Iraq and Afghanistan
Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to Support the Advising Mission
Gao ID: GAO-11-760 August 2, 2011
In Process
Army guidance identifies key characteristics of the augmented BCT concept, such as how advisors are to be organized, commanded, and supported. For example, BCT commanders are to organize the advisors into teams, with other necessary resources being provided to the teams by the brigade. The theater commander determines the specific numbers and types of advisors based upon the operational environment and mission requirements. BCTs are envisioned to exercise command of advisor teams and provide support such as specialized personnel, equipment, and transportation and security. However, it is recognized that BCTs may have other priorities and must balance the demand for resources between the advising mission and other missions. The Army has deployed augmented BCTs in response to theater commanders' requests, but units have faced some challenges because commanders did not always set clear priorities between the advising mission and other missions or define specific requirements for how the BCTs should support the advising mission. For example, theater commanders did not require that advisor teams include specialized personnel, such as logisticians or intelligence officers. Because the BCTs already have high demand for these personnel, the brigades are challenged to meet the advisors' requirements for those same personnel. As a result, some advising teams told GAO that they were limited in their ability to advise in some specialty areas or that they may be advising Iraqi and Afghan security forces in functional areas where the advisors have little or no experience. Also, theater commanders' requests did not always specify command relationships. As a result, in some cases, advisors were reassigned to the control of a division or a brigade that they had not trained and deployed with, which disrupted the unity of command envisioned under the augmented BCT concept. The use of augmented BCTs has decreased the total number of advisor personnel required for the advising mission, but increased requirements for field grade officers, already in short supply. According to Army officials, as a result of these shortages, the Army has faced challenges meeting the requirement to provide field grade advisors at least 45 days prior to the brigades' mission rehearsal exercise. In many cases, advisors did not join the brigades until after the exercise, hindering their integration into the BCTs and complicating efforts to establish support and command structures. Some officials suggested that it would be helpful if at least two or three of the highest-ranking advisors arrived significantly earlier than currently required in order to facilitate integration. Moreover, GAO found that augmented BCTs are organizing their advisors into smaller numbers of larger teams than envisioned in the theater commander requirements. As a result, augmented BCTs may not need the number and rank of advisors currently required by those requests. GAO recommends that theater commands assess and refine, as appropriate, advisor requirements and define advisor support and command structures. GAO also recommends that the Army provide certain advisor personnel to brigades earlier in pre-deployment training. DOD concurred with the recommendations.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Sharon L. Pickup
Team:
Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management
Phone:
(202) 512-9619
GAO-11-760, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to Support the Advising Mission
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
August 2011:
Iraq And Afghanistan:
Actions Needed to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to Support the
Advising Mission:
GAO-11-760:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-760, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Developing capable Iraqi and Afghan security forces is a key component
of the U.S. military effort in Iraq and Afghanistan and, in 2009, the
Army began augmenting brigade combat teams (BCT) with advisor
personnel to advise the host nation security forces in these
countries. House Armed Services Committee report 111-491 directed GAO
to report on the Army‘s plans to augment BCTs to perform advising
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This report (1) identifies the key
characteristics of the augmented BCT concept; (2) assesses the extent
to which the Army has provided augmented BCTs, and what challenges, if
any, these units have faced; and (3) assesses the extent to which
requirements for augmented BCTs have impacted overall Army personnel
requirements, including the Army‘s ability to provide advisor
personnel. GAO examined augmented BCT doctrine and guidance, analyzed
advisor requirements, reviewed after-action reviews and lessons
learned from augmented BCTs, and interviewed Army, theater command,
and augmented BCT officials.
What GAO Found:
Army guidance identifies key characteristics of the augmented BCT
concept, such as how advisors are to be organized, commanded, and
supported. For example, BCT commanders are to organize the advisors
into teams, with other necessary resources being provided to the teams
by the brigade. The theater commander determines the specific numbers
and types of advisors based upon the operational environment and
mission requirements. BCTs are envisioned to exercise command of
advisor teams and provide support such as specialized personnel,
equipment, and transportation and security. However, it is recognized
that BCTs may have other priorities and must balance the demand for
resources between the advising mission and other missions.
The Army has deployed augmented BCTs in response to theater commanders‘
requests, but units have faced some challenges because commanders did
not always set clear priorities between the advising mission and other
missions or define specific requirements for how the BCTs should
support the advising mission. For example, theater commanders did not
require that advisor teams include specialized personnel, such as
logisticians or intelligence officers. Because the BCTs already have
high demand for these personnel, the brigades are challenged to meet
the advisors‘ requirements for those same personnel. As a result, some
advising teams told GAO that they were limited in their ability to
advise in some specialty areas or that they may be advising Iraqi and
Afghan security forces in functional areas where the advisors have
little or no experience. Also, theater commanders‘ requests did not
always specify command relationships. As a result, in some cases,
advisors were reassigned to the control of a division or a brigade
that they had not trained and deployed with, which disrupted the unity
of command envisioned under the augmented BCT concept.
The use of augmented BCTs has decreased the total number of advisor
personnel required for the advising mission, but increased
requirements for field grade officers, already in short supply.
According to Army officials, as a result of these shortages, the Army
has faced challenges meeting the requirement to provide field grade
advisors at least 45 days prior to the brigades‘ mission rehearsal
exercise. In many cases, advisors did not join the brigades until
after the exercise, hindering their integration into the BCTs and
complicating efforts to establish support and command structures. Some
officials suggested that it would be helpful if at least two or three
of the highest-ranking advisors arrived significantly earlier than
currently required in order to facilitate integration. Moreover, GAO
found that augmented BCTs are organizing their advisors into smaller
numbers of larger teams than envisioned in the theater commander
requirements. As a result, augmented BCTs may not need the number and
rank of advisors currently required by those requests.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that theater commands assess and refine, as
appropriate, advisor requirements and define advisor support and
command structures. GAO also recommends that the Army provide certain
advisor personnel to brigades earlier in pre-deployment training. DOD
concurred with the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-760] or key
components. For more information, contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-
9619 or pickups@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Army Has Identified the Key Characteristics of the Augmented BCT
Concept:
Army Is Deploying Augmented BCTs to Iraq and Afghanistan, but Some
Challenges Exist:
Use of Augmented BCTs Has Alleviated Some Personnel Strains while
Increasing Requirements for Field Grade Officers:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Command Organizations and Offices Contacted During Our Review:
Abbreviations:
BCT: Brigade Combat Team:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FORSCOM: U.S. Army Forces Command:
HRC: U.S. Army Human Resources Command:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 2, 2011:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Key components of the U.S. military effort in Iraq and Afghanistan
include developing capable host nation security forces and
facilitating the transition of security responsibility to the host
nations.[Footnote 1] Prior to 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD)
relied on hundreds of small training and transition teams
(collectively known as "transition teams") made up of personnel from
all of the military services to advise and mentor Iraqi and Afghan
security forces. However, filling the personnel requirements of the
transition teams was difficult for the Army and the use of these teams
led to command and control challenges, since they operated separately
from major combat units.
