Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border
Gao ID: GAO-11-856R September 12, 2011In order to satisfy the requirement in the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 to report on the security of the southwest land border of the United States, we briefed Congress on July 12, 2011, with our preliminary observations. This is our final report to Congress on the Department of Defense (DOD) issues we addressed in response to the mandate. As directed by the mandate, we assessed: (1) what is known about the costs and benefits of an increased DOD role to help achieve operational control over the southwest land border, including the deployment of additional units, the National Guard, or other DOD personnel; increased use of ground-based mobile surveillance systems by military personnel; and use of additional mobile patrols by military personnel, particularly in rural, high-trafficked areas; and (2) what is known about the costs and benefits of an increased deployment of additional unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft to provide surveillance; as well as the impact of any increased deployment of unmanned aerial systems or manned aircraft on national airspace use and availability.
The cost of an increased DOD role to help achieve operational control over the southwest land border is determined largely by the legal status and mission of military personnel being used, specifically whether military personnel are responding under Title 32 or Title 10 of the United States Code. If Title 32 National Guard forces are used, factors that may impact the cost include whether in-state or out-of-state personnel are used, the number of personnel, duration of the mission, ratio of officers to enlisted personnel, as well as equipment and transportation needs. The costs of Title 32 National Guard forces working at the border can also be impacted by specific missions. For example, if National Guardsmen are to conduct patrols (as discussed in the mandate), they are to be assigned in pairs and would, therefore, require twice as many personnel as the Border Patrol to perform only the identification segment of the mission because they are not permitted to make arrests or seizures. Currently, National Guard personnel assigned to the southwest border are only identifying those individuals attempting to enter the United States and relaying such information to the Border Patrol for possible arrest. The estimated DOD cost has been about $1.35 billion for two separate border operations conducted by the National Guard forces in Title 32 status from June 2006 to July 2008 and again from June 2010 through September 30, 2011. Efforts of active-duty Title 10 forces at the border are generally conducted under authorities that allow DOD to provide military support to law enforcement agencies for counterdrug operations. Since 1989, DOD estimates the cost of using active duty Title 10 forces nationwide in support of drug law enforcement agencies (with additional operational costs borne by the military services) at about $10 million annually. According to officials we spoke with, the primary benefits of an increased role for DOD to help achieve operational control over the southwest land border include providing a bridge or augmentation until newly hired Border Patrol agents are trained and deployed to the border, obtaining training opportunities in a geographically inhospitable environment similar to current combat theaters, contributing to apprehensions and seizures along the border, deterring illegal activity at the border, building relationships with law enforcement agencies, and maintaining and strengthening military-to-military relationships with Mexico. DOD and DHS include different cost factors for deploying manned and unmanned aircraft, and therefore the costs are not comparable. Also, DOD's access to the national airspace is constrained given the safety concerns about unmanned aerial systems raised by the Federal Aviation Administration, specifically the challenges inherent with the unmanned aerial system's ability to detect, sense, and avoid an aircraft. Deploying additional unmanned aerial systems to provide surveillance would improve coverage, real-time imagery, and allow longer mission duration. For example, the Predator B provides a mission duration of 20-30 hours, depending on mission configuration and operational parameters, because there is no need to land and change pilots. On the other hand, we found that, unlike the unmanned aircraft, manned aircraft, whose pilots have the ability to see and avoid other aircraft, may have more routine access to the national airspace. Further, DOD has limited availability of unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft along the border because these systems are needed to support missions abroad. Officials from DHS reported during our review that they had 7 unmanned aerial system aircraft to provide response and monitoring capabilities throughout North America, and - funding permitting - they plan to expand their fleet to 24 total UASs that are operational by Fiscal Year 2016, including 11 on the southwest border. We are not making any recommendations for agency action in this report.
GAO-11-856R, Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border
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GAO-11-856R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 12, 2011:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased
Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land
Border:
In order to satisfy the requirement in the Ike Skelton National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 to report on the
security of the southwest land border of the United States, we briefed
your offices on July 12, 2011, with our preliminary observations. As
agreed with your offices, this is our final report to you on the
Department of Defense (DOD) issues we addressed in response to the
mandate.[Footnote 1] As directed by the mandate, we assessed:
(1) what is known about the costs and benefits of an increased DOD
role to help achieve operational control over the southwest land
border, including the deployment of additional units, the National
Guard, or other DOD personnel; increased use of ground-based mobile
surveillance systems by military personnel; and use of additional
mobile patrols by military personnel, particularly in rural, high-
trafficked areas; and:
(2) what is known about the costs and benefits of an increased
deployment of additional unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft
to provide surveillance; as well as the impact of any increased
deployment of unmanned aerial systems or manned aircraft on national
airspace use and availability.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports that the southwest
border continues to be vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity,
including the smuggling of humans and illegal narcotics. Several
federal agencies are involved in border security efforts, including
the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense (DOD), Justice, and
State. In recent years, the National Guard has played a role in
helping to secure the southwest border by providing the Border Patrol
with information on the identification of individuals attempting to
cross the southwest border into the United States. Generally, the
National Guard can be activated under three authorities:
(1) State status - State funded under the command and control of the
Governor;
(2) Title 32 status - Federally funded under command and control of
the Governor. Title 32 forces may participate in law enforcement
activities; and:
(3) Title 10 status - Federally funded under command and control of
the Secretary of Defense. Forces serving in this status are prohibited
from conducting direct law enforcement activities, but work to provide
certain types of support to civilian law enforcement.
