7, Current
and Future Warfighting Capabilities Division, for validation and
prioritization. In the Air Force, urgent needs are handled by the
various major commands; however, Air Force headquarters also has a
process and an entity that can process urgent needs that do not get
fulfilled by the major commands.
Furthermore, at the joint level, six entities facilitate urgent needs
requests and five entities provide sourcing support for urgent needs
requests. Officials from two combatant commands have expressed
frustration with the number of entities involved in the processing of
urgent needs requests and suggested that streamlining of the
validation, facilitation, sourcing, and funding processes would
improve the timeliness of solutions. Additionally, many entities track
the fulfillment of urgent needs requests and their solutions; however,
most entities with a role in tracking focus only on specific requests
they process or solutions they developed. The overlap created by
numerous entities involved in processing urgent requirements and
expediting solutions may create fragmented efforts and overall
inefficiencies within DOD.
Multiple Entities Respond to Requests for Similar Capabilities,
Resulting in Potential Duplication of Efforts:
Multiple entities we surveyed reported a role in responding to similar
categories of urgently needed capabilities. We identified eight
entities with a role in responding to ISR capabilities, five entities
with a role in responding to counter-IED capabilities, and six
entities with a role in responding to communications, command and
control, and computer technology, among others.
Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, multiple
organizations have been created to handle specific types of urgently
needed capabilities for urgent operational needs and these
organizations also experience overlap. For example, JIEDDO initially
was established as an Army task force and was changed to a DOD task
force to meet urgent counter-IED needs; however, counter-IED is not
handled exclusively by JIEDDO, and we have previously reported that
JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over counter-IED
initiatives throughout DOD and are at risk of duplicating efforts.
[Footnote 23] Similarly, we previously reported that many biometrics
activities are dispersed throughout DOD at many organizational levels
and that DOD has been focusing most of its efforts on quickly fielding
biometrics systems, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, to address
DOD's immediate warfighting needs without guidance to prevent
duplication of biometrics-related efforts.[Footnote 24] In 2010, the
Army Biometrics Task force was institutionalized as the Biometrics
Identity Management Agency to lead DOD activities to program,
coordinate, integrate, and synchronize biometrics technologies and
capabilities. However, our ongoing work has identified instances of
potential duplication.[Footnote 25] For example:
* Both the Army and the Marine Corps continue to develop their own
counter-IED mine rollers with full or partial JIEDDO funding. The
Marine Corps' mine roller per unit cost is about $85,000 versus a cost
range of $77,000 to $225,000 per unit for the Army mine roller.
However, officials disagree about which system is most effective, and
DOD has not conducted comparative testing and evaluation of the two
systems. Further, JIEDDO officials said that JIEDDO cannot compel the
services to buy one solution over the other.
* The Navy developed a directed-energy technology to fill a critical
theater capability gap, yet JIEDDO later underwrote the Air Force's
development of the same technology to create a more powerful and
faster-moving equipment item than the Navy had developed. However, the
Air Force has now determined that its system will not meet
requirements and has deferred fielding the technology pending further
study. This may have a negative effect on the continued development of
this technology by the Navy or others for use in theater. For example,
according to DOD officials, during the recent testing of the Air
Force's system, safety concerns were noted unique to that system that
may limit the warfighter's willingness to accept the technology.
However, according to Navy officials, the Navy plans to begin fielding
its system in 2011.
While our review did find the potential for duplication, we also found
some cases where various entities took the initiative to work
together, resulting in collaboration to satisfy urgent needs. For
example, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell received eight validated
joint urgent operational needs requirements, and facilitated the
integration of the eight separate, but very much related, ISR and
force-protection needs. Specifically, this coordination involved the
Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, U.S. Central Command, JIEDDO, and the
Army to consolidate the validated requirements, find a sponsor, and
develop a solution. Approximately 6 months from the date of funding,
the Army PEO-Intelligence, Electronic Warfare & Sensors, specifically
Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition,
developed and fielded the Base Expeditionary Targeting and
Surveillance Sensors-Combined, a flexible, movable, adjustable,
scalable, and expeditionary base defense system for persistent ground
targeting and surveillance.
DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Guidance and Full Visibility to
Effectively Manage and Oversee Its Urgent Needs:
DOD has taken several steps to improve the management and oversight of
its urgent needs. While these efforts have shown some progress, the
department does not have comprehensive policy and guidance for
directing efforts across DOD, the military services, and combatant
commands to effectively manage and oversee the fulfillment of its
urgent needs. Moreover, the department lacks full visibility over the
full range of urgent needs efforts from funding to measuring results
achieved.
DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Improve Management and Oversight of Urgent
Needs Requests:
In response to our April 2010 finding that DOD's urgent needs guidance
was fragmented, Joint Staff officials stated that they were in the
process of revising the Joint Staff instruction on the joint urgent
needs process to better align with the department's strategic plan for
urgent needs.[Footnote 26] Moreover, OSD has been drafting Directive-
Type Memorandum 10-002 to establish policy, assign responsibilities,
and outline procedures for the resolution of joint urgent operational
needs.[Footnote 27] The draft directive-type memorandum seeks to
provide guidance on a range of issues, including rapid-acquisition
authority, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell's role as the DOD focal
point for tracking and coordinating joint urgent operational needs
resolution, as well as clearly defining the responsibilities of those
involved in the processing of urgent needs. A senior DOD official
explained that after review by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, senior DOD officials decided to
expand the draft memorandum to include the services' urgent
operational needs--as well as joint urgent operational needs--to
increase visibility. According to senior DOD officials, the department
expects the memorandum to be issued in 2011.
Furthermore, in 2009, the department established the Rapid Fielding
Directorate within the office of the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering,[Footnote 28] Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, and reorganized the Joint Rapid Acquisition
Cell, the Rapid Reaction Technology Office, and the Joint Capability
Technology Demonstrations under this new office to better align
similar missions related to accelerating capabilities to the
warfighter.[Footnote 29] Rapid Fielding Directorate officials stated
that one of the first imperatives is to accelerate the delivery of
capabilities to the warfighter, emphasizing the ability to efficiently
collaborate directly with the military services. Additionally,
officials from the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell stated that they are
working to address a number of challenges, including applying their
definition of urgent need to validate requirements, prioritizing the
urgency of needs identified by the warfighter, developing universal
metrics to track and evaluate urgent needs, and formalizing the
department's urgent needs processes. Finally, to address concerns of
senior-level leadership regarding the management of its urgent needs,
the department is planning to establish a senior-level oversight
council in Directive-Type Memorandum 10-002. According to a senior OSD
official, this council may include three-and four-star-level
representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the military services
to ensure that all efforts across the department are synchronized to
rapidly acquire and field materiel solutions to urgent needs.
DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive Policy for Guiding All Parts of the
Process for Addressing Warfighters' Urgent Needs Requests:
Despite these actions, DOD does not have departmentwide guidance that
provides a common departmentwide approach for how all urgent needs are
to be addressed. Guidance for issues that affect all the defense
components originates at the DOD level, typically either through a
directive or instruction. A directive is a broad policy document that
assigns responsibility and delegates authority to the DOD components.
Directives establish policy that applies across all the services,
combatant commands, and DOD components. An instruction implements the
policy, or prescribes the manner for carrying out the policy, for
operating a program or activity, and for assigning responsibilities.
According to federal best practices reported in GAO's Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government,[Footnote 30] management is
responsible for developing detailed policies, procedures, and
practices to help program managers achieve desired results through
effective stewardship of public resources. However, DOD has not issued
any such directives or instructions that provide policy and guidance
over all of its urgent needs processes. DOD is in the process of
developing guidance concerning its urgent needs processes through the
Directive-Type Memorandum 10-002. However, it remains in draft form,
so it is not clear to what extent this guidance will establish such a
common approach for service and other urgent needs processes.
Additionally, our analysis found that DOD has a fragmented approach in
managing all of its urgent needs submissions and validated
requirements. For example, the Joint Staff, JIEDDO, the military
services, and the Special Operations Command have issued their own
guidance outlining activities involved in processing and meeting their
specific urgent needs. Through comparative analysis of policies issued
by the Joint Staff, each military service, JIEDDO, and the Special
Operations Command for managing the various urgent needs processes, we
identified that the policies often varied. Moreover, we found that
Joint Staff, Navy, and Air Force policies do not define roles and
responsibilities for some activities involved, as shown in table 5.
Table 5: Activities Included in Urgent Needs Policies and Guidance:
Organization: Joint Staff;
Policy: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01,
July 15, 2005;
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Not Validated[A]: Activity not included in the policy/guidance;
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Execution: Activity not included in the policy/guidance;
Tracking: Activity not included in the policy/guidance;
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity not included in the
policy/guidance.
Organization: Army;
Policy: Army Regulation 71-9, December 28, 2009;
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Tracking: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity included in the
policy/guidance.
Organization: Navy;
Policy: Joint Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research Development and Acquisition), July 19, 2007; Secretary of
the Navy Notice 5000, March 12, 2009[B];
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Tracking: Activity not included in the policy/guidance;
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity not included in the
policy/guidance.
Organization: Marine Corps;
Policy: Marine Corps Order 3900.17, October 17, 2008;
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Tracking: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity included in the
policy/guidance.
Organization: Air Force;
Policy: Air Force Instruction 63-114, June 12, 2008; Air Force
Instruction 10-601, July 12, 2010;
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Tracking: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity not included in the
policy/guidance.
Organization: JIEDDO;
Policy: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
Instruction 5000.01, November 6, 2009;
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Tracking: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity included in the
policy/guidance.
Organization: Special Operations Command;
Policy: Special Operations Command Directive 71-4, June 9, 2009;
Special Operations Command Directive 70-1, March 19, 2010;
Generation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Validation: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Not Validated[A]: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Funding: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Execution: Activity included in the policy/guidance;
Tracking: Activity not included in the policy/guidance;
Transition, transfer, or terminate: Activity included in the
policy/guidance.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Notes: The data are from urgent needs policy and guidance.
[A] The "not validated" activity within the urgent needs process
refers to what occurs when an urgent need is not approved.
[B] The Secretary of the Navy Notice 5000 is an additional piece of
guidance that clarifies and supplements the Joint Memorandum that
describes the Navy urgent needs process.
[End of table]
As indicated in table 5, some policies include each of the activities
involved in the processing and fulfillment of urgent needs. However,
Special Operations Command, Joint Staff, Navy, and Air Force policies
do not include guidance on all the activities included in the process.
For example, we determined the following:
* Joint Staff policy did not address how to provide feedback on urgent
needs that are not validated. Officials from one combatant command
expressed frustration that they received no feedback as to why joint
urgent operational needs they submitted were not validated and lacked
adequate insight to understand the decision process. However, other
policies addressed this issue. For example, Navy guidance stated that
urgent needs that were not validated would be returned to the
requester with rationale as to why or with recommendations on how to
revise the request, or both.[Footnote 31]
* The Joint Staff, Navy, and Air Force policies did not define roles
and responsibilities involved in the decision to transition, transfer,
or terminate the capability solution provided. Furthermore, Special
Operations Command, Joint Staff, and Navy policies did not address how
validated requirements would be tracked as a capability solution was
being developed.
* Also, DOD's urgent needs policies varied for transitioning or
transferring capabilities. For example:
- It is JIEDDO's policy to decide within 2 years whether to transition
or transfer the capability over to a service or agency or to terminate
it.[Footnote 32]
- The Special Operations Command determines at the 1-year mark whether
the capability is still needed in-theater, and if so, defines out-year
funding requirements and how the funding will be obtained.
- While the Army has a process in place for transitioning urgent
needs, it is applicable only to those urgent needs that are nominated
to go through the Army's Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition
process. However, this process identifies and approves only certain
capabilities that have been nominated for sustainment, rather than
tracking all capabilities fielded for the Army's urgent needs.
[Footnote 33]
During our review, numerous officials stated the need for overarching,
uniform guidance to all entities involved in urgent needs processes.
Senior officials we spoke with stated that the department needs to
provide more comprehensive management and oversight over all of its
urgent needs. Additionally, combatant command, Joint Staff, and
service officials stated a need for policies to be explicit regarding
the necessary activities that must be addressed within the urgent
needs process. For example, officials at one combatant command stated
that when submitting an urgent need through the joint urgent
operational needs process, they lacked insight into the validation
process and metrics used by the Joint Staff, as well as guidance on
how joint urgent operational needs are evaluated across the combatant
commands. An official at a different combatant command emphasized the
importance of defining which requests truly qualify as an urgent need,
and noted that the Joint Staff's requirements process lacks a method
to verify that requirements are properly defined. Moreover, Joint
Staff officials discussed the importance of defining a joint urgent
operational need, as well as criteria for what qualifies as an urgent
need in their guidance that is currently undergoing revisions.
[Footnote 34] Army officials noted that inconsistency exists regarding
rapid acquisition guidance between the Joint Staff, Army, and Air
Force policies. And finally, Air Force officials stated that urgent
needs policy should include guidance on which steps within the
acquisition process should and can be waived, deferred, or tailored in
order to rapidly acquire capabilities, which would allow acquisition
personnel to more quickly address urgent needs. Because DOD does not
have baseline DOD-wide guidance that applies to urgent operational
needs processes across the department clearly defining the roles and
responsibilities of how urgent needs should be assessed, processed,
and managed--including activities such as tracking the status of a
validated requirement--the department continues to maintain a
fragmented approach to managing its urgent needs processes. As a
result, the department risks inefficiently responding to urgent needs
and potentially duplicating efforts.
