Nuclear Nonproliferation

Major Weaknesses in Foreign Visitor Controls at Weapons Laboratories Gao ID: RCED-89-31 October 11, 1988

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) extent to which foreign nationals participated in activities at the Department of Energy's (DOE) weapons laboratories; and (2) effectiveness of DOE controls for identifying those that pose a security or proliferation risk.

GAO found that: (1) DOE generally did not follow its own requirements and obtain background information on foreign visitors from communist or sensitive countries; (2) although 176 of the 181 communist visitors that GAO reviewed required background checks, DOE did not obtain this data for 119 and completed only 6 checks before the visit; (3) DOE inadequately used other available information to prescreen visitors from foreign organizations suspected of nuclear-weapons-related activities; (4) DOE did not identify and review all visits that involved sensitive weapons-related subjects; (5) DOE did not enforce various internal control requirements for approving, monitoring, and reporting foreign visits; and (6) DOE did not have an integrated information system or conduct reviews of the foreign visitor program.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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