Warfighter Support
Improved Joint Oversight and Reporting on DOD's Prepositioning Programs May Increase Efficiencies Gao ID: GAO-11-647 May 16, 2011The Department of Defense (DOD) prepositions equipment to help ensure combat-ready forces receive equipment in days rather than the weeks it would take if it had to be moved from the United States to their location. Prepositioned stocks may also support activities including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. As GAO's third report in response to Congress's annual reporting requirement, GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) met the six reporting requirements in the annual report to Congress on its prepositioned stocks, and whether additional information may be needed related to those requirements; (2) developed effective departmentwide guidance on prepositioned stocks to achieve national military objectives; and (3) organized effectively to provide joint oversight over its prepositioning programs and achieve efficiencies. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant DOD reports, strategies, and policies, and met with DOD and service officials in the U.S., Kuwait, and Qatar.
In its 2010 report to Congress, DOD generally responded to its six required reporting elements and GAO's prior recommendations, which resulted in a more informative report. However, DOD's report does not discuss the full range of prepositioned equipment, such as Army equipment required in excess of a military unit's authorization to meet specific combatant command planning requirements. The Army may spend at least $441 million to replenish this equipment, which is part of the $4.5 billion needed to fully reconstitute the Army's prepositioned stocks. Without this information, Congress may lack a complete picture of areas where potential efficiencies may be gained. In addition, DOD's report does not list any operation plan affected by shortfalls in prepositioned stocks, as required. Further, DOD's report does not include the specific risks of such shortfalls, the full range of mitigation factors, and the extent to which these factors reduce risk. Although not required, we believe that such information would help clarify DOD's assessment of the consequences of choosing among options and continuing evaluation of areas where the department can assume greater risk, as called for in its 2008 National Defense Strategy. DOD has limited departmentwide guidance that would help ensure that its prepositioning programs accurately reflect national military objectives, such as those included in the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. DOD has developed departmentwide guidance, referred to as Guidance for Development of the Force, but as of September 2010 this guidance contained little information related to prepositioned stocks even though DOD's 2008 instruction on prepositioned stocks specifically directed the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to develop such guidance. Furthermore, the information the services use to determine their requirements for prepositioned stocks may not clearly state the full range of DOD's need for these stocks. DOD's challenges in identifying the full range of potential demands for prepositioned stocks highlight the importance of departmentwide guidance specifying planning and funding priorities associated with DOD's current and future needs in this area. DOD faces organizational challenges which may hinder its efforts to gain efficiencies in managing prepositioned assets across the department. Specifically, DOD has been unable to ensure that the working group established to address joint prepositioning issues achieves its objectives because the working group lacks clearly stated lines of authority and reporting to other components within DOD. As a result, the working group may not be able to effectively synchronize or integrate, as appropriate, the services' prepositioning programs and the results of its efforts may not go beyond the working group itself. According to joint and service officials, efficiencies or cost savings could be gained through improved joint program management across the services and leveraging components in DOD such as the Defense Logistics Agency, which may be able to provide efficiencies in delivering stocks during early stages of contingency operations. GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense take five actions to provide comprehensive information, develop overarching guidance, and enhance joint oversight to increase program efficiencies. DOD agreed with GAO's recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: William M. Solis Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-8365GAO-11-647, Warfighter Support: Improved Joint Oversight and Reporting on DOD's Prepositioning Programs May Increase Efficiencies
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2011:
Warfighter Support:
Improved Joint Oversight and Reporting on DOD's Prepositioning
Programs May Increase Efficiencies:
GAO-11-647:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-647, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) prepositions equipment to help ensure
combat-ready forces receive equipment in days rather than the weeks it
would take if it had to be moved from the United States to their
location. Prepositioned stocks may also support activities including
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. As GAO‘s third report in
response to Congress‘s annual reporting requirement, GAO assessed the
extent to which DOD has (1) met the six reporting requirements in the
annual report to Congress on its prepositioned stocks, and whether
additional information may be needed related to those requirements;
(2) developed effective departmentwide guidance on prepositioned
stocks to achieve national military objectives; and (3) organized
effectively to provide joint oversight over its prepositioning
programs and achieve efficiencies. To meet these objectives, GAO
reviewed relevant DOD reports, strategies, and policies, and met with
DOD and service officials in the U.S., Kuwait, and Qatar.
What GAO Found:
In its 2010 report to Congress, DOD generally responded to its six
required reporting elements and GAO‘s prior recommendations, which
resulted in a more informative report. However, DOD‘s report does not
discuss the full range of prepositioned equipment, such as Army
equipment required in excess of a military unit‘s authorization to
meet specific combatant command planning requirements. The Army may
spend at least $441 million to replenish this equipment, which is part
of the $4.5 billion needed to fully reconstitute the Army‘s
prepositioned stocks. Without this information, Congress may lack a
complete picture of areas where potential efficiencies may be gained.
In addition, DOD‘s report does not list any operation plan affected by
shortfalls in prepositioned stocks, as required. Further, DOD‘s report
does not include the specific risks of such shortfalls, the full range
of mitigation factors, and the extent to which these factors reduce
risk. Although not required, we believe that such information would
help clarify DOD‘s assessment of the consequences of choosing among
options and continuing evaluation of areas where the department can
assume greater risk, as called for in its 2008 National Defense
Strategy.
DOD has limited departmentwide guidance that would help ensure that
its prepositioning programs accurately reflect national military
objectives, such as those included in the National Defense Strategy
and the National Military Strategy. DOD has developed departmentwide
guidance, referred to as Guidance for Development of the Force, but as
of September 2010 this guidance contained little information related
to prepositioned stocks even though DOD‘s 2008 instruction on
prepositioned stocks specifically directed the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy to develop such guidance. Furthermore, the
information the services use to determine their requirements for
prepositioned stocks may not clearly state the full range of DOD‘s
need for these stocks. DOD‘s challenges in identifying the full range
of potential demands for prepositioned stocks highlight the importance
of departmentwide guidance specifying planning and funding priorities
associated with DOD‘s current and future needs in this area.
DOD faces organizational challenges which may hinder its efforts to
gain efficiencies in managing prepositioned assets across the
department. Specifically, DOD has been unable to ensure that the
working group established to address joint prepositioning issues
achieves its objectives because the working group lacks clearly stated
lines of authority and reporting to other components within DOD. As a
result, the working group may not be able to effectively synchronize
or integrate, as appropriate, the services‘ prepositioning programs
and the results of its efforts may not go beyond the working group
itself. According to joint and service officials, efficiencies or cost
savings could be gained through improved joint program management
across the services and leveraging components in DOD such as the
Defense Logistics Agency, which may be able to provide efficiencies in
delivering stocks during early stages of contingency operations.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense take five actions to
provide comprehensive information, develop overarching guidance, and
enhance joint oversight to increase program efficiencies. DOD agreed
with GAO‘s recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-647] or key
components. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202)
512-8365 or SolisW@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD's Report Addressed the Six Required Reporting Elements, but
Additional Information Would Further Enhance Future Reports:
DOD Has Limited Departmentwide Guidance Linking Its Prepositioning
Programs with the Achievement of National Military Objectives:
Organizational Challenges May Hinder DOD's Ability to Provide
Effective Joint Oversight for Its Prepositioning Programs and Achieve
Potential Efficiencies:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figure:
Figure 1: Prepositioned Equipment and Materiel Represented in DOD's
Annual Report by Service:
Abbreviations:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EUCOM: U.S. Europe Command:
GDF: Guidance for Development of the Force:
PACOM: U.S. Pacific Command:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 16, 2011:
Congressional Committees:
The Department of Defense (DOD) prepositions equipment at strategic
locations around the world to enable it to field combat-ready forces
in days, rather than the weeks it would take if equipment had to be
moved from the United States to the locations of conflicts. Beyond the
rapid fielding of combat forces, today's global security environment
creates other potential needs for prepositioned stocks, such as
supporting security cooperation activities, deterrence, multilateral
training exercises abroad, and humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief. Effectively achieving national military objectives in this
fiscally challenged environment requires careful balancing of current
and future needs with other DOD planning and funding priorities.
Through their individual programs, each of the military services
maintains preconfigured groups of combat and logistics equipment on
ships and ashore at locations around the world. These equipment "sets"
are intended to speed response times of U.S. forces to operating
locations and reduce the strain on scarce airlift or slower sealift
assets. The Army stores sets of combat brigade equipment, supporting
supplies, and other stocks at land sites in several countries and
aboard prepositioning ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The
Marine Corps stores equipment and supplies for its forces aboard
squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships located around the world
and at land sites in Norway. The Air Force stores ammunition at land
sites and aboard prepositioning ships and prepositions base support
equipment, vehicles, and supporting supplies at several land sites.
The Navy stores equipment and supplies to support ship offloading,
deployable hospitals, and construction projects also aboard the
maritime prepositioning ships and at land sites around the world.
In recent years, we have identified a number of ongoing and long-term
challenges regarding DOD's prepositioned stocks and made
recommendations related to centralized operation direction, risk
assessment, inventory management, equipment excesses, maintenance, and
requirements determination, among other issues. For example, in our
September 2005 report,[Footnote 1] we found that absent a
departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution
of prepositioned stocks,[Footnote 2] the services were developing
plans without a clear understanding of how they would fit together to
meet evolving defense strategy. We recommended that DOD publish a
departmentwide strategy to set a direction and a shared foundation for
the services' prepositioning programs. Further, we recommended that
the Secretary of Defense direct an assessment of the near-term
operational risks associated with shortfalls in prepositioned stocks.
DOD concurred or partially concurred with these recommendations. DOD
has not yet developed such a strategy, and the extent to which it has
assessed the near-term operational risks of shortfalls in
prepositioned stocks is unclear.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008[Footnote
3] amended Title 10 of the United States Code[Footnote 4] so as to
require DOD to submit an annual report to the congressional defense
committees on the status of prepositioned materiel and equipment as of
the end of each fiscal year. DOD's reports are required to address the
following six elements: (1) the level of fill for major end items of
equipment and spare parts in each prepositioned set as of the end of
the fiscal year covered by the report; (2) the materiel condition of
equipment in the prepositioned stocks, as of the end of such fiscal
year, grouped by category or major end item; (3) a list of major end
items of equipment drawn from prepositioned stocks that fiscal year
and a description of how the equipment was used and whether it was
returned to the stocks after its use; (4) a time line for completely
reconstituting any shortfall in the prepositioned stocks; (5) an
estimate of the funding required to completely reconstitute any
shortfall in the prepositioned stocks and a description of the
Secretary's plan for carrying out the reconstitution; and (6) a list
of any operation plans affected by a shortfall in the prepositioned
stocks and a description of the action taken to mitigate any risk
created by that shortfall. In May 2010, DOD submitted its report to
Congress on the status of its prepositioned materiel and equipment for
the time period of October 2008 to September 2009. DOD's report
includes an unclassified section to address reporting elements one
through five and a classified annex to address reporting element six.
The annual reporting requirement also directs GAO to review DOD's
annual reports and submit to the congressional defense committees any
additional information that will further inform the committees on
issues relating to the status of the materiel in prepositioned stocks.
