Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness Gao ID: GAO-11-621 June 20, 2011Maritime security threats to the United States are broad, including the naval forces of potential adversary nations, terrorism, and piracy. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very real threats. The Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness--that is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient awareness to make timely decisions--a means for facilitating effective action in the maritime domain and critical to its homeland defense mission. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts and uses a risk-based approach. GAO analyzed national and DOD documents; interviewed DOD and interagency maritime domain awareness officials; and conducted site visits to select facilities engaged in maritime related activities. This report is a public version of a previous, sensitive report.
DOD has identified numerous maritime capability gaps and developed documents that articulate a broad strategy for maritime domain awareness. However, DOD does not have a departmentwide strategy that adequately defines roles and responsibilities for addressing gaps, aligns objectives with national strategy, and includes measures to guide the implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts, and to assess and manage risk associated with capability gaps. GAO has previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy that lays out goals and objectives, suggests actions for addressing those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and responsibilities, and measures performance against objectives. DOD and its components have developed a number of documents that incorporate some of these key elements of an overall strategy for maritime domain awareness such as a definition of the problem. However, collectively they do not have several key elements a strategy should contain. For example, neither DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept nor the DOD's Executive Agent Assessment of U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans fully address organizational roles and responsibilities and resources, investments, performance measures, and risk management. Additionally, DOD leverages numerous capabilities to collect, fuse, and share maritime information to respond to global maritime challenges. DOD components have identified and started prioritizing capability gaps; however, DOD does not have a departmentwide risk assessment to address high priority capability gaps. DOD combatant commands and components prioritize maritime domain awareness differently based upon their respective missions and these component-level views may not provide a full view of the risks associated with these gaps at a departmentwide level. Prior GAO work has emphasized the importance of using a comprehensive risk assessment process. A strategy that includes a comprehensive, risk-based approach to managing maritime domain awareness may provide better information to decision makers about the potential implications of policy and resourcing decisions both within DOD and across the interagency. In the absence of a departmentwide strategy, DOD may not be effectively managing its maritime domain awareness efforts. This report is a publicly releasable version of a previously issued, sensitive report. GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement a strategy with objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime domain awareness, aligns with DOD's corporate process, identifies capability resourcing responsibilities, and includes performance measures; and (2) perform a comprehensive risk-based analysis, including prioritized capability gaps and future investments. DOD agreed with the recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Davi M. Dagostino Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202)512-3000GAO-11-621, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
June 2011:
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
DOD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime
Domain Awareness:
GAO-11-621:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-621, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Maritime security threats to the United States are broad, including
the naval forces of potential adversary nations, terrorism, and
piracy. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in Mumbai in 2008, and on
the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very real threats. The
Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness”-that
is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient
awareness to make timely decisions”-a means for facilitating effective
action in the maritime domain and critical to its homeland defense
mission. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which DOD has
developed a strategy to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts
and uses a risk-based approach. GAO analyzed national and DOD
documents; interviewed DOD and interagency maritime domain awareness
officials; and conducted site visits to select facilities engaged in
maritime related activities. This report is a public version of a
previous, sensitive report.
What GAO Found:
DOD has identified numerous maritime capability gaps and developed
documents that articulate a broad strategy for maritime domain
awareness. However, DOD does not have a departmentwide strategy that
adequately defines roles and responsibilities for addressing gaps,
aligns objectives with national strategy, and includes measures to
guide the implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts, and to
assess and manage risk associated with capability gaps. GAO has
previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy
that lays out goals and objectives, suggests actions for addressing
those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and
responsibilities, and measures performance against objectives. DOD and
its components have developed a number of documents that incorporate
some of these key elements of an overall strategy for maritime domain
awareness such as a definition of the problem. However, collectively
they do not have several key elements a strategy should contain. For
example, neither DOD‘s Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating
Concept nor the DOD‘s Executive Agent Assessment of U.S. Defense
Components Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans fully address
organizational roles and responsibilities and resources, investments,
performance measures, and risk management.
Additionally, DOD leverages numerous capabilities to collect, fuse,
and share maritime information to respond to global maritime
challenges. DOD components have identified and started prioritizing
capability gaps; however, DOD does not have a departmentwide risk
assessment to address high priority capability gaps. DOD combatant
commands and components prioritize maritime domain awareness
differently based upon their respective missions and these component-
level views may not provide a full view of the risks associated with
these gaps at a departmentwide level. Prior GAO work has emphasized
the importance of using a comprehensive risk assessment process. A
strategy that includes a comprehensive, risk-based approach to
managing maritime domain awareness may provide better information to
decision makers about the potential implications of policy and
resourcing decisions both within DOD and across the interagency. In
the absence of a departmentwide strategy, DOD may not be effectively
managing its maritime domain awareness efforts.
This report is a publicly releasable version of a previously issued,
sensitive report.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement a strategy with
objectives, roles, and responsibilities for maritime domain awareness,
aligns with DOD‘s corporate process, identifies capability resourcing
responsibilities, and includes performance measures; and (2) perform a
comprehensive risk-based analysis, including prioritized capability
gaps and future investments. DOD agreed with the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-621] or key
components. For more information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202)
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
DOD Identified Numerous Maritime Capability Gaps, but Does Not Have a
Comprehensive, Departmentwide Strategy to Manage Risk Associated with
These Capability Gaps and Guide Future Investments:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: The Extent to Which DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint
Integrating Concept and the DOD Executive Agent's Assessment of the
U.S. Defense Components Annual MDA Plans 2009 Address GAO's Desirable
Characteristics for National Strategies:
Table 2: The Extent to Which DOD Documents Meet GAO Risk Assessment
and Management Criteria:
Figures:
Figure 1: Maritime Challenges:
Figure 2: GAO Risk Management Framework:
Figure 3: Extent to Which Maritime Domain Awareness Covers Several
Joint Requirements Capability Integration System Process Functional
Capabilities Boards:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 20, 2011:
Congressional Requesters:
Security threats to the United States from the maritime domain include
the naval forces of potential adversary nations as well as terrorism
and piracy. Historical and potential threats include the use of large
merchant vessels to transport weapons of mass destruction; explosive-
laden suicide boats as weapons; and vessels to smuggle people, drugs,
weapons, and other contraband. The attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, in
Mumbai in 2008, and on the Maersk Alabama in 2009 highlight these very
real threats to U.S. interests and persons. The September 2005
National Strategy for Maritime Security identifies as a key national
security requirement the understanding of all the activities, events,
and trends within the maritime domain that could threaten the safety,
security, economy, or environment of the United States and its people.
The Department of Defense (DOD) considers maritime domain awareness--
that is, identifying threats and providing commanders with sufficient
awareness to counter those threats--a means for facilitating effective
action in the maritime domain. DOD does not consider maritime domain
awareness to be a distinct mission, but rather an enabler for the
range of military operations performed in the maritime domain.