Although National Guard forces working in support of law enforcement
at the southwest border have been activated under Title 32, the
Secretary of Defense has limited their activities with regard to law
enforcement. In addition to the National Guard, support at the
southwest border is also provided by active duty military forces
operating in Title 10 status.
To conduct this work, we reviewed relevant legal authorities governing
military forces operating under state--Title 32--and--Title 10
(federal)--status; the funding and cost data related to the deployment
of DOD personnel, equipment, unmanned aerial systems, and manned
surveillance aircraft; costs and benefits of recent efforts by DOD to
assist DHS at the southwest land border; after-action reports and
evaluations related to recent efforts to support law enforcement
efforts at the southwest land border; and interviewed appropriate
officials from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, State,
and Transportation. We conducted this review from March through
September 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. Cost data, as well as data on apprehensions and seizures,
were provided by agency officials. The data on apprehensions and
seizures have been used in past GAO reports. Although we did not
independently verify the data, we believe the data are sufficiently
reliable for providing contextual information for background purposes.
In summary, we found that the cost of an increased DOD role to help
achieve operational control over the southwest land border is
determined largely by the legal status and mission of military
personnel being used, specifically whether military personnel are
responding under Title 32 or Title 10 of the United States Code. If
Title 32 National Guard forces are used, factors that may impact the
cost include whether in-state or out-of-state personnel are used, the
number of personnel, duration of the mission, ratio of officers to
enlisted personnel, as well as equipment and transportation needs. The
costs of Title 32 National Guard forces working at the border can also
be impacted by specific missions. For example, if National Guardsmen
are to conduct patrols (as discussed in the mandate), they are to be
assigned in pairs and would, therefore, require twice as many
personnel as the Border Patrol to perform only the identification
segment of the mission because they are not permitted to make arrests
or seizures. Currently, National Guard personnel assigned to the
southwest border are only identifying those individuals attempting to
enter the United States and relaying such information to the Border
Patrol for possible arrest. The estimated DOD cost has been about
$1.35 billion for two separate border operations conducted by the
National Guard forces in Title 32 status from June 2006 to July 2008
and again from June 2010 through September 30, 2011. Efforts of active-
duty Title 10 forces at the border are generally conducted under
authorities that allow DOD to provide military support to law
enforcement agencies for counterdrug operations. Since 1989, DOD
estimates the cost of using active duty Title 10 forces nationwide in
support of drug law enforcement agencies (with additional operational
costs borne by the military services) at about $10 million annually.
According to officials we spoke with, the primary benefits of an
increased role for DOD to help achieve operational control over the
southwest land border include providing a bridge or augmentation until
newly hired Border Patrol agents are trained and deployed to the
border, obtaining training opportunities in a geographically
inhospitable environment similar to current combat theaters,
contributing to apprehensions and seizures along the border, deterring
illegal activity at the border, building relationships with law
enforcement agencies, and maintaining and strengthening military-to-
military relationships with Mexico.
DOD and DHS include different cost factors for deploying manned and
unmanned aircraft, and therefore the costs are not comparable. Also,
DOD's access to the national airspace is constrained given the safety
concerns about unmanned aerial systems raised by the Federal Aviation
Administration, specifically the challenges inherent with the unmanned
aerial system's ability to detect, sense, and avoid an aircraft.
Deploying additional unmanned aerial systems to provide surveillance
would improve coverage, real-time imagery, and allow longer mission
duration. For example, the Predator B provides a mission duration of
20-30 hours, depending on mission configuration and operational
parameters, because there is no need to land and change pilots. On the
other hand, we found that, unlike the unmanned aircraft, manned
aircraft, whose pilots have the ability to see and avoid other
aircraft, may have more routine access to the national airspace.
Further, DOD has limited availability of unmanned aerial systems and
manned aircraft along the border because these systems are needed to
support missions abroad. Officials from DHS reported during our review
that they had 7 unmanned aerial system aircraft to provide response
and monitoring capabilities throughout North America, and - funding
permitting - they plan to expand their fleet to 24 total UASs that are
operational by Fiscal Year 2016, including 11 on the southwest border.