This report is GAO's third report in response to its annual reporting
requirement.[Footnote 5] In our first report, issued in December 2008,
we found that additional information on the funding requirements for
the services' prepositioning programs and on the risk to current
operation and concept plans could further inform congressional defense
committees.[Footnote 6] As a result, we recommended that DOD (1)
provide additional information to Congress on funding requirements for
the services' programs, and in addition to the required elements, (2)
include in DOD's report to Congress information on the effect of
prepositioned equipment shortfalls on current operation and concept
plans, including risks and mitigation strategies to provide better
visibility over possible risks. DOD agreed with the first part of our
recommendation and provided this information in its subsequent report
to Congress. DOD did not concur with the second part of our
recommendation, stating that the department already provides a
comprehensive and more holistic approach to risk and mitigation
strategies each year with its submission of the Chairman's Risk
Assessment.[Footnote 7] In our second report, issued in November 2009,
we found that DOD's future reports to Congress on the status of its
prepositioned materiel and equipment would benefit from additional
information in three areas: (1) the amount of spare parts the Army
maintains in its prepositioned stocks; (2) the condition of the Air
Force's materiel and equipment needed to establish bases; and (3) the
services' progress to replenish their individual prepositioned sets,
such as level of fill and readiness rates and changes in those sets
from the previous year.[Footnote 8] We made recommendations in each of
these areas. DOD concurred with all three recommendations and included
most of the information we recommended it provide in its most recent
report to Congress.
For this report, which is an unclassified version of a report we
issued on February 7, 2011, our objectives were to assess the extent
to which DOD has (1) addressed the six reporting requirements in the
annual report to Congress on its prepositioned stocks, and whether
additional information would be useful; (2) developed effective
departmentwide guidance on prepositioned stocks to achieve national
military objectives; and (3) organized effectively to provide joint
oversight for its prepositioning programs and achieve efficiencies. To
meet our objectives, we examined prior GAO and DOD reports on the
services' prepositioning programs; reviewed relevant DOD and service
strategies, policies, and assessments; and met with DOD and service
officials in the United States, Kuwait, and Qatar. While we did not
independently assess the data DOD provided to Congress, we discussed
the reliability of the systems used to develop the report data with
service officials and determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable to meet the objectives of this engagement. A more detailed
discussion of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I. We
conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to November 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
While DOD provided information in response to the six required
reporting elements, our review of its 2010 annual report identified
several areas where more information would provide Congress with
comprehensive reporting to better weigh competing priorities. First,
with regard to the required reporting elements, DOD improved its
reporting in several areas in its 2010 annual report. For example, DOD
included reporting on the readiness of individual equipment sets,
grouped by military unit location or by capability. Additionally, DOD
included information on the Army's spare parts associated with its
prepositioned sets. However, DOD's annual report did not discuss the
full range of prepositioned equipment, particularly equipment and
materiel not directly associated with major unit sets, including
equipment the services plan to reconstitute; DOD's report only
includes major end items, such as tactical wheeled and tracked
vehicles, and some spare parts. For example, DOD's report provides
limited information on an element of the Army's Prepositioned Stocks
program that includes items required by commanders' operation plans
beyond unit authorizations. The Army may spend at least $441 million
to aid in reconstituting these stocks, which include tents, lights,
and cots--items that are in high demand for operations in Afghanistan.
Second, DOD did not include in its annual report a list of operation
plans affected by any shortfall in prepositioned stocks, as required.
While DOD provided some information related to the risks of shortfalls
in prepositioned stocks, it did not provide the specific, non-
aggregated risks of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks on its
operation plans, the full range of measures the services have in place
to mitigate the short-term risks of shortfalls in prepositioned
stocks, or the extent to which these measures reduce risk. Although
not explicitly required in its annual report to Congress, DOD already
reports much of this information in other forums. However, the
directorate within the Joint Staff most closely responsible for
assessing operational risk was not required to provide input to the
report and as a result DOD's report did not include such data. We
believe this information would help DOD to clarify its assessments of
the consequences of choosing among options and continued evaluation of
areas where the department can assume greater risk, as called for in
its 2008 National Defense Strategy. More broadly, without providing a
complete picture of the scope of its prepositioned stocks, including
associated funding, and enhancing its reporting of risks of shortfalls
in these stocks, DOD may not be able to provide Congress complete
information with which to determine the sufficiency of its
justification for the additional resources needed to reconstitute its
prepositioned stocks and Congress may not be able to fully recognize
areas where potential efficiencies may be gained. We therefore are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the annual
report to Congress include comprehensive information about the full
scope and associated funding of the services' prepositioning programs
and report the linkage between shortfalls in prepositioned stocks and
risks to DOD's operation plans and extent to which the full range of
mitigation measures in place reduce said risks.
DOD has limited departmentwide guidance for linking its prepositioning
programs with national military objectives. The 2008 DOD Instruction
that addresses prepositioned stocks requirements directs the Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to develop and coordinate
departmentwide guidance, referred to as Guidance for Development of
the Force (GDF), that identifies overall prepositioned stocks strategy
to achieve desired capabilities and responsiveness in support of the
National Defense Strategy.[Footnote 9] According to DOD strategic
planning guidance, GDF establishes force development planning and
funding priorities needed to meet future contingencies.[Footnote 10]
While DOD established GDF in 2008 and updated this guidance in 2009,
as of September 2010, this guidance did not contain information on
current or future departmentwide needs for prepositioned stocks or set
the planning and funding priorities to meet them. Meanwhile, existing
sources of information the services use to determine current and
future needs for prepositioned stocks may not fully reflect DOD's
broader potential needs for prepositioned stocks in the current global
security environment. For example, according to DOD officials, key
operation planning data do not encompass potential needs such as
support for theater security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and
deterrence. In the absence of clearly stated departmentwide needs and
priorities for prepositioned stocks, the services may not be able to
shape their prepositioning programs to most effectively and
efficiently meet evolving defense challenges. To help DOD clarify
evolving defense challenges, it has undertaken or recently completed
several studies. However, without an overall strategy for
prepositioned stocks in the GDF that would help ensure that the
results of these studies will have authority and visibility, DOD may
be less able to fully implement them and integrate their results into
any departmentwide guidance. To ensure that the services have the
overarching guidance they need to make informed management decisions
on program effectiveness and efficiency and that DOD will be best
positioned to fully implement the results of its studies, we are
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy to develop GDF that defines departmentwide needs
for prepositioned stocks, including the appropriate planning and
funding priorities.
DOD faces organizational challenges at the joint level in overseeing
its prepositioning programs, which may hinder its efforts to gain
efficiencies. Specifically, DOD has been unable to ensure that the
organization established to address joint prepositioning issues, the
Global Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group, achieves its
objectives because the working group lacks clearly stated lines of
authority and reporting to other components within DOD. According to
DOD officials, DOD's joint working group is not conducting the full
range of tasks outlined in DOD's instruction on prepositioned stocks,
focusing more narrowly on sharing information among the services and
coordinating the services' responses to audit inquiries. Further, the
working group does not include a representative from the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, which is responsible for
developing related departmentwide GDF. These issues may hinder the
working group's ability to effectively synchronize or integrate, as
appropriate, the services' prepositioning programs. Also, they may
hinder the potential reduction of unnecessary duplication. In
particular, according to DOD officials, efficiencies or cost savings
may be gained through improved joint program management across the
services and leveraging components in DOD such as the Defense
Logistics Agency. For example, according to DOD officials, several
capabilities critical to supporting ongoing operations in U.S. Central
Command's (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, such as bulk fuel
distribution, are resident in more than one of the services'
prepositioned inventories but are procured and sustained separately.
To enhance DOD's joint oversight of its prepositioning programs and
better position the department to achieve potential efficiencies, we
are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate
DOD components to (1) assess the continued relevance of the joint
working group's assigned tasks and membership and make any necessary
adjustments, including making the Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy a core member; (2) clarify lines of authority and
reporting between the working group and other components within DOD,
such as the Global Posture Executive Council; (3) implement effective
and appropriate oversight to ensure that the working group achieves
its objectives; and (4) implement authoritative strategic guidance,
such as Guidance for Development of the Force, to integrate and
synchronize at a DOD-wide level, as appropriate, the services'
prepositioning programs so that they include updated requirements and
maximize efficiency in managing prepositioned assets across the
department.
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment, and DOD's
comments are attached as appendix II. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD concurred with our recommendations and discussed steps it
is taking or has already taken to address them.
Background:
Each military service maintains different configurations and types of
equipment and materiel to support its own prepositioning program. The
Army and Marine Corps programs forward deploy and preposition sets of
materiel and equipment by support unit or brigade type either on land
or at sea aboard ship storage facilities. The Navy and Air Force
maintain materiel that support capabilities through land and ship
storage facilities. For example, the Navy is currently modernizing its
prepositioned theater hospitalization capability by transforming its
fleet hospitals into expeditionary medical facilities that can be
sized according to the needs of particular military operations. The
Air Force maintains Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources that
provide basing assets at austere airfields and Fuels Operational
Readiness Capability Equipment to provide fueling capabilities in
areas without supporting infrastructure.
DOD's national military objectives are spelled out in various levels
of detail throughout numerous strategic and operational documents,
including the National Defense Strategy, the National Military
Strategy, and the geographic combatant commanders' plans.[Footnote 11]
Depending on the required level of detail, in these plans the
geographic combatant commanders may articulate the specific forces
needed to achieve the stated military objectives. The services then
determine how best to meet the needs of the combatant commanders,
which may include the issuance of prepositioned stocks or other types
of equipment to support the commanders' goals. For example, the Air
Force, Army, and Marine Corps have provided equipment out of their
prepositioned stocks to satisfy CENTCOM's requirements associated with
the build-up of forces in Afghanistan. More generally, prepositioned
stocks are employed by the geographic combatant commanders, who have
the authority to organize commands and forces and employ forces as
they deem necessary to accomplish assigned missions. The services'
prepositioned equipment is apportioned among the geographic combatant
commands according to joint strategic planning guidance.[Footnote 12]
Because they can be moved as needs dictate, afloat prepositioned
stocks may be apportioned to more than one geographic combatant
command.
DOD generally makes the determination of whether prepositioned stocks
will be used as part of the joint operation planning process, which
results in the production of plans that guide the employment of
military forces. Joint operation planning is a coordinated process
used by commanders, including the geographic combatant commanders, to
determine the best method of accomplishing a mission. In non crisis
situations, the process is called contingency planning.[Footnote 13]
There are four types of contingency plans, distinguished by the level
of detail they contain. Joint planning guidance describes the most
detailed level of plans, called operation plans, as containing, among
other things, time-phased force deployment data, which includes the
specific units to be deployed in support of the plan and the timeline
for when these forces are needed. According to DOD officials, these
data allow the services to determine whether prepositioned equipment
is necessary to achieve a plan's goals by, for example, making a fully
combat-equipped force available to the combatant or joint force
commander in a shorter time frame than would be possible using other
sources of equipment. Some plans with lesser detail, called concept
plans, may also contain these data as determined by joint strategic
guidance. Combatant commanders periodically review their contingency
plans, including an assessment of risk,[Footnote 14] and report the
results to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
DOD's Report Addressed the Six Required Reporting Elements, but
Additional Information Would Further Enhance Future Reports:
DOD provided information in response to the six elements required in
its 2010 annual report and addressed some of our prior
recommendations,[Footnote 15] which resulted in a more informative
report, but additional information would further enhance future
reports. Further, in its annual report to Congress, DOD is required to
include a list of operation plans affected by any shortfall in
prepositioned stocks and a description of any action taken to mitigate
any risk that such a shortfall may create.[Footnote 16] DOD did not
provide a list of affected operation plans its annual report to
Congress although it did provide some information on the risks of
shortfalls in its prepositioned stocks and mitigation strategies. In
addition, DOD did not discuss the full range of measures the services
have in place to mitigate the risks of shortfalls in prepositioned
stocks, and the extent to which these measures reduce risk. DOD did
not provide this information because the elements within the Joint
Staff most closely responsible for tracking such information were not
required to provide input to DOD's report.
