Nuclear Weapons

Improvements Needed to DOE's Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Surveillance Program Gao ID: RCED-96-216 July 31, 1996

The Energy Department (DOE) is falling years behind schedule in testing the nation's nuclear stockpile for reliability and safety problems, and the agency has yet to develop written plans detailing how it will get the testing program back on track. DOE lags behind schedule in conducting many stockpile surveillance tests, including flight tests, nonnuclear systems laboratory tests, and laboratory tests of key components. The delay has been caused by several factors. At one facility, testing was suspended because the facility lacked an approved safety study required to disassemble and inspect one type of weapon. Testing was suspended at another facility because of concerns about safety procedures. Testing delays also arose during the transfer of testing functions to new facilities.

GAO found that: (1) DOE is behind schedule in conducting flight tests, nonnuclear system laboratory tests, and nuclear and nonnuclear component laboratory tests; (2) these schedule slippages are a result of unapproved safety studies, suspended testing at certain nuclear facilities, and inappropriate transfer of testing functions; (3) DOE has reduced its plan for testing the Air Force's intercontinental ballistic missiles from three tests per year to two tests per year; (4) flight testing of W88 warheads is suspended until a safety study plan is approved; (5) DOE has taken actions to increase the number of stockpile surveillance tests, but DOE does not have formal contingency plans for continuous stockpile testing; (6) one DOE facility is unable to conduct surveillance tests due to procedural safety problems; (7) DOE uses the Stockpile Management Preferred Alternative Report to determine alternative locations for weapons testing depending on the nature of the problem at the original testing facility, length and time of the outage, and particular weapon involved; and (8) DOE prefers to develop a specific plan of action after testing problems occur to confront the wide range of problems and variables involved in the surveillance testing process.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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