Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Actions Are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DOD's ISR Enterprise Gao ID: GAO-11-465 June 3, 2011The success of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems in collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence information has fueled demand for ISR support, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has significantly increased its investments in ISR capabilities since combat operations began in 2001. In fiscal year 2010, intelligence community spending --including for ISR--exceeded $80 billion. Section 21 of Public Law 111-139 mandated that GAO identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities. This report examines the extent to which: (1) DOD manages and oversees the full scope and cost of the ISR enterprise; (2) DOD has sought to identify and minimize the potential for any unnecessary duplication in program, planning, and operations for ISR; and (3) DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap addresses key congressionally directed management elements and guidance.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) has the authority to oversee DOD's ISR enterprise; however, the broad scope and complex funding arrangements of DOD's ISR enterprise make it difficult to manage and oversee. The scope of the ISR enterprise and capabilities include many different kinds of activities conducted by multiple agencies. As a result, ISR activities may be funded through any of several sources, including the Military Intelligence Program, the National Intelligence Program, overseas contingency operations funding, and military service funds. To manage DOD's large ISR enterprise, the USD(I) serves as DOD's senior intelligence official, responsible for providing strategic, budget, and policy oversight over DOD's ISR enterprise. However, the USD(I) does not have full visibility into several budget sources that fund DOD's ISR enterprise, such as national intelligence capabilities, dual use assets, urgent operational needs, and military personnel expenses related to ISR. The USD(I)'s inability to gain full visibility and clarity into all of DOD's ISR financial resources hinders efforts to develop an investment strategy for ISR and to achieve efficiencies. DOD has developed general guidance in directives and other documents emphasizing the need to identify efficiencies and eliminate duplication or redundancies in its capabilities, which provides a foundation for further action. In August 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed that the department begin a series of efficiency initiatives to reduce duplication, overhead, and excess. However, the scope of the review pertaining to ISR was limited to analysis activities and excluded activities associated with collecting ISR data--one of the largest areas of growth in ISR spending. Additionally, two ISR efficiency initiatives are in the early stages of development and do not have implementation goals and timelines. Without goals and timelines, it will be difficult to determine whether these initiatives will make progress in achieving efficiencies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required DOD to develop a roadmap to guide the development and integration of DOD ISR capabilities over a 15-year period and report to Congress on the contents of the roadmap, such as goals and an investment strategy to prioritize resources. DOD responded to both of these requirements by issuing an ISR roadmap. GAO's review of DOD's 2007 and 2010 ISR roadmaps found that DOD has made progress in addressing the issues that Congress directed to be included, but the 2007 and 2010 roadmaps did not address certain management elements identified by Congress. In 2008, Congress restated the 2004 requirements and provided additional guidance to the USD(I). However, the 2010 roadmap still does not represent an integrated investment strategy across the department because it does not clearly address capability gaps or priorities across the enterprise and still lacks investment information. Until DOD develops an integrated ISR investment strategy, the defense and intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions and use resources that are not necessarily based on strategic priorities. GAO recommends that DOD compile and aggregate complete ISR funding data, establish implementation goals and timelines for its efficiency efforts, and give priority to examining efficiency in ISR collection activities. DOD agreed or partially agreed with these GAO recommendations. GAO also suggests that Congress consider holding DOD accountable to address required elements of the ISR roadmap.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Davi M. Dagostino Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202)512-3000GAO-11-465, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Actions Are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DOD's ISR Enterprise
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
June 2011:
Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance:
Actions Are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DOD's
ISR Enterprise:
GAO-11-465:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-465, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The success of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
systems in collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence
information has fueled demand for ISR support, and the Department of
Defense (DOD) has significantly increased its investments in ISR
capabilities since combat operations began in 2001. In fiscal year
2010, intelligence community spending-”including for ISR-”exceeded $80
billion. Section 21 of Public Law 111-139 mandated that GAO identify
programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals
and activities. This report examines the extent to which: (1) DOD
manages and oversees the full scope and cost of the ISR enterprise;
(2) DOD has sought to identify and minimize the potential for any
unnecessary duplication in program, planning, and operations for ISR;
and (3) DOD‘s ISR Integration Roadmap addresses key congressionally
directed management elements and guidance.
What GAO Found:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) has the
authority to oversee DOD‘s ISR enterprise; however, the broad scope
and complex funding arrangements of DOD‘s ISR enterprise make it
difficult to manage and oversee. The scope of the ISR enterprise and
capabilities include many different kinds of activities conducted by
multiple agencies. As a result, ISR activities may be funded through
any of several sources, including the Military Intelligence Program,
the National Intelligence Program, overseas contingency operations
funding, and military service funds. To manage DOD‘s large ISR
enterprise, the USD(I) serves as DOD‘s senior intelligence official,
responsible for providing strategic, budget, and policy oversight over
DOD‘s ISR enterprise. However, the USD(I) does not have full
visibility into several budget sources that fund DOD‘s ISR enterprise,
such as national intelligence capabilities, dual use assets, urgent
operational needs, and military personnel expenses related to ISR. The
USD(I)‘s inability to gain full visibility and clarity into all of DOD‘
s ISR financial resources hinders efforts to develop an investment
strategy for ISR and to achieve efficiencies.
DOD has developed general guidance in directives and other documents
emphasizing the need to identify efficiencies and eliminate
duplication or redundancies in its capabilities, which provides a
foundation for further action. In August 2010, the Secretary of
Defense directed that the department begin a series of efficiency
initiatives to reduce duplication, overhead, and excess. However, the
scope of the review pertaining to ISR was limited to analysis
activities and excluded activities associated with collecting ISR
data”-one of the largest areas of growth in ISR spending.
Additionally, two ISR efficiency initiatives are in the early stages
of development and do not have implementation goals and timelines.
Without goals and timelines, it will be difficult to determine whether
these initiatives will make progress in achieving efficiencies.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required
DOD to develop a roadmap to guide the development and integration of
DOD ISR capabilities over a 15-year period and report to Congress on
the contents of the roadmap, such as goals and an investment strategy
to prioritize resources. DOD responded to both of these requirements
by issuing an ISR roadmap. GAO‘s review of DOD‘s 2007 and 2010 ISR
roadmaps found that DOD has made progress in addressing the issues
that Congress directed to be included, but the 2007 and 2010 roadmaps
did not address certain management elements identified by Congress. In
2008, Congress restated the 2004 requirements and provided additional
guidance to the USD(I). However, the 2010 roadmap still does not
represent an integrated investment strategy across the department
because it does not clearly address capability gaps or priorities
across the enterprise and still lacks investment information. Until
DOD develops an integrated ISR investment strategy, the defense and
intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions
and use resources that are not necessarily based on strategic
priorities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD compile and aggregate complete ISR funding
data, establish implementation goals and timelines for its efficiency
efforts, and give priority to examining efficiency in ISR collection
activities. DOD agreed or partially agreed with these GAO
recommendations. GAO also suggests that Congress consider holding DOD
accountable to address required elements of the ISR roadmap.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-465] or key
components. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202)
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Complexity of DOD's ISR Enterprise Funding Presents Challenges for
Managing and Overseeing the Scope and Cost:
DOD Has Established Initiatives and Processes to Achieve Efficiencies,
but Additional Steps Could Improve Accountability:
DOD Has Developed an ISR Integration Roadmap but Has Only Partially
Addressed Management Elements Required by Legislation or Identified by
Congressional Committees:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOD's ISR Enterprise Relationship to the U.S. Intelligence
Community:
Figure 2: Offices That Oversee Various DOD ISR Capabilities:
Figure 3: Examples of the Multiple Sources That Fund or Partially Fund
DOD's ISR Enterprise:
Figure 4: Extent to Which 2007 and 2010 ISR Integration Roadmaps
Address Management Elements Required by Legislation or Identified by
Congressional Committees:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DNI: Director of National Intelligence:
IED: improvised explosive device:
ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance:
JIEDDO: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization:
ODNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence:
USD(I): Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 3, 2011:
Congressional Committees:
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems have
proved critical to the combatant commanders to plan and execute
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan by providing them timely
and accurate information on adversaries' capabilities and
vulnerabilities. The success of ISR systems in collecting, processing,
and disseminating useful intelligence information has fueled growing
demand for more ISR support, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has
increased its investments in ISR capabilities significantly since
2002. In fiscal year 2010, intelligence spending across the national
and military intelligence communities--which includes ISR--exceeded
$80 billion. As demand for ISR has increased and DOD has moved quickly
to develop and acquire new ISR capabilities, integrating and managing
DOD's ISR enterprise has become more complex and challenging. In
September 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense acknowledged that the
growth of intelligence organizations within DOD has not been centrally
directed or managed and there is a high probability that
inefficiencies exist. In January 2011, Congress expressed the need to
continue with oversight over certain ISR efforts given the growth and
demand of ISR.