DOD Lacks Full Visibility over Urgent Needs Efforts, Challenging DOD's
Ability to Manage and Oversee Its Processes:
DOD lacks full visibility over the full range of urgent needs efforts--
from funding to measuring results. This includes the lack of a single
senior-level focal point to help bring cohesion to DOD's urgent needs
processes. It also includes the lack of a system and metrics to
facilitate coordinating, monitoring, and tracking progress and
measuring results.
Funding Estimated at More Than $76 Billion over 6 Years:
The department lacks full visibility to readily identify the total
cost of its urgent needs efforts. However, we obtained data from the
majority of entities in our analysis on how much funding was made
available to them for the fulfillment of urgent needs. On the basis of
the data submitted to us in response to our data-collection
instrument, the total funding for the fulfillment of urgent needs is
at least $76.9 billion from fiscal years 2005 through 2010.[Footnote
35] As indicated in figure 1 below, funding is spread unevenly among
many urgent needs entities because the entities have different roles
in the fulfillment of urgent needs. In addition, some entities like
JIEDDO and the Rapid Reaction Technology Office have access to special
funds[Footnote 36] for the fulfillment of urgent needs, while others
rely on different sources such as funding through the annual budget
process or the reprogramming or transfer of funds from other DOD
programs and activities.
Figure 1: Estimated Funding for the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational
Needs of Entities Identified by GAO, Fiscal Year 2005 through Fiscal
Year 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart and associated horizontal bar graph]
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) Task Force: $40.441 billion
(53%);
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: $19.450 billion
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Task Force: $6.251 billion
(9%);
Other: $10,757 billion (13%); including:
Rapid Fielding Initiative: $4.502 billion.
Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar Program Directorate: $2.476 billion;
Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Sensors-Combined: $1.428
billion;
Rapid Equipping Force: $1.090 billion;
Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell: $475 million;
Rapid Reaction Technology Office: $442 million;
Rapid Action Teams: $218 million;
Biometrics Identity Management Agency: $52 million;
Rapid Development and Deployment Office: $41 million;
Rapid Response Process: $33 million.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Of the $76.9 billion in urgent needs funds represented in figure 1,
$67.1 billion or 87.2 percent has been assigned to OSD entities, $9.5
billion or 12.4 percent to Army entities, $259 million or less than 1
percent to Navy entities, and $33.0 million or less than 1 tenth of 1
percent to Air Force entities. The amounts reported in figure 1 may
underestimate the actual total amounts expended on urgent needs for
the given years because the list of entities is not exhaustive.
Further, the data are self-reported and not all entities we identified
provided funding data.[Footnote 37] Without full visibility of its
urgent needs efforts and costs, the department is not fully able to
identify key improvements and is inhibited in its ability to build
agile, adaptive, and innovative structures capable of quickly
identifying emerging gaps and adjusting program and budgetary
priorities to rapidly equip and field capabilities that will mitigate
those gaps.
Disparate Tracking Systems Limit DOD's Visibility over Its Urgent
Needs Process and Can Hamper Improvement Efforts:
DOD cannot readily identify the totality of its urgent needs efforts
as well as the cost of such efforts because it has limited visibility
over all urgent needs submitted by warfighters--both from joint and
service-specific sources. DOD and service officials cited two
impediments to full visibility: the lack of a comprehensive tracking
system to manage and oversee all urgent needs identified by the
warfighter and a lack of clearly defined roles. Specifically, DOD and
the services have disparate ways of tracking urgent needs; some have
formal databases to input information while others use more informal
methods such as e-mailing to solicit feedback. For example, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and each of the military services utilize electronic
databases to track capability solutions as they move through the
urgent needs process. However, more than a third of the entities
involved in the process did not collect or provide the necessary
information for the joint or service-based systems to track those
solutions. Rather, there was confusion over whose role it was to
collect and input data into these tracking systems. For example, one
program office that develops urgent needs solutions uses a metric of
operational readiness levels to track the effectiveness of its
solutions. However, the program office does not provide these data to
the joint or services' electronic databases. Rather, program office
officials stated they believed it was the responsibility of the
combatant command, Joint Staff, or service offices that maintain the
databases to maintain this information. However, officials from the
Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, which maintains the joint database,
stated they obtain data from the other individual databases based on
what the DOD components input.
DOD and military service officials stated the need for improvements to
tracking urgent needs. For example, some senior DOD officials stated
that they would like senior acquisition executives and other oversight
officials to review every 4 to 6 weeks how joint and service urgent
needs are progressing. Combatant command officials stated that while
they have visibility into the database for tracking joint urgent
operational needs, they do not have the same visibility into the
services' databases. Specifically, officials at one combatant command,
who stated they have zero visibility into the urgent needs being
addressed by the services, cited the value in having a global database
of all service and joint urgent needs as they develop and transition,
transfer, or terminate fielded solutions. Additionally, Army officials
recognized the need for improved visibility. Specifically the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army issued a memorandum in April 2010 to
develop a rapid acquisition/rapid equipping common operating picture
and collaboration tool as a means to increase efficiency and
transparency of Army urgent need processes. Stakeholders include
various Army entities as well as numerous other entities involved in
the process. Without full visibility into all of its urgent needs, the
department, military services, and combatant commands risk the
potential for overlap or duplication in developing capabilities to
respond to urgent needs. This reinforces the need for a single focal
point at a sufficiently high level to bring greater cohesion to these
disparate efforts.
According to DOD officials, the need for improved oversight was an
important factor in the decision to revise the Directive-Type
Memorandum 10-002. Furthermore, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell officials
stated the draft Directive-Type Memorandum 10-002 would require DOD
components to provide visibility to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell
of urgent needs managed through the DOD entities' processes.
DOD Has Not Established a Universal Set of Metrics for Evaluating the
Effectiveness and Tracking the Status of Solutions Provided to the
Warfighter:
Our analysis found that the feedback mechanisms across DOD, the Joint
Staff, the military services, JIEDDO, and the Special Operations
Command are varied and fragmented. In April 2010, we recommended that
DOD develop an established, formal feedback mechanism or channel for
the military services to provide feedback to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell on how well fielded solutions met
urgent needs. The department concurred with the recommendation and
stated that it would develop new DOD policy and that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff would update the Chairman's instruction to establish
requirements for oversight and management of the fulfillment of urgent
needs. The majority of DOD urgent needs entities we surveyed reported
that they do not collect all the data needed to determine how well
these solutions are performing. For example, one entity reported that
information on whether a deployed solution was successful is largely
anecdotal and there is no uniformity in the way such data are
collected and reported. Additionally, while the Air Force uses its
requirements database to track the progress of systems or solutions
under development, it has not formalized metrics to assess the
performance of deployed systems or solutions, or for reporting such
performance to senior leadership.