Maritime domain awareness is also a critical supporting pillar for
DOD's maritime homeland defense mission and for the execution of the
National Military Strategy of the United States of America.[Footnote
1] In addition, the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called
for DOD and its interagency partners to more comprehensively monitor
the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains for potential direct
threats to the United States. As we have previously reported, the
federal government is facing serious long-term fiscal challenges, and
DOD may confront increased competition over the next decade for
federal discretionary funds.[Footnote 2] In this environment, it will
be increasingly important for DOD decision makers to evaluate
competing priorities and alternatives to determine the most cost-
effective solutions for providing needed capabilities, including
capabilities to enhance maritime domain awareness.
The federal government has actively sought to enhance maritime
security and has established entities dedicated to maritime domain
awareness. DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Department of Transportation have all appointed executive agents for
the federal government's maritime domain awareness efforts. No single
department, agency, or entity holds all of the authorities and
capabilities necessary to fully achieve effective maritime domain
awareness, and the cost associated with maritime domain awareness
efforts is spread across multiple agencies, making the total cost
difficult to determine. In addition, resources and funding for
maritime capabilities can come from a number of sources including
national intelligence funding, military intelligence funding, military
service funding, and funding from other interagency partners such as
the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection. Additionally,
the intelligence community's diverse organizational cultures, funding
arrangements, requirements processes, and missions that DOD supports
present a challenge for DOD in prioritizing its intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, including capabilities
that support maritime domain awareness.
Combatant commands use maritime domain awareness to support their key
missions. For example, for U.S. Northern Command and North American
Aerospace Defense Command, maritime domain awareness is critical for
meeting the maritime homeland defense and maritime warning missions,
respectively. For U.S. Pacific Command, maritime domain awareness
supports overall awareness of its extremely large area of
responsibility, including location of friendly forces, force
projection, and theater security. U.S. Southern Command and Joint
Interagency Task Force-South both use maritime intelligence
capabilities to aid in locating and tracking highly mobile illicit
traffickers.
DOD considers the ability to monitor activity around the globe in
order to identify unknown threats to be a key aspect of maritime
domain awareness. The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain
Awareness refers to this ability as persistent monitoring, which is
defined as the integrated management of a diverse set of collection
and processing capabilities, operated to detect and understand the
activity of interest to expeditiously assess adversary actions,
predict adversary plans, deny sanctuary to an adversary, and assess
results of U.S. and partner actions. DOD relies on both its own and
national intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to
provide comprehensive intelligence to the joint warfighting forces.
Our prior work relating to maritime domain awareness focused on the
role of the U.S. Coast Guard, which uses maritime domain awareness
particularly to protect U.S. ports and waterways.[Footnote 3] You
asked us to examine DOD's current and planned maritime domain
awareness capabilities and maritime homeland defense efforts. This is
a public version of a sensitive report, issued in November 2010 and
examines the extent to which DOD has developed a strategy and uses a
risk-based approach to manage its maritime domain awareness efforts.
This version omits information on specific DOD intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; capability gaps; and
operations. As we agreed with your offices, we will address maritime
homeland defense and report separately in 2011 on those issues.
To address this objective, we analyzed national and DOD maritime
domain awareness planning documents; interviewed DOD and partner
agency maritime domain awareness officials; and conducted site visits
to facilities, such as operations centers and combatant commands
engaged in maritime domain awareness and homeland defense activities.
We selected these visits based on interviews with DOD officials and
reviews of relevant maritime domain awareness policy and strategy
documents and combatant command documents. To determine the extent to
which DOD has developed a strategy to guide implementation of maritime
domain awareness, we assessed information in the Department of Defense
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept and the DOD
Executive Agent's Assessment of U.S. Defense Components Annual
Maritime Domain Awareness Plans 2009 against our prior work on
desirable characteristics of national strategies. We also assessed the
documents against information obtained from interviews with combatant
command, Navy, intelligence agency, and Coast Guard officials. In
addition, we evaluated DOD efforts to allocate resources, measure
performance, and monitor progress in addressing maritime domain
awareness capability gaps. We compared information found in relevant
DOD and DOD component-level plans and strategies with GAO criteria on
management best practices. To determine what capabilities DOD
currently uses to support maritime domain awareness, what gaps still
exist, and how these gaps are prioritized, we assessed information we
received in interviews and site visits with combatant command,
military service, and supporting intelligence agencies' officials. We
compared this information with capability needs established in
national guidance such as the National Strategy for Maritime Security
and the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness and DOD
guidance such as the Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating
Concept and DOD Directive 2005.02E, which establishes DOD policy for
maritime domain awareness. We reviewed prior GAO work on risk
management and compared it to existing DOD maritime domain awareness
capability documents to determine the extent to which DOD applies a
risk-based approach to managing capabilities related to maritime
domain awareness. Appendix I provides additional details regarding the
scope and methodology of this report.
We conducted this performance audit primarily from June 2009 through
November 2010, and coordinated with DOD from January to May 2011 to
produce this public version of the prior, sensitive report issued in
November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Background:
DOD Shares Responsibility for Maritime Domain Awareness with Other
Interagency Partners:
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has emphasized the
need for a coordinated response to maritime threats. In December 2004,
the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 41
(NSPD-41)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD-13),
Maritime Security Policy, defining maritime domain awareness as the
effective understanding of anything associated with the global
maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or
environment of the United States. NSPD-41/HSPD-13 also directed the
Secretaries of Defense and of Homeland Security to jointly lead an
interagency effort to prepare a National Strategy for Maritime
Security to align all federal government maritime security programs
and initiatives into a comprehensive and cohesive national effort
involving appropriate federal, state, local, and private sector
entities.[Footnote 4]
Interagency coordination for maritime domain awareness is primarily
exercised within the Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee,
which reports to the National Security Council Deputies Committee. A
Maritime Domain Awareness Stakeholders Board consists of
representatives from all departments and the intelligence community
advises the Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee through its
Executive Steering Committee. DOD, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Department of Transportation have all appointed
executive agents for maritime domain awareness who, together with a
representative of the intelligence community, constitute the Maritime
Domain Awareness Stakeholder Board Executive Steering Committee. DOD
Directive 2005.02E establishes policy and roles and responsibilities
for maritime domain awareness within DOD. This directive designated
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as Office of the Secretary
of Defense Principal Staff Assistant to oversee the activities of the
DOD Executive Agent for maritime domain awareness and designated the
Secretary of the Navy as the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain
Awareness. In addition, the directive establishes several management
functions that the Executive Agent is required to conduct for maritime
domain awareness, including:
* Overseeing the execution of maritime domain awareness initiatives
within DOD and coordinating maritime domain awareness policy with the
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy);
* Developing and distributing goals, objectives, and desired effects
for maritime domain awareness, in coordination with the Under
Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence);
* Identifying and updating maritime domain awareness requirements and
resources for the effective performance of DOD missions; and:
* Recommending DOD-wide maritime domain awareness planning and
programming guidance to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and
the Director of Programming, Analysis, and Evaluation (now the Office
of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation).[Footnote 5]
The Secretary of the Navy issued an instruction in January 2009 that
assigned the Chief of Naval Operations with responsibility for
achieving maritime domain awareness within the Navy. This
responsibility includes aligning Navy guidance with DOD policy
guidance and coordinating with the Joint Staff to ensure that
combatant commands have the necessary Navy resources to support their
respective maritime domain awareness requirements.[Footnote 6]
In May 2009, the DOD Executive Agent requested that the Joint Staff
solicit maritime domain awareness annual plans from the military
services, combatant commands, and defense intelligence components, as
required by DOD Directive 2005.02E. In December 2009, the DOD
Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness completed an assessment
of DOD components' annual maritime domain awareness plans.[Footnote 7]
The effort was intended to provide the Executive Agent with a
"horizontal look" at maritime domain awareness concerns across DOD.