DOD's Annual Report to Congress Has Improved, but Information on the
Full Range of Prepositioned Stocks and Associated Funding Would
Further Enhance the Report:
In its May 2010 report to Congress, DOD provided more detail than in
prior reports on the status of its prepositioned stocks and the
estimated baseline and overseas contingency operations funding needed
to reconstitute major items associated with these stocks. Earlier DOD
reporting on funding for prepositioned stocks was aggregated. In
response to prior GAO recommendations, the 2010 annual report included
not only the quantities of equipment available and their
serviceability, but also the status of these items as organized into
military unit sets, either by geographic location, in the case of the
Army, or by capability sets, in the case of the Air Force and Marine
Corps. In addition, the report included, for the Army and Marine
Corps, information on the on-hand quantity and serviceability of the
repair parts intended to sustain these services' prepositioned stocks
upon their use. DOD's fiscal year 2010 annual report stated that the
services estimate that it will take at least $6.1 billion to replace
depleted major end items[Footnote 17] in their prepositioned stocks--
$1.1 billion for the Air Force, $4.5 billion for the Army, and $498
million for the Marine Corps. The Navy did not report any shortfalls
in its prepositioned stocks, but provided estimates on the costs to
replace its complete inventory of prepositioned equipment in this
year's annual report to Congress. The Army and Marine Corps
categorized their funding requirements for fiscal years 2010 through
2015 and fiscal years 2010 through 2012 respectively, by procurement
and operations and maintenance funding, and divided those categories
further into base budget and overseas contingency operations funding.
Within the overseas contingency operations funding line, the Army
created a separate category for reset funding dedicated to
reconstituting its prepositioned stocks which, according to the Army,
provides an essential source of funds to reset its prepositioned
stocks and cover program shortfalls.
Despite these reporting improvements, DOD did not fully represent all
types of prepositioned stocks in its report because the report only
includes major end items such as tactical wheeled vehicles and tracked
vehicles like tanks and some spare parts, in response to the reporting
elements. Information on the level of fill and serviceability of the
major end items included in DOD's report is useful because the absence
of or lack of serviceability among these items significantly impact
the readiness of the services' prepositioned stocks. In general, these
types of equipment items and the spare parts needed to maintain their
serviceability are part of the services' prepositioned unit or
capability sets. For example, the Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning
Force includes not only major repair items such as transmissions and
engines, but also other parts such as screws and light bulbs.
According to Marine Corps officials, these parts are stocked
specifically to support the prepositioned Marine Corps equipment and
are represented in DOD's annual report to Congress. Similarly, in
response to our prior recommendation, the Army included in DOD's
annual report the prepositioned repair parts needed to sustain its
prepositioned unit equipment. However, equipment prepositioned by the
services other than the major items and associated repair parts
comprising their unit and capability sets are not fully represented in
DOD's annual report. For example, according to a Marine Corps
official, the Marine Corps prepositions fuel distribution equipment
and medical stocks to support an entire deploying Marine Expeditionary
Brigade or Marine Air Ground Task Force. According to this official,
these stocks are not represented in DOD's annual report because they
are usually at 100 percent readiness. The Marine Corps also
prepositions other "capability sets" including water, habitability
equipment such as tents, electrical power/distribution equipment, and
rations, among other items, which are not represented in DOD's annual
report. According to an Air Force official, elements of the Air Force
prepositioning program not represented in DOD's annual report to
Congress include munitions, auxiliary fuel tanks, missile launchers,
pylons, ejector racks, and adapters,[Footnote 18] medical stocks,
fuel, and Defense Logistics Agency-managed items such as rations, with
on-hand quantities valued at approximately $17.3 billion and fill
levels at or near 100 percent. According to the Navy official in
charge of compiling the Navy portion of DOD's annual report for the
past 2 years, the Navy represented all elements of its prepositioned
program in DOD's annual report. In addition, this official stated that
the Navy intends to provide further details about the equipment types
included in the Naval Facilities and Civil Engineering and Support
Equipment categories in future reports to Congress. These categories
comprise non rolling stock, such as tents and communications gear, and
rolling stock, such as vehicles and generators, respectively.
In DOD's report, the Army did not discuss its prepositioned equipment
and materiel not associated with its unit stocks, including
Operational Project stocks and Army War Reserve Sustainment stocks.
Operational project stocks are groupings of equipment required in
excess of a military unit's authorizations in order to meet specific
combatant command planning requirements. Equipment in these sets
includes clothing for enemy prisoners of war, aircraft matting, pipes
to distribute petroleum, emergency rations, and housekeeping items
such as tents, lights, and cots, which have been in high demand for
operations in Afghanistan. In total, the Army maintains 12 categories
of operational project stocks, with an on-hand quantity worth about
$300 million throughout its land-based sites. The value of the
operational project stock equipment the Army does not yet have on hand
adds up to approximately $441 million, which is part of the $4.5
billion the Army has reported it needs to replace its depleted
prepositioned stocks. Army War Sustainment Stocks are prepositioned in
or near a theater of operations to support forces until wartime supply
lines are established. This category of prepositioned stocks is
comprised of major end items, ammunition, and parts needed to sustain
deployed forces in a theater, including forces that fall in on Army
Prepositioned Stocks and forces arriving with their own equipment,
until resupply from the United States can be established. War reserve
secondary items include not just the items on the repair parts
stockage lists required for the Army Prepositioned Stocks unit sets
included in the DOD report, but the parts needed for sustaining all
Army forces up to 60 days in theater, parts for repair facilities,
medical equipment, housekeeping sets, and packaged petroleum. The Army
obligated approximately $1.5 billion in fiscal years 2008 and 2009
overseas contingency operations funding incorporated into its working
capital funds to reconstitute these stocks.[Footnote 19]
Our prior work has demonstrated the need for decision makers, such as
Congress, to be fully informed in order to weigh competing priorities
effectively.[Footnote 20] Without comprehensive visibility of the
services' prepositioning programs and their funding, Congress may not
be able to make fully informed decisions about these programs.
Although some of the categories of equipment and materiel the services
do not discuss in DOD's annual report may be fully stocked or have
less of an impact on overall readiness if they are not fully stocked,
these program elements may represent areas where potential
efficiencies can be gained, for example, by considering the benefits
and costs of jointly managing commodities that each of the services
preposition such as repair parts, medical supplies, and fuel
distribution equipment. Further, some of the types of prepositioned
stocks not discussed in DOD's report that each of the services
maintain, such as equipment needed to set up bases at forward
locations, are used interchangeably because the services may not
possess such equipment in quantities sufficient to meet requirements.
For example, the Air Force has provided 29 of its expeditionary
military base sets to the Army and Marine Corps for use in Afghanistan
and, according to Army officials, the Army has provided 3 of its
similar sets to the Marine Corps. The potential for gaining
efficiencies by jointly managing such equipment is discussed in more
detail later in this report. Without information representative of all
the services' prepositioning program elements, including those
elements not directly associated with unit equipment sets, Congress
may be less able to have visibility over DOD's efforts to identify
opportunities in which efficiencies or cost savings may be realized.
Figure 1 below illustrates which service prepositioning program
elements are represented in DOD's annual report.
Figure 1: Prepositioned Equipment and Materiel Represented in DOD's
Annual Report by Service:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Army:
Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) 1-5:
Represented: Brigade Combat Team (BCT):
* Stocks stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships;
* Sets designed to support 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers;
* Abrams Tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, High Mobility
Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles, support trucks, and vehicles;
* Spare parts and other sustainment stocks to support the early stages
of a conflict.
Not represented: Sustainment stocks:
* Stocks stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships;
* Replacement equipment for losses in early stages of operations or
until resupply is established;
* Stocks to include major end items such as tracked vehicles;
* Secondary items such as meals, clothing, petroleum supplies,
construction materiels, ammunition, medical materiels, and repair
parts.
Operational project stocks:
* Stocks stored at land sites and aboard prepositioning ships;
* Authorized material above unit authorizations designed to support
Army operations or contingencies;
* Equipment and supplies for special operations forces, bare base
sets, petroleum and water distribution, mortuary operations, and
prisoner-of-war operations.
Marine Corps:
Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron (MPSRON)1-3:
Represented: Forward deployed; Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF):
* Sets stored aboard 16 prepositioning ships organized into three
squadrons;
* Each squadron‘s stocks that support about 16,000 Marines and sailors
for up to 30 days;
* Combat systems, communications systems, and some sustainment stocks.
Prepositioning program, Norway:
* Stocks stored in six cave sites and two storage facilities/air
stations located in central Norway;
* Stocks designed to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) with
select types and classes of vehicles, equipment, and supplies;
* Stocks including vehicles, engineering equipment, and other
equipment that will be used to support any geographic combatant
command.
Not represented: Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) and
Prepositioning program, Norway components:
* Capability sets including petroleum and water distribution
equipment, rations, medical supplies, electric power generation
equipment, and bare base equipment such as tents; munitions.
Navy:
Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron (MPSRON) 1-3:
Represented: Navy prepositioned assets:
* Assets stored aboard maritime prepositioning force ships and at land
sites;
* Equipment to offload prepositioning ships, including material
handling equipment, ramps and barges, landing and amphibious craft,
and bulk fuel;
* Construction equipment such as cranes, forklifts, trucks, and
tractor trailers;
* Stocks to include approximately 2,100 fleet hospital beds.
Air Force: Various geographic locations:
Represented: Bare base sets:
* Base operating support equipment and supplies used to house forces
at austere bare base forward operating locations;
* Stocks to support up to 77,500 personnel and 850 combat/mobility
aircraft at up to15 forward operating locations worldwide;
* Stocks to include housekeeping sets for personnel life support,
industrial operations sets to establish expeditionary airbase
infrastructure, and flight line (flying) operations sets.
Operational stocks:
* Direct and indirect mission support equipment and vehicles for up to
43 forward operating locations to support major combat operations and
vignettes as specified in DOD‘s Integrated Security Posture and
Strategic Planning Guidance;
* Stocks to include equipment stored at forward operating locations
(land bases) worldwide to provide direct mission support such as
Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) for flying operations, Fuels
Operational Readiness Capability Equipment (FORCE) for aircraft
refueling, and general aviation support;
* Stocks to include both general purpose vehicles such as trucks,
buses, vans, and special purpose vehicles such as material handling
equipment, fire trucks, and civil engineering construction equipment.
