Nuclear Security

Despite their crucial importance to national security, safeguards at the Department of Energy's (DOE) weapons facilities may be falling short. DOE security inspections have identified many weaknesses, including poor performance by members of DOE's security force, poor accountability for quantities of nuclear materials, and the inability of personnel to locate documents containing classified information. About 13 percent of the 2,100 identified weakness resulted in DOE inspectors giving out unsatisfactory security ratings; another 38 percent led to marginal ratings. In addition, DOE's centralized safeguards and security information tracking system lacks current data on whether DOE field offices have corrected the identified weaknesses. Without reliable information, DOE has no way of knowing whether timely action was taken to correct problems, nor can it determine whether weaknesses are systemic. DOE has tried to minimize the impact of these security weaknesses at its facilities by establishing multiple layers of protection measures and instituting interim and compensatory measures for identified weaknesses. DOE is also planning enhancements to the centralized tracking system that should improve its reliability and increase its effectiveness.

GAO found that: (1) between January 1989 and September 1990, DOE identified over 2,100 weakness at 39 DOE weapons-related facilities; (2) weaknesses identified included poor performance by DOE security forces, poor accountability for nuclear materials, and inability to locate documents containing classified information; (3) DOE does not have current data on whether field officers have corrected the identified weaknesses; (4) a random sample indicated that DOE has not corrected 60 percent of the weaknesses; and (5) DOE is planning enhancements to its centralized tracking system that should improve reliability and increase the system's effectiveness as a management tool.