The Executive Agent used information from the plans to: (1) gather
program and project priorities, (2) formulate and update overarching
DOD maritime domain awareness goals and objectives, (3) craft
programming and planning recommendations, and (4) synchronize and
align combatant command and component efforts and resources. The DOD
Executive Agent is currently conducting an assessment of 2010
component plans.[Footnote 8]
DOD relies on organizations both within and outside of the department
to achieve maritime domain awareness. The Office of Naval Intelligence
is a core element of Global Maritime Intelligence Integration, whose
goal is complete Maritime Domain Awareness and their primary mission
is to produce meaningful maritime intelligence. The Office of Naval
Intelligence produces a Common Operating Picture and Common
Intelligence Picture, both of which are compiled from multiple sources
of intelligence. The Office of Naval Intelligence, together with the
Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center, compiles and provides
a list of vessels of interest to DOD and Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) components. In addition, the National Maritime
Intelligence Center, created by the Director of National Intelligence,
serves as the integration point for maritime information and
intelligence collection and analysis in support of national policy and
decision makers, maritime domain awareness objectives, and interagency
operations at all levels.
DOD Leverages Numerous Capabilities to Collect, Fuse, and Share
Maritime Information to Respond to Global Maritime Challenges:
DOD, combatant commands, and joint task forces leverage numerous
capabilities to enhance maritime domain awareness, including
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection platforms;
intelligence fusion and analysis; and information sharing and
dissemination. These capabilities assist DOD in responding to the
range of maritime challenges, some of which are identified in figure 1.
Figure 1: Maritime Challenges:
[Refer to PDF for image: world map]
Challenges depicted at specific points on the map:
Drug Trade;
Environmental Attack;
Human Smuggling;
Illegal Immigration;
Organized Crime;
Piracy;
Terrorism;
Trade Disruption;
Weapons Proliferation.
Source: Department of the Navy.
[End of figure]
A range of platforms, such as sensors on naval vessels and aircraft,
provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection
capabilities. Once maritime domain awareness related data is
collected, fusion and analysis capabilities assist DOD combatant
commands and joint task forces to combine data from a variety of
sources to provide information that may include location, course,
destination, cargo, crew, and passengers of a given vessel. In
addition, DOD uses a number of capabilities to promote the sharing and
dissemination of maritime domain awareness information. For example,
the Maritime Safety and Security Information System uses an existing,
worldwide vessel safety system--the Automatic Information System--to
produce unclassified, Internet-based, password-protected ship tracking
system.[Footnote 9] Currently, more than 50 nations participate in the
Maritime Safety and Security Information System. In addition, DOD is
working with other international partners to set up more advanced
networks to share information.
To validate joint warfighting requirements, including those associated
with maritime domain awareness, DOD uses its Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System. The primary objective of the
system is to ensure the capabilities required by the joint warfighter
are identified with their associated operational performance criteria
in order to successfully execute assigned missions.[Footnote 10] The
Joint Requirements Oversight Council oversees this system and
Functional Capabilities Boards, headed by a general, admiral, or
government civilian equivalent, support the council by evaluating
capability needs, recommending enhancements, examining joint
priorities, and minimizing duplication of effort across the
department. There are nine Functional Capabilities Boards: Battlespace
Awareness, Building Partnerships, Command and Control, Force
Application, Force Support, Logistics, Net Centric, and Protection.
DOD Identified Numerous Maritime Capability Gaps, but Does Not Have a
Comprehensive, Departmentwide Strategy to Manage Risk Associated with
These Capability Gaps and Guide Future Investments:
DOD has articulated a broad strategy for maritime domain awareness and
identified numerous maritime capability gaps through various
documents. However, DOD does not have a departmentwide strategy that
adequately defines roles and responsibilities for addressing gaps,
aligns objectives with national strategy, and includes measures to
guide the implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts, measure
progress, and assess and manage risk associated with capability gaps.
DOD Strategy Documents Does Not Have Departmentwide Objectives,
Identify Roles and Responsibilities, and Align with National
Strategies:
We previously reported that it is standard practice to have a strategy
that lays out goals and objectives, identifies actions for addressing
those objectives, allocates resources, identifies roles and
responsibilities, and measures performance against objectives.
[Footnote 11] The federal government, DOD, and its components have
developed a number of documents that incorporate some of these key
elements of an overall strategy for maritime domain awareness.
Examples include the following:
* The National Strategy for Maritime Security broadly identifies
threats to maritime security and strategic objectives and actions
needed to achieve maritime security.[Footnote 12]
* The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is intended
to guide the execution of the security plans tasked in NSPD-41/HSPD-
13. It supports the National Strategy for Maritime Security by
outlining broad goals, objectives, threats, and priorities in order to
coordinate maritime domain awareness efforts at the federal level.
[Footnote 13]
* U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command worked with the Joint
Staff to develop DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating
Concept to, among other things, provide a common vision for the future
of maritime domain awareness related operations within DOD, identify
maritime domain awareness capabilities and tasks and conditions for
each capability, and inform future capability analyses.[Footnote 14]
* The DOD's Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness completed an
annual assessment of maritime domain awareness plans prepared by
several DOD commands, military services, and defense intelligence
components.[Footnote 15] The assessment organized the analyzed
information from the plans into three critical areas where it
determined that DOD must focus and expand its efforts: increased
information sharing, enhanced situational awareness, and enhanced data
on vessels, cargo, and people.
We found that these documents and others DOD and the Navy have
developed demonstrate a considerable amount of effort toward defining
and organizing DOD's maritime domain awareness efforts, but we
determined that they do not have several key elements that a strategy
should contain. DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating
Concept and the Assessment of U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime
Domain Awareness Plans are two of the key documents used to guide
current maritime domain awareness efforts and execute the national
strategies. DOD's Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness
reviewed and assessed plans submitted by the combatant commands, the
military services, and defense intelligence components. Table 1
summarizes the desirable characteristics of a strategy and compares
the elements contained in DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint
Integrating Concept and the DOD Executive Agent's Assessment of the
U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans 2009.
