Warfighter Support
Improved Cost Analysis and Better Oversight Needed over Army Nonstandard Equipment Gao ID: GAO-11-766 September 29, 2011As of March 2011, the Army had over $4 billion worth of nonstandard equipment in Iraq--that is equipment not included on units' standard list of authorized equipment. Concurrently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has acquired over $44 billion worth of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP), most of which have been allocated to the Army. This equipment must be withdrawn from Iraq by December 31, 2011. GAO examined the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for the disposition of (1) nontactical nonstandard equipment; (2) tactical nonstandard equipment; and (3) MRAPs that are no longer needed in Iraq. In performing this review, GAO analyzed relevant documents, interviewed Army officials, and visited Sierra Army Depot, where most nontactical nonstandard equipment is shipped once it leaves Iraq.
The Army has plans and processes for the disposition of nontactical nonstandard equipment (e.g., durable goods that are used to provide services for soldiers), and recently created a policy regarding the length of storage time. Excess nontactical nonstandard equipment is either redistributed in the U.S Central Command theater, disposed of, provided to other nations through foreign military sales or other means, or shipped to depots in the United States. In April 2011, the Army issued two messages that updated its procedures for requisitioning excess nonstandard equipment stored at Sierra Army Depot and created a forum to determine its final disposition instructions. The intent was also to extend use of this equipment by making it available to Army units; when an item is deemed not operational, to dispose of it in theater; and to enter these instructions in a disposition database so they will no longer be shipped back to the United States. The Army would then avoid unnecessary transportation costs. The Army has not made disposition decisions for most of its tactical nonstandard equipment (i.e., commercially acquired or non-developmental equipment rapidly acquired and fielded outside the normal budgeting and acquisition process), and its disposition process is impaired by a lack of visibility over this equipment and the absence of a focal point to manage this equipment. The Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition process enables the Army to assess tactical nonstandard equipment already in use in the U.S. Central Command theater and determine whether it should be retained for the Army's current and future force and subsequently funded in the Army's base budget. However, the decision about most of the equipment considered by the process is to continue to fund it with overseas contingency operations funds. In addition, the Army has no system to track, monitor, and manage its inventory of tactical nonstandard equipment and has no single focal point to oversee this equipment. Best practices as cited in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for effective stewardship of resources by developing detailed policies, procedures, and practices. Although the Army has plans for the disposition of its MRAP fleet, its cost estimates are incomplete and do not follow cost-estimating best practices. The Army conducted a study to effectively guide its integration of MRAPs into its force structure. The selected option placed the majority of MRAPs in prepositioned stocks. However, this study did not incorporate analyses of future costs based on Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and GAO cost-estimating guidance providing best practices; nor did it delineate total costs for sustainment of its MRAP fleet or when those costs would be incurred. Without such information, decision makers lack the perspective necessary to make asset-management and budgetary decisions. Although Army officials stated that they are working toward providing an estimate of future MRAP costs, this has not yet been completed. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct Army authorities to (1) finalize decisions about the future status of tactical nonstandard equipment; (2) designate a focal point to oversee this equipment; and (3) undertake a thorough life-cycle cost estimate for its MRAPs. DOD concurred with our third recommendation, partially concurred with our first, and did not concur with the second. Given DOD's lack of visibility over tactical nonstandard equipment, GAO continues to believe a focal point is needed.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: William M. Solis Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (202) 512-8365GAO-11-766, Warfighter Support: Improved Cost Analysis and Better Oversight Needed over Army Nonstandard Equipment
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Addressees:
September 2011:
Warfighter Support:
Improved Cost Analysis and Better Oversight Needed over Army
Nonstandard Equipment:
GAO-11-766:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-766, a report to congressional addressees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
As of March 2011, the Army had over $4 billion worth of nonstandard
equipment in Iraq”that is equipment not included on units‘ standard
list of authorized equipment. Concurrently, the Department of Defense
(DOD) has acquired over $44 billion worth of Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected vehicles (MRAP), most of which have been allocated to the
Army. This equipment must be withdrawn from Iraq by December 31, 2011.
GAO examined the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for
the disposition of (1) nontactical nonstandard equipment; (2) tactical
nonstandard equipment; and (3) MRAPs that are no longer needed in
Iraq. In performing this review, GAO analyzed relevant documents,
interviewed Army officials, and visited Sierra Army Depot, where most
nontactical nonstandard equipment is shipped once it leaves Iraq.
What GAO Found:
The Army has plans and processes for the disposition of nontactical
nonstandard equipment (e.g., durable goods that are used to provide
services for soldiers), and recently created a policy regarding the
length of storage time. Excess nontactical nonstandard equipment is
either redistributed in the U.S Central Command theater, disposed of,
provided to other nations through foreign military sales or other
means, or shipped to depots in the United States. In April 2011, the
Army issued two messages that updated its procedures for
requisitioning excess nonstandard equipment stored at Sierra Army
Depot and created a forum to determine its final disposition
instructions. The intent was also to extend use of this equipment by
making it available to Army units; when an item is deemed not
operational, to dispose of it in theater; and to enter these
instructions in a disposition database so they will no longer be
shipped back to the United States. The Army would then avoid
unnecessary transportation costs.
The Army has not made disposition decisions for most of its tactical
nonstandard equipment (i.e., commercially acquired or non-
developmental equipment rapidly acquired and fielded outside the
normal budgeting and acquisition process), and its disposition process
is impaired by a lack of visibility over this equipment and the
absence of a focal point to manage this equipment. The Capabilities
Development for Rapid Transition process enables the Army to assess
tactical nonstandard equipment already in use in the U.S. Central
Command theater and determine whether it should be retained for the
Army‘s current and future force and subsequently funded in the Army‘s
base budget. However, the decision about most of the equipment
considered by the process is to continue to fund it with overseas
contingency operations funds. In addition, the Army has no system to
track, monitor, and manage its inventory of tactical nonstandard
equipment and has no single focal point to oversee this equipment.
Best practices as cited in GAO‘s Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government call for effective stewardship of resources by
developing detailed policies, procedures, and practices.
Although the Army has plans for the disposition of its MRAP fleet, its
cost estimates are incomplete and do not follow cost-estimating best
practices. The Army conducted a study to effectively guide its
integration of MRAPs into its force structure. The selected option
placed the majority of MRAPs in prepositioned stocks. However, this
study did not incorporate analyses of future costs based on Department
of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and GAO cost-estimating
guidance providing best practices; nor did it delineate total costs
for sustainment of its MRAP fleet or when those costs would be
incurred. Without such information, decision makers lack the
perspective necessary to make asset-management and budgetary
decisions. Although Army officials stated that they are working toward
providing an estimate of future MRAP costs, this has not yet been
completed.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct Army authorities
to (1) finalize decisions about the future status of tactical
nonstandard equipment; (2) designate a focal point to oversee this
equipment; and (3) undertake a thorough life-cycle cost estimate for
its MRAPs. DOD concurred with our third recommendation, partially
concurred with our first, and did not concur with the second. Given
DOD‘s lack of visibility over tactical nonstandard equipment, GAO
continues to believe a focal point is needed.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-766. For more
information, contact William Solis, at (202) 512-8365 or
solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Army Has Policies for Disposition of Nontactical Nonstandard Equipment:
The Army's Process to Assess Disposition of Tactical Nonstandard
Equipment Does Not Compel Decisions about Most Equipment and Is
Impaired by Lack of Oversight:
Army Has Finalized Disposition Plans for Its MRAP Fleet, but Its Cost
Estimates Are Incomplete and Do Not Follow Best Practices:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Sierra Army Depot Nontactical Nonstandard Equipment Received
and Shipped, as of April 14, 2011:
Table 2: Allocation of MRAPs According to Final Report, Army
Capabilities Integration Center, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Study
II (June 22, 2011):
Abbreviations:
CDRT: Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition:
CENTCOM: United States Central Command:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GSA: General Services Administration:
LOGCAP: Logistics Civil Augmentation Program:
MRAP: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle:
NASASP: National Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 29, 2011:
Congressional Addressees:
Over the course of the war in Iraq, the U.S. Army has acquired
equipment that it considers nonstandard, which is equipment issued to
units that is not authorized on their modified table of organization
and equipment.[Footnote 1] This nonstandard equipment covers a wide
range of items including construction equipment, materiel-handling
equipment, flat-screen televisions, certain types of radios, advanced
gunsights, gunshot detection equipment, and surveillance systems.