Not represented: Other aviation support equipment and supplies:
* Stocks to include other war reserve materiel sustainment equipment
and supplies such as rations, munitions stored at land sites and
aboard prepositioning ships, petroleum (aircraft fuel), oils,
lubricants at multiple locations, tanks, racks, adapters, and pylons.
Source: GAO and DOD.
[End of figure]
DOD Did Not Clearly State the Risks of Shortfalls in Prepositioned
Stocks on Operation Plans, but Did Provide Some Information on the
Risks of Such Shortfalls:
In its annual report to Congress, DOD is required to include a list of
operation plans affected by any shortfall in prepositioned stocks and
a description of any action taken to mitigate any risk that such a
shortfall may create.[Footnote 21] In regard to the first part of this
requirement, DOD did not provide a list of affected operation plans
its annual report. In preparing the report, the Joint Staff employs a
methodology for determining the risks and mitigation related to
shortfalls in prepositioned stocks which compares the services'
materiel and equipment shortfalls with the combatant commanders'
Integrated Priority Lists.[Footnote 22] According to Joint Staff
officials, Integrated Priority Lists are a key source of information
considered by leadership within DOD when directing further study or
approving funding priorities to mitigate DOD capability gaps. DOD's
report states that this year's Integrated Priority Lists and Joint
Capability Gap assessments related to prepositioned stocks did not
directly relate shortfalls in these stocks to operation plans'
execution risk. Although the Integrated Priority Lists summarized in
DOD's report include contingency plans as a source for the mission
analyses upon which the assessments are based, the risks are not
stated in terms of impact on the combatant commands' ability to
execute these plans. Further, other sources of information within DOD
indicate that shortfalls in prepositioned stocks result in risks to
operation plans which DOD should have listed in its annual report. In
particular, DOD readiness reporting shows that, as of June 2010, risks
associated with shortfalls in prepositioned stocks affected one
specific operation plan. However, this specific plan is not listed in
DOD's annual report to Congress.
Concerning the second part of the requirement, DOD's report provided
some information on the risks of shortfalls in its prepositioned
stocks and measures the services have in place to mitigate such risks,
but additional information would be useful. In particular, DOD's
annual report summarized the capability gaps related to shortfalls in
prepositioned stocks, including risks to CENTCOM's theater posture and
U.S. Europe Command's (EUCOM) ability to build partnerships,
capabilities, and capacities of partners and institutions. Both
capability gap documents also contain the operational risk level
associated with the capability gaps that include shortfalls in
prepositioned stocks, which CENTCOM and EUCOM both assess as "high."
In addition, the Integrated Priority Lists and capability gap
assessments included recommended programmatic actions and associated
funding, policy changes, and capability development needed to mitigate
the gaps. For example, CENTCOM's assessment cites the need to
reconstitute depleted Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps equipment as
essential to the successful execution of its Theater Strategy. As we
previously reported, by including equipment shortfalls identified by
combatant commanders and service mitigation strategies, the Joint
Staff's methodology can provide DOD and the services greater
visibility to better assess the risks and subsequent mitigation plans
and better inform congressional decision making on the potential
ramifications associated with specific shortages of prepositioned
stocks.[Footnote 23] However, the Integrated Priority Lists that
underpin DOD's classified supplement aggregate the combatant commands'
descriptions of the impact of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks with
their descriptions of the impact of other related shortfalls, such as
military construction. Similarly, the 2010 Chairman's Risk Assessment,
which provides a holistic department-level assessment of risk,
discusses the impact of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks in the
context of other risks.
DOD's annual report provides some information on the steps the
services are taking to mitigate the risks of shortfalls in
prepositioned stocks, but this information does not include some
measures the services have in place to reduce short-term risk or the
extent to which these measures reduce risk. Such information would be
helpful to understand the full range of risks and mitigation
associated with shortfalls in prepositioned stocks. According to DOD's
report, with the exception of a potential Marine Corps CENTCOM-
specific equipment set that is currently awaiting program of record
definition, no additional steps will be taken by the services aside
from existing plans to reconstitute their prepositioned stocks.
Similarly, the 2010 Secretary of Defense Risk Mitigation Plan states
that DOD is "aggressively" pursuing funding to reconstitute its
prepositioned stocks, although, as the information in DOD's annual
report to Congress indicates, full reconstitution of all the services'
prepositioned stocks will not be complete until fiscal year 2017.
However, the services have taken other steps to mitigate the short-
term risks associated with current shortfalls in prepositioned stocks.
For example, the Army Prepositioned Stocks Strategy 2015 states that
the Army has implemented three risk mitigation measures to heighten
the Army's ability to provide trained and equipped forces to support
DOD's contingency requirements, which, according to Army officials,
will help decrease the time required to move equipment to where it is
needed. In addition, according to Air Force officials, the Air Force's
"mobility assets," which are assets positioned at Air Force bases
worldwide similar to those it prepositions, are available in
sufficient quantity to mitigate current shortfalls in its
prepositioned equipment. These measures are not discussed in DOD's
report, but would be useful if provided in future reports.[Footnote
24] Further, neither the classified supplement of DOD's annual report
nor the Integrated Priority Lists upon which the classified supplement
is based specify the extent to which the mitigation steps identified
by the services may reduce the risks associated with shortfalls in
prepositioned stocks, or whether these mitigation measures are
sufficient. For example, although the Army stated in DOD's report that
as a result of demands for equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan it could
not support EUCOM's request for accelerating the reconstitution of
portions of its land-based prepositioned stocks in Europe, the extent
to which the department has accepted risk by not meeting EUCOM's
request or mitigated overall risk by meeting higher priority needs
elsewhere is unclear.
DOD did not concur with our 2008 recommendation to provide additional
information on the risk of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks and
mitigation strategies, and stated that because the Chairman's Risk
Assessment considers all factors relating to DOD readiness and
strategy, it better aids decision making than would information
specific to the risks of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks. According
to DOD's 2008 National Defense Strategy, addressing the risks
associated with successfully executing the strategy within acceptable
costs entails clearly articulating the risks inherent in and the
consequences of choosing among options and proposing mitigation
strategies that would help to identify areas where the department can
assume greater risk. Similarly, according to DOD planning guidance,
Integrated Priority Lists are intended to outline potential areas in
which DOD can accept increased risk to cover the costs of the
mitigation strategies identified. We continue to believe that without
clearly articulating the extent to which shortfalls in prepositioned
stocks, relative to other factors, contribute to the risks cited in
the Integrated Priority Lists and Chairman's Risk Assessment, stating
these risks in terms of impact on DOD's contingency plans, providing
the full range of measures the department has in place to mitigate
risk, and assessing the extent to which these measures reduce risk,
DOD's ability to present areas where it can accept increased risk to
cover the costs of mitigating other risks, as could become
increasingly necessary in the current fiscally constrained
environment, may be limited with respect to prepositioned stocks.
Further, Congress may be less able to determine the extent to which
funding directed towards reconstituting DOD's prepositioned stocks
will reduce risk relative to funding directed towards other programs.
Other DOD Information Sources Provide More Indication of Risks of
Shortfalls in Prepositioned Stocks and Extent to Which Mitigation
Steps Reduce Risk:
DOD's Joint Force Readiness Review and associated documentation
provide more indication of the extent to which DOD's mitigation steps
reduce the risks of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks, although
questions remain.[Footnote 25] For example, such reporting suggests
that shortfalls in prepositioned stocks may not be significant drivers
of risk and that available mitigation further reduces risk. In
addition, one combatant command that submitted capability gap
documentation related to shortfalls in prepositioned stocks in fiscal
year 2008 did not do so in fiscal year 2009. As a result, the Joint
Force Readiness Review, when considered together with the steps DOD
has taken to mitigate risk, provides some indication of the
sufficiency of mitigation of the risks to the one operation plan that
lists shortfalls in prepositioned stocks as an execution risk.
However, although EUCOM identifies "forces for building partner
capacity" as a deficiency in the most recent Joint Force Readiness
Review, neither its submission nor CENTCOM's identification of
shortfalls in prepositioned stocks as stated in DOD's report is shown
in the Joint Force Readiness Review as influencing operational risk or
resulting in the inability to conduct mission-essential tasks. In
addition, mitigation strategies addressing these shortfalls as they
relate to EUCOM and CENTCOM are not included in the Joint Force
Readiness Review. As a result, questions remain as to the sufficiency
of service-specified mitigation for the shortfalls in prepositioned
stocks identified by these combatant commands in their joint
capability gap assessments and Integrated Priority Lists, especially
in the short term until the services' reconstitution of their
prepositioned stocks is complete.
Combatant command staffs take steps to mitigate short-term risk but
these actions may not be consistently reported. According to CENTCOM
officials, shortfalls in prepositioned stocks in their area of
responsibility had never resulted in any risk--short, medium, or long
term--that could not be mitigated to within acceptable levels. For
example, the Army decided to issue prepositioned stocks to support the
rapid movement of combat-equipped forces into Iraq in 2003, the surge
of forces in Iraq in 2006-2007, and the ongoing increase of 30,000
forces in Afghanistan. In response to these decisions, CENTCOM
assessed that the risk of issuing prepositioned stocks was mitigated
because the forces to which the stocks were issued were located in the
same area of operations as the stocks themselves, and the units which
received this equipment could be rapidly retasked to respond to
another contingency in the same area of responsibility. Further, in
the case of increasing the forces in Afghanistan, issuing the specific
types of required equipment did not significantly affect the combat
capability of the prepositioned set in Kuwait, even though the forces
using the equipment were operating further from the location where
they would most likely be needed should another contingency erupt,
according to the officials. In general, according to the CENTCOM
planners, risk assessment and mitigation comprise the majority of
combatant command planners' daily workload, although the results of
these actions may not always be reported outside of the combatant
command. We therefore recognize that external reporting on combatant
commands' risk mitigation for shortfalls in prepositioned stocks may
be limited.[Footnote 26]
The DOD internal tasking process used to respond to the annual
reporting requirement may have limited its ability to provide the
information on the risks to operation plans resulting from shortfalls
in prepositioned stocks that it already collects as part of the Joint
Force Readiness Review.[Footnote 27] As an example, a Joint Staff
official responsible for compiling the input for DOD's report to
Congress for the past 2 years said that in tasking the logistics
directorate to produce DOD's report, the Joint Staff did not require
input from the operations directorate, which is most closely
responsible for tracking information related to operational readiness
issues, such as the impact of shortfalls in prepositioned stocks on
operation plans. As a result, the information DOD already reports
elsewhere related to risks to DOD's operation plans of shortfalls in
prepositioned stocks has not been fully covered in DOD's report.
Without integrating the information in the Joint Force Readiness
Review with the information DOD currently provides to Congress in its
annual report on prepositioned stocks and in other products such as
the Chairman's Risk Assessment, Congress may lack information about
risk as it applies specifically to shortfalls in prepositioned stocks,
how these risks relate to other risks such as the risk of not
completing military construction projects, and the extent to which
DOD's mitigation measures reduce these risks. More broadly, without
providing a complete picture of the scope of DOD's prepositioning
programs and associated funding needed for their reconstitution,
together with a clearer discussion of the risk of shortfalls in its
prepositioned stocks and associated mitigation, DOD may not be able to
provide Congress the information necessary to determine the
sufficiency of DOD's justification for the additional resources needed
to reconstitute the department's prepositioned stocks.