To help alleviate these difficulties, in 2009, the Army shifted its
approach and, in coordination with theater commanders, began replacing
many of the individual transition teams with brigade combat teams
(BCT) augmented by advisor personnel, referred to in this report as
"augmented BCTs." Under this concept, the Army envisioned that
augmenting brigades would enable them to execute the advising mission,
as well as their combat missions. Among the intended benefits of this
strategy was the intent to make it easier for the Army to fill the
requirements for trainers, since the number of individually sourced
advisors for the augmented brigades would be smaller than the number
of individually sourced personnel needed for all of the transition
teams.[Footnote 2] In addition, it would also achieve unity of command
over the advising mission, with both the mission and the advisor
personnel being under the command and control of the brigades.
The House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a proposed bill
for the fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.
5136) directed us to report on the Army's plans to augment BCTs to
perform advising missions and on the use of such augmented brigades to
support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 3] To address
this requirement, this report: (1) identifies the key characteristics
of the Army's concept for augmenting BCTs with personnel to support
advising missions; (2) assesses the extent to which the Army has
provided augmented BCTs for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
what challenges, if any, these units have faced in implementing the
concept; and (3) assesses the extent to which the requirements for
augmented BCTs have impacted overall Army personnel requirements,
including the Army's ability to provide advisor personnel to BCTs in
required time frames.
To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed doctrine and guidance from
the Army and theater commanders, examined the training requirements
and program of instruction for the advising mission, and analyzed the
manning requirements for augmented BCTs, with specific focus on the
leadership augment. We also reviewed selected mission briefs, after
action reviews, task organization, and lessons learned from deployed
and redeployed augmented BCTs, dating back to 2009. Additionally, we
examined personnel data, also dating back to 2009. Finally, we met
with, among others, officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Department of the Army, U.S. Central Command, Army Human
Resources Command, Army Forces Command, U.S. Forces--Iraq, U.S.
Forces--Afghanistan, and various redeployed and deployed augmented
BCTs and division headquarters in the United States, Iraq, and
Afghanistan.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 through August 2011
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
contains additional information about our scope and methodology.
Background:
Security force assistance--the effort to develop capable host nation
security forces--is a key component of the U.S. efforts to create
sustainable security in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The goal of this
mission is to build partner capability and improve the security
situation such that, over time, U.S. forces and partnered foreign
security forces can collectively set the conditions to defeat common
threats and ultimately achieve strategic success. The Army's field
manual on security force assistance recognizes that this is not a new
mission but also states that in the current operational environment,
security force assistance is no longer an additional duty but is now a
core competency of the Army. It is part of the full spectrum of
military operations, meaning it can be conducted across the spectrum
of conflict, from stable peace to general war. The field manual also
notes that security force assistance can include both advising and
partnering to develop competent and capable foreign security forces.
[Footnote 4]
* Advising. Advising is the primary type of security force assistance
and is the use of influence to teach, coach, and advise while working
by, with, and through the foreign security force. Advising helps
foreign security forces conduct independent decision making and
operations, and advisors may also provide foreign security forces with
direct access to joint and multinational capabilities, such as air
support, artillery, medical evacuation, and intelligence.
* Partnering. In partnering, the U.S. attaches units to host nation
units at various levels in order to leverage the strengths of both
U.S. and foreign security forces. Partnered units should establish
combined cells for intelligence, operations, planning, and
sustainment. While effective coordination is always required and
initial efforts may require completely fused efforts, foreign security
forces should eventually build the capability and capacity to conduct
all efforts autonomously.
Advising and partnering, while complementary, are distinct activities
that can be performed simultaneously, sequentially, or in combination.
U.S. units, such as Army BCTs, are partnering with the Iraqi and
Afghan security forces. Examples include U.S. battalions conducting
combined route clearance missions or manning combined checkpoints with
host nation military units in their area of operations. The Army's
field manual notes that as a foreign security force's capabilities
mature, the echelon and degree of partnering decrease. For example, a
U.S. Army battalion may initially partner with a foreign security
force battalion, but as the foreign security force matures, a U.S.
Army battalion may partner at a higher echelon such as with a foreign
security force division while the U.S. battalion's subordinate
companies may partner with the foreign security force battalions.
Like partnering, advising also can occur at various echelons of the
foreign security force with the echelon of focus changing as foreign
security forces mature. However, brigades have only recently assumed
the advising mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, prior to
2009 and 2010, respectively, the advising mission was conducted
primarily with transition teams. These transition teams did not exist
as units in any of the services' force structures and were instead
comprised of company-and field-grade officers and senior non-
commissioned officers who were centrally identified and individually
selected based on rank and specialty.[Footnote 5] For the Army alone,
the number of individually sourced advisors--individually sourced
advisors are those identified by Army Human Resources Command and
assigned to transition teams--required to fill the transition teams in
Iraq and Afghanistan at any one time totaled about 8,000 personnel. As
we have previously reported, the demand for these leaders created
challenges for the services because the leaders were generally pulled
from other units or commands, which then were left to perform their
missions while undermanned.[Footnote 6] In addition, the transition
teams operated externally to the major combat units in their area of
operations and reported to a different command structure, which led to
a lack of unity of command that complicated coordination and
communication between the transition teams and the combat units.
The Army developed the concept of augmenting BCTs with specialized
personnel to execute the advising mission, in part, as a means of
alleviating these challenges. The replacement of transition teams with
augmented BCTs was intended to mitigate strain on the Army by reducing
the number of personnel who would have to be individually sourced by
the Army Human Resources Command for the security force assistance
advising mission, since the advisors would be able to leverage the
capabilities of the existing BCTs for support functions, thus
requiring fewer specially sourced individuals for the mission.
Augmented BCTs also were intended to improve command and control over
the mission by placing both the mission and personnel assigned to the
mission under a single brigade commander.
The Army Has Identified the Key Characteristics of the Augmented BCT
Concept:
In May 2009, the Army issued its Field Manual, Security Force
Assistance, which, among other things, identifies the key
characteristics of the augmented BCT concept and offers guidance on
the roles and responsibilities of augmented BCTs performing security
force assistance advising missions. In June 2009, the Army also issued
The Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance Handbook
[Footnote 7] which, among other things, is intended to provide a
useful summary of the Army's current security force assistance
doctrine and give commanders a snapshot of the key elements of this
mission. Taken as a whole, this guidance reinforces key
characteristics of the augmented BCT advising mission, such as how
advisors are to be task organized, the importance of clear command and
control relationships, the types of personnel capabilities that should
be considered when defining augment requirements, and the need to
support advisor personnel with resources from the BCT.
* Task organization: The BCT commander organizes the advisor augment
personnel into advisor teams based on advising mission requirements in
his area of operations. These advisor teams may be formed from organic
resources from the brigade, external augmentation, or a combination of
these.
* Command and control: The BCT commander has command and control
authority over the advisor personnel and advisor teams. The Army
handbook notes the advantage of the advisor teams being under the
command of the augmented BCT commander, with this unity of command
resulting in a unity of effort and purpose.
* Augmentation requirements: The field manual provides a basic
conceptual design for augmentation, which can include personnel
capabilities such as combat advisors, military police, or legal
personnel. According to the field manual, the theater commander is to
determine the precise mix of forces and augment capabilities--
including the specific numbers and types of advisors--required for
augmented BCTs in his area of operations, based upon the operational
environment and mission requirements. As advising tasks change in
response to the evolving needs of the host nation security force, the
theater commander can re-tailor the augmentation (i.e., the specific
numbers and types of advisors) provided to successive BCTs,
accordingly.