In addition, agency officials identified a number of broader issues
and concerns surrounding expansion of DOD's assistance in securing the
southwest U.S. land border. Specifically, they include:
* DOD officials expressed concerns about the absence of a
comprehensive strategy for southwest border security and the resulting
challenges to identify and plan a DOD role.
* DHS officials expressed concerns that DOD's border assistance is ad
hoc in that DOD has other operational requirements. DOD assists when
legal authorities allow and resources are available, whereas DHS has a
continuous mission to ensure border security.
* Department of State and DOD officials expressed concerns about the
perception of a militarized U.S. border with Mexico, especially when
State and Department of Justice officials are helping support civilian
law enforcement institutions in Mexico to address crime and border
issues.
* Federal Aviation Administration officials, who are part of the
Department of Transportation, stated that they are concerned about
safety in the national airspace, including challenges in the unmanned
aerial system's ability to detect, sense, and avoid an aircraft. The
Federal Aviation Administration has granted DHS authority to fly
unmanned aerial systems to support its national security mission along
the southern U.S. border, and is working with DOD, DHS, and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration to identify and evaluate
options to increase unmanned aerial systems access in the national
airspace.
We are not making any recommendations for agency action in this
report. For additional information see Enclosure I, slides 9 through
11.
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense,
Homeland Security, State, and Transportation and received technical
comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees. We are also sending a copy to the Secretaries of Defense,
Homeland Security, State, and Transportation. In addition, we are
sending a copy to the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration.
This report will be available at no charge on our Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/]. Should you or your staff have
questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431
or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Key contributors to this report can be found in Enclosure II.
Signed by:
Davi M. D'Agostino:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Enclosures - 2:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Briefing Slides:
Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased DOD Role in
Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Briefing for the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services:
Contents:
* Background;
* Objectives;
* Scope and Methodology;
* Summary of Observations;
* Objective 1: Costs and Benefits of an Increased DOD Role;
* Objective 2: Costs and Benefits and Impact of Increased Unmanned
Aerial Systems and Manned Aircraft Deployment.
Background:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports that the southwest
border continues to be vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity,
including the smuggling of humans and illegal narcotics. Several
federal agencies are involved in border security efforts, including
the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense (DOD), Justice, and
State.
National Guard can be activated under three authorities:
* State Status ” State funded under the command and control of the
Governor;
* Title 32 status ” Federally funded under command and control of the
Governor. Title 32 forces may participate in law enforcement
activities; and:
* Title 10 status ” Federally funded under command and control of the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).
Although National Guard forces working in support of law enforcement
at the southwest border have been activated under Title 32, the SECDEF
has limited their activities with regard to law enforcement.
Law enforcement support at the southwest border is also provided by
active duty military forces operating in Title 10 status.
Active duty military forces operating in Title 10 status are
generally prohibited from direct participation in law enforcement
activities without proper statutory authorization. For example, §1004
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as
amended, allows the Secretary of Defense to provide support for the
counterdrug activities of any other department or agency of the
federal government or of any state, local, or foreign law enforcement
agency if certain criteria, set out in the statute, are met.
National Guard has supported DHS's border security mission in the four
southwest border states through two missions: Operation Jump Start
(2006-2008) and Operation Phalanx (2010-2011). These missions varied
in size and scope.
National Guard has a 30-day period to accept or refuse mission support
requests generated by law enforcement agencies.
Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N) supports drug law enforcement agencies
in the conduct of counternarcotic operations.
Figure: Views of the Southwest Border:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Fencing along the southwest border between the United States (New
Mexico) and Mexico.
Arizona Guardsman conducting entry identification along the southwest
border (Nogales, Arizona).
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Objectives:
The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011 mandated, in part, that GAO report on the security of the
southwest land border of the United States and ongoing efforts to
improve such security by July 6, 2011.[Footnote 2] Specifically, we
assessed:
Objective 1: What is known about the costs and benefits of an
increased DOD role to help achieve operational control over the
southwest land border, including the deployment of additional units,
the National Guard, or other DOD personnel; increased
use of ground-based mobile surveillance systems by military personnel;
and use of additional mobile patrols by military personnel,
particularly in rural, high-trafficked areas?
Objective 2: What is known about the costs and benefits of an
increased deployment of additional unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and
manned aircraft to provide surveillance; as well as the impact of any
increased deployment of UASs or manned aircraft on national airspace
use and availability?