According to Army documents, as of March 2011 nonstandard equipment in
Iraq constituted approximately 47 percent of all Army equipment in
Iraq, totaling about 523,000 pieces worth over $4 billion. Another
type of equipment--Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP)--
just recently transitioned from nonstandard to standard items in the
Army.[Footnote 2] According to the MRAP Joint Program Office, as of
July 2011 the Department of Defense (DOD) had acquired 27,740 MRAPs
worth approximately $44 billion. Over 21,000 of these vehicles have
been allocated to the Army.[Footnote 3]
In accordance with the Security Agreement signed between the United
States and the Government of Iraq on November 17, 2008,[Footnote 4]
all U.S. forces must be withdrawn from Iraq by December 31, 2011.
According to Army officials, this includes all Army equipment,
standard and nonstandard. Plans for this drawdown have already been
developed, but they may be changed or adjusted based on emerging
requirements for DOD to support and sustain the Department of State in
its assumption of the Iraq missions, on the uncertain Iraqi political
and security environment, and on developments elsewhere in the region,
particularly Afghanistan. For example, on April 7, 2011, the Secretary
of Defense said that the United States is willing to have a military
presence in Iraq after December 31, 2011, if requested by the
Government of Iraq.
Regardless of the changing situation in Iraq, Army officials have
begun determining what to do about the disposition of nonstandard
equipment no longer needed in Iraq. Some types of nonstandard
equipment will be redistributed within the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility. Other types will be stored for
future contingencies or transferred to other U.S. government agencies,
other nations, or state and local governments. Finally, some
nonstandard equipment may not be retained and may be either disposed
of or provided to other nations through foreign military sales.
We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority
to conduct evaluations on his own initiative as part of a continued
effort to assist Congress in its oversight of U.S. military efforts in
Iraq. The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the extent to
which the Army has plans and processes for the disposition of
nontactical nonstandard equipment no longer needed in Iraq; (2) the
extent to which the Army has plans and processes for the disposition
of tactical nonstandard equipment no longer needed in Iraq; and (3)
the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for the
disposition of MRAPs no longer needed in Iraq.
To determine the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for
the disposition of nontactical nonstandard equipment no longer needed
in Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents, including Army
plans, messages, guidance, and briefings that addressed the subject.
In addition, we interviewed Army officials at relevant organizations
throughout the chain of command and at several different
organizations. We also conducted a site visit to Sierra Army Depot,
where the vast bulk of the Army's nontactical nonstandard equipment is
shipped once it leaves Iraq, to view procedures and processes there
for the evaluation, disposition, storage, and integration of
nontactical nonstandard equipment.
To determine the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for
the disposition of tactical nonstandard equipment no longer needed in
Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents, including Army
plans, messages, guidance, regulations, and briefings that addressed
the subject. We also reviewed Army Audit Agency reports on tactical
nonstandard equipment; interviewed Army officials at several
different, relevant organizations throughout the chain of command; and
made a site visit to Fort Monroe, Virginia, where we interviewed
officials from U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and from the
Army Capabilities and Integration Center, both of which play leading
roles in determining the ultimate disposition of tactical nonstandard
equipment. We also interviewed officials from the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization to discuss the interface between
that organization and the Army's processes for integrating tactical
nonstandard equipment into its inventory.
To determine the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for
the disposition of MRAPs no longer needed in Iraq, we reviewed and
analyzed relevant documents, including Army plans, messages, guidance,
and briefings that addressed the subject. In particular, we analyzed
Army cost estimates for integrating MRAPs into its ground vehicle
fleet and compared these estimates with DOD's instruction for economic
analysis, the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) guidance for
conducting cost-benefit analyses, and GAO's Cost Estimating and
Assessment Guide. We also considered in our analysis the Army's
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. We interviewed relevant officials
with direct knowledge of the Army's future plans for its MRAPs
throughout the chain of command and at different organizations, to
include officials from the Army's budget office and Red River Army
Depot, where MRAPs will be shipped once they are no longer needed in
Iraq or Afghanistan. Moreover, since the MRAP program is a joint
program under U.S. Marine Corps lead, we also interviewed officials
from the MRAP Joint Program Office.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2010 through
September 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix I includes more detailed information on our scope and
methodology.
Background:
The Army has divided nonstandard equipment into two broad categories:
* Nontactical nonstandard equipment, which consists primarily of
durable goods that are used to provide services for soldiers as well
as foreign governments. This equipment includes but is not limited to
fire trucks and ambulances, as well as equipment used for laundry and
food service. Most of this equipment has been acquired through the
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and is managed and
sustained by contractors under the LOGCAP contract (hereinafter
referred to as contractor-managed, government-owned property).
[Footnote 5]
* Tactical nonstandard equipment, which is commercially acquired or
nondevelopmental equipment that is rapidly acquired and fielded
outside the normal Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
System and acquisition processes, in order to bridge capability gaps
and meet urgent warfighter needs.
According to Army documents, as of March 2011, 36.5 percent of all
Army equipment in Iraq was contractor-managed, government-owned
property, with a value of approximately $2.5 billion. Furthermore, as
of March 2011 an additional 10.7 percent of Army equipment in Iraq,
valued at approximately $1.6 billion, was categorized as nonstandard
equipment. According to Army officials, all equipment--standard and
nonstandard--must be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011.
We have reported on issues related to nonstandard equipment in Iraq in
the past. In September 2008 we identified several issues that could
affect the development of plans for reposturing U.S. forces from Iraq.
[Footnote 6] One of those issues was that DOD, CENTCOM, and the
military services had not clearly established roles and
responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of standard
and nonstandard equipment from Iraq. We also noted that data systems
used during the retrograde process were incompatible, and although a
fix for the data system incompatibility had been identified, it had
not been implemented. As a result, we recommended that the Secretary
of Defense, in consultation with CENTCOM and the military departments,
take steps to clarify the chain of command over logistical operations
in support of the retrograde effort. We also recommended that the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the military departments,
correct the incompatibility weaknesses in the various data systems
used to maintain visibility over equipment and materiel while they are
in transit. DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation, and
took steps to clarify the chain of command over logistical operations
in support of the retrograde effort. DOD fully concurred with our
second recommendation, stating that it was actively assessing various
data systems used to maintain visibility over equipment and materiel
while in transit. Finally, though we made no recommendations on this
issue, we noted that maintaining accountability for and managing the
disposition of contractor-managed, government-owned property may
present challenges to reposturing in Iraq. In February 2009, in
testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives, we addressed factors that DOD should consider as the
United States refines its strategy for Iraq and plans to draw down
forces.[Footnote 7] We then included a section on managing the
redeployment of U.S. forces and equipment from Iraq in our March 2009
report on key issues for congressional oversight.[Footnote 8] In
November 2009, in a statement before the Commission on Wartime
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, we presented some preliminary
observations on DOD's planning for the drawdown of U.S. forces from
Iraq,[Footnote 9] and in April 2010 issued a report that highlighted
actions needed to facilitate the efficient drawdown of U.S. forces and
equipment from Iraq.[Footnote 10] In our April 2010 report, we noted
that DOD had created new organizations to oversee, synchronize, and
ensure unity of effort during the drawdown from Iraq, and had
established goals and metrics for measuring progress.[Footnote 11] We
also noted that, partly in response to our September 2008 report
recommendations, representatives from the Secretary of Defense's Lean
Six Sigma office conducted six reviews to optimize theater logistics,
one of which focused on the process for retrograding equipment from
Iraq, including disposition instructions.[Footnote 12] Results from
the Lean Six Sigma study influenced the development of a new data
system--the Theater Provided Equipment Planner--which is intended to
automate the issuance of disposition instructions for theater provided
equipment. Complementing the Theater Provided Equipment Planner
database was a second database--the Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard
Equipment database--which catalogued all types of nonstandard
equipment in Iraq in order to provide automated disposition. However,
we also noted that officials in Iraq and Kuwait stated that, of all
categories of equipment, they had the least visibility over contractor-
managed, government-owned property, and that U.S. Army Central Command
officials said they had low confidence in the accountability and
visibility of nonstandard equipment. While these reports, testimonies,
and statements focused primarily on plans, procedures, and processes
within the CENTCOM area of responsibility, especially in Iraq and
Kuwait, this report's focus will be specifically on nonstandard
equipment and MRAPs, and primarily on the plans, processes, and
procedures that affect its disposition once it leaves the CENTCOM area
of responsibility.