[Footnote 16]
Table 1: The Extent to Which DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint
Integrating Concept and the DOD Executive Agent's Assessment of the
U.S. Defense Components Annual MDA Plans 2009 Address GAO's Desirable
Characteristics for National Strategies:
Desirable characteristic: Problem definition and risk assessment;
Description: Addresses the particular national problem and threats the
strategy is directed toward;
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially
addresses--This document discusses risk and defines the problem, but
does not provide threat, criticality, or vulnerability assessments for
each capability or task that needs to be addressed;
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Partially
addresses--This document defines the problem, but does not provide an
analysis of threats to and vulnerabilities of critical assets and
operations.
Desirable characteristic: Purpose, scope, and methodology;
Description: Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its
coverage, and the process by which it was developed;
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially
addresses--The document identifies the purpose of the document along
with the purpose and scope of maritime domain awareness;
however the purpose and methodology of the strategy are not
specifically identified;
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Addresses.
Desirable characteristic: Organizational roles, responsibilities, and
coordination;
Description: Addresses who will be implementing the strategy, what
their roles will be compared to others, and mechanisms for
coordination of efforts;
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Does not address;
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Partially
addresses--The assessment generally states who is responsible for
implementing maritime domain awareness but does not assign specific
responsibility for the critical areas.
Desirable characteristic: Integration and implementation;
Description: Addresses how the strategy relates to other strategies'
goals, objectives, and activities;
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially
addresses--The document states that capabilities and tasks cited were
informed by national and interagency documents, but the alignment
between the Joint Integrating Concept's tasks and national-level gaps
and tasks is not clearly identified;
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Partially
addresses--The assessment identifies joint concepts, plans, and
policies each critical area relates to, but does not clearly align
future goals and objectives with those listed in national strategies
and plans.
Desirable characteristic: Goals, subordinate objectives, activities,
measures of performance, and monitoring of progress;
Description: Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, steps
to achieve those results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and
measures to gauge results and monitor progress;
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially
addresses--The document lists capabilities and tasks that need to be
addressed but does not contain mechanisms for monitoring progress;
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Partially
addresses--The document contains goals and objectives, and priorities
DOD should focus on;
but does not contain specific performance measures or mechanisms for
measuring progress.
Desirable characteristic: Resources, investments, and risk management;
Description: Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and
types of resources, and where resources and investments should be
targeted;
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Does not address;
Assessment U.S. Defense Component Annual MDA Plans: Does not address.
Source: GAO analysis of departmentwide maritime domain awareness
strategy documents.
Note: Explanations are provided only for why an element partially
meets GAO criteria for desirable characteristics of strategy
documents. A document "addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly
cites all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacks specificity
and details and thus could be improved upon. A document "partially
addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly cites some, but not all
elements of a characteristic. Within our designation of "partially
addresses" there is a wide variation between a document that addresses
most of the elements of a characteristic and a document that addresses
few of the elements of a characteristic. A document "does not address"
a characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or discuss any
elements of a characteristic, and/or any implicit references are
either too vague or general.
[End of table]
DOD and its components have completed or are developing additional
efforts that may assist the department in organizing its maritime
domain awareness efforts. The Department of the Navy developed a
strategy for maritime domain awareness in response to a congressional
committee report requirement, and several draft maritime domain
awareness roadmaps to guide the Navy's implementation of maritime
domain awareness. Additionally, as of November 2010, the Chief of
Naval Operation's Information Dominance Office was developing a Navy
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Roadmap that outlines
the Navy's vision for capabilities needed to fulfill its missions and
priorities, including maritime domain awareness. Additionally, several
of the services, combatant commands, and military intelligence
components submitted maritime domain awareness annual plans to the DOD
Executive Agent in 2009. As of November 2010, U.S. Pacific Command was
in the process of drafting a maritime domain awareness concept of
operations. This concept of operations is intended to provide a common
understanding of intelligence support to maritime domain awareness
throughout the combatant command. In June 2010, an interagency working
group issued the Current State Report, a reference document which
identifies maritime domain awareness tasks, capabilities gaps, and
ongoing efforts related to each gap. Finally, in July 2010, the DOD
Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness developed Maritime
Domain Awareness Planning and Programming Recommendations, which was
based, among other things, on the 2009 Annual Maritime Domain
Awareness Plans submitted by DOD Components to the Executive Agent.
While these efforts may help the individual components work towards
more effective maritime domain awareness, developing a departmentwide
strategy that clearly outlines objectives and roles and
responsibilities will better position DOD to align more detailed
objectives with national strategies and coordinate the results of
ongoing and future efforts across the department.
National and DOD Strategy Documents Also Do Not Have Provisions for
Allocating Resources, Measuring Performance, and Monitoring Progress:
As part of the overall framework for successful strategies, prior GAO
work has also emphasized the importance of allocating resources,
measuring performance, and monitoring progress as sound management
practices critical for decision making and achieving results in
specified time frames.[Footnote 17]
While DOD, its interagency partners, and other DOD components have
identified numerous capability gaps, DOD does not have a risk-based
approach for assessing its maritime capabilities and gaps. Although
some interagency-level and DOD component-level documents have
prioritized maritime domain awareness capability gaps in comparison to
other maritime gaps, the identified gaps have not been allocated
resources within DOD. Additionally, DOD does not measure performance
and monitor progress in implementing maritime domain awareness and
addressing these gaps.
We assessed a number of DOD and interagency documents to determine the
extent to which resource allocation and performance measurement were
incorporated and found mixed results. Examples include:
* National Maritime Domain Awareness Interagency Investment Strategy.
DOD representatives collaborated with interagency stakeholders to
develop a document that identified critical tasks and recommended lead
and supporting federal agency stakeholders to coordinate interagency
activities to address these tasks. However, the Interagency Investment
Strategy is not what is traditionally considered an investment
strategy with developed cost estimates or proposed dollar amounts for
each agency to invest. Instead, it identifies critical capability gaps
and makes recommendations on areas for interagency efforts. For
example, it recommended that DOD work with DHS and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence to establish national data standards
for maritime domain awareness.
* Interagency Solutions Analysis Current State Report. The Current
State Report provides the status of maritime domain awareness
capability gaps, solutions, and tools in use to address those gaps and
the effectiveness of those solutions to mitigate the gaps. This
document is an output of the Interagency Solutions Analysis Working
Group, a group of interagency subject matter experts that are
comparing current capabilities against scenarios that required, among
other things, information sharing and other capabilities in the
maritime domain. The DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain
Awareness, the Department of the Navy, and the Office of Naval
Intelligence participated in this process. However, this document does
not identify resources to address identified gaps. Additionally, this
document does not provide metrics to assess performance or monitor
progress in addressing identified gaps.
* Department of Defense Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating
Concept. This document identifies required capabilities, associated
tasks, and the DOD joint capability area for each required capability
and each associated task.[Footnote 18] However, it does not identify
how resources should be targeted to address the capabilities and tasks
nor does it assign specific components within DOD to address each
capability and task. Additionally, this document does not contain
milestones for measuring progress in addressing the capability gaps
and tasks will be measured.