Since 2004, Congress and we have reported on the need for greater
integration and efficiencies across DOD's ISR enterprise. In the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,[Footnote 1]
Congress required DOD to develop a fully integrated ISR roadmap and
coordinate activities across the military services, defense agencies,
and combatant commands. In 2008, a congressional committee provided
additional guidance stating the need for an ISR investment strategy.
We have also reported that ISR activities are not integrated and
efficient; effectiveness may be compromised by lack of full visibility
into operational use of ISR assets; and agencies could better
collaborate in the acquisition of new capabilities. Although DOD has
designated the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) to
manage ISR investments as a departmentwide portfolio, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has
been designated to lead the task force responsible for oversight of
issues related to the management and acquisition of unmanned aircraft
systems that collect ISR data. We have concluded that DOD has not
articulated a clear vision of the ISR enterprise and a unified
investment approach to manage the enterprise.[Footnote 2] A new
statutory requirement mandates that GAO identify federal programs,
agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and
activities within departments and governmentwide.[Footnote 3] Under
that mandate, this review examines the extent to which: (1) DOD
manages and oversees the full scope and cost of the ISR enterprise;
(2) DOD identified and minimized the potential for any unnecessary
duplication in program, planning, and operations for ISR; and (3)
DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap addresses key management elements
required by law or directed by congressional committees.
To determine the full scope and cost of DOD's ISR enterprise we
assessed DOD's ISR funding and budget elements reported in the
Military Intelligence Program, analyzed DOD's ISR spending plans in
the Future Years Defense Program, and conducted discussions with DOD,
military service, and intelligence agency officials regarding ISR
funding and capabilities. To determine the extent to which DOD manages
and oversees the full scope and cost of this enterprise, we reviewed
DOD directives regarding the capability portfolio management, the role
of the USD(I), and the Military Intelligence Program and compared
information found in DOD strategy and briefing documents along with
relevant meetings and discussions with USD(I), military service, and
intelligence agency officials against the directives. We met with
three of DOD's combat support agencies--the National Security Agency,
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency--to obtain information on how they use Military
Intelligence Program funds and their role in DOD's ISR enterprise. We
discussed national intelligence funding and efforts to assess
duplication, fragmentation, and overlap in the National Intelligence
Program with an official in the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI). ODNI also provided us classified information on
the extent to which the National Intelligence Program budget funds
each of the combat support agencies, excluding the National
Reconnaissance Office. We also determined that the data contained in
both the Future Years Defense Program and Military Intelligence
Program along with data received from the military services were
reliable for our purposes by conducting a data reliability assessment.
To evaluate the extent to which DOD has identified and minimized the
potential for unnecessary duplication, we assessed the progress of DOD
efforts to identify and implement efficiencies. We reviewed directives
and budget guidance documents to assess to what extent the need to
eliminate unnecessary duplication and fragmentation was emphasized as
a priority. We evaluated DOD's guidance to determine to what extent it
incorporated best practices we previously identified, such as
developing performance metrics, timelines, and goals for
implementation of efficiency efforts. We evaluated the extent to which
DOD took actions to resolve instances of fragmentation and duplication
they identified by reviewing ISR capability assessments and recent ISR
efficiency initiatives. Finally, to assess the extent to which DOD's
ISR Integration Roadmap addresses management elements required by law
or directed by congressional committees, two of our analysts
independently evaluated the 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap against key
elements of congressionally directed actions. We also compared the
2010 ISR Integration Roadmap to the 2007 ISR Integration Roadmap to
determine what progress DOD has made in addressing these elements.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 through June
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. More
detailed information on our scope and methodology is provided in
appendix I.
Background:
GAO has conducted various assessments related to DOD's ISR enterprise
including efforts assessing (1) unmanned aircraft system development,
acquisition, and operations; (2) how new ISR requirements are
generated; (3) the intelligence information processing, exploitation,
and dissemination processes; and (4) other intelligence-related
topics.[Footnote 4] DOD's ISR enterprise consists of multiple
intelligence organizations that individually plan for, acquire, and
operate manned and unmanned airborne, space-borne, maritime, and
ground-based ISR systems. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics oversees the space and unmanned
aircraft systems acquisition programs. In addition to the intelligence
branches of the military services, there are four major intelligence
agencies within DOD: the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National
Security Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and the
National Reconnaissance Office. The Defense Intelligence Agency is
charged with providing all-source intelligence data to policy makers
and U.S. armed forces around the world and provides defense human
intelligence. The National Security Agency is responsible for signals
intelligence and information assurance and has collection sites
throughout the world. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
prepares the geospatial data, including maps and computerized
databases, that are used by ISR systems necessary for targeting for
precision-guided weapons. The National Reconnaissance Office develops
and operates reconnaissance satellites. As figure 1 shows, DOD's ISR
enterprise is related to other elements of the U.S. national
intelligence community.
Figure 1: DOD's ISR Enterprise Relationship to the U.S. Intelligence
Community:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Director of National Intelligence:
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence designated as Director of
Defense Intelligence in the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
Defense Intelligence Community Members:
* Defense Intelligence Agency;
* National Security Agency;
* National Reconnaissance Office;
* National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
* Military Service Intelligence Branches (Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps).
National Intelligence Community Members:
* Central Intelligence Agency;
* Department of Homeland Security;
* Department of Energy;
* Department of the Treasury;
* Department of State;
* Federal Bureau of Investigation;
* Drug Enforcement Agency;
* Coast Guard.
DOD ISR Enterprise:
Provides capabilities in support of missions across the defense and
national intelligence communities.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Spending on most ISR programs is divided between the defense
intelligence budget, known as the Military Intelligence Program--
totaling $27 billion in fiscal year 2010--and the national
intelligence budget, known as the National Intelligence Program--
totaling $53.1 billion in fiscal year 2010. The Military Intelligence
Program encompasses DOD-wide intelligence programs and most
intelligence programs supporting the operating units of the military
services. The USD(I) is responsible for compiling and developing the
Military Intelligence budget and issuing detailed procedures governing
the Military Intelligence Program process and timelines associated
with budget development. The agencies, services, and offices that are
included in the Military Intelligence Program are: the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the military departments, the U.S. Special
Operations Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office,
the National Security Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the
Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Defense Security Service.
Each office, agency, and service designates a manager who is charged
with responding to guidance from the USD(I) and managing programs and
functions within the budget, among other things. The USD(I) guides and
oversees the development of the Military Intelligence Program in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the Director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Office of
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.
The national intelligence community, which primarily provides support
to national decision makers, also supports DOD ISR activities. The
line between military intelligence activities and national strategic
intelligence activities has blurred as DOD's tactical ISR supports
strategic decisions and national intelligence collection informs
military operations. The National Intelligence Program, which funds
national intelligence activities, also funds a portion of DOD's ISR
activities to support military operations. The Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) is responsible for compiling and reviewing the
annual National Intelligence Program budget.