DOD Has Limited Departmentwide Guidance Linking Its Prepositioning
Programs with the Achievement of National Military Objectives:
DOD has limited departmentwide guidance that would help ensure that
its prepositioning programs accurately reflect national military
objectives, such as those included in the National Defense Strategy
and the National Military Strategy. DOD has developed departmentwide
guidance, referred to as the Guidance for Development of the Force
(GDF), but as of September 2010, this guidance contained little
information related to prepositioned stocks even though DOD's 2008
instruction that addresses prepositioned stocks specifically directed
the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to develop GDF for
prepositioned stocks. Because other sources of information the
services use to determine their requirements for prepositioned stocks
may not clearly state the full range of DOD's need for these stocks,
without overarching planning and funding priorities that link DOD's
prepositioning programs to its national military objectives the
services' ability to make informed decisions about the future of their
programs may be limited.
DOD's Guidance for Development of the Force Does Not Contain
Information Synchronizing Its Prepositioning Programs with National
Military Objectives:
DOD's efforts to develop departmentwide guidance to synchronize its
prepositioning programs with national military objectives are
incomplete. In June 2008, DOD issued an instruction directing the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to develop and coordinate
guidance for approval by the Secretary of Defense, referred to as GDF,
that identifies overall prepositioned stocks strategy to achieve
desired capabilities and responsiveness in support of the National
Defense Strategy.[Footnote 28] According to a Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff instruction on joint strategic planning, GDF
establishes the department's force development planning and resource
priorities needed to meet future contingencies, and provides a
critical linkage between the National Defense Strategy, the National
Military Strategy, and DOD's budget.[Footnote 29] GDF for
prepositioned stocks would provide the services with information on
the medium and long-term departmentwide priorities they need to
effectively plan and apply their resources to meet future
contingencies, thus linking DOD's prepositioning programs with its
overall national defense strategies. DOD issued its GDF in 2008, prior
to the publication of its instruction on prepositioned stocks, and
updated this guidance in 2009. However, as of September 2010, the GDF
did not contain any information that would synchronize DOD's
prepositioning programs with national military goals. According to
officials from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
and the 2008 GDF, the information on prepositioning in the GDF has
been limited to instructions for the geographic combatant commanders
to include information on prepositioned stocks in their theater
posture plans.[Footnote 30] Thus, the extent of DOD's definition of
departmentwide planning and funding priorities for prepositioned
stocks is more limited, and the department continues to lack an
overarching assessment and prioritization of combatant commander needs
and service initiatives to meet these needs. As a result, the
information available to the services in terms of departmentwide needs
and priorities as they relate to prepositioned stocks remains limited.
Information from Other Sources on DOD's Needs for Prepositioned Stocks
Is Limited:
Beyond GDF, other sources of information used by the services to
determine combatant commanders' needs also may not clearly state the
full potential demand for prepositioned stocks in meeting national
military objectives. Title 10 of the U.S. Code charges the secretary
of each department with responsibility for carrying out the functions
of that department so as to fulfill the current and future operational
requirements of the combatant commands.[Footnote 31] In that role, the
services determine whether the needs of combatant commands can best be
supported with prepositioned equipment or with equipment from other
sources. In addition to overarching guidance such as GDF, other
sources of information, including DOD's contingency plans, may inform
the development of service requirements, such as those for
prepositioned stocks. For DOD's contingency plans that call for the
early entry of forces into combat, determining the need for
prepositioned stocks is relatively straightforward. For example,
according to Joint Staff officials, the fully developed operation
plans in U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) area of responsibility spell
out the combatant commander's requirements that the services have
determined can be best met with prepositioned stocks. According to
these officials, this is possible because PACOM's plans include time-
phased force deployment data.[Footnote 32] However, out of DOD's 50
top priority plans, only 7 are directed to contain these data,
according to Joint Staff documentation. As a result, the majority of
DOD's contingency plans may not include the data necessary for the
services to determine a clear need for prepositioned stocks based on
these plans' requirements.
Needs other than the support of early entry of forces into a military
operation, such as theater security cooperation, low-level military
action, or humanitarian assistance, may not be identified in operation
plans in as much detail as time-phased force deployment data provide.
Because combatant commands do not necessarily tie these types of
demands to such data, requirements for prepositioned stocks other than
those which facilitate early entry of forces may be harder to
determine and, according to a joint staff official, more difficult for
the combatant commands to justify. For example, as discussed earlier,
EUCOM has expressed a need for prepositioned stocks to build the
capacity of partner states. However, EUCOM does not have an operation
plan with time-phased force deployment data. As a result, EUCOM may
face challenges in justifying needs for prepositioned equipment that
reflect the current global security environment. In fact, EUCOM's
posture plan stated that a reexamination is necessary for how afloat
and land-based prepositioned equipment and materiel can be best
managed to support not just major military operations, which typically
are associated with time-phased force deployment data, but also
theater security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and disaster
relief, explicitly articulating the need for high-level action in this
area. Without combatant command statements of need expressed in terms
of detailed operational requirements, the services may be less able to
determine whether prepositioned stocks or equipment from other sources
would be most appropriate to meet these needs. Further, without such
information, the services may face challenges in resourcing combatant
command needs for prepositioned stocks. For example, according to Air
Force officials, one combatant command has expressed a need for
additional prepositioned stocks for some time, but as of August 2010
had yet to finalize an operation plan with time-phased force
deployment data. As a result, according to Air Force officials, the
Air Force has been unable to obtain the funding authorizations for the
prepositioned equipment it would need to support the draft plan.
Further, other potential sources of requirements outside of DOD's
contingency plans, such as Defense Planning Scenarios,[Footnote 33]
may not fully reflect current combatant commander needs. For example,
the 2010 Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study, which is based
on these scenarios and assumes the full reconstitution of all
currently programmed prepositioned equipment, found that combat
equipment on afloat prepositioned stocks was not employed early in the
fight for a particular scenario involving operations in the PACOM area
of responsibility. However, joint and service officials raised
questions about this conclusion, stating that combatant commander
needs may have changed since that particular scenario had been
developed. In particular, according to Army planning officials,
Defense Planning Scenarios incorporate combatant commander input in
the beginning of their development phase, but existing DOD planning
guidance does not require such input as part of the final validation
of these scenarios, which can occur 2 years later. As a result, these
scenarios may not fully reflect the current global security and
operational environments, including needs for prepositioned stocks
that may have changed during the 2-year period of scenario
development. By extension, this lack of clarity in the demand for
prepositioned stocks may affect the department's ability to
effectively determine its current and future needs for prepositioned
stocks, and link these needs with national military goals.
Without an overall prepositioned stocks strategy in its GDF, DOD may
not be able to effectively articulate the policy implications stemming
from the placement of prepositioned stocks in accordance with DOD's
global defense posture. For example, according to CENTCOM officials,
prepositioning provides combatant commanders the ability to signal a
U.S. commitment to its allies without officially making such a
commitment. As such, according to officials from the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, prepositioning forms an integral
component of DOD's global defense posture. For example, according to
CENTCOM officials, a decision to alter the size or composition of
prepositioned stocks at a location or replace them with something
else, such as an ongoing force presence, may diminish U.S. flexibility
of response, affect relationships with allies, and increase costs and
institutional risks. Further, removing prepositioned stocks could
embolden our adversaries by reducing the U.S. government's deterrence
capability, these officials stated. Such issues have intrinsic policy
components, according to officials from the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. However, in the absence of
policy-level direction on prepositioning from a source such as GDF,
DOD may not be able to ensure that the services' decisions about the
future of their prepositioning programs fully reflect current and
future needs in these areas.
In the absence of clearly stated departmentwide needs and priorities
for prepositioned stocks, the services may not be able to shape their
prepositioned stocks programs to most effectively and efficiently meet
evolving defense challenges. Both the Chief of Staff of the Army and
the Secretary of the Navy are currently considering major proposals to
adjust their prepositioning programs. Specifically, the Army is
considering eliminating its prepositioned heavy brigade combat team
equipment in Europe and, as of July 2010, the Navy had decided to
place a major portion of the Marine Corps' prepositioned ships in a
reduced operating status at locations in the United States rather than
locations abroad beginning in fiscal year 2013. However, the
information made available to the Secretary of the Navy focused on the
past usage of the Marine Corps' prepositioned stocks and, according to
Marine Corps documentation, did not consider the potential risks to
both known and unknown contingencies of reducing the capability to
rapidly respond to crises. In both cases, the combatant commands,
joint staff, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy may not have provided their formal input into the decisions as
of August 2010, according to DOD officials and documentation. Further,
the working group DOD established to oversee its prepositioning
programs at the joint level, which is discussed in more detail later
in this report, has, according to its charter, the responsibility for
monitoring requirements and risks associated with prepositioned stocks
and for remaining current on service plans. However, this group did
not meet before the recommendations were formally presented by service
senior leadership. Although the joint community will likely have the
opportunity to formally provide its input to these decisions, such
input will occur after the service chiefs make their decisions and as
a result the outcome may be more difficult to influence, according to
DOD officials. Without the development and implementation of
departmentwide guidance that includes planning and funding priorities
linking current and future needs and desired responsiveness of DOD's
prepositioned stocks to evolving national defense objectives, the
services may not be able to make fully informed decisions about the
future of their programs that would support the effective and
efficient achievement of such objectives.
DOD has undertaken or recently completed five major studies or reviews
which could help the department clarify evolving defense challenges
and determine its current and future needs for prepositioned stocks.
For example, in August 2010, the Senior Warfighting Forum concluded a
4-month review, during which each combatant command achieved consensus
on the attributes of prepositioning programs most valuable to them and
ranked these attributes by priority.[Footnote 34] The six attributes,
in order of prioritization, were responsiveness, tailorability,
expeditionary, flexibility, reliability, and relevance. The intent was
to incorporate the Senior Warfighting Forum results into a wide-
ranging review conducted by the Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. This wide-ranging
review, which is not yet complete, seeks to examine the Army and
Marine Corps prepositioning programs to identify costs and potential
efficiencies to be gained, provide information on how prepositioned
stocks have been used since 1990, identify the linkages between DOD's
contingency plans and its prepositioned stocks, and develop
alternatives to prepositioning equipment and materiel for senior DOD
leadership to consider. In addition, according to DOD officials, the
Joint Staff resources directorate is leading a study on global defense
posture, which will include a prepositioning component. Further,
according to officials, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense
for Policy is studying prepositioning as part of its ongoing efforts
to create implementing documentation for the posture strategy
articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review. Finally, in August 2010
the Under Secretary of the Navy initiated a review of the Department
of the Navy's prepositioning programs, including the Marine Corps'
prepositioned stocks. These studies have the potential to inform a
departmentwide approach to prepositioning requirements that fully
considers the current security environment and increases efficiencies
or cost savings, but the absence of policy, such as overarching
guidance, and the organizational means to institutionalize the results
of these efforts, may limit the studies' impact.