MRAPs were first fielded in Iraq in May 2006 by the Marine Corps for
use in western Iraq. A year later, the Secretary of Defense affirmed
the MRAP program as DOD's most important acquisition program. As of
July 2011, DOD's acquisition objective was 27,744 MRAPs; according to
DOD officials, funding appropriated through fiscal year 2011 is
sufficient to cover 27,740. The vast majority of these MRAPs were
allocated to the Army for use in Iraq and, increasingly, in
Afghanistan. According to Joint Program MRAP statistics, as of
February 2011, MRAPs had been involved in approximately 3,000
improvised explosive device events, and have saved thousands of lives.
We have also reported on MRAPs in the past. In October 2009, we
reported positively on the quick action taken by the Secretary of
Defense to declare the MRAP program DOD's highest priority. However,
we also noted as key challenges that long-term sustainment costs for
MRAPs had not yet been projected and budgeted and that the services
were still deciding how to incorporate MRAPs into their organizational
structures.[Footnote 13] In November 2009, in a statement before the
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, we noted
that although the Army had not yet finalized servicewide requirements
for its MRAPs, it had designated Red River Army Depot as the depot
that would repair MRAPs, and had issued a message directing the
shipment of 200 MRAPs from Kuwait to Red River Army Depot as part of
an MRAP Reset Repair Pilot Program.[Footnote 14] However, we also
noted that as of October 2009, there were approximately 800 MRAPs in
Kuwait awaiting transportation to the United States. In April 2010 we
noted that the Army's strategy for incorporating MRAPs into its ground
vehicle fleet was still pending final approval.[Footnote 15]
Army Has Policies for Disposition of Nontactical Nonstandard Equipment:
Army Has Plans and Processes for the Disposition of Nontactical
Nonstandard Equipment:
As part of the Iraqi drawdown effort, excess nonstandard equipment
that is no longer needed in Iraq is either redistributed in the
CENTCOM theater, disposed of, provided to other nations through
foreign military sales, or packaged for retrograde to a variety of
Defense Logistics Agency Distribution Depots or Sierra Army Depot in
the United States. According to Army Materiel Command, the majority of
the excess nontactical nonstandard equipment is sent to Sierra Army
Depot.[Footnote 16] According to officials at Sierra Army Depot, as of
April 2011 the depot had received a total of 22,507 pieces of
nontactical nonstandard equipment worth over $114.9 million, and still
has on hand approximately 13,200 items worth more than $75 million.
Smaller items, which are stored in a warehouse, include such items as
desktop computers, computer monitors, printers, laptop computers,
handheld palm computers, distress beacons, night vision goggles, rifle
scopes, laser sights, radios, and radio frequency amplifiers. Larger
items, which are stored outside, include all-terrain vehicles,
generators, tractors, fire suppression systems, large refrigerators,
and light sets.
Once the items are received at Sierra Army Depot, they are removed
from their containers, inventoried, evaluated for serviceability,
catalogued, and placed in the appropriate location in the warehouse
or, if they are larger items, in the appropriate outside storage
location. Simultaneously, once the items are catalogued, they are
recorded in Sierra Army Depot's property book for accountability.
Army Uses Various Means to Redistribute Nontactical Nonstandard
Equipment:
According to guidance issued by Headquarters, Department of the Army,
Army Materiel Command is to provide Army Commands,[Footnote 17] Army
Service Component Commands,[Footnote 18] and Army Direct Reporting
Units[Footnote 19] access to the inventory of nontactical nonstandard
equipment stored at depots such as Sierra Army Depot through the
Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard Equipment database; the guidance also
discusses use of the depot property book to view available nonstandard
equipment. Using these means to view what is on hand at Sierra Army
Depot, units can request items from Army Materiel Command, which will
then process the request and coordinate for its shipment to the
requesting unit. In January 2011, Army Materiel Command introduced
another means by which units can requisition nontactical nonstandard
equipment from Army Materiel Command. Called the "virtual mall," this
tool uses the Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard Equipment database as a
means by which units can both view items at Sierra and other Army
depots and request them for their use.
According to Sierra Army Depot records, as of April 2011 it had
shipped more than 7,600 individual pieces of nontactical nonstandard
equipment to various Army organizations. The total value for these
items exceeded $29 million. According to Sierra Army Depot officials,
its single largest customer in terms of number of items shipped is
U.S. Army Installation and Management Command (a Direct Reporting
Unit), which, as of April 2011, had received almost 1,800 items of
nontactical nonstandard equipment from the depot, including computers,
computer monitors, radios, "jaws of life," cameras, generators, metal
detectors, and binoculars. All equipment shipped from Sierra Army
Depot is in "as is" condition. Receiving units are responsible for
shipping costs and for any sustainment funding.
Table 1: Sierra Army Depot Nontactical Nonstandard Equipment Received
and Shipped, as of April 14, 2011:
Total received at the Sierra Army Depot;
Receipts: Items: 22,507;
Receipts: Value: $114.9 million.
Total shipped from the Sierra Army Depot;
Receipts: Items: 8,548;
Receipts: Value: $39.0 million.
U.S. Army posts and bases worldwide;
Shipments: Items: 5,607;
Shipments: Value: $18.7 million.
Sierra Army Depot, Information Management Directorate;
Shipments: Items: 250;
Shipments: Value: $6.9 million.
U.S. Army Installation and Management Command;
Shipments: Items: 1,797;
Shipments: Value: $4.2 million.
State and local governments through NASASP[A];
Shipments: Items: 256;
Shipments: Value: $5.9 million.
Defense Reutilization Management Office;
Shipments: Items: 638;
Shipments: Value: $3.2 million.
Catalogue adjustments[B];
Receipts: Items: 742;
Receipts: Value: n.a.
Equipment on hand at Sierra Army Depot;
Receipts: Items: 13,217;
Receipts: Value: $75.9 million.
Source: Sierra Army Depot.
Notes: n.a. = not applicable.
[A] National Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property.
[B] This is equipment received at Sierra Army Depot that is later
found to be a component part of another piece of equipment. Examples
include antennae that are later found to be component parts of certain
radios.
[End of table]
As shown in table 1 above, Army units are not the only organizations
that can requisition excess nontactical nonstandard equipment. If an
item of nontactical nonstandard equipment has not already been
requisitioned by Army or other federal agencies, such as the
Department of State, local and state governments may seek to acquire
it through the National Association of State Agencies for Surplus
Property (NASASP), which accesses it through the General Services
Administration (GSA). United States Forces-Iraq makes its excess
nontactical nonstandard equipment lists available to GSA and NASASP,
which in turn share these lists with state and local governments.
Moreover, DOD has facilitated and partially funded the placement of a
GSA/NASASP liaison in Kuwait. This liaison enables state and local
governments to make informed decisions about available nontactical
nonstandard equipment and coordinates its cleaning, customs clearance,
movement, and movement tracking. The only costs incurred by state and
local governments for equipment they decide to accept are
transportation costs, and DOD has offered GSA/NASASP access to the
Defense Transportation System, which provides door-to-door delivery,
pricing at the DOD rate, and seamless customs processing. Finally,
periodically GSA and NASASP officials are invited to Sierra Army Depot
to screen excess nontactical nonstandard equipment on site that they
did not have an opportunity to screen in theater.
According to Army documents, as of January 2011 local and state
governments have claimed 20 items valued at over $398,000 from Iraq,
and, as of April 2011, an additional 256 items valued at almost $6
million from Sierra Army Depot. These items include generators,
forklifts, tool kits, bulldozers, light sets, and concrete mixers. As
with Army units, excess nontactical nonstandard equipment is shipped
in "as is" condition. Moreover, according to Army officials, some
excess items, like generators, do not meet U.S. specifications and
therefore require modification.