* BCT support of advisors: The field manual notes that the advisor
teams may need resources from the brigade for support functions, such
as specialized personnel, equipment, transportation, and security.
This would allow the advisor teams to stay focused on advising. The
handbook acknowledges, though, that the brigades may have other
mission priorities in addition to security force assistance. Although
the augmented BCTs are specially resourced with advisor personnel to
advise, assist, and mentor the Iraqi and Afghan security forces, the
brigades still must balance the security force assistance advising
mission with other brigade missions.
The security force assistance field manual also addresses the training
that should be received by soldiers assigned to security force
assistance missions. The Army has tasked the 162nd Infantry Training
Brigade to provide advisor augment personnel with specialized advisor
training on topics such as language and culture, host nation
government and security forces, cross-cultural communication, and
rapport building as part of their pre-deployment training. The program
also includes leadership engagement scenarios where advisor team
leaders engage with role players in simulated exchanges and
opportunities for the advisors and brigade and battalion leadership to
conduct combined planning exercises with simulated host nation
security force leadership. The final stage of pre-deployment training
for the augmented BCT is the mission rehearsal exercise, through which
the advisor personnel and the BCT are expected to exercise the
augmented BCT concept as an integrated unit.[Footnote 8] In addition
to participating in combat and advising mission exercises, the
scenario is intended to enable the BCT and its advisors the
opportunity to create advisor teams and establish the key command and
control and support structures necessary for executing the mission in
theater.
Army Is Deploying Augmented BCTs to Iraq and Afghanistan, but Some
Challenges Exist:
The Army has deployed augmented BCTs in response to theater
commanders' requests; however, these units have faced challenges
because theater commanders' guidance did not always clearly define how
these units were to perform key aspects of the augmented BCT concept
and theater commanders' requests did not include some requirements
needed to support the advising mission, given the brigades' resource
limitations. As a result, brigade commanders have faced challenges
determining how to prioritize their resources when supporting multiple
missions in addition to the advising mission and providing specialized
personnel, equipment, transportation, and security for the advisors.
In addition, augmented BCTs and their assigned advisor personnel have
sometimes lacked the unity of command envisioned under the Army's
augmented BCT concept.
The Army Has Deployed Augmented BCTs to Iraq and Afghanistan Based on
Theater Commanders' Requests:
In 2009 and 2010, U.S. Central Command, on behalf of theater
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, submitted requests for augmented
BCTs for ongoing operations. In May 2009, the theater commander for
Iraq requested forces for the augmentation of Iraq-bound BCTs with 48
field grade officers specially trained as advisors to execute the
security force assistance advising mission. Likewise, in March 2010,
the theater commander for Afghanistan submitted a request for forces
for augmented BCTs that would each be augmented with a package of 48
advisor personnel--24 field grade officers and 24 non-commissioned
officers. Both requests envisioned that the 48 advisor personnel would
be organized into 24 two-man advisor teams and that the teams would
receive all necessary support--including additional specialized
personnel, equipment, and transportation and security support--from
the brigades.
The Army has been able to deploy augmented brigades to Iraq and
Afghanistan since August 2009 and June 2010, respectively, in
accordance with theater commanders' requests. As of June 2011, there
were six augmented BCTs operating in Iraq and nine in Afghanistan. The
Army intends for all future BCTs deploying to Afghanistan to be
augmented BCTs.
Augmented BCTs Have Faced Challenges Allocating Resources across
Multiple Missions and Supporting Advisor Teams:
Augmented BCTs have faced challenges allocating resources across
missions and providing support to enable the advising mission because
theater commanders did not always set clear priorities, ultimately
leading to challenges for these units. Specifically, augmented BCTs
have sometimes had difficulty allocating resources between the
advising mission and other missions, such as counterinsurgency
operations; advisor teams have sometimes lacked the appropriate
specialized personnel and equipment to conduct the advising mission;
and advisor teams have not always received consistent transportation
and security support from augmented BCTs to enable the advising
mission. Each of these challenges is discussed below.
Augmented BCTs Were Not Always Given Clear Priorities for Allocating
Resources between Advising and Other Missions:
Army guidance for security force assistance recognizes that augmented
BCT commanders consider the extent of threats, combined with resource
limitations, in order to set priorities, which would include
determining the degree to which BCT resources can be allocated to
support the advising mission. For example, augmented BCTs in Iraq and
Afghanistan must balance their requirements to support the advising
mission with other operational requirements, such as counterinsurgency
operations, partnering with host nation security forces, or performing
missions such as conducting checkpoints. Army officials told us that,
in the absence of other guidance from theater commanders, in kinetic
combat environments, such as Afghanistan, augmented BCT commanders
naturally prioritize the combat mission and direct their resources
that way. According to Army officials, the augmented BCT concept was
initially intended to be introduced to an operating environment after
major combat operations were concluded. This would make more of the
resources of the augmented BCTs available to support the advising
mission. When augmented BCTs first deployed to Iraq in 2009, the Iraqi
Security Forces were assuming greater responsibility for combat
operations and Iraqi forces have had the primary responsibility for
security since 2010. Iraq theater command officials told us that
advising the Iraqi Security Forces is the primary effort of U.S.
military forces in Iraq, including augmented BCTs. In contrast, U.S.
military forces in Afghanistan are still conducting counterinsurgency
operations in a combat environment and the theater commander in
Afghanistan has not specified the priority of the advising mission for
the augmented BCTs, relative to counterinsurgency operations. The
Afghanistan theater commander's request for augmented BCTs noted that
these BCTs would be responsible for both advising and
counterinsurgency operations, but provided no guidance as to how the
brigades should balance resources and make trade-offs between the two
different mission sets. Augmented BCTs in both theaters, though, had
challenges balancing resources between the advising mission and other
missions.
The theater commanders' requests for both Iraq and Afghanistan
envisioned the BCTs executing the advising mission by organizing their
advisors into 24 two-man teams drawing additional support from the
BCT. According to officials from several of these augmented BCTs,
though, the brigades do not have enough organic resources to support
24 dispersed teams while still preserving enough of their resources to
conduct other missions. For instance, officials from one augmented
Stryker brigade--Stryker brigades are significantly larger than other
brigades--told us that the brigade could only organize into a maximum
of 12 to 15 dispersed advisor teams using a company as the basis for
support while still addressing other mission requirements. Given their
resource limitations and the need to carry out other missions,
augmented BCT officials told us that they organized their advisors
into a smaller number of teams often consisting of more than two
advisors. For example,
* In Iraq, one augmented BCT that deployed with 43 advisors organized
them into five different advisor teams, while another augmented BCT
organized its 46 advisors into eight teams.
* In Afghanistan, one augmented BCT organized the 44 advisors that it
deployed with into 15 teams, while another augmented BCT organized its
48 advisors into nine advisor teams.
According to some of these officials, organizing the advisors in this
manner was intended to enable the brigade to better support the
advising mission while still retaining the capacity to meet other
mission requirements. However, we found that some of the augmented
BCTs that we visited faced challenges supporting their advisor teams,
regardless of the number of teams they had.