To encourage integration of DOD's ISR enterprise, in 2003 Congress
required the USD(I) to develop a comprehensive plan, known as the ISR
Integration Roadmap, to guide the development and integration of ISR
capabilities. The law also required the USD(I) to report back to
congressional committees on this effort. In response to this
requirement, DOD issued an ISR Integration Roadmap in May 2005 and
updated it in January 2007. However, we reported that this 2007
roadmap still did not meet all the management elements the USD(I) was
required to address.[Footnote 5] In 2008,[Footnote 6] the House
Committee on Armed Services restated the need for the USD(I) to
address these requirements and provided the USD(I) with additional
guidance for the roadmap. The USD(I) issued an updated roadmap in
March 2010.
In 2008, DOD began an effort to manage ISR capabilities across the
entire department, rather than by military service or individual
program. Under this capability portfolio management concept, DOD
intended to improve the interoperability of future capabilities,
minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability
effectiveness.[Footnote 7] The USD(I) was designated as the civilian
lead office for the portfolio of ISR activities, which is known as the
Battlespace Awareness Portfolio. As the portfolio manager for ISR
investments, the role and authorities of the USD(I) are limited to two
primarily advisory functions: (1) reviewing and participating in
service and DOD agency budget deliberations on proposed ISR capability
investments, and (2) recommending alterations in service or agency
spending to the Secretary of Defense as part of the established DOD
budget review process. Also in 2008, the Secretary of Defense
established the ISR Task Force to increase ISR capacity in Iraq and
Afghanistan, as well as improve operational integration and efficiency
of ISR assets across the services and defense agencies. The ISR Task
Force's primary focus was on regional capabilities and capabilities
that could be delivered more quickly than in the standard DOD
acquisition cycle. The task force is currently assisting the USD(I)
and the services in deciding how to integrate into the long-term base
budget more than 500 ISR capabilities that were developed to meet
urgent operational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We have previously reported on DOD's challenges in improving the
integration of ISR efforts, including difficulties in processing and
sharing information that is already collected and developing new
capabilities. We reported in 2010 that DOD's efforts to make
intelligence data accessible across the defense intelligence community
have been hampered by not having integration of service programs and a
concept of operations for intelligence sharing.[Footnote 8] The
services have each pursued their own versions of a common data
processing system to share information, the Distributed Common Ground/
Surface System, which was initiated in 1998. Although the services can
share limited intelligence data, their progress toward full
information sharing has been uneven. Moreover, as we reported in March
2011,[Footnote 9] although DOD created the Joint Improvised Explosive
Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to lead and coordinate all
of DOD's counter-IED efforts, which include some ISR capabilities,
many of the organizations engaged in the counter-IED defeat effort,
such as the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, continued to develop,
maintain, and expand their own IED-defeat capabilities. Even though
urgent operational needs include ISR capabilities, the USD(I) does not
have a direct role in determining urgent operational needs.
The Complexity of DOD's ISR Enterprise Funding Presents Challenges for
Managing and Overseeing the Scope and Cost:
The USD(I) has the authority to exercise oversight responsibility over
DOD's ISR's enterprise; however the broad scope and complex funding
arrangements of DOD's ISR enterprise make it difficult to manage and
oversee. The scope of the ISR enterprise and capabilities include many
different kinds of activities--from collection of information through
dissemination of analysis compiled from multiple sources--conducted by
multiple agencies. As a result, ISR activities may be funded through
any of several sources, including the Military Intelligence Program,
the National Intelligence Program, overseas contingency operations
funding, and service appropriations, or by a combination of these
sources. To manage DOD's large ISR enterprise, the USD(I) serves as
DOD's senior intelligence official, responsible for providing
strategic, budget, and policy oversight over DOD's ISR
enterprise.[Footnote 10] However, the USD(I) does not have full
visibility into several budget sources that fund DOD's ISR enterprise,
such as national intelligence capabilities, capabilities used for ISR
and non-ISR purposes, urgent operational needs, and military personnel
expenses related to ISR. Figure 2 illustrates that the USD(I) does not
have full visibility into many capabilities included in DOD's ISR
enterprise. The USD(I)'s inability to gain full visibility into all of
DOD's ISR financial resources may hinder efforts to develop an
investment strategy for ISR, to consider tradeoffs across military
services and programs, and to address potential duplication,
fragmentation, and overlap.
Figure 2: Offices That Oversee Various DOD ISR Capabilities:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The following offices are depicted as interlocking puzzle pieces:
Military Services:
Unmanned aircraft systems, urgent needs, space capabilities.
Defense Intelligence Agency:
All source intelligence data.
USD (ATL):
Space and unmanned aircraft systems acquisitions.
USD (I):
ISR architecture and Roadmap.
JIEDDO:
Urgent needs.
ODNI:
National intelligence capabilities.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency:
Geospatial intelligence.
National Reconnaissance Office:
Overhead intelligence collection.
National Security Agency:
Signals intelligence Information assurance.
USD (ATL): Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics.
USD (I): Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
ODNI: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
JIEDDO: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD's ISR structure.
[End of figure]
DOD's ISR enterprise comprises many organizations and offices from
both the defense intelligence community and the national intelligence
community, which represents a challenge for DOD in integrating
capabilities across the ISR enterprise. DOD relies on both its own ISR
assets and national ISR assets to provide comprehensive intelligence
in support of its joint warfighting force. DOD organizations are
involved in providing intelligence information using their respective
or joint ISR assets to both the defense and national intelligence
communities. Determining the scope of the ISR enterprise precisely is
difficult because the intelligence agencies and military services
include different activities in discussing their ISR missions and
priorities.
Within DOD's ISR enterprise, multiple organizations conduct strategic
planning, budgeting, and data processing and analysis across
intelligence disciplines in accordance with their own priorities.
Within the Office of the Secretary of the Defense, the USD(I), and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
have responsibilities for aspects of ISR that may overlap.
Specifically, DOD has designated the USD(I) to manage ISR investments
as a departmentwide portfolio. However, as the ISR portfolio manager,
the USD(I) has only advisory authority and cannot direct the services
or agencies to make changes in their investment plans. Moreover, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
has been designated responsible for heading a task force related to
the management and acquisition of unmanned aircraft systems that
collect ISR data and are part of the ISR portfolio. The services and
defense agencies also conduct ISR activities. The military services
each have their own ISR plans and roadmaps that focus on their
respective ISR activities and are not integrated with other services'
plans. For example, the Air Force maintains its own ISR plan and
metrics separate from DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap and the other
service roadmaps, and the other services have developed several
roadmaps outlining ISR priorities and capability gaps.
Because of the broad scope of ISR and the multiple agencies involved,
DOD's ISR enterprise is funded through several budgetary sources,
including both DOD and non-DOD organizations. These multiple sources
of funding complicate the USD(I)'s role as the office that develops
and oversees DOD's ISR enterprise, according to DOD officials. In
particular, USD(I) officials noted that the USD(I) does not have
complete information on ISR funding by these organizations and that it
is difficult to manage planning for ISR funding. As figures 2 and 3
show, the Military Intelligence Program, the National Intelligence
Program, and military service budgets are the various sources of
funding. Moreover, some ISR programs are funded through combinations
of these funding sources. For example, the USD(I) does not have full
visibility into space acquisitions, urgent warfighter needs, and
unmanned aircraft systems acquisitions and does not routinely collect
data regarding funding information. In fiscal year 2010, DOD's ISR
enterprise was funded by the entire Military Intelligence Program
budget totaling $27 billion, along with a portion of the National
Intelligence Program[Footnote 11] budget of $53.1 billion. In 2008, we
reported that DOD and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) work together to coordinate funding for programs
that support both military and national intelligence missions, but
determining how costs for joint ISR programs will be shared can be
difficult.[Footnote 12]
Figure 3: Examples of the Multiple Sources That Fund or Partially Fund
DOD's ISR Enterprise:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
National Intelligence Program: provides full funding;
Overseas Contingency Funding: provides a portion of funding;
National Intelligence Program: provides a portion of funding;
Military Appropriations: provides a portion of funding.