Army Recently Created Policy on How Long to Retain Nontactical
Nonstandard Equipment before Disposal or Redistribution:
Although Sierra Army Depot has been receiving nontactical nonstandard
equipment from Iraq since November 2009, until recently the Army had
no guidance as to how long that equipment should be stored before
being either redistributed or disposed of. According to Army Materiel
Command officials, the potential usefulness of much of the equipment
stored at Sierra Army Depot will be lost if items just sit on the
shelves. Moreover, Sierra Army Depot records indicate that, as of
April 2011, 59 percent of the nontactical nonstandard equipment
received at the depot since November 2009 was still in storage there,
while approximately 34 percent was shipped to Army organizations for
reuse--$18.7 million to Army installations and bases throughout the
world, $6.9 million to the Sierra Army Depot, and $4.2 million to the
U.S. Army Installation and Management Command. Of the remaining 7
percent, approximately $6 million was donated to state and local
governments and $3.2 million was transferred to disposal.
On April 27, 2011, Headquarters, Department of the Army, disseminated
a message that updated its processes and procedures for the
requisitioning of excess nonstandard equipment stored at selected Army
Materiel Command depots. According to this message, the intent is to
extend the use of that equipment where appropriate. The message also
discusses the use of the "virtual mall" under the Materiel Enterprise
Non-Standard Equipment database and Sierra Army Depot's property book
for units to view equipment. The message also states that the intent
is that once an item is unserviceable or no longer operational, it can
be disposed of through local Defense Logistics Agency Disposition
Services.[Footnote 20] Moreover, the April 2011 message calls for the
establishment of an executive forum to review and determine the final
disposition of excess nonstandard equipment stored at Sierra Army
Depot for more than 180 days that has not been identified for reuse.
According to this message, this semiannual review is intended to
enable the Army's effort to apply due diligence in the final
disposition of nonstandard equipment. In a follow-up to its April 27
message, Headquarters, Department of the Army, issued another message
on June 2, 2011, that outlines the makeup of the executive forum,
which met for the first time on June 18, 2011. Finally, although
neither message states this explicitly, according to a senior
official, once a decision is made by the executive committee to
dispose of nontactical nonstandard equipment that has been at Sierra
Army Depot for more than 180 days, similar instructions will be
included in the Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard Equipment database to
prevent items that have been determined not to have future value or
serviceability from being shipped back to the United States. In this
way unnecessary transportation costs will be avoided.
The Army's Process to Assess Disposition of Tactical Nonstandard
Equipment Does Not Compel Decisions about Most Equipment and Is
Impaired by Lack of Oversight:
Army's Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) Process
Evaluates Tactical Nonstandard Equipment:
According to Army documents, in 2004, the Vice Chief of Staff of the
Army directed U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Army
Capabilities and Integration Center to identify promising capabilities
in use in the CENTCOM theater that, based on their performance, should
quickly become enduring programs of record or acquisition programs.
Originally called Spiral to the Army, this effort eventually evolved
into the Army's Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT)
process. The CDRT process enables the Army to identify capabilities,
most of which involve tactical nonstandard equipment that has been
rapidly fielded, that are performing well in the CENTCOM theater and
then to assess whether the capability should be retained in the Army's
current and future force.[Footnote 21] Developed by the Army
Capabilities and Integration Center and the Army G-3/5/7, the CDRT
process involves the periodic nomination and evaluation of tactical
nonstandard equipment in use in the CENTCOM theater by a CDRT
community of interest. This community includes representatives from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, various
combatant commands, Army commands, Army service component commands,
and various Army centers, such as the Army's armor center, infantry
center, and signal center. At present, the CDRT community of interest
convenes quarterly to evaluate nominated capabilities.
To qualify as a candidate for consideration in the CDRT process, a
piece of tactical nonstandard equipment must first be nominated for
consideration and, in addition, must have been in use for at least 120
days and have undergone an operational assessment, among other
qualifications.[Footnote 22] Once identified, a list of candidates for
consideration is compiled by the Army Capabilities and Integration
Center and the Army G-3/5/7 and then sent to the CDRT community of
interest for assessment. Assessment of each item of equipment is
performed through a scoring system based on survey responses from
operational Army units. Based on the assessment, each piece of
equipment is placed in one of three categories: Acquisition Program
Candidate/Enduring, Sustain, or Terminate. Tactical nonstandard
equipment placed in the "enduring" category is theater-proven
equipment assessed as providing a capability applicable to the entire
Army and to the future force; as such, it may become eligible to
compete for funding in the Army's base budget. Tactical nonstandard
equipment placed in the "sustain" category is equipment assessed as
filling a current operational need in the CENTCOM theater, but which
is not applicable to the entire Army, useful to the future force, or
not yet recommended as an enduring capability. Sustain category
tactical nonstandard equipment is resourced through overseas
contingency operations funding, and is not programmed into the Army's
base budget. Finally, tactical nonstandard equipment placed in the
"terminate" category is equipment deemed to have been ineffective, or
as obsolete, or as having not fulfilled its intended function, or as
having no further utility beyond current use. Army policy states that
tactical nonstandard equipment in this category is not to be allocated
Department of the Army funding, although individual units may continue
to sustain the equipment with unit funds.[Footnote 23]
Through the CDRT process, the Army has been able to accelerate the
normal process by which requirements and needs are developed, as
outlined in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.
[Footnote 24] That is because tactical nonstandard equipment placed in
the enduring category as a result of the CDRT process enters the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System at a more advanced
developmental stage, as opposed to entering the system from the start.
Accordingly, the Army views the CDRT process as a key means for
determining the future disposition of rapidly fielded capabilities.
Most Army Tactical Nonstandard Equipment Is Sustained with Overseas
Contingency Funds:
Although one of the tenets of the CDRT process is to assess rapidly
developed capabilities equipped to deployed units and move those
proven in combat to enduring status as quickly as possible, a
significant majority of the tactical nonstandard equipment evaluated
to date has been categorized as sustain category equipment to be used
only in the CENTCOM theater and paid for with overseas contingency
operations funds. As of January 2011, the CDRT community of interest
had met 10 times and considered 497 capabilities, of which 13 were
nonmaterial capabilities. As a result, 30 material and 10 nonmaterial
capabilities were selected as enduring; and an additional 13
capabilities were merged into other programs.[Footnote 25] An example
of an enduring category material capability involving tactical
nonstandard equipment is the Boomerang Gunshot Detector, which is an
antisniper detection system that detects gunfire and alerts soldiers
to the shooter's location. A further 116 material capabilities were
terminated. An example of a capability that was terminated because the
CDRT community of interest considered it obsolete is the Cupola
Protective Ensemble, which is protective clothing worn over body armor
to protect troops from the blast effects of improvised explosive
devices. The remaining 328 capabilities, including for example the
Combined Information Data Network Exchange, were placed in the sustain
category. According to Army officials, this piece of tactical
nonstandard equipment was placed in the sustain category because,
although it works well in the CENTCOM theater, it would not be
applicable elsewhere, as it is a database with intelligence
information specific to that theater. Capabilities that are designated
as sustain category items may be reviewed during future CDRT
iterations to see if that decision is still valid, and selected excess
equipment placed in this category and no longer required in theater is
being warehoused by Army Materiel Command until called upon in the
future. Army officials have also stated, however, that the majority of
capabilities considered by the CDRT community of interest are placed
in the sustain category because the Army has yet to make definitive
and difficult decisions about whether it wants to keep them and cannot
afford to sustain this equipment without overseas contingency
operations appropriations. As we have previously recommended, DOD
should shift certain contingency costs into the annual base budget to
allow for prioritization and trade-offs among DOD's needs and to
enhance visibility in defense spending. The department concurred with
this recommendation.[Footnote 26]
Lack of Oversight for Tactical Nonstandard Equipment Impairs
Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition Process and May Inhibit
Future Funding Estimates:
The effectiveness of the Army's CDRT process is also inhibited by the
lack of a system to track, monitor, and manage this equipment, which,
in turn, may be attributed to the absence of a single focal point with
the appropriate authority to oversee the fielding and disposition of
tactical nonstandard equipment. As stated above, to qualify as a
candidate for consideration in the CDRT process, a piece of tactical
nonstandard equipment must first be nominated. But without a system or
entity responsible for tracking, monitoring, and managing all items of
tactical nonstandard equipment in its inventory, some capabilities in
the CENTCOM theater may not be nominated and, therefore, never
considered by the CDRT community of interest.