[End of section]
Scope and Methodology:
To determine what is known about the costs and benefits of an
increased DOD role to help achieve operational control over the
southwest land border and the impact of any increased deployment of
UAS or manned aircraft on national airspace use and availability, we
reviewed:
* the legal authorities governing military forces operating under
state, Title 32, and Title 10 status;
* the cost and benefits of recent efforts by DOD to assist DHS,
including Operation Jump Start (2006-2008) and Operation Phalanx (2010-
2011);
* DOD after-action reports and evaluations related to recent DOD
efforts to support law enforcement efforts at the southwest land border;
* strategic and operational plans, and guidance related to addressing
security concerns at the southwest land border;
* funding and cost data and sources of funding related to the
deployment of DOD personnel, equipment, UASs, and manned surveillance
aircraft.
We also interviewed cognizant officials about efforts to secure the
southwest land border:
* Department of Defense, including the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps),
National Guard Bureau, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Army North, and
Joint Task Force-North.
* Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
(including U.S. Border Patrol, Office of Air and Marine).
* Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration.
* Department of State, including Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, and Office of Mexican Affairs.
GAO conducted this review from March through September 2011.
Cost data, as well as data on apprehensions and seizures, were
provided by agency officials and CBP data have been used in past GAO
reports. Although we did not independently verify the data, we believe
the data are sufficiently reliable for providing contextual
information for background purposes.
[End of section]
Summary of Observations:
Objective 1: The costs of an increased DOD role to help achieve
operational control over the southwest land border are determined
largely by the legal status and mission of military personnel. Factors
that may impact the cost of using Title 32 forces include:
use of in-state versus out-of-state Guardsmen, the number of
personnel, duration of mission, ratio of officers to enlisted
personnel, equipment, and transportation needs.
According to the National Guard, the cost of border operations carried
out by Title 32 forces, conducted from June 2006 to July 2008 and
again from July 2010 to June 2011 is about $1.35 billion. Use of
active duty Title 10 forces is limited primarily to situations
where there is a counterdrug nexus. The cost of counterdrug operations
nationwide conducted by active duty Title 10 forces in support of drug
law enforcement agencies since 1989 is about $10 million annually
(with additional operational costs borne by the military services).
According to officials we spoke with, the benefits of an increased DOD
role to help achieve operational control over the southwest land
border focus primarily on providing a surge capacity; bridge or
augmentation until newly hired Border Patrol agents are trained and
deployed to the border; real-world training opportunities; an impact
on apprehensions and seizures along the border, as well as a deterrent
force against illegal activity at the border; building relationships
with law enforcement agencies; and maintaining and strengthening
military-to-military relationships with Mexico.
Objective 2: DOD and DHS include different cost factors for deploying
manned and unmanned aircraft, and therefore the costs are not
comparable. DOD's access to the national airspace is constrained given
the safety concerns about UASs raised by the FAA, specifically the
challenges inherent with the UAS's ability to detect, sense, and avoid
an aircraft. DHS has requested and obtained Certificates of Waiver or
Authorization to conduct UAS missions in the national airspace in
support of border security missions. FAA officials report that it has
approved DOD UAS training operations in the national airspace. The
benefits of an increased deployment of additional UAS to provide
surveillance include improved coverage, real-time imagery, and longer
mission duration. For example, the Predator B provides a mission
duration of 2D-30 hours, depending on mission configuration and
operational parameters, because there is no need for land and change
pilots. As manned aircraft have the ability to see and avoid other
aircraft, an increased deployment of manned aircraft may have more
direct access to the national airspace. UAS and manned aircraft use
and availability from DOD is limited due to the demand from current
missions abroad (e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq). DHS officials report
that they presently have 7 UAS aircraft to provide response and
monitoring capabilities throughout North America, and ” funding
permitting ” they plan to expand their fleet to 24 total UASs that are
operational by Fiscal Year 2016, including 11 on the southwest border.
Agency Perspectives:
* DOD officials are concerned that there is no comprehensive southwest
border security strategy. As a result, DOD is hampered in identifying
its role and planning for that role. DOD is also concerned about
"mission creep" because border security is not a core DOD mission.
* DHS/CBP officials are concerned that DOD assistance is ad hoc in
that DOD has other operational requirements. DOD assists when legal
authorities allow and resources are available, whereas border security
is a continuous and ongoing mission for DHS.
* Department of State officials are concerned about perception of a
"militarized" U.S. border with Mexico, especially in light of efforts
by State and the Department of Justice to help support civilian law
enforcement institutions in Mexico to address crime and border issues.
DOD officials also expressed concerns about militarizing the border.