DOD's ISR Enterprise.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD's ISR spending.
[End of figure]
According to DOD Directive 5143.01,[Footnote 13] the USD(I) is
responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the
implementation of DOD policy, strategy, and guidance related to ISR.
This directive also provides the USD(I) with the authority to obtain
reports and information as necessary to carry out assigned
responsibilities and functions. The USD(I) also has responsibility for
ensuring that policies and programs related to the acquisition of ISR
capabilities are designed and managed to improve performance and
efficiency. GAO's Internal Control Standards[Footnote 14] state that
managers, such as the USD(I), need accurate and complete financial
data to determine the effective and efficient use of resources.
However, the complexity of DOD's ISR enterprise may make the USD(I)'s
management and oversight responsibilities difficult to fulfill because
it is not receiving complete information and does not have full
visibility over DOD's entire ISR enterprise.
The USD(I)'s lack of full visibility into the full scope of ISR
capabilities, programs, and budget sources, makes it difficult for the
USD(I) to receive, collect, and aggregate reports and information
necessary to carry out its oversight responsibilities. We identified
four areas for which the USD(I) does not have complete information on
ISR spending: (1) military assets that are used for both ISR and non-
ISR missions--that is, dual use assets; (2) DOD's urgent ISR
warfighter capabilities; (3) budget items funded from multiple
sources; and (4) military personnel funding related to ISR missions
and capabilities.
* Dual use assets--DOD officials stated that certain assets fulfill
both non-ISR and ISR missions. Such assets are funded primarily
through appropriations for the military services and may not always be
reported to the USD(I) as Military Intelligence Program capabilities,
which limits the USD(I)'s oversight of such capabilities and ability
to make trade-offs or shift resources across the department. According
to the USD(I), specific examples of dual use capabilities include the
Air Force's airborne ISR Reaper program, the Navy's P-3 Orion land-
based maritime patrol aircraft, and DOD's biometrics program.
* Urgent ISR warfighter capabilities--As we reported in March 2011,
[Footnote 15] GAO estimated that between fiscal years 2005 and 2010
DOD spent $6.25 billion on urgent ISR capabilities sponsored by the
ISR Task Force, as well as a portion of the $19.45 billion sponsored
by the JIEDDO to field new ISR capabilities. However, we also reported
that DOD cannot readily identify all of its urgent needs efforts or
associated costs, including spending on ISR, because it has limited
visibility into the totality of urgent needs submitted by warfighters.
* Capabilities funded from multiple sources--DOD officials have also
cited capabilities funded from multiple sources as a cause of delays
in tracking and reporting ISR data. For example, many ISR capabilities
are funded jointly by the Military Intelligence Program and National
Intelligence Program. In addition, capabilities that have both ISR and
non-ISR uses receive funding from different appropriations. For
example, capabilities with both ISR and non-ISR uses can be supported
by services' operation and maintenance and personnel funding. In 2010,
according to a DOD financial regulation[Footnote 16] the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Director of the Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation Office are to work with the USD(I)
to create and maintain whole, distinct budget items within each
component of the intelligence community. The military services and
defense agencies are required to show measurable and steady progress
towards completing this effort. On the basis of information we
received from the military services, the services reported making
varying progress in developing whole Military Intelligence Program
budget items for some of its ISR capabilities. The services estimated
that this effort will be completed sometime after 2012 and they have
cited challenges in creating whole budget elements. For example, a
Navy official said that it is very difficult to determine individual
Military Intelligence Program and non-Military Intelligence budget
portions for some capabilities at the program level.
* Military intelligence personnel funding related to ISR--DOD,
military, and intelligence officials cited challenges in identifying
exact costs associated with military personnel conducting ISR
activities. In a change from previous years, DOD's fiscal year 2012
Military Intelligence Program budget submission did not include
military personnel costs. According to a USD(I) official, military
personnel funding was removed from the Military Intelligence Program
because: (1) military personnel expenses are not reported in the
National Intelligence Program; and (2) the USD(I) does not have
oversight authority for military personnel funding. Some of the
military services cited military personnel costs as an example of a
budget item that is split between ISR and non-ISR programs. For
example, the Air Force estimates that it has approximately 200 budget
items that contain at least some funding for military intelligence
personnel. Additionally, Army officials reported that military
personnel funding accounts for approximately 62 percent of their
budget items that are funded from multiple sources.
Without accurate and complete financial resource data, the USD(I) may
not be able to fulfill its responsibility to develop, coordinate, and
oversee the implementation of DOD's ISR enterprise policy, strategy,
and programs and manage the Battlespace Awareness capability portfolio
from an informed perspective. Until the USD(I) gains more clarity over
DOD's ISR funding, DOD efforts to integrate ISR, recommend tradeoffs
within the Battlespace Awareness capability portfolio, determine the
effective use of ISR resources, and address potential fragmentation,
overlap, and duplication will continue to be impeded.
DOD Has Established Initiatives and Processes to Achieve Efficiencies,
but Additional Steps Could Improve Accountability:
DOD has developed general guidance in directives, a manual, and
memorandums emphasizing the need to identify and eliminate duplication
or redundancies in its capabilities, which provides a foundation for
further action. ISR activities are explicitly included as an area for
possible efficiency improvements. However, current ISR efficiency
studies have limited scope, initiatives are in the early stages of
development, and implementation plans, including resource
requirements, have not been fully developed.
DOD Has Emphasized the Importance of Efficiency in ISR Activities
through Broad Guidance, but Efficiency Initiatives Have Limitations:
DOD's broad guidance highlights the need for the services and defense
agencies to work together to eliminate duplication in ISR activities.
DOD's directive Functions of the DOD and Its Major Components[Footnote
17] instructs the services to coordinate with each other in
eliminating duplication, to equip forces that can work closely with
each other, and to assist other components by providing intelligence.
Similarly, DOD's Capability Portfolio Management[Footnote 18]
directive charges portfolio managers with identifying resource
mismatches, including redundancies, and providing recommendations on
integrating capabilities. In addition, DOD's requirements process
guidance instructs the services and defense agencies to identify
overlaps and redundancies when proposing the development of new
capabilities and to assess areas of overlap and unnecessary
duplication that could be eliminated to provide resources to address
capability gaps.
In response to the emphasis on efficiencies, DOD, as a departmental
official indicated, has recently completed one efficiency study and is
developing two tools to help identify efficiencies and promote
integration in its ISR enterprise; however, these efforts have limited
scope or are in the early stages of development. Further, it is not
clear whether the tools will result in improved efficiencies because
DOD has not established implementation goals or timelines with which
to establish accountability, measure progress, and build momentum. As
we have previously reported, successful management efforts use
implementation goals and timelines to identify performance shortfalls
and gaps, suggest midcourse corrections, and build momentum by
demonstrating progress.[Footnote 19]
In August 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed that the department
begin a series of efficiency initiatives to reduce duplication,
overhead, and excess. The ISR portion of the review focused on
streamlining organizations that primarily analyze intelligence
information. The review group's assessment recommended cost savings of
approximately $29 million in intelligence personnel costs for fiscal
year 2012 by consolidating some intelligence centers and streamlining
certain intelligence organizations. However, the scope of the review
was limited to ISR analysis activities and excluded ISR activities
associated with collecting ISR data, which represents one of the
largest areas of growth in ISR spending. ISR officials were unsure
whether or when ISR collection activities would be studied for
efficiencies.