Augmented BCTs Sometimes Faced Challenges Providing Specialized
Personnel and Equipment for the Advising Mission:
The Army's augmented BCT concept and the theater commanders' augmented
BCT requests assumed that any specialty personnel required by the
advisor teams--such as logisticians and intelligence personnel--would
be pulled from the brigade. The theater commanders' requests for
advisors therefore do not include requirements for the advisors to
have any specialized capabilities, despite the fact that advisors are
frequently advising Iraqi and Afghan security forces in specialized
areas. In contrast, the transition teams were often comprised of
personnel with specialist capabilities in areas such as intelligence,
logistics, or communications. According to the security force
assistance field manual, the composition of the advisor teams is
subject to objectives (e.g., the type of training to be provided) and
conditions (e.g., the security environment), and BCT commanders tailor
advisor teams to match those objectives and conditions. For example,
the BCT commander, in coordination with the advisor personnel, could
identify specialized personnel from the BCT who would be assigned to
support the advisors. Because such personnel are also in high demand
within the brigade, though, the brigade is expected to make trade-offs
and prioritize its missions, including the advising mission. However,
in the absence of advisor teams receiving specialized personnel from
the brigade or the advisors themselves being specialists, some
advising teams lacked specialized capabilities. For example, some
advising teams told us that they were limited in their ability to
advise in certain specialty areas and that advisor personnel may be
advising Iraqi and Afghan leadership in functional areas where they
have little or no experience. In one case, a field grade officer
advisor in Iraq who had no prior intelligence experience was tasked
with helping the Iraqis set up an intelligence fusion center.
Since advisor teams are not regularly receiving specialized personnel
from the brigades, Army and augmented BCT officials told us that
including advisors with specialty capabilities as part of the
augmented BCT advisor requirements would be very beneficial for the
advising mission. The Army has gathered feedback from nine augmented
BCT commanders and the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade, among others,
that identified the need for logisticians to be a part of the advisor
packages. The Army's feedback also identified the need for military
police, military intelligence, and other specialties in augmentation
packages. In order to mitigate the challenges that the augmented BCTs
face with shortages of specialist personnel, the Army currently has an
effort underway to examine the advisor requirements and determine the
need to tailor them to include more specialized capabilities. The
results of this effort have not been finalized, though, so its impact
cannot yet be determined.
The theater commanders' requests for the augmented BCTs assumed that
the advisors would get all of their equipment from the BCTs. As was
the case with specialized personnel, the theater commanders' requests
did not establish specific advisor equipment requirements for the Army
to fill, with the exception of some individual weapons and other small
items. As a result, some augmented BCTs experienced challenges
providing personal and operational equipment to the advisors both
prior to and after deploying to theater since all advisor equipment
had to come from the brigades' existing stocks. For example, augmented
BCT and advisor officials told us that, prior to deploying, the
advisors joining the brigades expected to have equipment such as
personal computers with both unclassified and classified capabilities
as well as office space to work from, but that some of the brigades
had difficulties providing these things without limiting the access of
others in the brigade.
Theater command and augmented BCT officials told us that, once in
theater, advisors sometimes lacked personal equipment, such as
navigation equipment, personnel locators, and cell phones.
Additionally, augmented BCTs sometimes lacked the operational
equipment necessary to support advisor teams at dispersed locations.
Iraq theater command officials told us that some augmented BCTs had
submitted requests for additional communications equipment to support
advisor teams at dispersed locations because the brigades did not
deploy with the number of communications systems necessary to support
all of the advisor teams that needed to operate separately from the
brigade. In instances where additional operational equipment for
advisors was not available, equipment shortages for advisors could
impact the way that brigades organized for the advising mission. For
example, officials from one augmented BCT in Iraq told us that the
brigade only had seven command and control communications nodes, which
limited the number of dispersed locations where the brigade could
operate. While the brigade mitigated that limitation as much as
possible by co-locating units and advisor teams, the shortage of key
communications equipment, in part, limited the brigade's ability to
support a larger number of advisor teams.
Augmented BCTs Sometimes Faced Challenges Providing Transportation and
Security Support for the Advising Mission:
The theater commanders' requests for the augmented BCTs envisioned
that the advisor teams would get their required support from the
brigades to which they were attached, but did not define the minimum
level of support that the brigades were to provide to the advisor
teams. Augmented BCT officials and advisors told us that the augmented
BCTs are responsible for making determinations regarding the
allocation of support to the advisor teams, balancing those needs
against the needs of other missions. According to augmented BCT
officials, advisor teams often operate away from larger combat units
or established bases and could therefore require up to a platoon or
company of soldiers for support. In the absence of guidance on the
level of support that the augmented BCTs were to provide, the level of
support that the augmented BCTs we visited provided to their advisor
teams varied, depending on the operating environment and the
priorities of the BCT commander. For example,
* Officials from an augmented BCT that had redeployed from Iraq told
us that, once in theater, the BCT received a requirement to secure a
number of joint checkpoints with the Iraqi Security Forces, which
limited its ability to provide transportation and security assets to
the number of advisor teams that it had initially planned to support.
* Advisors from an augmented BCT in Afghanistan told us that the
advising mission was a low priority for the brigade and that the
brigade and its battalions had too many other requirements to provide
support to the advisor teams. Instead, the advisor teams relied on
nondedicated support from a separate military police company operating
in the area.
* Advisors from an augmented BCT in Afghanistan told us that there was
no official allocation of support resources within the brigade and, in
some cases, the support was haphazard and came from other units
outside the brigade.
Transportation and security support is considered to be critical for
the augmented BCT advisors' ability to execute the advising mission.
Some advisors told us that the level of dedicated transportation and
security support they received from the brigade directly impacted
their ability to meet with host nation security forces in order to
build relationships and advise the host nation security forces.
Augmented BCTs and Advisors Have Sometimes Lacked Unity of Command:
Augmented BCTs and their advisor personnel sometimes lacked the unity
of command envisioned under the Army's augmented BCT concept because
theater commanders did not always provide clear guidance on command
and control structures for the advisors. As a result, in some cases,
advisors were reassigned to be under the control of a division or a
brigade other than the one that they trained and deployed with.
According to Army guidance on security force assistance, advisor teams
require a clearly defined and structured chain of command under which
to operate, which alleviates confusion regarding who tasks or monitors
the teams' progress and ensures that advisor teams are supported. The
Army augmented BCT concept envisions the advisor teams being under the
command of the augmented BCT commander, with this unity of command
facilitating the integration of all aspects of the augmented BCT
mission. This was intended to address a challenge with the prior
transition teams, which operated independently from major combat units
and were overseen by higher headquarters at the division or theater
level. Iraq theater command, Army, and augmented BCT officials told us
that the unity of command is one of the primary benefits of the
augmented BCT concept.