In April 2010, we also recommended that DOD develop and implement
standards for accurately tracking and documenting key process
milestones such as funding, acquisition, fielding, and assessment, and
for updating data management systems to create activity reports to
facilitate management review and external oversight of the process.
DOD agreed with these recommendations and noted actions it planned to
take to address them. However, our analysis found that the department
lacked a method or metric to track the status of a validated urgent
requirement across the services and DOD components, such as whether a
requirement currently in development could be applicable to another
service. Specifically, officials from one combatant command stated
that they do not have visibility into the urgent needs being addressed
at the service level, which could be beneficial to have so that the
combatant command would have awareness of capabilities being developed
and could communicate with that particular service if the combatant
command saw it as a solution to an urgent need. In addition, officials
within the Joint Staff recognize the importance of establishing
tracking in an urgent needs system and plan to include language in
revisions to their policy on joint urgent operational needs. With the
establishment of a metric or mechanism to track the status of a
validated requirement, the department would gain improved awareness of
urgent needs as they move through the process.
DOD Lacks a Focal Point Responsible for Managing, Overseeing, and
Maintaining Full Visibility over All the Department's Urgent Needs
Efforts:
DOD's lack of visibility over all urgent needs requests is due in part
to the lack of a senior-level focal point (i.e., gatekeeper) that has
the responsibility to manage, oversee, and have full visibility to
track and monitor all emerging capability gaps being identified by
warfighters in-theater. At present, the department has not established
a senior-level focal point to (1) lead the department's efforts to
fulfill validated urgent needs requirements, (2) develop and implement
DOD-wide policy on the processing of urgent needs or rapid
acquisition, or (3) maintain full visibility over its urgent needs
efforts and the costs of those efforts. We have previously testified
and reported on the benefits of establishing a single point of focus
at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate and integrate various DOD
efforts to address concerns, such as with counterterrorism and the
transformation of military capabilities.[Footnote 38] Moreover, the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review seeks to further reform the
department's institutions and processes to support the urgent needs of
the warfighter, buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly
needed, and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and
responsibly. Similarly, the Secretary of Defense initiated major
efforts in August 2010 to significantly reduce excess costs and apply
savings achieved by reducing duplication and overhead, and set a goal
to find $100 billion in savings over a 5-year period. Without
establishment of a senior-level focal point, DOD officials may be
unable to identify areas for improvement, including consolidation, to
prioritize validated but unfunded requirements, to identify funding
challenges and a means to address such challenges, or ensure
collaboration to modify capabilities in development to meet several
similar urgent needs requirements--and may be unable to reduce any
overlap or duplication that may exist as solutions are developed or
modified.
Opportunities Exist for Consolidating Urgent Needs Processes and
Entities:
In addition to not having a comprehensive approach for managing and
overseeing its urgent needs efforts, DOD has not conducted a
comprehensive evaluation of its urgent needs processes and entities to
identify opportunities for consolidation. Given the overlap and
potential for duplication we identified in this review, coupled with
similar concerns raised by other studies, there may be opportunities
for DOD to further improve its urgent needs processes through
consolidation. On the basis of our discussions with DOD officials as
well as our analysis of prior reports and studies and the responses
from our data-collection instrument, we identified several options
that the department might consider in an effort to evaluate the merits
of consolidating its urgent needs processes and entities.
DOD Has Not Comprehensively Evaluated Opportunities for Consolidation
across the Department:
Despite various reports by the Defense Science Board, GAO, and others--
that raised concerns about the numbers and roles of the various
entities and processes involved and the potential of overlap and
duplication--DOD has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for
consolidation across the department. For example, the Defense Science
Board Task Force found that DOD has done little to adopt urgent needs
as a critical, ongoing DOD institutional capability essential to
addressing future threats, and it twice provided recommendations to
the department about potential consolidations. Specifically, in July
2009, the task force identified a number of critical actions to
address the situation, including a dual acquisition path that
separates "rapid" and "deliberate" acquisitions as well as the
establishment of a new agency to implement this separation, called the
Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency. Further, the Task Force stated
that this new agency should (1) be focused on acquiring new solutions
to joint urgent operational needs; (2) work with the combatant
commands to anticipate future needs; and (3) oversee and coordinate
tracking of all urgent need statements in conjunction with the
services and the service components. Contrary to these
recommendations, some DOD officials whom we interviewed across the
department expressed their concern with the creation of a new agency
since the Secretary of Defense publicly questioned why it was
"necessary to bypass existing institutions and procedures to get the
capabilities needed to protect U.S. troops and fight ongoing wars."
[Footnote 39]
According to senior OSD officials, the department has conducted
studies, including a Lean Six Sigma study, to determine lessons
learned from several independent urgent needs processes that might be
integrated into the department's main acquisition process. Briefings
have been presented to the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, making the business case to standardize the
department's urgent needs processes, improve support to the
warfighter, and achieve greater collaboration across the department.
However, DOD has not developed or implemented any courses of action to
address the findings of these studies. Many DOD and military service
officials stated that higher-level senior leadership needs to take
decisive action to improve and formalize its urgent needs processes,
thus reducing unnecessary duplication in staff, IT, support, and
funding. Until the department comprehensively evaluates its strategic
direction on urgent needs, it will be unaware of opportunities for
consolidation across the department as well as opportunities for
improved coordination, or other actions to achieve savings or
increased efficiencies in its fulfillment of urgent needs.
DOD Directive 5105.02 directs the Deputy Secretary of Defense to serve
as the Chief Management Officer of the department with the
responsibility and function, among others, to establish performance
goals and measures for improving and evaluating overall economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness and monitor and measure the progress of
the department.[Footnote 40] Moreover, the department's Strategic
Management Plan outlines the five top-level business priorities of
DOD, including "Reform the DoD Acquisition and Support Processes" as
its third business priority.[Footnote 41] A goal of this priority is
to focus research and development to address warfighting requirements
in an effort to speed technology transitions focused on warfighting
needs. Furthermore, GAO's Business Process Reengineering Assessment
Guide establishes that a comprehensive analysis of alternative
processes should include a performance-based, risk-adjusted analysis
of benefits and costs for each alternative.[Footnote 42] Our prior
work on business process reengineering has demonstrated the importance
of exploring available options, including the potential of each option
to achieve the desired goals as well as to determine the benefits,
costs, and risks of each.[Footnote 43]
Other Options Aimed at Consolidation and Increased Efficiencies:
Given the overlap and potential for duplication we identified in this
review, coupled with similar concerns raised by other studies, we
identified and analyzed a number of options aimed at potential
consolidations in an effort to provide ideas for the department to
consider in streamlining its urgent needs entities and processes. The
options are presented in table 6 below. Using information and
documentation provided by DOD officials, prior reports and studies,
and the responses from our data-collection instrument, we analyzed
each option in terms of its potential capacity to (1) reduce overlap
or duplication or both, if any, in the mission, roles, and key
activities; (2) reduce fragmentation and potential gaps in the
processes; (3) increase coordination and visibility; and (4) increase
efficiencies. We also assessed the advantages and disadvantages of
each option. Additionally, while title 10, U.S. Code, provides that
the military services are responsible for equipping and training their
own forces, DOD officials indicated that title 10 would not preclude
consolidating or otherwise streamlining the processing of urgent
operational needs to maximize efficiency and response to the
warfighter.