Two other DOD efforts are intended to address impediments to
integration of the ISR enterprise management that we reported in March
2008.[Footnote 20] In our assessment of DOD's 2007 ISR Integration
Roadmap, we noted that DOD had improved its ability to look across its
ISR enterprise by compiling a useful catalog of capabilities. We have
previously identified a set of desirable characteristics for defense
strategies such as the ISR Integration Roadmap, which are intended to
enhance their usefulness in resource and policy decisions and to
better assure accountability. These characteristics include laying out
goals and objectives, suggesting actions for addressing those
objectives, allocating resources, identifying roles and
responsibilities, and integrating relevant parties.[Footnote 21]
However, we reported that the 2007 Roadmap did not provide (1) a clear
vision of a future integrated ISR enterprise that identifies what ISR
capabilities are needed to achieve to DOD's strategic goals, or (2) a
framework for evaluating trade-offs among competing ISR capability
needs and assessing how ISR investments contribute towards achieving
goals. Further, we reported that the department did not have complete
information on ISR capabilities in use or being developed to help
identify tradeoffs among potential future investments. We recommended
that DOD develop an integrated architecture and complete information
to use in understanding how changing investment levels in ISR would
affect progress and achieving goals and, in comments on that report,
DOD agreed with our recommendation and stated that plans of action
should be finalized by 2008.
In 2010, USD(I) officials proposed development of a comprehensive
architecture for DOD's entire ISR enterprise, to be called the Defense
Intelligence Mission Area Enterprise Architecture. This architecture
is intended to provide a standardized methodology for identifying and
addressing efficiencies in the ISR portfolio and support objective
investment decision making. However, this initiative is in the
earliest phases of development, and its concept and implementation
plans including resource requirements have not been fully developed.
The absence of implementation goals and timelines will make it
difficult to determine whether this initiative will make progress in
achieving efficiencies.
In 2008, we also recommended that the Joint Staff collaborate with the
USD(I) to develop a comprehensive source of information on all
existing and developmental ISR capabilities throughout the ISR
enterprise so that the military services and defense agencies can
determine whether existing systems or those in development could fill
their capability gaps. Based on this recommendation, in 2010, the
Joint Staff, in collaboration with the USD(I) and the services, began
an initiative to develop a comprehensive source of information on all
existing and developmental ISR capabilities for use in conducting ISR-
related assessments. According to Joint Staff officials, this decision
support[Footnote 22] tool is designed to use measurable data to enable
assessment of the relative utility and operating costs of different
ISR capabilities and has the potential to identify overlap and
duplication and inform trade-off decisions. Currently this tool
includes information on airborne ISR capabilities. The USD(I) is
currently collaborating with the Joint Staff to enhance the decision
support tool to address operational requirements across ISR domains.
However, it is not clear whether funding will be available to
implement plans to maintain and expand the experimental tool to
include all ISR capabilities and, with funding uncertain, goals and a
timeline for completion have not been established.
DOD Has Developed an ISR Integration Roadmap but Has Only Partially
Addressed Management Elements Required by Legislation or Identified by
Congressional Committees:
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004[Footnote
23] required DOD to develop an ISR Integration Roadmap to guide the
development and integration of DOD ISR capabilities over a 15-year
period, and to report to Congress on the content of the roadmap,
including specific management elements that DOD should address. In
response to both of these requirements, DOD issued an ISR Integration
Roadmap. In addition to other matters, DOD was required to include:
(1) fundamental goals, (2) an overview of ISR integration activities,
and (3) an investment strategy.[Footnote 24] The House of
Representatives Committee on Armed Services provided further guidance
in a 2008 committee report, after which DOD issued an updated roadmap
in 2010. Our review of DOD's 2007 and 2010 ISR roadmaps found that DOD
has made progress in addressing the issues that Congress directed to
be included, but neither roadmap included all the specified elements
or addressed the important issue of how to invest future resources
among competing priorities. As illustrated in figure 4, DOD's 2010 ISR
Integration Roadmap addressed two more required elements than did the
2007 roadmap. However, the 2010 roadmap does not represent an
integrated investment strategy across the department or contain key
elements of an integrated enterprise architecture, such as metrics to
help evaluate trade-offs between alternatives and assess progress in
addressing capability shortfalls. Further, unlike the 2007 roadmap
that cataloged military and national ISR capabilities across the
enterprise, the 2010 roadmap is organized by separate intelligence
disciplines, such as signals intelligence and imagery intelligence,
and is not integrated, making it more difficult to examine potential
investments and trade-offs departmentwide.
Figure 4: Extent to Which 2007 and 2010 ISR Integration Roadmaps
Address Management Elements Required by Legislation or Identified by
Congressional Committees:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
2004 National Defense Authorization Act Requirements:
Effort: Covers a 15-year period (FY 2004 through 2018);
2007 ISR Integration Roadmap: Does not address;
2010 ISR Integration Roadmap: Addresses.
Effort: Contains fundamental goals;
2007 ISR Integration Roadmap: Addresses;
2010 ISR Integration Roadmap: Addresses.
Effort: Provides an overview of ISR integration activities of the
military departments and the DOD intelligence agencies;
2007 ISR Integration Roadmap: Addresses;
2010 ISR Integration Roadmap: Addresses.
Effort: Includes an investment strategy for achieving”-(i) an
integration of DOD ISR capabilities that ensures sustainment of needed
tactical and operational efforts; and (ii) efficient investment in new
ISR capabilities;
2007 ISR Integration Roadmap: Partially addresses;
2010 ISR Integration Roadmap: Does not address.
Effort: Discusses how intelligence gathered and analyzed by DOD can
enhance the role of the DOD in fulfilling its homeland security
responsibilities;
2007 ISR Integration Roadmap: Does not address;
2010 ISR Integration Roadmap: Addresses.
Effort: Discusses how counterintelligence activities of the Armed
Forces and DOD intelligence agencies can be better integrated;
2007 ISR Integration Roadmap: Does not address;
2010 ISR Integration Roadmap: Partially addresses.
Effort: Recommends how annual funding authorizations and
appropriations can be optimally structured to best support the
development of a fully integrated DOD ISR architecture;
2007 ISR Integration Roadmap: Does not address;
2010 ISR Integration Roadmap: Does not address.
May 2008 Congressional Committee Report Guidance:
Effort: Discusses the appropriate mix of national overhead systems and
manned and unmanned airborne platforms to achieve strategic goals that
is based on an analysis of future ISR demand;
2007 ISR Integration Roadmap: N/A;
2010 ISR Integration Roadmap: Does not address.
Effort: Includes a comprehensive set of metrics to assess ISR
effectiveness in meeting DOD‘s strategic goals:
2007 ISR Integration Roadmap: N/A;
2010 ISR Integration Roadmap: Does not address.
Source: GAO analysis of 2007 and 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap.
Note: Because DOD submitted the roadmap to satisfy the reporting
requirement, the 2004 requirements for the roadmap and the report have
been combined in this table.
[End of figure]
The 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap addresses four and partially
addresses one of seven management elements set forth in the 2004
National Defense Authorization Act. Specifically, the 2010 ISR
Integration Roadmap includes information on:
* A 15-year time period--The 2010 ISR Roadmap includes investment
strategies for each type of intelligence activity and addresses
planned capabilities through at least 2025.
* A description of fundamental goals--The 2010 ISR roadmap outlines
broad national defense, ISR, and military goals along with missions
supported by various intelligence disciplines, and contains
fundamental goals such as (1) stewardship of funding, (2) serving
fundamental requirements, and (3) leveraging technology effects.
* A description of ISR Integration activities--The 2010 ISR roadmap
provides an overview of ISR integration activities across DOD such as
the structure and membership of the ISR Task Force, the ISR
Integration Council, and the Battlespace Awareness Functional
Capabilities Board[Footnote 25] among others.