The theater commander's request for augmented BCTs for Iraq included
direction on the intended command and control structure of the
advisors, but the request for augmented BCTs for Afghanistan did not
address this topic. Although the operational commander on the ground
may tailor the force as deemed necessary to meet mission requirements--
including changing command and control structures--the successful
implementation of the augmented BCT concept hinges significantly on
leveraging the resources of the BCT to support the advisors and
synchronizing the advise and assist mission as part of the overall
mission of the BCT. In addition, augmented BCTs we met with in both
Iraq and Afghanistan had planned and trained for their advising
mission consistent with the intention that advisors will act as a
synchronized force with established support and command and control
relationships and with the advisor teams being a part of the BCT. For
example, advisors and officials at the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade
told us that augmented BCT and advisor training focuses on the advisor
role as being part of the BCT. Augmented BCT officials also told us
that their final mission rehearsal exercises typically included
scenarios that allowed the BCT, including advisors, to exercise their
support and command and control relationships.
Absent guidance from theater commanders on advisor command and
control, we found several instances, particularly in Afghanistan,
where advisor personnel were diverted away from the augmented BCT with
which they had deployed. In such instances, division commanders
assumed control of the advisor teams and managed them as a division
resource, similar to how the prior transition teams were managed.
Those advisor teams were sometimes tasked for other advising missions
not linked to the augmented BCT to which they were initially attached,
or for other assignments, such as serving on division headquarters
staff. For example, in the operating area of one division in
Afghanistan,
* The division commander assumed control of all 48 advisors from a
National Guard augmented BCT and created three division level teams,
each focused on different areas of the security force assistance
mission. That National Guard BCT was then assigned advisor teams from
another augmented BCT and the National Guard also provided additional
field grade officers to allow the BCT to meet advising requirements in
its area of operations, since it had lost its original advisor
personnel.
* The division commander tasked a five-man advisor team from one of
the augmented BCTs to mentor the brigade of a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization partner and some individual advisor personnel to serve as
liaisons to the division.
Changes to the established command relationships between the brigades
and advisors after the units deploy can cause a range of challenges
for augmented BCTs and advisors. These include questions about how or
if the advisors' mission continues to fit with their parent augmented
BCT; how or if the advisors will continue to be supported by their
parent augmented BCT, particularly if the advisors and the BCT are
operating in different areas; and what the chain of command is for the
advisors.
Use of Augmented BCTs Has Alleviated Some Personnel Strains while
Increasing Requirements for Field Grade Officers:
Advisor requirements for augmented BCTs have decreased the total
number of individually sourced advisor personnel required for the
advising mission, but have increased Army personnel requirements for
field grade officers, already in short supply. According to Army
officials, as a result of field grade officer shortages, the Army has
faced challenges meeting the requirement to provide field grade
advisors to the augmented BCTs at least 45 days prior to the brigades'
mission rehearsal exercise. Since augmented BCTs have been forming
fewer advisor teams than initially intended by theater commanders'
requests, augmented BCTs may not need to be sourced with as many total
advisor personnel or such large numbers of field grade advisors.
Shift to Augmented BCTs Has Decreased the Total Number of Advisors and
Alleviated Personnel Strain on Some Ranks, but Increased the Demand
for Field Grade Officers:
Moving from transition teams to augmented BCTs to advise the Iraqi and
Afghan security forces, driven, in part, by the need to address some
of the challenges the Army faced in filling requirements for
transition teams, has decreased the total number of advisors required
for the advising mission and alleviated the strain on certain ranks,
but increased the strain on others. Specifically, the shift to
augmented BCTs has:
* Decreased the total number of advisors required for the advising
mission because, rather than relying completely on transition teams
comprised of individually sourced personnel to man the advisor teams,
the augmented BCT concept envisions advisor teams led by advisor
augments (who are individually sourced) and further manned by pulling
additional personnel from the brigade, as needed;
* Alleviated the strain on the Army's pool of company grade officers
(e.g., Captains) and non-commissioned officers (e.g., Sergeants 1st
class) because these ranks were required in greater numbers on the
transition teams than the augmented BCTs; and:
* Increased requirements for field grade officer advisors, since the
ranks of the advisors required for augmented BCTs are generally higher
than the ranks of transition team personnel--particularly in Iraq,
where all advisors are field grade officers. For example, according to
Army Human Resources Command data, augmented BCT advisor requirements
increased demand for deployable field grade officers by 463 in fiscal
year 2010 and by 398 in the first two quarters of fiscal year 2011.
Deployable field grade officers were already in short supply prior to
the introduction of the augmented BCT requirements. For example,
taking into account requirements for augmented BCT advisor personnel,
Army Human Resources Command data showed that the Army had shortages
of 2,469 majors and 1,297 lieutenant colonels as of June 2011. To
manage these shortages, the Army has prioritized the units and
commands for sourcing personnel such that filling advisor requirements
for augmented BCTs is among the highest sourcing priorities. As a
result, Army Human Resources Command data showed that, as of October
2010, 97 percent of all advisor requirements for augmented BCTs were
ultimately filled. However, the high priority for the augmented BCT
advisor requirements, combined with the field grade officer shortages,
has, at times, resulted in the understaffing of field grade ranks in
other commands and units, such as U.S. Army Europe, Army Training and
Doctrine Command, and units in South Korea, among many others.
Army Has Been Challenged in Providing Advisors to the Augmented BCTs
within Specified Time Frames:
While the Army has been able to fill most requirements for augmented
BCT advisor personnel, it has not always been able to provide advisors
to the units within specified time frames. Army officials have told us
that Army execution orders for augmented BCTs require that advisors
join the augmented BCTs at least 45 days prior to the units' mission
rehearsal exercise. Army and augmented BCT officials have told us that
early advisor arrival is critical to integrating the advisors into the
unit, building advisor teams, and establishing key support and command
and control relationships between the advisor teams and the BCT.
Similarly, according to Army guidance, building the advisor teams as
early as possible facilitates cohesion and trust. Given the shift in
how the advising mission is being handled--from stand-alone transition
teams operating independently to advisors who are integrated with and
reliant on a BCT--these exercises help the augmented BCTs become
comfortable with their structure and facilitate their missions once
they are in theater.
However, Army Human Resources Command has had difficulty providing the
field grade officer advisors to the units being augmented in
accordance with the 45-day time line because they were challenged by
shortages of deployable field grade officers and changes in unit
theater arrival and mission rehearsal exercise dates for operational
reasons, which may shorten the time that Army Human Resources Command
has to identify personnel who meet the requirements. Many of the
augmented BCTs we met with did not receive the total number of advisor
personnel that they would deploy with until after the mission
rehearsal exercise. For example, one augmented BCT that we visited in
Afghanistan told us that, prior to its exercise, it had received only
six of its 24 non-commissioned officer advisors and none of its 24
field grade officer advisors, while another augmented BCT we visited
in Afghanistan had received only one of its 22 field grade officer
advisors that it ultimately deployed with prior to the exercise. In
both instances, the units were limited in their ability to organize
for and exercise the advising mission because they lacked the field
grade officers necessary to lead the advisor teams. While recent Iraq-
bound units have not received all of their advisors by the specified
report date, the deployed augmented BCTs that we visited in Iraq had
received most of their advisors--40 of 43 in one instance and 42 of 46
in the other--prior to their mission rehearsal exercises.