Table 6: Identified Potential Options for Consolidating the
Department's Urgent Needs Processes, with Advantages and Disadvantages:
Option 1: Consolidate into one OSD-level entity all the urgent needs
processes of the services and DOD, while keeping the development of
solutions at the services' program offices. This option would
consolidate eight urgent needs processes into a single process at the
OSD level. The option addresses consolidation of processing
activities, such as the submission from the warfighters, validating
the requirement as urgently needed, sourcing, facilitating the
solution development or modification, and tracking the fielded
solution. However, the option recognizes the need for the solution
development to remain at the service-level program offices.
Advantages:
* the process for the warfighter could be simplified if there were no
multiple policies, procedures, points of contact, and bureaucracies
involved in fulfilling their urgent needs;
* a single validation point may provide an additional opportunity to
prioritize urgent needs;
* may expand visibility over all urgent needs, including (1) the types
of capabilities being requested; (2) the types of solutions being
developed; (3) the tracking of solutions;
Disadvantages:
* may eliminate potentially duplicative work on solutions;
* may improve efficiency through consolidation of staff and
infrastructure;
Option 2: Consolidate entities that have overlapping mission or
capability portfolios regarding urgent needs solutions. Rather than
consolidate entire entities, DOD may find it beneficial to consolidate
elements of entities that overlap in function. For example, DOD could
consolidate all entities involved in the development of urgent needs
solutions for biometrics. Additionally, for example, JIEDDO has a
training element that may overlap with the services‘ own training
missions.
Advantages:
* may improve efficiency and effectiveness of revised entities;
* research and development may benefit from consolidating subject-
matter expertise;
* may eliminate potentially duplicative work on solutions;
Disadvantages:
* may remove expertise needed by entities to conduct missions
unrelated to the urgent needs process;
* may stifle innovation that occurs through varying approaches to
solving capability gaps.
Option 3: Establish a gatekeeper within each service to oversee all
key activities to fulfill a validated urgent need requirement. Some
phases of the process are fragmented”without clear ownership”and
overseen by multiple entities. For example, Navy guidance that
designates the Chief of Naval Operations to serve as the Navy Urgent
Needs Gatekeeper does not task the Chief of Naval Operations with
responsibility to ensure the tracking of urgent needs or the oversight
of the transition, termination, or transfer process.
Advantages:
* centralized oversight may aid in minimizing fragmentation, overlap,
and duplication within each process;
* urgent needs processes could be managed holistically rather than
sequentially;
* may increase coordination, visibility, and accountability within
services‘ processes;
Disadvantages:
* an additional layer of oversight may slow down the urgent needs
processes;
* flexibility and agility in addressing urgent needs may be impeded;
* would still have several urgent needs processes within DOD that
would require coordination.
Option 4: Consolidate within each service any overlapping activities
in the urgent needs process. The services‘ activities include the
submission of an urgent needs request, its validation, execution,
tracking, transition, termination”and the transfer of any solution.
For example, the Army could consolidate overlapping activities, such
as its multiple entry and validation points, and the Air Force could
centralize its urgent needs processes that are in place at each major
command.
Advantages:
* may allow full transparency of each service's process;
* may improve efficiency through consolidation of staff and
infrastructure;
* may eliminate potentially duplicative work on solutions;
Disadvantages:
* may inhibit any flexibility in addressing urgent needs and reduce
any agility that may allow existing urgent needs entities to respond
to warfighters innovatively and rapidly;
* may eliminate subject-matter expertise within existing entities;
* would still have several processes across the department.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
The options we identified are not meant to be exhaustive or mutually
exclusive. Rather, DOD would need to perform its own analysis,
carefully weighing the advantages and disadvantages of options it
identifies to determine the optimal course of action. Additionally, it
must be recognized that many entities involved in the fulfillment of
urgent needs have other roles as well. For example, while the
Biometrics Information Management Agency may respond directly to an
urgent need, it also has the mission to lead the department's
activities to program, integrate, and synchronize biometric
technologies and capabilities. Furthermore, several DOD officials also
pointed out that although efficiency is important, the speed of
development and effectiveness of solutions are generally a higher
priority for urgent needs.
In sharing our analysis of options with DOD and military service
officials, they agreed that such an analysis considering all the
advantages and disadvantages of consolidation is a necessary step to
improving the department's fulfillment of urgent needs. Given the
increasing number of urgent needs and the escalating fiscal
challenges, it is critical for DOD to reevaluate the current status of
how it fulfills its urgent needs and whether there is potential to
reduce duplication, fragmentation, and overlap to achieve increased
efficiencies or cost savings, or both. Without a comprehensive
evaluation of its urgent needs entities and processes, DOD will not be
in a position to know if it is fulfilling urgent needs in the most
efficient and effective manner as well as accomplishing its strategic
management objectives.
Conclusions:
DOD has issued guidance that addresses several aspects of the process
for warfighter needs, but the entities aiding warfighters' needs do
not have DOD-wide guidance in such areas as clearly defining roles and
responsibilities and minimum requirements for processing requests.
Additionally, DOD and military service officials have limited
awareness of all urgent needs--including how well those needs are
being met--which can hamper their ability to effectively manage and
identify areas where overlap and duplication exist, in accordance with
the department's strategic and long-term goals. Yet DOD does not have
a focal point to provide visibility into the totality of these urgent
needs activities. Without DOD-wide guidance on the department's urgent
needs processes and a focal point to lead its overall efforts on
urgent operational needs and to act as an advocate within the
department for issues related to the department's ability to rapidly
respond to urgent needs, DOD is likely to continue to risk
duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented efforts, which contributes to
inefficiency and loss of potential financial savings. Additionally,
without full visibility and the establishment of a metric or mechanism
to track the status of a validated requirement, including its
transition, the department may not be able to identify key
improvements. Moreover, without a formal feedback mechanism or channel
for the military services to provide feedback, the department is
likely to be unaware of how well fielded solutions are performing.