* Assessment of the U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime Domain
Awareness Plans 2009. The DOD Executive Agent solicited Maritime
Domain Awareness Annual Plans from DOD combatant commands, military
services, and defense intelligence components. The plans outlined each
component's planned maritime domain awareness capabilities and
described current gaps. The Executive Agent assessed the plans and
listed critical areas for expanded focus and efforts. However, several
DOD components did not submit plans, so the assessment may not include
departmentwide data. Also, as identified in table 1, this assessment
does not incorporate several key elements that would help guide DOD's
implementation of maritime domain awareness including an allocation of
resources and investments, performance measures, and a mechanism to
monitor progress.
* Department of the Navy Initial Capabilities Document for Data Fusion
and Analysis Functions of Navy Maritime Domain Awareness. This 2009
Navy document summarized a capabilities-based assessment that
identified capability shortfalls and recommended approaches to improve
Navy's overall maritime domain awareness capability. According to some
DOD officials the Initial Capabilities Document reflects the Navy's
view, but not necessarily the views of other DOD components and
interagency stakeholders. For example, many Navy maritime domain
awareness documents are Navy-centric and it is unclear how they align
with interagency efforts. Lastly, the Navy Initial Capabilities
Document does not resource identified gaps.
These documents articulated broad strategic goals for maritime domain
awareness and identified several critical capability gaps; however,
DOD has not allocated resources to these efforts. Additionally, the
Department of The Navy Initial Capabilities Document, DOD's Maritime
Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept, and the National Maritime
Domain Awareness Working Group Interagency Investment Strategy gaps
were separately approved by DOD's Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, but DOD has not developed a departmentwide capability gap
assessment for approval by the council. We also previously reported
that the requirements determination process is more focused on the
needs of military services than the joint warfighter, and combatant
commands and defense intelligence agency needs are often not
incorporated into this process.[Footnote 19] A departmentwide
strategy, including a capability gap assessment, would assist DOD in
assessing and prioritizing maritime domain awareness capability gaps
that have already been identified through various service and
interagency efforts in order to integrate them into its corporate
processes--such as the Joint Capabilities Integration Development
System--for determining requirements and allocating resources.
[Footnote 20]
Multiple DOD and Interagency Documents Have Identified Maritime
Capability Gaps Primarily in the Areas of Collection, Fusion and
Analysis, and Information Sharing:
Interagency maritime domain awareness documents identified maritime
capability gaps and designated DOD as the lead agency to address some
of these gaps. For example, in October 2005, the National Plan to
Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness identified numerous near-and long-
term maritime domain awareness priorities relating to maritime
capabilities, and listed DOD as the lead agency for 22 of these
priorities. In May 2007, the National Maritime Domain Awareness
Requirements and Capabilities Working Group developed the National
Maritime Domain Awareness Study Interagency Investment Strategy, which
prioritized capability gaps.[Footnote 21] The Interagency Investment
Strategy listed DOD as the lead or co-lead agency to address a
majority of the prioritized gaps. The Maritime Domain Awareness
Steering Executive Steering Committee approved an execution plan for a
maritime domain awareness Interagency Solutions Analysis which would
develop a coordinated, interagency approach for addressing previously
identified gaps. In April 2010, the Interagency Solutions Analysis
working group decided to focus immediate efforts on closing existing
gaps related to information about the three areas of people, cargo,
and vessels for the interagency group to initially address.
In addition to interagency efforts, DOD and Navy documents have
identified maritime domain awareness capability gaps related to the
department's ability to collect, analyze, and share information on
maritime vessels. For example, DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint
Integrating Concept identified required capabilities that the joint
forces will need to address in order to conduct future operations to
develop and maintain awareness of the maritime domain. In addition,
DOD is conducting a Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating
Concept capabilities-based assessment that is considering current and
programmed capabilities through 2012 in addition to projections of
future programs. An initial capabilities document for this assessment
was approved on November 29, 2010. This capabilities-based assessment
is also intended to validate the Maritime Domain Awareness Joint
Integrating Concept and provide a baseline of maritime domain
awareness elements to inform interagency efforts.
Key themes have emerged through the identification of capability gaps
in several national, interagency, and department documents that DOD
may need to address to support maritime domain awareness. DOD
components have also identified maritime domain awareness capability
gaps. While initial capability assessments share common themes, there
has not been a departmentwide prioritization of these capability gaps.
As DOD components start developing solutions for these gaps and
allocating resources, the absence of a departmentwide prioritization
may result in unnecessary duplication of efforts or redundancy in
addressing shared capability gaps. A departmentwide prioritization,
determined by a comprehensive, risk-based approach would assist
decision makers in more effectively allocating resources to the joint
forces departmentwide and contribute to interagency efforts to
prioritize maritime capability gaps.
DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive, Risk-Based Approach to Assessing
Maritime Domain Awareness Capability Gaps:
DOD has not assessed the risk associated with its maritime capability
gaps, in addition to not prioritizing these gaps. As we have
previously reported, an agency's strategic plan should, among other
things, address risk-related issues that are central to the agency's
mission.[Footnote 22] To provide a basis for analyzing these risk
management strategies, we have developed a framework based on industry
best practices and other criteria. This framework, shown in figure 2,
divides risk management into five major phases: (1) setting strategic
goals and objectives, and determining constraints; (2) assessing
risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for addressing these risks; (4)
selecting the appropriate alternatives; and (5) implementing the
alternatives and monitoring the progress made and results achieved.
Figure 2: GAO Risk Management Framework:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Continuous, interlocking circle:
strategic goals, objectives, and constraints;
risk assessment;
alternatives evaluation;
management selection;
implementation and monitoring.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Even though DOD, its interagency partners, and its components have
made efforts to identify and start prioritizing capability gaps, DOD
does not have a departmentwide risk assessment to address high
priority capability gaps. DOD Directive 2005.02E, which establishes
the department's policy for maritime domain awareness, states that the
department will determine its resource priorities and awareness levels
needed to persistently monitor the maritime domain. The 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review states that risk management is central to
effective decision-making. As shown in table 1, we have previously
reported that risk assessment and risk management are desirable
characteristics of national strategies. We have described risk
assessments as including an analysis of threats to, and
vulnerabilities of, critical assets and operations. The results of
risk assessments may be used to define and prioritize related resource
and operational requirements.
Currently, maritime domain awareness is prioritized through various
mechanisms across DOD, instead of through a departmentwide approach.
For example, DOD's combatant commands and components prioritize
maritime domain awareness differently based upon their respective
missions. Additionally, when prioritizing capabilities across DOD,
maritime domain awareness falls into multiple capability areas. For
example, according to DOD documents and DOD officials, maritime domain
awareness capabilities are assessed under multiple joint capability
areas and functional capability boards through the Joint Capabilities
Integration and Development System process. Figure 3 illustrates this.