* Department of Transportation/Federal Aviation Administration
officials are concerned about safety in the national airspace, and
provide authorization for government agencies to fly UASs in the
national airspace. Because of challenges inherent with a
UAS's ability to detect, sense, and avoid an aircraft, DOD and FAA are
working on options that would allow DOD to fly UASs in the national
airspace. FAA has granted Certificates of Waiver or Authorization to
allow DHS to fly UASs in the national airspace in support of its
national security mission along the southern U.S. border. In addition,
DOD, DHS, NASA, and FAA have formed an Executive Committee to raise and
evaluate options to increase UAS access in the national airspace,
according to both DOD and DHS officials.
[End of section]
Objective 1: Costs and Benefits of an Increased DOD Role:
National Guard in Title 32 Status:
Operation Jump Start (OJS) (June 2006-July 2008) cost $1.2 billion
over 2 years, of which $84 million was spent for aviation support,
according to National Guard officials. OJS involved volunteers from
the border states, and volunteers from outside the border states;
mission included aviation, engineering, entry identification teams
(EIT), among others, according to National Guard officials.
Costs:
* Personnel costs (federal pay). OJS deployed up to 6,000 Guardsmen
(more than 30,000 Guardsmen participated during the mission).
* Operation & maintenance costs estimated at $120 per person per day.
* Transportation costs were "significant" due to use of out-of-state
units, according to National Guard officials.
* Equipment operating costs included aviation assets.
Benefits:
* CBP officials reported that during the 2-year operation, the
National Guard assisted in the apprehension of 186,814 undocumented
aliens, and the seizure of 316,364 pounds of marijuana, among other
categories of assistance such as rescues and the seizure of illicit
currency. Based on these reported figures, the National Guard assisted
in 11.7% of all undocumented alien apprehensions and 9.4% of all
marijuana seized on the southwest border.[Footnote 3]
Operation Phalanx (July 2010-June 30, 2011) cost $110 million over 1
year; costs to extend Operation Phalanx estimated at about $35 million
(July 1, 2011, through September 30, 2011), according to National
Guard officials. Operation Phalanx involves volunteer units, and in-
state units. SECDEF limited mission to EIT, criminal analysts, and
command and control, according to National Guard officials.
Costs:
* Personnel costs (federal pay). Operation Phalanx has deployed up to
1,200 Guardsmen to date.
* Operation & maintenance costs estimated at $100 per person per day.
* Transportation costs were limited due to use of in-state units,
according to National Guard officials.
* No equipment costs; used CBP equipment (e.g., MEDEVAC helicopters).
Benefits:
* According to CBP officials and CBP's daily reports for the southwest
border, as of May 31, 2011, the National Guard assisted in the
apprehension of 17,887 undocumented aliens and the seizure of 56,342
pounds of marijuana. Based on these reported figures, the National
Guard assisted in 5.9% of all undocumented alien apprehensions and
2.6% of all marijuana seized on the southwest border.[Footnote 4]
Challenges for National Guard in Title 32 Status:
There are a number of challenges to the National Guard providing
support to law enforcement missions that could impact costs and
benefits, for example:
* Currently, National Guard personnel involved in activities on the
border are under the command and control of the Governor and are
receiving federal funding in Title 32 status. In this status, although
permitted to participate in law enforcement activities, the SECDEF has
limited their activities. For example, Guardsmen are not performing
law enforcement functions, such as arrests; therefore, all arrests and
seizures are performed by Border Patrol. Currently, National Guard
personnel assigned to the southwest border are identifying those
individuals attempting to enter the United States and relaying such
information to the Border Patrol for possible arrest.
- Civilians may not distinguish between Guardsmen and active duty
military personnel in uniform, which leads to the perception that the
border is militarized, according to DOD and National Guard officials.
- Returns on the value of some training for surveillance activities
diminishes over time, according to National Guard officials.
- The use of out-of-state Guardsmen for long-term missions in an
involuntary status may potentially have an adverse affect on future
National Guard recruitment and retention, according to National Guard
officials.
- Availability for other duties is reduced (e.g., disaster
assistance), according to National Guard officials.
- Temporary duty can impact long-term border security planning,
according to CBP officials.
- Apprehension and seizure data is collected by CBP. National Guard
does not independently collect information on apprehensions and
seizures, since National Guard is not involved in those aspects of the
law enforcement mission.
Future Cost Considerations for National Guard in Title 32 Status:
* To meet the missions identified in the mandate (including deploying
additional units, increasing the use of ground-based mobile
surveillance systems, and using additional mobile patrols in rural,
high-trafficked areas), National Guard officials report that the costs
would be impacted by:
- In-state versus out-of-state Guardsmen. For example, if additional
units or individuals originate from outside of border states, then
transportation and per diem costs may increase.
- National Guard versus Border Patrol-owned equipment. For example, to
identify the costs of additional ground-based mobile surveillance
systems, costs may increase if National Guard provides its own or
rents equipment.
