Nuclear Weapons Complex

The end of the cold war and expected reductions in the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal has prompted the Department of Energy (DOE) to study ways to consolidate the agency's nuclear weapons complex. The agency's first choice is to centralize most of its nonnuclear operations, which produce nonnuclear components for weapons, in Kansas City, Missouri. A number of other nonnuclear activities would move to other DOE facilities or be privatized. GAO is concerned because the costs associated with this plan are uncertain and the technical risks of consolidation have not been thoroughly explored. DOE recognizes some of these weaknesses and is looking into other options, such as moving specific operations to the national laboratories. It is also doing more detailed cost estimates on other options. Some weaknesses, however, continue to receive little attention. Further analysis of additional policy options and technical risks is needed to assure Congress and the public that all reasonable options have been explored and that DOE's approach will minimize risks. Moreover, a specific size for the complex has yet to be decided. GAO believes that the selection of the complex's size and capabilities sets a critical baseline for consolidation planning. Once parameters are placed on the future production capability of the complex, consolidation planning to establish that capability can go forward.

GAO found that: (1) the selection of a single site as the preferred consolidation option was flawed because DOE did not fully consider other nonnuclear options including downsizing and modernizing existing facilities, or maximizing consolidation by eliminating all nonnuclear sites and relocating their functions to another nuclear site or a national laboratory; (2) NCP assessed capital and operating costs and the additional costs of privatizing selected technologies; (3) the DOE cost estimate for the single site consolidation option totalled $352 million; (4) the NCP single site option did not include $47 million in personnel termination costs, facility decontamination and decommissioning costs, or the costs to transfer work to other facilities; (5) the single site option provided the least technical risk because the fewest manufactured and procured parts and employees would be transferred; (6) NCP failed to address such technical risks as how an accelerated consolidation schedule would impact production of limited life components; and (7) further examination of options, costs, and the overall size of the nonnuclear complex is needed.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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