Department of Energy

Almost 10 years after GAO issued a report on problems with foreign visitors to nuclear weapons laboratories, the Department of Energy's controls over these visitors remain ineffective. Essentially, the problems GAO cited in 1988 persist. A September 1997 report (GAO/RCED-97-229) describes how, at two of three laboratories GAO visited, few background checks were done on visitors from countries that DOE considers sensitive. As a result, visitors suspected of having foreign intelligence connections gained access to the laboratories without DOE's or the laboratories' advance knowledge of these connections. Moreover, sensitive subjects, such as the detection of unsanctioned nuclear explosions, may have been discussed with foreign visitors without DOE's knowledge or approval. Weak security controls allowed foreign nationals to enter buildings unescorted or after hours. In some cases, they obtained sensitive and classified information. DOE's counterintelligence programs may not be fully effective in combating foreign intelligence efforts. In GAO's view, these problems could lead to sensitive information being passed on to foreign countries considered a risk to U.S. national security. These concerns have been heightened by recent events in India and Pakistan.

GAO noted that: (1) GAO found at two of the three laboratories, few background checks were performed on visitors from countries DOE views as sensitive; (2) as a result, visitors suspected of having foreign intelligence connections obtained access to the laboratories without DOE's or the laboratories' advance knowledge of these connections; (3) visits involving sensitive subjects were not always identified; (4) some sensitive subjects, such as the detection of unsanctioned nuclear explosions, may have been discussed with foreign visitors without DOE's knowledge or approval; (5) the security controls in areas most frequently visited by foreign nationals do not preclude them from obtaining sensitive information; (6) foreign nationals have been allowed after-hours and unescorted access to buildings; (7) in some instances, they have had access to sensitive and classified information; (8) DOE's headquarters and laboratory counterintelligence programs may not be fully effective in mitigating foreign intelligence efforts; (9) these programs have lacked comprehensive threat assessments to focus their efforts, as well as performance measures to evaluate their effectiveness; (10) these problems could lead to the loss of sensitive information to foreign countries regarded as posing a risk to national security or nuclear nonproliferation goals; (11) while DOE is initiating actions to improve the management and oversight of foreign visits to the weapons laboratories, DOE has not demonstrated a lasting commitment to improving controls over foreign visitors; and (12) DOE's plan to devolve the authority for approving foreign visits to the laboratories may not be appropriate until significant recommendations that GAO has made are addressed.