Defense Logistics

In Process

The Army uses AWPS to generate reports on a variety of workload and workforce issues at its industrial activities located throughout the United States, but the accuracy of the reports varies. As we previously reported, information must be accurate in order for it to be useful in decision making. Some AWPS reports--such as those used to monitor the status of efforts to repair equipment and to assess whether the Army is maintaining a core logistics capability--are accurate, and Army users express satisfaction with the reports. Other AWPS reports--specifically, those reports that are used to forecast workload at Army depots--are substantially inaccurate. For example, we reviewed the workload forecast reports for all five Army maintenance depots in February 2011, and found that the workload forecasted for the depots was higher than the workforce that was actually needed to complete the anticipated work. These AWPS reports overestimated the workforce actually needed by amounts ranging from 1,500 resources per day to 200,000 resources per day. Consistent with findings from our prior reports, we determined that these inaccurate AWPS reports are a result of inaccuracies in data that AWPS receives from LMP. Army officials stated that they are continuing to correct the underlying data inaccuracies, and in May 2011, they provided us AWPS reports that indicate slight declines in the overestimation at some of the five depots, but the workload forecast reports continue to estimate more workforce than is needed to complete ongoing and anticipated work at all five Army depots. Without accurate information, the Army's ability to use AWPS to serve as a standard Army-wide manpower system and to link its industrial facility workload demands to its workforce requirements is limited. The Army does not have a coordinated strategy for AWPS development and implementation. At present, the users and oversight of AWPS are dispersed among several Army entities. Our prior work has shown that strategic planning is the foundation for achieving desired results. However, the Army has not maintained or updated the AWPS master plan since 2002. Moreover, the Army is not following its original master plan, and certain AWPS capabilities are no longer being developed or used. Through 2010, the Army has spent more than $63 million to develop and sustain AWPS, and expects to spend another $22.75 million through 2012. One reason that the Army has not submitted the required reports or developed a strategic plan for AWPS is because the Army's oversight of AWPS is fragmented. For example, several Army organizations are pursuing developments in AWPS, but officials from these organizations told us that they were not responsible for providing overall oversight of the system. Even without a strategy guiding AWPS implementation and with fragmented oversight, the Army nevertheless intends to use AWPS in the future and is continuing development of the system, but the end point for AWPS development is unknown. Until the Army develops a long-term strategy guiding the development and implementation of AWPS, the Army will not have assurance that AWPS is meeting its objectives, and the Army will be unable to inform Congress on its progress. To improve the accuracy and efficiency of the Army plans for utilizing its industrial facility workforce, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take two actions: (1) Identify which Army organization is responsible for the overall oversight of AWPS. (2) Report--as required by law--to Congress annually on the implementation of the system's master plan, and specifically address any changes made to the master plan.