Figure 3: Extent to Which Maritime Domain Awareness Covers Several
Joint Requirements Capability Integration System Process Functional
Capabilities Boards:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Maritime Domain Awareness issues:
* Battle Space Awareness Board;
* Command and Control Board;
* Net-Centric Board;
* Building Partnerships Board.
Protection Board;
Logistics Board;
Force Application Board;
Force Support Board.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents and interviews with DOD
officials.
[End of figure]
The various interagency and DOD views on capability gaps and
priorities may not provide a full assessment of the risks associated
with these gaps at a departmentwide level. Table 2 illustrates that
current DOD-wide documents do not meet all of GAO's criteria for a
risk assessment. Prior GAO work has cited that while principles of
risk management acknowledge that risk generally cannot be eliminated
altogether, enhancing protection from known or potential threats can
serve to significantly reduce risk.
Table 2: The Extent to Which DOD Documents Meet GAO Risk Assessment
and Management Criteria:
GAO risk management criteria[A]: Assess threats: identify and evaluate
potential threats based on factors such as capabilities, intentions
and past activities;
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially
addresses--Maritime domain threats are identified but not evaluated;
Assessment of U.S. Defense Component Annual Plans: Partially
addresses--This document addresses the mission impact of not
addressing each critical area but does not provide a specific threat
assessment.
GAO risk management criteria[A]: Assess vulnerabilities: identify
weaknesses that may be exploited by identified threats and suggest
options to address these weaknesses;
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Partially
addresses--The document identifies broad solutions and discusses risk,
but does not include specific threat and vulnerability assessments. It
also broadly discusses risk mitigation;
Assessment of U.S. Defense Component Annual Plans: Partially
addresses--The mission impact of not addressing each critical area is
discussed;
but threat, vulnerability and criticality assessments are not
identified.
GAO risk management criteria[A]: Assess the criticality of assets and
functions: evaluate and prioritize important assets and functions in
terms of factors such as mission and target significance;
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Does not address;
Assessment of U.S. Defense Component Annual Plans: Does not address.
GAO risk management criteria[A]: Use assessment results to balance
threats and vulnerabilities, and to prioritize related resource and
operational requirements;
Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating Concept: Does not address;
Assessment of U.S. Defense Component Annual Plans: Does not address.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents.
Note: A document "addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly cites
all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacks specificity and
details and thus could be improved upon. A document "partially
addresses" a characteristic when it explicitly cites some, but not all
elements of a characteristic. Within our designation of "partially
addresses" there is a wide variation between a document that addresses
most of the elements of a characteristic and a strategy that addresses
few of the elements of a characteristic. A strategy "does not address"
a characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or discuss any
elements of a characteristic, and/or any implicit references are
either too vague or general.
[A] For more information on these criteria, see GAO-02-160T.
[End of table]
Efforts such as The Maritime Domain Awareness Joint Integrating
Concept and Assessment of U.S. Defense Component Annual Maritime
Domain Awareness Plans have demonstrated DOD's progress in identifying
capability gaps related to maritime domain awareness, but have not
been included in a larger, departmentwide maritime domain awareness
risk assessment. As a result, DOD may lack the insight needed to
actively manage the risk associated with identified capability gaps.
Additionally, because maritime domain awareness is a broad interagency
effort, DOD may be unable to effectively coordinate with its
interagency partners in the absence of a clear departmentwide strategy
for maritime domain awareness. Consolidating these component efforts
to prioritize capability gaps into a comprehensive departmentwide
approach to risk management may facilitate developing solutions for
each gap. A strategy that includes a comprehensive, risk-based
approach to managing maritime domain awareness, including a
departmentwide assessment of the critical capabilities, may also
provide better information to decision makers about the potential
implications of policy and resourcing decisions both within DOD and
across the interagency.
Conclusions:
Our prior work has shown that a strategy including goals, roles, and
responsibilities; resource allocation; and performance measures can
help ensure that agencies are supporting national and interagency
objectives. Achieving maritime domain awareness requires cooperation
across a range of agencies throughout the federal, state, and local
levels. DOD has a lead role in maritime domain awareness both because
it serves as a key enabler for its own maritime activities and because
DOD is positioned to provide so many of the resources which assist
other agencies in meeting their respective maritime domain awareness
needs. It is important that DOD components' efforts are consolidated
together and aligned amongst each other to ensure that departmentwide
maritime domain awareness needs are met and appropriate contributions
to the efforts of its interagency partners are made. In the absence of
a departmentwide strategy for maritime domain awareness, including the
prioritized allocation of resources to maritime domain awareness,
measures of performance in meeting the goals and objectives,
monitoring of progress in addressing capability gaps, and assessing
risk, DOD may not be effectively managing its maritime domain
awareness efforts. Efforts on the part of DOD combatant commands,
military services, the DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain
Awareness, and interagency working groups resulted in the
identification of several capability gaps, some identified by multiple
components. The next step in achieving effective departmentwide
maritime domain awareness would be a departmentwide strategy and risk
assessment that incorporates these efforts. As DOD and the rest of
government face increasing demand and competition for resources,
policymakers will confront difficult decisions on funding priorities.
Threats to the maritime domain are numerous and include the use of
large merchant vessels to transport weapons of mass destruction;
explosive-laden suicide boats as weapons; and vessels to smuggle
people, drugs, weapons, and other contraband. The importance and
vulnerabilities of the maritime domain require that efforts be made to
reduce the risk of maritime threats and challenges, such as a
terrorist attack or acts of piracy. Additionally, a comprehensive,
risk-based approach would help DOD capitalize on the considerable
effort it and its components have already devoted to maritime domain
awareness, make the best use of resources in a fiscally constrained
environment, and contribute to interagency efforts to address maritime
threats. A strategic, risk-based approach is particularly important in
light of emerging threats in the maritime domain and an increased
strain on government resources. Such a departmentwide approach will
provide DOD with important tools that can assist in confronting the
myriad policy and fiscal challenges the department faces.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve DOD's ability to manage the implementation of maritime
domain awareness across DOD we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy, as DOD's Executive Agent, to take
the following two actions:
* Develop and implement a departmentwide strategy for maritime domain
awareness that, at a minimum:
- Identifies DOD objectives and roles and responsibilities within DOD
for achieving maritime domain awareness, and aligns efforts and
objectives with DOD's corporate process for determining requirements
and allocating resources; and:
- Identifies responsibilities for resourcing capability areas and
includes performance measures for assessing progress of the overall
strategy that will assist in the implementation of maritime domain
awareness efforts.
* In collaboration with other maritime interagency stakeholders, such
as the Coast Guard and the National Maritime Intelligence Center,
perform a comprehensive risk-based analysis to include consideration
of threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities relating to the
management of maritime domain awareness in order to prioritize and
address DOD's critical maritime capability gaps and guide future
investments.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of the prior, sensitive report, DOD
concurred with our recommendations and discussed actions they are
taking--or plan to take--to address them. DOD's written comments are
reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where
appropriate.