According to federal best practices reported in GAO's Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, management is responsible
for developing detailed policies, procedures, and practices to help
program managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship
of public resources.[Footnote 27] To this end, in March 2011 we
reported that DOD lacks visibility over the full range of its urgent
needs efforts--one of the methods though which tactical nonstandard
equipment is obtained and fielded--including tracking the solutions
developed in response to those needs. Additionally, we found that DOD
does not have a senior-level focal point to lead the department's
efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs requirements. Accordingly,
we recommended that DOD designate a focal point to lead the
department's urgent needs efforts and that DOD and its components,
like the Army, develop processes and requirements to ensure tools and
mechanisms are used to track, monitor, and manage the status of urgent
needs. DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would
develop baseline policies that would guide the services' own processes
in tracking urgent needs and that the Director of the Joint Rapid
Acquisition Cell would serve as the DOD focal point.[Footnote 28] In
April 2010 the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army issued a memorandum
calling for the development of a rapid acquisition/rapid equipping
common operating picture and collaboration tool, as a means to
increase the efficiency and transparency of Army urgent needs
processes. As of April 2011, however, Army officials stated that the
system directed by the Vice Chief of Staff had yet to be deployed due
to a lack of agreement over information sharing and over who would be
responsible for the system. Because Army officials have repeatedly
stressed that they do not have visibility over the entire universe of
tactical nonstandard equipment in the CENTCOM theater and consider
only those capabilities that have been nominated, in the absence of a
common operating picture and a single focal point responsible for
tracking, monitoring, and managing Army tactical nonstandard equipment
it is possible that a piece of nonstandard equipment may exist in the
CENTCOM theater that is either more effective, less expensive, or
both, than a comparable piece of equipment that has been considered by
the CDRT community of interest. Moreover, without visibility over the
universe of tactical nonstandard equipment, the Army cannot project
reset and sustainment costs for this equipment, and ensure that
equipment is only being funded to the extent needed to meet a
continuing requirement.
Army Has Finalized Disposition Plans for Its MRAP Fleet, but Its Cost
Estimates Are Incomplete and Do Not Follow Best Practices:
Army Has Finalized Detailed Disposition Plans for Its MRAP Fleet:
The Army has recently transitioned MRAPs from nonstandard to standard
items of equipment and published detailed disposition plans outlining
how the vehicles will be integrated into the Army's force structure.
These detailed disposition plans are outlined in the document Final
Report, Army Capabilities Integration Center, Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Study II (final report), which was released on June 22,
2011.[Footnote 29] This final report followed an August 2010 U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command study to determine the best means to
integrate MRAPs into the overall Army force structure. The August 2010
study presented Army leaders with two courses of action. Although
there were several similarities between the two--for instance, each
called for the placement of approximately 1,700 MRAPs in training
sets--there were also some substantial differences. Specifically, the
first course of action called for the placement of the majority of the
Army's MRAPs, more than 10,600, into prepositioned stocks. The second
course of action allocated almost 4,000 fewer MRAPs to prepositioned
stocks, and placed more with Army units. The August 2010 study
recommended adoption of the first course of action because, according
to Army officials, it offered the most balanced distribution of MRAPs
among prepositioned stocks, training sets, reserve sets, and unit
sets. Furthermore, the August 2010 study stated that other benefits
that would accrue from the first course of action include reduced
installation infrastructure effects and lower military construction
costs, lower operations and maintenance costs, and lower life-cycle
costs. For example, the study estimated that over a 25-year period,
the first course of action would accrue $2.093 billion in life-cycle
costs, while the second course of action would accrue $2.548 billion
in life-cycle costs (these costs do not include onetime costs,
discussed below, for upgrading and standardizing MRAPs that are
returned to the United States). According to Army officials, the
savings would result from having more MRAPs in prepositioned stocks,
which, in turn, require less maintenance. Finally, according to Army
Training and Doctrine Command officials, the first course of action
provided the Army better operational flexibility, because MRAPs would
already be positioned in forward areas and would not have to be
transported from the United States, while the approach would still
maintain sufficient numbers of MRAPs for training.
On December 16, 2010, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
presented the results of its August 2010 study to the Army
Requirements and Resourcing Board, for decision. On April 20, 2011,
Headquarters, Department of the Army, published an order to provide
guidance to develop an execution plan for the retrograde, reset, and
restationing of the MRAP fleet, with an end state being an MRAP fleet
that is properly allocated and globally positioned to support the full
range of Army operations. The order did not give any specifics
regarding the allocation of MRAPs across the Army ground vehicle
fleet, however. According to Army officials, these specifics would be
provided by the final report, which was released on June 22, 2011.
According to the final report, MRAPs will be allocated as shown in
table 2.
Table 2: Allocation of MRAPs According to Final Report, Army
Capabilities Integration Center, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Study
II (June 22, 2011):
Stocks and sets: Prepositioned Stock Sets;
Number of MRAPs: 10,797.
Stocks and sets: Unit Sets;
Number of MRAPs: 4,727.
Stocks and sets: Training Sets;
Number of MRAPs: 1,989.
Stocks and sets: Reserve Stocks;
Number of MRAPs: 746.
Stocks and sets: Total;
Number of MRAPs: 18,259.
Source: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
[End of table]
Although the specific allocation of MRAPs varies slightly from that
recommended in the August 2010 study (for example, the course of
action recommended in the August 2010 study allocated 970 MRAPs to
reserve stocks instead of the 746 adopted by the final report), the
reasons given in the final report for allocating the MRAPs across the
fleet were essentially the same as proposed in the August 2010 study:
to provide a balanced distribution of MRAPs between units and
prepositioned stocks, to provide strategic depth and operational
flexibility by placing the bulk of the MRAPs in prepositioned stocks,
and to provide a pool of reserve stock MRAPs that could be used to
sustain prepositioned stock sets and maintain unit MRAP readiness. In
addition, as had the August 2010 study, the final report highlighted
the expected life-cycle costs for MRAPs based on the chosen
allocation. This figure, $2.086 billion over 25 years, is slightly
lower than the figure estimated in the August 2010 study.
Army's Cost Analysis of MRAP Disposition Is Incomplete and Does Not
Fully Follow Cost Estimating Best Practices:
Though both the August 2010 study and the final report state the
estimated life-cycle costs for MRAPs over 25 years, neither estimate
fully follows recommendations in DOD's instruction on economic
analysis and decisionmaking,[Footnote 30] Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) guidance for conducting cost-benefit analyses,[Footnote
31] and GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.[Footnote 32] For
example, all three sets of guidance recommend that costs be calculated
in or adjusted to present value terms, yet both the August 2010 study
and the final report present costs in constant fiscal year 2011
dollars. While constant dollars allow for the comparison of costs
across years by controlling for inflation, present value analysis is
also recommended when aggregating costs to account for the time value
of money. As a result of not doing a present value analysis and not
recognizing the time value of money, the timing of when the costs are
expected to occur is not taken into account. According to DOD's
instruction for economic analysis and decisionmaking, "accounting for
the time value of money is crucial to the conduct of an economic
analysis."[Footnote 33] Moreover, the August 2010 study and the final
report present life-cycle costs in aggregate, yet OMB guidance
regarding underlying assumptions suggests that key data and results,
such as year-by-year estimates of benefits and costs, should be
reported to promote independent analysis and review. DOD guidance
suggests that the results of economic analysis, including all
calculations and sources of data, should be documented down to the
most basic inputs to provide an auditable and stand-alone document,
and the GAO guide says that it is necessary to determine when
expenditures will be made. Without a year-by-year breakout of the
costs, decision makers have no insight on the pattern of expenditures,
a perspective that could be important for future asset management and
budgetary decisions. Moreover, a year-by-year breakout of estimated
costs would facilitate independent analysis and review.
Complicating the issue surrounding life-cycle costs for MRAPs is that
neither the August 2010 study nor the final report indicates that the
"known" life-cycle costs, as they are labeled, are not, in fact, the
total life-cycle costs. According to Army officials, the costs
depicted in both documents are differential costs, meaning that the
only life-cycle costs that were used in the decision-making matrix
were costs that would differ between the two courses of action.