Finally, we acknowledge that rapid response to urgent needs has a high
priority, but on the basis of our analyses we believe there are still
opportunities to achieve efficiencies without sacrificing response to
the warfighter. Without one DOD office--such as the Chief Management
Officer--taking a leadership role to analyze options for consolidating
urgent needs processes and entities, there are both real and potential
risks of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation in the efforts, as
well as the risk that DOD may not address urgent warfighter needs in
the most efficient and cost-effective manner.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To promote a more comprehensive approach to planning, management, and
oversight of the department's fulfillment of urgent operational needs,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five
actions:
* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics to develop and promulgate DOD-wide guidance across all
urgent needs processes that:
- establishes baseline policy for the fulfillment of urgent
operational needs;
- clearly defines common terms as well as the roles, responsibilities,
and authorities of the OSD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands,
and military services for all phases of the urgent needs process,
including, but not limited to, generation, validation, funding,
execution, tracking, and management of the transition, termination, or
transfer process and that incorporates all available expedited
acquisition procedures;
- designates a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (such as the Rapid
Fielding Directorate, or other entity as deemed appropriate) with the
appropriate authority and resources, dedicated to leading the
department's urgent needs efforts, including, but not limited to: (1)
acting as an advocate within the department for issues related to
DOD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs; (2) improving
visibility across all urgent needs entities and processes; and (3)
ensuring tools and mechanisms are used to track, monitor, and manage
the status of urgent needs, from validation through the transition,
including a formal feedback mechanism or channel for military services
to provide feedback on how well fielded solutions met urgent needs;
and:
- directs the DOD Components to establish minimum processes and
requirements for each of the above phases of the process.
* Direct DOD's Chief Management Officer to evaluate potential options
for consolidation to reduce overlap, duplication, and fragmentation,
and take appropriate action.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred
with all five of our recommendations. However, DOD stated that
specific actions it will take to address these recommendations will be
identified in a report on its urgent needs processes required by the
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011
and due to Congress in January 2012.[Footnote 44] This act requires
DOD to review its processes for the fielding of capabilities in
response to urgent operational needs and consider such improvements as
providing a streamlined and expedited approach, clearly defining the
roles and responsibilities for carrying out all phases of the process,
and establishing a formal feedback mechanism.
Although DOD noted in its comments that actions to be taken would be
identified in its subsequent congressionally mandated report, it did
provide some actions it planned to take. For example, DOD agreed to
issue guidance to address our recommendations that DOD develop and
promulgate DOD-wide guidance across all urgent needs processes that
establishes a baseline policy and directs DOD components to establish
minimum processes and requirements across the urgent needs process.
DOD stated this policy will permit DOD components to operate their own
processes, but would maintain a sufficient baseline commonality to
maintain DOD oversight. We agree that nothing in our recommendations
preclude the DOD components from maintaining their own urgent needs
processes, but as we reported, these processes should be part of a
comprehensive DOD-wide approach for how all urgent needs should be
addressed.
Additionally, with regard to our recommendation that DOD develop
guidance that identifies a focal point to lead the department's urgent
needs efforts, DOD stated that the Director of the JRAC would act in
this capacity pending the outcome of the congressionally mandated
study. We agree that this would be a good step towards addressing our
recommendation until DOD completes its review. Finally, in concurring
with our recommendation that DOD evaluate potential options for
consolidation, DOD stated that the Deputy Chief Management Officer and
the military services' Chief Management Officers would provide
oversight and assistance in DOD's review of the end-to-end process
with regard to utilizing process improvement techniques and tools.
Providing this DOD review specifically includes an evaluation of
potential consolidation options, we agree that it would address our
recommendation. Technical comments were provided separately and
incorporated as appropriate. The department's written comments are
reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. This report will be available
at no charge on GAO's website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8365 or by e-mail at SolisW@gao.gov. Contact
information for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who
have made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix
III.
Signed by:
William M. Solis, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C.W. Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jason Chaffetz:
Chairman:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine what entities exist within the Department of Defense
(DOD) for responding to urgent operational needs and to what extent,
if any, there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication in their
missions, roles, and responsibilities, we reviewed the Defense Science
Board Task Force report and used it as our starting point to identify
the joint and service entities involved in the fulfillment of urgent
operational needs.[Footnote 45] We interviewed officials from the
Defense Science Board Task Force to gain an understanding of their
methodology, their findings, and their recommendations. We developed a
46-question data-collection instrument to collect information from the
urgent needs entities identified by the Defense Science Board report
to determine the entities' roles and the extent of their involvement
in the various activities of the urgent needs processes. For example,
for each entity, we collected general information on the mission,
role, and responsibility, organizational structure, and impetus for
creation; the roles and processes the entity employs with respect to
urgent needs; and specifically how the entity is involved in the
vetting, funding, tracking, and transitioning of urgent needs. Prior
to fielding the data-collection instrument, we tested it with two
entities and adjusted the questions and layout based on the feedback
we received. Moreover, in an effort to identify any additional urgent
needs entities not captured by the Defense Science Board Task Force or
by us in our background research, we employed a "snowball" sampling
technique, whereby we included our list of urgent needs entities and
asked each entity (1) if it was aware of any others that are involved
in the response and fulfillment of urgent operational needs and (2) if
it interfaces with any other organizations or programs with regards to
managing the urgent operational needs process. We then contacted those
entities that the respondents had identified to better understand the
population of urgent needs related entities. After analyzing data
provided as well as interviews with DOD, military service, selected
combatant command, and entity officials, we judgmentally selected the
entities included in our analysis to exclude entities that did not
meet our definition of an urgent needs organization. For example, we
did not include the department's Commander's Emergency Response
Program after reviewing its mission and purpose. After the urgent
needs entities responded to the data-collection instruments, we
created a database and analyzed the variables to gain an understanding
of the mission, roles, and responsibilities, as well as the
organizational structure, and impetus for creation of the entity, and
the roles and processes the entity employs with respect to urgent
needs. On the basis of this data as well as our analyses of DOD's
urgent needs policies and guidance, the Defense Science Board Task
Force report, and other relevant documents, we identified six broad
urgent needs activities involved after the submission of an urgent
needs statement: validation, facilitation, sourcing, execution,
tracking, and transition, transfer, or termination. We then analyzed
the data obtained through the data-collection instrument and other
documentation to identify the prevalence of fragmentation, overlap, or
duplication in response to urgent needs between and among the entities
and within DOD more generally. In order to present the cost analysis
for each urgent needs entity in consistent terms, all cost data in
this report are in fiscal year 2010 dollars. We converted cost
information to fiscal year 2010 dollars using conversion factors from
the DOD Comptroller's National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal
Year 2010.