Organizational Challenges May Hinder DOD's Ability to Provide
Effective Joint Oversight for Its Prepositioning Programs and Achieve
Potential Efficiencies:
DOD faces organizational challenges which may hinder its efforts to
gain efficiencies. Specifically, DOD established the Global
Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group to address joint
prepositioning issues. However, DOD has been unable to ensure that the
working group's activities include the full range of tasks the working
group was established to perform, including making recommendations
that would synchronize and integrate, as appropriate, the services'
prepositioning programs, because the working group lacks clear
oversight and reporting relationships to authoritative bodies within
DOD. According to joint and service officials, efficiencies or cost
savings could be gained through improved joint program management
across the services and leveraging components in DOD, such as the
Defense Logistics Agency.
DOD's Joint Organization Responsible for Providing Oversight for Its
Prepositioning Programs May Be Unable to Achieve Its Objectives:
DOD faces organizational challenges in effectively synchronizing the
individual services' prepositioning programs. The 2008 DOD instruction
on war reserve materiel policy directed the establishment of a Global
Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group, comprised of
officials from the services, joint organizations, and entities within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. According to DOD officials,
this working group was formalized in June 2008, although it had been
in existence for several years. Further, according to DOD officials,
this working group has constituted DOD's response to recommendations
from GAO to develop a departmentwide strategy related to prepositioned
equipment and materiel. In particular, according to DOD officials
involved with the group since its inception, the intent of the working
group was to provide an overall view of DOD's prepositioning programs
and ensure that the services' programs were synchronized, as a
strategic plan would do. According to GAO's Standards for Internal
Control in the Federal Government, internal control should provide
reasonable assurance that an agency's objectives are being achieved in
the areas of effectiveness and efficiency of operations and compliance
with applicable laws and regulations.[Footnote 35]
According to the standards, federal agencies are to employ internal
control activities, such as oversight through reviews by managers, to
help ensure that an organization's directives are carried out and
resources are effectively and efficiently used. DOD's working group
has not carried out all of its responsibilities under the DOD
instruction or the objectives and responsibilities in its charter.
According to DOD's instruction, the working group is responsible for,
among other things, addressing joint issues concerning requirements
and positioning for prepositioned stocks and developing
recommendations for improved processes, as needed, and making
recommendations that balance limited resources against operational
risk for use during budget and program reviews. However, instead of
conducting these tasks, the working group has served primarily as a
forum for service representatives to share information about their own
service's programs, collect information to support the publication of
DOD's annual report to Congress on the status of its prepositioned
stocks, and coordinate responses to audit inquiries such as those in
support of GAO's annual review, according to joint and service
officials. Although these tasks are consistent with the purpose
statement in the working group's charter, both the charter and the DOD
instruction illustrate a much broader set of objectives and
responsibilities, as noted above. Further, according to DOD officials
involved in the working group since 2008, as working group
participants became more comfortable with the annual reporting process
and GAO's annual review, the frequency of meetings--which initially
occurred quarterly and then increased to monthly--declined and the
results of the group's discussions may not have been consistently
recorded.
In addition, DOD's 2008 instruction on prepositioned stocks may not
specify the correct core membership for the working group. One of the
objectives set out in the charter for DOD's working group is to
support DOD's global defense posture initiative. However, the working
group's core membership does not include representation from the
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, which develops
DOD's global defense posture and is responsible for developing GDF
that identifies overall prepositioned stocks strategy to achieve
desired capabilities and responsiveness in support of the National
Defense Strategy. On the other hand, DOD's instruction does include
the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness in the list of working group participants. However, a
working group participant did not recall someone from this office ever
having attended a working group meeting.
DOD's ability to ensure that its joint prepositioning working group's
activities include the full range of tasks the group was established
to perform and that the group includes the correct core membership has
been limited by unclear reporting relationships between the group and
other components within DOD. According to the working group's charter,
the responsibility for ensuring that the working group meets the
objectives set out in the charter falls on the group's co-chairs--
representatives from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In addition, shortly after the working group was formalized, officials
stated that the working group reports to officials senior to the co-
chairs in their respective organizations. Further, DOD's instruction
states that the working group will make recommendations that balance
limited resources against operational risk to the Director of Program
Analysis and Evaluation, now referred to as the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation,
during program reviews, and to the Undersecretary of Defense
Comptroller during budget reviews. According to officials involved in
the working group, the group has not made recommendations to these
offices. In addition, officials from the joint staff stated that the
working group in fact did not formally report to any other
organization within the department, although these officials were
considering developing a recommendation that the working group report
to another working group focused on global posture, called the Global
Posture Executive Council.[Footnote 36] Unless appropriate reporting
relationships are clarified and adhered to, and the group is overseen
by an authoritative body that can review its activities, DOD may
continue to be unable to ensure that the group's activities and
objectives align and that the results of its efforts will go beyond
the working group itself. Further, without taking the appropriate
steps, such as periodic reviews, to ensure that the working group
performs its assigned functions and includes the proper core
membership, DOD may be hindered in its ability to synchronize, at the
joint level, its prepositioning programs with planning and funding
priorities to better oversee its prepositioning programs, which may
affect the department's ability to gain potential efficiencies or cost
savings.
Efficiencies May Be Gained through Improved Joint Integration of
Service Prepositioning Programs:
According to joint and service officials, better synchronization and
integration among the services' prepositioning programs and other
components within DOD may result in efficiencies or cost savings. In
particular, efficiencies or cost savings may be gained by an increased
emphasis on joint program management, as appropriate, and by
leveraging components in DOD such as the Defense Logistics Agency.
Potential Opportunities for Joint Program Management:
DOD officials involved in the department's prepositioning programs
generally agreed that integrating elements of DOD's prepositioning
programs may lead to efficiencies. According to DOD officials,
materiel and equipment critical to supporting ongoing operations in
CENTCOM's area of responsibility are resident in more than one of the
services' prepositioned inventories and yet are managed and funded
separately. For example, all of the services include in their
prepositioning programs equipment to distribute and store fuel. In
addition, the Air Force and Army both field similar sets of equipment
used to establish bases in forward locations. Because these sets are
currently managed and funded separately, officials from both services
agreed that consolidating the management of these capabilities would
result in savings. Challenges for making this change, however, would
include establishing a common quality-of-life standard for the sets
acceptable to all the services and determining who would be
responsible for funding. According to an Air Force official, the
department is moving towards establishing common quality-of-life
standards for the services, and departmentwide initiatives, such as
the Joint Expeditionary Basing Working Group, have successfully
implemented joint management for certain equipment and materiel, such
as refrigerator units and hygiene sets. Funding is a major challenge
under current arrangements, especially for the Air Force, which has
provided a significant number of its expeditionary base sets to the
Army and Marine Corps. The Air Force is currently unable to replace
this equipment, and has not yet been reimbursed for the sets it has
provided to the Army. As a result, the Air Force faces a $315 million
shortage that will affect its ability to meet the requirements of
other contingency plans, according to Air Force data.
Officials from both the Army and the Marine Corps agreed that
efficiencies could be gained by implementing some kind of joint
management arrangement for afloat prepositioned stocks. Marine Corps
officials offered that the Marine Corps afloat prepositioned stocks
maintenance and staging facility in Jacksonville, Florida could
support a level of expansion sufficient to incorporate the Army's
afloat prepositioning program. These officials also stated that it may
make sense to develop and implement an "executive agency" form of
management for DOD's afloat prepositioned stocks. Similarly, EUCOM's
posture plan recommends joint consolidation of stocks. An Air Force
official noted that the joint program management concept has been
employed with DOD's Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle program.
Although the Institute for Defense Analyses studied the potential cost
savings of combining the Army's and Marine Corps' afloat prepositioned
stocks maintenance facilities, located in Charleston, South Carolina,
and Jacksonville, Florida, it found no compelling reason to combine
the facilities since doing so would offer small and uncertain cost
savings and could result in strategic drawbacks.[Footnote 37] However,
this study was conducted over 12 years ago.
Although it is currently unclear whether combining the Army's and
Marine Corps' entire afloat prepositioning programs would be
beneficial, efficiencies may be gained through joint management of
elements within each service's program. For example, both the Army and
Marine Corps maintain separate contracted capabilities to load and
maintain equipment stored on prepositioned ships at their respective
facilities. Although the capabilities are very similar and are now
even provided by the same contractor, each is managed as a separate
program. In fiscal year 2010, the Army obligated about $48 million for
its contract and the Marine Corps obligated about $74 million.
According to Army officials, consolidating these programs under one
office may result in savings to the government through efficiencies
gained by, for example, reducing the overhead costs associated with
parallel management and contract oversight functions. Further,
according to Army officials, managing the Army's and Marine Corps'
afloat prepositioned stocks maintenance activities under one program
would help the contractor streamline its workforce and ensure
experienced management oversight in both locations. According to the
charter for DOD's working group for prepositioned stocks, one of the
group's objectives is to evaluate and provide recommendations for
assignment of management responsibility for common items to designated
entities. However, without proper management oversight facilitated by
clear reporting relationships, the ability of the working group to
provide such recommendations and the responsibility of the recipient
offices to consider them is unclear.
Leveraging Components in DOD:
Increased emphasis on leveraging components within DOD, such as the
Defense Logistics Agency, may also improve prepositioning program
effectiveness over current service-centric strategies. For example,
the Army's current requirements for its war reserve sustainment
stocks, worth about $608 million, are based largely on a new
methodology that established the demand for parts during operations in
Iraq as a baseline for global requirements for these parts. The
methodology emphasizes placing "big, heavy, and cheap" items in
forward locations in order to minimize the lift required to transport
these items to the locations if needed for a contingency operation.
Army officials responsible for executing the Army's prepositioning
program raised concerns with this methodology, arguing that the needs
experienced during operations in Iraq may not reflect the demand for
parts that would occur during operations elsewhere in the world. For
example, officials responsible for executing the Army's prepositioning
program in East Asia noted that 20,000 tires are currently stored in
Korea solely because operating forces in the early days of military
operations in Iraq had to change a lot of tires. However, even if
operations in Korea would require this number of tires in sustainment
stocks, which the officials doubted, they noted that they could not be
used anyway because the Army has switched to tire/wheel assemblies as
the authorized parts. Army officials predicted that the Army would
have to find a way to rapidly ship a large amount of parts at the last
minute to supply its forces should a contingency operation arise,
because the stocks authorized under the new methodology would not meet
the needs on the ground, or accept risk if such shipment capability
were unavailable. These officials and others agreed that, while
tedious, involving the operating forces on the ground in validating
sustainment stocks requirements is the best way to determine the
needed equipment and materiel.
DOD officials also stated that the Defense Logistics Agency could
provide greater efficiencies in delivering sustainment stocks. For
example, according to Defense Logistics Agency officials, the Defense
Logistics Agency's global supply chain, which already provides 84
percent of all the military services' repair parts, may be leveraged
to provide certain materiel when needed in the early stages of a
conflict at a potentially lower cost than would be incurred by
prepositioning, allowing the services to reduce their prepositioned
inventories. In addition, by obtaining such materiel through
requisitions from the operating forces on the ground, the services may
be more likely to have on-hand the actual items needed than they would
by relying on methodologies that project demand. The Army has begun
exploring ways to better take advantage of the Defense Logistics
Agency's capabilities. Further, the charter for DOD's Global
Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group states that one of
its objectives is to leverage the capabilities of defense agencies to
better synchronize their efforts with the services' prepositioning
programs. However, without departmentwide guidance and appropriate
lines of authority and oversight for the Global Prepositioned Materiel
Capabilities Working Group, DOD may not be able to fully realize
potential efficiencies that could be gained by integrating the
services' prepositioning programs with each other and with other DOD
components, as appropriate.