In concurring with the first recommendation, DOD stated that they have
completed the initial policy, goals, and objectives for maritime
domain awareness and promulgated it in a document to all DOD
components. DOD also stated their intent to identify responsibilities
for resourcing capability gaps and performance measures for assessing
progress in achieving maritime domain awareness. DOD identified
further steps it is taking to establish objectives for maritime domain
awareness, assign appropriate roles and responsibilities, and conduct
a second assessment of annual maritime domain awareness plans to
inform DOD's overall effort to develop a departmentwide strategy. We
believe these actions will address the intent of our recommendation
and better enable DOD to address maritime capability gaps.
DOD also concurred with our second recommendation. DOD stated that it
will collaborate with the other principal members of the National
Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office to develop a
comprehensive, risk-based approach for maritime domain awareness. The
DOD Executive Agent is also requesting that DOD components include
risk assessments in their annual maritime domain awareness plans. We
believe these actions will address the intent of our recommendation
and help DOD prioritize its maritime capability gaps and guide future
investment decisions.
We are distributing this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Navy, and other relevant DOD officials. We are also
sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees.
The report is also available on our Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for
our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Mac Thornberry:
Chairman:
The Honorable James R. Langevin:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Committee on Armed
Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We were initially asked to look at four questions: (1) to what extent
has the Department of Defense (DOD) developed the capability to
perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
activities in the maritime domain; (2) to what extent has DOD
integrated the maritime domain awareness investment strategy into its
overall ISR capability investment strategy; (3) to what extent does
DOD have operational plans, planning and coordination structures in
place to meet maritime domain awareness and maritime homeland defense
requirements; and (4) what gaps, if any, exist in DOD's ability to
identify maritime threats, achieve fusion of information sources from
interagency and international partners, coordinate a response, and
deploy forces to address identified threats at all relevant distances
from the United States. We agreed with the requesters to respond to
this request with two reports. The first report focuses on maritime
capabilities and the second report will focus on maritime homeland
defense. However, we considered the homeland defense perspective when
we determined our site visits so we could gather relevant data on
maritime homeland defense where possible and feasible to support the
second report. As a result, we focused the scope of this audit on
geographic combatant commands that had both a maritime focus and a
homeland defense mission set. We determined that U.S. Northern
Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command met this
criteria, and we conducted site visits to a facilities, such as
operations centers, engaged in both maritime domain awareness and
homeland defense that support these combatant commands.
To determine what capabilities DOD currently uses to support maritime
domain awareness, what gaps still exist and how these gaps are
prioritized, we assessed capability needs established in national
guidance such as the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain
Awareness and DOD guidance such as the Joint Integrating Concept and
DOD Directive 2005.02E, which establishes DOD policy for maritime
domain awareness. We compared this information with current
capabilities and gaps described by combatant command, military
service, and supporting intelligence agency's officials during
interviews and site visits. For example, we visited several combatant
and joint operation centers to observe what capabilities were used at
maritime operations centers. In addition, we evaluated DOD's efforts
to prioritize capability gaps against established DOD acquisition
processes such as the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System. We reviewed prior GAO work on risk management and compared it
to existing DOD maritime domain awareness capability documents to
determine the extent to which DOD applies a risk-based approach to
managing capabilities and identified gaps related to maritime domain
awareness.
To determine the extent to which DOD developed a strategy to address
maritime domain awareness capability gaps, we reviewed prior GAO work
on strategic planning including GAO's work on assessing specific
components of national strategies. Given that there is no established
set of requirements for strategies, we relied on GAO assessments of
national strategies and the criteria that were applied to assess these
strategies.[Footnote 23] We identified six desirable characteristics
that national or departmentwide strategies should contain. We assessed
these criteria against existing DOD and component-level documents such
as the Joint Integrating Concept, the DOD Executive Agent's Assessment
of the U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plans
2009, and the Department of the Navy's Capability Assessment and
roadmaps to determine the extent to which these documents contain the
elements of a departmentwide strategy. We specifically focused our
assessment on the two departmentwide efforts to identify a maritime
domain awareness strategy, DOD's Maritime Domain Awareness Joint
Integrating Concept and DOD's Executive Agent for Maritime Domain
Awareness's Assessment of U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime
Domain Awareness Plans 2009. To determine the extent to which DOD has
allocated resources, measured performance and monitored progress in
addressing identified capability gaps, we reviewed the same documents
noted above to see if identified gaps were resourced within DOD, and
if implementation and monitoring programs were discussed in relation
to these gaps. We also assessed the information described in these
documents against information obtained from combatant command,
military service, and supporting intelligence agency's officials
during interviews and site visits.
To evaluate our reporting objectives, we obtained relevant national,
interagency, and DOD-level documentation and interviewed officials
from the following DOD components and interagency partners:[Footnote
24]
* Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence):
* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and America's Security Affairs:
* Defense Intelligence Agency:
* Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center:
* National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency:
* Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics):
* Joint Chiefs of Staff:
* Department of the Navy:
* Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness:
* Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N3/N5):
* Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Information Dominance
Division (N2/N6):
* Office of the Chief Information Officer:
* Office of Naval Intelligence:
* Office of Naval Research:
* U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet:
* U.S. Navy Third Fleet:
* Naval Air Systems Command:
* Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command:
* Combatant Commands:
- Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command:
- Headquarters, U.S. Northern Command:
- Headquarters, North American Aerospace Defense Command:
- Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command:
- Headquarters, Fleet Forces Command:
* Joint Forces Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance, U.S. Strategic Command:
* Joint Interagency Task Forces:
- Joint Interagency Task Force-South:
* The United States Coast Guard:
- Headquarters:
- District Five, Sector Hampton Roads:
- District Eleven, Sector San Diego:
- Intelligence Coordination Center:
- Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (Atlantic Area):
- Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (Pacific Area):
- Joint Harbor Operations Center, Port of San Diego:
- The Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness/National
Maritime Domain Awareness Coordination Office:
* National Maritime Intelligence Center:
We conducted this performance audit primarily from June 2009 through
November 2010, and coordinated with DOD from January to May 2011 to
produce this public version of the prior, sensitive report issued in
November 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Intelligence:
5000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-5000:
October 14, 2010:
Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. D'Agostino,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, [redacted] "Intelligence,
Surveillance, And Reconnaissance - DoD Needs a Strategic, Risk-Based
Approach to Enhance its Maritime Domain Awareness", dated 11 September
2010 [redacted]. The Department of Defense acknowledges receipt of the
DRAFT report and concurs with the recommendations. The Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence response is attached.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
John B. Salvatori:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technical Collections and
Analysis:
Enclosure: As stated.
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated September 11, 2010:
[Redacted]
"Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a
Strategic, Risk-Based Approach to Enhance its Maritime Domain
Awareness"
Department of Defense Comments to the GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy, as DOD's Executive Agent, develop
and implement a department-wide strategy for maritime domain awareness
that, at a minimum:
* Identifies DOD objectives and roles and responsibilities within DOD
for achieving maritime domain awareness, and aligns efforts and
objectives with DOD's corporate process for determining requirements
and allocating resources; and;
* Identifies responsibilities for resourcing capability areas and
includes performance measures for assessing progress of the overall
strategy that will assist in the implementation of maritime domain
awareness efforts.