Conversely, costs associated with elements of each course of action
that were the same were not included. For example, both courses of
action delineated in the August 2010 study allocated 2,818 MRAPs to
certain types of units (truck companies for convoy protection, for
instance). According to Army officials, costs associated with these
MRAPs were not included in the decision matrices depicted in either
the August 2010 study or the final report, and nowhere in either
report is this indicated. According to Army officials, the Army does
not yet know the true total MRAP life-cycle costs, although the Army's
MRAP program management office is leading an effort to complete such
an estimate no later than fiscal year 2015. Nevertheless, the fact
that neither document states that the life-cycle costs presented in
each are not total costs may be misleading for decision makers. It
also raises the question of to what extent the Army considered the
affordability of either alternative; the associated trade-offs in the
sustainment of its current fleet of tactical and combat equipment; or
offsets in future modernization procurement that might be necessary in
its base budget to sustain the additional 18,259 vehicles, of which
4,727 will be assigned to units. Finally, although Army officials
provided us with a copy of a sensitivity analysis,[Footnote 34] which
all three sets of guidance recommend, neither the August 2010 study
nor the final report indicates that a sensitivity or uncertainty
analysis was done.
According to DOD documents, as a joint program, MRAPs have been
allocated, through July 2011, $44.1 billion in overseas contingency
operations funding. The military departments consequently have not had
to fully account for long-term budgetary aspects and will eventually
face substantial operational support costs in their annual base
budgets. Army officials have likewise expressed concern about the loss
of overseas contingency operations funding for MRAPs once the vehicles
become part of the Army's enduring force structure. Specifically, they
are concerned about the Army's ability to fund operations and
maintenance costs for MRAPs within the Army base budget and the
funding trade-offs that might have to be made with other major
acquisition programs.
On May 25, 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) issued
budget submission guidance to the DOD components stating that costs
for non-war-related upgrades or conversions, home station training
costs, and the storage of MRAPs not active in combat operations must
be included in base budget estimates for fiscal years 2012 to 2016,
thereby compelling the services to begin planning for funding MRAPs.
Specific upgrades include increased armor protection, enhanced
suspensions, and the standardization and consolidation of the many
MRAP variants. In response, the Army has allocated $142.9 million in
its fiscal year 2012 base budget submission for the upgrade of 224
MRAPs at Red River Army Depot and, all told, has planned to budget for
the upgrade of 3,616 MRAPs for fiscal years 2012 through 2016, at a
cost of $1.6 billion.[Footnote 35] However, the Army has not allocated
funding for home station training or MRAP storage over the same period.
According to the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy,[Footnote
36] one of the references used to inform the final report, it is
important that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
executive and legislative branches are kept informed of the Army's
needs to support its given missions and of any risks it foresees, so
that thoughtful funding decisions can be made. In addition, this
strategy states that the availability of adequate funding poses
significant risks and that, if funding is lower than forecasted, the
Army will be required to make difficult trade-offs that would, in
turn, create increased operational risks. Moreover, in its April 20,
2011 order, Headquarters, Department of the Army, noted that one of
the objectives of the order was to direct Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution to ensure necessary action to identify and
validate requirements used to inform future programming development.
However, given the limitations to the cost estimates of both the
August 2010 MRAP study and the final report on MRAPs, and the fact
that the total cost estimates for the Army MRAP program are not yet
complete, it is difficult to see how Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution can be accomplished.
Conclusions:
Although the Army has plans and processes for the disposition of its
nontactical and tactical nonstandard equipment, challenges remain
that, if left unresolved, could affect plans for the eventual drawdown
of U.S. forces from Iraq as well as Afghanistan. Specifically, without
greater oversight over the universe of tactical nonstandard equipment
currently being employed in Iraq and without a single focal point
responsible for maintaining oversight of this equipment, there is a
potential that some tactical nonstandard equipment that has been
effective will be overlooked, and the Army could potentially forfeit
opportunities for cost-saving efficiency and for ensuring that
servicemembers are provided the most effective combat system. In
addition, because the Army has categorized the vast majority of the
tactical nonstandard equipment that it has considered as equipment
that will continue to be funded with overseas contingency operations
funds, it has not had to make the hard decisions about finding money
for these programs in its base budget. Yet the Army cannot afford to
sustain this equipment without overseas contingency operations funds,
and continuing to fund these items in this manner places a strain on
the Army budget that is not transparent. Finally, future costs
associated with MRAPs will remain uncertain without a thorough
analysis of those costs based on DOD, OMB, and GAO best practices and
the completion of a true total cost estimate. Moreover, without the
disclosure of the complete set of costs associated with MRAPs, the
Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and congressional
decision makers will be unable to ascertain the long-term budgetary
effects of the program, which is critical information in a time when
competing programs are vying for finite and increasingly constrained
funding.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To facilitate the Army's ability to efficiently evaluate, integrate,
and provide for the disposition of its nonstandard equipment being
retrograded from Iraq, and supply DOD decision makers and Congress
with accurate estimates of the future costs of these systems, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to take the following three actions:
* finalize decisions about the future status of tactical nonstandard
equipment, fund those items deemed as enduring capabilities in the
Army base budget if applicable, and provide Congress with its plans
for and estimates on future funding for or costs associated with any
equipment the Army will continue to use in theater that will not
become enduring capabilities;
* designate a senior-level focal point within the Department of the
Army with the appropriate authority and resources to manage the
service's effort in overseeing the disposition of its tactical
nonstandard equipment to include the implementation of a servicewide
means to track, monitor, and manage this equipment; and:
* undertake a thorough total life-cycle cost estimate for integrating
MRAPs into its ground vehicle fleet in accordance with DOD, OMB, and
GAO guidance and include costs for training, upgrades,
standardization, and military construction and:
- use this estimate to assess the affordability of its current plans
and make adjustments to those plans if warranted; and:
- provide the total life-cycle cost for integrating MRAPs into its
ground vehicle fleet to Congress.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our first recommendation, did not concur with our second
recommendation, and concurred with our third recommendation. These
comments are included in appendix II. In addition, DOD provided
technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate.
In response to our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to finalize decisions about the
future status of tactical nonstandard equipment, fund those items
deemed as enduring capabilities in the Army base budget if applicable,
and provide Congress with its plans for and estimates on future
funding for or costs associated with any equipment the Army will
continue to use in theater that will not become enduring capabilities,
DOD partially concurred. In its response, DOD stated that the
Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process
identifies enduring capabilities as Army Program Candidates and that
the CDRT meets quarterly and provides recommendations to the DOD Joint
Capabilities Development System, the Army Requirements Oversight
Council, or the Joint Requirements Oversight Council depending on the
acquisition strategy. DOD also stated that program managers and
appropriate Army personnel then compete selected programs in the
Program Operating Memoranda Joint Capabilities Assessment to secure
funding and for inclusion in the President's Budget Submission.
Finally, DOD stated that the Army will provide the recommended report
regarding any equipment the Army will continue to sustain in theater
after Army forces return from Iraq. We support DOD's rendering of a
report to Congress outlining the equipment that it will continue to
sustain in theater with overseas contingency operations funds. We also
recognize that the CDRT process has resulted in a recommendation that
certain equipment become programs of record and, as such, compete for
funding in the Army's base budget. However, as we reported, of the 484
material capabilities considered by the CDRT process as of January
2011, only 30, including Armored Security Vehicles and One-System
Remote Video Terminals, have received such a recommendation while 328
material capabilities considered by CDRT were still being maintained
by overseas contingency operations funds. Army officials familiar with
the CDRT process have stated that the Army has yet to make definitive
and difficult decisions about the majority of the material
capabilities considered by CDRT and it cannot afford to sustain this
equipment without overseas contingency operations funds. However, in
order for the department to plan for and Congress to be informed of
the future cost effect of sustaining new items of equipment after the
end of overseas contingency operations funding, we continue to believe
that the Army should eliminate this unknown by finalizing decisions
about the future status of its tactical nonstandard equipment.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to designate a senior-level
focal point within the Department of the Army with the appropriate
authority and resources to manage the service's effort in overseeing
the disposition of its tactical nonstandard equipment to include the
implementation of a servicewide means to track, monitor, and manage
this equipment. In its response, DOD stated that our recommendation
does not account for the complexity covering requirements
determination and approval, combat development, materiel development,
management, and sustainment. In addition, DOD's response stated that
the Army used the same processes for managing nonstandard equipment as
it does to manage standard equipment and highlighted the
responsibilities of the Army G-3/5/7, G-8, G-4, and Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology with
regard to nonstandard equipment. Moreover, in its response DOD
maintained that the Army has visibility of the nonstandard equipment
in theater and has undertaken extensive efforts to ensure all
nonstandard equipment is brought to record and accounted for, and that
the Army staff and the Life Cycle Management Commands review
nonstandard equipment on a recurring basis to determine its
disposition. In summation, DOD's position is that the Army does not
believe it advisable to treat tactical nonstandard equipment different
from nontactical nonstandard equipment or standard equipment. However,
as the report points out, the Army already does treat tactical
nonstandard equipment differently than nontactical nonstandard
equipment and standard equipment, a fact underscored by the existence
of the CDRT process, which is applicable only to tactical nonstandard
equipment and not to any other types of equipment. In addition, Army
officials repeatedly stressed to us that they do not have visibility
over the universe of tactical nonstandard equipment in the CENTCOM
theater. Army officials also told us that, despite an April 2010
memorandum from the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army calling for the
development of a common operating picture and collaboration tool as a
means to increase efficiency and transparency of Army urgent needs
processes by which tactical nonstandard equipment is acquired, as of
April 2011 one had yet to be fielded due to a lack of agreement over
information sharing and over who would be responsible for the system.