Conclusions:
Moving forward, DOD's annual report, as well as the active interest
and involvement of the congressional defense committees, can continue
to be an effective tool to help DOD effectively plan for and use its
prepositioned equipment to achieve national military objectives. The
ongoing evolution in the types of contingencies to which DOD may be
called upon to respond creates challenges for the department in how it
determines the demand for prepositioned stocks. Combatant commanders'
equipment and materiel needs related to low-level military
engagements, disaster relief, and theater security cooperation now
accompany requirements associated with major combat operations, but
may not be formalized in operation plans to the level of detail
necessary for the services to easily determine whether such needs can
be best met with prepositioned stocks, and therefore may be more
difficult to justify. Further, such demands may go beyond the major
equipment end items and spare parts required to be included in DOD's
annual report, to include other types of equipment such as the Army's
Operational Project Stocks. Providing additional information on the
full range of DOD's prepositioning programs would allow Congress
greater visibility on the scope of options available to meet national
military objectives within these programs when making decisions about
future funding--which would be especially helpful in finding potential
efficiencies to be gained in today's increasingly fiscally constrained
environment. Similarly, including in the annual report a more detailed
summary of the risks to operation plans resulting from current
shortfalls in these stocks and the full range of DOD's mitigation
measures, together with readiness information DOD already collects and
reports, would provide Congress a better idea of how these shortfalls
specifically affect the operational readiness of the force. Further,
DOD's challenges in identifying the full range of potential demands
for prepositioned stocks highlight the importance of departmentwide
guidance specifying DOD's current and future needs for these stocks as
well as associated planning and funding priorities. This is
particularly true given the many studies and reviews DOD has completed
or will complete in the near future, which have the potential to
inform departmentwide guidance and the future composition of the
services' prepositioning programs. Without such guidance, the services
may not be able to most effectively plan and apply their resources to
meet the needs of future contingencies. Finally, without clarifying
its joint prepositioning oversight structure, to include clearly
stated reporting relationships and management reviews to ensure that
DOD's joint activities in this area align with stated objectives, DOD
may continue to face organizational challenges that hinder its ability
to take full advantage of potential efficiencies that may be gained,
for example, through minimization of overlap or duplication among the
services' programs.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that DOD more fully informs the congressional defense
committees on the status of prepositioned equipment and materiel
through its annual report to Congress and to enhance joint oversight,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five
actions:
1. Direct the Joint Staff and the Secretaries of the military services
to provide, in addition to the six elements currently required in the
annual report, a more comprehensive picture of the full scope of the
services' prepositioning programs, to include (1) a representative
summary description including the dollar value and, as appropriate,
level of fill and information on serviceability, of (a) Army
Operational Projects and Army War Reserve Sustainment Stocks, (b) Air
Force munitions, medical stocks, rations, and fuel elements of its War
Reserve Materiel program, and (c) Marine Corps materiel prepositioned
to support an entire deployed Marine Corps force, such as its
capability sets; and (2) all sources of funding for the services'
prepositioned equipment and materiel, including working capital funds.
2. Direct the Joint Staff operations and plans directorates to provide
in DOD's annual report to Congress, in addition to the information DOD
already includes related to Integrated Priority Lists and capability
gap assessments, information it reports as part of the Joint Force
Readiness Review, including (1) a summary of all DOD's plans the
services have determined include requirements for prepositioned
stocks, (2) a description of the extent to which the combatant
commands assess that shortfalls in prepositioned stocks contribute to
any specific execution risk in these plans, (3) the full range of
measures in place to mitigate the risks of shortfalls in prepositioned
stocks, and (4) an assessment of the extent to which the mitigation
measures identified by the services reduce risk.
3. Direct the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, to (1) assess the continued relevance of the Global
Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group's assigned tasks and
membership as stated in DOD Instruction 3110.06 and the group's
charter and make any necessary adjustments to ensure that the working
group's objectives align with its activities. These would include
making the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy a core
member, and clarifying lines of authority and reporting between the
working group and other components within DOD, such as the Global
Posture Executive Council, so as to instill accountability through
appropriate oversight and management review.
4. Upon clarifying DOD's joint oversight structure for prepositioned
stocks, direct the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
to leverage the expertise of the Global Prepositioned Materiel
Capabilities Working Group members, the offices they represent, and
the results of the multiple recent or ongoing prepositioning studies
to develop appropriately detailed authoritative strategic guidance,
such as Guidance for Development of the Force. The guidance would
include planning and resource priorities linking the department's
current and future needs for prepositioned stocks, including desired
responsiveness, to evolving national defense objectives.
5. Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretaries of the military services to implement DOD's authoritative
strategic guidance on prepositioned stocks in such a way so as to
integrate and synchronize at a DOD-wide level, as appropriate, the
services' prepositioning programs so that they include updated
requirements and maximize efficiency in managing prepositioned assets
across the department to reduce unnecessary duplication.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations and provided information on the steps it is taking or
plans to take to address them. With regard to our first two
recommendations, which concern additional information that would be
useful to include in DOD's annual report to Congress, DOD stated that
the department will review our recommended additions to the report and
determine the elements within the services' programs that are
appropriate to include in future reports. DOD also stated that it
would include relevant information pertaining to prepositioned stocks
as reported in the Joint Force Readiness Review that does not conflict
with other risk assessment mechanisms, such as the Chairman's Risk
Assessment. With regard to our third recommendation, which is focused
on DOD's joint oversight of its prepositioning programs, DOD stated
that current studies undertaken by the department, such as those
discussed in our report, may result in significant changes to the
structure and management of the department's prepositioning programs.
As such, DOD stated that it will review and make necessary adjustments
to the roles and responsibilities of the Global Prepositioned Materiel
Capabilities Working Group based on the outcome of its ongoing studies
and codify lines of authority and reporting between this group and
other DOD components. Further, according to DOD, the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy
Directorate, and, as necessary, the Joint Staff Operations Directorate
(Readiness), are now included as core members of the joint working
group. With regard to our fourth and fifth recommendations, which
address the need for developing and implementing authoritative
departmentwide guidance, the department stated that it will develop
strategic direction concerning prepositioned stocks and explore
opportunities to integrate and synchronize DOD-wide prepositioning
efforts based on the results of its studies. The department's comments
are reprinted in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff; the Secretaries of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy;
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. This report also is available
at no charge on our Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or SolisW@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
Subcommittee on Defense:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
Subcommittee on Defense:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
To address our first objective on the extent to which DOD addressed
the six reporting requirements in its annual report to Congress on its
prepositioned stocks and whether additional information would be
useful, we compared DOD's report to the congressional defense
committees with the statutory reporting requirements. We interviewed
knowledgeable DOD, joint, and military service officials to determine
the full scope of the services' prepositioning programs, including an
understanding of the elements included in DOD's annual report, the
extent to which the services' programs have elements that are not
included in the report, and whether additional information could
further inform Congress on the status of prepositioned equipment and
materiel. We also reviewed prior GAO and DOD reports on the services'
prepositioned stock programs and collected and reviewed readiness data
on the services' equipments sets and materiel. While we did not
independently assess the data on levels of fill and material condition
DOD provided to Congress, we discussed the reliability of the systems
used to develop the report data with service officials. In addition,
we physically observed sites where the Air Force and the Army store
land-based prepositioned stocks at Al Udeid Air Base and Camp As
Sayliyah, Qatar, and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, to determine whether there
were any obvious visual discrepancies between the information DOD
reports and the status of the equipment stored at these sites. We
selected these locations because (1) they represent different
services' storage sites, (2) they included equipment stored both
indoors and outdoors, and (3) travel was possible within the short
time frame allowed by this review. We also visited locations where the
Army and Marine Corps maintain and load their afloat prepositioned
stocks onto ships in Goose Creek, South Carolina, and Jacksonville,
Florida. We determined that the data reported by the services were
sufficiently reliable to meet the objectives of this engagement. To
determine if the funding required to reconstitute shortfalls in
prepositioned stocks was transparent, accurate, and comprehensive, we
reviewed the services' funding estimates provided in DOD's annual
report to Congress, spoke with the appropriate service officials, and
reviewed supplementary funding data. To assess the classified
supplement to DOD's report and examine the risk created by shortfalls
in prepositioned stocks and any actions taken to mitigate the risk of
those shortfalls, we obtained and analyzed combatant commander
Integrated Priority Lists, Joint Capability Gap Assessments, Joint
Requirements Oversight Council memorandums, the Chairman of the Joint
Chief of Staff's Risk Assessment, the Secretary of Defense's Risk
Mitigation Plan, and recent Joint Force Readiness Reviews and
discussed them with the appropriate officials.
To address our second objective on the extent to which DOD has
developed effective departmentwide guidance on prepositioned stocks to
achieve national military objectives, we examined prior GAO reports,
DOD guidance including its instruction on prepositioned stocks, joint
doctrine, the National Defense Strategy, the Guidance for Development
of the Force, and service regulations. We discussed the extent to
which departmentwide guidance specific to prepositioned stocks has
been developed with DOD, joint, and service officials. We reviewed the
Army's Prepositioned Stocks Strategy 2015, the Marine Corps'
Expeditionary Policies Road Map, and briefing materials describing the
Air Force's Integrated Security Posture, and discussed them with the
appropriate service officials to determine how the services develop
their requirements for prepositioned stocks. To understand current
sources of information on DOD's needs for prepositioned stocks, we
reviewed summary data on operation plans and combatant commander
theater posture plans and spoke with combatant command and joint
officials about the information included in these documents and the
operation planning process. We also examined the Mobility Capabilities
and Requirements Study 2016 and discussed this study, as well as the
several recently completed or ongoing studies focused more
specifically on prepositioned stocks, with the appropriate officials.
To address our third objective on the extent to which DOD has
organized effectively to provide joint oversight for its
prepositioning programs and achieve efficiencies, we assessed the
extent to which DOD has implemented a joint oversight structure for
its prepositioning programs as stated in its instruction on
prepositioned stocks. We examined prior GAO reports and supporting
evidence to understand the history of DOD's efforts to oversee, at a
joint level, its prepositioning programs. We discussed DOD's Global
Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Working Group with knowledgeable
service and joint officials, including those who had participated in
this working group since its formalization in 2008. We assessed the
extent to which the working group has effective guidance, oversight,
and lines of authority and reporting in accordance with our Standards
for Internal Control in the Federal Government[Footnote 38] by
examining the reporting structures stated in DOD's instruction, the
working group's leadership, organization, and composition, and its
tasks as stated in the instruction and the group's charter. Further,
we discussed the actual activities this working group has undertaken
with knowledgeable service and joint officials and compared these
tasks with its purpose and objectives to determine the extent to which
the working group's activities address responsibilities assigned in
the DOD Instruction. In the course of our discussions, we obtained
views on areas where DOD may gain efficiencies through joint oversight
or management, as appropriate, of its prepositioned programs.
We interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all four of the military services, and one
combatant command. The specific offices and military activities we
interviewed and obtained information from include the following:
* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain
Integration, Arlington, VA:
* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Global Force
Planning, Arlington, VA:
* Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation, Arlington, VA:
* Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington, VA:
- Operations Directorate:
- Logistics Directorate:
- Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate:
- Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate:
- Force Structure Resources and Assessment Directorate:
* U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL:
- Logistics Directorate, Requirements:
- Plans Directorate:
* U.S. Air Force, Headquarters, Logistics, Expeditionary Equipment
Division, Arlington, VA:
* U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command, Logistics, Plans and Programs,
Hampton, VA:
* U.S. Air Force, U.S. Air Forces Central, Logistics, War Reserve
Materiel, Sumter, SC:
* U.S. Air Force, U.S. Air Forces Central, Logistics, War Reserve
Materiel, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar:
* U.S. Army Headquarters, Arlington VA:
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training, War Plans
Division:
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics:
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development:
* U.S. Army Office of the Surgeon General:
* U.S. Army Materiel Command, Army Prepositioned Stocks, Ft. Belvoir,
VA:
* U.S. Army Sustainment Command, Directorate for Army Prepositioned
Stocks and Support Operations, Rock Island, IL:
* U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Contracting Center, Rock
Island, IL:
* U.S. Army Sustainment Command, 2nd Battalion, 401st Army Field
Support Brigade, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait:
* U.S. Army Sustainment Command, 1st Battalion, 401st Army Field
Support Brigade, Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar:
* U.S. Army Strategic Logistics Activity, Goose Creek, SC:
* U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency, Force Projection Directorate,
Goose Creek, SC:
* U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, Arlington VA:
- Logistics Plans and Operations, Installations and Logistics:
- Plans, Policies & Operations:
* U.S. Marine Corps, Blount Island Command, Jacksonville, FL:
* U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Logistics Operations,
Arlington, VA:
* Naval Facilities Engineering Command Expeditionary Programs Office,
Arlington, VA:
* U.S. Navy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management & Comptroller, Arlington, VA:
We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 through November
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
November 20, 2010:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report,
GA0-11-85C, DoD Prepositioned Stocks, dated October 18, 2010 (GAO Code
351464). Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Nancy L. Spruill:
Director, Acquisition Resources and Analysis:
Enclosures: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated October 18, 2010:
GAO-11-85C (GAO Code 351464):
"DOD Prepositioned Stocks"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: SecDef direct the Joint Staff (JS) and Services to
provide a more comprehensive picture of Preposition (PREPO) programs
to include:
(1) Description, dollar value, and fill level of augmenting stocks.
(2) All funding sources for PREPO programs, including working capital
funds.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department will review the recommended
additions to the report and determine the elements within each
particular Service program that are appropriate to include in future
reports.
Recommendation 2: SecDef direct the JS J3 and J5 to provide
information it reports as part of the Joint Forces Readiness Review
(JFRR) including (1) A summary of all DoD plans requiring PREPO
stocks, (2) Combatant Commands (COCOM) assessment of specific
execution risk to plans from PREPO shortfalls, (3) Measures in place
to mitigate risks from shortfalls, and (4) Assessment of extent
mitigation measures reduce risk.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department will include relevant information
pertaining to prepositioned stocks it reports in the Joint Force
Readiness Review and does not conflict with other risk/assessment
reporting mechanisms. The Department already provides a comprehensive
and more holistic approach to risk and mitigation strategies each year
with its submission of the Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA). The annual
CRA, submitted to the President and SecDef along with Presidential
Budget Request to Congress, considers not only shortfalls in
prepositioning programs, but also all factors relating to DoD
readiness and strategy. Reporting additional risks and mitigation
strategies for specific execution of concept plans using only
prepositioning program shortfalls could result in sub-optimized
decision making.
Recommendation 3: SecDef direct USD(AT&L) to (1) Assess Global
Prepositioning Materiel Capabilities Working Group (GPMCWG or WG)
assigned tasks and membership, (2) Clarify WG authority/reporting
structure within DoD, and (3) Implement effective oversight of WG.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department is currently conducting multiple
prepositioning studies that have a high potential for significant
change in structure and management of its prepositioning programs, the
primary being the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (VCJCS)
initiated SecDef Efficiency "Transforming Materiel Response
Capabilities". The Department will assess the continued relevance of the
GPMCWG and make necessary adjustments to its role and responsibility
based on the outcome of these studies The recommendation to include
USD(P) as a core member of the GPMCWG has already been completed, and
contact has been established to include a core member from JS J5 and
an as needed representative from JS J3/Readiness. The Department will
codify lines of authority and reporting between the WG and other DoD
components, which are already established. Primary linkages include
the Global Force Management Board, Joint Logistic Board, and Joint
Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board.
Recommendation 4: SecDef direct USD(P) to leverage expertise of GPMCWG
members and results of PREPO studies to develop The Guidance for the
Development of the Force (GDF) that includes planning and prioritized
needs for PREPO stocks.
DOD Response: Concur. Current ongoing studies include the OSD(CAPE)
"Global Prepositioned Materiel Capabilities Study", SecDef
Efficiencies Initiative "Transforming Materiel Response Capabilities",
and US TRANSCOM/DLA study "Comprehensive Materiel Response Plan" due
to be completed by August 2011. The Department will develop strategic
direction concerning prepositioned stocks that best meet national
defense objectives based on the results.
Recommendation 5: SecDef direct the JS and Services to implement GDF
with integrated DoD-wide management of PREPO assets across the
department.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department will explore opportunities to
integrate and synchronize DoD-wide prepositioning efforts using the
results of the current ongoing studies. The studies were initiated to
establish strategic guidance to manage prepositioned assets across the
Department that lead to efficiencies and maximize effectiveness.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or SolisW@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key
contributions to this report include Grace A. Coleman, Rachel E.
Dunsmoor, K. Nicole Harms, Oscar W. Mardis, Elizabeth D. Morris, Jason
M. Pogacnik, David A. Schmitt, and Amie M. Steele.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Defense Logistics: Better Management and Oversight of
Prepositioning Programs Needed to Reduce Risk and Improve Future
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-427]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
[2] Reconstitution includes the costs to clean, inspect, maintain,
replace, and restore equipment to the required condition at the
conclusion of a contingency operation or unit deployment.
[3] Pub. L. No. 110-181, §352 (2008).
[4] 10 U.S.C. §2229a.
[5] 10 U.S.C. §2229a(b).
[6] GAO, Defense Logistics: Department of Defense's Annual Report on
the Status of Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Can Be Enhanced to
Better Inform Congress, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-147R] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15,
2008).
[7] In accordance with 10 U.S.C. §153(d), the Chairman's Risk
Assessment provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
assessment of the strategic and military risks associated with
executing the missions called for by U.S. military strategy.
[8] GAO, Defense Logistics: Department of Defense's Annual Report on
the Status of Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Can Be Further
Enhanced to Better Inform Congress, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-172R] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4,
2009).
[9] Department of Defense Instruction 3110.06, War Reserve Materiel
(WRM) Policy (June 23, 2008). War reserve materiel is another term for
prepositioned stocks.
[10] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01B, Joint
Strategic Planning System (Dec. 12, 2008).
[11] A geographic combatant commander is a commander of one of the
unified or specified combatant commands established by the President
under 10 U.S.C. §161. Geographic combatant commands include U.S.
Africa Command, CENTCOM, U.S. Europe Command, U.S. Northern Command,
U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command. Section 164 of Title
10 of the U.S. Code provides combatant commanders with the authority
to organize commands and forces and employ forces as the combatant
commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.
[12] Apportionment is the distribution for planning of limited
resources among competing requirements. The basis for apportionment is
the capability provided by unit stocks, host-nation support, theater
prepositioned war reserve stocks and industrial base, and DOD
stockpiles in the U.S. and available production. Item apportionment
cannot exceed total capabilities.
[13] Contingency Plans are "potential" military actions and must be
militarily and politically acceptable and feasible within resource
constraints during the time period contemplated by the plan. They
enable DOD to mitigate risk of "foreseeable" strategic challenges. In
crises, the planning process is called crisis action planning.
[14] The 2008 National Defense Strategy defines risk in terms of the
potential for damage to national security combined with the
probability of occurrence and a measurement of the consequences should
the underlying risk remain unaddressed.
[15] 10 U.S.C. §2229a, GAO-10-172R, GAO-09-147R.
[16] 10 U.S.C. §2229a (a)(6).
[17] According to the DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation,
DOD 4140.1-R, AP1.1.11.7 (May 23, 2003), a major end item is a final
combination of end products that is ready for its intended use.
[18] Referred to as Tanks, Racks, Adapters, and Pylons.
[19] A working capital fund relies on sales revenue rather than direct
appropriations to finance its continuing operations. A working capital
fund is intended to (1) generate sufficient resources to cover the
full costs of its operations, and (2) operate on a break-even basis
over time--that is, neither make a gain nor incur a loss. Customers
use appropriated funds, primarily operations and maintenance
appropriations, to finance orders placed with the working capital fund.
[20] GAO, Force Structure: Need for Greater Transparency for the
Army's Grow the Force Initiative Funding Plan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-354R] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18,
2008).
[21] 10 U.S.C. §2229a (a)(6).
[22] Integrated Priority Lists define shortfalls in key programs that
can affect the capability to achieve the combatant commander's
assigned mission.
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-172R].
[24] We did not assess the sufficiency of these measures.
[25] DOD publishes its Joint Force Readiness Review quarterly to
provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a baseline of DOD
readiness, including critical shortfalls.
[26] We did not assess the sufficiency of the day-to-day actions taken
by the combatant commands in mitigating the impact, if any, resulting
from shortfalls in prepositioned stocks.
[27] 10 U.S.C. §2229a.
[28] Department of Defense Instruction 3110.06, War Reserve Materiel
(WRM) Policy (June 23, 2008).
[29] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01B, Joint
Strategic Planning System (Dec. 12, 2008).
[30] Global Defense Posture includes forces, footprint, and
agreements, and includes prepositioned stocks as part of the United
States' global footprint. Each geographic combatant commander develops
an annual theater posture plan, which identifies gaps between posture
demands and the current defense posture. These plans also identify
posture initiatives to fill these gaps. The Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has overall responsibility for
developing DOD's global posture.
[31] 10 U.S.C. §§3013, 5013 and 8013.
[32] Time-phased force deployment data include the specific units to
be deployed in support of a plan, the movement requirements such as
airlift and sealift needed for these forces and their equipment, and
the timeline for the movements.
[33] Defense Planning Scenarios identify critical mid-and longer-term
challenges that DOD, with interagency and foreign partners, must be
prepared to handle.
[34] The Senior Warfighting Forum includes the 10 geographic and
functional combatant commands, as well as representatives from each of
the four services, the Joint Staff, Military Sealift Command, the
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Surface
Deployment and Distribution Command.
[35] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[36] The Global Posture Executive Council is co-chaired by the Office
of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Office of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy.
[37] Institute for Defense Analyses, Collocating the Army and Marine
Corps Afloat Prepositioning Maintenance Sites at Charleston, South
Carolina and Blount Island, Florida, IDA Paper P-3354, Alexandria, VA
(August 1998).
[38] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[End of section]
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