To determine the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach for
managing and overseeing its various activities to address urgent needs
identified by warfighters in-theater, we reviewed key documents
including the Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD's Strategic Management
Plan, prior National Defense Authorization Acts, and other public
laws. We examined these documents to gain an understanding of the
department's strategic goals as well as to examine any potential
effects each had on the department's rapid acquisition and urgent
needs processes. We analyzed joint and military service policies
pertaining to the fulfillment of urgent operational needs, including
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01; Army
Regulation 71-9; Air Force Instructions 63-114 and 10-601; Secretary
of the Navy Instruction 5000.2C and Secretary of the Navy Notice 5000;
Marine Corps Order 3900.17; DOD Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization Instruction 5000.01; and U.S. Special Operations
Command Directives 70-1 and 71-4, to gain an understanding of roles
and responsibilities involved in fulfilling urgent needs, what
constitutes an urgent need, and to assess whether the department has
comprehensive departmentwide policy for establishing a baseline on how
urgent needs are to be addressed, including key aspects of the process
such as generation, validation, or tracking. Likewise, we analyzed
forthcoming DOD policies, including the department's Directive-Type
Memorandum 10-002, which seeks to establish policy, assign
responsibilities, and outline procedures for the resolution of joint
urgent operational needs. We conducted comparative analysis of the
policies to identify the differences between the varying policies to
identify the extent of any fragmentation. We interviewed relevant DOD
officials, including senior defense officials within the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
including the Rapid Fielding Directorate, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to gain
an understanding of the totality of the department's efforts to
satisfy urgent warfighter requirements as well as on the metrics used
to evaluate the effectiveness of the capability solutions developed to
address urgent needs. Likewise, we interviewed officials from the
Joint Staff, selected combatant commands, and each military service,
including acquisition and Program Management/Program Executive
Officials to further our understanding of how urgent needs are
fulfilled; how the processes are managed and overseen; and what
improvements, if any, are warranted. In addition, we interviewed
officials at each entity we identified to gain an understanding of
their mission, role, and responsibilities, how data on their joint or
service-specific fulfillment of urgent needs is tracked and reported
to senior level officials, and what improvements, if any, are
warranted.
To determine the extent to which DOD comprehensively evaluated its
urgent needs entities and processes and identified potential for
consolidations, we contacted senior defense officials within the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation, selected combatant commands, and the military
services to identify and obtain any studies, reports, or analysis
conducted by the department on its fulfillment of urgent needs. Using
this information, together with analysis of prior reports and studies
and the responses from our data-collection instrument, we developed
several options that DOD may wish to consider, including a variety of
consolidation options for the entities and processes responsible for
responding to urgent operational needs. We tested and analyzed these
options in terms of their potential capacity to gain increased
efficiencies in the visibility, coordination, management, and
oversight of the department's urgent needs process as well as to
reduce duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, if any.
We visited or contacted the following offices during our review:
Department of Defense:
* Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Force,
Washington, D.C.
* Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Washington,
D.C.
* Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle Task Force, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and
Assessment Directorate (J8), Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, Washington, D.C.
- Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Office:
- Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell:
- Rapid Fielding Directorate:
-- Complex Systems, Joint Capability Technology Demonstration Office:
-- Rapid Reaction Technology Office:
* U.S. Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration Office,
Washington, D.C.
* Defense Science Board, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Army:
* Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7, Washington,
D.C.
* Asymmetric Warfare Group, Fort Meade, Maryland:
* Biometrics Identity Management Agency, Washington, D.C.
* Deputy Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Capability
Integration Division, Washington, D.C.
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology, Army Science Board, Arlington, Virginia:
* Program Executive Office--Command, Control, and Communications-
Tactical, Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Program Directorate,
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey:
* Program Executive Office--Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and
Sensors, Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition, Fort Belvoir, Virginia:
* Program Executive Office--Soldier, Directorate of Logistics (G4)
(formerly known as Rapid Fielding Initiative Directorate), Fort
Belvoir, Virginia:
* Rapid Equipping Force, Fort Belvoir, Virginia:
* Research, Development, and Engineering Command, Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland:
* Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize, Washington, D.C.
* Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia:
- Army Capabilities Integration Center:
- Human Terrain System:
U.S. Navy:
* Chief of Naval Operations, N81D, Washington, D.C.
* Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary Warfare,
Washington, D.C.
* Navy Comptroller's Office, Washington, D.C.
* Office of Naval Research, Office of Transition, Rapid Development
and Deployment Program, Arlington, Virginia:
U.S. Marine Corps:
* Combat Development Command, Capabilities Development Directorate,
Quantico, Virginia:
U.S. Air Force:
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition,
Washington, D.C.
* Requirements Policy & Process Division, Directorate of Operational
Capability Requirements, Washington, D.C.
* Air Force Comptroller's Office, Washington, D.C.
* Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois:
* 645th Aeronautical Systems Group (Big Safari), Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Dayton, Ohio:
* Rapid Capabilities Office, Washington, D.C.
Combatant Commands:
* U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida:
* U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany:
* U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs,
Colorado:
* U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa,
Florida:
* U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois:
We conducted this performance audit from February 2010 to March 2011
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
February 4, 2011:
Mr. William Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities Management Team:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-11-273, "Warfighter Support: DoD's Urgent Needs Processes
Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential
Consolidation," dated January 10, 2011 (GAO Code 351448). Comments on
the report's recommendations are enclosed.
Separately, the Department will be coordinating a review and
submitting the report to the congressional defense committees required
by section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2011, Review of Acquisition Process for Rapid Fielding
of Capabilities in Response to Urgent Operational Needs. We anticipate
that specific actions accomplished by the Department related to the
GAO's recommendations will be included in the report.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to respond to your draft
report. Technical comments were provided separately. Should you have
any questions, please contact Mr. William Beasley,
William.Beasley@osd.mil, 703-695-8045.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Thomas P. Dee:
Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell:
Enclosures: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated January 10, 2011:
GAO-11-273 (GAO Code 351448):
"Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need A More
Comprehensive Approach And Evaluation For Potential Consolidation"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics to develop and promulgate DoD-wide guidance across all
urgent needs processes that establishes baseline policy for the
fulfillment of urgent operational needs.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department will issue appropriate guidance
that will ensure the urgent needs/rapid acquisition processes meet the
warfighter's needs. The policy will permit DoD Components to operate
Component-specific processes while maintaining sufficient baseline
commonality that cross-DoD oversight can be accomplished.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics to develop and promulgate DoD-wide guidance across all
urgent needs processes that clearly defines common terms as well as
the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commands, and
the military services for all phases of the urgent needs process,
including, but not limited to, generation, validation, funding,
execution, tracking, and management of the transition, termination or
transfer process and that incorporates all available expedited
acquisition procedures.
DOD Response: Concur. Under the effort required by section 804 of the
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,
the end-to-end process will be assessed, responsibilities defined, and
appropriate policy changes initiated. It is expected that additional
policy and procedures under the authority of multiple DoD officials
(e.g., Chairman of the Joint Staff, Under Secretary of Defense
Comptroller/CFO, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation) will be
assessed for any necessary changes and coordinated with the
responsible officials.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics to develop and promulgate DoD-wide guidance across all
urgent needs processes that designates a focal point within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(such as the Rapid Fielding Directorate, or other entity as deemed
appropriate) with the appropriate authority and resources, dedicated
to leading the department's urgent needs efforts, including, but not
limited to: (a) acting as an advocate within the department for issues
related to DoD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs; (b)
improving visibility across all urgent needs entities and processes;
and (c) ensuring tools and mechanisms are used to track, monitor, and
manage the status of urgent needs, from validation through the
transition, including a formal feedback mechanism or channel for
military services to provide feedback on how well fielded solutions
met urgent needs.