* A description of the role of intelligence in homeland security--The
2010 ISR roadmap contains a section outlining how intelligence can
enhance DOD's role in fulfilling its homeland security
responsibilities.
* Counterintelligence integration--The 2010 ISR roadmap partially
addresses counterintelligence integration as it generally describes
DOD's counterintelligence mission, but it does not specifically
address how it will be integrated among DOD agencies and the armed
forces.
The 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap does not address two of the seven
management elements in the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act
that were also restated in the 2008 House of Representatives Committee
on Armed Services report. Specifically, the 2010 Integration Roadmap
does not do the following:
* Describe an investment strategy--The 2010 roadmap contains general
strategies for individual intelligence disciplines, discusses current
and future capabilities, identifies supported mission sets for each
discipline, and describes long-term actions and challenges. For
certain intelligence disciplines, the 2010 roadmap also generally
illustrates future needs for certain capabilities. However, it does
not contain a comprehensive investment strategy for the ISR
enterprise. For example, it does not clearly represent what ISR
capabilities are required to achieve strategic goals, and it does not
allow DOD decision makers to assess current capabilities across
different goals because it is structured according to individual
intelligence disciplines. Additionally, the roadmap does not provide
estimated costs associated with these capability needs and does not
prioritize ISR capabilities.
* Discuss improving the structure of funding and appropriations--The
2010 roadmap does not discuss how annual funding authorizations and
appropriations can be optimally structured to best support the
development of a fully integrated DOD ISR architecture. DOD included a
section in the roadmap entitled "Funding an Integrated ISR
Architecture," which provides an overview of the Military Intelligence
Program, the National Intelligence Program, and the Battlespace
Awareness Capability Portfolio, but does not include information on
how annual appropriations can be best structured for ISR.
The 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap also does not address the additional
guidance included in the 2008 House Committee on Armed Services
report.[Footnote 26] Specifically, the 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap
does not address the appropriate mix of national overhead systems and
manned and unmanned airborne platforms to achieve strategic goals and
does not include an analysis of future ISR demand. Certain
intelligence discipline sections generally describe the types of
overhead capabilities needed in the future; however, these
capabilities are not prioritized across the entire ISR enterprise.
DOD officials acknowledged that the 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap has
some limitations that DOD is planning to address in a later version.
For example, because the investment strategy section is organized by
intelligence area it does not address capabilities that collect
multiple types of intelligence data. The USD(I) also highlighted that
recent agreements between the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
and the USD(I) have resulted in the creation of the Consolidated
Intelligence Guidance, which is designed to synchronize activities and
investments between the DNI and DOD. They stated that this guidance is
specifically goal-based and is effective for managing the shorter-term
Future Years Defense Program[Footnote 27] budget. DOD officials also
acknowledged that the organization of future iterations of the ISR
roadmap by missions instead of intelligence discipline may better
illustrate integration and interoperability of capabilities across the
department. They stated that the roadmap is a living document and the
intent is for future versions to create linkages between the existing
DOD strategic guidance and the longer-term investment strategies.
USD(I) officials stated that it is developing a useful set of metrics
for the next iteration of the roadmap.
Requirements of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act,
additional guidance provided by the House Committee on Armed Services,
and our prior work have all emphasized that the roadmap should include
a clearly defined investment strategy. Without a unified investment
approach, senior DOD leaders do not have a management tool for
conducting a comprehensive assessment of what investments are required
to achieve ISR strategic goals, and they cannot be well-positioned to
prioritize ISR investments and make resource allocation and trade-off
decisions when faced with competing needs. Furthermore, until DOD
develops an integrated ISR investment strategy, the defense and
intelligence communities may continue to use resources that are not
necessarily based on strategic priorities, which could lead to gaps in
some areas of intelligence operations and redundancies in others.
Conclusions:
With demand for ISR growing and DOD planning to make additional
investments in ISR capabilities, the challenges the department faces
in integrating ISR capabilities, managing and conducting oversight of
ISR funding, and addressing efficiency efforts will likely be
exacerbated by expected budget pressures. Fragmented authority for ISR
operations among multiple agencies with different, and sometimes
competing, priorities hampers DOD's progress in planning for new
capabilities and targeting investments to joint priorities. The USD(I)
could be better positioned to facilitate integration and provide
oversight of ISR activities if it had more visibility into current
capabilities and clarity into the total amount that is being spent on
ISR activities funded through multiple sources. More complete
information would also be useful to the USD(I) in developing an
integrated ISR roadmap, including an investment strategy.
DOD's recent emphasis on efficiencies has extended to its ISR
enterprise, and it has initiated efforts to identify areas of overlap
and duplication. However, limitations in the scope of its current
efficiency efforts and undefined goals and timelines to implement its
newer efforts reduce the likelihood that all possible efficiencies
will be identified and action taken to achieve them. For example, more
work remains for DOD to identify efficiencies across the entire ISR
enterprise, such as exploring efficiencies in ISR collection
activities. Efficiency efforts in the earliest phases of development
and implementation could be tools to inform decisions about trade-offs
between competing priorities and may be helpful in identifying
opportunities for increased efficiencies and cost savings. If designed
and implemented properly, these tools could result in cost savings
across the ISR enterprise by reducing the likelihood of developing
unnecessarily duplicative capabilities. However, without plans for
completion and timelines to build momentum, DOD will not have the
ability to monitor progress and take corrective actions, if necessary,
to ensure that potential savings are realized.
DOD's 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap does not provide enough detailed
information on integrated goals and priorities for the ISR enterprise
to enable development of a long-term investment strategy. Without a
detailed investment strategy, DOD and the military services may not
have a common understanding of how activities should be prioritized to
meet goals. Until DOD addresses challenges related to managing
funding, integrating ISR capabilities, and minimizing inefficiencies
in its ISR enterprise, the department risks investing in lower-
priority and even duplicative capabilities while leaving critical
capability gaps unfilled.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve management of DOD's ISR enterprise and increase its ability
to achieve efficiencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the USD(I) to take the following three actions:
* Collect and aggregate complete financial data--including information
on dual-use assets, urgent operational needs, capability funding from
multiple sources, and military personnel funding--to inform resource
and investment decisions.
* Establish goals and timelines to ensure progress and accountability
for design and implementation of its defense intelligence enterprise
architecture, including clarifying how the department plans to use the
architecture and tools it is developing to achieve efficiencies.
* Expand the scope of current efficiency efforts to include ISR
collection activities.