- National Guard patrols require twice as many personnel as Border
Patrol to perform only the identification segment of the mission and
relay information to the Border Patrol, as the National Guard cannot
arrest, as noted earlier. For example, if Guardsmen were to conduct
rural patrols, they would be required to work in pairs to identify
persons of interest and contact Border Patrol to make arrests or
seizures, whereas Border Patrol agents may operate individually to
conduct the full range of these activities.
- Mission duration.
- Ratio of officers to enlisted personnel (e.g., 20:80 estimate; 10:90
Phalanx).
- Army National Guard personnel costs are less than those of Air
National Guard.
Active Duty Military Services in Title 10 Status:
* According to DOD officials, active duty Title 10 military services'
efforts at the border are generally being conducted under authorities
that allow DOD to provide military support to law enforcement agencies
for counternarcotic operations.
* JTF-N is responsible for brokering requests for law enforcement
support missions and matching them with available DOD assets. For
example, according to DOD officials, in Fiscal Year 2010 DOD conducted
79 missions with 842 DOD personnel in support of law enforcement and
assisted in the seizure of about 17,935 pounds of marijuana, assisted
in the apprehension of 3,865 undocumented aliens, and constructed
17.26 miles of road. (Statistics on apprehension and seizure amounts
provided to DOD by CBP.)
* Military services cover costs of DOD training that concurrently
support law enforcement counternarcotic operations, according to DOD
officials.
Financial Costs for Active Duty Military Services in Title 10 Status:
* According to DOD officials, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counternarcotics receives a budget of about $1.1 billion
annually for counternarcotics efforts, of which about $10 million goes
to JTF-N to meet law enforcement mission support needs nationwide. JTF-
N's budget has remained essentially the same since the late 1980s, DOD
officials noted.
- Of that approximate $10 million, JTF-N budgeted in FY 2011 about
$4.8 million 51%) for operations in support of law enforcement, $3.7
million (39%) for engineering support, and about $410,000 (5%) for
mobile training teams.
* JTF-N officials report that they receive about 400 requests per year
for law enforcement support and are able to fund approximately 80 of
those requests (about 20%).
Challenges for Active Duty Military Services in Title 10 Status:
According to DOD officials, there are a number of challenges to
providing support to law enforcement missions that could impact costs
and benefits, for example:
* Complexity of legal authorities and policy issues. It can take up to
180 days to obtain final approval to execute a mission in support of
law enforcement.
* Relationships with law enforcement agencies and Mexico. The
perception of militarizing the border has kept DOD units from actively
patrolling the border and carrying loaded weapons.
* Apprehension and seizure data is collected by CBP. DOD does not
independently collect information on apprehensions and seizures, since
DOD is not involved in those aspects of the law enforcement mission.
* Operational tempo impacts availability of DOD units to fill support
missions. Some DOD units are regularly available to meet specific
mission needs at the border (e.g., mechanized units to construct roads).
Other units (e.g., ground-based surveillance teams) are deployed or
soon will be deployed abroad making it more difficult to fulfill law
enforcement requests.
* Information sharing: (1) complex trust relationship between DOD and
law enforcement personnel; (2) not a priority to share information
among law enforcement personnel (investigators versus interdictors);
and (3) lack of security clearances for law enforcement officials,
which affects DOD's ability to provide classified information to CBP.
* Force protection is provided for active duty military services in
Title 10 status by Border Patrol because these forces do not carry
loaded weapons at the border.
There are legal restraints and other challenges that active duty
forces must be mindful of when providing assistance to civilian law
enforcement:
* The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385, prohibits the direct
use of Title 10 (federal) forces in domestic civilian law enforcement,
except where authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress.
* Congress has authorized military support to law enforcement agencies
in specific situations. For example, federal forces may provide
counternarcotic support under a number of legal authorities including
§1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991, as amended,
10 U.S.C. § 124, and 10 U.S.C. § § 371-382, among others. 10 U.S.C.
§375 restricts federal forces from directly participating in a search,
seizure, arrest or other similar activity without additional statutory
authorization.
* DOD further clarifies restrictions on direct assistance to law
enforcement and includes interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft,
or other similar activity; a search or seizure; an arrest,
apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity; or use of military
personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover
agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators as prohibited
activities. (DOD Directive 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Officials (Jan.15, 1986)).
* DOD has issued guidance setting out the approval process for Title
10 forces providing operational support for counternarcotic law
enforcement missions.
* Missions on the border, including missions identified in the mandate
(deploying additional units, increasing the use of ground-based mobile
surveillance systems, and using additional mobile patrols,
particularly in rural, high-trafficked areas), are generally being
carried out by active duty Title 10 forces under authorities related
to counterdrug operations. Therefore, the request for support must
meet a number of criteria, set out in an October 2, 2003, DOD memo
Department Support to Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies Performing
Counternarcotic Activities. The mission must:
- Have a valid counternarcotic nexus.