DOD Response: Concur. Pending completion of the effort required by
section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011, the Director of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell
will act as the focal point. The results of the section 804 effort
will shape the ultimate decisions on structuring the urgent needs and
rapid acquisition processes.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics to develop and promulgate DoD-wide guidance across all
urgent needs processes that directs the DoD Components to establish
minimum processes and requirements for each of the above phases of the
process.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department will issue appropriate guidance
that will ensure the urgent needs/rapid acquisition processes meet the
warfighter's needs. The policy will permit DoD Components to operate
Component-specific processes while maintaining sufficient baseline
commonality that cross-DoD oversight can be accomplished.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct DoD's Chief Management Officer to evaluate potential options
for consolidation to reduce overlap, duplication, and fragmentation
and take appropriate action.
DOD Response: Concur. Under the effort required by section 804 of the
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,
the end-to-end process will be addressed and the Deputy Chief
Management Officer, supported by component Chief Management Officers,
will participate and provide oversight and assistance in utilizing
process improvement techniques and tools.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William Solis, (202)-512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Cary B. Russell (Assistant
Director), Usman Ahmad, Laura G. Czohara, Lonnie McAllister II, John
Ortiz, Richard Powelson, Steve Pruitt, Amie Steele, Ryan Stott, John
Strong, Tristan To, Nicole Vahlkamp, Elizabeth Wood, Delia P. Zee, and
Karen Zuckerstein made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Defense Acquisition: DOD's Requirements Determination Process
Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2008).
[2] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment
of Urgent Operational Needs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, July
2009).
[3] The Defense Science Board notes that the figure is dominated by
the combination of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO) and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicle program, which in combination represent approximately 80
percent of this expenditure.
[4] Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on
Capability Surprise, vol. I: Main Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, September 2009).
[5] GAO, Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's System of Internal
Control, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-660]
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2010); Warfighter Support: Improvements to
DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite
Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2010); Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and
Coordination of DOD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95] (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 29, 2009); and Warfighter Support: Challenges Confronting DOD's
Ability to Coordinate and Oversee Its Counter-Improvised Explosive
Devices Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2009).
[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460].
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95]; [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T].
[8] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 801 (2008); S. Rep. No. 111-201, § 811
(2010).
[9] Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 201 (2010).
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95]; [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T].
[11] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can
Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development
of Future ISR Requirements, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24,
2008).
[12] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Overarching
Guidance Is Needed to Advance Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-500T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17,
2010); [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374]; Unmanned
Aircraft Systems: Advanced Coordination and Increased Visibility
Needed to Optimize Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-836] (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2007); Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-578] (Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2007).
[13] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Establishing
Guidance, Timelines, and Accountability for Integrating Intelligence
Data Would Improve Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-265NI] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22,
2010). This report is not available through GAO's Web site. Copies of
this report are available upon request by calling (202) 512-6000, toll
free (866) 801-7077, or TDD (202) 512-2537.
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460].
[15] For the purposes of this report, entities include organizations,
offices, programs, agencies, and task forces.
[16] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment
of Urgent Operational Needs.
[17] These studies include: Defense Science Board, 21st Century
Strategic Technology Vectors (2006); Defense Science Board, Defense
Industrial Structure for Transformation (2007-2008); MITRE, Venture
Capital and IT Acquisition: Managing Uncertainty (2008); Army Science
Board, Institutionalization of Innovative Army Organizations (2008);
Defense Science Board, Buying Commercial: Gaining the Cost/Schedule
Benefits for Defense Systems (2009); GAO, Perspectives on Potential
Changes to Department of Defense Acquisition Management Framework,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-295R] (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 27, 2009); Defense Science Board, Creating a DOD Strategic
Acquisition Platform (2009); Defense Science Board, Fulfillment of
Urgent Operational Needs (2009); Defense Science Board, 2008 Summer
Study on Capability Surprise (2009); [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460].
[18] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 801(2008).
[19] S. Rep. No. 110-335, at 359 (2008).
[20] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 801 (2008).
[21] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 803 (2011).
[22] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 804 (2011).
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-95]; [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-186T].
[24] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Establish Clear Goals and
Objectives, Guidance, and a Designated Budget to Manage Its Biometrics
Activities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1065]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008).
[25] We are conducting a separate review at the request of the House
Armed Services Committee to examine DOD's efforts to improve
visibility over its counter-IED programs and evaluate the potential
for overlap and duplication of counter-IED initiatives.
[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460].
[27] Directive-Type Memorandum 10-002 is entitled "DOD Guidance for
Fulfillment of Joint Urgent Operational Needs."
[28] Section 901 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2011 redesignated the Director for Defense Research
and Engineering as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering. Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 901(a)(1)(A) (2011).
[29] In January 2011, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell was removed
from the Rapid Fielding Directorate and became a direct report to the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
[30] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, DC: November 1999).
[31] Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Joint Memorandum 4000,
Navy Urgent Needs Process Implementation (July 26, 2007).
[32] Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction
5000.01, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability
Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) (Nov. 6, 2009).
[33] Army Regulation 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities Determination
(Dec. 28, 2009).
[34] As of December 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3470.01 is undergoing revisions but had not yet been
approved at the time of our review.
[35] Our estimate is based on funding data provided by urgent needs-
related entities responding to our data-collection instrument and
includes funding for processing of urgent needs as well as development
of solutions and some acquisition costs. As our survey was not
exhaustive, the numbers reported are a lower bound to the total amount
spent on urgent needs rather than an upper bound. Our estimate differs
from the figure reported by the Defense Science Board in September
2009 because we included fiscal year 2010 funds while the Defense
Science Board report only included funding over the period 2005-2009.
Additionally, our funding data have been converted to base year 2010
dollars.
[36] JIEDDO has access to the Joint IED Defeat Fund, and the Rapid
Reaction Technology Office has access to the Rapid Reaction Fund.
[37] The Asymmetric Warfare Group was unable to provide specific
funding for its urgent needs activities because it is not involved in
funding urgent needs.
[38] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership
and National Strategy, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-556T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27,
2001) and Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability,
and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform
Military Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-70] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17,
2004).
[39] Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming The Pentagon
For A New Age," Foreign Affairs (January 2009).
[40] DOD Directive 5105.02, Deputy Secretary of Defense (Feb. 18,
2009).
[41] Department of Defense, Strategic Management Plan (2009).
[42] GAO, Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide, ver. 3,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-10.1.15] (Washington,
D.C.: May 1997).
[43] GAO, Defense Health Care: DOD Needs to Address the Expected
Benefits, Costs, and Risks for Its Newly Approved Medical Command
Structure, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-122]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2007).
[44] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 804 (2011).
[45] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment
of Urgent Operational Needs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, July
2009).
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