To identify efficiencies in ISR capability development, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the USD(I) to collaborate in developing decision support
tool(s), such as the Joint Staff's decision support tool, and to
establish implementation goals and timelines for completion of such
efforts.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
To ensure that future versions of the ISR Integration Roadmap meet all
of the elements of an integrated ISR roadmap identified in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 as well as the
2008 House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services report,
Congress should consider establishing additional accountability in
legislation, such as conditioning a portion of ISR funding on
completion of all congressionally directed management elements,
including the development of an integrated ISR investment strategy.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially
concurred with all our recommendations and stated that there are
ongoing activities to address our recommendations. DOD did not agree
with the matter we raised for congressional consideration. DOD's
comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. In addition,
DOD provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the
report as appropriate.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the USD(I) to collect and aggregate complete financial
data to inform resource and investment decisions. In its written
response, DOD stated that the USD(I) is working to collect, aggregate,
and expand access to complete battlespace awareness portfolio
financial data to include information on dual use assets, urgent
operational needs, and multiple-source funding through a variety of
means and to extend its visibility over DOD's ISR enterprise. DOD
described its process for receiving complete information regarding
dual use assets and urgent operational needs and discussed how it
works to aggregate Military Intelligence Program data. DOD also stated
that the USD(I) maintains visibility and access to programs of
interest that are non-Military Intelligence Program-funded through
access to DOD's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation's
financial data warehouse. While increasing the USD(I)'s visibility
into ISR programs is a positive step, we believe that formally
aggregating complete intelligence-related financial data would give a
better overall picture of DOD's current ISR spending and ensure that
DOD considers its entire ISR enterprise when making future resource
and investment decisions.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
direct the USD(I) to establish goals and timelines to ensure progress
and accountability for implementing its defense intelligence
enterprise architecture. In its written comments, DOD described
current efforts to develop tools--such as the Defense Intelligence
Information Enterprise, the Distributed Common Ground System, and the
Joint Intelligence Operations Center for Information Technology
demonstration--that provide a common framework for some ISR activities
and stated that goals and timelines for implementing these efforts
will be displayed in the next ISR Integration Roadmap. However, DOD's
comments did not address how the department plans to integrate these
separate efforts into defense intelligence architecture that would
facilitate analysis of gaps and redundancies and inform future
investments. Our recommendation that DOD establish goals and timelines
for implementation was intended to improve management accountability
for the completion of an integrated defense intelligence architecture,
including clarifying how the tools it mentioned will contribute to the
architecture, as well as planning how the department will use the
architecture and tools to achieve efficiencies. We have revised the
recommendation language to clarify its intent.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the USD(I) to expand the scope of the current
efficiency efforts to include ISR collection activities. In its
written comments, DOD stated that the Secretary of Defense's current
efficiency initiatives include an effort to identify, track, and
determine the future disposition of multiple intelligence
organizations that were established to provide ISR support to ongoing
combat operations. We agree and acknowledge in the report that current
efficiency initiatives are focused on organizations that conduct
analysis. The department also noted that the USD(I) is collaborating
with the ODNI and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics to further ensure ISR collection investments
are fully integrated in the acquisition processes of the department
and intelligence community. While these efforts are positive, we
maintain that formally expanding the scope of current efforts to
include identification of efficiencies in ISR collection activities
would help ensure that these efforts receive continued management
priority.
DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the USD(I) to collaborate in developing decision support tool(s),
such as the Joint Staff's emergent decision support tool, and to
establish implementation goals and timelines for completion of such
efforts. DOD responded that it is exploring different portfolio
management tools and will consider goals and timelines when the
efficacy of such tools is verified. We agree that assessing options is
an important part of developing the most effective and efficient
decision support tool. However, DOD did not explain in its comments
how it would consider the efficacy of the tools it plans to assess, or
when it expects to choose and begin implementation of such a tool.
Establishing goals and timelines for assessing the efficacy of
decision support tools and taking actions to implement the selected
tool could help ensure that these efforts will be fully implemented in
a timely manner.
DOD disagreed with our suggestion that Congress consider establishing
additional accountability measures in legislation, such as
conditioning funding, to encourage the department to address all the
management elements Congress required in its 2004 legislation calling
for an integrated ISR roadmap. In its written comments, DOD
interpreted our matter as proposing the withholding of funds for ISR
activities, and DOD stated that withholding funds for ISR would be
counterproductive. However, we did not suggest withholding funding;
rather we proposed that Congress consider using the conditioning of
funding as a tool to provide an incentive for compliance with
legislative requirements that have been in place since 2004--
specifically, establishing fundamental ISR goals and an integrated ISR
investment strategy. Since 2004, none of the ISR roadmap updates DOD
has issued has fully addressed these congressionally required
elements. We believe that given the substantial resources allocated to
DOD's ISR enterprise, completion of an integrated ISR roadmap that
includes an investment strategy could help DOD and congressional
decision makers ensure that DOD is effectively using its ISR resources.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Secretary of Defense. This report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff
have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-
5431 or by e-mail at dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact information for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who have made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To describe the challenges, if any, that the department is facing in
managing costs, developing strategic plans, and identifying
unnecessary fragmentation, overlap, and duplication for the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) enterprise, we
reviewed and analyzed documents related to the enterprise and
discussed the enterprise with cognizant Department of Defense (DOD)
officials.
To determine the full scope and cost of DOD's ISR enterprise, we
assessed DOD's ISR funding and program elements reported in the
Military Intelligence Program for Fiscal Years 2010, 2011, and 2012,
conducted an analysis of DOD's ISR spending in the Future Years
Defense Program, and discussed with DOD, military service, and
intelligence agency officials their ISR funding and capabilities.
Specifically, we interviewed cognizant Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD[I]) and military service officials to determine the
content of DOD's ISR enterprise, the extent to which intelligence-
related costs are tracked and visible, and the resourcing challenges
inherent in a complex enterprise. To determine the extent to which DOD
manages the scope and cost of the ISR enterprise, we compared
information obtained in these interviews against criteria documents in
DOD directives related to the Military Intelligence Program and the
USD(I). We reached out to DOD's combat support agencies--including the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, and the National Security Agency--as part of this effort and
received high-level information regarding how they use their Military
Intelligence Program funds. We also conducted a high-level discussion
with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence related to
processes used to identify duplication, overlap, and fragmentation
within the National Intelligence Program.
To evaluate to what extent DOD has identified and minimized the
potential for unnecessary duplication, we assessed the progress of DOD
efforts to identify unnecessary fragmentation and overlap and reviewed
strategic guidance, and directives for their relative emphasis and
priority on unnecessary fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. We
assessed to what extent DOD was addressing fragmentation and
duplication in strategy documents by reviewing key strategies such as
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Defense Intelligence Strategy.
We also reviewed guidance related to DOD's recent efficiency
initiatives including memorandums and directives. We evaluated DOD's
guidance to determine whether it incorporated best practices on
measures of accountability needed to ensure specific initiatives are
fully implemented. We also asked DOD, military service, and
intelligence officials to provide examples of unnecessary duplication
and any actions taken to resolve them.
Finally, to assess the extent to which DOD's ISR Integration Roadmap
addresses congressional requirements, two analysts independently
evaluated the ISR Integration Roadmap against elements identified in
the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act and the House Report from
the Committee on Armed Services that accompanied the 2009 National
Defense Authorization Act. We determined that an element was addressed
if the 2010 ISR Integration Roadmap contained that element; however we
did not assess the overall quality of the section(s) that addressed
that element. We also compared the 2007 roadmap against these criteria
to show any relative differences between the two roadmap versions. We
conducted interviews with knowledgeable DOD, military service, and
intelligence officials to obtain information on the process to prepare
the 2010 Integration Roadmap and plans for future versions of the
roadmap.
In addressing all of these objectives, we received briefings on DOD's
ISR enterprise and its initiatives to reduce fragmentation, overlap,
and duplication in the enterprise, and we analyzed key documents
related to these initiatives. We interviewed and received
presentations from each of the following commands and agencies about
the ISR enterprise's scope, cost, strategic plans, and initiatives to
reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication: the USD(I); the Joint
Staff; the ISR Task Force; headquarters of the Army, Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; and Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2010 through June
2011, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Intelligence:
5000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-5000:
May 11, 2011:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino:
Attached is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-11-465, "Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
Actions are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DoD's
ISR Enterprise." dated April 8. 2011 (GAO Code 351533).
Here is our response:
* Recommendation 1: Partially Concur;
* Recommendation 2: Concur;
* Recommendation 3: Partially Concur;
* Recommendation 4: Partially Concur;
* Matter for Congressional Concern: Non-concur.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report. My point of contact for this effort is Mr. David M. Taylor,
(703) 695-4260, david.taylor@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Kevin P. Meiners:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Portfolio, Programs and Resources):
Attachment: As stated.
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated April 8, 2011:
GAO Code: 351533:
"Intelligence, Surveillance And Reconnaissance: Actions Are Needed To
Increase Integration And Efficiencies Of DOD's ISR Enterprise"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to collect and
aggregate complete financial data-including information on dual use
assets, urgent operational needs, capability funding from multiple
sources, and military personnel funding - to inform resource and
investment decisions.