DoD Response: Concur. On 22 September 2009, the Director of the Office
of the DoD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness (DoD EA for
MDA) promulgated to all DoD components the initial Policy. Goals and
Objectives (PGO) for MDA within DoD. On 29 July 2010, the Under
Secretary of the Navy signed the initial MDA Planning & Programming
Recommendations (PPR). Both documents, called for in DoD Directive
2005.02E, provide the foundation for developing and implementing a
department-wide strategy for maritime domain awareness.
The current PGO identifies DoD objectives for achieving maritime
domain awareness and will he forwarded for signature by the DoD EA for
MDA and re-issuance by the end of 2010. Also, the Office of the DoD EA
for MDA has begun work to update and re-issue the PPR by mid-2011 and
the P00 by the end of 2011. These revised documents will assign roles
and responsibilities within DoD for achieving maritime domain
awareness and align efforts and objectives with DOD's corporate
process for determining requirements and allocating resources. These
documents will also identify responsibilities for resourcing
capability areas and include performance measures for assessing
progress of the overall strategy that will assist in the
implementation of maritime domain awareness efforts. In the interim,
the Office of the DoD EA for MDA plans to include an assessment of
progress made against the current PGO as part of its Semi-Annual
Report.
Additionally, by the end of 2010, the Office of the DoD EA for MDA
will complete its second Assessment of Annual MDA Plans (A2MP) and
begin the cycle for submission of the 2011 AMPs, The AMP and A2MP
serve as key tools to inform the PGO, PPR and other documents in
developing and implementing a department-wide strategy for maritime
domain awareness.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy, as DOD's Executive Agent and in
collaboration with other maritime interagency stakeholders, such as
the Coast Guard and the National Maritime Intelligence Center, perform
a comprehensive risk-based analysis to include consideration of
threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities relating to the management
of maritime domain awareness in order to prioritize and address DOD's
critical maritime capability gaps and guide future investments.
DoD Response: Concur. The Director of the Office of the DoD EA for MDA
serves as one of the four principal members of the interagency
National MDA Coordination Office (NMCO) and will present this matter
for further consideration and development of a collaborative way
forward with the other NMCO Principals from the Department of
Transportation, Department of Homeland Security/United States Coast
Guard and National Maritime Intelligence Center.
Additionally, within DoD as part of the cycle for collection of the
2011 Annual MDA Plans (AMP), the Office of the DoD EA for MDA will
request that DoD Components report on threats, vulnerability and
criticality as well as provide insight as to how threats and
vulnerabilities are balanced, The Office of the DoD EA for MDA is also
working with the National Maritime Intelligence Center to include
their requirements in the 2011 AMP cycle. Information gathered from the
2011 AMP submissions will serve to enable a comprehensive risk-based
analysis that will further inform DoD prioritization and investment
decisions.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Joseph Kirschbaum (Assistant
Director), Alisa Beyninson, Christy Bilardo, Stephen Caldwell, Gina
Flacco, Brent Helt, Greg Marchand, Timothy Persons, Steven Putansu,
Amie Steele, and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the
United States of America (Washington, D.C.: 2004). The National
Military Strategy is the Joint Chiefs of Staff's document that
establishes three military objectives: (1) protect the United States
against external attacks and aggression, (2) prevent conflict and
surprise attack, and (3) prevail against adversaries.
[2] GAO, Quadrennial Defense Review: 2010 Report Addressed Many but
Not All Required Items, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-575R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2010); The Federal Government's Long-Term Fiscal Outlook: January 2010
Update, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-468SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2010).
[3] For example, see GAO, Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems
Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be
Reviewed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-337]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2009); Maritime Security: New Structures
Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing
Requires Further Attention, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-394] (Apr. 15, 2005); and Maritime
Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate
Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-868] (July 23, 2004).
[4] The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Sept. 2005.
[5] DOD Directive 2005.02E, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the
Department of Defense (Aug. 27, 2008).
[6] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3052.1 Maritime Domain Awareness
in the Department of the Navy (Jan. 30, 2009).
[7] Department of Defense Executive Agent for Maritime Domain
Awareness, Assessment of the U.S. Defense Components Annual Maritime
Domain Awareness Plans 2009, (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 31, 2009).
[8] The DOD Executive Agent completed its assessment of 2010 component
plans in January 2011, subsequent to the issuance of the original,
sensitive version of this report.
[9] Automatic Identification System equipment transmits information
such as the name of the vessel, its position, speed, course, and
destination to receivers within range of its broadcast, allowing these
vessels to be tracked when they are operating in coastal areas, inland
waterways, and ports. Automatic Identification System requirements
apply in general to larger commercial vessels, such as those 300 gross
tons or more, not to smaller vessels, such as most commercial fishing
boats or recreational boats.
[10] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3170.01G,
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 1, 2009).
[11] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[12] The National Strategy for Maritime Security, Sept. 2005.
[13] The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, Oct. 2005.
[14] Department of Defense, Department of Defense Maritime Domain
Awareness Joint Integrating Concept (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2009).
[15] The following components were requested to submit maritime domain
awareness plans to the DOD Executive Agent: the Departments of the
Navy and Air Force, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S.
European Command, U.S Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S.
Southern Command, Joint Forces Command, U.S. Transportation Command,
U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency.
[16] We assessed these two documents against GAO criteria for national
strategies. The criteria are cited in GAO, Combating Terrorism:
Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related
to Terrorism, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). Given the size and complexity of
DOD, a broad strategy for maritime domain awareness would be similar
in scope to a national strategy. Of all the documents DOD and its
components provided GAO, these were the two that were departmentwide
documents. Other related documents, such as the Department of the
Navy's roadmaps, strategies, and capability assessments and the
defense component maritime domain awareness plans are limited to that
particular component.
[17] See GAO, Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal
Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 1999); Performance Plans: Selected Approaches for Verification
and Validation of Agency Performance Information, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-99-139] (Washington, D.C.: July
30, 1999).
[18] Joint capability areas are collections of like DOD capabilities
functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy
development, investment decision making, capability portfolio
management, and capabilities-based force development and operational
planning. DOD Functional Capabilities Boards are organized around
joint capability areas and are responsible for ensuring that the joint
force is best served through the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System and acquisition process in each assigned functional
area
[19] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination Has
Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2008).
[20] DOD refers to these corporate processes as the Planning
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.
[21] This strategy did not include developed cost estimates that
typically are included in an investment strategy.
[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T], for
discussions on GAO criteria for risk management, see Homeland
Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-150T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12,
2002).
[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T].
[24] While the audit included visits to some joint DOD and Coast Guard
operation centers and meetings with Coast Guard officials, we
primarily focused on DOD entities involved with maritime domain
awareness and maritime homeland defense.
[End of section]
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