Nuclear Weapons

Safety, Technical, and Manpower Issues Slow DOE's Disassembly Efforts Gao ID: RCED-94-9 October 20, 1993

The Energy Department's (DOE) very ambitious schedule for dismantling retired nuclear weapons at its Pantex facility in Texas, coupled with unresolved safety and uranium storage concerns, could lead to conflict between safety and production goals. About 63 percent of the weapons scheduled were disassembled during fiscal year 1992. Disassembly was curtailed, however, by a transportation problem that prevented the delivery of retired weapons to Pantex for about two months. As a result, Pantex substantially slowed its disassembly to avoid depleting its inventory of weapons to be disassembled. Concerns about possible exposure of Pantex technicians to radioactive material also curtailed disassembly efforts. In GAO's view, the prospects for meeting DOE's disassembly schedule in the next several years are poor. DOE needs to address several issues that could affect its ability to disassemble nuclear weapons, including a shortage of disassembly technicians and the adequacy of facilities for and the environmental impact of storing large amounts of plutonium at Pantex. More than half of the required safety analysis reports, which enable decisions to be made about whether a facility can operate safely, have not been completed at Pantex. Many of the uncompleted safety analysis reports are for disassembly activities or facilities.

GAO found that: (1) the United States has made reductions in its nuclear weapons stockpile; (2) during fiscal year 1992, DOE disassembled 63 percent of the retired nuclear weapons at its Pantex facility; (3) DOE disassemblies fell behind schedule in 1992; (4) DOE has attempted to increase the number of disassemblies, but more technicians are needed to meet the disassembly schedule; (5) DOE needs to address several issues that could affect its capability to disassemble nuclear weapons, including a shortage of disassembly technicians, inadequate facilities, and the environmental impact of storing large amounts of plutonium at the Pantex site; and (6) the completion of safety analysis reports is a continuing problem at the Pantex facility.

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