- Have a proper request from law enforcement (from an appropriate
official, federal law must authorize DOD to provide support, which
will assist the law enforcement agency in accomplishing their
counternarcotic mission; is consistent with National Drug Control
Strategy; and is limited to unique military capabilities and benefit
DOD or is essential to national security goals).
- Improve unit readiness or mission capability.
- Provide a training opportunity to increase combat readiness.
- Not use Title 10 forces (military services) for continuing, ongoing,
long-term operation support commitments at the same location.
Future Cost Considerations for Active Duty Military Services in
Title 10 Status:
For missions conducted by Title 10 forces that meet the criteria, DOD
officials note they would consider cost factors including:
* JTF-N provides some funding for additional units deployed to the
border in support of law enforcement missions. For example, JTF-N
officials report that JTF-N provides about $350,000 per mile to DOD
engineering units that construct roads at the border. DOD provides the
manpower and equipment. CBP provides the materials.
* JTF-N provides about $125,000 funding for a DOD unit that provides
operational support (e.g., ground based mobile surveillance unit) to
law enforcement mission. Military Service (e.g., Marine Corps)
provides training funding to cover the cost of the personnel and
equipment. JTF-N officials report that one-third of Marine ground
sensor platoons train on JTF-N missions.
* DOD efforts to support counternarcotic border missions, such as
mobile patrols, are limited by DOD policies. According to DOD
officials, due to a shooting incident in 1997 in Redford, Texas, the
SECDEF determined that military personnel will not conduct mobile
patrols (e.g., they must remain stationary) and cannot carry loaded
weapons.
Benefits of Increased National Guard and Active Duty Forces:
According to officials we have spoken with, benefits of an increased
National Guard Title 32 presence at the southwest land border would
include:
* Providing a bridge (like Operation Jump Start) or augmentation (like
Operation Phalanx) until newly hired Border Patrol personnel are
trained and assigned to the southwest border;
* Increasing apprehensions and seizures along the southwest border;
* Deterring illegal activity at the southwest border; and;
* Providing training opportunities.
According to officials we have spoken with, benefits of an increased
active duty Military Service Title 10 presence at the southwest land
border would include:
* Training opportunities in a geographically inhospitable environment
similar to current combat theaters;
* Increasing apprehensions and seizures along the southwest border;
* Deterring illegal activity at the southwest border;
* Building relationships with law enforcement;
* Maintaining and strengthening military-to-military relationships
with Mexico; and;
* Enhancing intelligence used to help dismantle transnational criminal
organization networks.
[End of section]
Objective 2: Costs and Benefits and Impact of Increased Deployment of
UAS:
DOD and DHS include different cost factors for deploying UASs, and
therefore the costs presented below are not comparable.
We obtained limited data from DOD and DHS on flight hour costs for
UASs. For example:
* For Fiscal Year 2011, DOD Comptroller reported that an MQ-1 B
(Predator) and an MQ-9A (Reaper) cost $859 and $1,456 per flight hour,
respectively; and DOD uses depot level reparable and maintenance
costs, asset utilization costs, and military personnel costs to
calculate these figures.
- DOD officials identified additional factors that may impact
operating costs of UASs (e.g., transportation for personnel and
equipment, rental or lease for -hanger space, mission requirements).
- DOD officials state that UAS cost information may vary by platform
design and capabilities.
* For FY 2010, DHS reported that its Predator B (a variant of DOD's
Reaper) costs approximately $3,234 per flight hour. This is the total
direct and indirect cost, including fuel, maintenance, support
services, and labor.
Benefits of UAS deployment to the southwest border identified in 2010
by the Congressional Research Service include: improved coverage along
remote sections of southwest border; more precise and real-time
imagery; and longer mission duration. For example, the Predator B
provides a mission duration of 20-30 hours, depending on mission
configuration and operational parameters, because there is no need to
land and change pilots.
Challenges:
* Limited asset availability given the current demand from missions
abroad (e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq), according to DOD officials;
however, DHS officials report that they presently have 7 UAS aircraft
to provide response and monitoring capabilities throughout North
America, and ” funding permitting ” they plan to expand their fleet to
24 total UASs that are operational by Fiscal Year 2016, including 11
on the southwest border.
* Limited access to national airspace given inherent challenges with
the UAS's ability to detect, sense, and avoid an aircraft. DHS has
requested and obtained Certificates of Waiver or Authorization to
conduct UAS missions in the national airspace in support of border
security missions. FAA officials report that it has approved DOD UAS
training operations in the national airspace. In addition, DOD, DHS,
NASA, and FAA have formed an Executive Committee to raise and evaluate
options to increase UAS access in the national airspace, according to
a 2010 DOD report to Congress on challenges for unmanned aircraft
systems, and confirmed during our discussions with DOD officials.