Some officials suggested that, given the challenge of providing all
the advisors to the augmented BCTs within specified time frames, it
would be helpful if at least two or three of the highest-ranking
advisors arrived significantly earlier than currently required to help
integrate the advisors into the BCT's mission and structure. For
example, officials from some augmented BCTs as well as the 162nd
Infantry Training Brigade suggested that the ideal would be for the
highest-ranking advisors to arrive at the unit by the time that key
brigade leadership planning events begin, such as the brigade's Leader
Training Program.[Footnote 9] These events typically occur as early as
90 days prior to the final mission rehearsal exercise. That would
enable those leaders to represent the advising mission during brigade
mission planning and to help mitigate some of the challenges related
to integrating advisors, particularly late-arriving advisors, into the
brigade. We met with an augmented BCT that received one of its highest-
ranking advisors well before the 45-day window and in time for the
brigade's major leadership events. As a result, this advisor was able
to integrate into the brigade's leadership and provide inputs on the
advising mission into the brigade's mission planning. The advisor was
also able to set up a structure for the other advisor personnel to
integrate into when they arrived, develop the advisor teams, and
facilitate the provision of equipment to advisors.
The Number and Size of Advisor Teams May Impact the Number and Rank of
Advisors Needed for the Advising Mission:
Theater requests for the augmented BCTs assumed that (1) each BCT's 48
advisors would form the base of 24 advising teams, and (2) all of the
field grade officer advisors would be team leaders or deputy team
leaders. However, as discussed above, augmented BCTs are sometimes
operating with a smaller number of advisor teams that are comprised of
a larger number of advisors. This could affect the necessary numbers
and rank structure of advisor personnel since, with a smaller number
of advisor teams being formed, the augmented BCTs may not need to be
sourced with as many advisors. Further, since not as many advisors are
serving as team chiefs or deputy team chiefs, BCTs may not need such
large numbers of field grade officers. Army and augmented BCT
officials have told us that rank is an important factor for advisors
in establishing credibility with the Afghan and Iraqi officers that
they are advising. However, with larger advising teams, the higher
rank structure may be of less importance as all advisors may not have
the leadership roles within the advisor teams that were envisioned
when the rank structure requirements were initially established.
Further, several augmented BCT officials told us that capable company
grade officers, particularly when they are introduced by and lent the
weight of the brigade and battalion leadership, can establish the
necessary credibility with host nation leaders. Moreover, the
augmented BCTs in Afghanistan are executing the advising mission with
half as many field grade officers as augmented BCTs in Iraq--the
request for augmented BCTs in Iraq required 48 field grade officers,
versus 24 field grade officers in the request for augmented BCTs in
Afghanistan.[Footnote 10] Given the identified field grade officer
shortages that the Army is facing, re-assessing current requirements
for field grade officer advisors is important to ensure that the Army
is not being strained unnecessarily.
Conclusions:
Developing capable Iraqi and Afghan security forces is a key component
of the U.S. military effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. Shifting from the
use of individual transition teams comprised of advisors that operated
somewhat independently to augmenting BCTs with advisor personnel that
are an integral part of the BCT is a significant change in the way
Army units perform the advising mission. As the Army continues to
deploy augmented BCTs and theater commanders gain operational
experience with these types of units, some challenges are emerging
that suggest further refinements are needed to achieve greater unity
of command and other benefits envisioned by the Army in moving to the
augmented BCT concept. By reassessing needs and clarifying key
requirements such as the appropriate number, rank, and capabilities of
advisor personnel; the level of resources and support that the BCT
should provide; and how the BCT should prioritize and balance demands
associated with the advising mission with the demands of other BCT
missions, the Army and theater commanders will enhance the ability of
the BCTs to more effectively command and support the advisors. In
addition, assessing and validating the appropriate composition of the
advisor augment will ensure that the Army is providing the right mix
of personnel needed for the advising mission. Lastly, integrating
advisor personnel into the BCT is an important element of the
augmented BCT concept and requires advisor and other BCT personnel to
train together. Arranging for key leaders from the advisor augment to
arrive in sufficient time to participate in leadership planning events
would facilitate integration of the advisors and enable the units to
maximize the benefits of the time spent in training.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To enhance the ability of the augmented BCTs to support the advising
mission and to facilitate the integration of advisor personnel into
pre-deployment training, GAO is making the following three
recommendations.
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
Secretary of the Army and U.S. Central Command, direct that theater
commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan:
* Assess their needs for how advisor teams should be structured and
supported and, based on this assessment, ensure that any future
requests for augmented BCTs clearly define related requirements,
including the number of advisors, ranks of advisors, capabilities of
advisors, and equipment for advisors.
* Clearly define, in guidance to divisions and augmented BCTs, the
relative priority of the advising mission; the minimum level of
transportation and security support to be provided to the advisors;
and command and control relationships for augmented BCTs and their
advisors, including the level of command that has tasking authority
over and support responsibilities for the advisors.
We recommend that the Secretary of the Army revise existing guidance
to require that the highest-ranking field grade officer advisors join
the augmented BCTs in time to be present for major brigade leadership
planning events, such as the Leader Training Program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
three recommendations. Overall, DOD stated that it believes that the
information being sought in GAO's first two recommendations related to
more clearly defining requirements for advisors and the advising
mission is being provided through established processes. The full text
of DOD's written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with Secretary of the Army and U.S. Central Command,
direct that theater commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan assess their
needs for how advisor teams should be structured and supported and,
based on this assessment, ensure that any future requests for
augmented BCTs clearly define related requirements, including the
number of advisors, ranks of advisors, capabilities of advisors, and
equipment for advisors. In its comments, DOD stated that combatant
commanders have provided and will continue to provide detailed
requests for the advising mission. DOD stated that the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army has directed that commanders provide assessment of
their needs regarding advisor team structure and support. DOD,
therefore, stated that it saw no need for the Secretary of Defense to
direct these actions. In our report, we acknowledge that the Army
currently has an effort underway to examine the advisor requirements.
As theater commanders revise their requirements to reflect the Army's
effort, we would expect that future requests for advising capabilities
would more clearly define specific requirements, such as specialized
advisor capabilities that are needed.
DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense, in consultation with Secretary of the Army and U.S. Central
Command, direct that theater commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan
clearly define the relative priority of the advising mission, the
minimum level of transportation and security support to be provided to
the advisors, and command and control relationships for augmented BCTs
and their advisors. In its comments, DOD stated that, as presented,
our recommendation may be too prescriptive and, in of itself,
impractical to implement. Specifically, DOD stated that our
recommendation suggests that the priority of the vast number of
mission requirements under the commander's responsibility are static
and can be determined void of any external factors. DOD stated that
the recommendation's intent is captured within existing departmental
practices. DOD noted that the Department's approach to determining
mission priorities is based upon a thorough understanding of its
strategic objectives within the area of operations. Based upon this
understanding, DOD stated the commander gives his guidance through
mission objectives and subsequent creation of operational plans. It
noted that the commander's ability to employ these plans, and thus
identify mission priorities and allocation of resources, remains
situation specific and environmentally dependent. DOD further stated
that, for similar reasons, the command and control relationships
within the BCT are situation dependent and are tailored based upon the
commander's requirements.