DoD Response: Partially Concur. The Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) is making every effort to extend
its visibility over all financial data necessary to manage the broader
Battlespace Awareness (BA) portfolio. We are working to collect,
aggregate, and expand access to complete BA portfolio financial data
to include information on dual use assets, urgent operational needs,
and multiple-source funding through a variety of means.
All Military Intelligence Program (MIP) financial data is collected,
maintained and managed by OUSD(I). Disconnects between Departmental
guidance, including guidance from OUSD(I), and Service and Agency
budget decisions are resolved through the program review process,
allowing the Department to integrate ISR capabilities in accordance
with the ISR Roadmap. Additionally, recent agreements between the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the USD(I) have resulted
in the creation of the Consolidated Intelligence Guidance, which helps
to synchronize activities and investments between the MIP and the
National Intelligence Program (NIP). This guidance is specifically
goal-based and is effective for managing the shorter term Future Years
Defense Program budget.
OUSD(I) currently maintains visibility over dual-use programs using a
variety of means, to include the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) and Functional Capability Board (FCB)
processes. OUSD(I) also coordinates across the Intelligence Community
(IC) with the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
through the Executive Committees (EXCOM) and the Deputy Executive
Committees (DEXCOM) who provide leadership, governance and management
on capability issues impacting the entire IC.
The Combatant Commands (COCOMs) have the responsibility to identify,
validate and prioritize warfighter urgent operational needs within
their area of responsibility. The Joint Staff has the responsibility
to process, validate and resource combatant commander urgent needs
after full consideration by the appropriate Functional Capability
Board (FCB). The FCBs confirm each element of the urgent operational
need submission and investigate potential solutions available through
other combatant commands or service programs. Once the FCBs have fully
considered the alternatives, the urgent operational needs are
forwarded to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) who determines if
further action is warranted. Once that determination has been made,
the designated urgent operational need is sent to the appropriate
service or agency for action. As USD(I) representatives are members of
the BA FCB, there is normally sufficient visibility on urgent needs to
manage integration activities within established processes.
The MIP budget process continues to fully account for the number of
military personnel assigned to MIP activities. The decision to remove
military personnel funding from MIP Congressional justification
material was based on the realization that neither the MIP components
nor the MIP executive (USD(I)) could influence the military personnel
appropriation. Military personnel funding rates are dictated to the
Services by a number of factors that are not related to any
Defense intelligence plans, policies or operations.
Finally, USD(I) maintains visibility and access to programs of
interest that are non-MIP funded through access to CAPE's financial
data warehouse. We will continue to extend our visibility on financial
matters across the BA portfolio through the mechanisms described above.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to establish
implementation goals and timelines to ensure progress and
accountability for implementation of its defense intelligence
enterprise architecture.
DoD Response: Concur. The Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise
(D12E) is being designed to provide a common framework of tools for
security, access authentication, analytical tools, and intelligence
sharing. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) directed a Joint Intelligence Operations Center
for Information Technology (JIOC-IT) demonstration, which was led by
National Reconnaissance Office. The demonstration was designed to
begin development of HOC intelligence sharing capabilities consistent
with DI2E Council guidelines. USD(I) is continuing this effort in FY
2011, with an increased emphasis on Allied data sharing. The
Department's efforts are focused on enabling new methodologies for
intelligence information sharing which will integrate Enterprise
capabilities, provide interoperable tools needed for mission
requirements, and implement information sharing efforts with war
fighting and coalition partners. As an example, the fielding of the
Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS) across DoD is designed
to enhance the commonality of data transfer and sharing. Other
enterprise-wide programs include the effort to obtain commonality
across the IT suites in the various Combatant Command JIOCs. Goals and
timelines for these efforts will be displayed in the next ISR
Integration Roadmap.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for intelligence to expand the
scope of the current efficiency efforts to include ISR collection
activities.
DoD Response: Partially Concur. Evaluating ISR collection intelligence
capabilities must include a balanced look at collection, TPED, and
analysis. At present, the Secretary of Defense's efficiency
initiatives include an effort to identify, track and determine the
future disposition of multiple intelligence organizations that were
established to provide ISR support to ongoing combat operations.
USD(I) partners with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) to further ensure ISR collection investments
are fully integrated in the acquisition processes of the Department
and Intelligence Community. These collaborative processes help ensure
ISR collection investments reflect DoD and IC priorities.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence collaborate in developing decision support
tool(s), such as the Joint Staff's decision support tool, and to
establish implementation goals and timelines for completion of such
efforts.
DoD Response: Partially Concur. DoD continues to explore current state-
of-the-art collaborative portfolio management tools that capture not
only Service requirements, but also capture the geographic Combatant
Commander (COCOM) needs, and consider the measured or projected
performance of programmed ISR systems. The Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is currently collaborating with
the Joint Staff to enhance their developmental architectural tool to
address operational requirements across domains and COCOM regional
requirements. When the efficacy of this tool (and others like it) is
verified, the Department will consider establishing goals and
timelines for them.
Matter for Congressional Consideration: The Department does not
recommend including this section in the final report. Withholding
funds often has the effect of complicating further the processes for
evaluating, procuring, and operating the best combination of ISR
assets for our warfighters engaged in combat.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant
Director; Ashley Alley; Robert Breitbeil; Gina Flacco; David Keefer;
Brian Mazanec; Gregory Marchand; Timothy Persons; Amie Steele; and
Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No 108-136, § 923(b)-(c), codified in part at 10 U.S.C. §
426 (2003).
[2] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can
Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development
of Future ISR Requirements, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24,
2008).
[3] Pub. L. No. 111-139 § 21, 124 Stat. 8, 29 (2010).
[4] For examples, see GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Could Achieve
Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among Its Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-508T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2010); Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance: Establishing Guidance, Timelines, and Accountability
for Integrating Intelligence Data Would Improve Information Sharing,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-265NI] (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 22, 2010); [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374]; and Unmanned Aircraft
Systems: Advanced Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to
Optimize Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-836] (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2007).
[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374].
[6] H.R. Rep. No. 110-652, at 423 (2008).
[7] Department of Defense Directive 7045.20, Capability Portfolio
Management (Sept. 25, 2008).
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-265NI].
[9] GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More
Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-273] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 1, 2011).
[10] DOD Directive 5143.01, Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) (Nov. 23, 2005).
[11] According to USD(I) officials, DOD also relies on National
Intelligence Program capabilities, and a significant portion of DOD's
intelligence agencies are funded from the National Intelligence
Program. ODNI provided us with high-level classified budget numbers
for DOD agencies funded through the National Intelligence Program.
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374].
[13] Department of Defense Directive 5143.01.
[14] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. (November
1999).
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-273].
[16] DOD Financial Regulation, "Summary of Major Changes to DOD
7000.14-R, Volume 2b Chapter 16, Intelligence Programs/Activities,"
vol. 2b, ch. 16 (July 2010).
[17] DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of the DOD and Its Major
Components (Washington, D.C., December 2010).
[18] DOD Directive 7045.20, Capability Portfolio Management
(Washington, D.C., September 2008).
[19] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374].
[21] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[22] The decision support tool referred to in this section is the
Joint Staff's ISR Capabilities Map and Next Dollar Sensitivity Tool.
[23] Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 923 (c)-(d), codified in part at 10 U.S.C.
§ 426 (2003).
[24] Figure 4 includes a full list of these requirements.
[25] The Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board is one of
the eight DOD Functional Capabilities Boards that review and analyze
initial proposals for new military capabilities, and it is focused on
ISR capabilities. These Functional Capabilities Boards support the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council as it assists the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in this role by reviewing and approving
proposals for new military capabilities, among other responsibilities.
[26] H.R. Rep. No. 110-652, at 423 (2008).
[27] The Future Years Defense Program provides information on DOD's
current and planned out year budget requests and visibility over DOD's
projected spending.
[End of section]
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