- Illegal domestic surveillance concerns, according to DOD officials.
- Higher accident rates of UAS than manned aircraft, according to a 2010
Congressional Research Service report.
* Limited sensor coverage (e.g., "soda straw" view), according to DOD
officials. According to DHS officials, ifs UASs have a sensor
capability that does not limit its performance of border security and
other missions.
* Less effective than manned aircraft in supporting apprehension of
undocumented aliens, according to a 2005 DHS Inspector General report.
Objective 2: Costs and Benefits and Impact of Increased Deployment of
Manned Aircraft:
DOD and DHS include different cost factors for deploying manned
aircraft, and therefore the costs presented below are not comparable.
* Officials from DOD and DHS provided flight hour cost data for manned
assets. Estimated flight hour costs appear to vary because agencies
use different inputs to calculate cost estimates; therefore, these
costs are not comparable across agencies. For example:
- In Fiscal Year 2011, DOD reported that a UH-60A (Blackhawk) and
a C-12 (King Air) cost $5,897 and $1,370 per flight hour, respectively.
DOD uses depot-level reparable and maintenance costs, asset
utilization costs, and military personnel costs to develop its flight
hour estimates.
- In Fiscal Year 2010, DHS reported that a Blackhawk and a King Air
cost $5,233 and $3,994 per flight hour, respectively. DHS flight hour
costs do not include DOD items listed above, but do include total
direct and indirect costs, including fuel, equipment, and labor costs.
* Variations in DOD and DHS costs could also be attributed to the
different fiscal years reported.
* Consequently, a comprehensive evaluation of total manned aircraft
operating costs is hindered by the lack of comparable data from
agencies.
Benefits:
* Have the ability to see and avoid other aircraft in the national
airspace; therefore, gains routine access to national airspace by
following FAA requirements, according to DOD officials and DHS and
Congressional Research Service documentation.
* Effective support in apprehension of undocumented aliens per flight
hour, according to DHS Inspector General. For example, according to
DOD officials, JTF-N's Big Miguel Program (an aerial surveillance
mission), which began in Fiscal Year 2011:
- Contracted Cessna with forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor;
- Costs $1.2 million per year; and;
- Assisted in the apprehension of 6,500-8,000 undocumented aliens and
the seizure of $54 million in marijuana, according to JTF-N officials.
Challenges:
* Limited DOD asset availability given the current operational tempo,
according to DOD officials.
[End of section]
Enclosure II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Davi M. D'Agostino, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
(202) 512-5431; DagostinoD@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Mark A. Pross, Assistant
Director; Yecenia Camarillo; Nicole Harms; Lori Kmetz; Charles Perdue;
Richard Powelson; Terry Richardson; and Jason Wildhagen made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 111-383, §1057 (2011). In a separate "for official use
only" briefing, provided to congressional committees on July 12, 2011,
we addressed other portions of the mandate related to: (1) the extent
to which the Border Patrol has positioned staffing, technology, and
tactical infrastructure resources at high risk locations on the
southwest border, (2) the United States has achieved and maintained
operational control of the southwest border, (3) the actions that
Customs and Border Protection has taken to identify the costs and
benefits of additional efforts to enhance security on the southwest
border, and (4) the actions that the Department of Homeland Security
has taken to evaluate the adequacy of information-sharing agreements
between federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement authorities
regarding to the security of the southwest border. A "for official use
only" report based on this information was issued on September 12,
2011.
[2] Pub. L No. 111-383, §1057 (2011). In a separate "for official use
only" briefing, we address mandated issues related to the extent to
which the Border Patrol has positioned staffing, technology, and
tactical infrastructure resources at high risk locations on the
southwest border, the United States has achieved and maintained
operational control of the southwest border; the actions that Customs
and Border Protection has taken to identify the costs and benefits of
additional efforts to enhance security on the southwest border; and
the actions that DNS has taken to evaluate the adequacy of information
sharing agreements between federal, state, local, and tribal law
enforcement authorities with regard to the security of the southwest
border.
[3] The official start date for OJS was June 15, 2006, and the
official end date was July 15, 2008. CBP's data is reported monthly,
and as the beginning and end dates of OJS fell in the middle of the
calendar month, for the purposes of this analysis, the 24-month period
analyzed was July 2006 (the first full month of the mission) through
June 2008 (the last full month of the mission).
[4] Since there is no official Enforcement Integrated Database (EID)
data related to Operation Phalanx, we are presenting daily report
totals to provide context as to the extent of National Guard assists
during Operation Phalanx, since the Border Patrol relies on the daily
report totals.
[End of section]
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