We agree that DOD has an approach for developing operational plans and
that commanders establish mission priorities and allocate resources
based on specific situations and operating environments. We also agree
that command and control relationships are situation dependent and
need to reflect commanders' requirements. As we state in our report,
the Army has worked with theater commanders to define the key
characteristics of augmented BCTs while leaving commanders the
discretion to tailor the force as needed, and has provided guidance,
accordingly. We do not agree, though, that our recommendation is too
prescriptive or impractical to implement. Specifically, during our
review, we found that in some cases, theater commanders did more
clearly define some aspects of the advising mission, while in other
cases they did not. In those latter cases, the lack of clarity led to
some challenges, including with establishing priorities and command
and control relationships. For example, as we state in our report,
Iraq theater command officials made it clear that advising the Iraqi
Security Forces was the primary mission of U.S. forces there, but the
Afghanistan theater command has not established the relative priority
for the advising mission. Likewise, we found that the theater
commander's request for augmented BCTs for Iraq included direction on
the intended command and control structure of the advisors, but that
the request for augmented BCTs for Afghanistan did not address this
topic. Clarifying key requirements for augmented BCTs, including how
the BCTs should prioritize and balance demands of the advising mission
with the demands of the other BCT missions, will enhance the ability
of the BCTs to more effectively command and support the advisors.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army
revise existing guidance to require that the highest-ranking field
grade officer advisors join the augmented BCTs in time to be present
for major brigade leadership planning events. DOD stated that the
Department of the Army agrees that maximum benefit is achieved when
the entire augment of advisors is available and prepared to
participate in both pre-deployment planning and training events.
However, due to the nature of advisor force requirements, DOD's
comments noted that there will be instances where the entire augment
is not available to participate. DOD stated that the Army will
maximize coordination, prioritization, and integration of highest-
ranking advisors to ensure participation in deployment planning and
training events.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. This report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9619 or by e-mail at pickups@gao.gov. Contact
information for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who
have made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix
III.
Signed by:
Sharon Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Army has developed its concept
for augmenting brigade combat teams (BCT) with additional personnel to
support security force assistance missions we reviewed Army guidance,
such as the Army field manual for security force assistance and the
Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance Handbook. We
also reviewed advisor and augmented BCT training materials from the
162nd Infantry Training Brigade. Further, we analyzed the 2009 and
2010 requests for forces for augmented BCTs that were submitted by
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) for ongoing operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan to document advisor personnel requirements for augmented
BCTs. We interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, CENTCOM, U.S. Special Operations Command, Joint Staff,
Headquarters Department of the Army, U.S. Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM), U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC), and the Army
Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Maneuver Center of
Excellence regarding the development of the augmented BCT concept,
including how the BCTs were to be augmented, how command and control
structures were intended to function, and what advantages, if any, the
concept afforded the Army and theater commanders. We interviewed
officials at the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade, as well as advisor
augments with redeployed and currently deployed augmented BCTs in Iraq
and Afghanistan in order to discuss the structure and content of the
advisor training program for advisor augments. We interviewed
officials at the Joint Readiness Training Center, as well as officials
with redeployed and currently deployed augmented BCTs, in order to
discuss the mission rehearsal exercise and its functionality for the
augmented BCT.
To determine the extent to which the Army has provided augmented BCTs
for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and what challenges, if any,
these units have faced in implementing the concept, we reviewed Army
unit deployment schedules, after action reviews and lessons learned
from redeployed augmented BCTs, and mission briefings from deployed
augmented BCTs and division commanders, dating back to 2009. We also
analyzed the above-mentioned requests for forces submitted by CENTCOM
for augmented BCTs to document advisor personnel and equipment
requirements for augmented BCTs and guidance provided by theater
commanders on augmented BCT and advisor task organization, advisor
support, advisor command and control, and augmented BCTs roles,
missions, and priorities. Additionally, we reviewed key documents
related to the advising mission and priorities from theater commanders
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, we conducted interviews with a
range of deployed and redeployed BCTs that had served or were serving
as augmented BCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. We interviewed augmented
BCT officials and advisor personnel regarding augmented BCT task
organization, advisor team formation, the integration of advisors into
the brigade, the suitability of advisor personnel capabilities, the
ability of the brigade to support advisor teams, the equipping
requirements for advisor augments, and the guidance received by the
brigade on the augmented BCTs' roles and missions. In addition, we met
with theater command-and division-level officials in Iraq and
Afghanistan to discuss the execution of the augmented BCT mission in
their respective theaters and areas of operation, and management of
and guidance provided to augmented BCTs on the advising mission. We
also interviewed officials at Headquarters Department of the Army,
CENTCOM, FORSCOM, and 162nd Infantry Training Brigade for their
perspectives on how the augmented BCT concept is being executed in
theater and any related challenges.
To determine the extent to which requirements for augmented BCTs have
impacted overall Army personnel requirements, including the Army's
ability to provide advisor personnel to BCTs in required time frames,
we examined data provided to us by HRC regarding Army shortfalls faced
in certain officer ranks currently and in coming years. We also
discussed with HRC officials how this data was calculated, including
the details of how they determined the fill rate for advisor
requirements, overall Army field grade officer shortages, and extent
to which requirements for augmented BCTs increased overall Army
requirements for field grade officers. We found this data to be
reliable for the purpose of determining the impact of advisor
requirements on overall Army personnel requirements. To gain an
understanding of the extent to which BCTs are experiencing late
arrival of advisor augment personnel, we conducted analysis of advisor
fill rate and arrival time data provided by HRC, FORSCOM and augmented
BCTs, dating back to 2009, and comparing such data against the arrival
timelines laid out in the requests for forces for each theater. We
also met with officials from Headquarters Department of the Army, HRC,
FORSCOM, Joint Forces Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Personnel and Readiness, 162nd Infantry Training Brigade, and
redeployed and currently deployed augmented BCTs to discuss the impact
of advisor personnel requirements on overall Army personnel
requirements, the Army's ability to provide authorized numbers of
augment personnel within the specified arrival time frames, and any
challenges faced as a result of the late arrival of advisor augments
to the BCTs to which they have been assigned.
Table 1 below identifies the organizations, offices, commands, and
units that we contacted during our review, including the units and
commands we met with in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Table 1: Command Organizations and Offices Contacted During Our Review:
Command organization or office:
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Office of Personnel and Readiness;
Location: Arlington, Virginia.
Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict;
Location: Arlington, Virginia.
Office of Policy--Force Development;
Location: Arlington, Virginia.
Unified Commands:
United States Joint Forces Command;
Location: Norfolk, Virginia.
United States Central Command;
Location: MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
United States Special Operations Command;
Location: MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.
Joint Staff:
Location: Arlington, Virginia.
United States Army:
Department of the Army Headquarters;
Location: Arlington, Virginia.
United States Army Forces Command;
Location: Fort McPherson, Georgia.
United States Army Central Command;
Location: Fort McPherson, Georgia.
Army Maneuver Center of Excellence;
Location: Fort Benning, Georgia.
United States Army Human Resources Command;
Location: Fort Knox, Kentucky.
United States Army Combined Arms Center;
Location: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Center for Army Lessons Learned;
Location: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
162nd Infantry Training Brigade;
Location: Fort Polk, Louisiana.
Redeployed Augmented BCTs[A]:
4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division;
Location: Fort Bliss, Texas.
2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division;
Location: Fort Stewart, Georgia.
1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division;
Location: Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
4th Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division;
Location: Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Commands and Units Deployed in Iraq:
Commands:
United States Forces - Iraq;
25th Infantry Division, United States Division - Central;
4th Infantry Division, United States Division - North;
BCTs:
2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division;
4th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division.