Moreover, in March 2011, DOD concurred with our recommendation that
the department appoint a senior-level focal point to lead its urgent
needs efforts and that its components, like the Army, develop
processes and requirements to ensure tools and mechanisms are used to
track, monitor, and manage the status of urgent needs. On the basis of
the above, we continue to believe that like DOD, the Army should
designate a senior-level focal point with the appropriate authority
and resources to manage the service's efforts in overseeing the
disposition of its tactical nonstandard equipment to include the
implementation of a servicewide means to track, monitor, and manage
this equipment.
DOD concurred with our third recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to undertake a thorough total
life-cycle cost estimate for integrating MRAPs into its ground vehicle
fleet in accordance with DOD, OMB, and GAO guidance and include costs
for training, upgrades, standardization, and military construction;
that the Army use this estimate to assess the affordability of its
current plans and make adjustments to those plans if warranted; and
that the Army provide the total life-cycle cost for integrating MRAPs
into its ground vehicle fleet to Congress. DOD commented that the Army
staff, in conjunction with the Joint Program Office, is now conducting
a Sustainment Readiness Review that addresses issues of total life-
cycle costs for MRAPs, and that it will continue to refine its
estimates to determine total life-cycle costs, which will inform
future budget decisions as the Army continues to reset its force. We
believe that if the Army's total life-cycle cost estimate is conducted
in accordance with DOD, OMB, and GAO guidance and used to develop an
affordable plan for integrating MRAPs into its vehicle fleet as well
as to provide Congress with a total life-cycle cost of its plan, its
actions will be responsive to our recommendations.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army.
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed
in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who
made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
List of Addressees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John Tierney:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign
Operations:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for
the disposition of nontactical nonstandard equipment no longer needed
in Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents, including
various Army messages that address the procedures for requisitioning
retrograded nonstandard equipment from Iraq. In addition, we
interviewed Army officials at relevant organizations throughout the
chain of command and at several different organizations. We also
reviewed Army Materiel Command briefings regarding the Materiel
Enterprise Non-Standard Equipment database and Virtual Mall
demonstrations and spoke with officials involved with the National
Association of State Agencies for Surplus Property program.
Furthermore, we also conducted a site visit to Sierra Army Depot,
where the vast bulk of the Army's nontactical nonstandard equipment is
shipped once it leaves Iraq, to view procedures and processes there
for the evaluation, disposition, storage, and integration of
nontactical nonstandard equipment. We also drew from our body of
previously issued work related to nonstandard equipment to include
various Iraq drawdown-related issues to identify areas where the
Department of Defense (DOD) could make improvements in executing and
managing the retrograde of standard and nonstandard equipment from
Iraq.
To determine the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for
the disposition of tactical nonstandard equipment no longer needed in
Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents, including Army
plans, messages, guidance, regulations, and briefings that addressed
the subject. We also reviewed Army Audit Agency reports that
specifically address the Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition
process as well as the sustainment of tactical nonstandard equipment.
In addition, we interviewed Army officials at several relevant
organizations throughout the chain of command and made a site visit to
Fort Monroe, Virginia, where we interviewed officials from U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command and from the Army Capabilities and
Integration Center, both of which play leading roles in determining
the ultimate disposition of tactical nonstandard equipment. We also
interviewed officials from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization to discuss the interface between that organization
and the Army's processes for integrating tactical nonstandard
equipment into its inventory. Finally, we drew from our body of
previously issued work examining DOD's urgent needs processes and the
need for DOD to obtain visibility over these efforts.[Footnote 37]
To determine the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for
the disposition of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP) no
longer needed in Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents,
including Army plans, messages, guidance, and briefings that addressed
the subject. In particular, we reviewed the Army's MRAP disposition
plans included in the Final Report, Army Capabilities and Integration
Center, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Study II, and also considered
in our analysis the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy. We also
analyzed Army cost estimates for integrating MRAPs into its ground
vehicle fleet and compared these estimates with DOD's instruction for
economic analysis, the Office of Management and Budget's guidance for
conducting cost-benefit analyses, and GAO's Cost Estimating and
Assessment Guide. We interviewed relevant officials with direct
knowledge of the Army's future plans for its MRAPs throughout the
chain of command to include officials from the Army's budget office
and Red River Army Depot, where MRAPs will be shipped once they are no
longer needed in Iraq or Afghanistan. Moreover, we made a site visit
to Fort Monroe, Virginia, where we interviewed officials from U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command and from the Army Capabilities and
Integration Center, both of which were tasked to complete the MRAP
Study II Final Report; and since the MRAP program is currently a joint
program under U.S. Marine Corps lead, we also interviewed officials
from the MRAP Joint Program Office. Finally, we also drew from our
body of previously issued work regarding MRAPs to include the rapid
acquisition of these vehicles as well as the challenges the services
have faced with incorporating MRAPs into their organizational
structures.[Footnote 38]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010:
September 12, 2011:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office 441:
G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-11766, "Warfighter Support: Improved Cost Analysis and
Better Oversight Needed Over Army Non-standard Equipment," dated
August 10, 2011 (GAO Code 351550). The Department partially concurs
with recommendation #1, non-concurs with recommendation #2 and concurs
with recommendation #3. Detailed comments on the report
recommendations are enclosed.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Technical comments were provided separately for your consideration.
Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Brian Stutz,
Brian.Stutz@osd.mil, 571-256-1219.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Thomas P. Dee:
Director:
Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell:
Enclosure: As stated.
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated August 10, 2011:
GAO-11-766 (GAO Code 351550):
"Warfighter Support: Improved Cost Analysis And Better Oversight
Needed Over Army Non-Standard Equipment"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to finalize decisions about the
future status of tactical non-standard equipment, fund those items
deemed as enduring capabilities in the Army base budget if applicable,
and provide Congress with its plans for and estimates on future
funding for or costs associated with any equipment the Army will
continue to use in theater that will not become enduring capabilities.
DOD Response: Partially concur. The Army (as noted in the report)
already has a process that achieves the recommended end state. The
Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT), led by Army G-3,
identifies those enduring capabilities as Army Program Candidates
(APCs). CDRT meets quarterly and provides recommendations to the DOD
Joint Capabilities and Development System (JCIDS) or the Army
Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) or the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) depending on acquisition category. Program
managers and Army Staff System Synchronization Officers then compete
these programs (i.e. Armored Security Vehicles (ASV), One-System Remote
Video Terminals (OSRUT), etc.) in the Program Operating Memoranda Joint
Capabilities Assessment to secure funding and inclusion in the annual
Presidents Budget Submission. The Army will provide the recommended
report regarding any equipment the Army will continue to sustain in
theater after Army forces return from Iraq.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to designate a senior-level focal
point within the Department of the Army with the appropriate authority
and resources to manage the service's effort in overseeing the
disposition of its tactical non-standard equipment to include the
implementation of service-wide means to track, monitor and manage this
equipment.
