Nuclear Nonproliferation

The risk that unemployed weapons scientists in the former Soviet Union will sell sensitive information to countries or terrorist groups trying to develop weapons of mass destruction poses a national security threat to the United States. To reduce this threat, the Initiatives for Proliferation Program was established in 1994 to engage scientists in the former Soviet Union in peaceful commercial activities. In late 1998, the administrative launched a new complementary program -- the Nuclear Cities Initiative -- to create jobs for displaced weapons scientists in the 10 cities that form the core of Russia's nuclear weapons complex. This report reviews (1) the costs to implement the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program for fiscal years 1994-98, including the amount of money received by weapons scientists and institutes; (2) the extent to which the program's projects are meeting their nonproliferation and commercialization objectives; and (3) the Department of Energy's Nuclear Cities Initiative.

GAO noted that: (1) the cost to implement the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program from fiscal year 1994 through June 1998 are as follows: (a) of the $63.5 million spent, $23.7 million, or 37 percent, went to scientific institutes in the Newly Independent States (NIS); (b) the amount of money that reached the scientists at the institutes is unknown because the institutes' overhead charges, taxes, and other fees reduced the amount of money available to pay the scientists; and (c) about 63 percent, or $39.8 million, of the program's funds was spent in the United States, mostly by DOE's national laboratories in implementing and providing oversight of the program; (2) regarding the extent to which the program is meeting its nonproliferation and commercialization goals, GAO found that: (a) the program has been successful in employing weapons scientists through research and development projects, but it has not achieved its broader nonproliferation goal of long-term employment through the commercialization of these projects; (b) program officials do not always know how many scientists are receiving program funding or whether the key scientists and institutes are being targeted; (c) some scientists currently working on Russia's weapons of mass destruction program are receiving program funds; (d) some dual-use projects may have unintentionally provided defense-related information--an outcome that could negatively affect U.S. national security interests; and (e) chemical and biological projects may not be adequately reviewed by U.S. officials prior to approval; and (3) the Nuclear Cities Initiative may cost $600 million over the next 5 years: (a) the initiative is still largely in a conceptual phase, and it is uncertain how jobs will be created in the 10 nuclear cities because of restricted access and the current financial crisis in Russia; and (b) the initiative is likely to be a subsidy program for Russia for many years, given the lack of commercial success in the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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