Commands and Units Deployed in Afghanistan:
Commands:
United States Forces - Afghanistan;
101st Airborne Division, Regional Command - East;
10th Mountain Division, Regional Command - South;
International Security Assistance Force Joint Command;
BCTs:
3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division;
1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division;
4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Division;
2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment;
2nd Brigade, 34th Infantry Division.
Other Joint Organizations:
Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance;
Location: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Joint Readiness Training Center;
Location: Fort Polk, Louisiana.
Source: GAO.
[A] We also met with officials formerly with the 3rd Brigade, 3rd
Infantry Division and 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division at their new
assignments to discuss their operational experiences as part of an
augmented BCT.
[End of table]
To perform its review, we reviewed an illustrative, non-generalizable
sample of redeployed and deployed augmented BCTs. We met with three of
the four augmented BCTs that had returned from Iraq and the only
augmented BCT that had returned from deployment in Afghanistan at the
time that we selected our sites for visits. We also met with deployed
augmented BCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as theater commands
and deployed division commands. We selected deployed BCTs for visits
based on where they were in their deployments (we aimed for BCTs that
were at the midpoints of their deployments so that they had been in
theater long enough to be familiar with their missions, but not yet at
the point where they were preparing to redeploy). We worked with
theater commands in Iraq and Afghanistan to arrange visits or meetings
with deployed BCTs that fit our criteria, making adjustments as needed
because of security, transportation, or weather issues. Ultimately, we
met with personnel from two augmented BCTs and two divisions in Iraq
and personnel from five augmented BCTs and two divisions in
Afghanistan.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2010 through August 2011
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
[DOD's comments were provided July 27, 2011]
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Personnel And Readiness:
4000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000:
July 27, 2011:
Ms. Sharon L. Pickup:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Ms. Pickup,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-11-760, "Iraq And Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance
the Ability of Brigades to Support the Advising Mission," dated June
23, 2011 (GAO Code 351514).
The Department's position is that the information sought through the
first two of the three recommendations being made by GAO is being
provided through established processes. For the third recommendation,
the Department agrees that, in lieu of the entire augment, the highest-
ranking advisors should join the Augmented Brigade Combat Teams prior
to any major leadership planning event. The complete Department of
Defense response to the recommendations accompanies this letter.
Additionally, the Office of Security Review has completed its review
of the draft report. No classified or sensitive defense-related
information that could result in harm to national security was found
and there is no Department of Defense objection to the report's public
release.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on this draft
report. Please direct any questions or comments you may have to
Captain George Parisi, at (703) 693-6263 and george.parisi@osd.mil.
Signed by:
Jeffrey Lemmons, RADM, USN:
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness):
Enclosure: As Stated.
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report ” Dated June 23, 2011:
GAO-11-760 (GAO Code 351514):
"Iraq And Afghanistan: Actions Needed To Enhance The Ability Of
Brigades To Support The Advising Mission"
Department Of Defense Response To The Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Army and U.S. Central Command,
direct that theater commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan assess their
needs for how advisor teams should be structured and supported and,
based upon this assessment, ensure that any future requests for
augmented brigade combat teams (BCTs) clearly define related
requirements, including the number of advisors, ranks of advisors,
capabilities of advisors, and equipment for advisors.
DOD Response: Concur with comment. Combatant Commanders have and will
continue to provide detailed requests for the advising mission.
Furthermore, the Vice Chief of the Army has directed that Commanders
provide assessment of their needs regarding advisor team structure and
support. Therefore, there is no need for the Secretary of Defense to
direct these actions.
Recommendation 2; The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Army and U.S. Central Command,
direct that theater commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly define,
in guidance to divisions and augmented BCTs, the relative priority of
the advising mission; the minimum level of transportation and security
support to be provided to the advisors; and command and control
relationships for augmented BCTs and their advisors, including the
level of command that has tasking authority over and support
responsibilities for the advisors.
DOD Response: Concur with comment. As presented, this recommendation
maybe too prescriptive and, in of itself, impractical to implement. It
suggests that the priority of the vast number of mission requirements
under the commander's responsibility are static and can be determined
void of any external factors. However, the recommendation's intent is
captured within existing departmental practices. The Department's
approach to determining mission priorities is based upon a thorough
understanding of our strategic objectives within the area of
operations. Based upon this understanding, the Commander gives his
guidance through mission objectives and subsequent creation of
operational plans. The Commander's ability to employ these plans, and
thus identifying mission priorities and allocation of resources,
remains situation specific and environmentally dependent. For similar
reasons, the Command and Control relationships within the BCT are
situation dependent and are tailored based upon the Commander's
requirements.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army
revise existing guidance to require that the highest-ranking field
grade officer advisors join the augmented BCTs in time to be present
for major brigade leadership planning events, such as the Leader
Training Program.
DOD Response: Concur. The Department of the Army agrees that maximum
benefit is achieved when the entire augment of advisors is available
and prepared to participate in both pre-deployment planning and
training events. However, due to the nature of advisor force
requirements, there will be instances where the entire augment is not
available to participate. The Army will maximize coordination,
prioritization, and integration of highest ranking advisors to ensure
participation in deployment planning and training events.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this
report were James Reynolds (Assistant Director), Grace Coleman, Kasea
Hamar, Jonathan Mulcare, and Maria Storts.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] As of August 31, 2010, U.S. forces transitioned from combat and
counterinsurgency activities in Iraq to a more limited focus on
training and advising the Iraqi Security Forces under Operation New
Dawn as the Iraqis have assumed security responsibility. The United
States intends to begin transitioning security to the Afghan
government by July 2011.
[2] Transition teams are not units that exist in the Army force
structure, so they have to be formed from personnel identified
individually by the Army Human Resources Command, and then pulled
together to form these teams. Likewise, the personnel who augment Army
brigades for the advising mission are identified individually by the
Army Human Resources Command, since they are not part of the brigades'
existing personnel. We refer to both of these groups of personnel as
being "individually sourced."
[3] H.R. Rep. No. 111-491, at 337-338 (2010).
[4] Department of the Army, Army Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force
Assistance (May 1, 2009).
[5] Army company grade officers are those in the pay grades of O-1 to
O-3 or 2ND Lieutenants, 1ST Lieutenants, and Captains. Army field
grade officers are those in pay grades O-4 to O-6, or Majors,
Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels. Army senior non-commissioned
officers are those in the pay grades of E7 to E9, or Sergeant 1ST
Class, Master Sergeant and First Sergeant, and Sergeant Major.
[6] GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and
Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and
Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-380T]
(Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2009).
[7] U.S. Army Infantry School, The Modular Brigade Augmented for
Security Force Assistance Handbook (Jun. 1, 2009).
[8] Mission rehearsal exercises are the final collective training
event that units conduct prior to deployment.
[9] The Leader Training Program focuses on battle command and the
staff planning, coordinating, integrating, synchronizing and execution
of combat power. The program's goal is to refine the warfighting
skills of brigade and battalion task force commanders and their battle
staffs.
[10] For augmented BCTs in Afghanistan, the requests called for 48
advisors--24 field grade officers and 24 senior non-commissioned
officers.
[End of section]
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