DOD Response: Non-concur. The recommendation does not account for the
complexity covering requirements determination and approval, combat
development, materiel development, management and sustainment. The
Army uses the same processes for managing non-standard equipment as it
does to manage standard equipment. The G-3/5/7 maintains oversight for
requirements evaluation and approval, the G-8 and ASA(ALT) for
programming and acquisition and the G-4 for overall materiel
sustainment. Current Army policy requires all non-expendable property
(to include non-standard equipment) to be maintained on an accountable
system of record. For the tactical force, that is the Property Book Unit
Supply-Enhanced (PBUSE). Through PBUSE, the Army has visibility of the
nonstandard equipment in theater The Army has undertaken extensive
efforts to ensure all non-standard equipment is brought to record and
accounted for through the Army-wide property accountability campaign
which utilizes the United States Army Audit Agency, the DoD and
Department of the Army Inspector General staff to assess and measure
progress. In addition, the Army Staff and the Life Cycle Management
Commands review non-standard equipment on a recurring basis to
determine its disposition. Non-standard equipment, both tactical and
non-tactical, is identified for retrograde, divestment or disposal
based upon the items potential for use outside the theater of
operations. Additionally, the G-4 has established a quarterly
nonstandard equipment review board to determine and oversee the
disposition of nonstandard equipment at Sierra Army Depot. The first
board met in July 2011 with the second board scheduled in October
2011. The Army does not believe it advisable to treat tactical non-
standard equipment different from non-tactical non-standard equipment
or standard equipment.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to undertake a thorough total life-
cycle cost estimate for integrating MRAPs into its ground vehicle
fleet in accordance with DoD, OMB, and GAO guidance and include costs
for training, upgrades, standardization, military construction and;
* Use this estimate to assess the affordability of its current plans and
make adjustments to those plans if warranted; and;
* Provide to total life-cycle cost for integrating MRAPs into its ground
vehicle fleet to Congress.
DOD Response: Concur. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
Family of Vehicles was a rapid acquisition Joint Program providing
protected mobility for Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan and saved
lives. As a result of the rapid acquisition strategy, 25 MRAP variants
were produced over time to meet an evolving threat. The Army plans to
reduce the number of variants to nine in order to optimize management
of the MRAP enduring fleet. Joint Program Office MRAP ICW the Army
Staff is now conducting the Sustainment Readiness Review (SRR) which
addresses issues of total life cycle costs. SRR will continue to
refine its estimates to determine total life cycle costs which will
inform future budget decisions as the Army continues to RESET the
force.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William M. Solis (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov:
Staff:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key
contributions to this report include Larry Junek, Assistant Director;
Nick Benne; Stephen Donahue; Guy LoFaro; Emily Norman; Charles Perdue;
Carol Petersen; Michael Shaughnessy; Maria Storts; and Cheryl Weissman.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] A modified table of organization and equipment documents the
specific types and amounts of equipment U.S. Army units are authorized
to have.
[2] MRAPs transitioned from nonstandard to standard items of Army
equipment during the course of this engagement.
[3] For the purpose of this report, we are including the Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) in our
MRAP discussion and figures. As of February 2011, the United States
Marine Corps has 3,635 MRAPs; the Navy has 698 MRAPS; the Air Force
has 815 MRAPs; and Special Operations Command has 1,083 MRAPs.
[4] Agreement on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and
the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence
in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, Temp. State Dept. No. 09-6.
[5] This description, which is contained in a memo from the Secretary
of the Army, also uses the term "White Equipment" to refer to this
property. As defined in the memo, White Equipment is contractor-
acquired, government-owned property. Memorandum from the Secretary of
the Army, Army Directive 2010-07, Non-Standard Equipment Interim
Policy (Aug. 4, 2010). Other Army guidance also includes government-
furnished property in the definition of nontactical nonstandard
equipment.
[6] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD
Planning for Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-930] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10,
2008). According to DOD officials at the time, U.S. forces in Iraq
would not be "drawn down" but rather "repostured." Multi-National
Force Iraq officials defined "reposture operations," a nondoctrinal
term, as the "realignment of forces, bases, and resources to adjust to
changes in the operating environment."
[7] GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and
Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and
Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-380T]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2009).
[8] GAO, Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-294SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24,
2009).
[9] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DOD
Planning for the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-179] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2,
2009).
[10] GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the
Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19,
2010).
[11] Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all
forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not
necessarily part of the same command structure. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Pub. 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Mar.
20, 2009).
[12] Lean Six Sigma, a disciplined process improvement methodology,
has been endorsed by DOD leadership as a key means by which the
department will become more efficient in its operations and more
effective in its support of the warfighter. On April 30, 2007, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the establishment of a program
office to drive DOD-wide activities with Lean Six Sigma.
[13] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Rapid Acquisition of MRAP Vehicles,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-155T] (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 8, 2009).
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-179].
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376].
[16] Other depots that receive much smaller amounts of retrograded
nontactical nonstandard equipment are Tobyhanna Army Depot,
Letterkenny Army Depot, and selected U.S. Army Medical Command Depots.
[17] An Army Command is an army force, designated by the Secretary of
the Army, that performs multiple Army functions across multiple
disciplines. There are three Army Commands: U.S. Army Forces Command,
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and U.S. Army Materiel
Command. Army Regulation 10-87, Organization and Functions: Army
Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units
(Sept. 4, 2007).
[18] An Army Service Component Command is an Army force, designated by
the Secretary of the Army, comprised primarily of operational
organizations serving as the Army component or of a combatant command
or subunified command. Army Regulation 10-87. Although the regulation
identifies only 9 Army Service Component Commands, there are currently
10 with the addition of U.S. Army Africa. Examples include U.S. Army
Central, U.S. Army Europe, and U.S. Eighth Army, Korea. Army
Regulation 10-87.
[19] A Direct Reporting Unit is an Army organization comprised of one
or more units with institutional or operational functions, designated
by the Secretary of the Army, normally to provide broad general
support to the Army in a single, unique discipline not otherwise
available elsewhere in the Army. There are 11 Direct Reporting Units.
Examples include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Military
District of Washington, and the United States Military Academy. Army
Regulation 10-87.
[20] Formerly known as the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service.
[21] The CDRT process also evaluates capabilities associated with new
or evolving tactics, techniques, or procedures.
[22] According to a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command regulation
applicable to the process, to qualify as a candidate for
consideration, a capability must be in use in an operational theater
for at least 120 days, be operationally mature, fill a validated
current force need, and be applicable as an enduring element of the
future force. Material solutions must additionally be capable of
production without major modification, not be an existing acquisition
program, and have undergone an operational assessment. U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 71-20, Concept Development,
Capabilities Determination, and Capabilities Integration (Feb. 23,
2011).
[23] Guidance specifies that additional use of Army funds to support
this equipment is restricted to essential sustainment until sufficient
quantities of replacement items are on hand, or until the equipment
reaches the end of its useful life or is disposed of. Memorandum from
the Secretary of the Army, Non-Standard Equipment Interim Policy.
[24] The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System was
established to provide DOD with an integrated, collaborative process
to identify and guide development of a broad set of new capabilities
that address the current and emerging security environment.
[25] According to an Army official, a capability is merged with
another system when it is recognized that it shares capabilities with
other existing and emerging systems.
[26] GAO, Overseas Contingency Operations: Funding and Cost Reporting
for the Department of Defense, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-288R] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2009).
[27] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[28] GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More
Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-273] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 1, 2011).
[29] Army Capabilities Integration Center, Final Report, Army
Capabilities Integration Center, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Study
II (June 22, 2011).
[30] Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis for
Decisionmaking (Nov. 7, 1995).
[31] Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-94, Guidelines
and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (Oct.
29, 1992).
[32] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
[33] DOD Instruction 7041.3, p. 11.
[34] MRAP Study II Cost-Benefit Analyses, Sensitivity Analyses, no
date. This sensitivity analysis, which is in the form of PowerPoint
slides, varies several criteria used to make the final decision about
integrating MRAPs into the Army's ground vehicle fleet. According to
Army officials, the results of this sensitivity analysis confirm the
final decision.
[35] Meanwhile, it is anticipated that reset and repair of MRAPs in
the CENTCOM theater will continue to be funded with overseas
contingency operations funds.
[36] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8,
Army 2010 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy (Nov. 11, 2010). The 2010
Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy charts the way ahead for the
modernization and sustainment of the Army's wheeled vehicle fleet.
[37] For example, GAO, Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD's
Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to
Meet Critical Warfighter Needs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-460] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2010).
[38] For example, GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Rapid Acquisition of MRAP
Vehicles, GAO-10-155T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2009) and GAO,
Defense Acquisitions: Issues to Be Considered as DOD Modernizes Its
Fleet of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-83] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5,
2010).
[End of section]
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